Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
Transcript of Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
1/31
actional competition
and political
development
in the
New World
dited by
E L I Z B E T H M B R U M F I E L
and
J O H N W FO X
BIQUC VC L V n
OdUS UEZ
M B R I D G E
U N I V E R S I T Y
P R E S S
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
2/31
32256
P U B L I S H E D B Y T H E P R E S S SY N D I C A T E O F T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A M B R I D G E
Th e Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom
C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
Th e Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB 2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New
York
NY
lOOI
I-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melboume, V I C 3207, Australia
Ruiz
de larcn 13,28014
Madrid,
Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South
Africa
http ://www.Cambridge.org
Cambridge University Press 1994
This
book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First
published 1994
Firstpaperback edition2003
catalogue
record for
this book
is
available
from the ritish Library
Library of Congress
catalogiiing
in
publicationdata
Factional competition and politicaldevelopmentin the New
Worid/edited by Elizabeth M. Brumfiel and John W. Fox.
p. cm. - New directions in archaeology)
I S B N O521 38400 I hardback
I Indians- Polities andgovemment.2. Political anthropology-
America.3. Social archaeology - America.
4. Indians - Antiquities.
5.America- Antiquities. I Brumfiel, Elizabeth M.
II Fox, John W., 1947- .I II Series.
E59.P73F33 1993
306.2-dc20 92-32371 CIP
I S B N O521 38400 I hardback
I S B N O521
54584
6 paperback
j . ,
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
3/31
1
Factionalcompetition and
political
development in the
NewWorld:an introduction
E L I Z A B E T H M B R U M F I E L
This
volume calis attention to the importance of fac
tional
competitionas a
forc
of
social
transformation. It
rges
that factional competition is implicated in devel-
opments as diverse as the spread of ceramic technology
and maize agriculture, the origins of permanently insti-
tuted
leadership offices, the
exp nsin
and collapse of
States
and the European domination
o f
indigenous New
Wor ld peoples.
Although
this volumefocusesupon the
New Wor ld its perspective is relevant to the social
histories of other re sof thewor ldas well becauseall
non-egalitarian societies, both ancient and modern, are
shapedby the dynamics of
factional
competition. Bring-
ing
an agent-centered perspective to the study of
pol i
tical
development, this volume also contributes to a
general understanding ofsocialstabilityand change. An
agent-centered perspective maximizes the amount of
datadrawn into the analysis and thus permits the most
detailedand complete account of specificcasesofpol i
tical
continuity
and transformation.
Our
studies
o ffactional
competitionboth complement
and
critique
the
two prevailingapproaches
to prehistoric
social
change: cultural ecology and
Marxism.
Cultural
ecologyfocusesupon the dynamic interactions
o f
human
populations and their
local
environments. As a com
plement to this, the studies in this volume examine the
intemaldynamics of
local
populations, dynamics that
help to shape the strategy of resourceexploitation.
Marxist theory focuses upon the dynamics of
class
struggle: a model postulating solidaritywithin classes
and struggle between them. As a complement to
class
struggle, theessaysi nthis volume emphasize the import
ance
of conflicts
within
classesand alliances between
them.As critiques ofculturalecology and (particularly
structural)Marxism,
the studies in this volume
d emn
strate
the necessity of replacing a theory of strict
syste-
micor structural determination of human behavior
with
a theory that integrales agent-centered and system-
centered
analyses
into a single framework. Most of the
studies in this volume employ versions of an
agent-
centered practice theory developed in theworkof
Barth
(1966),Giddens (1979), and Ortner (1984).
Practice theory is especially suited to the analysis of
factional
competition.Factions are characterized by an
informal,
leader-focused organization (Nicholas 1965,
Bujra 1973, Silverman1977);thus, itseemsreasonableto
initiateanalysis by examining the goals and strategies
employedby factionleadersas
individual
social actors.
Furthermore, factions are groups whose singlefunction
appears
to be gainingaccess to limited physical and
social resources
(Bailey 1969:52), and
these
goals are
best
achieved through the application of a pragmatic,
advantage-seeking, maximizing strategy such as that
imputed
to
agents
in practice theory.
Finally,
factions
are structurally and
functionally
similar groups that
compete for
advantages
withina larger social
unit
such
as a kin group, ethnic group, village or chiefdom.
Prac
tice
theory anticipates
conflict
between
individuis
simi-
larly
positioned within society
while
cultural ecology
and
Marxism
do not. As argued below, this internal
competition supplies the dynamic for
political
devel
opment.
This
introduction
begins bydefiningfactions and fac
tionalcompetition. Then, it
discusses
the relationship
between factional competition and ecological vari
ables such as population, warfare, agricultural pro-
duction,and long-distance trade.Th i rd itproposeshow
factional
competition and
class
struggle interact to
produce the social formations discussed in the
case
studies that follow.
F o r t h
it considers how factions
and factional competition can be
identified
in the
archaeological record.
Finally,
i t examines the wider
theoretical
implications of an agent-centered per
spective.
What
are factions?
Aside from a few briefdiscussions of factions prior to
1955 (Lasswell 1931, L in ton 1936:229, French 1948,
Fenton 1955), anthropological interest in factions devel
oped as part of aneffort to expand thescopeof social
anthropology beyond the description and analysis of
formal social structure. This was accomplished rst
through
the recognition of the many
informal,
non-
corporate groups
present
in contemporary non-Western
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
4/31
4 Elizabeth M. Brumfiel
societies (including action groups, diques, networks,
factions, and patron-client dyads). andsecond,through
the investigation of how social structure isgeneratedby
individuis acting to maximize their self-interest given
their particularsetsofculturaland material constraints
(Whitten and Whitten 1972;Cohn 1974:40-3; Vincent
1978). From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the con
struction of modeis of
informal
groups and individual-
centered social transactions was aflourishing, if
some-
what insular, enterprise
within
social anthropology, and
factionsbecamethe object of considerable interest.
A t issue was the definition of factions (Lewis and
Dhil lon
1954;
Firth
1957; Boissevain 1964; Nicholas
1965),
whether factions served positive social functions
or were a
form
of social pathology (Siegel and Beals
1960; Schwartz 1969); the relationship between factions
and
classconflict
in
peasant
societies (Sandbrook 1972;
Alavi 1973; Gross 1973; Schryer 1977), and whether
factions were an obstruction or an
mpetus
to social
change (Bujra 1973; Silverman and Salisbury 1977).
However, this interest in factions abruptly collapsed in
the late 1970swhen anthropologists turned away from
local-level, agent-centered studies to pursue theissues
raised by the wor ldsystemsperspective. Although fac
tionshavecontinued toserveas a basicconstruct for
analyzing peasant polities (e.g., Hegland 1981; Green-
berg 1989; Munson 1989), the theoreticaldebates sur-
rounding factionshaveceased.
There are two
reasons
for resuscitating whatappears
to
be a
dead horse.
First, in the
sudden
move away
from
factions
fifteen
years
ago, a number of theoretical
issues
concerning factions were left underdeveloped or
unresolved. Second, while factional competition was
analyzed extensively in relation to contemporary
peasant
polities, its usefulness for understanding the
polities of prehistoric societies has not beenexplored.
Dealing firstwiththe most important of the unresolved
questions, we can ask, how should factions bedened
During the 1960s, factions were defined in terms of
their characteristics as a group. Factions were said to be
politically oriented conflict groups whose membership
was recruited and maintained through the efforts of a
leader
(Nicholas 1965; Bujra 1973; Silverman 1977). In
such groups, unity derives
from
ties betweenleadersand
followers; lateral ties among followers are poorly devel
oped (Nicholas 1965:28-9; Bujra 1973:134). This was
said to account for the loosely structured, personalistic
character
of factions
F i r th
1957:292). Factions were
also
said to be
based
upon calculations of self-interest
rather than moral commitment to the group (Bailey
1969:52), to be transitory groups with membership
recruited on many differentbases(Nicholas 1965), and
to be lacking in corporate property, frequent meetings,
structural
complexity,
and rules governingsuccessionto
leadership (Boissevain 1964; Bujra 1973). Explicitly or
implicitly, factions were contrasted with corporate
groups, the traditional focus of structural-functional
analysis in social anthropology.
Thesedefinitions are quite useful for investigating the
character
of factions as a type ofinformal group, but
they divert attention from the most interesting dynamic
property of factions, namely the competitive relation-
ships
between them. I f the object of investigation is to
discover how factional competitionacts as a
forc
of
social transformation, it is preferable to view factions in
terms of what they do rather than in terms of what they
are (Salisbury and Silverman 1977). Therefore, in this
volume,
factions are defined as
structurallyandfunc-
tionallysimilar groups which,byvirtueo theirsimilarity,
competefor
resources
and positions
o
power
or
prestige.
In this
definition,
factions are understood to be groups
engaged in
political
competition which are neither
classesor functionally differentiated interest groups.
The lack of structural and functionaldiTerentiation
between factions has
been
frequently noted. In a South
India village, Siegel and Beals (1960:396) found
"few
indicationsof consisten differences
between them in
terms of
policy
or kinds of people who belonged. In
Boissevain's (1964:1276) view, a faction is a loosely
ordered group inconflict wi tha similar group.
Simi-
larly,
Sandbrook (1972:111) defines a faction as a
segment
of a clientage network organized to compete
with
a unit or units ofsimilartype.
Bujra (1973:136-8) provides an excellent theoretical
account of the structural
similarity
of factions. She
explains that faction leaderscome from similar social
backgrounds because while social distance restricts
competition, social contiguityengendersit . . . Conflicts
thus often begin between people who are more socially
alike than different. Inaddition,factionleaderstend to
come from the dominant sectorsof society, since it is
these individuis who have the resources needed to
recruit large
followings.
Coming from the
same
privi-
leged
sector
of society, faction
leaders
are
likely
to
share
similarpolitical goals, and
these
goals are not
likely
to
challenge the
basic
structure of society.
Bujra
(1973:137)addsthat
leaders,
wishing to enlarge
their
followings,
will
seek
supporters in all the different
sectorsof society,claimingallegiance on many different
bases:pastor future patronage,
proximity
of
kinship,
a
common religinor ethnic identity, etc. Therefore, the
individuisforminga faction lack an identityof interests
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
5/31
Introduction
that
would engender
common political goals beyond
winningadvantages
for their own faction. or arethere
clear differences between themembersof different fac
tions that might result in
policy
differences between
them.
Thus,
while
factions compete for
resources,
their
structural
similarity insures
that they
w i l l hold
similar
ideas
about what the
wo r l d
is
l ike
and what it should be
l ike. Factional competition
tends
to be non-
revolutionary
in intent. The objective of factional com
petition
is to achieve a favorable allocation of existing
benefits;
each
faction
hopes
to gain more
while
its com-
petitors gain
less.
Participants conceptualize factional
competition as a zero-sum
game
in
which
one party's
gain is
another's
loss. Thus, in factional competition,
debategenerally
centers
upon the relative legitimacy of
each
faction's claims rather than the merits of
substan-
tivelydifferent social programs.
Given
the lack of structural differences between com-
peting
factions, it is at
firstdifficult
to see how they might
act as vehicles of social transformation.
Because
fac
tional
competition is non-revolutionary in intent, it has
often been
regarded as non-revolutionary in con
sequence
(Siegel and Beals 1960,
Gross
1973, Sandbrook
1972).
However, Salisbury and Silverman (1977:6-7)
observe
that factionalism has an inherent dynamism
grounded in competitive strategizing: Each confront-
ation[between factions]
changes
the terms on
which
the
next confrontation
w i l l
take place . . . [T]he strategy of
one side .. .
does
not produce an exact or mirror-image
strategy . . . Relations are, in fact, systematically oblique
and groupings are systematically unalike. Factionalism,
in short,
produces
actions and reactions that do not
simplybalance
o u t . . .
The
issue
of whether, as Silverman and Salisbury
suggest,
factional competition could
serve
as a
mechanism of social transformation has not
been
thoroughly
explored. A major obstacle to gauging the
transformative power of factional competition has
been
that, prior to this volume, factions
have been
studied in
contemporary communities under the dominance of a
state:
Native American communities supervised by the
Burean of Indian
AlTairs
and
peasant
communities in
colonial
or recently post-colonial nations. In such com
munities,
the
state
constrains both thescaleof
conflict
and thedegreeof structural
change
resulting from fac
tional
competition. For this
reason,
previous
studies
may easily
have
underestimated the transformative
power of factional competition. Almost certainly, fac
tionalcompetitionwas a more dynamicforcin
pre-state
societies than it is in the modern w o r l d.
Anotherissuethat has notbeenthoroughly explored
is the proper scaleof analysis for the study of factional
competition. In the ethnographic literature, outside
forces
have
sometimes
beenseen
as influencing factional
competition.
For example, the rise of factions is often
attributed
to the decline of traditional, power-holding
corporate groups under the impact of Western contact
(French 1948; Siegel and Beals 1960; Nicholas 1965;
Nagata 1977). And several
observers have suggested
that
the strength of factions and faction
leaders
varied
according to their
access
to outside
sources
of
revenue
and influence, most often supplied by the
state
(Schwartz
1969; Sandbrook 1972; Bujra 1973;
Gross
1973; Schryer
1977; Salisbury 1977). Nevertheless, factions
have been
regarded as an
aspect
of
local
level polities (Schwartz
1968),
impinged upon by regional or national polities
but not affecting them in
reverse.
I n contrast, severalessaysin this bookinvestgatethe
interplay
of local and regional
processes
in
tribal po l i -
ties.
Spencer
(Chapter 3)
arges
convincingly that the
internal
and external dimensions of
tribal
leadership are
intertwined.
The formation
o f
competing factions w i th i n
communities
goes
hand in hand
w i t h
the development of
alliances between faction
leaders
in different communi
ties. The net effect of this
process
is to turn an entire
regin
into a single
political
arena,
a community
wi th i n
which
competing coalitions of faction
leaders
vie
for resources.
In a similar fashion, it
becomes
extremely
difficult
to
di erentiate
between local,internal dimen
sions
of
political
violence (the suppression of rebellion)
and regional, external dimensions of
political
violence
(the pursuit of warfare)
once
communities
became
enmeshed
in intervillage alliances that compete at the
regional
level (see Anderson, Chapter 6, for Mississip
pian societies and Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13, for the
Classic Maya).
I n
examining factional competition and
political
development in prehistoric societies, the
essays
in this
volumeraise
a number of
issues,
most of
which
are new
to
archaeology.
These
include: the opportunities and
constraints
presented
by different
mdiums
of com
petition including
feasting (Clark and Blake, Chapter 2),
external alliances and
trade (Spencer,
Chapter 3), and
warfare (Redmond, Chapter 4; Helms, Chapter 5); the
sourcesof factional competition in the kinship and po l i -
tical
structures of chiefdoms (Anderson, Chapter 6),
t tes (Byland and Pohl, Chapter 11; Pohl and Pohl,
Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14) and empires (van Zant
w i j k
Chapter 9); factional competition and ethnic
identity
(Pollard, Chapter 7; Brumfiel Chapter 8); and
factional competition and imperial expansin(Hicks,
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
6/31
6 ElizabethM Brumfiel
Chapter 10). The apparent absenceof corporate groups
and factional competition is analyzed for theValleyof
Oaxaca (Kowaiewski, Chapter 12), cycles of factional
competition
and
political change
are defined for the
southeastern
UnitedStates,
the Maya lowlands and the
Postclassic
highlands (Anderson, Chapter 6; Pohl and
Pohl,
Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14), and the
shifting
composition
of factions and factional
conflict
in pre-
imperial, imperial,
and
colonial
societies is examined for
the central Andes( D A l t r o y ,Chapter 15).
Al l theessaysin this volume are concerned
wi th
the
relationships of
factional
competition to ecological con-
ditionsand
classconflict.
The next two sections of this
introduction
exploretheserelationships.
actionalcompetition andculturalecology
A t firstglance, the study of factional competition and
culturalecology
would
seemtohave littletooffereach
other. Factional competitionfocusesattention upon the
inner
dynamics of
socialsystemswhile
ecosystem theory
derives the dynamics of social
change from
the inter
action
of human populations
wi th
their environments
(HiU
1977:88;
Binford
1983:221). The study of factional
competition
invoives consideration of strategic
de isin
making
by self-promoting
leaderswhile,
in the
view
of
cultural
ecologists, social
change
is unrelated to the
perceptions and motives of
social
actors
(Hil l
1977:66-7;
Price 1982:720). Despite these differences, cultural
ecology can
only
benefit
from
a more
explicit
consider
ation
of
factional polities.
Such studies
would
reveal the
internal needsand resource requirements of complex
political
institutions that affect their
distribution
in time
and
space.
And studies of
factional
polities
would
reveal
the importance of the traits that accompany complex
political
institutions but
appear
toserveno
critical
eco
logical function. Forthese
reasons,
perhaps,a concern
withfactional polities is alreadypresentin theworkof
several ecosystems theorists (Flannery 1972; Webster
1975, 1976; Yoffee 1979;Spencer1982).
Cultural
ecologists generallyassertthat
socio-political
hierarchies evolvebecausechiefly and
state
hierarchies
provide
for a more effective relationship
o f
a population
to
its environment; under certain demographic and
environmental
conditions,
political
hierarchies are
adaptive.
Ecosystem theorists often assume that incipiently
complex political
institutions are at leastsporadically
present in simpler societies, ready to be pressed into
service when they are favored by demographic and
environmental conditions. The
timing
and location of
incipiently complex institutions is said to be random;
they do not in themselves constitute a problem suitable
for
research. Variation,
as Price (1982:716)
observes,
arises
constantly in all
l iving systems
and
does
not, in
terms of an evolutionary paradigm, require expla
naron. But this is not entirely true.
Just
as
sociopoliti-
cal
complexity might be precluded by environmental
problems that
have
no managerial solution, complex
political
institutions might be precluded by ecological
conditions
that do not meet their own institutional
requirements.
A n excellent example of this principie is supplied by
Clark
and Blake (Chapter 2 , summarizing Hayden 1990;
Hayden and Gargett 1990).A l lbut the most ephemeral
formso f
political
leadership require a disposable surplus,
a fund of power (Sahhns 1968:89). But so long as
humans relied upon limitedand fluctuatingresources,
the competitive accumulation of surplus depleted com-
munal
resources
and was not tolerated. Henee, despite
the managerial benefits that more powerful specialized
leadership mighthaveconferred upon the population,
such leadership did not emerge
until
after subsistence
carne
to be
based
upon
r ich
and reliable
foodresources.
Asecond and even more interesting example concerns
long-distance trade. Long-distance trade has a tendency
to increase
as
political
institutions become more
complex.Cultural
ecologists,
wi th
their attention peren-
nially fixed on population-environment interaction,
havesupplied three accounts of long-distance trade. One
regardsit as a
means
ofprocuring
criticalresources
that
are not
locally
available (Rathje 1971; Johnson and
Earle 1987:245). A second regards it as a
means
of
gaining alliances and valuables (storable wealth) that
enhance
subsistence security (Flannery 1968; Halstead
and
O'Shea
1982). The thirdregardslong-distance trade
as unimportantbecauseit is most often concerned wi th
sumptuary, as opposed to subsistence, goods (Price
1977;Binford 1983:227-31;
Sanders
1984).
However,a llthese
accounts draw attention away
from
the fact that valuables acquired
from
distant
sources
supply
considerable
political
control
because
of their
ability
to attract
followers,
allies and patrons and to
maintain
hierarchies of control (Schneider 1977; Earle
1978; Friedman and Rowlands, 1978; Helms 1979;Kris-
tiansen 1981:257;
Brumfiel
and Earle 1987; Gosden
1989).Coalition
buildingis an essential
activity
in creat-
ing
andmaintaining
political
power. But we cannot
fully
appreciate the importance of
thisaspect
of long-distance
trade in valuables untilwe stop looking for a directly
adaptive function for thisinstitutionor, unable to find
one,assesssuch trade as epiphenomenal.
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
7/31
ntroduction 7
Although
factional competition must be
eonsidered
in
ecological
analyses
of
political
complexity, ecological
variables areessential for understanding factional com
petition.
As Hayden and Gargett (1990) suggest, fac
tional
competition
w i l l
not exist so long as
subsistence
is
based
upon
l imited
and fluctuating
resources associated
w i t h
generalized foraging. When factional competition is
present,
the
success
of faction
leaders
is partly
deter-
mined
by local
resource
productivity and
trade
route
accessibility. Faction
leaders w i l l
be most successful in
reas
that are most productive, giving the prevailing
methods
of
resource
exploitation. For example,
under
conditions of low agricultural
in tensicat ion,
faction
leadersw i l l
dobest in
reas l ike
the American Bottoms
regin
of the middle Mississippi River) where a large
fo l lowing
can
gather
to enjoy the benefits of factional
membership without incurring the costs of intensified
subsistence
effort. Butunderconditions of higher agri
cultural intensification,
leaders w i l l
dobest in
reas w i t h
the
greatest
quantity of intensifiable
resources
(irrigable
land,
etc.).
Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)
suggest
that ecological
variables affecting agricultural production also shape
the
onset
and intensity
of factional
competition. Rainfall
agriculture permits a more mobile commoner popu
lation,easily
able
to shift allegiance
from
one leader to
another. Leaders
then
compete
to control
segments
of
this mobile population. More intensive agricultural
regimes tie farmers to the land, lessening competition
between
political
lites
and permitting
greater
political
stability.
Price (1984) has
also
noted this difference,
adding that
leaders
in rainfall agricultural regimes are
more
l ikely
to
engage
in conspicuous generosity in order
to attract followers.
Anderson (Chapter 6)
suggests
that extreme com
petition and violence are common during periods of
environmental instability or change. He believes that
European contact intensified factional competition
among native
peoples
in the
southeastern
UnitedStates,
first
through the introduction of European diseasesthat
ki l led
individuis
who occupied strategic positions
in
the
regional alliance network, and
second
through the
intro
ductionof European trade goodsthat
opened
new possi-
bilities
for acquiring wealth items.
Spencer
(Chapter 3)
cites a
case
where
disease
in a
Shavante
village led to a
realignment of factions.
Geography, by affecting theshape of interaction
net
works, also shapes
factional competition. Clark and
Blake (Chapter 2)
arge
that more open settlement
systemsw i th
greaterpossibilities for regional interaction
have greater
potential for being dominated by a single.
advantageously
situated authority. Conversely, both
Anderson (Chapter 6) and Byland and Pohl (Chapter 12)
suggest
that, in patchy environments, the
dif i icul ty
of
maintaining
Communications
between
scattered
commu
nities
prevents
any one
from
dominating the others.
Under
these
conditions, factional competition
tends
to
persist in a more or
less stable equilibrium.
The recognition that factional competition is
shaped
by
ecological variables does not
imply
that factional
competition
is always, at the base,
caused
by
subsistence
shortages.
Cultural ecologists
have
frequently argued
that intercommunity warfare is the result of growing
populations competing for
scarce subsistence
resources
(Sanders
and Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster 1975;
Ferguson 1984; Johnson and Earle 1987). Alternative
views on the
motivation
and
character of
warfare
appear
in
this volume. For example, Redmond (Chapter
4)
finds
that, in northern South America,
tribal
warfare is
m o t i -
vated by the
desire
for
revenge
rather than the
desire
for
resources.
A careful consideration of
Panamanian
chiefs
leads
Helms (Chapter 5) to conclude that their
leader
ship of warfare was motivated by theirdesire forper
sonal gain without the
added spur
of population
pressure. Spencer
(Chapter 3)
suggests
that the elitist
character of warfare in ranked
societies
is revealed
archaeologically in the fact that
litecenters
are
fortified
while
smaller communities are not.
But i f
warfare
arises
from
the
desire
for
revenge,
why
does
it occur in
some
societies
but not
others
(Johnson
and Earle 1987:124, 134)? And
i f
warfarearises
from
the
selfishmotives of chiefs, why do followers
particpate
A s
Redmond (Chapter 4)
makes
clear,
individuis
are
very
reluctant to
fight;
in fact, an
ambitousleader
may
earn
the
indebtedness
of
individuis
who must seek
revenge
by organizing a
raiding
party on their
behalf
(see
also Spencer,Chapter
3). Presumably,
leaders
organize
these
rads
on thesame basis as other activities that they
carry out, by
calling
to action
thosendebted
to them for
previous favors. Thus, warfare
becomes
possible
once
individual
jealousies
and thedesire forrevenge become
linked
to the
politicalgoals
of self-aggrandizing
leaders
whohave established followings that they can
cali
upon
to implement theirplans (seealso Sillitoe 1978).
I n
more stratified societies, the participation ofsub
ordnate
groups in warfare is
less
problematic. Rulers
compel participation through
coer c in,
and they reward
participation by conferring promotions of status upon
those
whose
performance is outstanding. The
l ink
between warfare and population pressure in stratified
societies
is weak. This is clearly indicated by Pohl and
Pohl s
(Chapter 13) observation that the population of
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
8/31
8
Elizabeth
M Brumfiel
Caracol grew by 325 percent in the 130
years
after it
defeated
T ika l . f
Caracol was making war
wi th
a popu
lation
oflessthan one-third ofitscapacity, it is
difficult
to
believe that the war was aconsequenceofpopulation
pressure.
actional
competition and class conflict
I f, because
of earlier
research
agendas, factions
have
frequently
beencontrasted
with
corporate groups, our
own
interest in social transformation
leads
us to contrast
factions
withclasses.
Under conditions ofclassstruggle,
ociety is divided by horizontal
cleavages
that
seprate
nternally
solidary and externally competing
strata.
This
wi th
a situation of factional competition in
society is divided by vertical
cleavages
that unite
of differentstrata and foster conflict between
of the
samestrata.
Intra-class competition is a common theme in Marx's
on capitalist society. Marx (1977:266-7)
erved that capitalist society contained two market-
intra-class struggles: on the one hand, the
waro fcapitalists among themselves to main
profits, on the other hand, the competition among
competition is only
overeme
byclassconscious-
brought about by class struggle: The
seprate
form a classonlyin so far as theyhaveto carry
a common battie against another
class;
otherwise they
wi th each
other as competitors
and Engels 1947:48-9). Thus, factional compe
and
classconflict
are
presented
as inversely related,
intensies.
Andclass
greaterexplanatory weight: The
of all hitherto existing society is the history of
struggles
(Marx
1977:222).
AsBloch(1983:18) points out, Marx'semphasisupon
struggle has not
been
very
helpful
for anthropolo
causesof
change
inclasslesssoci
absenceo fclassstruggle, Marxist anthropo
have
variously attributed social
change
in
societies to technological development and
change
(see Levine and
Wright
1980); to
structural incompatabilities ( contradictions )
tween the forces of production, the relations of pro
and the social and ideological superstructure
r 1977; Friedman 1975; Friedman and Rowlands
conflict
of interests between
individuis
occupy
subordnate
statuses
wi thin
society (women,
those who domnate them
1983:160). The dynamics of
conflict
among
those
similar social positions has received
little
attention.
On the other hand, several anthropologists, working
from
a variety of positions sympathetic to Marxism,
have suggested
that factional conflict
wi thin
the
lite
stratum explains the intensification, modification and
decline of
lite
power in chiefdoms and agrarianstates
(Webster 1975; Earle 1978, 1987;
Cowgill
1979;
Kristian-
sen 1981;
Brumfiel
1983; Gailey and Patterson 1987;
Patterson 1991). This volume
extends
their arguments to
suggest
that conflicts
wi thin
(both commoner and
lite
stratainteract
with
conflicts betweenstratato determine
the
course
of
political
development.
First of all , competition between non-elites provides
frequent opportunities for
leaders
to expand their influ
enceand power. As
Spencer
(Chapter 3) and Redmond
(Chapter 4)ind cate ,leadersin lowland South America
increased their influence by assisting
individuis
embroiled
in personaldisputesor blood feuds.
Brumfiel
(Chapter 8)
suggests
that mediating competition
between calpulliand teccalli groups for houses, land,
titles,and other
resources
was an important service per-
formed by city-state rulers in central
Mxico
prior to
Aztec rule. Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)
indcate
that the
Postclassic
Maya
lites,
as patrons to their subjects,
resolved property disputes and defended community
resources
against outside attack. And the
military
com-
manders
of the pre-Inka Wanka prosecuted wars that at
least
ostensbly
defended community
resources from
radsby neighboring groups (D Al t r o y , Chapter 15). In
each
of
thesecases,
competition among non-elites
mot i
vated commoners to
subordnate
themselves
to a
po l i
ticalleader.The resultingalgnmentswere factions.
A t the
same
time, competition among political
ehtes
frequently
moderates the intensity
with
which com
moners are exploited. In the
tribal
societies described
by Clark and Blake (Chapter 2),
Spencer
(Chapter 3),
and Redmond (Chapter 4)
leaders
compete
wi th
each
other to supply benefits to followers, although the
suc
cessful
leader wil lalso havecultvated
his
ability
tocali
in
his
debts
at critical junctures. In chiefdoms and
cty-states, rulers seek to finance their competition
against
rival lites
by enlarging the
size
of their tribute-
paying
populations. Although this is sometimes accom
plished
through conquest, it can also be achieved by
offerng
commoners prime
agricultural
land (Earle 1978)
or a low per
capta
tribute burden (Pohl and Pohl,
Chapter 13) as inducements to settle. In pre-Aztec
Mxico , intense
competition
wi thin
the
rulng class
enabled commoners to move
from
one city-state to
another,thus
avoidng
conditionso fintenseexploitation
(Hicks 1982;
Brumfiel,
Chapter 8).
The suppression of commoner residential
mobility
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
9/31
Introduction
may be a
necessary
condition for the existence of
class
stratification in agrarian states.This could be accom
plished
through social circumscription (Carneiro
1970),
as Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)suggest for the
t nMaya. Or, it might be accomplished by the
po l i
tical unification
of a
regin,
resulting in
uniform
con
ditionsofexploitation for the commoner class.Seeing
the
advantages
of
unification,
ruling
lites
might
volun-
tarily
surrender their sovereignty to an expanding
regional
state(Smith 1986;Hicks,Chapter 10).
Commoners can sometimes exploit intra-elite com
petition
to their ownadvantageeven without leaving
home. When plagued by oppressiverule,commoners can
support the efforts of
some
ambitious prince to over-
throwthe incumbentruler.Classwarfare canassumethe
guise of c iv il war between noble factions (Fallers
1956:247; Sahlins 1968:92-3). Thus, the suppression of
intra-elite
competition is a second condition
necessary
fortheemergence
of
class
stratification.
Mechanisms for
unifying the ruling class include fostering a homo-
geneous
lite
culture (Pollard, Chapter 7;
Brumfiel,
Chapter 8),liteintermarriage (vanZantwijk, Chapter
9) ,
the rotation of status-conferring ritual and political
activities (van Zantwijk, Chapter 9; Pohl and Pohl,
Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14), and the forging of
patron-client relationships between the
state
and
indi
vidual
members of the regional
nobili ty
(Pollard,
Chapter 7; Hicks, Chapter 10; Fox, Chapter 14;
D A l t r o y ,
Chapter 15). Interestingly enough, a homo-
geneous
lite
culture,
lite
intermarriage, and possibly
the rotationo fritualresponsibilities werepresentamong
the Classic Maya, who never achieved regional
unifi
cation
(Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13). Thus, intra-elite
patron-client relationships, backed by coercive forc,
emergeas the most important mechanism for securing a
unified
rulingclassamong therelatively non-bureaucra-
ticAztecs and Inkas.
While
factional competition affects the dimensions of
socialinequality,classstructureshapescompetitionand
alliance building
(L loyd
1965). In the tribal systems
described by Clark and Blake (Chapter 2),
Spencer
(Chapter 3), and Redmond (Chapter 4),
classes
are
absent,and followersalign themselves w i th the leader
who
supplies them
w i th
the
greatest
immediate benefits.
These
verticalalliances are shallow, extending
only from
followersto thelocalleader. On the regionallevel, l ink-
ages
are supplied by alliances between village leaders,
and theselinkages are the most critical
advantage
that
incumbentleadersenjoy over aspiringrivals.Alliances
between
leaders
give incumbents greater
access
to exotic
goods and
mili tary
assistancethan is available to their
rivals. Spencer
(Chapter 3) suggests that efforts by
incumbent
leaders
to regularize relationships
w i thin
their alliance network might lead them to deal prefer-
entially
with
the heir of a
deceased
leader, initiatinga
form
of ascriptive leadership that could develop into a
permanent chieftainship.
Institutionalized tribute extraction in chiefdoms and
city-states makesavailable greater quantities of wealth
for lite competition and alliance building.Anderson
(Chapter 6)suggeststhat competition is most intense
when the material rewardsassociated
w i th
leadership are
greatest, and this is borne out by the high level of
factional competition
w i thin
the
lite
stratum of the
chiefdoms and city-states described in this volume.
Internally, cisekinsmen struggle to control leadership
offices;externally,
leaders
struggle to gain higher posi
tions in the regionalpolitical hierarchy. Their allies in
this
quest
are an unstable
coalition
o f
consanguineal and
affinal kin and commoners raised to noble rank as a
reward for valorous
mili tary
service.
These
coalitions are
heldtogether by the redistribution of tribute wealth to
noble followers and the allotment of
segments
of the
tribute-paying
population to the
leader's
strongest
rivals.
But
the intra-elite competition, as discussed above,
limitsexploitation, creating a chronically underfunded
ruling
class.
To augment their incomes,
leaders
make
war upon their neighbors, and, as Redmond (Chapter 4)
documents so convincingly, warfare in chiefdoms
reaches
an intensity that is clearly greater than that
found among tribal peoples. To survive both internal
and external competition, leaders place themselves
under the patronage of strong regional leaders.
These
verticalallianceshavegreater depth (three or four
levis
andterritorialrangethan the vertical alliances found in
tribal big-man
systems.
Anderson (Chapter 6) sug
gests
that such
systems
are marked by a secular trend
away from intra-elite and inter-class relations
based
upon
display and redistribution toward the greater use
o f forc.
The
unification
of
lites
in a regionalstate permits
very
high
levis
of tribute extraction. This surplus
flows
to the paramount ruler who
establisheshimself
as the
primarysuppliero fsumptuary goods and
mili tary
assist
ancetosubordnateleaders. Thus, vertical alliance net
works
all converge on thestaterulerswhilehorizontal
alliances between
local
rulers wither away.Statepatron
age permits
subordnate
rulers to enjoy a definite
in-group
advantageover theirlocal rivals.As in modern
systems
of centralized patronage, the
level
of overt fac
tional
competition
tends
to be quite low.
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
10/31
ElizabethM Brumfiel
Thepositionof local litesis further weakened when
the
state creates
newterritorialunits and administrative
offices filled by members of the state s ruling group
instead of by local rulers. Such policies result in the
severing of ties between rulers and
ruled
and strengthen
class
stratification
( D A l t r o y ,
Chapter 15). Sub-
sequently, these policies may give rise to disputes
between those who have
traditional
claims on resources
and
those who derive claims from the new system, both
of
whommustturn to thestatefor recognition of their
claims.
The absence of local
solidarity
and the com
petition
between localfactions for favorable treatment
by the state weakens the
local
capacity for resistance
(D Al t roy , Chapter 15; see also Dennis 1987). The
greatest threat tothese
states
is
factional competition
at
the very highest level,
wi th in
the
royal family
(van
Zantwijk,Chapter 9;D A l t ro y , Chapter 15).
As
states
disintegrate, considerable wealth and power
maybecomelodgedoutside therealmo f politicalcontrol.
Blanton (1983) points out that associations organizing
craft productionor exchange tend to arise
during
periods
of
weakened
statecontrol.Religious
power may also be
lodged
in more orlessautonomous institutionssuch as
the priesthood
during
Postclassic times in Oaxaca and
possibly
also the
Mayalowlands(Pohl
and
Pohl,
Chapter
13;
see also Patterson 1985). To deal
wi th
thesegroups,
political
lites are sometimes forced to admit their
members
topolitical
officeso that the interests
o f
outside
groups coincide
wi th
the interest of the political
lite
(Lloyd
1965:98). At other times, such groups promote
factional
competitionamong
political
litesto maintain
their
own
autonomy.Aligning themselves
wi th
different
litefactions, outside groups may succeed in transform-
ing
a
tributarystateinto
a broker state, in which
factional
competition
is overshadowed by competition between
functionallydifferentiated interest groups.
actional
competitionandthe archaeological record
Factionalcompetition invoives twocomplementary pro
cesses: the construction of coalitions of support and
participationin
political
contests. Inbuilding
coalitions
of
support, leaders forge ties between themselves and
their clients, allies, and patrons. Inpolitical contests,
leaders exchange Information on the strength of their
coalitions
and determine who wi l l
control
contested
resources (seeBailey 1969).Coalition buildingand con
testsmay occursimultaneously,as
when
leaders compete
o
offer potential supporters the most attractive
gifts.
oth alliancebuilding and political contests leave dis-
inctiveimprintson the archaeological record.
Alliance building is frequently achieved through
exchange.
Locally,
the liberal
distribution
of gifts and
preferred foods is used to attract followerswho are then
tied to the leader by their indebtedness for unrecipro-
cated favors (Sahlins 1968:88-90).Regionally,balanced
gift
exchange establishes a pattern
o f
mutual
aid between
allied leaders whileasymmetrical exchange
(involving
the movement of staple crops upward and the flow of
valuables downward) characterizes relations between
locallitesand regional paramounts. The valuables used
in theseexchanges are
scarce
andhighlyvalued, usually
owing to their
foreign
origin or the quantity of labor
involved in their production (Drennan 1976:357). The
valuables are endowedwi th
symbolic
meanings that val-
date the alliances under
construction;
furthermore, the
valuables are distributed inritualcontexts that further
vahdate the relations of
alliance.
The
intensity
andorganization
o f
alliance
building
are
visible in the frequency and distribution of exotic or
highly crafted wealth items, preferred foods, and
feasting
paraphernalia in prehistoric sites.
Clark
and
Blake
(Chapter 2) cite the presence of
finely
finished,
elaborately decorated ceramies and maize to rge for
competitive
coalition building on coastal Chiapas by
1600 BC.
D A l t r o y
(Chapter 15)
suggests
that thehigh
concentrationof butchered camelidbones and certain
jar and basin types inlite households are evidence of
lite sponsorship of
feasts
at Tunanmarca, Per. Since
there appear to have been few dietary differences
between
lites
and commoners, commoners were prob
ablythe
guests
at elite-sponsored
feasts
(see also Costin
and Earie 1989).
A more exclusive
sphere
oflitealliancebuilding at
Tunanmarca is suggested by the
restriction
to lite
housesofmetalworkingand metal artifacts.Metalwas
probably
used in gift exchanges that created
coalitionso f
support among
political lites.
In Barinas, Venezuela, a
similar restrictionof polished stonejewelry(much of it
from extra-local serpentine) to lite contexts also sug
geststhe existence of a sepr te
sphere
oflitealliance
building
(Spencer, Chapter 3).
The
presence
of
non-local
goods in non-elite contexts
mightreveal another
dimensin
o f alliancebuilding.For
example, in Early to Middle Formative Oaxaca, the
uniformity
among households of the
sources
of
obsidian
usedsuggeststhat obsidian wasdistributed to a ll house
holds from a single point
(Winter
and Pires-Ferreira
1976).
This
could
be interpreted as evidence that obsi
dian
procurement and
distribution
was used by a
faction
leader tobui ld a popularfol lowing (seeClark 1987 for a
discussion of how the procurement and processing of
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
11/31
Introduction
obsidian provided opportunities for political entre-
preneurship inMiddleFormative Mesoamerica).
Shifts in the frequency and distribution of prestige
goods, preferred foods, and feasting paraphernalia
provide
Information
on changes in the structure and
intensity
of alliance
building
over time. Anderson
(Chapter 6)argesthat thedecliningfrequency of pres
tige goods in Mississippian chiefdoms marks the tran-
sition from
leadership
based
on
persuasin
(which
required chiefs to build amass following among com
moners) to leadershipbasedoncoercin(whichpermit-
ted chiefs to l imittheir attentions to a smaller group of
strong-arm men).I ntheValleyo f
Mxico
and the central
Andes, a decline in the frequency ofvessels used in
feasting in the capitals of
previously
autonomousstates
reflects the suppression ofpoliticalcompetition among
local polities by a powerful regional state
(Brumfiel
1987a, Costin and Earle 1989).
Marriages also play an important role in alliance
building.Unfortunately, the archaeological recordonly
rarely
preserves
evidence of marriage alliance. Stone
inscriptions
from
the Classic Maya constitute one of the
very few instances where such records are preserved
(Marcus 1976). Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)
suggest
that
the Late toTerminalClassic
shift in
stelaesubject matter
frommarriage to warfarereectsa secular trendinMaya
political
factionalism from an earlier
dependence
upon
alliances among regional
lites
to a later pattern of
violent competition.
The construction
o f
coalitionsrequires the production
of surplus wealth
which
can underwrite
gift exchange
and feasting (Sahlins 1968, D A l t roy and Earie 1985).
Because the vast majority of production in agrarian
societies is household
based,
changesin the intensity of
factionalcompetition should be marked bychangesin
household size and composition. The ini tia l stagesof
coalition building ought to be marked by high bir th
rates,
polygamy, and/or the inception of
dependent
labor
wi thin
the households of faction
leaders
(Sahlins
1968:89, Coontz and Henderson 1986).
Increases
in
leaders' influence and power should be reflected in the
size and structure of
a
growing
number of households as
the leader extracts increasing amounts of goods and
labor
from
a widercircleof clients and subjects.
Successful
coalition building
might leave its imprint
onsettlement patterns. The sizeo ftheleader'ssettlement
may suddenlyincreaseas it did during theemergenceof
chiefdoms on the south Chiapas
coast
(Clark and Blake,
Chapter 2) .The early
expansin
of San
os
Mogote in
theValley of Oaxaca might also be an example of an
unusually large settlement created by successful
coali
t ion building (Flannery and Marcus 1983b). Thesuc
cessful control of
local
rivals should be reflected in the
distribution of
literesidenceswi thin
a
regin,
as in de
MontmolHn's (1989:191-6) Ehte Forced Settlement
measure- the proportion of
lite residences
found at
political
centers
compared to the total number of
ehte
residences
in the political catchment controUed from
thesecenters. Alternatively,paramounts might favor a
policy
of dispersing their rivals to a
mximum
extent
(Anderson, Chapter 6). A lack of control over rivals
might
be indicated by evenly dispersed, tightclusters of
lite
and commoner housing indicative of leader-
followergroupings
well
suited to factional competition.
Successful coalition building may also be evident in
constructions that by their size or complexity
suggest
communal labor: raised fields and
causeways
in Venez
uela (Spencer, Chapter 3), agricultural terraces and
defensive works in
Per (D Al t roy ,
Chapter 15), and
fortifications
and monumental architecture among the
Mayas (Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14).
The particular type of labor investment reflects different
strategies
for competitive
success.
Agricultural intensifi
cationmay improve the
leader'sabil i ty
to attract
follow
ers by sponsoring largerfeastsor bysupplyingthemwi th
improvedlands (Earle 1978). Fortifications
suggest
that
warfare provided wealth that a leader could redistribute
to
followers (Webster 1975). Monumental architecture
might
involve
manipulation of the symbols of group
unity:the ancestral or
patrn
deity.Such symbolswould
be most prominent under conditions of
competition
at
the regional
level
as part of an
effort
to
crate
bonds
between
leaders
and followers that could not be easily
transferred to competing leaders. Ethnic symbols may be
manipulated
wi th
similar goals
(Brumfiel,
Chapter 8;
Pohl
and Pohl, Chapter 13). Public architecture also
suggests efforts to impress a regional audience of
potentialallies andrivalswho use the size
o f
thebuilding
projects to judge the size and commitment of one's
following.
Competitionon the regional
level
often
takes
the
form
of
warfare. Warfare is archaeologically visible in a
number of ways: physical evidence ofviolentdeath and
the taking of war trophies, defensive works, large settle
ment size, ephemeral site occupation, defacejnent of
public
buildings and prestige goods, and depictions of
warfare
in
art andinscriptions. Drawingupondata
from
Oaxaca, Kowaiewski (Chapter 12)suggests that terri-
torial ly based
competing polities on the regional
level
might also be indicated by the occurrence of shrines,
boundary markers, and bufferzonesbetween localities,
by roughly equivalent amounts of civic-ceremonial
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
12/31
12
Elizabeth
M
Brumfiel
architectureacrosssubregions, by theabsenceoforganic
sohdarity between subregions, by the existence of subre-
gional differences in settlement patterns and ceramic
styles, and by a settlement plan in regional capitals that
provides representation of geographically
affiliated
sub
regions. Many of the archaeological manifestations of
sociopolitical
and spatial segmentation in theValleyof
Oaxaca are also to be found in the Classic Maya
polity
analyzed by de Montmol l in(1989).
onclusin implic tions for theory
This
overview of factional competition and political
development has eonsidered a wide variety of ecological
and social variables. Resource productivity, geo-
graphical
boundedness,
long-distance exchange,
warfare, kinship and marriagesystems,rules ofsucces
sion,
class,
corporate group structure, and ethnicity all
impinge
upon the patterning and intensity of factional
competitionand are, in
turn,
affected by
it .
The number
of
variables discussed reflects the fact that competitive
advantageis pursued through the strategicmanipulation
o fmany material and social variables;
winningstrategies
must be fabricated according to the
resources
available.
The relativeadvantagesof extensive or intensive agri
culture,
attached craft production or long-distance
exchange, marriage alliance or warfare, ethnic assimila-
tionor ethnicpersistencevary according tolocal
circum-
stances.In addition, the efficacy of different
strategies
v res
over time, depending upon the development of
resources,alliancesystems,and competitivestrategiesas
consequencesof earlier rounds of
competition.
Given the great variation of competitivestrategies
over time andspace,no twocasesare identical.While
the logic of factional competition provides an essential
principiefor understanding thecourseof
local
history,
the study of factional competition isunlikelyto reveal
any universal laws of cultural development. The vari-
ablesinvolved
are too numerous; the
strategies
for
mobi-
lizing
resources
are too diverse.Althoughfactional com
petition
provides a common
mpetus
to political
development, any particular
sequence
of development is
uniquelycomplex and contingent.
Inthe face of suchcomplexity,it isnecessarytoaltr
nate
between a subject-centered and a system-centered
analysis. A subject-centered analysis organizes ecological
and social variables byweighingthem according to their
importance in
specic
competitive strategies. A system-
centered analysis
reveis
how the implementation of
strategiesalters thequalityanddistribution o fecological
and socialresourcesfor the next round ofcompetition.
Asubject-centered analysis is also required in order to
account for the dynamics ofpoliticaldevelopment.
Poli-
ticaldevelopment should be attributed to the efforts of
individuis
toadvancetheir goals of
material
advantage
and socialesteemby
joining
factions or
class
alliances
that prosecute their interests in competition
with
oppos-
ing factions or classes. Competition occurs
within
a
structure or matrix of ecologicalresources,social rela
tions,
and cultural rules and
vales which
constrain
behavior but which also provide opportunities for
innovation.The growth ofpoliticalcomplexity,marked
by
the
emergence
of larger, more centralized polities
with
greaterdegreeso fverticaland horizontaldifferenti-
ation,is an epiphenomenalconsequenceof thestrategies
and counter-strategies employed by
leaders
and
fol low-
ersengagedin factionalcompetitionand
lites
and com
moners locked inclassstruggle (see Clark and Blake,
Chapter 2).
The methodological
individualism
at thebasisof this
formulation
might be criticized as a projection of the
competitive,self-seeking, pragmatic ideology
o f
Western
capitalist society. This is
partially
true, although the
problemis ameliorated by situating self-interested com
petition
in specific ecological, social,cultural,and his-
torical
contexts. Even so, such a
formulation
might be
inappropriate for analyzing the more expressive and
solidary
aspectsof social
life.
However, an assumption
o fcompetitive, self-seeking, pragmatic social actors is
eminently suited to the analysis offactional competition,
for,
as Earle (1987:294)
observes,
factional competition,
which
is inherently a competitive, pragmatic
process,
requires
a maximizing strategy (see also Bailey
1969:36-7).
The subject-centered/system-centered approach to
factional competition and political development
adopted in this volume contrasts sharply
with
the
exclusively system-centered focus of both cultural
ecology and structural
Marxism,
currently the two most
popular theories for explaining political
change
in
ancient societies. Bothcultural ecology and structural
Marxism focus upon strictly bounded, culturally dis-
tinct
social groups. In
cultural
ecology, the social
unit
is
defined
by external boundaries, created by geographic
isolation and by the competitive relationships that
develop between populations under conditions of
resource scarcity
(Sanders
and Price 1968; Carneiro
1970; Ferguson 1984). In structuralMarxism,the social
unit
is defined by its internal organization of social
production and reproduction under a guiding set of
social
rules and practices ( structures ) (Friedman 1975;
Godelier 1977:63).
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
13/31
Introduction 3
Both
cultural ecology and structural
Marxism post-
late the narrow constraint of human behavior and deci
sinmaking
with in
thesesystems:by stringent consider-
ations of energetic efliciency in cultural ecology Price
1982:719) and by the Hmits of structurally determined
consciousness
in structural
Marxism
Godelier
1978:768).
Thesesame
constraints
opr te
equally for
all
members of society,
implying
a condition of cultural
homogeneity for human groups.
Based upon such assumptions, cultural ecology and
structural
Marxism
supply accountsofthegrowthof
poli-
ticalcomplexitythat are quite different
from
the one pro-
posed in this volume. Cultural ecologists believe that
incipientpolitical
complexityoccurs as a normal part of
the array of random,
low-level
cultural variation
present
in all populations Price 1982:724). However,political
complexitybegins togrowonlyafterpopulation
pressure
has created the need to intensify production
within
groups and to compete for
resources
belonging to others
Sandersand Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster 1975;
Ferguson 1984; Johnson and Earle 1987:16-18). Through
either
exp nsin
or emulation, the beliefs and practices
that resultinlarger groupswithgreaterabilityto organize
production
and warfare
prev lwithin
a
regin.
The con
centration ofwealth,coercive power, and prestige in the
hands of political leaders contributes to managerial
capacityby
giving
leaderstheabilitytocoordn telarger,
more complex populations Webster 1975, 1976).
This formulation can becriticized on two grounds.
First,
it
proposes
that populationpressureand
resource
shortages
arenecessarytoinitiatetheprocessofpolitical
development and to maintain its progress. There is,
however, empirical evidence to the contrary, presented
in
this volume and elsewhere. Second, in analyzing the
concept of power, cultural ecologists focus attention on
the energy used to maintain competing populations and
the
Information flows
used to organize them e.g., White
1959; Price 1982;Wright 1969; Flannery 1972; Johnson
1978).
But they tend to ignore the relations of alliance
and dominance that brings organizational structures
into existence and maintain them. The manipulation of
social
relations is as important as the manipulation of
natural
resources
i n
theprocessofpoliticaldevelopment,
a pointwhichculturalecologists tend to ignore but not
always, see Webster 1975, 1976;Spencer1982).
Structural Marxists
present
an epigenetic model of
political development Friedman and Rowlands 1978).
Politicalchangeis not due to the goal-directedstrategies
ofpolitical
leaders
but, rather, is a
consequence
of struc
tural contradiction that is, the
incompatibility
of the
interlinked
forces of production, relations of pro
duction, and social and ideological superstructure)
resulting in structural reorganization Friedman 1975;
Godelier
1977:63, Bloch 1983:154). Power is not con
structed by
individuis,
but rather
falls
to certain people
as a
consequence
of the prevailing cultural rules,
especially
those
allocating
resources,
labor, and product
Godelier 1978; Bender 1985). In the
init ial
phasesof
politicalcomplexityand socialinequality,the conferring
of
superordinate statusoccurs with the consent of sub
ordn te
groups,
with
superordinate status
falling
to
those
who
med te
between humans and deities, i.e.
thosewho control the imaginarymeansof social repro
duction through religious
ritual
Friedman and Row
lands 1978; Godelier 1986:156-64; Bender 1985).
Likecultural ecology, this account ofpoliticaldevel
opment is deficient. Its principal difiiculty is that it
postl les
consensus
with in
the bodypolitic
prior
to the
emergence
of
class
and
class
struggle.
While
the consent
of
followers
is
certainlyneededbyleadersinthe veryfirst
stagesofpoliticalcomplexity Clark and Blake, Chapter
2;
Spencer,
Chapter
3;
Redmond, Chapter
4 ,
evidence
in
this volume
and elsewheresuggeststhatcoercinand not
consensus
is a dominant
mo t i f in
complex chiefdoms and
is absolutely pervasive in agrarianstates.
Culturalecology and structural
Marxism
difier
from
the approach taken in this volume in yet another way.
They bothpostl testrict behavioral determinismwhile
this volume
takes
seriously the impactofhuman purpose,
creativity, and choice. This difference derives
from
the
number of variables employed by
each
of the
analyses.
Both cultural ecology and structural Marxismemploy
models constructed of relatively few variables,
which
necessarilylimitshuman choice and agency toafewhighly
redundant options. As aconsequence,human behavior
emergesas
highly
determined. In contrast, the studies in
this volume consider the
rich
complexity of
competitive
strategizing,
which invoives the manipulation of every
conceivable ecological and social variable
in
complex and
contingent ways. In doing so, they broaden the dimen
sions
of
human choice and leave room for the exercise of
human agency. Thus, the
willingness
to consider the
full
complexity
of specific historical situations
restores
the
concept of agency to the study of
social
change.
Acknowledgments
Earlierdrafts of
this
chapter were patiently read by John
Clark,
Timothy
Earle, John Fox, Roberto Korzenie-
wicz, Hattula Moholy-Nagy,Mary Pohl, and Glenn
Perusek. Their criticisms, comments, and lineediting
shaped
the chapter in many important ways. I am grate-
fu l for their help.
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
14/31
Ethnicity
and political
control in a complex
society:
theTarascan
state
of
prehispanic
xico
H E L E N P E R L S T E I N P O L L R D
The interrelationship between ethnic units and a central
political authority is known historically to have been
crucial to the operation of complex societies. In the
process of this interaction central authorities,
par
ticularly ruling lites havecreated new ethnic groups,
havealtered the attributeswhichdefine ethnic identity,
and
have
restructured relationships between ethnic
groups (Enloe 1980:17ff.).
Political
authoritieshavetwo
fundamental goals for the survival of their centralized
power: (1) the economic
exploitation o f
populations and
resources,
and (2) the protection of the integrity of the
state
frontiers. In achieving both
these
goals ethnic
diversity
can either
faciltate
or hinder
lite
action.
Centralized authorities canassuremaximalaccessto
populations and
resources
when
decisin
making
flows
from the top downward, according to principiesestab
lished
by dominant
lites.
Ethnicdiversityoften disrupts
this
f low
by interposing local or regionalleaders,who
acquire power not through their allegiance to central
hierarchies, but through positions of ethnic
status.Deci
sin
making may be undertaken to reflect the needsof
local
populations or local
lites
at theexpense of the
state.
On the other hand, under conditions of rapid
territorial
expansin
when large populations and/or
resources
are being incorporated into a single political
unit,
the existing lines of authority, legitimacy, and
social
cohesinpresent
n ethnically
distnct
populations
may provide central authorities
wi th
an infrastructure
o f political
and economic networks that can be tapped
to
the benefit of the
state.
In a similar manner, the main-
tenance
of the state's territorial integrity
demands
populations w ing to defend that territory, and not
themselves
act to foster rebellion against central auth
or i ty . That can be achieved in at least two ways: the
acceptance of
state
ideology and legitimacy, usually
through the
identification
of
individuis
and groups as a
single social group, i.e.,
coirmion
ethnicity;or theaccept
anceof common self-interest among ethnically diverse
populations who see their itmninent survival as depend
ent on subordination to a central authority. The second
is often found on active mil i tary frontiers or among
refugee populations fleeing
conquest.
To the
state
such
peoples
can provide valuable service as warriors,mess-
engers, spies, and long-distance traders, services that
may outweigh the hazard of desertion.
T o
a great extent our understanding of the evolution
o f complex societies is
based
on societies known pri-
marily or exclusively through archaeology. One
approach to studying the archaeology of
ethnicity,
that
o f ethnoarchaeology, has primarily concentrated on
acephalous
societies, attempting to
test
the regularities
in
relationships between isolable cultures and artifact
distributions
(e.g. Hodder 1979). A second major
approach, modeling the spatial and functional
distri-
bution
of prehistoric ethnic groups on the
basis
of
ethnohistoric evidence, has the
advantage
of dealing
directly
wi th
complex, ethnically plural societies. The
primarydisadvantageis its l imitat ion tothose societies
knowable through both ethnohistoric and
archaeo
logical
Information.
These
societies,
while
representing
only a small sample of complex societies which have
ever evolved,
nevertheless
provide a
basic resource
for
the identification of
those
ethnic
processes
of sig-
nificance in societal evolution and their detection
archaeologically. In the New
Wo r id
such an approach
has
been used
in the Andes to
evalate
the
patterns
of
Inka
expansin
(Morris 1982; Rowe 1982; Wachtel
1982, among others) and to
genrate
models of ethnic/
state
interaction
which
can be applied to earlier periods
(Schaedel 1978).
The central defining feature of an ethnic group, self-
identification,
and categorization by the governinglite
is cleariy beyond the
resources
of archaeologically
derived
research.
Nevertheless,
because
ethnicity is gen
erally
associated
wi th
high
rates
of endogamy, the
sharing of clusters of beliefs and vales marked by the
use of a common language, and is often
territorially
isolable, the discemment of ethnic variation is not
impossible. As
wi th
allaspectsof archaeological analy
sis, the introduction of ethnicity into the variables
studied must bedone
wi th
care.Ethnic boundaries are
fluid contracting or expanding
wi th
majorpoliticaland
economic shifts in the society at large. Ethnic identifica-
tions coexist
w i th
other social
identi f cat ions
meaning
79
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
15/31
80 HelenPerislein Pollard
that occupational and class boundaries, for example,
may cross-cut ethnic groups. Different artifact
classes,
or
properties of artifacts may signal thesedifferent social
boundaries. Moreover,
wi th in
a single multi-ethnic,
complex society the intensity of ethnic
affiliation
may
differ,
and along
wi th
this the number and kinds of
markers usedby a group to signal ethnicity may vary.
Finally,
the archaeologist
deals with
units of time that
often
compress
ethnic maps andobscurethe
processes
ofethnicemergenceandchange.
Justas complex societies vary in theirbasicstructures
and developmental trajectories, one must expect similar
variation in the structure and significance of ethnicity.
Aspart of the larger processof developing theories of
the nature of complex societies, one goal should there
fore
be the development o fmodels ofethnicity,
based
on
various ethnohistorically knowable societies, and their
application to earlier
polities.
Wi th
this goal in
mind,
a model of the structure o f
ethnicity
in the proto-
historic
Tarascan state of central
Mxico
(AD 1450-
1520) is hereinpresented Fig.7.1).
TheTarascanterritorialstatein its sixteenth-century
orm is renowned for its high degree of political
and relatively unchallenged control of its
p AZTEC
H TARASCAN
y
QUICHE
M
7 1
Protohistoric
Mesoamerica
territory
(Gorenstein and Pollard 1983, Pollard 1993).
When viewed
from
the perspective of the geopolitical
core, the Lake
Ptzcuaro
Basin,thesecharacteristics can
be related to theemergence,by the protohistoric period,
of a social system
with
a fully
Tarascan
identity, pro-
duced by the conscious subordination and replacement
of
localethnic/linguisticstatusas thebasisfor social or
political power. Despite clear indications of earlier
ethnic heterogeneity in central
Michoacn
Relacinde
Michoacn [1541] 1956), by the sixteenth century the
population
was self-identifying and being identified by
othersas solelyTarascan RelacindeMichoacn[1541]
1956;Suma deVisitasdePueblos[1547-50] 1905;Rela-
ciones
Geogrficas[1579-81] 1987; Warren 1968, 1985,
among others).
Such subordination and replacement of ethnic
vari
ationdistinguishes this system
from
the mainstream of
protohistoric Mesoamerica,
which
was characterized by
ethnic economic and political specialization and
mult i -
ethnic social classes (Carrasco 1971; Zantwijk 1973).
Along the Tarascan mil i tary frontier, however, the
Tarascan poli ty
was multi-ethnic,
plural,
and demo-
graphically largely non-Tarascan (Mendieta y
Nez
1940; Brand 1943; Gorenstein 1974, 1985; Herrejn
Peredo
1978;
onzlez
Brespo 1979; Contreras
Ramrez
1987). Taken together,
these
policies, the one emphasiz-
ingsocial homogeneity of the
lite
and a new common
Tarascan
identity, and the other emphasizing
plurality
and heterogeneity, appearto be in
conflict.
However,
these
two distinct policies of ethnic assimi-
lation and ethnic segregation, dominated community
interaction
in geographically
seprate
zones of the
Tarascan
poli ty.
By 1520 they had resulted in the ethnic
boundaries recorded inthe early documents and mapped
by
Brand (1943; Fig. 7.2). Combining our knowledge of
the ecological, economic,
poli t ical ,
and artifactual
vari
ation
wi th in
this territory we canproposethe following
model of the
Tarascan state.
one
ofassimilation
This
is the territory
wi th in which
Tarascan was the
dominant
language
and cultural identity was ethnic Tar
ascan.
It included at
least
two distinct regions.
Ethnicheartland
This
is the
zonewi th inwhich
the
Tarascan
politicalcore
existed,
wi th in
whichTarascan
vales
and norms were
held by the bulk of the population, and
wi th in
which
there
was a similar economic and settlement adaptation
to the
regin
(Stanislawski 1947). Thus, thiszonedefines
the regional marketing network of the core Fig.7.3) and
-
8/9/2019 Brumfield y Fox 1994. Factional competition (1).pdf
16/31
Ethnicityin theTarascanstate 81
ig
7.2 Sixteenth century
ethnicllinguisticboundaries.
Based on
Brand
1943.
the primary extent of
Tarascan religin
and ideology.
The population
wi th in
this
zone,
especially the
lite,
participated in a unitary social system dating to the
political
incorporation of central
Michoacn
(1350-
1440) and the
emergence
of
Tarascan
identity (Goren
stein and Pollary 1983). The geographical extent of this
zone is largely co-terminous
wi th
the
regin wi th in