Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception Author(s)- Christian Coseru

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Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of PerceptionAuthor(s): Christian CoseruSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 409-439Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

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BUDDHIST 'FOUNDATIONALISM' AND THEPHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

Christian oseru

DepartmentfPhilosophy, ollege ofCharleston

Introduction

The persistence f perceptual' ambiguities, ven under the bestconditions f ob-servation,s a challenge in any attempt o ground knowledgeon a foundation f

empirical xperience.Few philosophers, owever,would arguethat he reliabilityofperceptions a nontrivialssuefor pistemology.f nything,nferentialeasoningon the basis ofempiricaldata would be compromised, s inthe classical exampleoftryingo infer hepresenceof fire rom n observation f smoke whilemistakingdustfor moke.For Buddhist hilosophers f theDignãga-DharmakTrtiradition he

problem fthereliabilityfperceptions central otheepistemological roject: heyarguethat mpirical wareness,when properly eployed,can and does reveal thenature f reality t itsmostfundamentalevel: a causally interdependentexus of

psychophysical henomena n a constant tateof flux.This Buddhist laimaboutperceptions,ofcourse,stronglyounterintuitive:r-

dinarilywe experiencethe worldas populatedwith utonomous, nduring ntities

(and selves) thatdo notchange frommoment o moment. t is thisbasic intuitionabout continuance hat llows us to recognizepreviously ncountered ntities ndmakepredictionsbout their uture. rom phenomenological tandpoint, owever,whatwe taketo be 'selves' and 'entities' re disclosedas seriesof discrete ognitiveepisodes and aggregated henomenaofexperience.Moreover, n intentional on-sciousness s always co-presentneach instance fperception,manifestnthe factthat here s somethingt s liketo be apprehendingn object.

Thistransitoryature ftheperceivedas perceived s one of the mainreasons,I willargue,whya phenomenological ccountofperception n the modelprovidedby,for nstance,Husserl nd Merleau-Ponty,estserves o translatehe intuitionsf

the Buddhist hilosophers boutthecognitive unction fperception. he Buddhistis a kindofphenomenologist ecause forhim,giventhe immediacy nd directnessof sense experience, hesense-objectrelations an issue of continuous oncern justas forHusserlperceptionsultimatelyonstitutedyintentionalontent).Hence theBuddhist's nsistence n treatingach cognitive vent as a new introductiono an

object.Thiscontinuingoncernfor hesense-objectrelation xplains whythe Bud-dhist reats ognition s bearingthe characteristicmarks f embodiment: t is the

dynamics f the five ggregates hatgivesthecognitive vent tsexpression. t also

explainswhy hepursuitf reliable ognitions,ontraryopopularopinion,does not

automatically ualifyBuddhist pistemologys a typeof foundationalism.

Philosophy ast & West Volume59, Number October 2009 409-439 409© 2009 byUniversityf Hawai'i Press







Thisessay,which draws on a set of interrelatedssues nthephenomenologyf

perception, alls intoquestionthe assumption hat Buddhistphilosophers f the

Dignãga-DharmakTrtiraditionursue kindofepistemic oundationalism.tfurther

arguesthat he founding ivenness'providedbydirectperceptions notthat fanyontologically istinctivearticulars,e theyunique properties'r propertyearers/

Instead,directperception s akin to theco-presenceof sense and object character-isticof the raw' phenomenaofexperience.The mainpointof the Buddhist piste-mologicalproject s, then,pragmatic:n Dharmakïrti'selebratedformulationt isbecause all successfulhuman actionsare preceded byright nowledge hat piste-mology, nderstood s an inquirynto hesourcesofvalidcognition,s a worthwhile

enterprise.1Teasingout the founding ivenness'of perception n a way that aysno rec-

ognizableclaimto foundationalismhould become clear ifwe considerone centralaspectof thephenomenology fperception: ur reflectionn the contents fexpe-rience,unlike

perceptiontself,s not

perspectivai.notherwords,whereas no

singleinstanceof perception an ever exhaust the object, perceptual udgments lwaysapprehendthe object exhaustively y layingout certain claims about itsnature.This swhytheBuddhists nd their rincipal pponents, heNaiyãyikas, nderstand

conception o have such a differentoleinapprehendinghe contents fperceptualawareness.

Consider the differentositions hatBuddhists nd Naiyãyikas dopt vis-à-vis

perceptual mbiguities. or nstance,whentheearly NaiyãyikaphilosopherVãtsyã-yanagivestheexampleof a personunable to decide whetherwhat s seen risingnthe distance re (columnsof)dustorsmoke,2hetouchesuponone ofthe most om-

plex questions nthephenomenology fperception:whatturns he continuous lowof sense data intoperceptually istinct bjects?Vãtsyãyana s mainlyconcernedwith heconsequences of this ndecisiveness orperception, recisely ynoting hefact hatone could easilymistake uch cognitions, esultingrom ontactbetweenthe sense and theobject,forperceptionthat s,for ndirect erception,whichalonecan serve as a basis forcertainty). ut he is also preoccupiedwithmeeting hedemand of Nyãyaepistemology hata causal account ofperception ncludebothindeterminatend determinateypes fcognitive wareness.The firsts resolvedbyaddingtoperceptionhequalifiernondeceptive' avyabhicãri)thus liminating er-ceptual illusions) nd the latter implybyaddingthequalifierdetermined'vyava-

sãya) thus liminatingmbiguity).It spreciselywith imilar orts f demandsfor efiningheboundary onditions

ofempiricalknowledge, shallargue, hat heBuddhist efinesperception s a cog-nition ntirely reeof any conceptual content, husrejecting he intuitively oreplausibleaccount thatperception tartswith heindiscriminateense data and endsupwith omethingike a setof universal eatures.Much of thedisputebetweentheBuddhistsnd theNaiyãyikas n preciselywhat sort fcognitive apacitiespercep-tionhas, infact s directed t solving heambiguity ilemma.

The placingof logical constraints o insure hatperceptiondiscloses precisely

410 Philosophyast& West







thecategories fa realist ntology,t eems,does notfully ddresstheissueofper-ceptual indecisiveness. ortheNaiyäyika, hus, he idea that hesense-objectrela-tionsometimes evealsambiguitiesnd illusions s a problemratherhan a topicof

study.ndeed, heBuddhist-Nyãyaebate reveals n asymmetricalngagementnthe

epistemological roject: he Buddhistccount, nformedyAbhidharma sychology,regards onceptual proliferations the cause of ratherhan he solution o thepersis-tence ofambiguity;orNyãya,on the otherhand,perceptual udgmentsre thekey,sinceperceptions also defined s having hecapacityto pickout universais.

In this ssay I defend central hesisof thephenomenology fperception: ur

cognitive aculties re embodied and embedded within he environment fwhichwe are a part. furtherrguethat his ntuition, hich informs ecent fforts ithinthe Westernphilosophicaltradition o overcome the legacy of the disembodiedCartesiancogito,is also professed, lbeit in a modified orm, y Buddhist piste-mologists f theDignãga-DharmakTrtiradition. centralpremise fthe embodied

cognitionhesis, n thewordsof thecognitive cientist ranciscoVarela,philosopherEvanThompson, nd psychologist leanorRosch, is that first,ognitiondependsupon the kindsofexperiencethat ome fromhaving bodywithvarioussensori-motorcapacities, and second, thatthese individual sensorimotorapacities arethemselvesmbeddedinthemore ncompassingbiological,psychological, nd cul-tural ontexts. 3

It s this onstantnteraction ith worldoftransienthenomenathat xplains,for nstance,whyperceptual onstancy ormshebackboneof successful xperienceand insures hat, ogivean example,redapples remainred under ll natural ondi-tionsof luminance nd

people appearto retain heir ize even as

theyre about to

disappearfrom iew. The embodimenthesis, hen, eaves thequestionofepistemicfoundations pen to negotiation, s first-personhenomenologicalperspectivesgather o unravel he raw' data ofexperience: heunique particularshat onstitutetheobjectsofexperiencebecome, as proposedbyVarelaet al., the paradigm f a

cognitivedomain that s neither re-givennor represented ut rather xperientialand enacted/'4Thusthesubject-object elation xtendsbeyondthecognitive o the

experiential omains: perception s notsimply mbeddedwithin nd constrained

bythesurrounding orld; it also contributeso theenactment fthissurroundingworld/'5

I will arguethat he unique particularshat, he Buddhist ontends,we appre-hended in perception, re neither he properties f physicalobjects nor some ab-stractuniversais.Rather, hey correspondto the dynamic co-determinationfsense-consciousnessnd objectcharacteristicf each cognitive vent.The naturalist

perspectivenformingheembodied-cognitionhesis s also an invitationo exploretheroleofperception ragmatically.he epistemic uestionofdiscerninghetruth-value ofour cognitive tatesbecomes, then, subjectforpragmatics.ndeed,theview thatperceptual warenesshas a pragmaticnatureresonatesratherwell withthe Buddhistnotionthatany theory fvalid cognitionultimately epends on the

purposefulfficacyfcognitionsarthakriyãkaritva).

Christianoseru 41Ί







Foundationalismnd the Given'

It s commonly ssumed thatBuddhist hilosophers f theDignaga-Dharmakirtira-ditionpursue foundationalistgenda. Thisassumptionsbased on therequirement

that t least some perceptionsmustbe treated s intrinsicallyalid (svatahprãmã-nya).Theproject fthe Buddhist pistemologistss thusframednwaysthat esonatewith he sort f foundationalismhat ne finds riticized, or nstance,nSellars.Thiscriticism enters n the so called Myth f theGiven/'the idea that ll knowledgeultimatelyests n a foundation fnoninferentialnowledge.

Epistemologicaloundationalisms primarilyoncernedwith he ustificationf

knowledge which,ofcourse,should be the mainconcern ofany critique fBud-dhist oundationalism.he basic view,recentlyrticulated yTomTillemans, s thatBuddhistphilosophers dopt a positionrather ommon among philosophers othEast and West: that s,while conceptionmightnotaccurately apture hecontents

of our experience, t least the data ofexperience, n itself,must be real and un-assailable/'6We are thus told that he Buddhist reoccupationwithdefiningwhatcounts and what doesn'tcount as a reliable ource ofknowledge one that nsuresunmistakable ccess to the Given isprecisely hat f traditionalpistemology. ut,thestory oes,traditionalpistemologyontains rreconcilable ensions.

Ofcourse, fwe interpretpistemic oundationalisms groundingll knowledgein intrinsicallyalidcognitions,hen hekey nitiatorsf the Buddhist pistemologi-cal project,Dignãga and Dharmakïrti,o appear to be pursuing foundationalist

agenda (eventhough he issue ofepistemic oundations s only explicitlyreatednthecommentarial iteraturen Dharmakïrti).7heir

oncern,however,s a different

sortof concernthan,for nstance, hatofmodernempiricists argetedn the anti-foundationalistampaign.Here I want to make a heuristicuggestion: erhapswe

ought o frame hequestionofwhatmotivatesheseBuddhist hilosopherso accordperception preeminenttatus veranyother ource ofknowledge s twoseparateissues:first,he notion hat he reliabilityfperceptionmustbe intrinsicallyscer-tained, xceptfor hose nstanceswhere the connectionwith heobject is uncertain(inwhichcase itsreliabilitysextrinsicallyscertained),8nd second,thequestion fwhether he intrinsicscertainmentlause reflects logical concern with voidinginfiniteegress r an epistemic oncernwithhow best o secure an indubitable tatus

forperceptual ognitions.The locus classicus ofanti-foundationalismat least within he tradition fana-lytic hilosophy isSellars'critique fthesense-datumheorists; is criticismargetsthedistinction etween the act ofawareness,which is purportedo give access toa phenomenologicallyimple,furtherrreducible,Given,' and theobject,thepuresense datum of experience for nstance, patchof color).While acknowledgingvariousdisagreementsmongsense-datumheoristsbout whether r notthese actsofpuresensing re furthernalyzable,Sellars s keen to pointout that he sensumitselfs, ultimately, relationalproperty,ince we cannot refero a sensed some-thingwithout eference o a subjectofexperience.Evenalternative otions, uch as

sensiblesorsenseproperties,tillgivetheimpressionhat sensed items ould exist








without eingsensed 9 a presuppositionhat ellars nd all critics f sense-datumtheories indproblematic.

But there s anotherreasonwhythe epistemological ategory f the Given is

regardedby Sellarsas problematic: or ense-datum heoristshe Given is neither

thesubject-object elationnorthephenomenally impleact ofsensing,but thepar-ticular tself.n otherwords, he sense-datumheorists confronted ith dilemma:eitherwe sense particulars,nwhich case sensing s notepistemically arranted,r

sensing sepistemically arranted,ndwhat s thus ensed arefacts, hat s,states faffairs,atherhanparticulars. ither ay,thepresumptionf some special epistemicaccess to noninferentialnowledge s ruledout: sensedcolors,for nstance, re not

phenomenaldata butepistemic acts boutthe content fexperience.Indeed,on Sellars'reading f theempiricistrogram,heBuddhist,nsofar s he

grants erception ognitive tatus, s a foundationalist. utalthough t is truethateven at the evelof raw' phenomenal xperience ensing scognitive,hereliabilityof thisperceptual ognitionneeds two furtheronstraints:irst,herequirementhatonlya restrictedlass ofnondeceptive nd noninferentialognitions e counted as

perceptionnd,second,the ssignmentoperception f privileged pistemic tatus.It s theconflation fthese twoconstraintshatblurs hephilosophically nterestingconsideration f whether r not the Buddhists ursuea foundationalistgenda in

epistemology. imalKrishnaMatilalwas right,think,opoint utthat he Buddhist

argument thatperceptual wareness mustnecessarilybe freeof conception is

quite compelling fwe taketheview thatperceptualcognitionsreflecthe causal

power of the apprehendedobject: if a perceptualawareness . can represent

thingshat re inno

wayconnectedwith he

perceptualccasion, thenone can be

perceptuallyware of anythingnd everythingt any occasion since therewouldbe no restrictionn what heawarenesscould and would represent. 10ny ounter-

argumenthatexpands the rangeof perceptionbeyondwhat is empirically ivenmustnecessarily onfrontherestrictionroblem:perception, hen,becomes morelike maginationn its unrestricted)apacityto representnythingnd everything.

Particularsnd thePhenomenology fPerception

Thequestionof theepistemic tatus fperceptual ognitionssnottheonly problem

with foundationalisteading fthe Buddhist pistemological roject. wanttosug-gesta modelthatwill seem, hopefully, more suitablealternative: hile it is truethatBuddhist pistemologys preoccupiedwithfinding eliablegrounds orknowl-

edge, itsprogram esembles hat fthe Husserlianphenomenologistatherhanthatofthe modern mpiricistr rationalist. uddhist pistemology,t least inthemaintraditionfDignãga and DharmakTrti,s phenomenological.

Firstf ll,for heBuddhist,henondeceptivenessfperceptioni.e.,its pistemi-callywarrantedtatus) oes not mply, ace Tillemans, hat tscontents re factual

qua objects extrinsic o awareness. Rather, erception s epistemicallywarrantedbecause of,and onlywhen, itscontents, hat s,theperceptual mageas intended,

reflect hephenomenaofexperiencevia a direct ausal-cognitiveink. econd, this

Christian oseru 413







notionofperception s a cognition hat s free fconceptionand capable of directand unmistaken ccess to the phenomenalworld already representsn evolvedstage in the formation f a cohesive theory f perceptualknowledge pratyaksaj-nãna) within he Buddhist radition. ignãga, for nstance,did not view error s

something hat was in the purviewof perception,1but rather s a consequenceof conceptualdiscriminations. nlikethe Naiyãyikas,who use the qualifiernon-erroneous7 o exclude perceptions aused by some kindof sensory mpairment(e.g., color blindness r astigmatism),ignãga treats erceptual llusions s a typeof mentaldelusion. In the end, however, he Buddhist pistemologistgreeswithDharmakïrtihatdistorted erceptionsmay in factbe caused by defective enseorgans.12 t is the pragmatic fficacy fthegivenobject that cts as a corrective,excludingfrom erception mbiguitiesnd illusions.

Because the Buddhist onceives ofperception s a constantly ew introductionto an object,thenthe given' is notany structurallynique entity utchange itself

or,rather,heprinciples nderlyinghange: dependent rising nd momentariness.But,we may sk,howcan perception ffectivelyognizeaggregates fatoms,whichare inconstantmotion, s enduring, nitary,bjectswithout heaid ofconceptsandhigher-orderhought rocesses?Afterll, the Sautrãntika) bhidharma s clearthattheobjectofperceptual wareness s theparticularnly s cognizablesensibilia.Forexample,onlywhat is audible can be heardand onlywhat is visible can be seen,and what s thusheardand seen are not ubstantiventities utunique phenomenalproperties. ignäga's response othequestion bove invokes he holistic' haracterofperceptual ognition:

It smentioned intheAbhidharmareatise] hat these[sense-cognitions]ake a uniqueparticularsvalaksana) s their bject insofar s it s theparticularntheform f a [cog-nizable] sense-sphere ãyatana-svalaksana)nd not in the form f a [constituent]ub-stance [namely n atom] (dravya-svalaksana). ow is this o be understood? here[intheAbhidharma assages cited above], that perception], eingcaused by [thesense-organthroughts ontactwith]many aggregated] bjects,takes thewhole (sãmãnya) stheobjectof ts phereofoperation. ince it namely erception]scaused by[the ense-organthroughts ontactwith]many ubstances namely ggregates fatoms], t ssaid,inrespect o its phereofoperation, hat ttakes the whole as itsobject;but[itdoes] not[meanthat toperates]byconceptually ntegratinghatwhich smany nd separate.13

Dignaga seemsto be suggesting erethat nperception hefragmentarynd discretesense data are apprehended s a unitary hole. Thisdoes notmean,however, hatwe perceive n object inits ntirety,s though ll its spectswereavailable atonce:itonlymeans that ach instance fperception eveals unique phenomenal harac-teristic fexperience,where unique' here tandsfor oth heparticularspectoftheexperienced s experienced nd for n agent'sperspective. hus, ouse an example,perceivingolormeansexperiencingwithin hevisualsphere specific hade,suchas cherry ed or limegreen. t snot s though ed and green xist, s universal olorcategories,over and above the cognitiveevents in which theyare instantiated.

Rather,olorqualia is ustthat: hequalitative xperienceofunique shades,that s,

414 Philosophy ast& West







the productof particular ircumstances f luminance and the physiology f lightperception. f heappearance of sense data in perception s a unitarytructurelesswhole is not the result f a subsequent process of conceptual construction,henhow do we recognize t as such?We do, says Dignãga, because every nstance f

perceptualawareness is accompanied by self-awarenesssvasamvedana).We donot imply erceivecolor: we have theexperienceof what t s liketobe perceivingcolor.

Thisobservations interesting,think, ecause ithighlightshe mutual ripartiteconstitutivenessfobject intended,he ntentionalct,and the structurelessiven. tis here hat he Buddhist artswith raditionalpistemology oth East nd West. Likea Husserlan phenomenologist, e contends hat xperienceextends he boundariesof the given,constrainingour reason to go beyond intuitionallyiven physicalthings/'14 hese physical things' re either he naturalkinds of the realist r thesense datumof theempiricist.n either ase, theBuddhist greeswith Husserl hat

whateverphysicalthings here re, and whatever heir ntologicalstatus, theyare as experienceablephysicalthings. 15n Buddhist erms, hese discrete ntitiesthat eartheir wndistinctivemarksvalaksana) reparticularsnly qua phenomenaofexperience.

Phenomenologically,hen,the Given is a noninferentialognitiveeventthatcutsthroughhe dilemmaof thesense-datumheorist:ensing ust is the sort fper-ceptualawarenessbest suited o apprehend heconstitutivelements fexperience- it s notknowledgeof facts/Thisphenomenological ensing s, I think, ittinglycapturedby Merleau-Ponty's otionthat reflection ears upon and discloses anunreflected

xperience.As a

reflection, owever,tdepends on,

and has to ac-

knowledge, he primacy fthe worldover itsown operations not an abstract r

putativelyndependentworld,but a worldthat s givento thesubjectbecause the

subject sgivento himself. 16Butdoes thisunreflectedxperience'have any cognitive ontent?HubertDrey-

fushas recentlyrguedthat hispurephenomenological ensingdoes, indeed,havea kindof intentionalontent: t ust isn'tconceptualcontent. 17 henomenology,

thus,opens up a third lternative eyondthe bare Given and the mere con-

ceptual. Hence, Dreyfus'nvitationo accept thepossibilityhat urground-levelcopingopens up the worldby openingus to a meaningful iven a Giventhat s

non-conceptual utnot bare. 18Despite theambiguitiesn Husserl'sstatementhat here s a direct orrespon-

dence between an inherent oetic contentand a noematiccontent,19uch thateach perception has its noema or the perceivedas such, there s little oubtthatHusserl onceives of thephenomenologicalreductionor epoché) as preciselythe instrumenty which we can describe the data of perception s perceived:What isthisperceived s such? . We can obtain he answer o the above question

by pureopenness to what is essentially iven;we can describe what appears assuch' incompleteevidence. 20

But here smore obeing phenomenologically)ware of theperceived s such

thanseizing upon the noema ofwhat is essentially iven:we only apprehendit

Christianoseru 415







(namely heGiven)one aspect at a time, nd this pprehension f the discrete le-mentsof experiencecreates a certain llure forwhat, indeed, is yetto be given.Commentingn whatthe nfiniteotentialitiesfexperiencehold for urapprehen-sion ofthegiven,Husserlwrites:

The division pplying o what sgenuinely erceived nd what sonlyco-presentntailsa distinction etweendeterminations ithrespect o the content f theobject that re

actually here, ppearing ntheflesh, nd those that re still mbiguously refigurednfull mptiness. et us also note thatwhatactually ppears, s, in itself,lso laden withsimilardistinction.ndeed, the call resounds as well withrespectto the side that is

already actually een: Draw closer,closer still;now fixyoureyes upon me, changingyourplace, changing heposition fyour yes,etc. You willgetto see even moreofmethat snew,ever newpartial olourings tc.You willgetto see structuresf thewood thatwerenotvisible usta moment go, structureshatwereformerlynlyviewed indetermi-

natelynd

generally/'tc.Thus,evenwhat s

alreadyeen is laden with n

anticipatoryintention.t what salready een isconstantlyhere s a frameworkrefiguringome-thingnew.21

Thus,each instance fperception eveals new aspectof an object, making cces-siblewhat was hithertonknownbutbrimming ithpotentiality).here smore, orinstance, o visualconsciousness hanwhat s immediatelypprehended: hepréfig-uration fwhat syet o be seen or of whatmight e seen. This distinction etweenwhat is genuinely erceivedand what is merely o-presentntheperceptual ventbecomes clear onlyafter he epoché: it s onlythegenuinely erceived, hen, hatcountsas

nonconceptualnoematic ontent.

I want to claimthat he Buddhist pproachto theepistemologyfperceptionsphenomenologicalna sense that aptures he ntent fHusserl'smethod fepoché:its im is toconveythatparticularsrenotuniqueentities, ot venspecific elationsor properties, ut a kindof nonconceptualnoematiccontent.22 hisepistemologi-cally relevantnonconceptualnoematiccontent e.g., that pecific pple-like hadeofredbywhichsomethingsapprehended s a redapple) cutsthroughhe dilemmaofchoosing, n theone hand,between a coherencetheory f ustificationinwhichbeliefs re justified ecause theybelongto a coherent ystem fbeliefs) nd a (pre-sumablybare) perceptualGiven/23 econd, I want to suggest notherreasonwhy

the Mythof the Given (so-called by Sellars) and the doctrine of the Natu-rallyGiven (Rorty'serminology)24- amely, hatknowledge ssentiallytandsforany cognitive pprehension f entities mmediately resent o consciousness donotcapture he intentftheBuddhist pistemological rogram.

Before urningo theseBuddhist hinkers,et's considertwo of the mostrobustresponsesto current ebates about foundationalism:henomenology nd natural-ized epistemology. or tspart, henomenology elieson a methodologyfbracket-ingthenatural ttitude,nd thus resists hetendency o rest rgumentsboutfoun-dationalism n a naïveacceptanceoftheworld nd of ourcommonexperience f t.On theotherhand,naturalized pistemology iverts hediscussionabout founda-

tionalism nthedirection f thesciences ofcognition,where nvestigationsnto he

416 Philosophy ast & West







structurend dynamics fcognitive vents akeprecedenceover issues of ustifica-tionand a priori easoning.

Phenomenology tartswith the premisethatany critiqueof foundationalism,which neither racketsnorexamines the natural ttitude,s essentially imited o

logical reductions nly: at best itcan shift he attention rom nquiringbout theepistemicnature fstatements,nsofar s theyreflect acts bout theworld, o ana-

lyzing heir ogicalcontent nd their ropositionalmeaning.Consider, or nstance,JohnDrummond's rgumenthatphenomenology rovides differentesponsetofoundationalism,nd that albeit apodictic and transcendental·'t is effectivelynon-foundationalistiscipline/'25Responses to foundationalism, hen,may be

sorted longthreemaincritical ttitudes:Ί) logical theFregean radition),2) episte-mological, nd (3) phenomenological theHusserlian radition). or the logicalatti-tude,the concern is mainly onfined o the distinction etweenvalid and sound

arguments. o this logical distinction,he epistemological ttitude dds concerns

about the formal ontent f a statementnd theexperienced objectivity.t is onlyinthephenomenological ttitude, owever, hatwe attend o intentionalonscious-ness,which meansthat ny phenomenological ccount ofknowledgemust ake ntoaccount three hings: Ί) theknowing r experiencing ubject, 2) theexperiencedobject itself,nd (3) theexperiencedobjectas experienced.

It s precisely o the extent hatwe go beyondthe interplayetweensense and

object and seek to account for he structuref the intentionalct thatwe operatewithin he phenomenologicalattitude.The anti-foundationalismhat drivesmostdebates in epistemology estifieso thisoversight,acking, s it mostlydoes, anaccount of intentionalonsciousness.Most modern

epistemologiesither

neglectintentionalityr are guilty freductionism;s Drummondpointsout, theyreducetheimmediate bjectof ourexperiencefrom heobject itselfotheperceptual on-

tent, hussubjectifyingheobjectivecontent, nd theyconceive this content s a

psychic ontent/'26It swell known hatbothFrege nd Husserl onceived oftheir rojects s reac-

tions opsychologism. ut heir onceptionofwhatshouldcountas foundational or

knowledge s substantially ifferent.orhis part,Frege'sreduction f the experi-enced content o a third ealmoflogicalsense effectivelyollapses theexperiencedcontent ntoa realm f self-evidentnd self-justifyingtatementsboutrelations e-

tweensubjectand object,the inner nd theouter.Thisrelation s conceived eitherexternally,hat is, as causation, presentation, epresentation,t cetera,or, most

often, eft nexplained.The contrastwith hephenomenological ttitude ould notbe moreobvious: subjectand objectare notexternallyorrelatedwholes' butpartsof the all-encompassingntentionalct. The object is the intentionalbject as in-

tended,which swhy, s Drummondmaintainsn hiscritique fthefoundationalism

debate, theexperiencedor the intentionalontent fexperience s not psycholo-gized' or logicized.' 27 'Experience,'experiencedobject,'and 'experiencedobjectas experienced' re all definingventswithin he same experiencedobjectivity.

Now let's see whether heseargumentsn favor f a nonfoundationalhenom-

enologicalreflection,nd ofthe nherentntentionalityfconsciousness, ervebetter

Christianoseru 417







to illustrate he Buddhist hilosophicalprogram f Dignãga and DharmakTrti,ndthuswhetherhisphilosophicalprogrammight, espite ts pparentlyoundationaliststance, hare a commongroundwithphenomenologynd itsmethod.The question,then, s whether r not the Buddhist pistemological ommitmento knowledgeof

the Given' is suggestive f a foundationalistroject.Let'sbegin,first, ith he Buddhist bhidharma otion hat nly partless ntitiescount as (ultimately)eal. Thispoint s demonstrated yVasubandhu in hisAbhi-

dharmakosabhãsya hiledifferentiatinghings uch as potsand clothes,whichexist

only conventionally,romwhat is ultimatelyeal. The argumentt playhere s thatentities hat an be physically ragmentedrdissolved hrough ognitive nalysis renotultimatelyeal,unlike hose, uch as thedharmas, hat re:

When theapprehension fan entity ersists fter hat ntity as been reducedthroughcognitive nalysis, hat ntityxistsultimately,.g., form:while formmaybe reduced to

atoms, ndwhile we mayexclude from t hroughognitive nalysis ther ualia (suchastaste, tc.),theapprehension f thepropernature fform ersists. eelings oo are to beunderstoodas ultimatelyrue].As this empiricalwareness]existsultimately,t s [also]ultimatelyrue.As declared byolder authorities:he manner n which entities re per-ceived, eitherby means of a supra-mundane ognition r by means of a subsequentlyacquiredmundanecognition,s howtheyultimatelyxist.28

Severalargumentsre putforward ere:first,hatonlyentitieswhose form ersistsafter hysical ragmentationnd cognitive nalysis ount as ultimatelyeal;second,that ur sense experiences feelings, ision, tc.) are real,byvirtue f our conditionof

embodiment,nd thatwhat

theydisclose is also

real;and

finally,hat hemanner

inwhichentities re apprehended s preciselyhowthey rdinarilyxist keeping nmind that the unique particular s here understood o refer o qualia within hesphereof perception ãyatana-svalaksana),hus to the perceivedas perceived,notto thepropertiesf a substantiventitydravya-svalaksana).he argumentsdducedinsupport fthe view thatultimate ealitysfurtherrreducible epend on the doc-trine fmomentariness: hatwe apprehend s distinctpatiotemporalntitiesre, nfact, iscrete eriesofphenomenaundergoingonstant hange.29 nequatingrealitywithmomentariness,heBuddhist dherestothephenomenological tomism hat sa commoncharacteristicf all Abhidharmachools.

There is, however, n importanthiftn emphasisfrom ntologicalto episte-mological concernswithin hatparticular chool ofAbhidharma, he Sautrãntika-Yogãcãra, to whichthe Buddhist pistemologistselong.The 'real' is described npragmatic ather hanontologicalterms. fphenomenalrealitywere made up ofchangelessand enduring ntities, he effects roducedby such entitieswould beequally changelessand enduring, husgivingrise to a logical impossibility: hatdoes notchange cannotproduceanyeffect,or tseffect itherwould be identicalwith hegeneratingause orwould consist n a perpetual eiterationf tself. his on-clusion is particularlyrawnbyDharmakTrti,ho expandson Vasubandhu'snotionof thepartlessnature fthe real. ForDharmakTrti,hus, ausal efficacyr theability

of an objectto perform functionarthakriyãsamartha)s thetruemark f thereal:








This ndividual characteristic]lone constitutesn object [ofperception]; ther charac-teristics,.g., universal ropertiesnd the like]are concealed [fromhepurview fper-ception].This[individual]s referredo in terms f cause and effect nd is whatwe mean

by [the erm] particular. As we have said, onlyan entitywhichhas causal efficacysdeemed a real

object [ofperception].And it is

[this pecificcharacteristic hich

we]referredo as an individual bject.30

Indeed,as ithas been recentlyrgued,and I think onvincingly, ignaga, Dhar-makïrti,nd their ollowers o not use theconceptsof particular' nd 'universal' ntheir riginalAbhidharmicense. While examining tsmeaningand use byVasu-bandhu in his earlierAbhidharmaworks,JohnDunne, for nstance,notes that asvalaksana s a wayofcharacterizingn object interms f a propertyhat speculiarto thetype fentitynquestion uch that nattendingo the svalaksana one under-stands tto have the characteristicfbeingdisturbedbycontact, tc.]' (rüpanalak-sana). 3^ Thusused, svalaksana ndicates a definingharacteristicf a singletypeofentitydharma) n theAbhidharma ypology, 32ather hanan external eferent

(namely unique particular).But even ifthe Buddhist pistemologisthifts he focus of perceptionfrom

unique particulara token)to a uniquelycharacterizedphenomenon a type), he

'uniqueness' of the perceivedas perceivedstemsfrom he factthat tpresents tsown formeven thoughfor he Buddhist he ultimatelyeal has no spatialor tem-

poral extension).But themanner n whichan object presents ts own form s alsoreflectivef its mode of apprehension.On the Abhidharma ccount,the uniqueand irreduciblelementswithints

omplextaxonomyre

alwaysrelated o

concep-tually ognate terms uch as 'unique particular' svalaksana)and 'intrinsic ature'(svabhãva).These terms re cognitive quivalents fwhat sgenerally esignated sa 'bearer' (dharma).33 xamplesof such unique particularsnVasubandhu'sontol-

ogyarefeelings nd thoughts,lthough he focus s less on whatthey re and moreon howthey re disclosed.As he states: The bodyis examined nrelation o itspar-ticular nd universal haracteristics.eelings nd thoughtsre dharmas; he natureofthese[feelingsnd thoughts]s their articularharacteristic. 34t shere, main-tain,thata phenomenologicalreadingof the experienceof the particular etterservesto capturethe intent f the Buddhist pistemologicalproject.Thoughts nd

feelings re momentarynd discrete, frecurrent,nd reflecthe dynamicsof thepsychophysical ggregates hatare constitutivef humanexperience.Ultimately,however, hey re reflectivef our conditionofembodiment, o whichperceptualawarenessprovides onstant nd unmediated ognitive ccess.

AsMerleau-Pontyells us: In perceptionwe do notthink heobjectand we donotthink urselves hinkingt,we are givenover to theobject and we merge ntothisbody which is better nformed hanwe are about the world,and about themotiveswe have and themeans at ourdisposal. 35Perception oes notprovidedescriptive mageof reality,n internalmap of what is externallyvailable, butanormativeccountofhow theworldmust e formy xperienceof t obe practically

efficacious r, nMerleau-Ponty'serminology,ohave maximalgrip n it.Thus, he

Christian oseru 419







Buddhist greeswithMerleau-Pontyhat everyperception akesplace inan atmo-

sphereofgenerality ven though when seen from he inside,expressesa givensituation: can see blue because I am sensitive o colors. 36

Whether uch unique particularsre regarded s real and unitaryntities xist-

ingover and above an apprehendingonsciousness, r as phenomenalpropertiesfexperiencethat uperveneupon it cannot be settled n thegrounds fconceptualanalysisalone. Granted n ontologicalcommitmento realism ofthe Sautrãntika

type),perception, or heBuddhist,eemsperfectlyuited o apprehendbothempir-ical and conceptualentities. nd,whileconceptualentities re beyondthe realmof

phenomenal xperience, henonconceptual lements fexperienceor,inphenom-enological terms, ts noematic content re not,despitethe fact that t is only bymeans of itsunique definingharacteristicshatwe intend particulars such. It snot an objectthat s thus ntendedbut a set ofinterdependenthenomenalproper-ties.Perception,hen, an only apprehenddistinctualia suchas hardness, oftness,

roughness,uminance, t cetera. Butwhen thesequalitative xperiences re fusedtogethernto omethingike a distinctpatiotemporalbject,we no longerhave the

perception funique particulars ut theconceptualapprehension f an aggregatedentity.

So, do we apprehend hesephenomenalproperties,ven if heir onstitutivele-ments re neverdissociated ll at once? For omeAbhidharma hilosophers,ike heVaibhãsikas, ll aggregated ntities omprise he four lements, utthephenomenalnature fanygiven aggregated ntity epends on additionalcauses, so thatundercertaincircumstances omething olid may become liquid, like heat causing the

meltingf a block of ice intowater. For others theSautrãntikas) whose

positionVasubandhuclearly tates phenomenal qualitiesare present nlyas merepoten-tialities. n a block of ice, the fire lement s only potentially resent, orwithoutthispotentialityce cannot melt and become water. The primary ropertyf anygivensubstance thusdepends on the preponderance f any one element namelyearth,water, tc.) withwhich thatpropertys associated.37The same principle f

preponderancepplies inthe case of all natural inds. nthe case ofaggregatednti-ties such as trees and cows, it is no longerthe principleof preponderance hat

applies but rather hatofbeinga product fcertain auses and conditions.A cowis nota merecollection ofelementswith certainpredominant ropertyike solid-

ity,heat,or thecapacityto producemilk. t s also not a conceptually onstructedentityike a forest,r a car,that sanalytically educible o itsprimitivearts.Ifparticulars esignatethe phenomenalproperties f objects as experienced

objects, henwhat sgiven nperceptionspartlesswholes rather handifferentiatedstructurallements.The question,then,becomes thatof whether hisAbhidharmaanalysis ellsus somethingbout the nature f theparticulartself r, rather,ome-

thing bout theepistemic tatus fperception; urely, hisquestion s a crucialonefor nyepistemological roject, oundationalistrotherwise. ursuing similar ortofquestion,Dan Arnoldhas recentlyoncludedthat t s Dignaga's intuitionboutparticularshat s servedby his account of perception, ather hanthe otherway

around.38 notherwords,perception ltimatelyims to justifyhe existenceofpar-








ticulars s uniquely ualified ntities. his means thatDignaga isto a certain egreeconstrainedo adopta specificdefinition fperceptionnorder o ustify is under-

standing ftheparticular.Dignaga's understandingnd definition f theparticulars the logical conclu-

sion of a longtradition fspeculationabout the irreducible lementsof existence.Now, are these particulars'n the sense of irreducible henomenalproperties f

experience'or inthe sense of ontologically rimitiveategories'?Arnold nterpretsDignaga as departing romVasubandhu's view thatthese are particularss typesrather hanthings, typesofwhichthere an be, presumably,n infinite umber ftokens. 39Arnoldproposesthatwe understand heparticularss propertiesfphe-nomenalobjects,because such an understandingeflects hecommonusage of thetermnAbhidharmaexts.Whether rnotwe treat articularss types, t s obviousthatVasubandhu'sAbhidharmaprojectseems concernedwith more than sortingthroughn elaborate axonomy fontologicalprimitives the sole purposeofwhich

isto provide causal accountofwhat s taken o existonly conventionally.For the Buddhist pistemologisthe 'phenomenallygiven' particular oes not

correspond o any inherent hysicalpropertyf an object,notwithstandinghede-bate about whether r not someone likeDharmakïrti avers betweenextemalismand internalism. ather,what is givenemergesfully n perception long withanintentionalct of consciousness.Consciousnessmaybe characterized s aware-ness ofan object, 40 s inherentlyntentional,ssentiallys consciousnessof some-

thing n the Husserlian ense. This consciousness is essentially n object-orientedconsciousness nthesame manner nwhich hardness'or resistance' s an inherent

propertyf the

experienceof whatwe

generically esignateas 'earth.'Thus, on

Arnold'sreadingthe Abhidharmakas' iew that svalaksanas in virtueof whichdharmasqualify s such are, in fact,universais r abstractions 41ffectivelyol-

lapsesthe differenceetween heparticulars a support or heperceptual ognitionand theparticulars perceived.

But,whereasVasubandhu's analysisoftypes n theAbhidharmakosancludesboth substantial' ropertiesnd 'conceptual'designations, ignaga's understandingof theparticulars found, nter lia, inthe Pramãnasamuccaya,s purelyphenom-enological:theparticulars a sort funiquely haracterized henomenon ccessible

only through perceptual ognition r noema. ForDignaga,then, heparticulars

not implynternal,niquely haracterized,ensedata,butveridicalnonconceptualcontent.What makes itveridical s thefact hat t s intersubjectivelyvailable and

pragmaticallyffective.ndeed, he causal efficacyfobjects nformsothDignaga'sand Dharmakïrti'srgumentshatwhat sgenerally ermedperception' onsists naseriesofdistinctognitive vents hat re causallyrelated. n thismodel,contactbe-tweensense and object givesriseto a perceptual mage (ãkãra)thatrepresentshe

specificcharacteristicsfthe object, and the relationship etweenthe perceptualimageand theempirical bject is one ofsimilaritysãdrsya). hus,whereastheper-ceptual image is causallydetermined ytheobject,the manner f itsappearance(i.e., its spect)42 s determined yfactorshat re intrinsico cognition tself.

As DharmakTrtitates: Exceptfora cause, thereis nothing lse that [could

Christianoseru 421







constitute n entity's] eingan apprehendedobject. Amongthe [causes ofaware-ness], that[cause] in the image of which awareness [arises] s called the appre-hendedobject of that awareness]. 43Note, however, hat lthoughbothDignãgaand DharmakTrtippear to adopt an empiricalstandpoint egardinghe statusof

external bjects,their nalysisofperception eflects n internalisterspective hatdeniestheultimate eality fexternal bjects.Now let's continue ur discussionwith he dea that hereliabilityfperception

mustbe intrinsicallyscertained. t eems tomethatwhen the Buddhist efends heidea thatperceptionmustbe intrinsicallyscertained, heprimaryoncern s avoid-

ingtheproblem f infiniteegress.As Sãntaraksita eminds s, there an be no in-finite egressfvalidity epends [on an external ause]. Hence, certaintyboutself-

validity nlyensues when there s an apprehension f effective ction. 44 ndeed,what is characteristicfperceptual ognitions s precisely he factthat heyreflectthe causal powerof the apprehendedphenomena.For the Buddhist, hus, know

that am perceiving ire, or nstance,when I perceivean entitys capable offulfill-inga certainpurpose, uch as burningnd radiating eat.Anopponent, nthis asea Mïmamsâkarealist,would be curious, fcourse,to find utexactlywhat kinds f

specificconditionsmust be in place in order to facilitate ifferentiatingetween

succeeding cognitions. he answercomes inthe form f a unique typeofBuddhist

pragmatism:he condition fvaliditys definedbythe formal imilarityfcognitionwith he real entity a similarity hose warrant s none other han the continuous

cognition fpractical fficacy.But practical fficacy,'we are told,does not come in leaps and bounds. Each

perception lwaysmanifeststs

practical fficacywith

ertainty,ven inthecase of

perceptual llusions,which is preciselywhyno subsequentcognitionof practicalefficacys ever needed. Santaraksita's iew thatonly cognitions ausallyanchoredinrealityount as knowledge s a typical ase ofreiteratingharmakïrti'sefinitionof an epistemicwarrant s that ognitionwhich s inconformityith tsobject. Isn'tittrue, aystheBuddhist,hat t sonlywhen one wantsto attain certain oal thatthereliabilityfcognitions ecomes a matter fconcern?How else would one getthinkingboutepistemicwarrants?take t hatherewe have a classic case of reduc-ing the epistemicdisposition o various apparentand less apparentmotivations,whether sychological r social, that re part f the structurefbeing. Presumably,

on DharmakTrti'suggestion, fone were not concerned with actions and theirresults,ne would not be particularlyotheredwith ssues ofreliabilityr ustifica-tion. t sonlybecause successful ctionrequires omeevaluationof theveridicalityofcognitioni.e., itsconformityith heobject)that n individual sdriven o epis-temic nquiries.

While itmaybe true, s J.N. Mohanty bserves, hat thedistinction,ommoninWestern hought, etweenthe causal questionand thequestionof ustificationwas not made by the Indiantheories, 45here s an important ay in which thiscould simply eflect hepragmatic oncernsof the Indianphilosopher ather han afailure o addressthenormativeuestion ofwhymightwe be justifiednbelievingsomething on itsown. If, ndeed, Indianepistemologies reat s warranted nly








that ognitionwhich correspondso its bject'' and isproduced ntheright ay/'46it eemstheyhave a wayofexplaining heepistemic isposition s a consequence ofour condition f embodiment ather han as the instrumentf a disembodiedcogito(servinghe ustificationf tsbeliefs).

Foundationalismnd ItsDiscontents

Recall theobservation bove that heself-validityfperception s mainlygearedtoaddresstheproblemof infiniteegress.Butthisdiscussion about perceptual ogni-tionbeingself-validatingddresses nfact womain issues: 1) thefallacy finfinite

regress, herecognition lwaysdependson another ognition or tsvalidation, nd(2) thepractical fficacy fperceptual ognitions ince,unlikeconception,percep-tionconstitutes direct ntroductiono an object. It s thefirst f these issues theconstrual fperception s self-validatingthathas forcedupontheepistemologicalprogramfDignãga and DharmakTrtihelabel ofempiricistoundationalism.

Now, let'sreturnoTillemans'viewthatBuddhistpistemologys bestdescribedas a typeof foundationalismbout empiricalfacts. t was first ketched n a studyof the disputebetweenthe Svãtantrikasnd the PrasangikasMãdhyamikas n theexistenceof self-validatingognitions.47 ecently, owever,Tillemanshas arguedcogently and at some length that heBuddhist,ike his Western ounterpart,ot

onlyasserts hegivenness fparticulars utdoes so regardless fwhetherhe oper-atesfromn externalistran internalisterspective. articularsre thesort fthingsavailable onlyas objectsofperception.

Here,it s

helpfulo recallthatboth

Dignãgaand DharmakTrtireat

particularseither s external bjectsor as perceptual mages ntrinsico awareness,dependingonwhetherhey peratefrom heperspective fexternal ealism rphenomenalism.Tillemans rgues: Particularsre the sort fthingnaturallyuited to be present onon-inferentialwareness, nd hence can be consideredas a typeofgiven. 48All

this,despitethefactthat he Buddhist, nlikehis Western ounterpart,mploysa

sliding cale ofanalysis,wherebyparticularsre treated irsts external bjectsbut

eventually s mental ppearances or perceptual mages,and thusnot as genuinelyreal.

Tillemans gain: Not surprisingly,ntheYogãcãra-Svãtantrikaystem f Sãnta-

raksïita nd KamalasTla, ppearances (pratibhãsa) o perception nd up beingthecustomary-truthounterpartso the particularsf the Buddhist ogician'sYogãcãraontology. 49 o illustrate is interpretationf the apparitionalnature f empiricalobjects,whichsupposedly onfirmsheir dherenceto theYogãcãra ontology, ille-mans quotes KamalasTla s advocatingthe notionthat mages appearing in con-sciousness erroneouslyack intrinsic atures, espite being restrictedo a specifictime nd place.50

The idea thatparticularsre restrictedn time nd space is discussedextensivelybyDharmakTrtihroughoutis work.51 close look at DharmakTrti'sccountofhow

particulars re apprehended in perception hould make clear that,despite their

uniqueness, hey re notpure representationalmagesbut infactcan become the

Christianoseru 423







objectofempirical wareness.52 o: what Dharmakirti eansbythe unique partic-ular' are phenomenawithin hereach ofempirical onsciousness, n otherwords,entities etermined ytheir patiotemporalocation and formal ppearance. Thus,forDharmakTrti,onceptual entities re necessarilyunreal,preciselybecause they

lack spatiotemporaletermination.he contrastwithperceptual bjects is now ob-vious:these,unlike oncepts, re positioned utsidethearbitraryealmofthought.Tillemans'positiononly becomes moreproblematic fwe factor n the well-

knownobservation hat a necessarycondition for inference s the presence ofappearingobjects/'53 t is these objects appearingto perceptualconsciousness

thatprovide theactual subjectofdebate/' Foundationalism,t least on Tillemans'readingof the Buddhist pistemologicalprogram, btainsonly ifthese appearingobjectsare a kind fperceptual iven.But fwe understand erceptionna phenom-enological sense, as providingheperceiving ubjectwith mode ofengaging heworld nsuch a waythather ntentionsre realized, henperceptions foundational

forknowledge nly nthe sensethat tprovides n implicit asis for hese appearingobjects.'

Now,thisphenomenological ccount also captures, think, hatGeorges Drey-fus has inmindwhen he pointsout thatfor he Buddhist pistemologist erceptionand inference are distinguished otonlyon the basis of theirmodes ofapprehen-sion butmostly n the basis of their bjects. 54 notherwords,perceptionhas thecapacity o apprehendreal individuals yvirtue fthefact hat ts ontents re non-conceptuallygiven nexperience,whereasinference an only apprehendwhatareessentially onceptualconstructs. hisco-presenceofperception nd object as per-ceived

explainswhy onlyperceptionan be said to be

providing cognitiveink o

reality, ith hecaveat thatreality' ere tandsfor heparticular aysinwhich selfand 'other' re empirically isclosed.

I takeDreyfuso be reiteratingere inno uncertain erms Dignaga's positionthatperception nd conceptionoperatewithdifferentbjects. That,as Dignãgadeclares, there s no object ofcognition ther hanthe unique particularsvalak-sana) and theuniversal samanyalaksana), ecause perceptionhas as itsobject theunique particular nd inference he universal. 55 onception, n Dignaga's view,is a remote, econdary-orderognition, o understoodbecause of the chasm be-tweenthe world s experienced nd its onceptualapprehension. here s, however,

more to thestory: ontraryo theempiricisthesis thatknowledge s reducible oexperience- perception n and of itself oes not provideknowledgeof relationsand concepts. ndeed,propositional nowledgerequires heparticipationfpercep-tual udgments,nd perceptualudgments,s we all know,requirememory. ow doperceptual udgmentsbecome knowledge?Through pperception,which bridgesthememory ap and retrieves reviouslyearnedconcepts. In addition, ppercep-tion is 'indubitable':we maywell be mistaken bout theobject ofourexperience,butwe can neverbe mistakenbouttheobjectofexperience s experienced, boutourawareness ofanyexperiencewhatsoever.

Capitalizing n this eemingly nbridgeable ap for he Buddhist etween the

indeterminate erceptionof particulars nd the sphere of conception,Monima








Chadha has recently rguedthat omethingike a Nyãya-Kantian nderstandingf

perception,s always involvingheparticipationfconception,furthernderminesthe Buddhist ntuitionboutthecognitive unction fperception.Her thesis s that,because any perceptual ognition equires hepossibilityfrecognition,ecognition

is possibleonlywhen perceptual wareness is restrictedo universal eatures: theverynotion of experienceor perceptual cognition s that of cognizingor (recog-nizing) heparticular atum s an instantiationfa propertyr a universal/'56

Whilenotdirectlyddressinghequestion fepistemic oundationalism,hadha's

argumentsre relevant or nother eason:theyraisethehermeneuticallynterestingquestionofwhat nterpretiveodel best erves otranslate,nthis ase, the Buddhistand Nyãya epistemologicalprograms nd, conversely, o what extent hese pro-gramsanticipate, r complement, imilarphilosophical programs n theWest. Inhis defense of the Buddhist pistemologicalposition and in responseto Chadha)Mark Sideritss right, think, o pointout that epistemic onsiderationspart a

Naiyãyika, Sautrãntika-YogãcãrauddhistikeDignãgaand DharmakTrti,ndsome-one likeKantworkwith rather ifferentotions fthe given/57FortheNaiyãyikathecategory fthe given' theobjectofperceptual wareness) ncludesbothpartic-ulars entitiesuchas redroses) nd theuniversais ywhichthey requalified suchas redness nd rosehood).The Nyãyaclaim is thatparticularsre always cognizedas such: individuals earing relation finherence o a universal. ortheBuddhist,perception an only pprehend unique phenomenal) haracteristica svalaksana),whereas for omeone likeKant he given' is simply hephenomenal ppearance of

objectsseen bythe transcendentalgo throughhe lensofnoumena.

Thus, enlistingKant's

supporto claim thatwe never

perceive particularss

such and that onceptsmediateour awarenessof whatwe take to be phenomenally(as opposed to metaphysically)eal,confrontshadha with ll sorts funwarranted

assumptions bout the scope of the Kantianepistemologicalprojecton the one

hand,and ofwhat we taketo be phenomenally ealon the other.Moreover, hereis an important ay in whichboththe Buddhist nd theNaiyãyika greethat nde-terminateerceptionnirvikalpa ratyaksa)tandsfor n awarenessof theparticularalone,whose causal-pragmaticink operceptual ognition s undisputed.A disputeonly riseswhenthe Buddhistnd theNaiyãyika onsiderwhether rnot his ausal-

pragmaticmodel also applies to perceptual udgments.Note,though, hatfor he

Naiyãyikasndeterminateerception nlyapprehendsunrelated ntitiese.g.,roses,redcolor,rosehood, tc.) and that his pprehension s notepistemicallywarranted

(i.e., itoccursprior o a distinctionetweentruth nd falsity).Obviously,the Kantianmodel of apperception s a statementbout the anti-

foundationalistole ofapperception.Tillemans, oo, calls intoquestionthe Kantianmodelof theroleofapperceptionncognition, ointing utthatDignãga and Dhar-makïrti dvocate a thesisthat s exactlycontraryo Kantian ntifoundationalism:intuitionsor,for heBuddhist, erceptions) re not blindwithout oncepts.Percep-tionsare indeed cognitive, ven ifonlyrudimentarilyo. Tillemans akesthe Bud-dhistto be sayingprettymuchthe opposite: it is conceptsthat are blind,while

sense intuitionoes see, albeitunintelligently. 58

Christianoseru 425







Tillemans' ontention s that nsofar s Dharmakirtind hisfollowers egard nycognition hat onformswith tsobject as warrantedi.e., as a pramãnatout ourt)they re empiricistsf a foundationalist ent: The fact s, however, hatpeople ofan empiricist ent have consecrated considerableenergy nd ingenuityo doing

epistemologyhisway and have thought hatperceptual wareness is not ustoneof themany nimal functions ecessary or ognition o occur,but s itself typeof

cognition f a certainkindofthing. think hatDharmakïrtis one of theseempiri-cists, nd I think hat ãntaraksitand Kamalasïlaare too/'59

To supporthis claim that Dharmakïrtind thatSãntaraksita nd Kamalasïlaaswell arefull-fledgedmpiricists,illemans nterpretsheir ommitmento reflexivity- namely hat ach cognitive pisode isaccompaniedbyself-awarenesssvasamve-dana),60 to mean that nthe direct pprehension f an object perceptual ognitionand self-awarenessre fused ntoone dual-propertyognition.

Tillemans uotes favorably obertBrandom's nterpretationf the Myth f the

Given to mean thatdirectperception s always accompanied by a special sortofawareness that an discern bjectsand their roperties ithout heaid ofconcepts:The 'Myth f the Given' is the idea that here an be a kindofawarenessthathas

twoproperties. irst,t s or entailshaving certain ort fknowledge that heonewhose state t s possesses simply nvirtue fbeing inthat tate.Second, it entailsthat hecapacity o have that ort f awareness does notpresuppose heacquisi-tion of any concepts thatone can be aware in that ense independentlyf and

antecedently o grasping r masteringhe use of any concepts (paradigmaticallythroughanguage earning). 61

Now,it s

not, think,oo much of a stretcho understand he Buddhist

piste-mological programs roughly nalogousto phenomenology,t least nthe minimalsense that here we come across a systematic nvestigationf the (nonconceptual,but notbare)contents fawareness and ofintentionalitys the intrinsiceature f a

cognitive vent.Here I wish to concentrate n the issue of whetherDignãga andDhamakïrti o indeedpursuea foundationalistroject nepistemologyrwhether,pace Tillemans, heycould be seen as phenomenologistsofthe Husserlian ype)concerned with he intentionalharacter f thephenomenal ontents fexperienceas experienced romhefirst-personoint fview. It eemsto me that he Buddhist'sreaction othe realist'schieflyheNaiyãyika nd theMïmâmsâka) laimthat nper-

ceptionone apprehends ealobjectsendowed withboth ndividualitynd generalityworksagainstthe sortof foundationalism dvocated by twentieth-centuryense-datumtheorists. his point s made quite clearly byMatilal in his own attemptopositionthe classical debate between the Naiyãyikas, he Mímãmsãkas, nd theBuddhistsna modernphilosophical ontext:

There s .. one importantifferenceetweenhenature fthegiven ccordingo theBuddhistnd thatwhich s currentmong he modernWesternhenomenalists.hegiven,which heBuddhist ouldcall svalaksana, as no structure.t s a structurelessunitaryhole.But Russellian atumwouldprobably avethe tructurex isQ' or xresembles/This s whatWilfredellars as called the tructuref primordialware-

ness'requiredy llabstractionistsrfoundationalists.62








Matilal makesthis bservationnthe context fhis discussionofKumarila's nalysisofthephenomenologyfperception. orKumãrila,s for heNaiyãyikas, erceptionmarks hegradual progressionrom stageof indéterminationo a stagewhere the

object is clearly pprehendedbothas a particularnd as the locus of a universal.

Rather, think,he Buddhist pistemologisteems to come notonlyon the sideofphenomenologists ut also ofphilosophers ikeQuine, who labored inthepastfew decades to naturalize pistemology. o be sure,Quine's understandingf natu-ralism s empiricalpsychology iffersignificantlyrom hat fHusserl,who essen-

tially ees it as the intersubjectiveasis ofexperience,which,amongother hings,allows for he abstraction f thebodyas Körper rom he livingBody (Lieb). It alsodiffersromMerleau-Ponty'sonceptionofnaturalism,onfined s it s to theGestalt

psychology e critically doptsinhisrejection f reductive) ehaviorism. ike Hus-serl's, he Buddhist pistemologist's aturalisms circumscribed o a certain oncep-tion of thebodythat ttributeso itthe marks f intentional r purposive ctivity.n

the case ofperception,hispurposive ctivityakesthe form f direct pprehensionofparticulars. hus,when DharmakTrtieacts gainstcertaindefinitions fpercep-tion hat ttributeo it hecapacity oapprehendgeneralities, e isessentially ayingthat ndirect erception s not veridical.Without n awarenessthat acks the deter-mination f perceptual) udgments, ne could not claim to be perceiving t all, butrathero be constantly uperimposing ponthestream fsensory xperiencewhat-ever one imagines obe thecase. Inthis atterense,theBuddhistppearstobe say-ingthatordinary,ntutorederception, s conceived bytherealist, oes not countas an epistemicwarrant,nd that n effectivepistemology an relyneither n the

testimonyf commonsense nor on

anyinferential

rocessesthereof. or the Bud-

dhist, trainedperception abhyãsavat ratyaksa)s a perception hatdoes noterr,and thusone thatholds thekey o successful pistemicpractices.While notexactlyan invitationo disciplinedobservation,Quine's often-quoted lea for naturalismrests n theassumption hatwe standa better hance ofknowinghowwe arrive tourpicture ftheworld fwe let empirical) sychologyxplore he nature nd func-tionofcognition:

Butwhy ll this reative econstruction,ll thismake-believe? he stimulationf his sen-

soryreceptorss all the evidenceanybodyhas had togo on, ultimately,narrivingt his

picturefthe world.

Whynot

ustsee how thisconstructioneallyproceeds?Whynot

settle orpsychology?uch a surrenderf theepistemological urden o psychologys amove thatwas disallowed in earlier imesas circularreasoning. ftheepistemologist'sgoal is validationof thegrounds fempirical cience, he defeatshis purposeby usingpsychology rother mpirical cience inthevalidation.However, uch scruples gainstcircularity ave little ointonce we have stoppeddreaming fdeducingscience fromobservation.63

UnlikeQuine's appeal to what is essentially third-personsychologicalper-spective n the mechanisms hatunderpin erception nd belief ormation,he Bud-dhistrelieson thecomplex introspectivesychology f theYogãcãra tradition. ike

Quine, theBuddhist,oo, is concernedwith hecausal processesof belief ormation.

Christian oseru 427







Butthere s a differencenmotivation etweenQuine's project fnaturalizingpis-temology that s,makingphilosophymorereceptive o thefindingsfthenaturalsciences and withdrawinghe claim that pistemology,onstrued s a metatheoret-ical discourse, s foundational orall knowledge and the Buddhist'spragmatic-phenomenological pproachtoepistemology:he Buddhistwantsto understand he

mechanisms nd function f belief formationor,of the invariable oncomitance[avinãbhãva] between conscious apprehensionand bodily behavior),and seeksknowledge nly nsofar s he intends o reacha certaingoal,whether simpleonesuch as object recognitione.g.,whether rnotthevariegated olors of a butterfly'swingsare perceivedby a singleinstanceofperception), r a moremetaphysicallychallenging ne (e.g.,theontological tatus fconstructedhenomena ikesound).

Thus,to doubt the trustworthinessfordinaryense experienceis to call into

question,on naturalist ather han skepticalgrounds, he foundationalist's laimthatordinary xperience is a trustworthyource of knowledge.For someone like

Quine, epistemologyan benefit rom

eing placedin a

psychological ettinge-

cause itsolves the enigma'ofa priori easoning. ndeed,a cursory eviewofsomeof theempiricaldata would suffice s proof hat heembodied-cognitionhesis s amore ccurateworking ypothesis orhow we come to form eliefs nd be justifiedinholding hem.Take severalexamplesfrom ision cience: first,ightrradiatesheretina ntwodimensions,yetwe see theworldthree-dimensionally;econd, colorsensitivitys onlyavailable in a small centralregionof the visual field,yet t doesnot seem as though here s a differencen our experienceofcolor saturation e-tweenthecentral nd peripheral egions fthevisualfield;64 hird,here s a discrep-ancybetweentheseemingrichness nd presenceof the visual worldand therather

poor and fragmentaryata processed bythevisual system;65 inally,we ordinarilysee the world s complete,dynamic, nd uniformlyetailed,when, nfact, t scon-structed ut ofmomentaryetinalmageswithin certain hreshold fawareness.66These examples suggestthat there is more to perceptionthan the transparencyclaimedfor tbythe (naïve) realist.Furthermore,erceiving s notsimplyknowingwhatobjectappears as endowed with which pecific haracteristics. ather, n thepragmatic-phenomenologicalodel,perceivings learninghe rules fsensorimotorcontingency,hat s,thenonpropositionalormfknowing ow,whichgovernshowchanges in theorientation four sensory pparatustransformhe character f theperceivedworld.67

Forthe Buddhists,whose approachto knowledge s basicallyphenomenologi-cal, the return o naturalismn epistemology hould be regarded s a welcomemove. Indeed,as MarkSiderits as noted, ndianepistemology as neverdisplayedthe sortof nonnaturalismharacteristicf the Cartesiantradition:The very deaofepistemology s pramãnavãda determininghe number nd nature f reliablemeans of beliefformation suggests non-foundationalistnd externalist roject.Non-foundationalistecause the projectpresupposesthe existence of knowledge,instead fseeking oprove tsvery ossibility. ndexternalist ecause it eeksto dis-tinguish etweenveridical nd non-veridicaltates f thesubject nterms fcausalfactors,nd not nterms fstates hat re

necessarilyccessible tothe

subject. 68








The Buddhist'sown interestn grounding pistemology n the psychologicalanalysis fcognition,t eems,echoes both he Husserlian henomenological rojectas well as the shiftf focus nmuch ofthecontemporary hilosophy f mind oward

workingnclose collaborationwith hesciences ofcognition. should make clear atthispointthat he non-empiricisteadingof Buddhist pistemology utlined bove

does not addressthe issue of the mportance f Sautrãntikand Yogãcãra psycholo-gies in informinghe Buddhist pistemological ccount of how cognition ctuallyoperates,partly ecause Dignãga, Dharmakïrti,nd their ollowers eldomexpandon thepsychological iewsthatunderpin heir heories.

Conclusion

I would like to suggest, n conclusion,that mere surfaceresemblances betweenthe sense-datum heoristnd various otherbrandsof modernnaïve empiricism,nthe one hand,and the Buddhist

pistemological roject,n theother,might,ndeed,

suggest hat he Buddhists peratefrom foundationalisttance;however, his ntu-ition smisguided. o sayabout an instance fperceptual warenessthat tdisclosessome truthnd, as such, provides basis forvalid reasoning s already equivalentto placing itwithin he logical space ofreasons/'to use Sellars'expression.Froma distance,Dignãgaand Dharmakïrti aywell appear guilty faccordingperceptionthisgroundingtatus.When looked at moreclosely,however, heir ccountof theroleofperception s a sort fanchorageinto hegivendoes notappear to supporta foundationalisteading.

Indeed, t shouldbe possibleto offern antifoundationalisteading f theBud-

dhist pistemological roject fwe abandon therequirementhatperceptual ware-ness provide justificationorbasic empiricalbeliefs.Afterll, self-awarenessndvarioustypesofcognitive onditioningre central o the Buddhist pistemologicalprogram. or heBuddhists,eeing and anyother ypeofperceptualknowing) s al-

ready onditioned ypastexperience nd operates s a functionf theenactive ndintentionalspectsofconsciousness.69 do think, owever, hatwe can move be-

yondtheargumenthatmemorynd self-awarenessre precisely heconditioningfactors ecessary or perceptual vent o become cognitive.

There s another nglefromwhichtheproblem f the Myth fthe Given doesnotquite capturethe intent f the Buddhist pistemological nterprise:hatof the

contents ftheperceptual vent. fwe take the Given' to refer o noematic ontent,ratherhan o somepresumablyndependent niqueparticular,henwhat sgiven n

perception s notextrinsic o it.What is given in perception s a cognitive mage(ãkãra),notwithstandinghecausal processthat races heappearance ofthat mageto some phenomenalentity.We may, hus, nterprethesecognitive magesneitheras some kind of internal epresentationsf externalrealitynor as imaginative rconstructivespects of cognition.Rather, ollowingproponents f the embodied-

cognition hesis, uch as Lakoffnd Johnson,70 e may nterprethem interms fembodiment as imageschémasor Gestalt tructuresfexperience:cognitive ndthuspart ftheintentionalct,yet ndirectlyonnectedto theexternalworld.Thus,

Christian oseru 429







a phenomenal ntityounts s a givenonly nsofars itcauses thesensory ignaltotravel cross thesensory athways nd emerge s a particularnstance f ntentionalconsciousness.Moreover, he manner n whichimpressionselectand group crossthese sensorypathways,drawingthe contourof a unique particular, epends asmuch on thefunctioningf theperceptual ystemsnd thepropensityfintentional

consciousnesstowardgrasping fterggregated bjectsas upontheempiricalprop-erties f thephenomenal ntitytself.

At the level of pure sensations,however,only intentionalitys present;deter-mined selves' and 'entities' re yetto emergefrom he perceptual tream.Oncemore,Merleau-Ponty rovides vivid account of what itmight e like to be fullyimmersedn theperceptual xperience: If wantedto render recisely hepercep-tual experience, oughtto say that one perceivesin me, and not that perceive.Every ensationcarrieswithin t thegermof a dreamofdepersonalization uch aswe experience when we really ry o live atthelevel of sensation.71

In his ownattempt

oexplain

the causes ofperceptual

llusions,KamalasTlaclaimsthat ne conjuresand grasps fterhings such as a circleof fire aused bythe fastrotation f a firebrand that, nfact,do notexist: The appearance of thismental llusionmãnasJ hrãnti)s notdue to theconnection f uccessivevisualper-ceptions.Then what kindof illusion) s it? It s an error]whichoriginates imulta-

neouslyand at once from he sensory ystemsntheform f a circle, [and] as theresult fspecific ausal conditions/'72 orhispart,Kamalasïlauses this xampleto

argue hat nsome sense all ordinary,ntutorederceptionsre like hat generatingthe llusion faggregated bjects having nduring,ubstantive, atures.73 hese un-tutoredperceptions re, in fact,typicalof what the Husserlianphenomenologist

calls the natural ttitude/ he problem ies not in perception,whose mechanismsare generallynot alterableat will,but in the awarenessthat ttends o it. For it isthe latterhat,whendevoidofany conceptualcontent, ivesperceptual xperiencethe directness hat he Buddhist laims for t. Untutored erception s determined,for t lready ppearsladenwithudgment. ycontrast, irect erceptions an inten-tionalcognitive ct,at least nthe sense that, iventheinherentlyntentional atureof consciousness,to perceive means to apprehenddirectlywhateverappears inawareness without llowingthesurgeofconceptualization o interfere.hisprocessis preciselywhy,for nstance,DharmakTrtiescribes hephenomenology fpercep-tion ncausal terms.

The causal model ofperception dopted bytheBuddhists husrests n two setsofpremises: irst, hat s apprehended nperceptions merely heeffect fa causalchain reachingback to theco-presenceofsense, object,and empirical onscious-ness; second, real objects are capable of producingreal effects,ven when addi-tional circumstances ause a cognitivediscrepancybetween the object and itsperceptual epresentation,s inthecase ofperceptual llusions. nthe final nalysis,theBuddhistrguesthat, iven mmediate cquaintancewith ur own mental tates,thenonconceptualnoemaof a pureact of ntendingstrulyheonlywarrantedypeofperception. he onlyindubitable ognitionswe have,whatever hestatus f the








particularshey represent,re those nonconceptual,noninferentialognitions hatdefinedirect, onmediate erception.

Whether rnotwe interprethenomenologys antifoundationalist,hope thathave suggested,t least, hat omethingike phenomenological ttitudemore ptlydescribesthe philosophical program f Dignãga, DharmakTrti,nd their ollowers.

I have notarguedthatcurrent ebates about foundationalismn epistemologyrenotrelevant s interpretiveoolsfor he student fBuddhist hilosophy; am, how-ever,persuadedthat onsiderablephilosophical nsightsan be gainedfromxplor-ing he Buddhistpistemological rogramhroughhe ntentionallyide-angled ensofthe Western henomenological radition.

Notes

I am gratefulo SheridanHoughfor eading hroughhis ssayand suggestingmanyconceptualand stylisticmprovements,nd especiallyto theanonymousreviewersfor heir elpfuldvice and comments.An earlier ersion fthis ssaywas readat thePacificDivisionmeeting fTheAmerican hilosophicalAssociationn San Francisco,April 007.

Ί - Dharmakïrti,yãyabindu, 1 Right nowledgeprecedesthe attainmentf allsuccessfulhumanaction, [and]this isthereasonfor]giving n exposition fit samyagjnãnapdrvikãarvapurusãrthasiddhirtitadvyutpãdyate).

2 - See Nyayasutrabhasyad Nyayasütra.14.

3 - Varela,F.,Thompson,Ε.,and Rosch, Ε., TheEmbodiedMind Cambridge,MA:MIT Press, 001), pp. 172-173. Thisconceptionofembodiment,whichfindsitsroots n Husserl'snotionof the livedbody (Lebenswelt),was first iscussedat lengthn HubertDreyfus,WhatComputers an'tDo (New York:Harper nd

Row,1979).

4 - Varela,Thompson, nd Rosch,TheEmbodiedMind,p. 171.

5 - Ibid.

6 - Tillemans, MetaphysicsforMadhyamikas, n Georges Dreyfus nd Sarah

McClintock,eds., The Svãtantrika-Prasangikaistinction:What DifferenceDoes ItMake? (Boston:WisdomPublications, 003), p. 90.

7 - Note thatDignãga does not addressthe issue of the intrinsic alidity svatah

prãmãnya) fcognitions,nd Dharmakïrtinlyframes t erms f their racticalefficacy. orDevendrabuddhi,who distinguishesetweensvatah- nd paratahprãmãnya,perceptions re generallynot intrinsicallyalid, exceptwhen re-lated to theaccomplishment fa humangoal (arthakriyãvisayamramãnam)(see Pramãnavãrttika-panjikã5a6-7, and translationnJohnDunne, Founda-tionsof Dharmakïrti's hilosophy Sommerville,MA: Wisdom Publications,

Christian oseru 431







2004], p. 376). Sakyabuddhi dds to the requirementbove thatthe causesof error be absent for perceptionto be reliable (see Pramãnavãrttika-tJkãD72a4-b1, and translationnDunne,Foundations f Dharmakïrti'shilosophy,p. 375 n. 4). Dharmottara s thefirst o give a morenuanced account ofthedifference etween ntrinsicnd extrinsic aliditynthe case ofperceptual og-

nitions: n entity's niversal haracteristicsmaybe intrinsicallypprehended(e.g., I see an entitywith branches nd leaves), but itsspecific haracteristics

(namelywhethert s a Dhava [Anogeisus atifolia]r a Palãsa [Buteafrondosa]tree)are extrinsicallypprehended see Pramãna-viniscaya-fíkã3.1-2.). Themostcomprehensive reatmentf the nature fcognitions sfound nthe Sva-tahprãmãnyaparlksãectionof the Tattasamgrahapanjikã,here Kamalasïlaadds trainedperception abhyãsavat ratyaksa)o the list f validperceptualcognitions see especially Tattasamgrahapanjikãd Tattasamgraha944, inSvãmí Dvãrikadãsa, ed., Tattvasamgrahaf ÀchãryaShãntaraksitawith the

CommentaryPanjikã'of ShrJKamalasïla,vol. 2 [Vãrãnasí:Bauddha BhãratT

Series,1968], p. 647). Fora detailed treatmentf the statusof intrinsic ndextrinsicognitions nthe Buddhist pistemological iteratureee also HelmutKrasser,On the AscertainmentfValidityntheBuddhist pistemological ra-dition, Journal f ndianPhilosophy 1 (2003): 161-1 84.

8 - Cf. note7 above. Thus,to use an example, I knowI am perceiving irewhen

my pprehension f fire lso leads totheapprehension fthat ntitys havingthe capacityto burn,radiateheat,cook meals,et cetera. For a discussion ofthe differenceetween ntrinsicnd extrinsic aliditywithregard o Devendra-buddhi nd Sakyabuddhi ee Dunne,Foundations f DharmakTrti'shilosophypp.294-297. InTattasamgrahapanjikãd Tattasamgraha944, however,Kama-lasTla learlydemonstrateshat ognitions re only intrinsicallyalid in somelimited ases, while inmostother ases theydependon external onditions.

9 - W. Sellars, Empiricismnd the Philosophy f Mind, in HerbertFeiglandMichael Scriven, ds.,Minnesota tudies nthePhilosophy fScience, VolumeI: TheFoundations f Science and theConceptsofPsychologynd Psychoanal-ysis UniversityfMinnesotaPress,1956), p. 1

10 - Bimal KrishnaMatilal, Perception:An Essayon Classical Indian TheoriesofKnowledge Oxford:OxfordUniversityress,1986), p. 319.

1 1 - Dignãgatreats erceptionpratyaksa)s an inerrantaviabhicarin)ognition,nidea he adoptsfromheNyãyadefinitionfperception s found nNyãyasutra1.14: Perceptionsa cognition enerated hroughhecontactbetween he ob-ject and thesensory aculty,and]which is inexpressible,nerrantnd defini-tive (indriyãrthasannikarsotpannamnãnamavyapadesyam vyabhicãri yava-sãyãtmakam ratyaksam).

12 - Note that n thePramanavarttikaharmakTrtiollowsDignaga's definition fperceptionwithout nymodifications Perception s [that ognitionwhichis]devoid ofconception ).His addition f non-erroneous'abhrãnta)s foundfor








thefirstime nPramanaviniscaya52b.3: Perception s [that ognitionwhichis] devoid ofconceptualconstructionnd non-erroneous pratyaksa alpanã-podham abhrãntam).Dharmakïrti'sddition of non-erroneous'n fact corre-

sponds to the Nyãya definitionf perception s inerrantavyabhicãrin)ndcan also be found nAsanga'suse of abhrãnta o exclude from erception rro-

neous cognitions uch as the illusory ircle of a firebrandalãtacakramãyã),mirages mancikã), nd phantoms divyudãsa): Perception s [that ognitionwhich] in itself is] clear and non-erroneous 'Non-erroneous' s used for[thepurposeof] excluding[erroneous ognitions] uch as the illusory ircleofa firebrand, mirage, phantom pratyaksamvasatprakasabhranto'rthah. abhrãntagrahanamlãtacakramãyãmancikãdivyudãsãrthmti/ in NathmalTatia, ed., Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhãsyamPatna: Κ. P. JayaswalResearchInstitute,976], p. 152).

13 - Pramãnasamuccayavrttid Pramanasamuccaya .4: rdas kyi rang gi mtshad

nyid a nima y nno zhes kyangi Itar sungs he na, der don du mas bskyedpa7phyir rangdonspyiyi spyodyulcan /de rdas du mas bskyed ar by ba7

phyirna ranggi skyemched la sphyi'i pyodyul can zhes brjodkyi, ha dad

pa la thami dad par rtogs a las ni ma y n no (text nd translation,lightlyadjustedfor onsistency,n M. Hattori, ignaga,On Perception: eingthe Pra-

tyaksaparicchedafDignaga's Pramanasamuccaya rom heSanskrit ragmentsand the TibetanVersions Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityress,1968],pp. 26-27, 178).

14 - EdmundHusserl, deen zu einerreinenPhämenologieund phänomenologi-schen

Philosophie:Erstes

Buch,ed. KarlSchuhmann,rev. ed. (The

Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 976), translated y FrankKersten s Ideas Pertainingo aPure Phenomenology nd to a Phenomenological Philosophy Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers, 983), vol. 1, p. 105.

15 -Ibid.

16 -Maurice Merleau-Ponty, henomenologyof Perception, rans.Colin Smith(New York:Routledge nd KeganPaul, 1962), p. xi.

17 _ Overcoming heMyth ftheMental:How Philosophers an Profit rom he

Phenomenology f Everyday xpertise, residentialddressdeliveredat the

EasternDivisionmeeting ftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,Decem-ber 2006 inWashingtonDC, p. 1 1 Dreyfus ses theexampleof master-level

chess,specificallyightninghess,whereplayers recapable ofplaying gameintwominutes. he suggestions that t thespeed ittakes to playa game inundertwo minutesplayersmustnecessarily ely entirely n perception ndnot at all on analysis nd comparison falternatives p. 8). The master hess

player'sknowledge s notanalyticbutembodied.The maintarget fDreyfus'criticisms theconceptualism ohnMcDowell develops inhisMind and World

(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityress, 994). Inrejectinghepossibilityf

nonconceptual ognitive tates, nd in advancingan intellectualistiew (best

Christian oseru 433







capturedby Merleau-Ponty'sbservation hatfor he intellectualistjudgmentis everywhere uresensation s not,which is to say everywhere''),McDowell,likeSellars, oins KantbyendorsingwhatDreyfus alls theMyth f the Men-tal (p. 7).

Ί8- Ibid.,p. 12.19 - Thisambiguity as first otedbyHubertDreyfuswhileexploring he different

interpretationsf themeaningof HusserPsperceptualnoema (the intentionalcorrelate fperceptual onsciousness).See Husserl'sPerceptualNoema, inH. Dreyfus, d., Husserl, ntentionality,nd CognitiveScience (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1982), p. 98. The two dominant nterpretationsre those of

DagfinF0llesdal and AronGurwitsch: he first roposesa Fregeanmodel ofthe noema as a concept,while the latter rguesthatthe noema best fits heGestalttheorydescription f a percept.See F0llesdal, HusserPs NotionofNoema, in

Dreyfus,Husserl,

ntentionality,nd

Cognitivecience,

pp.73-

80), and Gurwitsch,HusserPsTheory f theIntentionalityfConsciousness,in bidvpp. 59-72. For recent eview fthe continuing)ebate on themean-

ingof HusserPsnoema,see Dan Zahavi, HusserPsNoema and the nternalism-Externalismebate, Inquiry 7 (2004): 42-66.

20 - Husserl/Kersten,deas Pertainingo a PurePhenomenologynd to a Phenom-

enological Philosophy, 128.

2 1 - Analysen urpassivenSynthesis: usVorlesungs-ndForschungs-manuskripten0918-1926), ed. MargotFleischerTheHague: MartinusNijhoff,966), p. 11,

translated y Anthony .Steinbock s AnalysesConcerning assive and ActiveSynthesis: ectures n Transcendentalogic Dordrecht:Kluwer, 001), p. 43.

22 - Itseems Husserlquite clearlydistinguishes etween the data of the inherentnoetic content r hyle thequalia of experience,e.g. redness,hardness) ndthe data of the noematiccontent thethingperceivedas perceived): Corre-sponding nevery ase to themultiplicityf Data pertainingo thereally nher-entnoeticcontent, here s a multiplicityfData, demonstrablenactual pureintuition,na correlative noematic ontent Thisnoema,orperceptual ense(Sinn) s nothing uttheperceivedas perceived Husserl/Kersten,deas Pertain-

ingto a Pure

Phenomenologynd toa

PhenomenologicalPhilosophy,214).

23 - A case forthe epistemicrelevance of nonconceptualnoematic contenthasbeen made recently yMichael Shim,who arguesthatHusserPsnoema,con-traryo F0llesdaPsFregean nterpretation,lso admits,besides internal epre-sentational ontent,noemataof theperceptual ort hat re nonconceptual. findeed,as Shimsuggests,Husserl llows for henoematicnonconceptual on-tent obe perceived, hen olving heproblem ftheveridicalitynd reliabilityofperceptual ognitions emands notsimply n abandonment fthe naturalattitude ut also an effectingf the epoché. Without he phenomenologicalreduction, onceptualizationeasily reduces the contentsof perception o a








theoreticallyoherent ystem f beliefs bout experience, husforcing con-clusionthat oherentists,or nstance, hare withNaiyãyikas: the content f

experience sconceptual/'See MichaelShim, The Duality fNon-conceptualContent nHusserl'sPhenomenology fPerception, henomenologynd the

Cognitive ciences4 (2) (2005): 209-229.

24 - RichardRorty,hilosophynd the Mirror f Nature Princeton: rincetonUni-

versity ressΊ980), p. 104. Note thatRorty nderstands he doctrine fNatu-

rallyGivento encompass boththe Cartesian nd Behaviorist ccounts of the

'perceptually iven/

25 - JohnDrummond,Phenomenologynd the Foundationalism ebate, Reason

Papers16 (Fall 1991): 45.

26 - Ibid.,p. 49.

27 -Ibid.

28 - Abhidharmakosabhasyad AbhidharmakosaVI, 4: anyadharmapohe'pi ud-

dhayãtatparamãrthasat tadyatha üpam/tatra iparamãnusebhinnevastuni

rasãrhãnapi a dharmãnapohya udhayã rüpasya vabhãvabuddhirbhaktyevaevamvedanädayo'pidrstvyãhétatparamãrthanhãvãtparamãrthasatyamti/yathã okotarenahãnena grhyate atprsthalabdhena ã laukikenatathapara-mãrthasatyam ... púrvãcãryh {Abhidharmakosabhãsyamf Vasubandhu,ed. P. Pradhan,rev. by A. Haldar [Patna: Κ. Ρ. JayaswalResearchInstitute,1975], p. 334).

29 - Notethat or omeone likeDharmakirtihe phenomena' underdiscussion re

not simply nternalnoematiccontent,but infinitesimalarticles hatcan, inprinciple,be perceptually pprehended.See PramãnavãrttikaII, 194. Argu-ably,at the (sub)atomic evel ofswarmingnfinitesimalarticles he internal/external istinction o longer pplies.

30 - DharmakTrti,ramanavarttikasvavrttid PramanavarttikaII, 171cd-1 72: atovisesa eva / sa evãrthas asyavyãvrttayopare/ tatkãryakãranamoktam tatsvalaksanam isyate//tattyãgãptiphãharvãh purusãnãmpravrttayah yadarthakriyãkãriat va vastv ti uktam sa ca visesaeva / text n Ram Chandra

Pandeya,ed., The PramãnavãrttikamfAcaryaDharmakJrti: ith the Com-

mentaries vopajnavrttif theAuthor nd PramãnavãrttikavrttifManoratha-nandin Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 989], p. 258. Cf.Dunne, Foundations fDharmakTrti'shilosophyp. 84 n. 49. See also GeorgesDreyfus, ecognizingReality: harmakïrtYshilosophy nd ItsTibetan nterpretationsAlbany: tate

Universityf New YorkPress,1997], p. 67 and p. 479 n. 35).

31 - See Dunne, Foundations f Dharmak'rtVshilosophypp. 83 ff.

32 - Ibid.,p. 82.

33 -See Abhidharmakosabhasyad Abhidharmakosa , 1cd: [They are called]dharmasbecause

they'bear'

particularssvalaksanasdhãranãddharmah).

Christian oseru 435







Cf. ColletteCox, Disputed Dharmas: EarlyBuddhist Theories on Existence

(Tokyo: nternationalnstitutef Buddhist tudies,Ί995), p. 12.

34 - Abhidharmakosabhasya I, 14cd, p. 341: kayam svasamanyalaksanabhyamparlksate vedanãm cittam harmãs a /svabhãva evaisãm svalaksanam/.

35 - Merleau-Ponty,henomenology fPerception, . 238.36- Ibid.,p. 250.

37 - See Abhidharmakosabhasyad AbhidharmakosaI,22ab.

38 - Dan Arnold,Buddhists, rahmins,nd Belief New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 005), p. 22.

39- Ibid.,p. 18.

40 - For the sake of consistency nd also because consciousness and perceptualawareness are not interchangeable or the Buddhists, translatevijnãna as

consciousness and vijnapti s awareness.41 - Arnold,Buddhists, rahmins,nd Belief, . 26.

42 - DharmakTrtiistinguishesetweenfour ypesofperceptual ppearances (pra-tyaksãbhãsa); hreeof thesepertain o conceptualcognitions nd one to non-conceptualfactors ertainingo perturbationst the basis (ãsrayopaplava) thebasis here referso thesensory ystems). ee PramãnavãrttikaII,288.

43 - Pramanaviniscaya, 34: hetubhãvadrtena anyagrahyatanama kacana. tatrabuddhiryadãkãratasyãstadgrãhyam cyate.Cf.Dunne, Foundations f Dhar-

makïrti's hilosophy, . 84. Whetheror not DharmakTrtietains he causalmodel ofperception nthe case of internalbjects is disputable.See GeorgesDreyfus, ecognizingReality, . 336, and Dunne,Foundations f Dharmaklrti'sPhilosophy, . 84, for discussionof this ssue.

44 - Tattvasamgraha958: ucyate vastusamvadah ramanyamabhidhiyatetasyacãrthakriyãbhyãsajnãnãdanyannaaksanam// rthakriyãvabhãsama jnãnamsamvedyate phutam.

45 - J.N. Mohanty,Classical IndianPhilosophyLanham:Rowmanand Littlefield,2000), p. 149.

46 - Ibid.47 - See T. TiNemans,Materials or heStudy fAryadeva, harmapalaand Candra-

klrtiVienna:Arbeitskreisür ibetischeundBuddhistischetudies,1990).

48 - T. Tillemans, MetaphysicsforMadhyamikas, n Dreyfus nd McClintock,TheSvãtantrika-Prasangikaistinction, . 98.

49 - Ibid.

50 - The quote is fromKamalasila'sSarvadharmanihsvabhavasiddhitext nd trans-lation nTillemans, Metaphysics orMadhyamikas, p. 1 16-1 1 7 n. 13).








51 - See, for xample,Pramanavarttikasvavrttid Pramanavarttika. 5., and Hetu-bindu26, 12-13.

52 - For discussionof this ssue see GeorgesDreyfus, ecognizingReality, . 69.

53 - See Santaraksita'sMadhyamakalamkaravrtti,s quoted in Tillemans, Meta-

physics orMãdhyamikas, . 99.54 - GeorgesDreyfus,Can the Fool Lead the Blind?Perception nd the Given in

Dharmakïrti'shought/' ournal f ndianPhilosophy 4 (3) (1996): 224.

55 - See Pramanasamuccaya , 1, and Pramanasamuccayavrttid cit mngonsum

dang ni rjessu dpag, tsadma'o mtsannyidgnyisgzhal bya, de la rab sbyorphyir sadma,gzhan niyodpa mayinno (text nd translation,lightlyltered,in Hattori, ignãga, on Perception, p. 24, 176). In thispassage, I followthe

suggestions f RadhikaHerzberger nd Vittorio an Bijlert hat ranslating iin na hi svasãmãnyalaksanabhyãms 'for'or 'because' and not as 'only' (as

Hattori oes) avoids the unwarrantedonsequence, untenable, think,onsid-eringDignaga's doctrine fapoha, that here s a completeand unbridgeablegap betweenthe perceptualand the conceptual. See Herzberger, hartrhariand theBuddhists:An Essay in theDevelopmentof Fifth nd SixthCenturyIndianThoughtDordrechtnd Boston:D. ReidelPublishing ompany,1986),

p. 14, and V. van Bijlert, pistemologynd SpiritualAuthorityWien:WienerStudien urTibetologieundBuddhismuskunde,989), p. 15.

56 - M. Chadha, PerceptualCognition:A Nyäya-Kantian pproach, PhilosophyEastand West51 (2) (April2001): 205. Chadha's main arguments thatthe

Kantianmodelofperception rovides satisfactoryeasonforwhy he ntuitionof a late Naiyãyika ikeGangesa that eeing is best understood s seeing a

particulars a property-instancehould, nfact,be extendedto all instancesofperceptual ognition.

57 - See MarkSiderits, PerceivingParticulars: BuddhistDefense, PhilosophyEast nd West50 (3) (July004): 368-372.

58 - Tillemans, Metaphysics orMãdhyamikas, . 103.

59- Ibid.,pp. 102-103.

60 - Self-awareness,s Tillemansrightlyotes, s crucialto the Buddhist ramãnatheorists, ut is strongly ejected by Mãdhyamika philosopherssuch asCandrakTrti.

61 - See W. Sellars, Empiricism nd the Philosophyof Mind, Introduction yRichardRortynd a StudyGuide by RobertBrandom Cambridge:Harvard

Universityress,1997), pp. 121-122, as quoted in Tillemans, MetaphysicsforMãdhyamikas, . 120 n. 25.

62 - Matilal,Perception, . 321.

63 -Quine, Epistemology aturalized, eprinted

nHilary

Kornblith,d., Natural-

Christian oseru 437







izing Epistemology,nd ed. (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, Ί994), p. 74. Notethat n his responseto hiscritics, uine had subsequently eformulatedomeof his earlierviewsby allowing epistemologyo play itstraditional ormativefunctionsnaddressing uestionsofvalue and moral udgmentsee, esp., TheWeb of Belief[New York:Random House, 1978] and Theories nd Things

[Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityress,1981 ).64 - For a discussionofthephilosophical mplications fcurrent esearch ncolor

constancy ee EvanThompson,Color Vision:Study n Cognitive cience andthePhilosophy fPerceptionLondon:Routledge, 995), pp. 97-98.

65 - See, for xample,J.K.O'Regan, Solving he Real·' MysteriesfVisual Percep-tion:The World as an OutsideMemory/'CanadianJournal fPsychology 6(3) (1992): 484-485.

66 - See, for xample,S. J.Blackmore, . J.Brelstaff,. Nelson,and T. Troscianko,

Is the Richnessof Our VisualWorldan Illusion?TranssaccadicMemoryforComplexScenes, Perception 4 (9) (1995): 1075-1076.

67 - Cf. MarkRowlands, Two Dogmas ofConsciousness, Journal f Conscious-ness Studies9 (5-6) (2002): 172.

68 - MarkSiderits,Madhyamakaon NaturalizedEpistemology unpublishedms.for nternationaleminar n ConceptsofKnowledgeEast and West,Calcutta,January, 1995).

69 - A somewhat imilar iew isexpressedbySara McClintockwhen she writes hat

even thoughBuddhist ramãnatheorists nderstand erception.. as a kindof direct nd full-blownncounterwith hereal there re good grounds orcaution nreferringo thecontents fperception s thegiven, inceperceptualawareness alone seemsunable toground r ustifyasic beliefs The Role ofthe Given' inthe Classificationf Sãntaraksita nd Kamalasïla as Svãtantrika-Mãdhyamikas, n Dreyfus nd McClintock,The Svãtantrika-Prasangikais-tinction, . 129).

70 - See G. Lakoff,Women, Fire, nd Dangerous Things:WhatCategoriesRevealabout the Mind (Chicago: Universityf Chicago Press,1987), pp. 284-290.More

recently,akoff nd Johnsonhave

arguedthat these basic

cognitiveimages or Image schémas/which are reflective f our phenomenologicalembodiment, re themeansbywhich we apprehend heworldnonconceptu-ally throughhebody.As themeansbywhich we orient urselves nthe envi-ronmentnd act out ourpurposefulctions,ourapprehension f what s phe-nomenally iven nanysituation dependson ourembodiedunderstandingfthe situation Lakoff nd Johnson, hilosophy n the Flesh: The EmbodiedMind and ItsChallengeto WesternThoughtNew York: Basic Books, 1999],pp. 36, 102).

71 - Merleau-Ponty,henomenology fPerception, . 250.

438 Philosophy ast & West







72 - Tattvasamgrahapanjikad Tattvasamgraha253-1 255: yato netam manasibhrãntih ramavarttinJarsanãnighatayantJamupajãyate,kirn arhi? akrde-

kaivendriyajããakrãkãrã hrãntihãmagrlvisesabalãdutpadyate.he arising fa conscious cognitive ventdepends, accordingto the Abhidharma iew on

perception, n the presenceof the object, the sensoryorgan,and attention.

For nstance, n order o cognize a formrCipavijnãna,.e., have thecognitionof a form),our actorsre necessary: he visualsense,thevisibleobject,ambi-entlightãloka) (inthe case ofvisualobjects),and consciousness manaskãra)(inthe sense of mental ctivity).

73 - See Tattvasamgraha253-1255 and Tattvasamgrahapanjikad cit.

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Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception Author(s)- Christian Coseru

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