Buddhism, Constitutionalism, and the Limits of LawReligious supremacy clauses, like the Buddhism...
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1 Buddhism, Constitutionalism, and the Limits of Law A Talk Delivered by Dr. Ben Schonthal October 5, 2015 Osgoode Hall Law School, York University Osgoode Colloquium on Law, Religion & Social Thought Introduction When one starts to look comparatively at the constitutional regulation of religion around the world, one notices a curious thing. The secular liberal models that most of us assume to be the norm-- or at least paradigm towards which we should aspire – have a much narrower footprint than might be expected. A large proportion of the world’s constitutions are not secular, but instead give special status and/or protection to a single religion, usually the most populous religion. According to recent data from the Pew Forum, 45% of the world’s basic laws are of this type. That is, virtually one out of every two constitutions in the world today recognizes a favored religion. Yet, ubiquity doesn’t count for much among law scholars. For many of us who study law in universities, and for most of those who engage in international legal advocacy work, religiously preferential constitutions have a bad name. This bad name comes from an assumption about how these sorts of constitutions work: we assume that, by giving special status to a particular religion, these constitutions give unambiguous legal and institutional advantages to the followers of that
Transcript of Buddhism, Constitutionalism, and the Limits of LawReligious supremacy clauses, like the Buddhism...
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Buddhism,Constitutionalism,andtheLimitsofLaw
ATalkDeliveredby
Dr.BenSchonthal
October5,2015
OsgoodeHallLawSchool,YorkUniversity
OsgoodeColloquiumonLaw,Religion&SocialThought
Introduction
Whenonestartstolookcomparativelyattheconstitutionalregulationof
religionaroundtheworld,onenoticesacuriousthing.Thesecularliberalmodels
thatmostofusassumetobethenorm--oratleastparadigmtowardswhichwe
shouldaspire–haveamuchnarrowerfootprintthanmightbeexpected.Alarge
proportionoftheworld’sconstitutionsarenotsecular,butinsteadgivespecial
statusand/orprotectiontoasinglereligion,usuallythemostpopulousreligion.
AccordingtorecentdatafromthePewForum,45%oftheworld’sbasiclawsareof
thistype.Thatis,virtuallyoneoutofeverytwoconstitutionsintheworldtoday
recognizesafavoredreligion.
Yet,ubiquitydoesn’tcountformuchamonglawscholars.Formanyofus
whostudylawinuniversities,andformostofthosewhoengageininternational
legaladvocacywork,religiouslypreferentialconstitutionshaveabadname.This
badnamecomesfromanassumptionabouthowthesesortsofconstitutionswork:
weassumethat,bygivingspecialstatustoaparticularreligion,theseconstitutions
giveunambiguouslegalandinstitutionaladvantagestothefollowersofthat
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religion.Weassumethatprivilegingagivenreligioninlawworkstoenhancethe
security,solidarityandwellbeingofthatreligioustraditioninlife.
Thislineofthinkingcanbeseenwithparticularviminliberalcriticismsof
SriLanka’sconstitution.ChapterTwoofSriLanka’sconstitutiongivestoBuddhism
the“foremostplace”andobligatesthestateto“protectandfoster”theinstitutions,
practicesandteachingsoftheBuddha,collectivelyreferredtoastheSāsana.Since
thecreationoftheseconstitutionalprovisionsin1972,avarietyofcritics—from
non-Buddhistpoliticians,toliberalsecularists,tosocialists,tointernationalhuman
rightgroups—haveidentifiedthischapterofSriLanka’sconstitutionasbothproof
of-andperpetratorof-religiousmajoritarianismontheisland.
Thereissometruthtothis.Religioussupremacyclauses,liketheBuddhism
ChapterofSriLanka’sconstitution,doindicatesomethingimportantaboutthe
relationshipbetweenconstitutionallawandreligiousmajoritarianism.Tomany
readers,theysuggesttheideathatthereisahierarchyofreligions.Moreover,these
clausesshowtracesoftheprocessofconstitution-writing:theconstitutionsofSri
LankaorMalaysia–or,forthatmatter,Iceland1–aremarkedbythesentimentsof
politicalelitesatthetimesoftheircreation.Thesesentimentsincludeconvictions
thatthemajorityreligionshouldbespeciallyprivileged.
However,constitutions—likeBuddhists—havemultiplelives.Theyhavea
pre-enactmentlifeasthecarefullywordedproductofelitepoliticalnegotiation;and
apost-enactmentlifeasacollectionofrulesandprinciplesthatarethoughttoguide
1TheEvangelicalLutheranChurchshallbetheStateChurchinIcelandand,assuch,itshallbesupportedandprotectedbytheState.Thismaybeamendedbylaw.(Art.62)
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acountry’ssharedpoliticalfuture.Theyhaveasocietallife,inwhichconstitutional
languagefunctionsaspartpopulardiscourse,andalegallife,inwhichconstitutional
clausesfunctionastechnicalinstrumentsinofficialprocessesoflitigationand
regulation.Constitutionallawfunctionsdifferentlyinthesedifferentlives.
Thistalkexploresonetellingmomentinthepost-enactment,legallifeofSri
Lanka’sBuddhismChapter.Ithighlightsasurprisingchasmbetweenthesimple
meaningoftheseclausesandtheiractualeffectswhenusedinthecontextof
litigation.Itrevealsanunexpecteddisconnectbetweenthepre-enactment,societal
desiresthatgaverisetoSriLanka’sBuddhismChapterandthepost-enactment,legal
outcomeswhichtheChapterhasenabled.
ThosewholobbiedforspecialprotectionsforBuddhisminSriLanka’s
Constitutiondidsointoorder“tomakeLanka’sBuddhistpeopleintoastrongand
unifiedbody(eksatprabalaāyatanayak)onceagain”-aftercenturiesofcolonialism.
However,contrarytotheexpectationsdrafters–andcritics–thesespecial
protectionsforBuddhismhavenotsimplysupportedorenabledBuddhist
hegemonyontheisland.Althoughlitigantshave,attimes,attemptedtousethe
BuddhismChaptertojustifyspecialtreatmentfortheisland’sreligiousmajority,a
moreconsequentiallegacyoftheBuddhismChapterhasbeenitspolemicaluseby
certainBuddhiststodefendthereligionagainstotherBuddhists.
Thus,ratherthansimplyconsolidating“Buddhistinterests,”constitutional
protectionsforBuddhismhave,inmanycases,authorizedsplitsamongBuddhists.
ThesesplitshavedividedoneBuddhistorganizationagainstanother,onemonastic
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fraternity(nikāya)againstanother,andhaveevendividedtrusteesandincumbent
monkswithinasingleBuddhisttemple.
ThestakesofthisargumentextendwellbeyondtheshoresofSriLanka.A
closelookattheSriLankancasenotonlyforcesustorethinktheworkdoneby
religioussupremacyclauses,italsoforcesustorethinktheessentialdifference
betweenso-calledsecularconstitutionsandreligiouslypreferentialones.Couldit
bethatwhenitcomestoreligion,modernconstitutionalismasaform—asasetof
institutionsandpractices—ismoredeterminativethanthecontentandsubstanceof
thatform?Inotherwords,isitpossiblethat(asrecentcriticsofsecularismremind
us)justasafullyreligiouslyneutralconstitutionisimpossible,sotooisafully
religiouspreferentialconstitution?
ThesequestionsandthisargumenthangonmyreadingofaparticularSri
Lankancourtcase,oneheardrecentlyintheisland’sAppellateandSupremeCourts.
ThecaseinvolvedtheratherbanalquestionofwhetheroneBuddhistmonkshould
getadrivinglicense.Yet,asIhopetoshow,thiscaseprovidesauseful(andIhope
intriguing)frameforthinkingcloselyaboutonewayinwhichreligioussupremacy
clausesliketheBuddhismchapterworkontheground.
Factsofthecase
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InMay2004,aBuddhistmonk,VenParagodaWimalawansaThero,chief
incumbentoftwosmalltemples,appliedforaDrivingLicenseinaColomboofficeof
theCommissionerofMotorTraffic(CMT).Wimalawansaexplainedthatherequired
alicensesothathecouldmoreefficientlycarryouthisregularweeklyduties,which
involvedmorethanjustpreaching(baṇa)andreceivingalms(dāna)–the
traditionaldutiesofBuddhistmonks.LikemanyothermonksinSriLanka,
Wimalawansaalsoservedinavarietyofotherroles.Hewasanassistantprinciple
andlectureratacollege15kmaway.Heservedasdeputysecretaryofaregional
Buddhistorganization.AndhealsotaughtatavarietyofBuddhistreligiousschools
inthearea(dahampasal).
Wimalawansa’spetitionmadeclearthat,whilehehadusedpublic
transportationinthepast,buthefounditextremelydifficult.Ofparticular
frustrationwasthefactthat,asamonk,hewasrequiredtobeatthetempleforhis
onlymealoftheday,which,accordingtomonasticlaw,orVinaya,hadtobe
consumedbeforemidday.Thistime-sensitivepracticeoftenclashedwithlate-
runninganderraticbusschedules.
Takingmattersintohisownhands,Wimalawansahadbeguntotakestepsto
startdriving.Heattendeddrivingclassesandtriedtoacquireacar.2InJune2004,
hemetwithanofficeroftheCommissionofMotorTraffic(CMT)tofilehis
applicationforadrivinglicense.However,hewasrebuffed.Monkscouldnotbe
2Inhispetition,theTheraexplainedthathehadtoldthethen-PrincipaloftheMoratuwaVidyalayaabouthisplans,whoapproachedtwoseparatedeputyCommissionersofMotorTrafficonhisbehalf:oneindicatedthatBuddhistmonkswerenoteligiblefordrivers’licenses,theotherindicatedthatlicensingwouldbepossibleprovidedtheTherareceivedaletterfromtheBuddhaSasanaMinistry.Onhearingthisnews,theTherawrotealettertotheMinistryandmetwiththesecretary.However,theSecretaryexplainedthathehadnopowerinthismatter.
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issuedwithdrivinglicenses,hewastold,onaccountofthegovernment’s
constitutionalobligationstoprotectBuddhism.
WimalawansathenfiledawritpetitionaskingtheCourtofAppealstocompel
theofficertoissuethelicense.Aten-yearcourtcasefollowed.
WhichRules?WhoseBuddhism?
Ingeneralterms,theeventsofWimalawansacasemirrorthoseofmanylegal
contests:itbeganwithaparticularunresolvedgrievance;whichwasthenchanneled
throughthecourts,wherelawyers,judgesandlitigantsconstruedargumentsfor
andagainstthatgrievanceintermsofbroaderabstract,legalprinciples.What
distinguishesWimalawansa’scaseforourpurposesisthearrayofpartiesandissues
thatbecameinvolved.OntheonesidewasaBuddhistmonksupportedbyroughly
15othermonksciting,amongotherthings,thestate’sconstitutionalobligationsto
Buddhismtoarguethatheshouldbegrantedadrivinglicense.Ontheotherside
weregovernmentadministratorsandotherBuddhistmonksinvokingthesame
constitutionalobligationstoarguethatWimalawansashouldnotbeissuedwitha
drivinglicense.
Beforemovingtoconsiderthesearguments,itshouldbenotedthat
competinginterpretationsofBuddhismandpropermonasticcomportmentare
certainlynothingnewinSriLanka.Debatesaboutwhatmonksshouldand
shouldn’tdohavealonghistoryontheisland,aswellasinotherpartsofthe
Buddhistworld.AvarietyofPaliandSinhalasourcesprovidedetailedaccountsof
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historicalcontroversies(vādaya)overhowthemonksoughttoact,dress,eat,
preach,etc.Inthetwentiethcentury,monksandlayBuddhistsbegantoargue
regularlyabouttheappropriatenessofmonksengagingin“worldly”(laukika)
practices,suchaspropitiatingdeities,teachinginpublicschools,practicing
Ayurvedicmedicineanddoingastrology.Asopposedto“other-wordly”lōkōttara
practicesassociatedwithpursuingabetterrebirthand,ultimately,nibbāna.
Thisidealoftheserene,cloistered,apoliticalmonkstrivingquietlyfor
nibbānaisfamiliartomanyofus.However,itdidnotgounchallengedbymonksin
SriLanka.Sporadically,throughoutthetwentiethcenturyinfluentialandvocal
groupsofmonksspokeoutagainstwhattheysawasattemptstousethisidealto
limittheinfluenceofmonksonsociety.Inoneparticularlywellknownepisodein
the1940s,monksfromoneoftheisland’slargestmonasticcolleges,Vidyalankara
Pirivena,publiclychallengedtheisland’smostpowerfulpolitician,D.S.Senanayake,
indemandingrecognitionofmonks’righttoparticipateinpolitics.3Sincethattime,
largepartsoftheSriLankanmonkhoodhaveassertedtheirrightstoparticipate
fullyinmanyspheresofsociety:fromeducation,tosocialwork,tobeingmembers
ofparliament.
InSriLankatheseongoingdebatesoverpropermonasticconducthavea
certainqualityofun-resolvabilitytothem--onethat(inpart)stemsfromthefact
3OnFebruary2,1946,thisgroupdraftedapublicdeclaration,calledthe“DeclarationoftheVidyalankaraPirivena,”whichblamed“invadersfromtheWest,whobelongedtoanalienfaith”forpopularizingtheideathattheaffairsofthesanghaandtheaffairsofthenationshouldbekeptdistinct.Rejectingtheideathatmonksshouldstayalooffrompolitics,thedocumentinsisted,“We,therefore,declarethatitisnothingbutfittingforbhikkhustoidentifythemselveswithactivitiesconducivetothewelfareofourpeople—whethertheseactivitiesbelabeledpoliticsornot—aslongastheydonotconstituteanimpedimenttothereligiouslifeofabhikkhu.”Rahula,"AppendixII:TheVidyalankaraDeclaration"(1974).
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thatthereisnosingle,universallyacceptedmonastichierarchyontheisland.
Buddhologistswillnotfindthissurprising.Untilrecently,throughoutmostpolities
inSouthandSoutheastAsia,theBuddhistmonkhoodlackedsinglewell-defined
monasticinstitutions,whichclaimedundisputedauthorityoverBuddhism.The
ecclesiasticalhierarchiesthatoneseestodayintheBuddhistworld—e.g.thelama
systemforGelugpamonksinTibetorthecouncilofgreatmonks
(mahatherasamkorn)inThailand—areofrelativelyrecentorigins,andemerged
fromhistoriesinwhichtheprojectofcentralizingBuddhistmonasticauthority
alwaysinvolvedactsofcoercionandcontrolbyrulers--andwerealwayscontested.
Today,avarietyofmonasticandlaygroupsinSriLankaclaimtheauthority
tointerpretandactofbehalfofBuddhism.Theislandhasthreemajormonastic
fraternities,andnumeroussubfraternities.Thesevariousgroupsaredividedalong
multiplelines.Theseincludestrongallegiancestocertainmonks,particularregional
affiliations,controlofpropertyandevencasteidentities.4
AlsoincompetitionforauthorityoverBuddhismarelayBuddhist
organizationsandgovernmentrepresentatives—thepresident,theCommissionerof
BuddhistAffairs,andothers—whoalso,attimes,seemtospeakonbehalfof
Buddhism.
BuddhismTypeOne:Wimalawansa’sPragmaticBuddhism
4Abeysekara
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OpponentsofWimalawansahadamajorthinggoingforthem:itwouldbe
unusualtoseetoamonkdrivinginSriLanka.AlthoughWimalawansadidoffer
someevidence(anewspaperarticle)ofanotherdrivingmonk,thefactremained
thattodatethisisuncommoninSriLanka.5ButwasthisanathematoBuddhism?
Bothsidesagreedononething:noBuddhisttextorinscriptionssaidanythingabout
motorcars.Wimalawansaconstruedthisasagoodthing.Oneoftheleitmotifsofhis
submissionswasthatBuddhismwasnotastatictradition,butadynamicone
designedtodevelop,changeandaccommodatenewsituations.Inoneofhismost
potentexpressionsofthis,Wimalawansahighlightedawell-knownpassageinthe
MahaparinibbanaSuttawheretheBuddha(onhisdeathbed)instructshischief
discipleAnanda,thatafterhispassing,themonksshouldholdontothemajor
principlesofmonasticlifebutto“abolishthelesserandminorprecepts.”(The
problemisthat,inlasthoursofhislife,theBuddhadidn’tspecifywhichwere
which.)This,Wimalawansainsisted,wasthekey:theBuddhaneverintended
monasticlifetoprogressunchanged,buttomovewithsociety,developingand
adaptingaccordingly;monks’drivingwasjustthatsortofadaptationthatthe
Buddhahadinmind.
Amongthedocumentssubmittedwithhispetitions,Wimalawansaincluded
personalletterthathehadwrittentotheCMTin2004.Inthisonce-private-now-
publicdocument,oneseesveryclearlythisviewofBuddhism.Intheletter,
Wimalawansainsiststhat“therearesomepeoplewhodonotwantmonksmoving
forward(idiriyaṭayanavā)withsociety.Whattheywantistoholdmonksbackin5EvidencewassubmittedthatthatBuddhistmonksdrivecarsinMalayasia,SingaporetheUSandelsewhere.
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the6thcenturywhiletheygointothe21stcentury.”Thesepeople,Wimalawansa
argues,dosointhenameofdefendingculture(saṅskṛtiyak)andtradition
(sampradāyak).Yet,Wimalawansainsists,cultureandtraditionareworldly
(laukika)innatureandoughtnottorestrictordeterminethebehaviorofmonks.
InWimalawansa’sBuddhism,thepurposeofmonasticlifeisnottoconservesome
pastidealbuttoconstantlyguidesocietyaccordingtosupremeotherworldly
(lōkōttara)values.Toholdontosomestatictraditionwouldnotonlybeinimicalto
thisprojectofvirtuousguidance,itwouldalsoinconsistentwiththebasicprinciples
oftheBuddha’steachingitself,thedhamma:
Buddhismteachesprimarilythateverythingisimpermanentandchanging
andthatnothinginthisworld(melova)isinfinite(nitya).[Itteaches]that
witheverymomentallthingsarechanging.[Itteaches]thattheessence
(svabhavas)ofallthingsisbecoming,existingandperishing(naetivīma)…No
[harm]wouldcometoamonkfordrivingavehicle.Noevil(pāpā)would
accrue.There[wouldbe]noviolationoftheVinayarules.
Wimalawansaarguedthatchangedcircumstancesnecessitatedchanged
standardsoforthopraxy.Inthepast,herecollects,monksweresupported
completelybythelaity.Todaythissupporthasdiminished,requiringmonkstoearn
income,performmaintenancearoundthetempleand,insomecases,evencook
theirownfood.Monkslikehimwerenolongersimplyfulltimespecialistsin
dhamma,ritualandself-cultivation;theywereteachers,administrators,even
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occasionalchefs.Theyreluctantlytookonlaukikacommitmentsandthose
commitmentswerenecessarytosustainingtheirlōkōttarapursuits.Drivingacar
wasnotaluxury–therefore-butamuchneededtoolofthenewmonasticlife.
BuddhismTwo:HisOpponents’TraditionalBuddhism
ThosewhoopposedWimalawansaofferedadifferentvisionofBuddhism,
onethatdrewarigidlinebetweenthelifestyleofmonksandthatoflaity.Someof
theseopponentsfiledwrittensubmissionsinthecase,includingtheCMTandCBA,
aswellastwoimportantgroupsofseniormonks.Amongthemostassertive,
however,werethedocumentsfiledbythelaytrustees,orDayakaSabha,of
Wimalawansa’sowntemple(although,Wimalawansadeniedthattheywereindeed
bonafidetrustees).
ThecruxofDayakaSabha’spositioncanbeseeninalettertotheMinisterof
BuddhistAffairs,whichtheysubmittedasevidence.Theletterimploresasfollows:
HonorableMinister,theonlyplaceintheentireworldwhereBuddhism
existsinitsuncorrupted(nirmala)formishereonthistinyisland;
[therefore]carehastobetakenbyBuddhists[here]tokeepthisuncorrupted
formofBuddhismforaverylongtime.Itismainlybecauseof
theirrestrainedandcalmdemeanor(saṅsuniriyav)andtheirattractive
behavior(ākarsanīyaaevatumpaevatum)thatBuddhistmonksgainthe
faith(bhaktiya),lovingrespect(gauravādaraya),faithandadmiration
(pahansita)oftheBuddhistpeople.Ifthisultimatebond(uttarītara
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baendīma)betweentheMahasangha(greatcommunityofmonks)andlay
peopleisstrained,thenwithoutadoubtthesupremestatusofBuddhism
wouldtoppleinnotime.IftheMahasanghabegintodrivevehicles,then
thereisariskofthelaypeopleloosingtheconfidence(pahanbava)they
hadforthem.6
InpurposefulanddirectcontrasttoWimalawansa,thetrusteesassertedthatthe
keytoBuddhism’ssurvivalontheislandwasnotitsadaptability,buttheenduring
relationshipsbetweenmonksandlaity.Theserelationshipswere,inturn,basedon
afragilereciprocity:laypeoplepatronizedmonksonlytotheextentthatmonks
wereabletoexudecalmness,equanimityandindifferencetotheworld—qualities
thatwerehardtoembodybehindthewheel.
ThisunderstandingofBuddhismwasalsounderscoredbyagroupofsix
seniorscholar-monkswhointervenedagainstWimalawansa.Intheirletter,they
acknowledgedWimalawansa’sargumentthattherewasnospecificruleagainst
drivingmotorvehicles.However,theycountered,intheabsenceofthisparticular
prohibitiondidnotmeanthatmonasticlifeshouldbeaccommodatedtomodern
technology.Rather,theyargued,oneoughttoconsiderthematterofdriving
licensesinlightofanotherbroadprinciplethatrancentrallythroughtheentire
monasticdisciplinarytradition:theconcernwitheliminatinganynegativepublic
imageofmonksinsociety.Infact,forthem,keepingandmaintainingtherespectof
thelaitywasperhapsthekeyorganizingprincipleofBuddhistmonasticlifeitself!
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CitizenorBhikkhu?
Ofcourse,Wimalawansa’scasewasnotsimplyamatterofBuddhistlaw.Had
thisbeenthiscase,itmighthavebeenaddressedbyoneoftheisland’smonastic
tribunalsorexecutivecommitteesthatnormallyhearplaintsandmakerulings
aboutmonks’behaviorwithinindividualmonasticfraternities.Theserulingsare
notnormallyenforceablebythestate,unlesstheyinvolvethecontroloftemple
propertyinwhichcasetheinitialmonasticdecisionmaybeappealedorreheardby
civilcourts(happytotalkaboutthis).7
TheWimalawansacasewasdifferent.Itinvolvednotonlyquestions
concerningtheinterpretationofBuddhism,butquestionsconcerningthelinks
betweenBuddhistlawandtheconstitution.WhatwasthelegalstatusofBuddhist
lawandBuddhistmonksontheisland?IfBuddhistauthorityresidedwithmonks—
apointonwhichbothsidesappearedtoagree—whatroledidstateagents(inthis
case,non-monks)haveinenforcingthatauthority?Buddhistmonasticlifeemploys
elaboraterituals,habitsofdressandcodesofconducttodistinguishmonksfrom
laity.SriLankanstatuelawevenmakesitlegaloffenseto“passoneselfoffasa
monk.”Yet,didthestatehavearightorobligationtoenforcethedistinction
betweenmonkandlaitywithinaconstitutionalframeworkthatalsoespoused
equalityunderthelaw?
7inaccordancewithaspeciallydesignedstatute(calledtheBuddhistTemporalitiesAct)andaspecialstreamofSriLankancaselawcalledBuddhistEcclesiasticalLaw
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Thequestionofwhethermonksareconsideredcitizensforthepurposesof
statelawhasoccupiedBuddhiststhroughouttheworld.Thequestionarisesin
referencetoavarietyofissues.InSriLanka,e.g.,monkswhoarefoundguiltyof
criminaloffensesmustdisrobebeforegoingtoprison.Thatis,theymustre-become
citizensbeforeundergoingpenalsanctions.Fromthe1940stotheearly1970s,
throughmostoftheBuddhistworld(althoughnotSriLanka),Buddhistmonks(and
insomecasesnuns)werebannedfromvoting.8Twocountries—Thailandand
Myanmar—stillenforcethisruletoday.Indesigningtheselaws,politicalelites
positedanecessaryoppositionbetweenthelegalstatusofmonksandthatof
normal,everydaycitizens.
WasWimalawansaamonkoracitizen?Wimalawansa’scasegenerated
opposinganswerstothatquestion.Inhissubmissions,Wimalawansamadeclear
thathisstatusasamonkwasdistinctfrom,butdidnotnullify,hisstatusasacitizen.
Hearguedthatmonkswerebothclericsandcitizensthereforetheyoughtnottobe
deprivedofrightsgiventoothercitizens:
IstatethatIappliedtotheCommissionerofMotorTrafficinthecapacityofa
SriLankancitizenforadrivinglicenseandnotasaBuddhistMonk…I
respectfullystatethatjustbecauseIamamonkIcannotbepreventedfrom
enjoyingmyrightsguaranteedtomebythelegislatureofthiscountry….
8ThesepoliciesremaininplaceinMyanmarandThailandtoday,withreversalshavingoccurredfollowingperiodsofCommunistruleinLaosandCambodia{Larsson2014}.
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InWimalawansa’sview,monksinteractwithstateservicesandstatelawssuchas
theCMTnotasrepresentativesofBuddhismbutascitizenslikeanyoneelse.In
Wimalawansa’sestimation,tobetreatedprimarilyasarepresentativeoftheisland’s
protected,“foremost”religionistobeheldtoanunfair(andextra)standardof
scrutiny.
ThesubmissionsofWimalawansa-andthemonkswhowroteinsupportof
him-putforthaparticularviewofthelinkbetweenmonasticnormsandstatelaw.
Thetwoweredistinct;andmonks,byvirtueoftheirsimultaneousstatusasclerics
andascitizens,weresubjectsofboth.Yet,thejurisdictionswereseparate.State
officials—whowerelaypeople—couldnotclaimauthoritytoenforcemonasticlaw.
Atthesametime,theycouldnotdenymonks’statusandrightsascitizensand
subjectswithinstatelaw.MonasticlawandBuddhistnormswerethereforedoubly
outofboundstogovernmentagents.Ontheonehand,thoseagentshadapositive
dutytoupholdimpartiallyallstatelaws.Ontheotherhand,governmentagentshad
noauthoritytopronounceonBuddhistmonasticlaw.
Wimalawansa’sopponentsconcurredthatstatelawandmonasticlawwere
distinct;yettheyrefusedtheideathatonecouldchoosewhichoneapplied.Monks,
theyinsisted,werealwaysprimarilysubjectsofmonasticlaw.Aletterfromthefour
headmonks(mahānayaka-s)oftheisland’sfourlargestfraternitiesexplainedthis
positionthroughanalogytotheworkofjudgesandlawyers:justasjudgesand
lawyerswereboundbyparticularstringentprofessionalcodesofconductwhichdid
notapplytoordinarycitizens,sotooweremonkssubjecttotheirVinayarules.Or,
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asanothergroupofseniormonksputit:“Thelaukikapath[ofhumanrightslaw]is
onething....Thelōkōttarapath[ofBuddhistmonasticlaw]isanother.”
TheCourt’sDecision
Thecultureofconstitutionallawinvitesargumentation,butitalsolimitsit.
IntheWimalawansacasethoselimitsinvolvedagents(whowouldandwouldnotbe
allowedtoargue),discourse(whatthosepartieswereallowedtoargueabout)and
time(howlongthosepartieswereallowedtoarguefor).Themostimportant
temporallimittotheWimalawansacasewastheeventualjudgmentgiveninMarch
of2014byaunanimoustwo-judgebenchoftheCourtofAppeals.Inthejudgment,
thecourtcamedowndecisivelyandemphaticallyagainstWimalawansa’s
application.Thelogicofjudgmenttoalargeextentunderscoredtheargumentsof
Wimalawansa’sopponents:thecourtagreedthatthestatehadconstitutional
obligationtoprotecttheuncorrupted(nirmala)BuddhismofSriLankaandit
affirmedtheideathatthestateoughttoenforcecertainpartsofmonasticlaw.Asit
relatedtothequestionofmonks’identitiesascitizensversustheiridentitiesas
representativesofBuddhism,thecourtclearlyindicatedthatmonkshaddifferent
civilandlegalobligations,rights,andstatusestothoseoflaypeople.
Inaparticularlystrongflourish,thejudgewrotethat:“aBuddhistMonk
cannotdoandshouldbeprohibitedfromdoinganyandeveryact,donebyalayman,
inhisdailyroutinelife.”9Andthat,“thelifeofaBuddhistMonkinitspureform,is
incompatiblewithlaylife.”
9p.27ofthedecision
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Thecourt’sjudgmentmayhaveprovidedatemporalendpointtomatter;but
italsogeneratednewlinesoftension.Onereasonforthisisthat,indecidingthe
matter,thecourt,bynecessity,exerciseditsownauthoritytospeakforBuddhism.
Inlegitimatinghisjudgment,JusticeGooneratne(writingforthecourt)assertedhis
owninterpretationsofBuddhisttexts,normsandideas.
Intheend,therefore,thejudgmentofthecourtembodiedapositionthat
neithermonasticpartyendorsed:thatofstateagentsspeakingonbehalfof
Buddhism;ofpowerfullaukikavoicesactingastheinterpretersanddefendersofthe
requirementsofalōkōttaralife.
Conclusion
JacquesMaritain,oneofthearchitectsoftheUniversalDeclarationofHuman
Rights,famouslyquippedthatthedraftersofthedeclarationagreedonitscontents,
butonlyontheconditionthatnooneaskedthemaboutwhytheyagreed.Thatis,
Declarationdrafterscouldagreeonabstractprinciplesbutnotonthemeaningof,or
rationalebehind,thoseprinciples.Thesamecouldbesaidaboutdraftersof
religioussupremacyclausesinmostpartsoftheworld:thosewhoincorporate
specialprotectionsforreligionintoconstitutionsseethisasagoodthing,evenif
theydidn'tallagreeonwhatitistheyareprotecting.
Fromoneperspectivethisisnothingnew.Lawdoesthisallthetime:people
disagreeaboutthemeaningsoffreedom,equality,neutralityandavarietyofothers
primaryconstitutionalgoods.Judgesandlegislaturesinterpretthemeaningof
thosetermsovertime,tosuitthetimes.Theinevitableambiguityoflanguageis,in
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manycases,managedorlimitedthroughthehermeneuticaldisciplineofstaredecisis
and/ortheguidelinessetbytheinterpretationssectionsoflaws.
However,whenitcomestoreligioussupremacyclauses,theproblemisnot
simplyoneofambiguity.Moreprecisewordingorinterpretationswillnotresolve
theissue.Thereisaconundrumattheheartofreligioussupremacyclausesin
constitutions.Ontheonehand,theseclausesclaimtosecuretheprotectionand
primacyofparticularreligion-whichistosayaparticularsetofinstitutions,
authorities,textsandpractices.Yetitdoessothroughmechanismsthatperformthe
primacyofanothersetofinstitutions,authorities,textsandpractices,thoseofstate-
legalauthority.State-legalauthoritythereforealwaysprojectsitselfsimultaneously
thearbiterandviolatorofreligiousauthority.Theinstitutionsandpracticesof
constitutionallawcanneverfullyhandoffresponsibilityforreligiontoreligion.
Thus,inevitabledisputesoverreligiousorthodoxyendupsimultaneously(also
becoming)disputesoverreligiousautonomy.
ThisconundrumbothinitiatedandconcludedtheWimalawansacase.
Wimalawansatreatedtheideaofagovernmentofficial(alayperson)pronouncing
ontheorthodoxyofhis(amonk’s)actionsasanattackonBuddhistautonomyand
authority.Similarly,seniormonkswhoopposedWimalawansamayhavereceiveda
favorablerulingbytheAppellateCourt;buttheverylogicandinterpretivelicense
showninthatrulingultimatelyunderminedtheirclaimsofindependenceand
authorityoverBuddhism.10
10comment:relevanceincourt?
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WhatHusseinAgramasaysof“seculardoctrine”onecouldsayanalogously
fordoctrinesofreligioussupremacy:justas“secularpower”continuouslyprovokes
andentanglesuswiththeveryquestionsofdefinitionitclaimstoresolve(namely,
questionsofthelinebetweenreligionandpolitics)sotoodoreligiouslypreferential
constitutionalordersprovokeandentangleuswithquestionstheyclaimtoresolve:
questionsabouttheconditionsof—andpossibilitiesfor—theprimacyofBuddhism
orotherreligions.Putdifferently,theveryconstitutionalclausesusedtosignala
particularreligioussupremacybydrafters,providetheconditionsunderwhichthat
termsofthatsupremacymaybeconstantlyquestionedandfoughtover.
Letmebeclear,theparticularcontoursoftheWimalawansadebatewerenot
generatedbecauseoflaw.Asstatedabove,debatesoverBuddhism—itsnature,
orthodoxinterpretationsandproperstructureofauthority—havebeenvisibleinSri
Lankaforcenturies.
However,whilethetermsofthedebatepre-existlegalaction,theframework
oflegalactionisnotsimplyarehashingofthedebate.Theformatofmost
constitutionallegalaction—inwhichpetitionersfaceoffagainstrespondentsinan
agonisticstruggleoverremediesusingabstractconstitutionalprinciples—amplifies
therigidityofdisputesandthefirmsuplinesofopposition.Participantsinthe
Wimalawansacaselinedup,bynecessity,forWimalawansa’svisionofBuddhismor
againstit.Oncethemotorsoflegalactionbeganrevving,eachsidegrippedmore
tightlytotheirvisionandengagedinapoint-counterpointmethodicalrejectionof
theother’sposition,aprocessthatquicklyerodedorobscuredpreviouslyexisting
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terrainsofcompromiseorcoordination,suchaslitigants’sharedcommitmentto
protectingmonasticautonomy.
Thecontextoflegalactionisalsouniqueinthat,unlikedebatesthattake
placeinnewspapersorparliament,litigation(particularlyconstitutionallitigation)
isespeciallypoorlysuitedforacknowledgingthevarioussocial,economicand
politicaldimensionsofBuddhistmonasticism–dimensionswhichplayedacentral
roleinthiscase.Wimalawansa’sactionswere,inmanyways,aprotestagainst
economicandsocialinequalityinthesangha.Wealthy,seniormonksdidnotneed
todrivecars,Wtoldme,becausetheyallhavechauffeurs.Moreover,theylivedin
theprime,centrally-locatedtemples.Bycontrast,helivedinarelativelypoor
templeontheoutskirtsofColombo,wherehestruggledtocopewiththerapidly
risingcostoflivinganddiminishinglaysupport.WImalawansa’sactionswere,in
thisframeofreference,notonlyaboutdrivingbutabouthisfeelingsofalienation
andinjusticevis-à-vistheisland’smonasticelites.ThesedefiningfeaturesofW’s
situation,however,weresiftedoutofthediscussionsthroughtheprocessof
constitutionalanalysis--andtransmutedintobroad,abstract,generalclaimsabout
whatBuddhismisandhowthestateoughttoprotectit.
Myconclusionshere—totheextentthattheymakesense—extendandlink
argumentsthathavebeenmadewithinwiththedomainsofcriticallegalstudiesand
recentscholarshiponsecularism.ScholarssuchasStuartScheingold,MaryAnn
Glendonandothershavehighlightedthedisruptiveandevencorrosiveeffectsof
Americanrightsdiscourseandlitigationonsocialstabilityandcooperation.
HusseinAgrama,whoIreferredtoabove,hascharacterizedseculardoctrineasa
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regimeofendlessnormativeprovocation—provocationsthatprovideanexcusefor
expandingtheambitofstateauthority.Inotherwords,theproblemsthatlaw
generates,itsolvesbyrecoursetomorelaw.
Tolinkthesetwoargumentsistomakeanevenmorecontroversial
argumentabouttherelationshipbetweenconstitutionallawandreligion,onewhich
Imakeinmybook:morethansimplyamplifydisagreementandprovoke
contestation,constitutionalprivilegesforreligionmayevenhaveatendencyto
generatetheiropposites.Thesolutionsbecometheproblem.Icallthisprocess
pyrrhicconstitutionalism.
WhenitcomestoconstitutionallawinSriLanka,politicians“victory”in
introducingspecialprotectionsforBuddhismintotheconstitution,havebeen
pyrrhicvictories.Inmultiplecases,includingthisone,constitutionalprotectionsfor
BuddhismhaveproducedundesirableconsequencesforBuddhists--boththe
winnersandthelosersoflitigation!!Buddhistsupremacyclauseshavecontributed
tothefracturingofsolidarityamongBuddhistgroupsandtotheunderminingof
monasticauthority.IntheprocessoffosteringBuddhism,constitutionalagentshave
transformedlong-standing,ambientdifferencesofopinionsamongmonksinto
public,high-profile,high-stakes,agonisticconflictsoverBuddhistorthodoxyand
orthopraxy.FavoringBuddhisminlawhasprovokedandintensifiedmanyofthe
problemsitwasmeanttoresolve.Ratherthan“mak[ing][Sri]Lanka’sBuddhist
peopleintoastrongandunifiedbody(eksatprabalaāyatanayak)onceagain”
Buddhistconstitutionalsupremacyhasconfirmedtheimpossibilityofsodoing.
22
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