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British International Studies Association Conference, Manchester, 27-29 May 2011

“Privatizating the African State: uneasy process and limited outcomes.

The case of the cotton sector in Mali”,

by Isaline Bergamaschi*

This article aims at analysing the trajectories of aid’s “global prescriptions”1 and in

particular the modalities of State privatization in sub-Saharan Africa. It builds on the case of

the Compagnie Malienne des Textiles, the parastatal in charge of supervising cotton

production since 1974 in Mali. Its privatization became a World Bank conditionality for aid

disbursements in 2000, but has been highly contested, often delayed and poorly implemented

since then.

The paper makes two main arguments. It first argues that the privatization was not

imposed on Mali’s government but substantially negotiated. The reform scheme initially

envisaged by the World Bank has been adapted and adjusted as a result of ten years of harsh

negotiations with the government and practical difficulties at all stages. It then shows that

neoliberal reforms lead to a shift in State intervention rather than its retreat. The State has

remained – and will remain - important in securing production, finance and trading in the

sector.

The article falls to three sections. The first explains why and how our case-study calls for

a departure from existing institutional and academic accounts of economic reforms and aid

conditionality in Africa. The second section explains the causes of, and drivers for reform

adaptation. It underlines the socio-political meaning of cotton in the country and the

divergence of representations, worldviews and interests between national and interactional

actors involved. The second section highlights the patterns and outcomes of reform

adaptation. It shows that the State is cotton’s main reformer, regulator and arbitrator, and

describes the ongoing power shifts between stakeholders at play.

* PhD candidate at Sciences-Po and junior lecturer in Politics at La Sorbonne University, Paris, France. Email

address: [email protected]. I thank Pierre Texier (former director at Dagris), Alassane Diabaté (former

economist at the International Monetary Fund’s representation in Mali), Sadio Mandé Keita and Lucien Humbert

(former rural development experts at the French development agency in Mali) for providing me information on

the cotton sector and the negotiations described here. The works by, and insights of Kako Nubukpo (economist

at CIRAD research institute), Claire Delpeuch (PhD candidate at Sciences-Po), Alexis Roy (PhD candidate at the

Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales), Pascal Babin (agronomist and former agent of the Dutch

cooperation for rural development in Mali) and Renata Serra (researcher and professor at the University of

Florida) were crucial in writing this article. I also thank Pierre-Louis Mayaux (PhD candidate at Sciences-Po) for

his comments on an earlier draft.

1 Dezalay, Yves, Garth, Bryant (dir.). Global Prescriptions. The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a

New Legal Orthodoxy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002, 368 p.

mailto:[email protected]

2

I. Departure from existing accounts of economic reform and aid

conditionality in Africa

Our analysis departs from the institutional positions and expertise deployed by the actors

involved in the reform process. The former are structured around two extreme poles. On the

one hand, the World Bank interpret the difficulties of reform implementation as a result of

insufficient “political will”, post-colonial market rigidity and economic backwardness, rent-

seeking of national parastatals’ agents and producers’ lack of capacity.2 The international

financial institution hence seeks to delete the existing rigidities, buy government “ownership”

and empower peasants. On the other hand, in its engagement for the promotion of peasant

interests and the rights of West African States on cotton issues, Oxfam offers a Black-and-

White vision of the process which presents the government and peasants as united and

undifferentiated victims of the World Bank’s dogmatic recommendations.3 Our account of

CMDT’s (absence of) privatization shows a more complex reality of actor agency and

interactions. Without denying the pressure put on Malian actors over the past years, delay in

the implementation schedule, government reluctance and the final privatization scheme

suggest that intense negotiations have indeed taken place, and that international financial

institutions have displayed greater flexibility than they (or observers) want to acknowledge.

By doing so, we provide an analytical framework that makes a contribution to the existing

academic literature.

In the field of economics (inspired by neo-classical or neo-institutional models), some

works insist on the benefits and efficiency of market logics and free competition and are close

to World Bank’s policy papers and recommendations. Heterodox economists accuse IFIs of

being captured by the neoliberal ideology and unable to provide answers and tools adapted to

the needs and realities of developing countries.4 They tend to assume Africans systematically

share interests and credence opposed to liberalization5 Although their conclusions contrast

with the World Bank’s, their approach is equally normative because it assumes a unique

definition of, and route to “development” and takes position in favour of developing countries

sovereignty in domestic politics in that quest. Because they do not account for the socio-

political meaning of economic practices and study politics in an instrumental and exogenous

way, i.e. as a tool for economic efficiency, these works fail to explain the plurality of interests

2 All these factors were mentioned during the interviews with donor representatives (and also some civil

servants) we conducted in Bamako and Paris between 2007 and 2010.

3 See: OXFAM. « Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic

policy conditions to aid ». Oxfam Briefing Paper n°96, November 2006:

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/Kicking%20the%20Habit.pdf, and « Comment les agriculteurs

sont exclus du marché du coton : Les coûts des réformes de la Banque mondiale au Mali ». Oxfam Briefing

Paper 99, mars 2007, 45 p.

4 These works include: Chang, Ha-Joon. “Policy Space in Historical Perspective – with special reference to

Trade and Industrial Policies”. Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLI, n°7, 2006, pp. 627-631; Fine, Ben,

Lapavistas, Costas and Pincus, Jonathan (dir.). Development Policy In The Twenty-first Century: Beyond The

Post Washington Consensus. London: Routledge, 2001, 240 p. Taylor, Marcus. The World Bank, Global

Accumulation and the Antinomies of Capitalist Development. Doctoral thesis, Coventry: University of Warwick,

2003, 368 p.

5 Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social realities: An application to the case of

Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 1, p. 15 and p. 18.

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/Kicking%20the%20Habit.pdf

3

and complexity inherent to economic dynamics and reforms.6 In addition, they tend to take

the influence of international recommendations on recipient societies for granted.7 This article

is an invitation to reassess recipient agency in aid negotiations8 and to consider that economic

and public policies in Africa are coproduced rather than unilaterally imposed. The hypothesis

of an inherent “weakness” of African States9, or their “retreat” under the influence of foreign

aid, international institutions or globalization more broadly10

are invalidated here.

In order to do, we use selected political economy works that challenge the assumptions of

rationality and interests and emphasize the importance of values, cultural beliefs and social

arrangements in economic practices. In link with international financial governance,

Jacqueline Best highlighted the limits of rationality and transparence and the constructive role

of ambiguity.11

Her later work with Matthew Paterson underlines how habits, daily practices

and cultural representations drive and shape real economic life12

. In a comparative study of

West African cotton reforms, Renata Serra studied pre-existing arrangements between actors

and social meanings of the cotton culture and consider them as a resource - rather than an

impediment - to the sector’s positive achievements and successful modernization.13

In

reference to West African trade policies and the politics of economic reform in North Africa,

Béatrice Hibou has shown that States could exert control over economic activities despite

6 This criticism was made by Béatrice Hibou in L’Afrique est-elle protectionniste ? Les chemins buissonniers de

la libéralisation extérieure. Paris : Karthala, 1996, pp. 9-10 and p. 16.

7 This is the case of: Craig, David, Porter, Doug. Development Beyond Neoliberalism?: Governance, Poverty

Reduction and Political Economy. London: Routledge, 2006, 340 p.; Goldman, Michael. Imperial Nature: The

World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of Globalization. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale

University Press, 2005, 360 p.

8 This was one of the goals of: Whitfield, Lindsay (ed.). The New Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing

with Donors. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 401 p.

9 Zartman, Michael. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, 303 p.

10 See: Strange, Suzan. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996, 239 p. and an important body of grey literature: Birdsall, Nancy. “Seven

Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings”. Center for Global Development, Working Paper n°50, 2005, 37 p.

Goldsmith, Arthur A. “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa”. Discussion Paper Number 47, June 2000, p. 262:

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACJ129.pdf; Lancaster, Carol, Wangwe, Samuel. Managing a Smooth

Transition from Aid Dependence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p.

40; Knack, Stephen, Rahman, Aminur. “Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients”. Journal

of Development Economics, vol. 83, n°1, 2007, pp. 176-197; Moss, Todd, Pettersson, Gunilla, van de Walle,

Nicolas. “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan

Africa”. Center for Global Development Working Paper n°74, January 2006, 28 p.

11 Best, Jacqueline. The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2005, 219 p.

12 Best, Jacqueline, Paterson, Matthew (eds.). Cultural Political Economy. London/New York: Routledge, 2010,

p. 1, p. 3, p. 5, pp. 8-9 and p. 11.

13 Serra, Renata. « Cotton Sector Reform within wider political and social realities: An application to the case of

Mali », p. 13 and p. 16.

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACJ129.pdf

http://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/deveco.html

http://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/deveco.html

4

their apparent privatization and use compliance with international agendas to nurture and

reproduce the domestic foundations of their power.14

The article hence purports to bring new and innovative material to the existing knowledge

on economic reforms in Africa. Its contribution is two-fold. From a theoretical perspective, it

updates accounts of traditional structural adjustment programs and makes a critique of the

latest aid buzzwords (peasant “participation” and “empowerment”). Building on the idea that

State intervention changes but does not disappear, it also looks at the tensions, divisions and

power shifts at play created by donor-driven reform plans. From an empirical point of view, it

focuses on a country – Mali – that is noticeably absent of the most influential general

accounts of structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms in Africa.15

It also focuses on a

sector that, despite its vitality and interest, has not yet been studied through a political

economy lens.16

II. The drivers for reform adaptation: cotton’s strategic importance and

shared values

The need of reform adaptation by national actor can be explained by two main factors,

related to cotton’s strategic importance and the existence of shared values between

stakeholders. This section tells a brief story of cotton in Mali underlines the economic, social

and political role of its production.

Cotton between two worlds: a brief history

The history of cotton in West Africa is placed at the juncture of “two worlds”, of local

dynamics and insertion into the global economy.1 Cotton played an important role in social

life (clothing and its symbolic dimension) and continental trade since the Middle Ages

already.17

At the turn of the twentieth century, the French colonial policy aims at reducing

dependence towards North American fiber, and meeting the needs of the developing textile

14

See : Hibou, Béatrice. « Retrait ou redéploiement de l’État ? ». Critique internationale, automne 1998, n°1, pp.

151-168 ; Surveiller et réformer : Economie politique de la servitude volontaire en Tunisie, Mémoire

d’habilitation à diriger des recherches, Paris : Institut d’Etudes Politiques, 2005, 597 p. In English, see : Hibou,

Béatrice (ed.). Privatising the State, London : Hurst/ New York : Columbia University Press, 2004.

15 Here we refer to: Suleiman, Ezra, Waterbury, John (eds.). The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and

. Boulder/Oxford : Westview Press, 1990, 388 p.; Haggard, Stephan, Kaufman, Robert (dir.). The Politics of

Structural Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, 376 p.; Widner, Jennifer (dir.). Economic

Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1994; Mosley, Paul, Harrigan, Jane, Toye, John. Aid and Power: the World Bank and Policy-based

lending. London: Routledge, 1991, 352 p.; and Campbell, Bonnie K., Loxley, John (eds.). Structural adjustment

in Africa. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989, 293 p. The former deals with the cases of Zimbabwe,

Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, du Cameroon and Morocco.

16 The fourthcoming publications by Renata Serra and the African Power and Politics program should make

important contributions in that sense.

17 Docking, Tim. International Influence on Civil Society: the case of Farmers’ Union SYCOV. Doctoral

dissertation: University of Boston, 1999, p. 80.

5

industry.18

Cotton is the main link between the French Sudan and the metropole and the

colony’s raison d’être into the broader empire.19

The official decision to develop cotton culture in the French Sudan is made in 189520

and materialized after a mission by General de Trentinian in 1898-1899.21

Controversial,

hesitant22

, the cotton colonial policy raised issues about the goals and modalities of the

colonial project, and involved a great variety of actors. African traders used to link producers

to the French export agents and the Association cotonnière coloniale (ACC) created in 1903

by French textile manufacturers in order to lobby public authorities.23

In order to provide

incentives to peasants, the colonial administration sets up a fixed price mechanism (0.20

francs per kilo in 1899-1900).24

Cotton culture becomes compulsory in April 1912. It leads to

the displacement of populations and forced labour, and becomes known as the « master’s

culture ».25

Recruitment is difficult26

, fields are deserted.

Despite technical fixes and a big irrigation project (the Niger Office) the first harvests

are late and modest in volume.27

The colonial project implied to invert trade flux from the

regional channels to Europe. Because of colonial arrogance, lack of consideration for peasant

constraints (growing cotton is extremely demanding) and understanding of market dynamics,

18

Roberts, Richard. Two worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the regional economy in the French Soudan, 1800-

1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 3 and p. 6 ; Fok, Michel. Le développement du coton au Mali

par analyse des contradictions : Les acteurs et les crises de 1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de

Recherche Economie des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, p. 21-2. Available online:

http://agents.cirad.fr/pjjimg/[email protected]/acteurs_crises.pdf

19 Roberts, Richard. Two worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the regional economy in the French Soudan, 1800-

1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 76.

20 Fok, Michel. Le développement du coton au Mali par analyse des contradictions : Les acteurs et les crises de

1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de Recherche Economie des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, p. 18.

21 Levrat, Régine. Le coton en Afrique Occidentale et Centrale avant 1950 : un exemple de politique coloniale

en France. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 100.


1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 7-8 et 20.

23 Levrat, Régine. Le coton en Afrique Occidentale et Centrale avant 1950 : un exemple de politique coloniale en

France. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 55.








1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de Recherche Economie des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, p. 39

and p. 44. Roberts, Richard. Two worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the regional economy in the French

Soudan, 1800-1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 163.

http://agents.cirad.fr/pjjimg/[email protected]/acteurs_crises.pdf

6

adhesion to the project remains weak and the colonial policy led to failure.28

A big share of

cotton production systematically bypasses colonial borders and control to be used by local

craftsmen29

or sold on the regional markets (instead of being exported to the metropole)

where prices were more attractive. Overall, the colonial project was actively resisted and

failed.30

Peasants are considered as pawns31

and passive objects and try to turn the cotton

policy to their advantage.32

Roberts asserts that « the battle to control the French Sudan’s

economy between 1918 and 1932 was won by the Sudanese ». No colonial economy ever

emerged, and colonial hegemony throughout the period remained weak and “foggy” rather

than hegemonic.33

The current integrated production chain is a legacy of the colonial and post-colonial

achievements. After World War Two, colonialism is increasingly challenged and the cotton

colonial policy is better organised. The fixed price is raised up34

, State intervention

intensified. After the Brazzaville conference (1946), forced labour is abolished; greater

attention is paid to the populations’ well-being and economic development. The sector is

regulated by new institutions. A public entity, the Compagnie française pour le

développement des textiles (CFDT) is created in 1949 as a result from a partnership between

the French State and private textile companies. It is placed under the tutelage of the French

Ministry of Overseas Territories. It seeks to « improve the balance of payments, secure inputs

for the textile industry. Secondarily, it must increase the well-being of Africans and ensure

functions of public utility after 1961.35

A specialised supervision by region replaces the

former authoritarian system. In 1946, research activities are launched by the Institut de

Recherche du Coton et des Textiles exotiques (IRTC) in order to enhance productivity and the

quality of cotton.36

Technical investments and innovations are made: the use of fertilizers is

28

Fok, Michel. Le développement du coton au Mali par analyse des contradictions : Les acteurs et les crises de

1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de Recherche Economie des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, p. 12

and p. 44. Roberts, Richard. Two worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the regional economy in the French

Soudan, 1800-1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 13-14. p. 105 and p. 152.


France. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 142, pp. 144-145.


1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, pp. 6-7, p. 9, pp. 10-12, p. 22, p. 30, p. 188, pp. 190-191.




France. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 146


1946. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 16 and p. 220.


France. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2008, p. 255, pp. 258-59, pp. 261-62.


1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de Recherche Economie des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, pp. 54-

55.

36 Levrat, Régine. Le coton dans la zone franc depuis 1950. Un succès remis en cause. Paris : L’Harmattan,

2009, p. 280 and p. 291.

7

generalised, pesticides distributed and credit tools developed.37

The purchase price is

guaranteed by the State and stable.38

The integrated production chain is set up.39

Independence introduces changes in the system, but no revolution.40

In 1961, an

exploitation convention is signed between the Malian government and the CFDT for five

years, in which the later commits to supervise the production and ensure trading of cotton in

her zone.41

Cooperation patterns are very good42

, even at a time when relationships between

the French and Malian socialist regime are tense.43

For the government, the cotton culture and

the parastatal in charge of it are sources of tax revenues and patronage opportunities, a tool for

fostering development and expanding State influence in rural zones.44

But peasant supervision

remains « authoritarian » and triggers new resistances.45

A training department is created in

196846

to the benefit of agronomists and technicians.47

Over time, the « psychological

handicap »48

and « bad memories » associated with the colonial cotton culture are overcome

and increasingly replaced by trust.49

Only after independence did cotton become a dynamic

sector appealing to local farmers.50

37

Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 14



39 Berti, Fabio, Hofs, Jean-Luc, Sery Zagbaï, Hubert, Lebailly, Philippe. « Le coton dans le monde, place du

coton africain et principaux enjeux ». Biotechnologie, Agronomie, Société et Environnement, 2006 10 (4), pp.

271–280.



41 Ibid.

42 Maharaux, Alain. L’Industrie au Mali. Paris : L’harmattan, 1986, pp. 50-51.

43 Hugon, Philippe. « Les réformes de la filière coton au Mali et les négociations internationales ». In

GEMDEV/Université du Mali. Mali-France : Regards sur une histoire partagée. Paris : Karthala/ Bamako :

Université du Mali, 2005.

44 Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 4 and p. 14.

45 Roy Alexis (2009), « La privatization de la filière coton au Mali: la solution qui risque de prolonger le

problème », communication présentée à la 3è Conférence européenne d’Etudes africaines (ECAS), Leipzig, juin,

p. 1.



47 Piot, Olivier. « Pourquoi le Sud rue dans les brancards : Paris brade le coton subsaharien ». Le Monde

Diplomatique, September 2007. Maharaux, Alain. L’Industrie au Mali. Paris : L’harmattan, 1986, p. 51.




2009, p. 17 and p. 121.

50 Hugon, Philippe, “Les réformes de la filière coton au Mali et les négociations internationales”, in GEMDEV,

Mali-France : Regards sur une histoire partagée, Paris : Karthala et Bamako : Université du Mali, 2005, p. 486.

8

The CFDT becomes an agro-industrial holding with engineering, financial and

commercial missions.51

Its activities expand progressively52

and include production

supervision, marketing, input provision, transport of cotton, subventions, ginning of seed

cotton (in ginning industries set up in Koutiala and Segou between 1963 and 1965), oil

extraction, price stabilisation mechanisms.53

Production increased from 80 000 to 540 000

tons of seed cotton between 1950 and 1975.54

The purchase price is fixed at the beginning of

the campaign each year and guaranteed in 1952.55

A support mechanism and a stabilization

fund are introduced to smooth up variations in international cotton prices.56

In the 1960s, the French grew increasingly aware that the status quo was soon to end,

and wished to prepare the hand-over while maintaining strong cooperation ties. A

compromise is found. In 1974, a semi-public limited company was born: the Compagnie

malienne de Développement des Textiles (CMDT). 60 percent of shares are held by the

Malian State, and 40 percent by the CFDT. The CMDT takes over the missions previously

accomplished by the CFDT.57

Purchase teams collect cotton in the countryside. Associations

of villagers organise collection beforehand58

and supervise the construction of community

facilities such as schools, maternities, health centers or input stores.59

In 1980, the CMDT

provides 47 percent of salaries in the whole cotton zone, and 3.2 percent at the national

level.60

Producing cotton gives peasants access to credit tools to grow cereals used for

household consumption, creating complementarity between export culture and subsistence

crops.61

51

Piot, Olivier. « Pourquoi le Sud rue dans les brancards : Paris brade le coton subsaharien ». Le Monde

Diplomatique, September 2007. Available online : http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/09/PIOT/15073.



53 Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 14.

54 Maharaux, Alain. L’Industrie au Mali. Paris : L’harmattan, 1986, p. 51.



56 Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 14.


2009, pp. 106-109.


59 Bocchino, François. « La CFDT, outil du développement ». Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1999. Available

online : http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/05/BOCCHINO/11997, p. 33.


61 Maurice Adevah-Poeuf, « La privatization du coton au Mali : Opportunité ou risque ? », conférence au centre

Djoliba, Bamako, 24/11/2007.

http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/09/PIOT/15073

http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1999/05/BOCCHINO/11997

9

Production volumes and productivity have increased since the 1960s.62

Mali was the

world’s seventh cotton producer and the first in Africa in 2004.63

Turnovers created by cotton

culture represent 25 percent of the national budget, and brings CFA 15 billion to the State

each year through customs revenues and tax collection.64

It is the second source of public

revenues after gold and it generates higher redistributive and spill-over effects. Cotton is one

of Africa’s few economic « success stories ».65

It provides, directly (production) or indirectly

(transports and other activities) revenues for 4 million people, which is one third of Mali’s

total population. As a result of a progressive appropriation of the cotton culture by national

actors, the integrated production chain has produced shared values and is commonly known as

Mali’s “white gold”. In addition to industrial and marketing functions (collection of cotton

fiber, transport to oil factories, oil extraction, etc.), the CMDT provides public utility services

(like road maintenance in cotton-producing areas, hydro-agricultural facilities in rural areas,

initiatives for the diversification of revenues and local development).66

The CMDT is an important element in the country’s economic, social and political

fabric67

and the fundamental social pact. Cotton culture bears a system of values: it defines

the identities, social roles and relationships of individuals in villages. It also creates a contact

between Man and nature.68

However, the crisis provoked by a fall in international prices in the

1990s, and gives weight to the World Bank’s call for privatization.

Mali’s cotton « crisis »: shifting equilibrium and representations

The crisis is three-fold. Firstly, shifts in international balances between supply and

demand result in decreasing prices.69

In addition, because the CFA franc is pegged to the

euro70

, variations in interest rates make Malian cotton relatively more expensive and affect

62

Nubukpo, Kako. « Le piège du coton : le Mali à la croisée des chemins ». Oléagineux, Corps Gras, Lipides,

vol. 13, n°4, juillet-août 2006.

63 Ibid, p. 278.

64 Lique R-J, « Mali: le coton, le supplice de Tantale », Afrique-express.com, http://www.afrique-

express.com/afrique/mali/coton-mali.html.

65 Nubukpo, Kako. « Quand la Banque Mondiale s’attaque à la filière coton au Mali ». Abc Burkina, January

2005.

66 SOFRECO, Étude du Recentrage des activités de la CMDT autour du système Coton, rapport final, septembre

2002, pp. 18-19. And République du Mali, Contrat plan Etat –CMDT – Producteurs en date du 21/10/1999,

section « B », article 10.

67 Dr Olivier Vallée, interview with the author, Paris, 2009. Diarrah, Cheick Oumar. Mali : bilan d’une gestion

désastreuse. Paris : L’Harmattan, 1990, p. 57.


Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, pp. 16-17.

69 Nubukpo (2006), opcit. et Ton Peter et Wankpo Eustache, « La production du coton au Bénin : Projet

d'analyse d'une spéculation agricole par pays », Agriterra, février-mars 2004, disponible en ligne :

http://uploads.agro-info.net/uploads/pww/documents/resume_production_coton_benin.pdf, p. 9.

70 The CFA franc is the currency used in several former French colonies in West Africa. CFA standed for

Colonies Françaises d'Afrique (French colonies in Africa) and then for Communauté Financière Africaine

http://www.afrique-express.com/afrique/mali/coton-mali.html

http://www.afrique-express.com/afrique/mali/coton-mali.html

http://uploads.agro-info.net/uploads/pww/documents/resume_production_coton_benin.pdf

10

sales on international markets, made in dollars.71

Finally, subsidies provided to its cotton

producers by the US government lead to a bias on the market, an over-production and a

decrease in international prices that are detrimental to less-privileged, but more competitive

African producers (African cotton is four times less expensive that US-grown cotton).72

Deficits grow and the sector’s economic and financial perspectives change radically.73

The integrated production chain and the trust relationship between peasants and the CMDT

are challenged.74

Perceptions shift, and the crisis gives weight to the World Bank’s criticisms

which were totally ignored by African States during the 1980s and 1990s because cotton

production was performing well.75

World Bank criticisms are two-fold and challenge the values and perceptions of cotton

shared by national actors. On the one hand, they focus on economic efficiency and good

governance: the system is depicted as unproductive, rigid and unable to adapt a new

environment. West African economies are described as trapped in a primary specialisation

and in need for “painful adjustment”.76

The international institution considers that the CMDT

should abandon its public utility missions (literacy, transport and road maintenance, etc.) and

focus on production activities stricto sensu.77

African public companies are accused of

corruption, mismanagement, rent-seeking and peasant exploitation.78

They are blamed for

creating deficits, hierarchic supervision methods, opacity in revenue-sharing, subsidies to

producers and their lack of choice for the provision of seeds and inputs and the mixing of

economics and political, i.e. the political meaning and use of stabilization funds and the price

mechanism.79

In 1999, an audit report by Ernst & Young draws a negative portrait of the

(African financial community). This common currency was adopted as part of the French-African cooperation

policy after independence. It used to be pegged to the French franc, and now is to the euro.

71 Nubukpo, Kako, Devajaran, Shanta. L’autre débat, 03/10/2008/, available online :

http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/l-autre-debat

72 Nubukpo et Keita Mandé Sadio, « Prix mondiaux, prix au producteur et avenir de la filière coton au Mali »,

Cahiers Agricultures, 2006, 15 (1), pp. 35–41.

73 Guillaumont Patrick, Guillaumont Jeanneney Sylviane,

Sidibé Michel, Amprou Jacky, « Aide et réforme au Mali », document de travail du CERDI, 2000, n°20, p. 47.

74 Quentin Wodon, Virginie Briand, Patrick Labaste Kofi Nouve, and Yeyande Sangho, “Cotton and Poverty in

Mali”, draft World Bank working paper (never published), 2006, P. 4.

75 Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009.

76 Nubukpo, Kako. « Le piège du coton : le Mali à la croisée des chemins ». In Oléagineux, Corps Gras, Lipides,

vol. 13, n°4, juillet-août 2006, pp. 283-4.

77 SOFRECO, opcit., 2002, p. 10.

78 Baffes John. « Cotton: Market setting, Trade policies, and Issues ». World Bank Policy Research Working

Paper n°3218, February 2004, p. 26.



Université du Mali, 2005, p. 484. Baffes John. « Cotton: Market setting, Trade policies, and Issues ». World

Bank Policy Research Working Paper n°3218, February 2004, p. 27.

11

company’s financial state80

: huge deficits, failing information and accounting systems,

insufficient insider control and financial malpractices. The same year, a World Bank aide-

mémoire highlights “serious slippage” and major management defects. Although it was meant

to be confidential, the document’s conclusions are published in the press, which provokes

great political turmoil.81

After blaming the integrated system for over-taxing producers in the

1980s82

- Malian producers were the less well-paid in the sub-region until then83

- the Bank

now denounces excessive support to producers84

and insufficient alignment of domestic

purchase prices on international ones.85

French participation in the system, which is part of a

broader cooperation policy with her former colonies, is said to impede transparency.86

On the

other hand, and in line with her new guiding principles, the Bank argues that public funds

could be allocated more effectively to promote poverty reduction87

and mobilizes her

expertise to show that cotton producers are poorer than producers in the country’s other

regions. The described “Sikasso paradox” and poverty trap enter in contradiction with

cotton’s positive image widespread in society at large.88

In the reform project promoted in all African countries by the World Bank, delegation

to private agents and the introduction of competition should offer producers better

opportunities concerning prices and input provision. Deficits should be reduced, and public

resources redirected towards health and social services89

and pro-poor expenses.90

80

Alexis Roy, interview with the author, Paris, 2010.

81 Pour les informations présentées dans ce paragraphe : Massou Assou, « Compagnie Malienne du

Développement des Textiles : la CMDT file un mauvais coton », Inter de Bamako, 14/01/2008,

http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=26017.

82 Delpeuch, Claire. « Prologue on the desirability of domestic reforms ». Working Paper, 2009.

83 Baffes, John. « Cotton: Market setting, Trade policies, and Issues ». World Bank Policy Research Working

Paper n°3218, February 2004, p. 26. Levrat, Régine. Le coton dans la zone franc depuis 1950. Un succès remis

en cause. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2009, p. 62.

84 Delpeuch, Claire, Leblois, Antoine. “Sub-Saharan African Cotton Policies in Retrospect”. Paper presented at

the third AAAE/AEASA conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 19-23rd September 2010, p. 7.

85 Baffes John. « Cotton: Market setting, Trade policies, and Issues ». World Bank Policy Research Working

Paper n°3218, February 2004, p. 26. Ce « retournement improbable des arguments » est également relevé par 85

Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social realities: An application to the case of

Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 11.



Université du Mali, 2005, p. 491.


Mali”, draft World Bank working paper (never published), 2006, p. 6.

88 Delarue, Jocelyne, Mesple-Somps, Sandrine, Naudet, Jean-David, Robilliard, Anne-Sophie. « Le paradoxe de

Sikasso : coton et pauvreté au Mali ». DIAL Working Paper 2009-09, novembre 2009, p. 7. Available online :

http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_publications/PDF/Doc_travail/2009-09.pdf

89 Babin Pascal/SNV. « Enseignements de la mission d’étude et de l’atelier de professionnels ». Rapport de

mission, juin 2009, vol. 1.

http://www.maliweb.net/category.php?NID=26017

http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_publications/PDF/Doc_travail/2009-09.pdf

12

Professional associations should participate in management committees, producers own part

of the companies’ capital, new price mechanisms must be adopted to better reflect

international price variations.91

Power relations between actors must be transformed,

producers become active co-managers of the sector), corruption and other « socio-

political manipulations ».92

Producer empowerment must be understood as part of wider

international attempts at strengthening “civil society” organizations as utility service

providers93

and counter-power against a discredited State.94

Donors show limited appreciation

of the system’s global advantages and regret that “the cotton sector is run as a social

enterprise, while they would like to turn it into a business”.95

Focusing on the causes of reform adaptation has revealed that the privatization project

confronts diverging representations of the sector and the ways to ensure its good management

and efficiency. An analysis of the patterns of reform adaptation, its processes and outcomes,

shows that the government of Mali was able to deploy tactics and use resources in their

negotiations with donors and that the State keeps important leverage in the sector’s

management.

III. Reform adaptation patterns: negotiation process and outcomes

World Bank pressure, government’s cautious opposition

The World Bank has exerted strong financial pressure on the government.

Privatization became a conditionality to access debt relief operations in 1998. The

government hence adopted a sector rehabilitation plan, a condition to benefit a third structural

adjustment credit of $ 70 million granted in December 2001. In June 2001, the government

adopted the Lettre de Politique de Développement du Secteur (LPDSC). In 2002, the IMF

makes access to its Facility for Growth and Poverty Reduction conditional to the CMDT

privatization.96

In November 2004, a World Bank delegation suspends aid disbursements until

the government takes action to reduce deficits are not reduced during a mission in the capital

city.97

They ask an amendment of the price mechanism and a « clear signal » of government 90

OXFAM, « Comment les agriculteurs sont exclus du marché du coton : Les coûts des réformes de la Banque

mondiale au Mali », Oxfam briefing paper 99, mars 2007, p. 30.

91 Berti Fabio, Hofs, Jean-Luc, Sery Zagbaï, Hubert, Lebailly, Philippe. « Le coton dans le monde, place du

coton africain et principaux enjeux ». Biotechnologie, Agronomie, Société et Environnement, 2006 10 (4), p. 278.

92 Pascal Babin, interview with the author, Paris, 2010. Roy, Alexis. « Faut-il en finir avec la notion de société

civile? Réflexions à partir de l'exemple malien ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 1.

93 Roy, Alexis. « Faut-il en finir avec la notion de société civile? Réflexions à partir de l'exemple malien ».

Working Paper, 2009.

94 Raghavan N. « Les ONG au Mali ». Politique africaine, n°47, octobre 1992, p. 93 and p. 99.

95 Serra Renata, « Business and Politics II: Institutions, power and norms in African cotton sector reforms »,

Africa Power & Politics Programme Research Progress, Working Paper, November 2009, p. 15.

96 OXFAM, “Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic

policy conditions to aid”, Oxfam briefing paper n°96, November 2006, p. 20.

97 Nubukpo, Kako. « Quand la Banque Mondiale s’attaque à la filière coton au Mali ». Abc Burkina, January

2005.

13

will to privatize. The credit is adopted in January 2005 after tense negotiations. In February,

the Bank disbursed half of what should have been disbursed in December the previous year,

thus depriving the country of greater Bank financial support.98

Privatization was half-heatedly accepted by President Alpha Oumar Konaré99

, whose

team faced huge social demands and intense pressure to launch a new wage of reforms by the

World Bank, on the grounds that democratic transition and political change were creating a

favorable context.100

Key ministers have served regional or international institutions and are

committed to improve public management according to their standards.101

An emergency financial fund and a Restructuring mission attached to the Prime

minister’s office (Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton) are set up. In April 2001, a

general Assembly is held to gather national actors and donors. In October, the Council of

ministers translated the Letter of Intent for the Development of the cotton sector into a action

plan (Plan d’Action de la Lettre de Politique de Développement du Secteur Coton) including

different measures to reduce and improve the parastatal’s management and prepare its

privatization102

, ensure that the State withdraws from all outside production activities103

,

“increase the private sector’s participation” and “reinforce the producer organizations”104

so

that they can « be in charge of input and agricultural equipment provision, rural credit and

technical advice” and “become shareholders of the CMDT”.105

In April 2002, just before its

inevitable replacement (presidential election take place in June and he cannot run for a third

mandate), President Konaré adopted a plan for State withdrawal of public utility missions.

Elected in 2002, President Amadou Toumani Touré is rather opposed to it and in line with the

country’s public opinion.106

Its counselors were driven by a developmental vision.107

98

OXFAM, “Kicking the Habit: How the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic

policy conditions to aid”, Oxfam briefing paper n°96, November 2006, p. 20.

99 Maurice Adevah-Poeuf, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

100 Hibou, Béatrice, Vallée Olivier. « Énergie du Mali ou les paradoxes d’un échec retentissant « . Agence

française de Développement, Working Paper, n°37, 2007.

101 Maurice Adevah-Poeuf, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

102 République du Mali, « Le programme de réforme du secteur coton du Mali : Mesures et état d’exécution »,

communication de la délégation malienne au Forum Union Européenne-Afrique sur le coton, Paris, 5-6 juillet

2004.

103 Nubukpo, Kako. « Le piège du coton : le Mali à la croisée des chemins ». Oléagineux, Corps Gras, Lipides,


104 République du Mali, Ministère de l’Agriculture, « Développement des productions agricoles », 2004, fiche

technique, disponible sur le site du ministère: http://www.maliagriculture.org/camp_agr/rest_coton.html

105 Nubukpo, Kako. « Le piège du coton : le Mali à la croisée des chemins ». Oléagineux, Corps Gras, Lipides,


106 Alexis Roy, interview with the author, Paris, 2009.

107 Hibou, Béatrice, Vallée Olivier. « Énergie du Mali ou les paradoxes d’un échec retentissant ». Agence

française de Développement, Working Paper, n°37, 2007.

14

The government’s reluctance can be traced down to the financial and symbolic

importance of cotton’s rent culture and its diversified production system.108

To a certain

extent, « the CMDT is the State »109

or, at least, a « State within the State ».110

It was not

unusual for its engineers and managers to take government positions.111

As a parastatal, the

CMDT also contributed to finance political parties112

and redistribution within the enterprise

and beyond.113

Highly politicized, it has served as a milking cow in particular with the

democratic transition process in the 1990s.114

A “CMDT clan” within the Alliance pour la

Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) has supposedly transformed the company into the party in

power’s treasury.115

International donors seek to put an end to the company’s political use.116

Finally, the CMDT provides financial leverage to the government, allowing the former to

borrow funds on the international financial markets. These funds (about FCFA 100-120

million each year to finance the campaign) are otherwise inaccessible for a HIPC like Mali

and are protected from donor control and conditionalities.117

For all these reasons, the CMDT’s problems are also those of the Malian State.118

Piloting the reform process and « reforming one of its own components » is not an easy task

for the State, itself penetrated by strong influence networks.119

But because the international

pressure is high and the reform’s principle was accepted by its predecessor, he cannot turn

back and oppose it directly. As a consequence, Malian authorities build on objective factors

and an accurate time management strategy to postpone reform implementation.

108

Secrétariat du Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest/OCDE, « Importance économique et sociale du

coton en Afrique de l’Ouest : Rôle du coton dans le développement, le commerce et les moyens d’existence »,

novembre 2005, disponible en ligne : http://www.cotton-acp.org/docs/study/csao_etude_socio_eco_coton_fr.pdf,

p. 22.

109 Pascal Babin, interview with the author, Paris, 2010.


2009, p. 17 et Roy Alexis, « Retour sur la grève des producteurs de coton maliens en 2000 ». Working Paper,

2009, p. 3.

111 Pierre Texier, interview with the author, Paris, 2010.

112 Dr Olivier Vallée, interview with the author, Paris, 2009.


114 Roy Alexis, « Retour sur la grève des producteurs de coton maliens en 2000 ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 3.


116 Lucien Humbert, interview with the author, Paris, 2010.

117 Dr Olivier Vallée, interview with the author, Paris, 2009.



mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, pp. 36-7.

http://www.cotton-acp.org/docs/study/csao_etude_socio_eco_coton_fr.pdf

15

Non implementation: objective factors and negotiating tactics

Several objective, both technical or political factors, have hampered reform

implementation since 2001. In fact, most national actors are opposed to privatization, but not

for the same reasons. Despite their common attachment to the cotton culture, ancient rivalries

are reactivated with the reform project and prevent them from adopting a united position and a

united front posture against the World Bank.

Firstly, finding a “good” private substitute to the CMDT, i.e. a reliable economic actor ready

to make the necessary investments is not an easy task. Because Mali is landlocked, transport

costs are important.120

The commitment of private managers in the region have not last and

proven opportunistic.121

In the midst of a crisis, the national company and the sector are less

attractive.122

The volumes produced, after reaching a historical pick in 2004 (with over 500

000 tons), fell to 190 000 tons in 2008-2009.123

The mere possibility to privatize the CMDT

causes doubt.124

The parastatal itself is opposed to privatization and have resisted it. The staff and their

trade unions want to protect their jobs, missions and salaries as well as the social prestige and

advantages associated with the integrated production chain. They have organized massive

striked in the capital city and campaigned in the countryside to gain peasant support.125

Many

arrangements have been made for the social plan to be accepted.126

The CMDT’s director

general publicly expressed his opposition to the privatization’s project until 2008.127

Its

“barons” have proven influential because they have very strong link with political power.128

At the international level, the sectoral initiative for cotton was set on the World Trade

Organisation’s negotiation agenda by the governments of Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and

Benin. Its goal is the suppression of US government subsidies to American producers

120

Levrat, Régine. Le coton dans la zone franc depuis 1950. Un succès remis en cause. Paris : L’Harmattan,

2009, p. 164.

121 Tazi, Sophia. « Privatization/libéralisation des filières cotonnières en Afrique. Quels gagnants ? Quels

perdants ? ». Biotechnologie, Agronomie, Société et Environnement, 2006, 10 (4), p. 287.

122 Claire Delpeuch, interview with the author, Paris, 2009.

123 Diallo Mamoutou, « La Culture du coton pourrait-elle retrouver ses lettres de noblesse au Mali? », Nouvel

Horizon, 05/03/2009, http://www.malikounda.com/nouvelle_voir.php?idNouvelle=20710


mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, pp. 84-5.


126 126 Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social realities: An application to the

case of Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 8.

127 Voir les propos tenus par le Président Directeur général de la CMDT, Ousmane Amin Guindo, au journal Les

Echos du 22 mai 2008, Ogopémo Ouologuem, « Privation de la CMDT : le PDG Ousmane Amion Guindo

sceptique ? », http://www.malikounda.com/nouvelle_voir.php?idNouvelle=17505


2009, p. 168.

16

generated hope.129

The government of Mali wished to wait and see the request’s outcomes

before committing to a privatization scheme and timetable.130

The initiative offered a view of

the cotton sector’s problems different from the World Bank’s, and projected the image of a

national consensus and union between actors and served the government, who appeared to be

fighting for their producers and more justice in the international trade system.131

Nonetheless,

it did not enhance the government negotiating power at the domestic level since the World

Bank insisted that the issue of privatization and the question of subsidies (dealt with under the

tutelage of the WTO and not hers) should be kept strictly separate.132

It has further

contributed to postpone reform implementation.133

Throughout the 1990s and until 2004-2005, Malian authorities have benefited from

donor division on the privatization issue and French support.134

This opposition results from a

credence in the integrated production system (French researcher and aid agencies have

contributed to shaping this “remnant of colonization”, and are attached to its public utility

missions135

) as well as economic interests (the French own 40 of the CMDT’s shares and

Dagris is in charge of selling Mali’s cotton on international markets.136

But this position

shifted in 2004-2005137

and the privatization became a conditionality for the French aid

agency’s rural development projects.138

Several factors account for this move from a post-

colonial opposition to a neoliberal alignment on the World Bank. First of all, France accused

of holding a self-serving, neocolonial posture and blamed for her failure to anticipate the

129

Pesche, Denis, Nubukpo, Kako, « L’Afrique du coton à Cancún : les acteurs d’une négociation ». Politique

africaine, n°95, octobre 2004, pp. 158-61.

130 OCDE/ Miroudot Sébastien, « Quel avenir pour l’initiative sectorielle en faveur du coton après l’échec de

Cancún ? », Publications et documents du Club du Sahel et de l'Afrique de l’Ouest de l’OCDE, 2004, disponible

en ligne : http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,fr_2649_33711_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, pp. 9-10. On the

initiative’s modalities, outcomes and symbolic power involved in its negotiations, see: Eagleton-Pierce Matthew,

Uncovering Symbolic Power: Power Analysis, Southern Countries, and the World Trade Organization, 2008,

thèse de doctorat en relations internationales, Université d’Oxford.

131 Pesche, Denis, Nubukpo, Kako, « L’Afrique du coton à Cancún : les acteurs d’une négociation ». Politique

africaine, n°95, octobre 2004, p. 160.

132 Interview with Sadio Mandé Keita and Lucien Humbert (French development agency), Bamako, 2007.

133 Valérie Kelly, rural economist at the Michigan State University, electronic message with the author, 2009.

134 Lucien Humbert, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007. Levrat, Régine. Le coton dans la zone franc

depuis 1950. Un succès remis en cause. Paris : L’Harmattan, 2009, p. 160.

135 Sadio Mandé Keita, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007. Piot, Olivier. « Pourquoi le Sud rue dans les

brancards : Paris brade le coton subsaharien ». Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2007.


2009, p. 168.

137 Edmond Dembelé, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007. Pierre Texier, interview with the author, Paris,

2010.

138 Sadio Mandé Keita, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,fr_2649_33711_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

17

sector’s crisis.139

For some, it is due to a renewal of staff (with personalities close to IFIs

appointed in key positions at the turn of the 2000s) and the prevalence of the French Ministry

of Finance in the file’s management, favorable to a purely budgetary and financial perspective

(by opposition to aid staff and agronomists).140

Finally, the privatization of Dagris changes the

terms of French engagement in West African cotton.141

Donor positions harmonize142

around

the World Bank (the de facto leader) thus exerting greater pressure on the recipient

government.143

French alignment obscured the CMDT’s future and deprived it of an

experimented and valuable potential investor.144

A political factor also accounts for the privatization’s « permanent delay ». In July

2004, President ATT addressed a letter to the World Bank asking for its postponement to

2008. The President’s attention to peasant needs.145

He also runs for a second mandate at the

presidential election in 2008, and this highly unpopular reform could generate turmoil and

diminish his chances of success.146

Because it is supported by French authorities and the

World Bank is traditionally sensitive to electoral imperatives, the request is accepted.147

Finally, peasant reluctance has also created an important obstacle to reform

implementation. Their position is not heterogeneous and was not a priori opposed to

privatization as such. But two trends stand clearly. On the one hand, the relationships between

the CMDT and cotton producers are fundamentally ambiguous and ambivalent, mixing

collaboration and distrust. Peasants have suffered the paternalistic and sometimes corrupt

practices of CMDT agents for decades and often asked for greater autonomy148

and some of

them may have been seduced by the promise of “empowerment” contained in the

139

Lucien Humbert, Kako Nubukpo, Maurice Adevah-Poeuf and Edmond Dembelé, interview with the author,

Bamako, 2007.

140 Kako Nubukpo, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007. Pierre Texier, interview with the author, Paris,

2010. Maurice Adevah-Poeuf, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007


mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, p. 29.

142 Sadio Mandé Keita, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

143 Lucien Humbert, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

144 Pierre Texier, interview with the author, Paris, 2010. Maurice Adevah-Poeuf, interview with the author,

Bamako, 2007.


Mali”, draft World Bank working paper (never published), 2006, p. 6.

146 Kako Nubukpo and Sadio Mandé Keita, interviews with the author, Bamako, 2007.

147 Discussions with Dr Lindsay Whitfield, Oxford, 2007.

148 Sanogo Youssouf, « Evolution du développement local et de l’économie sociale et populaire au Mali », in

Louis Favreau (dir.), Création de Richesses en Contexte de Précarité : l’Expérience de l’Afrique de l’Ouest,

Cahiers de la Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Développement des Collectivités (CRDC), Université du

Québec en Outaouais, mai 2003, pp. 15-6. Fok, Michel. Le développement du coton au Mali par analyse des

contradictions : Les acteurs et les crises de 1895 à 1993. Document de travail de l'Unité de Recherche Economie

des Filières, Montpellier : CIRAD, p. 102.

18

privatization’s scheme.149

But on the other hand, they are attached to some of the integrated

production chain system.150

Their main concerns relate not to the CMDT’s status per se, but

rather to the access to inputs and credit.151

The price mechanism provided security and

predictability in a highly uncertain context and allowed them to anticipate and adopt

productive behaviour.152

Because its mission were broad and widespread on the territory, the

CMDT often was the only palpable present of the State in Southern Mali and an essential

intermediary between the local and national levels of powers.153

The CMDT’s technical

advisors provided advice to producers, and training that facilitated social promotion (a peasant

could become a trainer or a trade union representative).154

Peasants have started to mobilize

when they felt the reform’s first side-effects, i.e. when the guaranteed purchase price or the

number of technical advisors dropped and public utility missions were abandoned155

.

Producers do not trust private operators to accomplish the critical missions of fiber cotton

transport and road maintenance in rural areas.156

The trust relationship between the CMDT

was imperfect and asymmetric but real, but peasants are anxious about the new conditions and

stakeholders coming in the sector.157

Because the latter are likely to be foreign158

, they may be

less able to establish close contacts with peasants and focus on cotton exports at the expense

of local food crops.159

149

Babin Pascal/SNV. « Enseignements de la mission d’étude et de l’atelier de professionnels ». Rapport de


150 Coughlan Koïta, Claire. « Governance Partners and Corrupt Clients: Producer Organisations and the

Liberalisation of Mali’s Cotton Sector ». Communication presented at the Third European Conference on

African Studies, Leipzig, June 2009, 12 p. This analysis is shared by Alexis Roy, interview with the author,

Paris, 2010.

151 Pascal Babin, interview with the author, Paris, 2010. Edmond Dembelé and Kako Nubukpo, interview with

the author, Bamako, 2007.



Université du Mali, 2005, p. 489. 152 Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social

realities: An application to the case of Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 12

and p. 14.


154 Johanna Siméant, Paris, novembre 2010.


156 SOFRECO. « Étude du Recentrage des activités de la CMDT autour du système Coton ». Rapport final,

septembre 2002, pp. 99-100 et 107.



158 Coughlan Koïta, Claire. « Governance Partners and Corrupt Clients: Producer Organisations and the

Liberalisation of Mali’s Cotton Sector ». Communication presented at the Third European Conference on

African Studies, Leipzig, June 2009, 12 p.


19

Donors consider that governmental « leadership »160

has been weak. On the contrary,

we argue that there has indeed been a political strategy and a very accurate time

management.161

Fueled by objective factors, the privatization’s delay was also wished and

searched by Malian negotiators, and key in their management of the constraint and pressure

exerted by donors.162

The government and CMDT have constantly avoided definite

commitments163

and have made reform implementation steps conditional on the production of

consultancy reports in order to waste time in hope that the context would become more

favorable.164

For example, the MRSC was created only in 2001.165

The privatization’s

timetable and strategic document were only available in February 2005.166

The company’s

asset values are frequently over-estimated, which introduces a bias in the discussions.167

Cotton’s professional association was not set up until February 2009 (although initially

scheduled for April 2006.168

Malian civil servants have shuffled and adopted retention

strategies:

« Several months were needed before a timetable was provided. When we

[donors] would receive it, it was outdated, and then it wasn’t implemented. But if

we wanted something new, we would have to start the procedure all over again,

make another official request and so forth (…) It was impossible to get data about

the CMDT’s asset values (…) We would spend most of our time to ask for

documents to start serious discussions, but they would never come ».169

Malian negotiators have tried to negotiate the necessary arrangements, flexibility and

arrangements necessary to make the project feasible in practice, and to protect certain high

priority interests. The government seeks to « avoid negative consequences » and the problems

160

French development agency, interviews in Bamako and Paris, 2007 and 2010.

161 Dr Hamidou Magassa, consultant au SERNES, discussion avec l’auteur, Bamako, novembre 2007.




2009, pp. 169-70.

164 Alassane Diabaté, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

165 Coughlan Koïta Clare, “Governance Partners and Corrupt Clients: Producer Organisations and the

Liberalisation of Mali’s Cotton Sector”, communication présentée à la 3è conference des Etudes africaines en

Europe, Leipzig, 6 juin 2009.

166 Roy Alexis, « Retour sur la grève des producteurs de coton maliens en 2000 ». Working Paper, 2009, p. 3.

Also see: Republic of Mali, Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Coton (MRSC)/Primature. « Mission de

Clarification et de recadrage du processus de réforme du secteur coton ». August 2005.




169 Interview with the author, Paris, 2010.

20

experienced by neighbouring countries.170

The mere fact that the privatization has not been

implemented since 2001 is a strong indicator of how weak the government’s « ownership » of

reform is.171

They never really accepted the privatization in principle172

and very few of its

pre-requisites occurred in the past ten years.173

The privatization seems doomed to occur, but

each stage of it is blocked, and the goals and rhythm of reform are still debated174

and Mali

appears as reluctant to privatization, and successful in bypassing it at the sub-regional level.

They have preferred to adapt the reform scheme rather than entering a direct ideological battle

against the World Bank, to gain flexibility in the modalities and schedule of its

implementation175

and to transform the “permanent delay”176

into a resource. According to

Renata Serra, this lack of implementation can be explained by factors related to poverty

reduction and food security concerns as well as more political and patrimonial ones. The

Malian government adopted a “stop-and-go” strategy that consisted in postponing each step of

reform implementation.177

As a result of this strategy, the government has managed to protect

some vital interests, and ensure that they will maintain some control over the cotton sector.

Reform adaptation

In the negotiation process, Malian authorities have used resources and the circumstances so as

to increase their bargaining power. The itinerary and strategy were unknown and unclear to

Malian authorities at the beginning178

and the equation’s main components uncertain and

changing. However, certain interests considered vital have been protected. Indeed, the scheme

initially promoted by the World Bank has been substantially adapted.

Two main options were initially available: in one block or the proliferation of private actors,

whose number would be defined by market logics.179

The government was in favour of the

170

Adama Traoré (responsable de la formation à la CMDT), communication électronique avec l’auteur, avril

2008.

171 OXFAM (2006), opcit.



174 Babin Pascal/SNV, « Enseignements de la mission d’étude et de l’atelier de professionnels », rapport de

mission, juin 2009, pp. 36-7.

175 Le cadre théorique de ce chapitre s’inspire de Hibou Béatrice, « Retrait ou redéploiement de l’État ? »,

Critique internationale, n°1, automne 1998 ; et Hibou, Béatrice, Vallée Olivier. « Énergie du Mali ou les

paradoxes d’un échec retentissant « . Agence française de Développement, Working Paper, n°37, 2007.

176 Dr Olivier Vallée (economist and international consultant), interview with the author, Paris, 2009.


Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 6, p. 8 and p. 19.


mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, p. 34.

179 These options are presented in : République du Mali, Ministère de l’Agriculture. « Développement des

productions agricoles ». Bamako, 2004. Available online:

http://www.maliagriculture.org/camp_agr/rest_coton.html

http://www.maliagriculture.org/camp_agr/rest_coton.html

21

first option180

, which meant to create a “CMDT bis” under private tutelage. This option had

the advantage to formally respect the international conditionality while preserving the features

and benefits of the existing system,181

including the system’s high concentration and

possibility of control. The World Bank opposed it precisely on the grounds that the changes

would be minor and the privatization’s expected effects annihilated.182

Key to Malian negotiators was to avoid the sector’s complete disintegration and the

production chain’s atomization.183

In that regard, the case of the cotton sector’s reform in

Benin served as a counter-example. In this country, liberalization and introduced in the 1990s

have led to a proliferation of private actors in all domains and created considerable

coordination and supervision issues, destructive competition, highly dysfunctional results and

a fall in production volumes.184

A compromise between those diverging constraints was reached with the division of the

company into four private subsidiaries, each controlling a cotton production zone. The State

will cede 61 percent of its shares to a private entity, 20 percent to producers and 2 percent to

the companies’ employees.185

Government priorities are satisfied to the extent that the

integrated system does not disappear: it is simply transferred from the national to the regional

level, with one reference company enjoying monopoly and control on each zone.186

For some, the boom in international cotton demand in 2010 has reduced the sector’s deficits,

and the promising perspectives thus created make privatization highly unlikely.187

The formal

process of reform implementation has been moving forward in the past years. Transport of the

seed-cotton and oil factories have been privatized since 2002. The cotton parastatal has

180

Traoré Fousseni, « CMDT : un nouveau schéma pour la privatization », opcit.


182 République du Mali, Ministère de l’Agriculture. « Développement des productions agricoles ». Bamako,

2004.

183 SOFRECO (2002), opcit., p. 96. Fousséni Traoré, « CMDT : un nouveau schéma pour la privatization »,

Communiqué du conseil des Ministres, Le Républicain du 10/9 et Adama Traoré, interview with the author,

Bamako, 2007.

184 Berti, Fabio, Hofs, Jean-Luc, Sery Zagbaï, Hubert, Lebailly, Philippe. « Le coton dans le monde, place du

coton africain et principaux enjeux ». Biotechnologie, Agronomie, Société et Environnement, 2006 10 (4), p. 278.

Babin Pascal/SNV. « Enseignements de la mission d’étude et de l’atelier de professionnels ». Rapport de

mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, p. 73. Kpadé, Patrice. « Analyse institutionnelle de la dynamique d’évolution des

politiques cotonnières au Bénin ». Communication présentée lors des 2è journées de recherches en sciences

sociales de l’INRA SFER CIRAD, 11 et 12 décembre 2008, Lille, pp. 18 and 24.

185 Adandé Robert, « Mali : le feuilleton de la privatization de la CMDT se poursuit », Les Afriques, 04/03/2009,

http://www.lesafriques.com/produits-de-base/mali-le-feuilleton-de-la-privatization-de-la-cmdt-se-pou-

2.html?Itemid=308


Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010, p. 8-9.


http://www.cefib.com/presse/actu2.php?page=71

22

disengaged of all rural development activities in 2005188

. On August 1st 2008, the National

Assembly passed a law (117 “yes” against 20 “no” and six blank ballots) allowing the State to

cede its shares of the CMDT.189

A social plan was signed in January 2010. However, Even if

the privatization was meant to occur in the short-run, the State will not withdraw. It will

remain an important player and keep control on the system through renewed modalities and

devices.190

Shifts in public intervention and control: the State as a reformer, regulator and

arbitrator

There are many indicators and signals that State intervention and control have remained

strong, and will remain so. The State does not withdraw, but act as a reformer, regulator and

arbitrator.

First of all, the State is the pilot and conductor of reforms and will have the important task of

selecting private investors. During negotiations, the decision-making structure was highly

centralised and pyramidal; the usual technical department (the Ministry of Agriculture, the

IER) were ignored or bypassed.191

The cotton issue was dealt with separately from global

poverty reduction goals, and piloted by the Ministry of Finance192

, which was the more eager

to blame the national company for the sector’s problems193

and whose staff share a budgetary

and financial approach to development with IFIs.194

In fine, “all decisions were made at the

Primature (the Prime Minister’s office) or the Presidency”.195

Alternative information and

studies produced by researchers from the Rural Economics Institute (Institut d’Economie

Rurale) with the support of OXFAM showed that privatizing the CMDT held the risk of a

decrease in national growth, national export revenues and peasant incomes and is the cause

rather than the remedy to the sector’s problems. Their conclusions have not been taken into

account in formal negotiations with donors and their authors censored or muzzled196

, although

they could have given some scientific value and weight to Malian negotiators’ arguments.

188

Levrat, Régine. Le coton dans la zone franc depuis 1950. Un succès remis en cause. Paris : L’Harmattan,

2009, pp. 168-9.

189 Coulibaly Seydou, « Dioncounda Traoré avoue : « nous avons reçu beaucoup de pressions », Le Républicain,

n°2680, 04/08/2008.

190 Béatrice Hibou shows that private actors are closely linked to State power and speak of « cosmetic

privatizations » or « diffused etatism », Hibou Béatrice, Surveiller et réformer : Economie politique de la

servitude volontaire en Tunisie, Mémoire d’habilitation à diriger des recherches, IEP de Paris, 2005, pp. 522-7.

191 Kako Nubukpo, Edmond Dembelé (conseiller technique des producteurs de coton maliens entre 2001 et

2006), interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

192 Sadio Mandé Keita, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007

193 Lucien Humbert, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.

194 Kako Nubukpo, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007.


196 Kako Nubukpo and Alassane Diabaté, interviews with the author, Bamako, 2007.

23

More importantly, farmers’ interests have not been taken into high consideration. In Mali,

peasants are traditionally ill-represented. Trade unions are recent –they were allowed with

democratic opening in 1992 -, have a small base and representativeness issues.197

When the

World Bank made its support conditional to the privatization of CMDT, the government

suspected trade unions to be manipulated by international donors and supporters of donor-

driven reforms. As a result, the CMDT has intervened directly in the appointment of producer

representatives (in 1997, the historical leader, Baba Berthé, is replaced by Yaya Traoré,

considered more cooperative) and has tried to co-opt them.198

The tension between the State’s

« bureaucratic class »199

and the peasants and the authoritarian exploitation of the former200

that dates back from the socialist regime is reactivated with the perspectives of reform. The

divergence of interests between them could not be overcome and fragilized the government’s

position in the negotiations with the World Bank. But it did reinforce the State’s supremacy

on the sector’s management and peasants. The latter have been the true “adjustment variable”

in the ongoing reform process and have been resilient.201

Recent donor initiatives to empower

peasants (with the transformation of traditional village association into professional

organizations) or attempts at delegating certain aspects of cotton production supervision to

them have proven inefficient and counter-productive. They have led to the weakening and

greater fragmentation in peasant representation and an extension of patrimonial practices.202

From a financial point of view, the Malian State is the almost unique shareholder of the

CMDT, at a level never reached even at independence. It provided financial guarantee for the

purchase of inputs in the 2008-2009 campaign, which is essential to gain the banks’

support.203

Its financial contribution will remain key if the private entities refuse to make all

the necessary investments, or if producers do not have the required capital to buy 20 percent

of its shares.204

Moreover, the price mechanism fixed by the State is still crucial in building

trust between producers and the cotton company and in ensuring that the risks and costs of

197

See: Roy, Alexis. “Peasant struggles in Mali: from defending cotton producers interests to becoming part of

the Malian power structures”. The Review of African Political Economy, vol. 125, n°27, 2010, pp. 299-314.

198 Docking, Tim. International Influence on Civil Society: the case of Farmers’ Union SYCOV. Doctoral

dissertation: University of Boston, 1999, p. 8

199 Diarrah, Cheick Oumar. Mali : bilan d’une gestion désastreuse. Paris : L’Harmattan, 1990, p. 57.

200 Amselle, Jean-Loup. « Le Mali socialiste (1960-1968) », Cahiers d'études africaines, 1978, vol. 18, n°72, p.

631-2.

201 Kako Nubukpo, interview with the author, Bamako, 2007

202 Roy, Alexis. “Peasant struggles in Mali: from defending cotton producers interests to becoming part of the

Malian power structures”. The Review of African Political Economy, vol. 125, n°27, 2010, pp. 299-314.

203 The two former points are underlines by Babin Pascal/SNV. « Enseignements de la mission d’étude et de

l’atelier de professionnels ». Rapport de mission, juin 2009, vol. 1, pp. 36-7 and pp. 84-5. Pierre Texier,

interview with the author, Paris, 2010.

204 Claire Delpeuch, interview with the author, Paris, 2009 and 2010.

24

cotton production are shared.205

For that reason, subsidies for the purchase of inputs are set up

again despite IFI reluctance.206

From an organizational perspective, the State will have to coordinate actors and clarify the

division of labour and rent-sharing rules between national and international, public and

private actors. The State must act as an arbitrator and set up sanctions mechanisms in case

rules are violated.207

The missions the State is and will be in charge of are much broader and

heavier than mere « regulation », i.e. the establishment of rules and standards implied by the

introduction of competition.208

Ancient mechanisms coexist and overlap with new ones, and

the announced reform remains incomplete. In neighbouring countries where the process is

more advanced, State withdrawal from cotton production remains very partial and

ambiguous.209

In Burkina Faso, because the deficits were important and the private actors

were reluctant to finance massive investments, the State had to recapitalize in such important

proportions that it became the major shareholder in the regional subsidiary firms.210

The case of the CMDT’s (non) privatization shows that in spite of donor rhetoric and

recommendations in favour of bigger private participation in developing economies, the

African State pursues its intervention according to new modalities and devices. Pascal Babin

hence refers to the “fake privatizations” of cotton parastatals in West Africa. Delpeuch and

Dubois see a general “curb in the deregulation trend” on the continent.211

This does not mean

that the status quo prevailed, since the production chain has been destabilized by recent

developments, and because the costs and risks associated by reform have been assumed

primarily by producers.212

It is interesting to note that contemporary issues facing the Malian

cotton sector resonate with those faced by colonial policy concerning the legitimate

supervisor of cotton policy, the relevant level of peasant incentives, the division of labour,

share of revenues and risks associated with the cotton rent culture.213

Our conclusions also

converge with those developed in recent works focusing on social protection reforms in

205

Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social realities: An application to the case of


206 Estur, Gérard. « Coton : Un changement radical est intervenu dans la position de la Banque mondiale et du

FMI », Les Afriques, 08/10/2010, http://wwww.lesafriques.com. Pascal Babin, interview with the author, Paris,

2010.



208 Pierre-Louis Mayaux, conversation with the author, Paris, 2010.



210 Serra, Renata. « Cotton sector reforms within wider political and social realities: An application to the case

of Mali ». Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper, 2010.

211 Delpeuch, Claire, Leblois, Antoine. “Sub-Saharan African Cotton Policies in Retrospect”. Paper presented at

the third AAAE/AEASA conference, Cape Town, South Africa, 19-23rd September 2010, p. 3.

212 Pascal Babin and Alexis Roy, interviews with the author, Paris, 2010.

213 I am grateful to Alexis Roy for encouraging me to highlight this point.

http://wwww.lesafriques.com/

25

Europe.214

This means that Mali’s current economic dynamics are neither new nor specific to

sub-Saharan countries and that Africa is a relevant and valuable site for studying economic

reforms and the global diffusion of neoliberalism.215

214

See : Hassenteufel, Patrick. « La mise en place du gouvernement à distance de l’assurance maladie ». Regards

sur l'économie allemande. n°89, 2008, pp. 27-33 ; and Hassenteufel, Patrick. « Libéralisation ou étatisation de

l’assurance maladie ? ». Regards sur l’Economie allemande – Bulletin économique du CIRAC, 2009, n°79, pp.

5-12.

215 Harrison, Graham. Neoliberal Africa: the Impact of Global Social Engineering. London/New York: Zed

Books, 2010.

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