Controversies and Polemics Involving the Sufi-Martin Van Bruinessen
Bruinessen Traditions for the Future
Transcript of Bruinessen Traditions for the Future
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Traditions for the Future:
The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU
Martin van Bruinessen
[published as: Martin van Bruinessen, 'Traditions for the future: the reconstruction of traditionalist discourse
within NU', in: Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, traditional Islam and modernity in
Indonesia, Clayton, VIC: Monash Asia Institute, 1996, pp. 163-189.]
When the Muslim modernists of the early 20th century were thinking about developing an Islamic
practice appropriate to the modern age, they raised the slogan of return to the original scriptural
sources, Qur'an and hadits, throwing off the intellectual ballast accumulated during the intervening
thirteen centuries. They attributed the stagnation of the Muslim world to the heavy weight of
established practice and the blind following (taqlid) of earlier generations of Muslim thinkers, and they
were convinced that the exercise ofijtihad, independent interpretation of the Qur'an and hadits (though
within definite limits) would make Islam much more adaptable to new circumstances.
When in the early 1980s the Nahdlatul Ulama made a radical break with its recent past as a
political party and withdrew from formal politics, this too was explained as a return to an earlier past,
to the spirit of the founding fathers, to the strategy (khitthah) of the year 1926, when the organization
was established. It was hardly a coincidence that simultaneously with this alleged return to tradition,
leadership of the organisation passed from the tired old men who had unimaginatively been at the helm
into the hands of two younger men who were, each in his own way, very much concerned about the
future of Islam and of the people whom they were going to lead. The very concept of the Khitthah of
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1926 was, in fact, first formulated by one of them, Kiai Achmad Siddiq, as recently as 1979.1
Both
modernist and traditionalist Muslims, when planning to take a step forward, thus appealed to an
older tradition - although what was understood thereby in these two cases was quite different.
There is a growing awareness among historians and anthropologists that the relationship
between tradition and change, or tradition and modernity, is not as straightforward as earlier
generations used to think. Not only is the body of tradition in any society continually evolving, it is also
often subject to deliberate innovations.2 We have for some time now been aware that many allegedly
ancient traditions are in fact quite recent inventions.3 This may be true of religious traditions as well as
of court ceremonies or the rituals surrounding sports events. Bearing this in mind, there is no a priori
reason to presume that a self-consciously traditionalist organisation (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama) is
less dynamic or less prone to change than a self-proclaimed anti-traditional one.
NU and Islamic tradition
Any attempt to define what the Nahdlatul Ulama is, what it represents and what it stands for, involves
the concept of tradition; tradition is the essence of its self-perception and self-definition. There is no
single Indonesian (or Javanese) term covering the entire semantic range of this self-conscious
traditionalism. Instead, the foreign loanwords tradisi and tradisional are often used. Thus one may
speak ofIslam tradisional; a recent study of the pesantren world by a person of NU background was
titled Tradisi Pesantren,4 and a textbook for use in NU-affiliated schools discusses a few points of
difference with modernists under the heading of tradisi keagamaan kaum Nahdliyyin, the religious
1Kiai Achmad Siddiq published a booklet titled Khitthah Nahdliyah just before the 1979 NU congress. The ideas had
been germinating for more than a decade, however, before receiving their final shape. An earlier version appeared in 1969
as Pedoman Berfikir "Nahdlatul Ulama". I am grateful to Greg Fealy for providing me with a copy of this document.2
Dutch adatlaw scholars believed that they were uncovering such ancient and unchanging traditions. It is satisfying to
observe that one of the chief works of this school, C. van Vollenhove's The Discovery of Adat Law, in Indonesian
translation has been given (though not deliberately, I fear) the fittingly ambivalent title ofPenemuan Hukum Adat- the
first word of which may mean "invention" as well as "discovery".
3Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
4Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982). This is a
translation of the author's 1980 ANU dissertation, The Pesantren Tradition.
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traditions of NU's followers.5
The absence of an indigenous term suggests that the present awareness
of the tradition as such is relatively recent.
What does the NU's traditionalism consist of? There are several key concepts in Islam that are
frequently translated as tradition, the most important of them being hadits, sunnah and adat. None of
these terms is co-extensive with Muslim traditionalism, and with the last it has had a highly ambivalent
relationship.Adat(Ar. `dah) is local practice, the way of the ancestors; since for the first generations
of Indonesian Muslims the ancestors obviously were not Muslims, Islam and adathave at some times
and places been at odds. As time went by, however, inevitably more and more of the ancestors were
Muslims, and adatwas gradually adapted to Islam (or even came to incorporate elements from Muslim
law). Conversely, much ofadatcame to be seen as part and parcel of Islam. In the view of Muslim
reformists, the religious practice of the traditionalists is pervaded with local practices of non-Islamic
origin, it is a mixture of Islam and adat. The traditionalists themselves strongly object to this view; they
emphasise that traditionalist ulama have played leading roles in the struggle against adatpractices that
are in conflict with the syari`ah.
The sunnah of the Prophet, i.e. the precedents set by him for the believers' behaviour in all
matters, constitutes a core element in the self-conscious traditionalism of the NU ulama. Traditional
Muslims refer to themselves as Ahlussunnah wal Jama ah (abbreviated to Aswaja), people of the
sunnah and the (orthodox) community. This term explicitly excludes rationalists (who depend on
reason rather than the sunnah) and all sorts of sectarians, notably the Shi'is (who have de facto broken
with the Sunni community), but the traditionalists most commonly use the term to distinguish
themselves from modernist and reformist Muslims, whom they also see as deviating from the sunnah.
The latter, however, firmly claim that they are the true Ahlussunnah wal Jama`ah themselves, and
point out that for many traditionalist beliefs and practices no Prophetic precedent can be found.
Reformists and traditionalists have different perceptions of the sunnah, rooted in different attitudestowards the hadits.
5Aliy As'ad, Ke-NU-an. Buku pertama (Yogyakarta: Pengurus Wilayah Ma'arif NU Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta,
1981), pp. 31-3. The traditions described and defended here include ziarah kubur(visiting the graves of ancestors and
teachers), tahlilan (reciting the formula la ilaha illa'llah, "there is no god but God"), shalawatan (invocations of divine
blessing on behalf of the Prophet and his family).
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Hadits (literally meaning reports but commonly translated as traditions) are sayings
attributed to the Prophet or, occasionally, eyewitness reports concerning his acts. They constitute the
major source of knowledge of the sunnah of the Prophet and thereby embody the most authoritative
doctrinal and behavioural norms. The hadits have in fact had a much greater impact on the life of the
Muslim community the Qur'an has; there is no belief or practice that is not ultimately legitimated by
some hadits. In the light of what was observed on tradition in general above, it should come as no
surprise that numerous hadits can be shown to be later fabrications, apparently invented in order to
legitimate existing local practices, to support one faction as against others, or to address problems
arising long after the Prophet's lifetime.6
When the modernists and reformists raised the slogan of return to the Qur'an and hadits, they
meant by the latter in the first place the canonical collections of sound (shahih) traditions, from which
the most obvious falsifications had been weeded out. Traditionalists also acknowledged the central
importance of hadits, but before the early 20th century, the canonical collections of Bukhari and
Muslim were not studied in the pesantren. Many santri, it is true, got to know one or more of the
shorter Forty Hadits collections that were popular throughout the Muslim world, or even one of the
larger collections of devotional and moralistic hadits.7
Mostly, however, they encountered hadits in the
processed form, as they are quoted in support of an argument in the texts on fiqh (jurisprudence)
and doctrine that made up most of the pesantren curriculum.8 For in matters of law and doctrine,
traditionalist Muslims - and here we come to the core of the tradition - follow the great ulama of the
6European scholars such as Ignaz Goldziher, Joseph Schacht and G.H.A. Juynboll have emphasized that the hadits
literature is to a large extent a product of later centuries. Muslim scholars reject their conclusions but agree that there are
hadits of various degrees of reliability, the canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim being considered as the most
reliable. Reformists insist on stricter criteria of reliability ofhadits than traditionalists, and have in fact declared numerous
popular hadits to be false or unreliable.
7Of the "Forty Hadits" collections, those by Nawawi and `Ushfuri are the most popular among traditionalist Muslims in
Indonesia. Nawawi's Forty exist in numerous editions and translations, and they are for instance appended to the
Indonesian translation of Hasjim Asj'ari'sMuqaddimah al-Qanun al-Asasi, the most authoritative early statement of whatNU stood for (the translation was published by Menara, Kudus, 1969). `Ushfuri's Forty (known as Ushfuriyah) were
recently translated into Indonesian by the santri-journalist Mustafa Helmi with the explicit intention of acquainting an
urban public with the pesantren atmosphere. A more voluminous collection used in many pesantren is Riyadl al-Shalihin,
also by Nawawi. Many of the hadits in these collections do not stand up to the reformists' stricter criteria of authenticity,
and the same is true of numerous hadits quoted in thefiqh textbooks referred to below.
8See Martin van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu",Bijdragen tot de
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146 (1990), 226-269; idem, "Pesantren and Kitab Kuning: Maintenance and Continuation
of a Tradition of Religious Learning",Mizan (Jakarta) vol. V no. 2 (1992), 27-48.
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past rather than deriving their own conclusions from the Qur'an and hadits. In other words, they adhere
to one of the orthodox madzhab or schools of law and practise taqlid, i.e. follow the rulings of the
founding father and other major scholars of this school as they are found in standardfiqh works.
Fiqh, madzhab and taqlid
Taqlidand madzhab are perhaps the most central concepts of the learned variety of traditionalist Islam.
A few ulama of exemplary learning and piety in the early Islamic period laid down the principles of
jurisprudence and legal practice in more or less fixed madzhab (lit. path). In doing so, they practised
ijtihador independent interpretation of the scriptural sources; later generations modestly refrained from
ijtihad and practised taqlid instead. In the traditionalist view, depending on one's own reading of
Qur'an and hadits is most perilous and may be the source of sinful error. The average believer, and
even learned scholars, can only avoid going astray by strict adherence to one of the madzhab, i.e., by
relying on its standard works offiqh. Out of a larger number existing in the past, only four Sunni
schools of law survive, the Hanafi, Syafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali madzhab (sometimes the Shiite Ja`fari
madzhab is counted as the fifth). Indonesian Muslims almost without exception used to adhere to the
Syafi'i madzhab, which was also the dominant one in South Arabia and southern India.
Fiqh is, for the traditionalists, the queen of the sciences; it is the guide for all behaviour,
prescribing what the believer should and should not do. In the other religious sciences of doctrine
(`aqidah) and mysticism (tasawwuf), they also practice taqlid, following in matters of belief Asy'ari and
his school (with lip service to the rival school of Maturidi) and in mysticism the moderate Ghazali,
while rejecting Ibn `Arabi's mysticism and metaphysics. Reformists reject Asy'ari and Ghazali (as well
as, of course, Ibn `Arabi) and elevate the puritan Ibn Taimiyya to the status of the greatest scholar of
the past. Ibn Taimiyya's works, in turn, are anathema in thepesantren world.
The traditionalist insistence on taqlidappears to be rooted in a pessimistic view of history,
according to which knowledge and piety necessarily decrease with increasing distance from the
Prophetic intervention. The periodical appearance of mujaddid, great scholars who revitalised and
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renewed the old teaching, could only temporarily stall this process of general decline.9
Today's ulama
are believed to be but pale shadows of the great scholars of the past, and presuming to improve upon
their rulings by practising one's own ijtihad is seen as unwarranted arrogance. Reformists and
modernists, on the other hand, vehemently criticised blind taqlid and the accompanying medieval
mentality as responsible for the backwardness of Indonesia's Muslim community. Their call for a return
to the Qur'an and hadits often amounted to a radical rejection of most of the religious literature of the
intervening period, and especially offiqh and its madzhab.10
Both traditionalists and reformists, incidentally, have tended to exaggerate the rigidity of the
madzhab. It is true thatfiqh books prescribe in great detail what has to be done in numerous specific
situations, but a fair amount of flexibility and freedom has always existed because fiqh is neither a
complete nor a consistent system. It is not complete, for many concrete problems are not covered by it,
so that the expert has to choose which known problem he considers most relevant to the case at hand.
And the casuistry of thefuqaha is proverbial; a skilled legist can find arguments in support of almost
any opinion. This is further facilitated by the fact that on many questions that are explicitly treated in
thefiqh works there appear to exist not one but several answers, derived by different leading lights of
the madzhab or sometimes by the same expert in different periods of his life. Due to the willingness to
accommodate different opinions and inconsistencies, the madzhab have retained a certain potential for
development and adaptability. Taqlid is not necessarily rigid. Ironically, in the late 20th century,
traditionalist ulama often appear more flexible than the spokesmen for reformist Islam, many of whom
have not evolved beyond the positions taken at the beginning of this century.
9There is a widespread belief that every century there will appear a mujaddidin order to keep the ummah on
the right track. Lists of such mujaddidhave been compiled; the one most celebrated in NU circles is the prolific
15th
century Egyptian scholar Jalaluddin al-Suyuti, whose work constitute a synthesis of classical Islamic
scholarship and many of whose books are still studied in the pesantren.
10The origin of the madzhab, the potential for development within the madzhab, and the challenge posed to the
madzhab by reformist thought are presented very clearly in Noel J. Coulson, "The concept of progress and Islamic law",
in: Robert F. Bellah (ed.),Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 74-92.
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Respect and rituals for the dead
The concept oftaqlidis closely associated with the great respect in which the ulama, and especially
those of the past, are held by traditionalist Muslims. The ulama deserve respect as the carriers of
(religious) knowledge; they are, as a celebrated hadits has it, the heirs of the prophets. The
transmission of religious knowledge, even if this concerns only a written text, involves a personal
relationship between teacher and disciple, and the latter is acutely aware of being at the end of a long
chain of such teacher-disciple links (the chain is called isnadin the case ofhadits and other textual
knowledge, silsilah in the case of mystical initiations). It is the disciple's duty to continue paying
respect to his teachers and teachers' teachers, even after their deaths. He may also request a deceased
teacher's, or another saint's, intercession, blessing or supernatural assistance. Pilgrimages to the shrines
of the saints who introduced Islam and to those of great ulama - especially the kiai who allegedly
possessed supernatural powers - are an important part of traditionalist religious life. Most pesantren
organise annual celebrations, called khaul (Ar. hawl), to commemorate the deaths of their founders.
The khaul is a special case ofziarah kubur, the visiting of graves that is considered as
meritorious in traditionalist circles (and much frowned upon by reformists). It is part of a whole
complex of practices relating to the dead, based on the assumption that some form of contact still
exists. On the first seven nights after a death, relatives and friends come together for a ritual mealpreceded by prayers and tahlilan (recitation of the creed la ilaha illa'llah). The participants present the
merit (pahala, sawab) of prayers and recitation as a gift to the soul of the deceased. In the same way,
one says prayers and Qur'anic verses when visiting a grave, as a present to the person buried there. In
exchange, especially when visiting graves of saints, one may ask for intercession with God, the cure for
a disease, business success or other forms of supernatural assistance, or seek a divinatory dream or
vision. In the view of the Sufis, even after their death teachers remain indispensable as intermediaries in
the chain of spiritual guidance from the Prophet to the individual believer.
These practices are severely condemned by reformists, in whose opinion communication ends
with death and all attempts at contacts beyond the grave are no less than syirk, idolatry. Much more
than technical questions of taqlidversus ijtihad, it is these practices that maintain a sharp boundary
between reformists and modernists on the one hand, and traditionalists on the other. On the former
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matter, both sides have evolved in converging directions (more emphasis on canonical hadits in the
pesantren and more respect for the intellectual tradition offiqh among reformists). On the point of
relations with the dead, however, the difference is as wide now as it was seventy years ago. This is
therefore, certainly at present, the most sharply distinguishing feature of Muslim traditionalism in
Indonesia. It is recognised as such by several NU-affiliated authors, and the defense of the said
practices receives much attention in their apologetic works.11 However, in the more self-conscious
recent statements of the essence of Muslim traditionalism, the various reformulations of NU's Khitthah,
these practices are hardly mentioned and certainly not given any emphasis.
Demise of the traditionalist-reformist conflict
There is no disagreement as to the centrality of the above-mentioned traditions to the identity of NU.
Taqlid with the Imam Syafi'i in questions of religious obligations, with Imam Asy'ari in matters of
doctrine, and with Ghazali in mysticism and piety, extraordinary veneration for the ulama of the past,
presenting prayers and other gifts to the dead and asking for their intercession are the elements of
traditional religiosity most fiercely attacked by reformist and modernist Muslims in the first decades of
this century. Traditionalism, which declared precisely the criticised aspects of religious practice to be
essential, was the understandable defensive reaction to the reformist onslaught. In the 1920s and 1930s
the debates between reformists and traditionalists were heated, but the emotions have since long
subsided. In matters concerning the relations with the dead, the reformist and traditionalist viewpoints
are as irreconcilable as ever, although this now rarely leads to open conflicts between neighbours
anymore. In the taqlid versus ijtihad debate, however, there has been among the traditionalists a
gradual shift towards accommodation with reformist positions.
An early attempt at reconciliation was made by Kiai Machfoezh Shiddiq, who was the NU
chairman from 1937 to 1942. In an influential booklet he argued that there was no real contradiction
11A booklet by K.H. Ali Ma'shum, NU's Rois Aam from 1982 to 1984, discusses nine issues on which reformists
vehemently disagree with traditionalists (K.H. Ali Ma'shum, Kebenaran Argumentasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah.
Translated from the Arabic by K.H. Ahmad Subki Masyhadiy. Pekalongan: Udin Putra, 1983). Three of these concern
matters of worship (non-obligatory prayers and the determination of beginnning and end of the fasting month), one the
experiences of the soul after death, and the other five concern various aspects of relations with the dead. See also note 5.
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between taqlidand ijtihad. Strict ijtihadwas only practised by the great imams of the past, but within
the madzhab there remain numerous problems that cannot be solved by literal following those imams
and that necessitate interpretation and creative thought of a lower order. Taqlidshould never consist of
the blind unthinking following that is so criticised by reformists, but in Machfoezh Shiddiq's view
necessarily involves a certain amount of what the reformists term ijtihad. Reformists, on the other
hand, agree that ijtihadmay only be practised within very strict limitations.12 Kiai Machfoezh' younger
brother Achmad Siddiq was later to develop this argument a little further in his Khitthah Nahdliyah,
and as NU'sRois Aam was to preside over the formal reconciliation of Muhammadiyah and NU.
It needs hardly be said that the heated reformist-traditionalist debates of a half century ago
were not part of the idealised past that the return to the Khitthah of 1926 should recreate. Those
thinkers in NU who attempted a formulation of the Khitthah were also for various reasons in favour of
further accommodation with the reformists and wished for an emulation of their successes in education,
welfare and social mobility. They therefore tended to underemphasise in their formulations the
dimensions of traditionalism that used to define the boundaries with reformism.13 There were no anti-
reformist overtones in any stage of the discussions on the return to the Khitthah of 1926.
The desire for change and definitions of the Khitthah
When the Situbondo congress in 1984 decided to return to the Khitthah of 1926 there was little
agreement as to what precisely was meant by those words. Different persons held and continue to hold
different, sometimes even conflicting, views on this return to a better past, depending on what they
12Ch.M. Machfoezh Shiddiq,Debat tentang Idjtihaad dan Taqlied. Soerabaia: H.B.N.O., n.d. My attention was first
drawn to this publication by Professor A. Mukti Ali (who remembered it as a watershed in traditionalist-reformist
relations). I thank Kiai Muchith Muzadi of Jember for finding this rare booklet and sending me a photocopy.13
This should not be thought to imply that the said aspects of traditionalism were less meaningful for these thinkers
personally. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was also an associate of the unconventional peripatetic, highly charismatic clairvoyant,
miracle-working mystic and living saint, Gus Mik (K.H. Chamim Djazuli) and he was later buried in a graveyard
designed by the latter to become a centre of spiritual power by having 40 huffazh (persons knowing the Qur'an by heart)
and 40 "heirs of the saints" buried there. It would have been hard to find anyone in NU more directly embodying the polar
opposite of Islamic reformism than Gus Mik.
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perceived to be the major ills of the present. The sources of discontent had been numerous recently: the
increasing political marginalisation of NU, its failure to contribute to the well-being of its constituency,
the declining role of the kiai in the organisation. To some delegates at the congress, returning to NU's
original platform implied a clean break with parliamentary politics, to others it meant that the ulama
should take full control of the organisation again (after it had been hijacked by the politicians), to yet
others that it should also represent the social and economic interests of its constituency.
Since the NU had been forced to merge with other Muslim parties into PPP, its effectiveness as
a channel of political and economic patronage had steadily declined. NU politicians faced heavy-handed
government intervention in PPP to reduce their influence. NU-affiliated businessmen faced economic
boycotts: not only were they not awarded government contracts, but even their dealings with private
sector partners were often blocked by local authorities. These were reprisals for the oppositional role
NU played in Indonesia's parliament during the 1970s. Many if not most of NU's local branch
committees were dominated by businessmen, who desired to get rid of the odium of political
opposition.
Many kiai felt that they had lost their grip on the organisation; by name it still was an
organisation of ulama but in practice it was run by urban politicians who had little time for the rural
kiai. The kiai were, of course, not just loosing control of the organisation, their influence in society atlarge was declining even faster. They were no longer the highest educated persons of their villages, and
the value of a pesantren education had fallen far below that of a western-type school diploma.
The largely rural mass following of NU belonged to the most backward segments of
Indonesian society, and Indonesia's pattern of economic development tended to exacerbate their
relative backwardness. Some young members of the NU elite felt that the emphasis on political struggle
during the past decades had led to neglect of NU's educational role and of its responsibility for the
welfare of its following. They too looked back to a less politicised past to legitimise the community
development-type activities they envisaged.
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The founding fathers, the Khitthah and the future
Apart from discontent in various circles, there is another reason why around 1980 there was an
increasing demand for an explicit formulation of NU's principles. This was the inevitable process of
aging and death of the charismatic leaders of the first hour. The great ulama of the founding generation
enjoyed tremendous respect in NU circles, and as long as they were alive it was they who embodied
NU's values and aims.
Until 1980, the highest position in the organisation had in turn been held by the three most
respected founders, Hasjim Asj'ari (d. 1947), Wahab Chasbullah (d. 1971) and Bisri Syansuri (d. 1980).
Each of them put a highly personal stamp on the organisation, resulting in quite different emphases in
NU's traditionalism. It was not only due to changed external circumstances that NU's behaviour in their
respective periods shows great differences. NU's unyielding support for Sukarno's policies was very
much due to Kiai Wahab and his pragmatic attitude. The radical traditionalism of the 1980s, which
several times brought NU into open conflict with the New Order government,14
was just as much due
to Kiai Bisri's personality and his different views as to when one should be principled.
The difference between the attitudes of Kiai Wahab and Kiai Bisri is often explained by their
preferences of, respectively, qawa`id al-fiqh and ushul al-fiqh as methods of deciding which course of
action is dictated by Islamic law in a given situation. To many concrete questions, as said above, the
fiqh literature does not provide unambiguous answers. The qawa`id(sg. qa`idah, rule) are simple
legal maxims, rules of thumb for quickly cutting through a problem. One of the most celebrated of
these maxims may be paraphrased as the prevention of developments that could be detrimental or
sinful has a higher priority than the pursuit of that which is beneficial or morally superior.15 Reliance
on this maxim, to the unsympathetic observer, will be hard to distinguish from ordinary opportunism.
Ushul al-fiqh, on the other hand, is a sophisticated methodology offiqh, detailing how to arrive at a
judgement from first principles (Qur'an, hadits, consensus of the great ulama of the past), allowing a
14The expression "radical traditionalism" was first used by Mitsuo Nakamura to describe NU's political attitude during
the 1970s. See his article in this volume.
15In Arabic: daf` al-mafasid muqaddam `ala jalb al-mashalih. This maxim was often referred to by NU politicians to
explain that they cooperated with Sukarno in order to prevent worse, i.e. an even stronger influence of the communists on
government policies.
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restricted form of reasoning by analogy (qiyas). It is a strict and severe intellectual discipline, that does
not condition its practitioners for compromise. Kiai Bisri clearly was the better scholar; Kiai Wahab
had the stronger political instinct. His use ofqawa`id al-fiqh gave religious legitimation to what his
instincts told him was in the best interests of NU.
After Bisri Syansuri's death, none of the founding fathers remained, and there was nobody left
who could be said to embody NU's principles (Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin tried to act that part but was
not really successful). This made it more urgent for the principles to be laid down explicitly; it was
necessary to define the traditions that until recently had been present in the form of the founding
fathers. In a way, one could say that Kiai Bisri's real successor was the Khitthah.16
The idea that a new formulation of NU's aims and principles should take the place of the living
presence of the ulama of the founding generation was expressed quite explicitly by Kiai Achmad Siddiq
in the booklet in which he attempted this formulation.17 Kiai Wahab and Kiai Bisri were still alive then
but according to the author the time had come for an authoritative statement. Not only was he worried
about the widening gap between the founding fathers and the younger generation of NU members, but
he also perceived that the latter had become very heterogeneous in educational and cultural
backgrounds.
One gathers that this observation referred to the fact that NU's becoming a political party had
made the organisation dependent on leaders with different skills, and perhaps different basic values as
well, than those transmitted in the pesantren. After the 1955 elections NU did not itself have sufficient
educated members to fill all the parliamentary seats it had won, and it had to recruit outsiders
(including two Chinese businessmen). This pattern continued into the 1970s, and even many politicians
of solid NU family backgrounds lacked the exposure to pesantren education that could have made the
kiai's norms and values second nature to them.
16One is reminded, of course, of Weber's well-known discussion of the transition from charismatic to legal-bureaucratic
authority, of which this process of explicit self-definition is clearly a part. The reader will have no difficulty discerning
Weber's third type, traditional authority, as a crucial factor in the selection of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid to
become the first new team to lead the organisation after the adoption of the Khitthah.
17K.H. Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah (second edition, Surabaya: Balai Buku, 1980), pp. 14-15.
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Kiai Achmad Siddiq's restatement of the Khitthah
Kiai Achmad Siddiq emphasised that NU had been established as a purely religious organisation
(jam'iyyah diniyyah) and that its participation in practical politics had been only an intermezzo that had
in fact ended in 1973, when its political role was taken over by the PPP.18 This was not how most
people then saw the situation: the general view was that NU was continuing its political life as one
clearly identifiable stream within PPP. Even Kiai Bisri Syansuri, the Rois Aam, remained active in
politics almost up to his death. There were in the late 1970s already voices in NU calling for a
withdrawal from practical politics and Kiai Achmad Siddiq probably agreed with them, but rather than
joining in the call for a change he chose to redefine the situation and state that the change had already
occurred. Only the actors had yet to be made aware of it. Many individual NU members were and
would remain politically active but, as Kiai Achmad implied, not in the name of their organisation. Kiai
Achmad Siddiq was a past master in such semantic games, and he was to repeatedly have recourse to
similar stratagems in the following years.
The radicalism and confrontation with the government of the 1970s were, as Kiai Achmad
implied (without explicitly referring to them, however), not part of the NU tradition. The most essential
characteristics of Islam, he wrote, are the principle of tawassuth (moderation, keeping to the middle
road) and the aim ofrahmatan lil alamin (compassion and kindness towards the entire world). Both
imply tolerance and accommodation towards all but the implacable enemies of Islam. Tawassuth and
the cognate concepts ofi`tidal and tawazun (equity and balance) should be applied in all spheres of life.
In religious matters, Kiai Achmad continued, tawassuth means the avoidance of fanaticism, a
balanced use of reason as well as tradition based in revelation, efforts to purify Islam of foreign
accretions but tolerance towards Muslims whose religion still contains such foreign elements. This
formulation appears to imply accommodation with reformist Islam and benevolent neighbourly
relations with abangan. Like his brother Machfoezh Shiddiq before him (cf. note 12), Kiai Achmad
18Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah, p. 15-16.
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appeared willing to meet the reformists halfway.19
No such religious accommodation was possible with
abangan Kiai Achmad resolutely rejected all forms of syncretism but the emphasis on tolerance
appears designed to cool down the confrontation of rural santri and abangan, that had divided Java's
countryside since the 1950s. One may perhaps also perceive here an implicit criticism of NU's angry
response to the recognition ofaliran kebatinan by the MPR session of 1978, which had caused the NU
deputies to stage a walk-out.
In social and political life, tawassuth, i`tidal and tawazun imply acceptance of the variety of
mankind, and mutual understanding and respect for others. The political consequences Kiai Achmad
derives from his concepts of moderation deserve quoting in full:
(1) The preservation of the national state (which was established by the common wish of the
entire people) and the defense of its existence are obligatory.
(2) The legitimate head of state (government) must be held in respect and must be obeyed as
long as it does not deviate from, or issues orders in contravention of, God's commands.
(3) If it so happens that the government is at fault, the way to admonish it is in a polite
manner.20
This carefully worded statement allows various readings, probably deliberately so. It affirms acceptance
of the status quo and accommodation with the government but has a built-in reservation. The
government, it is implied, may well do wrong and will then have to be admonished - be it politely.
Interestingly, the state is said to be legitimate because it is a national state and an embodiment of
popular sovereignty. This is an implicit rejection of Islamic religio-politics. From this position it was
not a great step to argue in favour of acceptance of Pancasila as the one-and-only ideological
foundation of NU, as Kiai Achmad did in 1983. Also his affirmation at the 1984 Congress that the
Pancasila-based Republic represented the final form of the Indonesian state i.e., his rejection of the
19As NU's Rois Aam he was later to make overtures towards Muhammadiyah and, together with the latter
organisation's chairman, A.R. Fahruddin, signal that the differences of the past had largely been ironed out in the interest
ofukhuwwah islamiyah, brotherly relations among Muslims.
20Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah, p. 51.
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idea of an Islamic state is already implicit in this earlier formulation.21
As important elements of the Khitthah, Kiai Achmad further mentions ma`arif (education),
mabarrat (charity), mu`amalah (economic activities) and `izzul Islam wal Muslimin (glory of Islam
and Muslims). All of these are well-known terms, but they are given a somewhat modern slant.
Speaking of education, the kiai always mentions madrasah and school together, thereby implicitly
attributing equal weight to non-religious and religious subjects. Charity is declared to be a social act
of worship (`ibadah ijtima`iyyah) and thereby placed on a level with other forms of worship such as
prayer and fasting. Establishing hospitals and orphanages (once this was an activity in which
Muhammadiyah distinguished itself from NU) is an important this-worldly form of social worship, but
other-worldly forms of charity such as prayers for the dead should not be forgotten either.
In economic matters, to provide for one's own and one's family's basic needs is declared a
fardlu 'ain, a religious duty incumbent upon each individual. It is, moreover, highly desirable to achieve
more than a minimal standard of living, so that one can also fulfill the obligation of expendingzakatand
shadaqah.22
It is perhaps significant that Kiai Achmad does not mention performance of the hajj in this
context; the hajj only results in the individual acquisition of merit, while giving zakatand shadaqah is
also an act of social solidarity.
Among the possible interpretations of `izzul Islam wal Muslimin, finally, Kiai Achmad
mentions the need for Muslims to overcome their under-representation in politics and economics,
nationally as well as internationally. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was, more than other ulama, acutely aware of
how backward the Muslim ummah in general was compared to the West and Japan, how
underdeveloped the Indonesian Muslims were compared to the Christian minority and the secular elite,
and how far NU's following lagged behind the modernist Muslims. This awareness gave the old term of
`izzul Islam wal Muslimin as he used it a new overtone of emancipation.
21"... Republik Indonesia adalah bentuk upaya final seluruh nasion teristimewa kaum Muslimin untuk mendirikan
negara di wilayah Nusantara." See: Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo (Semarang: Sumber Barokah,
1985), p. 89.
22Zakatis the obligatory "alms-tax," consisting of a fixed, precisely specified percentage of certain sources of income,
to be divided among equally specified categories of recipients (including the poor); shadaqah are voluntary gifts to those
recipients.
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This reformulation of NU's Khitthah caused a few raised eyebrows even among the kiai. Some
of the politicians no doubt felt Kiai Achmad's ideas to be an attack on their own interpretation of what
NU stood for, and many of the kiai too were not at once convinced by his arguments against radicalism
and in favour of moderation and accommodation. The terms he used in support, tawassuth, i`tidal and
tawazun, were known to the kiai and understood to represent desirable attitudes. Many kiai privately
said, however, that they had never before heard NU's ideals and values defined by these terms; Kiai
Achmad's interpretation of them too was new to many.23
That in the end he carried the day was due to
his excellent personal credentials, being Machfoezh Shiddiq's younger brother and having been Wahid
Hasjim's personal secretary, and to the political skills he had acquired in his long bureaucratic career.
The Tim Tujuh and the Situbondo decisions
Kiai Achmad was not the only one who attempted to lay down in writing what according to him was
the essence of NU's tradition. Not long after Kiai Bisri Syansuri's death a grave conflict divided the
organisation into two opposing camps, commonly called the Cipete and Situbondo groups, after the
residences of the major protagonists, Idham Chalid and Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin.
Idham Chalid had since 1956 been the chairman general (ketua umum) of NU and had given
proof of great political flexibility and willingness to serve any government in power. He had since its
establishment also been the president of PPP and in this function apparently had connived in chairman
Naro's purging of vocal NU deputies from the party's list of candidates for the 1982 elections. Idham
became the chief target of the general dissatisfaction of the kiai with the Jakarta politicians. On the eve
of the 1982 elections, the four most senior kiai from East and Central Java visited Idham and
persuaded him to resign the chairmanship for health reasons. A few days later, Idham withdrew his
resignation under pressure from his closest supporters. For over two years, until the congress of 1984,
the organisation remained practically without an effective leadership. Idham was recognised by none
but his closest supporters, but his opponents refrained from designating another chairman. The conflict
23K.H. Muchith Muzadi of Jember, who for many years acted as Kiai Achmad Siddiq's secretary, told with relish of the
surprise of many of his colleagues when they first read Kiai Achmad's booklet.
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was widely seen as one between kiai and politicians, even though kiai were to be found in both groups,
as were politicians.24
A number of young and reform-minded concerned men belonging to NU's elite families made
concerted attempts to overcome the crisis. They attempted to mediate between the Cipete and
Situbondo groups, and at the same time used as best they could the opportunity provided by the crisis
to place themselves and their ideas in position to take over. This group included Abdurrahman Wahid,
Fahmi Saifuddin (a medical doctor and rapidly rising bureaucrat, the son of Saifuddin Zuhri), the kiai-
poet Musthofa Bisri of Rembang and another medical doctor, Muhammad Thohir of Surabaya (a
nephew of Machfoezh and Achmad Siddiq). Inviting a few other kiai, young intellectuals and
community development activists, they established in mid-1983 a forum to discuss the changes they
thought necessary in NU.25
The Majlis-24, as this forum came to be called after the number of its members, appeared
almost unanimous in their perception that three decades of practical politics had prevented NU from
devoting sufficient attention to its religious, social and economic functions. Empty slogans and
emotional posturing had taken the place of constructive efforts. It was felt that NU had got off the right
track a long time ago and that NU should attempt to regain its original purity by re-emphasising its
identity as ajam`iyyah diniyyah, a religious association (the Arabic term as always suggesting a moreprofound meaning than could be expressed by its Indonesian equivalent). The forum called for the
restoration (pemulihan) of the original Khitthah and gave a seven-man team (the Tim Tujuh) from
their midst the task of formulating more explicit recommendations on the subject.26
The frequent references to the past and to the Khitthah of 1926 were not simply a transparent
24The conflict will be discussed more extensively in my forthcoming book on the Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1980s.
25
Besides those already mentioned, the Majlis 24 included the then junior kiais Sahal Mahfudz (the first NU kiai tobecome actively involved in community development) and Muchith Muzadi of Jember (who often acted as Achmad
Siddiq's secretary and is by many believed to be responsible for part of Siddiq's formulations), former student activist M.
Zamroni, community development worker Abdullah Sjarwani, NU youth leader Slamet Effendy Yusuf, and the student
leader and most promising young thinker, Masdar F. Mas'udi.
26The members of this "Tim Tujuh" were: H. Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Zamroni, H.M. Said Budairy, H. Mahbub
Djunaidi, H. Fahmi D. Saifuddin, H.M. Danial Tanjung and A. Bagdja, all of them young men based in Jakarta. Not a
member of the team, but making crucial contributions to the ideas formulated and their later implementation was K.H.
Mustafa Bisri of Rembang.
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attempt to disguise reformist intentions and to claim traditional legitimatisation. The initiators of these
debates had a genuine interest in the past. They dug up the original statutes of the organisation and the
Arabic preamble to the statutes (titledMuqaddimah Al-Qanun al-Asasi) written by Hasjim Asj'ari for
guidance, and they later made both widely available.27
In its recommendations, however, the Tim
Tujuh even more clearly than Kiai Achmad Siddiq was looking forward to the future.28 The team did
take up several of Kiai Achmad's ideas but it added an emphasis of its own. The fact that none of the
seven was a kiai and that all were concerned with the social and economic problems of the ummah is
evident both from the overall tone of the document and from the specific topics taken up for
discussion.
Of the various fields of activity discussed in the recommendations, education received the
longest paragraph. It concentrated on modern science and technology and did not even mention
religious education. This section was followed by a paragraph on social and economic activities,
pleading for training in entrepreneurship and cooperatives, family planning, care for orphans and the
aged, and community development.
The same concern with the social and economic problems of the ummah is perceptible in what
the Tim Tujuh had to say on more strictly religious matters. It recommended that the concept of
worship (`ibadah) be understood in a less restricted sense than had been common and that socialsolidarity and charitable work too be seen as acts of worship. The most formal, legalistic aspect of
religion, the madzhab system should, according to the team, be made more flexible and responsive to
new social developments and changing needs.
In matters of organisation, finally, the team declared it urgent for NU to complete the transition
from political party tojam`iyyah diniyyah; it clearly did not subscribe to Kiai Achmad's claim that the
27The statutes were published as an appendix to a book by a journalist close to the reform-minded group, Choirul
Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama (Sala: Jatayu, 1985). TheMuqaddimah al-Qanun al-Asasi
was translated into Indonesian by K.H. Musthofa Bisri and later appended to the Situbondo decisions (Hasil Muktamar
Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo, pp. 121-132). Comparison of this translation with the earlier one mentioned in note 7
shows how much interpretation is involved in translating even a relatively simple text like this.
28 Pokok-pokok Pikiran Tentang Pemulihan Khittah Nahdlatul Ulama 1926 (Jakarta: Tim Tujuh Untuk Pemulihan
Khittah NU 1926, 1983). I am grateful to Fahmi Saifuddin, a member of this team, for an enlightening expos on the
process of "return to the Khitthah."
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transition had in fact been made in 1973. What exactly this transition should imply was not made more
explicit, and members of the Tim Tujuh would a few years later find themselves in conflict with each
other over the consequences to be drawn from this recommendation. The team furthermore judged that
supreme leadership in NU should be held by the Syuriah, the ulama council (and not, therefore, by the
Jakarta-based politicians of the Tanfidziyah, as it had practically been for most of the past three
decades).
The reform-minded group had its lobbying well organised (which no doubt was facilitated by
the fact its ideas were quite agreeable to the government). The recommendations of the Tim Tujuh
were submitted to and largely adopted by the NU conference (Munas, national consultation) of
December 1983 and the congress of the following year, both in Situbondo. The congress elected
Abdurrahman Wahid as the new chairman, and no less than eleven other members of theMajlis-24
were also given positions on the new board. The greatest winner, however, was Kiai Achmad Siddiq,
who had become the inevitable choice for Rois Aam, due no doubt to strong backing from the
government as well as his own clever manoeuvring. The Situbondo decisions incorporate most of
Achmad Siddiq's earlier formulations.
The influence of the younger reformers is most clearly evident in the demand for a greater
social relevance of NU activities at the Situbondo Munas and congress, which became even louder onsubsequent occasions. TheMunas discussed syu'un ijtima`iyyah (a new but traditional-sounding term
meaning matters of social concern) and decided to carry out a number of modest community
development projects: cooperatives, legal aid, a self-reliant transmigration project and clean water
procurement. Clearly there was less than unanimity among the delegates as to what constituted matters
of social concern, for among the matters of social concern listed in another recommendation by the
sameMunas we find the cost of the hajj, the need for a handbook on how to coach new converts to
Islam, proper Islamic dress, the separation of boys and girls on the sports field, etc.
The emphasis on social relevance come also to expression in a new and different approach to
the discussion of religious questions, always an important part of the proceedings at any NU congress.
Questions to which local branches had not been able to find satisfactory answers were discussed in a
separate session at the congress, where NU's leadingfiqh experts gave their opinions. In the past, these
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questions had always been haphazard and not related to each other, and they were usually answered
very briefly, with a reference to an authoritativefiqh work but without any attempt to explain why this
reference was relevant to the case at hand.29
The reformers wished both different, more relevant
questions and a different, more intellectual, way of answering them.
At the 1984 congress, participants in the sessions discussing religious questions were
confronted with a number of questions prepared in advance, several of which appealed to a sense of
social justice: "Which is more meritorious: performing the hajj more than once if one can afford it, or
using those funds to improve social welfare?"; "Canzakat, or part of it, instead of being divided among
the entitled recipients, be used to other purposes that are in the public interest?". 30 On later occasions
(the 1987 Cilacap Munas and the 1989 congress in Yogyakarta), the people who prepared the
questions deliberately phrased them so that it was almost impossible to simply look up an answer in a
fiqh book. Each question consisted of a number of sub-questions covering a range of situations,
formulated in such a way that they could hardly be mechanically answered but required deeper
reflection.
Two of the problems discussed at the 1989 congress were medical questions reminiscent of
important ethical debates in the West. "Is a testament valid that bequeaths one's organs for
transplantation to some person who needs them, considering that one of the conditions for the validityof a bequest is one's full ownership?" The answer to this one after some discussion and quoting of
appropriate texts was negative, because according to the syari`ah one's organs are not his own
property but belong to God alone. The ulama decided to add to this answer, almost as an afterthought,
that human organ transplants are allowed when medically necessary and when there is no alternative
cure.
The second question concerned euthanasia. The people who had prepared this one clearly
intended to stimulate a fundamental discussion on the subject and presented a number of interesting
hypothetical cases. May the costly treatment of an incurable patient (far beyond the financial capacities
29The questions and answers discussed at the first twenty-five congresses have been collected in three slim volumes
titledAhkm al-fuqah, published by Toha Putra, Semarang.
30Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27, pp. 62-66.
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of his family) be stopped at his own request? Or of a patient who has been in coma for a long time
without any hope of his regaining consciousness? Or, out of pity, the treatment of the victim of an
accident who is certain to remain a physical and mental cripple if he lives? Where, the questions
continued, does Islam place the boundary between life and death, and which are the outward signs by
which life or death may be defined? The ulama declined to be drawn into a debate on these choices;
they agreed that Islam enjoins the protection of life under all circumstances and that euthanasia is
therefore strictly forbidden.
The only question that did engender a lively debate in which rational arguments were used and
not just quotations fromfiqh books, consisted of a rephrasing of a question negatively answered at the
previous congress. Mayzakat, instead of being distributed in the form of money and/or food, also be
spent on some productive investment on behalf of the same beneficiaries? Simply phrased, what should
one give the poor, fish or fish hooks? This question was of course directly relevant to the role NU
wished to play in alleviating the poverty and backwardness of most of its constituency. Many of the
ulama tended to respond emotionally to this question and answer with arguments based in a conception
of fairness. The discussion, incidentally, remained inconclusive (apart from the provisional stricture that
any alternative uses of thezakatshould be agreed upon by those who have a right to its enjoyment).
Conclusion
Kiai Achmad Siddiq and the younger group of reformers have been successful in effecting a major shift
in traditionalist discourse within NU. This shift was in congruence with the only partially voluntary
realigment of priorities away from political to educational and community welfare-oriented activities.
The emphasis in Kiai Achmad's formulations on the the middle path between extremes and on tolerance
towards others was no doubt also favourably looked upon by the government. This did not mean,
however, that these principles were simply stated for reasons of political expedience. Both Kiai
Achmad and many of the younger reformers were genuinely convinced of the need for dialogue rather
than confrontation with different sections of the ummah and with non-Muslims.
Abdurrahman Wahid especially has repeatedly asserted his firm support for an inclusive
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nationalism over and against all forms of sectarianism (a term that refers to narrower group loyalties
and perception of non-Muslims as potential enemies). His strongest praise for Kiai Achmad Siddiq as a
thinker concerned the latter's ideas on the concept ofukhuwwah, brotherhood. Ukhuwwah islamiyyah
is a term commonly used in Indonesia to indicate the desirability of good relations between the various
currents within Indonesian Islam, especially between NU and Muhammadiyah. Kiai Achmad put this
ukhuwwah into practice when he presided over a formal reconciliation between both organisations. To
this well-known ideal of brotherhood he added two new dimensions, which he named ukhuwwah
wathaniyyah and ukhuwwah basyariyyah, indicating that they encompassed, respectively, the entire
fatherland and all of humanity. These terms stood for his concern with the common interests of all
Indonesians in their nation's economic and political welfare and with the common interests of all
humanity in world peace and protection of the environment. He and Abdurrahman Wahid with a fewothers succeeded in introducing these concerns into traditionalist religious discourse.
The same term ofukhuwwah, along with syu'un ijtima`iyyah and similar neo-traditional terms,
also represent attempts to focus traditionalist discourse more on problems of social justice and
economic development. In 1984 it was obvious that many of the ulama attending the congress failed to
grasp what and how the reformers really wished to discuss, or simply refused to let themselves be
drawn into that sort of discussion. In the following decade, however, many kiai gradually grew
accustomed to new style of discussion of religious questions. One of the initiatives born out of the
Situbondo conference was a regularly convening study circle (halqah) in which young committed
ulama with a few senior kiai addressed contemporary social and political problems, that were presented
to them by outside experts. These discussions forced the participants at times to overstep the
boundaries of the worn fiqh book discourse and think creatively.31
Taqlid and the madzhab were
challenged and given slightly different meanings. Instead of following Imam Syafi'i's madzhab, i.e. the
ready-made answers of his school, some of the younger kiai suggested that taqlid should mean
following his manhaj, his method which allows for much more flexibility.
Thanks to the patronage of by now senior kiai such as Kiai Sahal Mahfudz and Kiai Imron
Hamzah, the halqah discussions had a much wider impact than the relatively small number of
31This halqah and its role in opening upfiqh discourse are discussed at some length in my forthcoming book on NU.
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participants might suggest. Some of the problems first discussed in the halqah were later presented in
the religious discussions sessions at NU's Lampung conference (Munas). The most remarkable decision
of this conference was also an important victory for the halqah group. For the first time the assembled
ulama accepted a form of collective ijtihad as a legitimate method of answering religious-juridical
questions to which no unambiguous answer can be found by more established methods. This was a
watershed decision, guaranteeing that not only what the ulama discuss is changing, but also the
methods by which they discuss it.