BSc Dissertation

2012Jananan Nandakumar 090137918

Biology with Psychology C1C8

[ARE ANIMALS CONCIOUS?]

SBS2 Project skills in the Life Sciences

Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 2

Table of Contents

(Note: All figures and tables were created by the author unless otherwise stated

The “Abstract” is the Summary we had to include; “146 words”

Word Count: 4,375

Acknowledgments 3 .........................................................................................

1.0 Abstract 4 ................................................................................................

2.0 Introduction 5 ...........................................................................................

2.1 Definitions of Consciousness 5 ........................................................................

2.2 Foundational Theories on Consciousness 7 ..........................................................

2.3 Metaphysical Theories of Consciousness 7 ..........................................................

2.3.1 Dualist Theories 7 ....................................................................................

2.3.2 Physicalist Accounts 8 ................................................................................

2.4 Specific Theories of Consciousness 9 ................................................................

2.4.1 Neurofunctional Accounts 9 .........................................................................

2.4.2 Representationalist Accounts 10 .......................................................

2.4.3 Higher-Order Theories 10 ...........................................................................

2.4.4 Cognitive Theories 12 ................................................................................

2.5 Measurement of Consciousness 13 ...................................................................

2.6 Recognising Consciousness in Animals 19 ............................................................

2.6.1 Experience of Pain and Suffering 19 ...............................................................

2.6.2Animal Emotions & Perceptual Phenomenology 20 ...............................................

2.7 Self-consciousness 20 ...................................................................................

2.8 Implications of Animals Being Conscious 21 ........................................................

3.0 Conclusion 22 ............................................................................................

4.0 Reference List 24.......................................................................................


Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to Dr Keith Jensen for his advice and

general teaching within Psychology. His last year of teaching within the principles of Psychology

was fascinating and allowed me to develop a passion to further learn topics around the subject. I

would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Nathan Emery who expanded my knowledge with

his initial help and advice for this project which was greatly appreciated.


1.0 Abstract

The question of whether animals possess consciousness has intrigued philosophers, scientists,

and lay people for many years, yet the answer remains unresolved. Furthermore, no clear

definition of the meaning of consciousness has been agreed upon to date. It has, however, been

suggested that consciousness can be defined as having a state of awareness of oneself and the

surrounding environment (Bermond, 2001). Numerous theories have been put forward that argue

for the presence of consciousness in animals, and tremendous achievements have been made in

establishing consciousness in animals with the available techniques, such as neurological

analysis, the mirror test, and neuroimaging. Additionally, a number of naturally occurring

phenomena, including mental time travel, blind sight, and metacognition, have provided means

via which to investigate animal consciousness Evidence for animal consciousness has had major

implications for the formulation of laws that govern the animals and institutions of animal rights.


2.0 Introduction

Whether animals possess consciousness has been contested for many years. The answer, of

course, has implications for how humans perceive their place within the world, and for policies

that consider how non-human animals are treated. The question, therefore, is of importance.

Consequently, many philosophers and scientists have developed ways in which animal

consciousness can be investigated. However, various perceptions of the existence of animal

consciousness remain. For example, some individuals perceive the animals to be mere automata

while others acknowledge that indeed animals have consciousness that is perhaps somewhat

analogous to our own (Papineau et al., 2002).

2.1 Definitions of Consciousness

It is probable that the nature of consciousness takes various forms across the multitude of known

species. In certain animals (e.g. Placozans, jellyfish), it is conceivable that consciousness simply

confers upon the organism the ability to perceive sensations. In other animals (e.g. great apes),

however, perhaps consciousness comprises other capacities such as thinking, or the capacity to

experience emotions, in addition to the ability to perceive sensations (Bermond, 2001). However,

despite the contributions from scientists and philosophers, there remains no precise definition of

consciousness. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the best way to understand the meaning of

consciousness is through the separation of various aspects of consciousness, which include the

explicit (phenomenal), implicit (self-consciousness) and access consciousness (Papineau et al.

2002).


The explicit aspect is the experiential aspect of consciousness and is composed of all the

information that the animals need to know about themselves, their senses and the environment

around them (Brigandt et al., 2005). On the other hand, implicit consciousness is composed of

the functions of cognition that occur without awareness. It is essential to note that no intentional

choices are made in this aspect of consciousness. Access consciousness is a more technical form

of consciousness. It arises when the phenomenal consciousness fails. It occurs in instances when

mental representations have been poised for use in rational control of actions and speech (Horgan

and Tienson 2002).

Given that consciousness appears to consist of different aspects, it is possible to conceive of

states of consciousness in terms of varying levels of complexity, whereby the quantity of facets

present in an organism’s conscious experience reflects the complexity of their consciousness.

Indeed, Edelman and Seth (2009) suggest that consciousness exists in four basic levels. These

levels include consciousness with only one sense, consciousness with all the sensory systems

integrated, consciousness with all sensory systems integrated with emotions, and consciousness

that integrates sensory systems, emotions, and in which thoughts are in symbolic language

(Gennaro et al, 2004).

In trying to establish the presence of consciousness in animals, it is relevant for one to

understand its concepts. Consciousness is composed of numerous senses. Thus, the presence of

these senses is what makes an animal be identified as having consciousness (Chalmers et al,

2003). The following considers are range of broad perspectives, as well as more specific theories,

of consciousness that have been derived from various commonly-used methodological paradigms


developed to establish whether consciousness – or aspects of it – is present in a number of

different species.

2.2 Foundational Theories on Consciousness

Various theories have been postulated that to try to explain consciousness in animals. There are

two broad categories of theories: the metaphysical and consciousness theories (Sufka et al,

2009).

2.3 Metaphysical Theories of Consciousness

The metaphysical theories are composed of the Dualist and Physicalist accounts. The former,

essentially, argues that the mind and body are distinct, whilst the later, conversely, postulates that

there are no non-physical phenomena.

2.3.1 Dualist Theories

Cartesian dualism posits that the human body embodies the Cartesian mind – where the mind

and body are able to interact. (Fig 1)Accordingly, the perspective argues that since animal

behaviour does not require a non-mechanistic explanation, it is not necessary to confer upon

animals the cognitive capacities required for a Cartesian mind (Tye, 2000). That is, since animal

behaviour can be explained in mechanistic terms, it makes no sense to attribute them with

consciousness. This theory does not attempt to prove that humans lack the fundamental mental

properties or substances. Why would you expect it to? In addition, the theory does not suggest

that the model be used to establish the absence of presence of consciousness in animals.

Examples of dualistic theories include substance dualism, property dualism, fundamental


property dualism, emergent property dualism, neutral monist property dualism and panpsychism

(Van Gulick, 2003).

Property dualism, in contrast to Cartesian dualism, asserts that, whilst there are only physical

substances, these consist of two properties – physical and mental. Fundamental property dualism,

on the other hand, suggests that consciousness has properties that form the basic constituents of

realities together with physical properties such as electromagnetic charge. The emergent theory

suggests that consciousness arises from complex organisations of physical constituents that are

neither predictable nor explicable in terms of their physical properties (Smith and Washburn,

2003). Neutral monist property dualism on the other hand, treats both the properties of

consciousness and physical properties as derivatives of real life. Both the physical properties and

the properties of consciousness depend on real life for existence. Finally, Panpsynchism theory

regards the properties of reality to differ from those of physical properties (Kouider et al., 2010)

(Fig 1).

2.3.2 Physicalist Accounts

Physicalist theories acknowledge the presence of consciousness in animals. However, they argue

that the qualitative nature of that consciousness depends on the biological, chemical and physical

principles that animals are built upon (Terrace 2009). The theory points out the level of

consciousness are highly particular in the mammal populations of the animal kingdom (Papineau

2002).

Examples of the physicalist theories include eliminativism, identify theory and the type-type

identify theory. The eliminativism theory terms consciousness as non-existent. This is attributed


to the lack of clear merit in separating consciousness from unconsciousness (Seth et al. 2003).

The identity theory on the other hand relates consciousness to the neurophysiological nature. The

type-type identity theory, in contrast to elimitavism, postulates that for every mental state there is

a distinct, corresponding physiological process. Presumably, therefore, advocates of this

perspective would accept that an animal experiences a given state of consciousness if it can be

established that the animal exhibits a physiological process that is known to correlate with a

specific mental state in humans.

2.4 Specific Theories of Consciousness

Various theories have been sectioned and outlined below that highlight specific theories of

consciousness (Figure 1). The following section considers the relevance of these theories -

neurofunctional accounts, representationalist accounts, higher-order theories, cognitive theories,

and quantum theories – to the question of animal consciousness.

2.4.1 Neurofunctional Accounts

Neurofunctional accounts support the existence of consciousness in the animal population. The

theory singles out the mammal population as having the most elaborate consciousness compared

to all the other animal groups (Sutton and Shettleworth 2008).The theory is based on the findings

of neuroscientists who have studied recurrent feedback in the sensory cortex. According to this

theory, the level of consciousness is directly proportional to the neuronal activity (Papineau

2002).


2.4.2 Representationalist Accounts

Representationalist accounts of consciousness link phenomenal consciousness to the

representational content of the mental state. The first order representationlist account

acknowledges that an organism with, for example, visual system state, is considered conscious

since the property represents functionally appropriate phenomena (O’Regan and Noe 2001).

Furthermore, the account suggests that the internal states that are present in animals have the

requisite functional and representational properties, and, therefore, animals are considered to

possess consciousness. The theory points out that consciousness in animals are directly

proportional to its capacity to perceive and respond to features in its environment (Horgan and

Tienson 2002). Whist there is something of an intuitive logic to this premise – from an

evolutionary perspective, indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the complexity of consciousness

in an organism would reflect the demands of its environment – it is appears difficult, if not

impossible, to use credible criteria via which extents of perception or responses could be

assessed.

2.4.3 Higher-Order Theories

The higher-order theory was formulated in response to dissatisfaction with the first order

theories. Whilst first order theories distinguish between phenomenal and reflective

consciousness, for example, higher order theories suggest that they form part of some higher, all-

encompassing representation. The higher order account is potentially more attractive in that

whilst it appears to make little sense to doubt that we have phenomenal experiences, one cannot

be as certain that what we might term reflective consciousness is distinct from phenomenal


experience. The theory points out that consciousness in animals is directly proportional to the

creatures’ theory of mind – the capacity, essentially, to consider another organism’s mental state

(Washbirn et al. 2006). Furthermore, the theory denies that many animals have phenomenal

consciousness. The theory does not support the existence of the non-human theory of mind.

However, according to the higher-order perspective, a limited number of animals, such as

chimpanzees, are considered to possess phenomenal experience (Papineau 2002).

Using theory of mind as a basis for establishing consciousness in animals is, however,

problematic for a number of reasons, including, for example, whether methodological

approaches can establish without doubt whether the animal in question possesses theory of mind.

Indeed, Penn and Povinelli (2007) argue that the methods that have often been employed by

researchers of animal theory of mind are inherently incapable of establishing its presence or

absence. Moreover, they suggest a tendency to anthropomorphize. Establishing evidence for

animal consciousness using the higher-order perspective’s criterion of theory of mind is,

therefore, at best, challenging.

Nagel’s (1974) now famous article, “What is it like to be a bat?” expresses a similar sentiment to

Penn and Povinelli (2007). Nagel argues that, whilst one might be able to imagine what it might

be like if they were a bat, they cannot, however, really experience what the bat experiences.

Nagel’s use of a bat – an organism that, of course, is now known to navigate with great accuracy

with the use of sonar – provides a powerful illustration of the limits of our imagination and

highlights, as Penn and Povinelli do, the potential pitfalls faced by those who conduct research

on animal consciousness.


Despite various philosophical theories having been put forward for the existence of

consciousness in animals, the theories still do not provide the most effective way of establishing

its presence (Rose, 2002). The explanation of consciousness still remains uncertain. All the

theories rely on various accounts of consciousness with none being sufficiently decisive to

endorse the actual existence or absence of consciousness among the animals. Most of the

proponents and the opponents have facts to back their arguments for the absence or existence of

animal consciousness (Van Gulick, 2003).

2.4.4 Cognitive Theories

This theory aims to elaborate consciousness in terms of cognitive processes. One cognitive

theory is the multiple draft model of consciousness, which combines both represenationalism,

and higher order theory. The theory aims to explain consciousness based on content relations and

is similar to that of higher order theories (Papineau, 2002).


Figure 1: The Theories of Consciousness from www.itsasmallweb.wordpress.com)

2.5 Measurement of Consciousness

The question of whether animals are conscious presents researchers with the task of establishing

empirical means of measuring it. Consciousness in animals can be assessed in many ways. The

techniques work in some animals, though are not applicable to all (Mellor et al. 2012).

One widely-used test is the mirror test which tests for self-recognition was developed by Gallup

(1970). It entails placing some sort of marker on an animal (e.g., a spot of paint) and seeing

whether, if placed in front of a mirror, the animal touches it. It has been argued that this

Own parallel “realm” of existence outside reality

Consciousness and its states are functions the brain performs

Functionalism

Physical property of matter (electromagnetism) Property Dualism

Simply, mental states are physical events seen in brain scans

Identity Theory

A sensation that “grows out of complicated brains Emergent Dualism

Just behaviour in certain ways Behaviourism

The idea of quantum mechanics and its effects on structures

Quantum Consciousness

The most significant thoughts that are highlighted Cognitivism

Higher order thoughts processed via conscious decisions

Higher Order Theory

http://www.itsasmallweb.wordpress.com


behaviour indicates that the animal has some form of self-awareness (Radick, 2000). It has been

used to assess self-recognition in great apes (e.g., Gallup, 1970), cetaceans (e.g., Marten &

Psarakos, 1995), and solitary elephants (e.g., Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006). However this

technique has attracted various forms of criticism. For example, the mirror test relies solely on an

animal’s visual system. Consequently, it might not provide a suitable method for investigating

self-recognition in animals that primarily rely upon senses other than sight, such as canines,

which are known to be heavily dependent on their sense of smell (Mellor et al. 2012). Similarly,

it is conceivable that animals that are visually-orientated are simply not motivated to touch the

spot. Again, the tendency of researchers to anthropomorphise is revealed in the mirror test; whilst

it might be intuitive for humans to investigate an unfamiliar mark their body, this is not

necessarily the case for other animals.

A second approach used in the assessment of consciousness is metacognition which entails

thinking about one’s thoughts. Metacognition has been effective in providing evidence for

consciousness in dolphins, great apes and rhesus monkeys. In addition, it appears that these

species are fully aware of their mental strengths as well as their memories (Metcalfe and Kober

2005). The technique relies heavily on the images of the body and the ability of the animal to

demonstrate self awareness. The technique also seeks to establish the success or failure of the

subject’s cognitive capabilities. The behavioural criterion considered by metacognition is vital in

the analysis of animal consciousness. The technique has been key to establishing consciousness

in human beings but it uses verbal methods to establish consciousness (Jozefowiez et al. 2009).


A behaviourist account of consciousness provides a useful model for investigating animal

consciousness (Figure 2). Techniques that are based on the behaviourist account are founded on

the ability of the animal to perceive stimuli (Plotnik et al. 2006). Observations are made of the

behaviour elicited from an animal when a stimulus is introduced. This behaviour may lead to a

higher payoff. This behaviour change is measurable.

Another measurable parameter is the perception of pain which, in animals, is always

characterised by noise. During the study, painful stimuli are timed and the values plotted using

the Gaussian distribution (Jozefowiez, et al. 2006). In addition, metacognition can be measured

using the delayed matching to sample procedure. It entails the presentation of a stimulus,

followed by a brief delay, followed by the presentation of an array of stimuli; the participant is

required to indicate which stimulus was previously presented. The test, therefore, depends on the

ability of the animal to make decisions based on its internal representation rather than a direct

representation of a stimulus (Jozefowiez et al. 2009). That is, passing of the test requires that the

animal is capable of a type of consciousness that is not merely the product of the immediate

environment thus allowing evaluation of consciousness.


!

Figure 2 (above): The behaviour economic model of consciousness in animals: A flow chart highlighting the

impact a stimulus presents on an organism and its receptive response in the aftermath.

Some techniques attempt to test for whether an animal possesses theory of mind. Some of the

attributes include the beliefs, desires and knowledge. The attributes in animals are then compared

to the attributes of human beings. The theory of mind is founded on the presumption that humans

comprehend the existence of the mind based on introspection (i.e. the self-examination of one’s

conscious thoughts) (Pessoa et al. 2003). However, there is no direct mechanism of accessing the

mind of another animal. The theory implies links to the mental state of an animal with its


behaviour. It has been tested though, in chimpanzees since they are thought to understand the

goals, perceptions, intentions and knowledge of others. However, the theory has one issue as it

does not have the ability to attribute false beliefs (Tomasello 2008).

Interestingly, animal consciousness has been investigated in terms of their use of ‘mental time

travel’; this refers to the ability of the mind to travel back and forth in time. It is, of course, easy

to imagine how this capability can be tested in humans, though it is more difficult to measure use

of mental time travel in other animals (Mellor et al., 2012). Birds have proven to be a good

model for these studies. However, in actuality, mental time travel has been investigated quite

extensively in a range of animals, including, for example, birds. It has been shown that corvids

(e.g., jays) are able to remember what, where, and when they buried food, indicative that they are

able to store and subsequently represent in the present events that occurred in the past (Clayton

and Emery, 2009). Consequently, it is apparent that certain animals possess consciousness that is

more than merely a product of immediate sensory inputs.

The phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ has also provided insights in to the nature of consciousness.

Blind sight occurs when there is an injury to the occipital lobe that is responsible for vision.

According to this phenomenon, people will often be perpetually blind in certain areas of their

visual field. They will thus exhibit variations on the way they perceive certain stimulus (Barbas

et al. 2003). There are various types of blind sight category. Type-1 blind sight is composed of

the people who are able to predict the aspect of the visual stimulus such as their location and

type. These people have now awareness of the stimulus. The response offered in this category is

a forced response or a response that is arrived at by guess work. In type-2 blind sight, people


have some awareness about the stimuli. However, these individuals lack visual perception

(Tamietto and de Gelder 2010

Neuroimaging has also been used to investigate consciousness. Specifically, neuroimaging has

been used to study neural activity in the amygdala (which contains a collection of nuclei located

in the medial temporal lobe of the brain) and the ventral visual cortex. These studies have been

applied to animals. The amygdala plays a vital role in the ventral visual stream in primates by

enhancing levels of visual awareness (Anderson and Phelps 2002). It increases the activity of the

fisiform gyrus, thereby increasing the visual representation for the primates, thus they able to

have effective levels of awareness originating from the amygdala. The individuals with a lesion

in the amygdala will often have a decline in the fisiform gyrus. Thus, measuring activity of the

amygdala in primates offers a means of establishing the level of consciousness (Lahti et al.

1998).

Modern advances in functional brain imaging may now be the key to establishing the level of

consciousness in animals. Functional imaging (e.g., fMRI) refers to obtaining data regarding

activity within the nervous system, rather than measuring, for example, the size of physical

structures within the brain – as is with case with structural methods (e.g., MRI). The technique is

very useful in evaluation of consciousness in human beings (Robinson and Clore 2002) and

facilitates better understanding of the neuroanatomical organisation of behaviour. fMRI links the

behaviour of the animal to the neural activity after stimulation has occurred (Lahti et al. 1998).

Consequently, scientists can impute brain regions responsible for certain types of experience. For

example, the observation that different areas of the occipital cortex are active when animals are


presented with different types of visual stimuli suggests that the brain region is responsible for

visual experience. However, it is, of course, difficult to make any precise inferences regarding

the specific nature of the presumed experiences.

2.6 Recognising Consciousness in Animals

Neuroscience has gradually replaced the behaviourist techniques in psychology and ethology in

trying to establish the presence of consciousness in animals. However, cognitive abilities and

self-awareness are also being used to establish consciousness in animals (Mellor et al 2012).

2.6.1 Experience of Pain and Suffering

One of the strongest pieces of evidence of animal consciousness is found in their experience of

pain and suffering. Pain refers to interference in the psychological, neurological and behavioural

well being of animals (Mathews 2008). Studies show they also have a neurological system where

the pain begins when there is a clear differentiation between nociception and pain. In animals,

the capacity to respond to particular stimuli is one of the earliest forms of sensory capacity

(Barret et al. 2007, Tamietto and de Gelder 2010). However, it is necessary to distinguish

between the physical process of nociception and the subjective experience of pain.

Whilst it proves impossible, as Nagel (1974) argued, to actually know what it is like to be

someone or something else, it is possible to compare physiological responses and chart

behaviour. Such studies are highly suggestive that animals are conscious.


2.6.2Animal Emotions & Perceptual Phenomenology

If it were possible to prove that animals had emotions it could reasonably be taken as further

evidence of animals having consciousness. Emotions are considered an elementary component of

intelligence (Panksepp 2004) with perception also playing a part. Animals perceive things in the

natural environment and careful neural investigation reveals that animals are a product of

consciousness. Chiroptera (bat) is good example of an animal that uses perception (Smith 2009).

It is able to move around based on its ability to perceive echo vibrations, similar to that which

humans share when blind. Studies have shown that some visual field portions are subconsciously

altered as a result of consciousness (Roberts 2002).

2.7 Self-consciousness

Establishing the existence of self-consciousness in animals, in particular, chimpanzees have been

key to finding evidence for animal consciousness. They used the mirror test using untrained

chimpanzees and the chimps responded like humans (Sneddon et al. 2003). Interestingly, using

the mirror test, other non-human primates have been less promising. Modified versions of

Gallup’s (1974) experiment of the mirror test provide evidence that other non-primate species do

have self-consciousness. A prime example is in pigeons which were trained to peck on their

bodies that were visible in the mirrors. Similarly, dolphins have been shown to pass the mirror

test (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007).


2.8 Implications of Animals Being Conscious

The implication that consciousness exists not only in humans but also in animals has had a

profound effect on how we view animal life. In humans the impact of consciousness, cannot be

underestimated (Trout, 2001). From our earliest developmental stages it can be identified, studies

suggest that foetuses have perceptions such as that of pain and that they experience sensations. In

the light of these data a major public debate has ensued about how consciousness is related to

rights of life for the foetus. The study has led to the establishment of welfare laws to cater for the

life of the foetus (Mellor et al., 2012.

It seems likely that our attitude to animals has been shaped by recent investigations into

establishment of animal consciousness. Evidence for animals experiencing pain as a consequence

of noxious stimuli has encouraged the development of animal rights. These rights are aimed at

protecting the animals from any form of violation of their bodies (Prinz 2005). Evolving views

concerning animal consciousness have led to significant changes in the law protecting animals.

Older laws were designed when little had been done to establish the presence of animal

consciousness (Leavens 2004).The change has been driven by studies showing that in the early

stages of life, the animals are capable of perceiving noxious stimuli. In countries, such as New

Zealand, the Animals’ Welfare Act protects even the foetuses of the mammals (Zeman 2003).

For some, animals are considered to have the same moral status as the humans. Activists argue

that the rights of the animals ought to be respected in the same way that the human rights are.

According to animal rights activists, animal rights should not be overridden by people to justify


their means. Therefore, people have to treat the animals in accordance with their rights (Mellor et

al. 2012).

3.0 Conclusion

Various studies have been carried out over time to try to establish the presence of consciousness

in animals. It is evident that indeed animals have variations of consciousness. The establishment

of consciousness in animals in some studies is based on the fact that they are able to perceive

stimuli. The perception of stimuli is only possible when a living organism has a central nervous

system and neuronal mechanisms that support the transmission of impulses. This raises the

question of whether non-vertebrates are susceptible to a conscious feeling.

Evidence for consciousness can be found in data that shows that animals are able to perceive

various forms of stimuli such as pain. In addition, the animals are able to mount an effective

response towards the stimuli (e.g. making a noise when the stimulus is noxious). Further

establishment of animal consciousness is based on self-consciousness. It is evident that during

the mirror test animals are able to recognize that there is a difference in their appearance. This

shows that animals have the capability of recognising themselves. Self-consciousness is only

possible when an animal has consciousness. Hence, these animals have consciousness even

though the level of consciousness differs from one animal to another.

Presently, neuronal analysis is providing a better way of establishing levels of consciousness in

animals. For instance, by using fMRI one is able to analyse the activity of the neurones.


The perception ability has also played a vital role in the establishment of consciousness in

animals. An example of such a technique is the blindsight test. The test is based on perpetual

visual ability of an individual. However, neuronal analysis is the best technique that is currently

used in establishing the presence of consciousness in animals. This technique is more effective

than other methods since it uses neuronal activity to establish animal consciousness.

The establishment of the presence of consciousness in animals has led to the introduction of

various laws that protect the animals. In addition, the ability of the animals to perceive noxious

stimuli has also made them giant in their own rights. According to this, laws and rights of the

animals have stemmed from evidence that they are conscious entities like us.


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