Can Exclusive Politics Produce Inclusive Development?

Ronald Umali Mendoza, PhDAIM Policy Center

Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2012. “Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress”. Philippine Political Science Journal 33(2):132-145.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969605

70% of the 15th Philippine Congress is dynastic; and dynasties dominate all of the major political parties.On average, there are more dynasties in regions with higher poverty and lower human development.

Dynasties tend to be richer (higher SALNs) when one outlier is removed among present non-dynasties (MP).

80% of the youngest Congressmen (age 26-40) are from dynastic clans.

Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality

Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality:

• PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies (e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).

• STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for reform and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson, 2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009).

• LONG RUNWAY FOR REFORMS: Dynasties are better able to pursue reforms with longer-term gestation periods for results; policy stability and continuity that investors would prefer

Additional complexity:

• PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for dynasties as long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in times of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005).

• SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties: being in public office affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010).

Innovations in this Study

• THIN DYNASTY • FAT DYNASTY

A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty: “Fat –type”

Sibling

Spouse

Cousin

PBM (Provincial Board Member)Note: Incumbent positions are in brackets.

Province

LGU Revenue•Taxes•IRA

Governor

Municipal Mayor A

Municipal Mayor B

Municipal Mayor C

Cong

•PDAF

SangguniangPanlalawigan

Distortions in Local Public Finance?

Ravanilla (2012): study of legislators and their use of “pork barrel” funds from 2001-2010;

Legislators bias distribution of their constituency development fund (CDF) in favor of local patrons and allies ;

More political competition (tighter Congressional races) tend to exacerbate this clientelistic distribution bias.

Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013): Maguindanao

AMPATUAN6 MAYORS4 VICE MAYORS13 COUNCILORS

AMPATUAN; 23

MIDTIMBANG; 12

MANGU-DADATU,

11

SINSUAT; 7

LUMENDA; 5

ABDULLAH; 4ANGAS; 4

KALI; 4MAMALAPAT; 4PAGLAS; 4SANGKI; 4UTTO; 4

ALI; 3KASIM; 3

MASUKAT; 3PENDATUN; 3

SABAL; 3ALIM; 2

BIANG; 2BUAT; 2

DAGALANGIT; 2

DELNA; 2DILANGALEN; 2DIMAUKOM; 2DIOCOLANO; 2

DUKAY; 2EBUS; 2

IBRAHIM; 2IMAM; 2

KATAMBAK; 2LANGKUNO; 2

LAUBAN; 2MACAPEGES; 2

MALAGUIAL; 2MAMA; 2MAMALO; 2

MAMASAB-ULOD; 2

MATALAM; 2

MUSTAPHA; 2SALENDAB; 2 SANDIGAN; 2SEMA; 2 TALUSAN; 2 MUSA; 1 PIANG; 1

DYNASTIC

NONDYNASTIC

0 50 100 150 200 250

155

115

58

FAT THIN

Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties

Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013): Dinagat Islands

ECLEO1 GOVERNOR1 VICE GOVERNOR3 MAYORS2 COUNCILORS2 PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS

Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties

ECLEO; 10

LONGOS; 3

BORJA; 2CREENCIA; 2LADAGA;

2

LISONDRA; 2

LLAMERA; 2

LUIB; 2

PELIS-MINO; 2

TAN; 2

VARGAS; 2

DYNASTIC

NONDYNASTIC

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

31

49

3

FAT THIN

Top 10 Provinces in terms of the following dynastic indicators:

DYNASTIC SHARE LARGEST DYNASTIC CLAN (SHARE OF TOTAL POSITIONS)

DYNASTIC COMPETITION-HERFINDAHL

TOP 1 MAGUINDANAO DINAGAT ISLANDS DINAGAT ISLANDS

TOP 2 APAYAO SIQUIJOR MAGUINDANAO

TOP 3 SULU MAGUINDANAO SIQUIJOR

TOP 4 TAWI-TAWI CAMIGUIN APAYAO

TOP 5 ILOCOS NORTE BILIRAN QUIRINO

TOP 6 ABRA LANAO DEL SUR TAWI-TAWI

TOP 7 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL BATANES BILIRAN

TOP 8 ILOCOS SUR GUIMARAS SULU

TOP 9 QUIRINO AGUSAN DEL SUR CAMIGUIN

TOP 10 CEBU SAMAR (WESTERN SAMAR) DAVAO ORIENTAL

Snapshot of Inequality – Ecleo Castle and fishing villiage in Dinagat Islands

Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2013. “Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the ‘chicken or the egg’ question.” AIM Working Paper. Makati City.http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292277

•Media (proxied by more AM radio stations) increases the share of dynasties in total positions, but it reduces “fat” dynasties. (Interpretation: Media levels the playing field, but it is still dominated by dynasties or would-be dynasties)

•Higher poverty incidence increases the chance for dynasties to grow (become “fat”) and dominate the political positions under analysis.

•There is weak evidence that suggests that the level of education is negatively associated with the share of political dynasties in the total positions under analysis.

•Dynasties (using our proxy indicators) are not associated with increasing (or decreasing) poverty, on average.

How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties?

Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.

GOVERNOR

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

9 40 19 4 3 5

DYN UNCONDYN BEAT DYNDYN BEAT NONDYNNONDYN BEAT DYNNONDYN UNCONNONDYN BEAT NONDYN

Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.

How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties?

MAYOR

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

172 425 445 215 67 215

DYN UNCONDYN BEAT DYNDYN BEAT NONDYNNONDYN BEAT NONDYNNONDYN UNCONNONDYN BEAT NONDYN

Balimbing Nation

Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.

2013 MAYORS CAREER SWITCHINGS DISTRIBUTION

SWITCH OP 1

SWITCH OP 2

SWITCH OP 3

SWITCH OP 4

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

214

32

32

40

240

125

153

78

287 130

WINSWI 0 WINSWI 1 WINSWI 2 WINSWI 3 WINSWI 4

This presentation builds on: Mendoza, R.U., E.Beja, V.Venida and D.Yap. 2012. “An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Congress.” Philippine Political Science Journal 33(2):132-145. This study is conducted with the support of the Asian Institute of Management Scientific Research Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The views expressed herein are the authors’ and these do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Institute of Management, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTHAIM Policy Center / http://Policy.aim.edu

Presented during the Foundation for Economic Freedom’s Fellows Monthly MeetingApril 30, 2014, 7:00PMManila Golf and Country Club

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