Buddhism, Hume, No Self

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    P.175

    The problem of personal identity is often said to beone of accounting for what it is that gives personstheir identity over time. However, once the problemhas been construed in these terms, it is plain thattoo much has already been assumed. For what has beenassumed is just that persons do have an identity. Tothe philosophers who approach the problem with thissupposition already accepted, the possibility thatthere may be no such thing as personal identity isscarcely conceived. As a result, the morefundamental question--whether or not personalidentity exists in the first place--remains unasked.Consequently, the no-self theory, that is, therejection of the notion of personal identityaltogether, is never fully considered. One of thereasons for the ignoring of the no-self theory seemsto be the failure of many philosophers todistinguish between reductionism and the no-selfview. The reasons for this error are perhaps

    understandable. For there is a sense in which thetwo theories are in agreement. Both theories, forexample, reject the notion of a substantive selfwhich somehow exists beyond the bounds ofexperience. The difference, however, is that whilethe reductionist accounts then go on to resurrectthe self and, consequently, its identity, in termsof putative psychological relations or varioustheories of the body, the no-self theory lets theself lie where it has fallen. This is because theno-self theory is not a theory about the self atall. It is rather a rejection of all such theoriesas inherently untenable. And since reductionism is

    just one more theory about the self, it, too, mustbe untenable. In explaining the distinction betweenthese two theories it is instructive to turn to thephilosophy of mind, where we find a similardistinction being employed. Here a distinction isoften drawn between reductive materialism andeliminative materialism. Both these theories are inagreement so far as they reject the existence ofmental phenomena. But while the former attempts todo so by showing how the notion of the mental can bereduced to the physical--that is, that those thingscalled minds are really just brains or states of thebrain--the latter rejects the notion of the mental

    as fundamentally confused, and so hopes to eliminatethe idea of the mental altogether. The eliminativematerialist would argue that although the reductivematerialist is right to reject the idea of themental, he is wrong to think he can reconstruct themental in terms of the physical. This is because, itis argued, discourse about things likeintentionality and awareness is simply not reducibleto discourse about things like neurological states.Importing this distinction into the discussion ofpersonal identity, we could then say that theno-self theory is an eliminative rather than areductive theory of personal identity. The no-self

    critique of the reductive theory of

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    identity would then be that the concept of self andpersonal identity cannot be reduced to our ideasabout psychology or bodies and, therefore, that suchconcepts have to be eliminated.(1) We must not,however, push the analogy too far. For although someeliminative materialists see the elimination of thetheory of the mental as implying an elimination ofmental language, an analogous implication does nothold for the no-self theory. That is, within theno-self theory we can, as I shall soon argue,eliminate the notion of the self and its identity,and yet on pragmatic grounds continue to permit theuse of the language of personal identity.

    A further but related point that separatesreductionism from the no-self theory is that sincereductionism seeks to give an account of personalidentity--a notion which has its roots firmlyembedded in the soil of the strict or nonreductivetheory (that is, the view that personal identity is

    something simple and unanalyzable)--then it hasalready accepted a certain view into which it mustnow force the structure of human existence. Andthis, it would seem, cannot but lead to distortedaccounts of how we undergo our experience. Theno-self theory, on the other hand, has no such priorcommitments. And in this sense it is morephenomenologically based than are the reductionisttheories. To borrow Husserl's phrase, it goes backto the things themselves. That is, it starts with anexamination of experience rather than with anattachment to the project of how to account forpersonal identity. This does not mean, of course,

    that the no-self theory need not face the issue ofwhy someone might come to believe in his ownidentity. For if there is no such thing as personalidentity, then it is essential that we can offersome other account of why someone might be led tothink there is.

    It is just this sort of approach to the problemof personal identity that is found in the writingsof the most important no-self theorist, David Hume.Hume was the first Western philosopher to unmask theconfusions attending our idea of personal identityand subsequently to reject the idea as a fiction. It

    will be worth our while, therefore, to start byconducting a detailed examination of his position.The problem, however, is that there is muchdisagreement about how we are to interpret Hume onthis point. On the one hand, there are somecommentators who, while agreeing that Hume doesreject the idea of personal identity, go on toproclaim that his account is deeply confused andinconsistent with what he says elsewhere. On theother hand, there are those who argue that hisaccount is quite consistent, but only because he didnot really reject the notion of personal identitybut only a particular version of that notion. It

    shall be my contention in what follows that boththese accounts are wrong. The latter is wrongbecause it fails to accept what Hume clearly says,namely, that identity of the self is a fiction. The

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    former is wrong because it finds confusion andinconsistency where, if we are fair to Hume, thereis none. This is not to say that Hume is completely

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    clear and exhaustive in his treatment of personalidentity, but only that within his writings we havethe makings of a solution to the problem of personalidentity.

    What, then, is Hume's position? If we attend tothe section "Of personal identity" in Book I or ATreatise of Human Nature, an answser is immediatelyforthcoming. Hume starts by pointing out thatalthough some philosophers believe we arecontinuously aware of something we call the self,when We look to our experience there is nothing tosubstantiate this belief. We are never, says Hume,aware of any constant invariable impression thatcould answer to the name of self. What we

    experience, rather, is a continuous flow ofperceptions that replace one another in rapidsuccession. "When I enter most intimately into whatI call myself," says Hume, "I always stumble on someparticular perception or other, of heat or cold,light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. Inever catch myself at any time without a perception,and never can observe any thing but theperception."(2) Within the mind, he continues, theseperceptions "successively make their appearance;pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinitevariety of postures and situations" (p. 253). Andthere is nothing to the mind but these perceptions.

    There is consequently never any simplicity withinthe mind at one time nor identity at two differenttimes. Nor, says, Hume, do we have any idea of aself; for every real idea must be derived from someone impression: "but self or person is not any oneimpression, but that to which our severalimpressions and ideas are supposed to havereference" (p. 251).

    With this much said against the notion ofpersonal identity, Hume turns to the question of whywe have such a proclivity to ascribe identity to oursuccessive perceptions. Prefacing his reply to this

    question, Hume points out that a distinction mustfirst be made between "personal identity as itregards our thought or imagination, and as itregards our passions or the concern we take inourselves" (p. 253). His concern here, he says, iswith the former. He then starts his answer bydistinguishing between the ideas of identity anddiversity. In the former case we have the idea of anobject that persists, invariable and uninterrupted,through a particular span of time. It is this thatcomprises our idea of identity. In the case ofdiversity we have the "idea of several differentobjects existing in succession, and connected

    together by a close relation" (p. 253). Now althoughthese two ideas are plainly distinct, it is certain,says Hume, that in our "common way of thinking" wegenerally confound them. That is, we often claim

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    that an object at one time is identical with anobject at another time, when in fact the two arelittle more than a succession of different objectsconnected by a close relation. To justify theseabsurd ascriptions of identity we either come upwith the notion of a substantive self by feigningthe continued existence of our perceptions, or weimagine the existence of something mysterious whichbinds our many

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    perceptions together. Even where we do not do thiswe at least have a propensity to do so. We can see,then, says Hume, that because we often assert theexistence of such fictions, the problem of personalidentity is not merely a verbal dispute. It isnatural to ask, therefore, what it is that inducesus mistakenly to attribute identity to somethingwhile, being a succession of objects, it is reallyan instance of diversity. Hume feels that the

    answer must lie in the workings of the imagination.The reason why we might make such an attribution,says Hume, is that "the passage of thought from theobject before the change to the object after it, isso smooth and easy, that we scarce perceive thetransition, and are apt to imagine, that 'tisnothing but a continu'd survey of the same object"(p. 256) . This is especially true when thealteration is either relatively small or when itoccurs gradually and insensibly.

    From here Hume goes on to consider the variousother ways in which we ascribe identity to objects

    which are variable and interrupted. This lays theground for his account of personal identity. For theidentity of the mind, like that of such changingthings as plants, animals, repaired ships, rebuiltchurches, and republics, says Hume, is only afictitious identity. It must therefore be similarlyexplicable in terms of the workings of theimagination. Hume concludes his account with theimportant remark that all "nice and subtile"questions concerning personal identity are bestconsidered as grammatical rather than philosophicaldifficulties. Thus, except where the notion of afictional entity or principle is involved, all

    disputes about personal identity are merely verbaldisputes and can never possibly be decided.

    A hurried reading of this section of theTreatise might well lead one to conclude that Humeis confused; for there are some apparentinconsistencies. These difficulties, however, areresolved by keeping in mind the scope of Hume'sproject and not allowing his claims to be taken outof context. Let us start our appraisal of Hume bydealing with a criticism raised by one of hiscommentators. In a paper called "Hume on PersonalIdentity," Penelhum argues that Hume's account is

    an immense blunder, "an excellent example of howcomplex and far-reaching the consequences of amistake in linguistic analysis or conceptualinvestigation can be."(3) According to Penelhum,

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    Hume's fatal mistake is to think that one objectcannot have many parts. This is false, claimsPenelhum, because whether or not an object has partswill depend upon what sort of object it is. Amelody, for example, is still one melody even thoughit consists of a succession of notes. A relatedmistake, we are told, is Hume's muddling of thedistinction between the numerical and specificsenses of identity. To remain the same through aperiod of time is to remain the same in a specificsense: to be exactly the same as one was at anearlier time. For an object to change, however, itmust remain numerically the same; for it must be oneand the same object which is doing the changing.

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    Unfortunately for Penelhum, Hume makes it quiteplain that he does allow for one object to have manyparts, and he even allows that the parts may undergo

    certain changes without affecting the identity ofthe whole:

    Suppose any mass of matter, of which the partsare contiguous and connected, to be plac'dbefore us; 'tis plain we must attribute aperfect identity to this mass, provided all theparts continue uninterruptedly and invariablythe same, whatever the motion or change of placewe may observe either in the whole or in any ofthe parts. (P. 255)

    What Hume does not allow is that an object can

    maintain its identity with a coming and going of itsparts. It might seem, however, that this is allPenelhum needs to have his point go through. Forwhat is a melody but one thing which is a successionof other things? And if this is so, then Hume wouldappear to be wrong in holding that a succession ofobjects cannot be one object.

    This, however, will not sustain Penelhum'sobjection. For if a melody is an object, it is adifferent sort of object than are the objects withwhich Hume is concerned. A melody, by definition, isa temporal sequence of musical notes: it is

    something whose existence is necessarily spread outover time. It is therefore logically incapable ofexisting instantaneously in the specious present.But there are no such logical restrictions on theexistence of trees, ships, churches, or persons. Wecan easily imagine a tree, for instance, whichsuddenly pops into existence only to disappearimmediately. And we can also imagine, it would seem,a person who exists but for a second. It is truethat trees and persons as a matter of fact tend toexist for varying durations of time, but I seenothing logically incoherent about their existingmerely in the specious present. Indeed, it is just

    because our idea of a person does allow for themomentary existence of a person that we are able toask questions about personal identity in the firstplace. For only when we have allowed this can we

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    raise the question of whether a person existing atthis particular instant is the same as an earlierperson existing at an earlier instant. We cannot,however, ask the same question about a melody, formelodies do not exist at particular instants; onlytheir notes do.

    So Penelhum's alleged counterexample of onemelody that contains several parts is quiteacceptable to Hume. It is acceptable, first, becauseHume never denied that one object cannot consist ofseveral parts and, secondly, because even though amelody is a succession of parts, this is a necessaryfeature of a melody in a way that it is not anecessary feature of a person.

    What about Hume's purported muddling of thenumerical and specific senses of identity? Thiswould be a strange error for Hume to make since, asPenelhum is aware, Hume himself draws this verydistinction in the course of his argument. But,

    according to Penelhum, Hume has made

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    this mistake just so far as he thinks that forsomething to remain the same it must not change. Foran object to remain unchanged is for it to remainthe same in the specific sense. But for an object tochange through time it must remain the same in thenumerical sense. Of course, says Penelhum, an objectcan lose its identity by changing, but only if theobject is by definition an unchanging thing.

    It should not be too difficult to see what iswrong here. Consider Hume's example of a ship thathas its parts gradually replaced. It is possiblethat eventually none of the parts of the originalship remain. And yet the ship of today might beexactly similar to the earlier ship. We can expressthis relationship by saying the two ships have aspecific identity; that is, they exactly resembleeach other. It would be false, however, to say thatthe two ships have a numerical identity; for thereis nothing about them that is numerically the same.In contrast to this, Penelhum argues that the only

    reason for saying that something has lost itsidentity (that is, has become another thing) is thatit is by definition an unchanging thing. Sincenothing in the definition of a ship seems to ruleout the possibility of the ship having its partsrepaired, then even though the ship of today sharesnot one plank or bolt in common with the earliership, the two are nonetheless numerically identical,that is, one and the same ship. But were we toaccept this scenario we would immediately be facedwith a difficulty. For how could we distinguishbetween the situation where a ship has persistedwithout changing any of its parts, and the very

    different situation where it has changed all of itsparts? The natural way for us to mark thisdistinction would be to say that in the former casethe ship of today is exactly one and the same as the

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    earlier ship, while in the latter case it onlyresembles the earlier ship. That is, in the firstcase the two ships are numerically identical, but inthe second case they are only specificallyidentical. But on Penelhum's account we cannot drawthis distinction, because there is no distinction tobe drawn. Both cases have equal claim to beinginstances of numerical identity. And yet it isobvious that there is an important distinction to bemade here. In the case of the unaltered ship, whatwe have is a ship that is identical in the strongestsense with the earlier ship. In the case where theship suffers a total change of its parts, it can bethe same as the earlier ship only in a weaker senseAnd thin distinction, which is natural to mate, ismerely the distinction between numerical andspecific identity. Hume's account of identityallows us to make this distinction; Penelhum's doesnot. It seems, therefore, that it is Penelhum whohas muddled things.

    We should not, however, be led to conclude thatthe distinction between numerical and specificidentity is central to Hume's discussion. For Humeis not really interested in specific identity andonly introduces the distinction by way of showinghow we might come to ascribe (numerical) identitywhere there is none. One such way--and there are

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    other ways--is to confound the ideas of numericaland specific identity and to claim that twosuccessive objects are numerically identical when

    they are only specifically identical.

    This, it seems, is the mistake made by JamesNoxon.(4) Noxon tries to argue that this distinctionlies at the heart of Hume's thesis and that Hume'sreal purpose is to show how identity terms can bemeaningfully applied to persons once thenumerical/specific distinction is made clear.

    But this is an unfounded reading of Hume. Fornot only does Hume refer to the notion of specificidentity only in passing, but also nowhere does hemention or even imply that the real identity of

    these variable and interrupted things is a specificidentity. If we turn to the quotations cited assupport for this view, we can see the errorimmediately. When Hume says that a seedling whichbecomes a large tree is still the same oak, and thatan infant which becomes a man is still the sameindividual, he cannot be referring to specificidentity; for it is evidently false to say that aseedling is exactly similar (that is, specificallyidentical) to a one-hundred-foot tree, and just asfalse to say that an infant is exactly similar to anadult. There may be some vague similarities ineither case, but not enough to justify a claim to

    specific identity. Noxon seems aware of this problemand tries to avoid it by asserting that specificidentifications are based on "points of resemblanceevaluated in light of general knowledge of the

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    changes which things of a certain sort undergoduring a certain period of time."(5) But I am noteven sure if I know what this means. How is theknowledge that a seedling will change into a largeoak supposed to aid us in evaluating points ofresemblance between the two? For, regardless of ourknowledge of arboreal ontogeny, the fact remainsthat a sprouting acorn bears little or noresemblance to a massive oak.

    Further, it seems clear that Hume, in hisexamples, is intent on denying similarity ratherthan affirming it. Not only does the tree have noparticles of matter in common with the seedling, buteven the "figure of its parts is different.Likewise, the infant not only grows into an adult,but is "sometimes fat, sometimes lean." Noxon couldalways protest here that the tree remains exactlysimilar to the seedling so far as it is still anoak. But Hume says more than that the tree is stillan oak; he says it is still the same oak. And this

    strongly suggests that he is not here using "same"in its specific sense. If he only meant that theseedling is as much an oak as the tree (a pointlessthing to say), there would have been no need for theinsertion of the words "the same" before "oak."

    But does this not leave us with a problem? Forif Hume is not here referring to the specificidentity of the oak, then, we might think, he mustbe referring to its numerical identity; but as wehave just noted, the tree is said to have not oneparticle in common with the seedling, which means,for Hume, that the two cannot be numerically

    identical. The solution to this problem is to seethat Hume is not referring to the tree's

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    identity in any sense: he is referring to ourattribution of identity to the tree (that is, ourattribution of numerical identity). This is evidentfrom the line which immediately precedes his exampleof the tree. Hume remarks here "tho' everyone mustallow, that in a very few years both vegetables andanimals endure a total change, yet we stillattribute identity to them, while their form, size

    and substance are entirely alter'd" (p. 257). Thereference to the growing oak and the growing man aremerely illustrative examples of a changing plant anda changing animal to which we attirbute identity.Since, however, there can be no identity where theform, size, and substance of a thing has entirelyaltered, the identity which we attribute in suchcases can only be a fictitious one; that is, it isthe work of the imagination, not a propertybelonging to the object or, better, to thesuccession of objects to which we attribute it. Andthis is true not just for plants and animals but forall things which are variable and interrupted: for

    example, repaired ships, rebuilt churches, rivers,republics, and persons. So when Hume discusses "theidentity" of such things, he is only discussing howwe come to attribute identity to them, not their

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    actual identity.

    The only reason we might think that Hume ismaking positive statements about the actual identityof things is that we may fail to notice thestructure of his overall argument and locus only onspecific remarks. If we view the section "Ofpersonal identity" as a whole, wee will see that inthe first four paragraphs Hume discusses the actualidentity of the self and categorically rejects thenotion as untenable. He does, however, feel that wehave a natural propensity to ascribe identity toourselves, and it is to an explanation of thispropensity that Hume devotes the rest of hisdiscussion. This division in the test is alsoattended, for the most part, by a division in thetype of language that Hume uses to discuss identity.In the first part, Hume speaks in a categorical way.Thus it is claimed, for example, that "there is noinmpression constant and invariable" (p. 251) ."there is no such idea (of the sell)" (p. 252), "I

    always stumble on some particular perception orother" (p. 252), and, finally, "there is properly nosimplicity in (the mind) at one time, nor identityin different" (p. 253). However, when we come to thesecond part of the discussion, the language becomesmore psychological than categorical. That is, Hume'sconcern here is more with how we imagine, suppose,ascribe, or attribute identity rather than with theactual identity of things. And so the second partbegins by asking "What then gives us so great apropension to ascribe an identity to thesesuccessive perceptions, and to suppose ourslevespossest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence

    thro' the whole course of our lives?" (p. 253; myemphasis). This psychological language continues,for the most part, throughout this latter half: therepaired ship "is still consider'd as the same; nordoes the difference of the materials hinder us fromascribing an identity to it" (p. 257); although

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    plants and animals undergo a total change, "yet westill attribute identity to them" (p. 257); a manwho hears an intermittent noise "says it is stillthe same noise" (p. 258); and because an earlier

    church is demolished before its successor appears wedo not think of them as being different, "and forthat reason are less scrupulous in calling them thesame" (p. 258; my emphasis throughout the last fourquotations). Likewise, when Hume says we can extendour identity beyond our memories, his discussionmakes it plain that he is only talking about "themost established notions of personal identity" (p.262; my emphasis) , that is, what is commonlybelieved to be true about personal identity, and notabout personal identity itself.

    This use of psychological language to discuss

    the supposed identity of interrupted and variableobjects should keep us alert to the fact that Humeis here discussing only the origin of our belief insuch identity, and not the actual identity of what

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    is really an instance of diversity. Once we see thiswe should not be worried by Hume's occasional use ofcategorical statements in what is overtly adiscussion of psychology. Thus, when, in the secondpart of the text, Hume states that a seedling whichbecomes a tree "is still the same oak," all that isbefore this makes it plain that he can only meanthat it is still called the same oak, or it is stillsupposed to be the same oak, or some such thing, notthat it is actually still the same oak. Likewise,when he says that the infant becomes a man "withoutany change in his identity," all that he can mean is"without our attributing any change to hisidentity."

    There will be those, no doubt, who will chargethat I am riding roughshod over what Hume says andam twisting the text to suit my own purposes. But ifthis is true, then my critics must explain why Humesays that although the addition or removal of evenan inconsiderable amount of a mass of matter

    "absolutely destroys the identity of the whole,strictly speaking; yet as we seldom think soaccurately, we scruple not to pronounce a mass ofmatter the same, where we find so trivial analteration" (p. 256). For in saying this Hume hasnot only given the reasons why growing plants andhumans cannot maintain their identity over time(they are continually losing and gaining amounts ofmatter), but he also explains why we scruple not topronounce them the same (we find theirmonment-to-moment alterations too trivial to note).Of course, over many years the alterations that aseedling has undergone will no longer be trivial,

    "but where the change is produc'd gradually andinsensibly we are less apt to ascribe to it the sameeffect (that is, the loss of its identity)" (p.256).

    All of this should make it clear that, contraryto what many of Hume's interpreters would have usbelieve, for Hume it is an error to attributeidentity to variable and interrupted things. He saysin several places that the attribution of identityto instants of diversity is both a

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    mistake and an absurdity (see especially pp.254-255). But we must be careful here; for its beinga mistake does not imply what Penelhum thinks itdoes.

    After noting Hume's claim that we are making amistake in referring to a person over time as thesame person, Penelhum remarks that "a little effortof imagination is enough to indicate just how muchchaos would result from adopting Hume's diagnosis asthe source of a prescription and using a different

    proper name whenever we noticed the slightestchange, even in ourselves (or rather in the separatepeople that we would be from minute to minute)." Andif this is a mistake, continues Penelhum, it is one

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    whose correction "would require a complete overhaulof the concepts and syntax of our language."(6)

    Yet there is no reason to think that the correctprescription for Hume's diagnosis need be using adifferent proper name every time we notice a changein someone or something. Indeed, Hume even says thata rebuilt church, which we only imagine to be thesame as an earlier one, can still be called the sameas its predecessor "without breach of the proprietyof language" (p. 258). He does not, unfortunately,elaborate on this. However, at the end of thesection on personal identity something is said thatsuggests how it might be permissible to call twothings the same which in fact are only imagined tobe the same. Here Hume states that all disputesabout the identity of successive objects "are merelyverbal, except so far as the relation of parts giverise to some fiction or imaginary (i.e. mysterious)principle of union" (p. 262). Thus if two personsare arguing about whether or not an earlier church

    is the same as its rebuilt predecessor, and neitherof them is asserting the existence of a fictionalentity or principle of union which somehow unitesthe two churches, then their dispute will be merelyabout how the word "same" is to be used in thesecircumstances. That is, they will not be disputingan actual identity but only the linguisticconventions surrounding our use of identity terms.If we imagine that our disputants finally agree thatour linguistic conventions permit us to call the twochurches the same (a conclusion to which Hume wouldgive his assent), then we can see why it ispermissible to call two things the same which are in

    fact different This is because there are two levelsat which the notion of identity can be employed: onewhich deals with questions about identity at themetaphysical or ultimate level, and one which dealswith them at the verbal or conventional level.

    It is disappointing that Hume does not have moreto say about the two levels of "disputes." For it iswith such an account that we are able to explain whyit is acceptable for us to continue to talk in termsof selves and personal identity despite the factthat there are no such things. We can, however,arrive at a fuller understanding of what the

    two-level account involves by turning to anotherversion of the no-self theory. This

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    is the no-self theory as propounded by the Buddhaand various of his followers. The Buddhist theorycan offer some insights. For at the very heart ofthis theory lies the doctrine of the two levels oftruth. Although the different schools of Buddhistthought disagree on the exact nature of thedistinction to be drawn between the two truths,there are enough similarities-at least in the early

    Hinayana schools--for us to give a general account.This will be useful to our project because it willallow us both to see what Hume might have beengetting at and to acquire more munitions with which

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    to fend off this attack on the no-self theory.I hasten to add, however, that I am not hereattempting a scholarly exposition of Buddhistthought; for my present interests are confined to anexposition of the no-self theory of personalidentity. It is just that Buddhism has some valuablecontributions to make here. There are, of course,problems involved in the cross-cultural discussionof ideas; Hume and the Buddha, after all, livedtheir lives in very different social and historicalcontexts. And yet I do not think that thesedifficulties need detain us; for when we go to thetexts where Buddhist thinkers are grappling with theproblem of personal identity, we find their concernsare essentially the same as Hume's.

    In the earliest texts of Buddhism, the PaliCanon (about 500 B.C.), we come across a distinctiondrawn between two types of discourse: that of directmeaning and that of indirect meaning. The former

    type of discourse is said to be one whose meaning isplain while the latter type needs to have itsmeaning inferred with reference to the former. Inthe discourses of indirect meaning, words are usedwhich apparently refer to persisting entities suchas a self or an I which, according to the Buddha,are merely "expressions, turns of speech,designations in common use in the world which theTathagata (i.e, the Buddha) makes use of withoutbeing led astray by them."(7) That is, although wemay use words like "self" and "I," we should not beled into thinking that they actually refer tosomething, for they are but grammatical devices.

    This nondenoting aspect of these expressions issomething which must be inferred in light of thediscourses of direct meaning. In this latter type ofdiscourse, the nonexistence of anything permanent orenduring, such as the self or I, is asserted, andthe misleading features of language--those featureswhich lead us astray into the belief in an I--aremade explicit. Here there is no need for inference,since the meaning of such discourse is plain.

    As it happens, however, we are apt to confusethe two types of discourse: "there are these two whomisrepresent the Tathagata. Which two? He who

    represents a Sutta (i.e., discourse) of indirectmeaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and he whorepresents a Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta ofindirect meaning."(8) Although the Pali Canon doesnot elaborate here, we can easily see what sorts oferrors are being referred to. On the one hand wemight think that someone who is using the

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    words "self," "I,"or "Buddha" (which are mere turnsof speech) is in fact denoting a particular entity.

    Or, on the other hand, we might think that someonewho is denying the existence of the self cannotreally mean what he or she is saying and so we mightbe tempted to infer a further meaning which would

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    still allow the existence of the self. We might, forinstance, think that the person making this claim isonly denying the existence of a certain type ofself.

    The discussion of the two types of discourse iscontinued in the various Buddhist commentaries onthe Pali Canon, and here we are introduced to therelated ideas of two levels of truth. In onecommentary it is stated that all "Buddhas (i.e.,enlightened beings) have two types of speech;conventional and ultimate. Thus 'being', 'man','person', (the proper names) `Tissa', 'Naga' areused as conventional speech. `Cagegories','elements', 'sense-bases' are used as ultimatespeech." Because of this division in speech, we aretold that the Buddha "declared two truths: theconventional and ultimate, there is no third. Words(used by) mutual agreement are true because ofWorldly convention; words of ultimate meaning aretrue because of the existence of elements."(9)

    Although the various elements are said to be theconstituents of which everything else, includingwhat we call the self, is made, it is not becausethe elements are more basic than the self that theself is said ultimately not to exist. It is simplybecause there is nothing in the world, not even anassemblage of the elements, that can be identifiedwith the self. Although the Buddha cites variouscharacteristics that something must have if it is tobe considered a self, the most important is that ofpermanence or identity over time. But when we lookto our experience, there is nothing but impermance:our bodies, feelings, and thoughts are forever

    coming and going. In this sense the Buddha is incomplete agreement with Hume: where there isdiversity there can be no identity. None of this,however, implies that statements which make use ofwords like "self," "I," "you." " "Tissa, " or"Buddha.' are false or nonsensical at every level ofdiscourse. For they can be true at the conventionallevel, which means that they can be true because oftheir being used in accordance with mutualagreement, that is, linguistic convention.

    A good illustration of how this distinction isto be drawn is given in a well-known passage from

    the The Questions of King Menander (about A.D.100).(10) In this dialogue, the Indo-Greek kingMenander puts various questions about the nature ofthe self to the Buddhist monk Nagasena. At theopening of the dialogue, Menander asks "How is yourReverence known, and what is your name? " Thesomewhat provocative answer given to the king is"I'm known as Nagasena, your Majesty, that's what myfellow monks call me. But though my parents may havegiven me such a name... it's only a generallyunderstood term, a practical designation. There isno question of a permanent individual implied in theuse

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    of the word." Menander is quite astonished by thisreply and eventually asks "If your fellow monks callyou Nagasena, what then is Nagasena?" He askswhether Nagasena is any part of the body or themind, or whether he is all of these things takentogether, or whether he is anything apart from them.To all of this Nagasena replies merely "No, yourMajesty." Menander then exclaims triumphantly "Thenfor all my asking find no Nagasena. Nagasena is amere sound! Surely what your Reverence has said isfalse!" But Nagasena is not to be dealt with soswiftly and, in good Socratic fashion, replies byhimself asking a question: "Your Majesty, how didyou come here--on foot, or in a vehicle?" "In achariot," says Menander. Nagasena then asks what thechariot is, whether it is the pole, axle, wheels,frame, reins, or yoke, or whether it is all thesetaken together, or again whether it is somethingother than the separate parts. Menander replies inthe negative. With this Nagasena fires back at theking his own reasoning: "Then for all my asking,

    your Majesty, I can find no chariot. The chariot ismerely a sound. What then is the chariot? Surelywhat your Majesty has said is false! There is nochariot!" Menander protests that he has not saidanything false: "It's on account of all thesevarious components, the pole, axle, wheels, and soon, that the vehicle is called a chariot. It's justa generally understood term, a practicaldesignation." Nagasena's rejoinder is to praiseMenander for this remark and to point out that thesame holds true of himself. For it is because of hisvarious components that he is known by the practicaldesignation "Nagasena." However, he adds, in the

    ultimate sense there is no person to whom the namerefers.

    It is easy to mistake this passage, as some havedone, for a statement of reductionism.(11) But the textclearly disallows this interpretation. Thereductionist view would be that the person ofNagasena can be reduced without remainder to hisvarious impersonal constituents. But when the kingasks if Nagasena is all of the parts of his body andmind taken together, Nagasena answers "No." This isbecause Nagasena rejects any notion of a person thatexists in the ultimate sense: a person is not

    ultimately something other than his parts (thestrict theory), nor is a person ultimately the sumof his parts (the reductionist theory). This doesnot mean, however, that the word "Nagasena" is amere sound; for it is more than that: it is agenerally understood term whose proper use isdetermined by mutual agreement concerning how, when,and where it is to be used. Or, as Nagasena says, itis because of his various components that he isknown as "Nagasena," even though "Nagasena" does notrefer to anything.

    It is crucial to see, however, that in

    relegating such terms to the realms of conventionaldiscourse, Buddhism is nor proposing aconventionalist theory of personal identity. Thatis, for Buddhism, a person's identity is not

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    something ultimately to be decided by convention.For to

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    hold this position would be to commit the very erroragainst which the Pali Canon warns us, that is, torepresent a discourse of indirect meaning as adiscourse of direct meaning. It would be to conflatethe levels of truth and think that questions at theultimate level can be answered by agreements at theconventional level.

    We are now able to see why the no-self theorydoes not imply that our language is in need of anoverhaul. For it is quite consistent with thenonexistence of the self or I that we continue toemploy the words "sell" and "I" in their practicaleveryday usage, provided we do not mistake them fordenoting some particular entity at the ultimatelevel, or, as Hume would say, feign the existence of

    a fiction. This is why, contrary to what many ofHume's critics think, Hume's own use of thefirst-person pronoun does not undermine his theory.In Hume's statement "when I enter most intimatelyinto what I call myself, I always stumble on someparticular perception" (p. 252), the word "I" isbeing used at the convectional level: it is merely agenerally understood term whose proper use isdetermined by mutual agreement. We should not,therefore, think that in using the first-personpronoun Hume has committed himself to the existenceof a self at the ultimate level.

    Some will no doubt find it paradoxical that wecan use personal language correctly when there isnothing to which these terms ultimately refer. Itwas reasoning akin to this, it seems, that ledDescartes to his famous proclamation "I think,therefore I am." I must exist, reasoned Descartes,because even when I doubt that I exist there isstill an I that is doing the doubting. But Descarteshas become led astray by his own language, for thereis no need for the "I" in "I think" or "I doubt" torefer to anything. What Descartes was aware of, asboth Hume and the Buddha would agree, was justthinking, not an I that was doing the thinking.

    Consequently Descartes might just as well have said(and should have said if his concern was withultimate rather than conventional truth) "there isthinking, therefore there are thoughts." And such adeduction, if we may call it that, does not sufficeto prove the existence of an I.

    A possible response here would be to say thatalthough there need be no reference to an I when weuse the nounal sense of "thinking" or "thoughts,"when the verbal sense "I think" is employed, thenplainly there must be some reference to a subject;for what is it that thinks? To this it can be

    replied that although the term "think" does requirea subject, this is little more than a grammaticalrequirement. And so we might just as well employ anonreferring grammatical subject rather than the

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    misleading term "I." This is a point that isrecognized by George Christoph Lichtenberg, whosays, about Descartes' dictum, "We should say,'Itthinks', just as we say 'It thunders'. Even to saycogito is too much if we translate it with 'Ithink'. To assume the 'I' to postulate it is apractical need."(12) Thus, since the use of theverbal sense "thunders" also

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    requires the introduction of a subject, we bring inthe word "it" and say "it thunders." But this doesnot mean that the grammatical subject "it" hererefers to anything. All we are saying when we say"it thunders" is "there is thunder." Consequently,since the requirement that the word "thinks" have asubject is also a convention of grammar, or, as wemight say with Lichtenberg, a practical need, wecould likewise employ "it" to serve this purpose. Wecould say "it thinks, therefore there are thoughts,"

    and the appearance of "it" here would no more implya reference to an actual subject than would "it" in"it thunders."(13)

    There remains, however, a further problem whichneeds our attention. It was mentioned earlier thatone of the criticisms leveled at Hume is that hisaccount of personal identity is inconsistent withwhat he says elsewhere. The passages which aresupposed to contradict the view of the section onpersonal identity come from Book II of the Treatise,where in Hume discusses the nature of the passionsor emotions.(14) Because Hume refers here to the

    importance of the role played by the self as theobject of such passions as pride and humility, somewriters have been quick to accuse him ofcontradicting his earlier claims about the self.Thus Norman Kemp Smith cites the following passagesfrom Book II as being incompatible with Hume'sclaims from Book I:

    'Tis evident, that the idea, or ratherimpression of ourselves is always intimatelypresent with us, and that our consciousnessgives us so lively a conception of our ownperson, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that

    any thing can in this particular go beyond it.(P. 317)

    The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselvesand any object, the more easily does theimagination make the transition, and convey tothe related idea, the vivacity of conception,with which we always form the idea of our ownperson. (P. 318)(15)

    Kemp Smith suggests that the reason why Hume sofreely makes use of the idea of the self in Book IIwhen he has just dismissed the notion in Book I is

    that Book II was written before Book I, and,consequently, by the time Hume had got around towriting Book I he had forgotten what he had said inBook II.(16) Before we accept this picture of a

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    strangely distracted Hume, it seems we should lookat what is actually being said about the self inBook II. And what we find in the opening pages ofBook II is this: "`Tis evident, that pride andhumility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the sameobject. This object is the self, or that successionof related ideas and impressions, of which we havean intimate memory and consciousness." And a fewlines later we are told about "that connectedsuccession of perceptions, which we call self" (p.277). These hardly seem like the words of someonewho is totally incognizant of the view expressed inthe section on personal identity. Indeed, by takingthe time to insert these descriptions of the self inBook II, it seems that Hume is

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    anxious to remind us of the conclusions reached inBook I. And so, when Hume says in Book II that anawareness of ourselves is always intimately present

    to us, we should understand this in terms of whatwas said in Book I, namely, that to enter intimatelyinto what is called the self is just to encountervarious impressions. That is, what is alwaysintimately present to us is just those particularperceptions whose succession we call the self (thefact that Hume uses the word "intimately" in boththe passages from Book I and Book II also suggeststhat he is intent on discussing the same notion ofthe self in both places).

    Still there is an apparent problem here. Andthis is highlighted by the fact that Hume often

    speaks in Book II of our idea or impression of theself as though it were something which occursinstantaneously within our awareness, a singularperception which we experience as the object ofpride and humility. But, as Hume has told us, thereis no impression or idea of the self; there is onlythe smooth and uninterrupted progress of thoughtwithin our imagination. But how is it that a smoothand uninterrupted progress of thought could appearinstantaneously within awareness? The notion of anuninterrupted progress is a temporal notion; it issomething that occurs over an extended period oftime. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how such a

    train of perceptions could be an object to which wecould, in an instant, direct our emotions.

    I doubt, however, that this is a majordifficulty. Hume himself is aware that a differentaccount is needed to deal with those occasions, suchas in certain emotional states, where we suddenlycome across the object of what we callself-awareness. He says, we have noted, that inorder to discover what is responsible for thetendency to believe in personal identity, adistinction must be drawn between "personalidentity, as it regards our thought or imagination,

    and as it regards our passions or the concern wetake in ourselves" (p. 253). Personal identity ofthe first sort is his professed concern in Book I,while in Book II it is the latter sort. The problem

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    is that Hume never explains just how we are tounderstand the relation between the two sorts ofpersonal identity. He obviously wants the personalidentity that concerns the passions to be basicallythe same as that which the imagination constructs.This is evident from the descriptions of the selfgiven in his discussions of the passions. And yethis theory seems to require that the object of thepassions be capable of appearing to awareness in away that does not render it a succession.

    The way for us to deal with this problem, and sofill out our picture of the no-self theory, is tosee that when we enter a psychological or emotionalstate that seems to depend on an instantaneousawareness of self, what we are doing is notreflecting on a succession of related ideas (whichcould not be done at any one instant); rather we arelatching on to a particular collection of some ofthese ideas which, by virtue of their

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    being related, can instantaneously presentthemselves in a condensed form to our awareness. Itis with this discovery of a constructed or condensedself-image, as we shall call it, that we are broughtto a central point within the no-self theory,namely, that although we may on various occasionshave experiences of something that we take to beourself, on closer examination this object of ourawareness turns out to be nothing more than acollation of related images.

    Even some nonreductionists, such as JohnMcTaggart, for example, Seem to be alive to thepossibility that the establishment of what we callself-perception would not be enough to prove that aself exists, but only that something is perceived asbeing a self.(17) This suspicion that we might perceivesomething which we mistakenly believe to be ourselfis borne out by an examination of our states ofself-awareness. We can start by noting that althoughwe do experience occasions of self-awareness, thereare numerous instances in which it is plain that wehave no awareness of anything that can be considereda self. Take, for example, my awareness in the

    activity of listening to music. It is often the casein listening to music that one can become immersedin the music to the point that there is no room inconsciousness for the awareness of an I. Here thereis just the experience of the music: the gradualunfolding of the melody or theme. And listening tomusic is hardly an exceptional case. Otheractivities, such as reading or writing, playingchess, daydreaming, and making love, all provideinstances in which one can go on being thoroughlyunaware of oneself. It is, of course, possible forme to shift my awareness to a point where I am awarethat I am listening to music, but then I am no

    longer immersed in the music. It is important tosee, however, that when I am thus not immersed, thenmy experience of the activity is drasticallyaltered. This is because, in entering a state of

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    self-awareness, I undergo a "giving-up" or a"forsaking" of the activity in which I waspreviously engaged. My listening gets left behind asI conjure up the I to which I now direct myattention. Here the act of listening loses its senseof spontaneity; it becomes something I must strugglewith, something impeded by the new awareness that itis I who am doing the listening. The act ofself-awareness is thus a reflective and complicatedact which involves both a stepping back from theflow of experience and the introduction of a furtherelement (or rather collation of elements) into thatexperience. It is in this sense, then, thatself-awareness can be called a secondary phenomenon,for the object of self-awareness is not part of thebasic fabric of experience; rather it is somethingwhich experience itself fabricates and then takes asits object. It is, consequently, understandable thatself-awareness, with its complicated and reflectivequalities, is but an infrequent visitor toconsciousness.

    This view of the secondariness of self-awarenessis supported, I think, by what we know about theontogeny of consciousness. The develop-

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    mental psychologist Jerome Kagan, for example,delineates a sequence of four psychologicalfunctions which lead up to but do not imply theemergence of self-awareness. According to Kagan, thefirst function to appear which comes close toimplying the existence of consciousness is

    recognition memory. This makes its appearance in thefirst eight months of life and is displayed in theability to discriminate between familiar and novelstimuli. A few months later there appear thefunctions of retrieval and inference, by which Kaganmeans "the retrieval of schemata without any cues inthe immediate field and the generation of inferencesfollowing the relating of those schemata to presentexperience."(18) These functions are demonstrated bya child who looks persistently for a toy it just sawhidden a moment earlier. Here the child maintains aschemata of the hiding of the toy and infers thatthe toy must still exist somewhere. The fourth

    function, which emerges at about sixteen months,constitutes the child's ability to monitor, select,and control the other functions. This function isthe awareness of one's potentiality for action and,for Kagan, comes closest to our notion ofconsciousness.

    The difficulty, however, appears with theemergence of the fifth function, namely, theawareness of self as an entity with characteristics.This is a difficulty because, although the functionof self-awareness seems to depend on the appearanceof the earlier functions, nothing in the earlier

    functions implies that self-awareness need emerge:"To explain why a 30-month-old declares, laughingly,'I'm a baby,' as she crawls on the floor and suckson a bottle, requires more than an awareness of

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    one's ability to act. This behaviour presupposes notonly a schema for one's actions but also a schemafor the self as an object with variations inattribute."(19) Consequently, says Kagan, some newprocesses must be introduced into the developmentalsequence if the self-awareness function is to makeits entrance. But just what this must involve Kagancannot say; it remains, we are told, part of anancient enigma.

    However, it is not too difficult to see that ananswer to this "enigma" is already contained withinthe account. We need only observe that Kagan'sschema for the self as an object with variations isjust what we have called the constructed self-image.That is, it is a collation of earlier experienceswhich presents itself in a condensed form to ourawareness. Once we spell out the schema for the selfin this way we can see that the process needed togenerate it is not altogether dissimilar to theprocess which generates the fourth function, that

    is, the awareness of the potentiality for action.The child arrives at its action schema by directingits awareness toward its own abilities, that is, bymonitoring, selecting, and controlling the moreprimitive functions of recognition memory,retrieval, and inference. Once the child hasacquired the capacity thus to direct its awareness,it is but a small step then to turn this awarenesstoward some of the perceptions which constitute thesuccession of related ideas

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    and so arrive at a schema for the self. However,although the self schema will contain components notto be found in other schemata, the components ofother schemata will nevertheless be discoverablewithin the self schema. This is what kagan means, Itake it, by saying that the function ofself-awareness depends on the earlier functions.Thus the infant's awareness of being a baby willrequire more than an awareness of the ability toact, but will still involve such an awareness. Thisis because to have the awareness "I'm a baby" is,among other things, to be aware that one acts like ababy; and even a thirty-month old will know that

    crawling on the floor and sucking on a bottle arethings that are (normally) only done by babies. Thereason, however, why self-awareness will includemore than the child's awareness of its ability toact is that, in addition to acting, the child alsois acted upon by others, has an idea of its ownappearance, experiences emotions, and so on--all ofwhich are condensed into the object ofself-awareness. Thus, self-awareness is a secondaryphenomenon on the ontogenetic theory because it doesnot involve the acquisition of a new ability: it ismerely the deployment of an earlier function upon awider range of objects.

    Having established that self-awareness is both acomplicated and rare occurrence, we can now move onto the phenomenology of the constructed self-image.

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    For in laying bare its structure we will see thatalthough it is the object of what we callself-awareness, it is constituted by nothing morethan a collection of transient images.

    One of the central features of the constructedself-image is that it is a condensation of relatedexperiences. It is this feature that helps it tomasquerade as being a self; for, being acondensation of our experience, it appears both as asingular thing (although, as we shall see, this neednot be so) and, at the same time, as something whichcontains our experiences. Since the experiences ofwhich it is composed may be taken from the differenttimes of our life, we can also see how theconstructed self-image might, in an instant, conveysomething of the notion of identity over time; thatis, present itself as something that has persistedthroughout our lives.

    The psychological process of condensing several

    experiences into a single image or idea is notunique to the structure of self-awareness. On thecontrary, it is a process commonplace in much of ourpsychology. Thus, when I call up an image of myfriend Mary, I am not presented with a singleportrait, as it were, of Mary. What I find isseveral different images of Mary which have beencollated and superimposed upon one another. I may,for example, have an image of her hair in the wind,which at the same time incorporates the movement ofher dress. This composition may be further blendedwith an image of her face which is at once a frontalview and a profile, and this in turn may allow the

    blueness of her eyes to merge with the turquoise ofher earrings. In the same instant this

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    will all be bathed in emotional qualities that willreveal the feelings I have for Mary. Such imagesare, of course, transient, with certain of theirparts being introduced, expelled, and replaced in aninstant. However, as long as I dwell on the image ofMary, there will continue to be an indistinctnetwork of constituent images, the older of whichare forever dying away while new relations take

    their place. A similar process of condensation alsoseems to take place in the construction of dreamimages, and here, because of what Freud has calledprimary process or the unrestrained character ofhypnagogic cognition, the resultant complex mayincorporate numerous diverse elements that are heldtogether by only the remotest of connections.(20) Wemay, for example, encounter someone in our dreamswho displays the characteristics of severaldifferent people at once: in one way he is ourchildhood playmate, in another way he is our oldschoolteacher, while in yet a third way he issomeone whom we saw only yesterday. It is as if we

    were looking at one of those anatomy textbooks whichdepicts the different organ systems on a series ofoverlapping transparent pages. On the bottom page isthe skeletal system, on the next page is the nervous

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    system, and then comes the circulatory system, andso on. The end result is a single image of the humanbody in which the different organ systems arenevertheless discernable.

    The constructed self-image is put together inmuch the same way as other condensed images. When Ienter a state of self-awareness, the I that issummoned before my consciousness is not a simpleentity that infixes itself changelessly in my mind.It is rather a composite of various fading imageswhich will have some reference to how I see and feelabout myself. I may, for example, have an image ofmy face as it appeared to me in the mirror thismorning which is nevertheless infused with featuresof previous images of my face. Thus, although myeyes and lips might appear to me as they did today,my cheeks and the shape of my face might seem morelike those of myself of twelve years ago. Or againit might include features of how I would imaginemyself to look in twenty years. This composite image

    of my face might itself be superimposed on somefamiliar scene, say, the beach where I often go forwalks. Here the sand dunes might be incorporatedinto the cheeks and the rising of the waves into theforming of a smile. And all of this will bepresented in a suffusion of affective tones whichwill exhibit the emotional evaluations I have ofmyself. Like other of our condensed images, theself-image will have but an ephemeral existence; theconstituent images, continuously dissolving as newassociations, make their way into the complex. Justwhat the constituents of the constructed self-imageare will naturally be different for each person,

    since each person will see herself in a differentway. While for one person it may consist mainly ofidealized images of her physical appearance, foranother it may be a mixture of certain sensations oremotions, while for a third it may be

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    images of how others respond to her. To verify thatthis is so one need only ask different persons todescribe what it is they are aware of when they areaware of themselves. It will then be seen that suchimages vary quite markedly. Further, it also seems

    to be that although some people have a relativelyconsistent image of themselves over time (they havealways seen themselves as a whirling complex ofemotions), others do not (they now see themselves asmore of a physical entity than they did five yearsago).

    I said above that the constructed self-imageneed not exist as a singular thing; that is, at anyone moment it is possible for a person to have morethan one constructed self-image. And this much seemsto foflow both from what has been said about thepossible inconsistencies in the self-image over

    time, and from the nature of the psychologicalmechanism of condensation. For, in the first place,if one can construct two or more different images ofoneself at different times, then the stage is set

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    for the possibility of constructing as manydifferent self-images at the same time. It might beobjected that consciousness could not operate inthis divided way, but various other phenomena, suchas the findings of research on brain bisection, giveus sufficient grounds to question such anassumption.(21)

    Further, because the constructed self-image is acondensation of related ideas, it seems likely thatcertain of our ideas which normally appear when wethink of ourselves are such that they bear littlerelation to other ideas that also appear in the sameinstant. Consequently, any attempt at condensingthese ideas into a composite idea will tend to fail.Now in most cases the solution to this dilemma willbe somehow to repress one of the inconsistentexperiences or at least deny it entry into theconstructed self-image, that is, not allow it to bean element in the state of self-awareness. Theproblem, however, is that some of these offending

    experiences may present themselves as too salient ormeaningful to accept banishment from the self-image.What we have, then, is an experience or group ofexperiences that is at once pulled into and yetexpelled from the self-image. Under these conditionsit is quite conceivable that the exiled experiencesmight set up their own camp in which they, too,could fly the flag of the self-image. There wouldthen exist two or more groupings of experience, eachof which would present itself as the appropriateobject of self-awareness. To enter a state ofself-awareness in these circumstances would be tohave one's awareness divide itself between two

    objects competing for the same phenomenologicalstatus. In understanding how this could occur inconsciousness we must not think of the constructedself-image as an object to which I direct myattention in the same way that I might direct a beamof light upon a plane in the sky. For if we use thisanalogy we will be tempted to see the constructedself-image and my consciousness of it as if theywere

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    two separate entities, the latter of which somehowengulfs the former. We will then imagine that to have

    two or more simultaneous self-images will involvelittle more than having one instant of consciousnesswhich simultaneously engulfs more than one thing,much as one beam of light might illuminate twoplanes. But, in reality, the constructed self-imagejust is an instant of consciousness. For when Ienter into a state of self-awareness, what happensis this: my consciousness throws itself into acertain configuration that is structured in the formof a condensed self-image which permeates ordiffuses over my world at that instant. In thissituation we can begin to see how parts of myexperience, which are neither assimilable nor

    repressible, might fissure themselves off to becomea separate sphere of consciousness.

    A Person in this state might then begin to

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    experience himself as two distinct persons.Something like this could well play a role in thegenesis of the type of dissociative condition knownas multiple personality. Here the problem of havingmore than one self-image would be dealt with byproducing a schism in awareness which wouldsubsequently be attended by the appearance of two ormore personalities, each of which would be matchedto the appropriate self-image. I am not saying, ofcourse, that the constructed sell-image is to beidentified with the personality, but only thatwhatever sort of image we have of ourselves willtend to relate both to the way we behave and to theway we think, and that, as a consequence, having twoor more radically distinct self-images will tend tocorrelate with having two or more radically distinctpersonalities.

    We now have to ask what it is that leads someoneinto perceiving the constructed self-image as beinga self. And here again the work of Buddhist

    philosophers is most helpful. According to Buddhisttheory, what we call a person is really just anaggregation of the five khandhas or elements. Theseare: physical form, perceptions, feelings, motives,and consciousness. But none of these elements,whether considered separately or in combination, canrightly be identified with the self, for they lackthe various qualities which we attribute to theself.(22) This, however, does not stop one frommistakenly identifying oneself with one or anotherof the elements, and indeed this is a ubiquitousconfusion from which Buddhism hopes to set us free.But what is it that leads a person to this mistaken

    identification? To answer this we need to refer backto our previous discussion of the conventional andultimate levels of truth. There we saw that althoughpersonal names and personal pronouns do not at theultimate level refer to anything, at theconventional level it is quite acceptable to usesuch expressions for pragmatic reasons. Thus theBuddha uses the language of the self as convenientdesignations without being led astray by them. Theproblem is that, unlike the Buddha, many of us doget led astray by the expressions we use; that is,in failing to notice that we are using language atthe level of convention, we end up

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    thinking that there must be something to which thewords "I" or "self" refer. And so we turn our gazeinward (because this is where the self is supposedto exist) and, coming upon one or another of theelements, or a collection of the elements, hasten toidentify it with our self. Buddhism underlines theimportance that language plays here by making adidactic use of the Pali word ahamkara, which canmean both "the utterance of 'I'" and "I-make."(23)That the same word has both meanings helps to

    suggest a connection between the two meanings: notonly that the language of the self leads to thefabrication of a self but also that a fabricatedself leads to a misconstrual of the language of the

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    self. Here, then, we see the cyclical nature of thetrap in which the straying language user is caught.In uttering "I" one is led to misidentify an elementin one's experiences as the self. Having affectedthis delusory identification, one then goes on tomake similar utterances firm in the belief thatthese utterances ultimately refer to oneself. ForBuddhism, it is thus that we come to weave the firstthreads of an ever-expanding veil of delusion. Forin believing that we have a sell, we are easily ledto other experiences which depend on this illusoryself. Pride and humility, for example, can only gettheir foothold if there is something which weperceive to be the self and to which we can relatethe causes of our pride or humility. I cannot be proudof my successes or humiliated by my failures unlessI believe there is an I to whom these successes andfailures belong. This is why, on Buddhist theory,the giving up of the belief in the self--which wemust do if we are to be free from delusion--is alsoattended by the cessation of pride, humility,

    embarrassment, envy, and other self-oriented (andhence delusive) emotions.

    The Buddhist method for overcoming the delusionof self is to engage in meditation, a practice whichmay be described as pure internal analysis orsustained inward gazing. Through this technique, thesupposed internal self comes to be seen for what itis: a mere collection of transient elements. Thisrealization loosens the grip of the belief in selland so dissolves the constructed self-image backinto the elements from which it came. In one Palitext, the Visuddhimagga Sutta or The Path of

    Purificalion, we are told that through thecontemplation of voidness or, what is the samething, not-self, "the misinterpreting (insisting)that 'a self exists' is abandoned." This abandoningoccurs "because it has been clearly seen that thereis no core of permanence and no core of self."(24)The insight thus acquired, the Sutta tells us, is"the death of formations"; the formation that wetook for a permanent self dies before our very eyes.

    Here at last we are in a position to see howHume's idea of personal identity as it regards theimagination is related to the notion of the

    constructed self-image, or personal identity as itregards the passions. When I come to believe that Iam the same person I was twelve years ago, it isbecause of the smooth and uninterrupted progress ofthought

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    that is produced in my imagination when I reflect onthe succession of related ideas. This is theimaginary self which is contemplated over time andwhose identity is fictitious. When, on the otherhand, I believe that I am perceiving my self in an

    instant of self-awareness, such as when I experiencea self-oriented emotion, what is happening is thatmy awareness is being directed to an object which ismerely a condensed version of extracts from the

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    succession of related ideas. This is the constructedself-image, which is a rare and secondary aspect ofconsciousness. In either case, what I come upon ismerely a collection of experiences: in either case,there is no sell to be found.

    NOTES

    This essay is a version of part of a doctoral thesiswhich was accepted by the University of Edinburgh in1989. I should like, therefore, to thank theUniversity of Edinburgh and the Committee ofVice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universitiesand Colleges of the United Kingdom, from both ofwhom I received the scholarships which helped tomake this research possible.

    1 - For a discussion of how the bodily version ofreductionism misconstrues the nature of thebody, see my "Bodily Theory and Theory of theBody, " Philosophy 66, no. 257 (July 1991):

    339-347.2 - David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. J.

    A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978),p. 525. Further references are to this editionand are indicated in the text. Unless statedotherwise, all italics within this andsubsequent quotes are Hume's.

    3 - Terence Penelhum, "Hume on Personal Identity, "The Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 571.

    4 - James Noxon, "Senses of Identity in Hume'sTreatise, " Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical

    Review 8 (1969): 367-384.

    5 - lbid., pp. 372-373.

    6 - Penelhum, "Hume," p. 578.

    7 - Trans. K. N. Jayatilleke in Early BuddhistTheory of Knowledge (London: Alien & Unwin,1963), p. 319.

    8 - Ibid., p. 361.

    9 - Trans. Steven Collins in Selfless Persons:

    Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),p.154.

    P.199

    10 - In Sources of Indian Tradition, ed. Wm.Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1958) , vol. 1, pp. 103-105. Thefollowing translation comes mainly from thisedition. However, the editor omits theimportant final remark made by Nagasena. Thisline, which I have included, can be found in

    The Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol. 23,Milinda's Questions, trans. I. B. Horner(London. Luzac, 1963), bk. 1, pp. 37-38.

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    11 - For example, Derek Parfit, in Reasons andPersons (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), p. 273.Parfit is one of those who fail to distinguishbetween the eliminative no-self theory andreductionism. Consequently, he mistakenlythinks that the Buddhist position supports hisreductionism.

    12 - Trans. J. P. Stern in Lichtenberg: A Doctrineof Scattered Occasions (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1959), p. 270.

    13 - Stern does not seem to me to be aware of thispoint in his discussion of Lichtenberg. Seeibid., p. 270.

    14 - There are also the so-called "second thoughts"in the Appendix to the Treatise (pp. 633-636),where Hume seems to express doubts about thetruth of his account of personal identity.Here, however, I follow Norman Kemp Smith in

    thinking that the passage in question is infact a reaffirmation of his principles and thathis only doubts are with his theory's abilityto account for states of self-awareness. This,as will be seen, is not a difficulty for a moreexpanded version of Hume's account. For KempSmith's remarks on the Appendix, see his ThePhilosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study ofits Origins and Central Doctrines (London:Macmillan, 1931), pp. 553-560.

    15 - Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p.171.

    16 - Ibid., p. vi.

    17 - John McTaggart, The Nature of Existence(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), vol.2, chap. 36.

    18 - Jerome Kagan, The Second Year: The Emergence ofSelf-Awareness (Cambridge, Massachussetts:Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 148-149.

    19 - Ibid., p. 149.

    20 - For a discussion of primary process, seeSigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of theComplete Psychological Works vol. 5, TheInterpretation of Dreams, ed. J. Strachey(London: Hogarth Press, 1964), pp. 599-609.

    21 - See Thomas Nagel's "Brain Bisection and theUnity of Consciousness," in Personal identity,ed. John Ferry (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1975).

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    22 - For the Dialogue in which this argument isgiven, see The Collection of the Middle-LengthSavings (Majjhima Nikaya), trans. I. B. Horner(London: Pali Text Society, 1957), vol. 1, sec.

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    233.

    23 - See J.A.B. van Buitenen, "Studies in SamkhayaII," Journal of the American Oriental Society77 (1957): 15-25.

    24 - Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification(Visuddhimagga) , 2d ed., trans. BhikkhuNyanamoli (Columbo: A. Semage, 1964), p. 815.