CONTENTSINTRODUCTION

CHRONOLOGY

RECRUITMENT

TRAINING

APPEARANCE

EQUIPMENT

CONDITIONSOFSERVICE

ONCAMPAIGN

BELIEFANDBELONGING

EXPERIENCEOFBATTLE

COLLECTIONSANDMUSEUMS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTIONThe British Commandos were created in response to a disaster. On 10 May 1940 theGermanslaunchedtheirinvasionofFrance,BelgiumandtheNetherlands.Justastheydidin 1914,British troops fought alongside theirBelgian andFrench counterparts, but thistimetherewouldbenostemmingtheGermanjuggernaut.On22MaythePanzersreachedtheEnglishChannel.TheBritishandisolatedFrenchunitsretreatedtowardsDunkirk,andon 27May the evacuation ofAllied troops began.Over the next eight daysmore than300,000 Allied troops were rescued and spirited to safety in Britain. Prime MinisterWinstonChurchillmighthavecalledtheevacuationthemiracleofDunkirk,buttherewasnodisguisingthescaleofthemilitarydisaster.

FrancehadbeendefeatedandwasnowoccupiedbyGermantroops.BritainhadbeendrivenfromtheEuropeanmainland,andwhileitsarmywaslargelyintactithadlostmuchof its equipment. However, even as the last troops were being brought off the beach,ChurchillwrotetotheChiefsoftheGeneralStaffarguingthatBritainneededtoregaintheinitiative and avoid adopting a defensive mentality. His solution was this: ‘We shouldimmediatelysettoworktoorganizeraidingforcesonthesecoasts,wherethepopulationsarefriendly.Suchforcesmightbecomposedofself-contained,thoroughlyequippedunits.’The Chiefs of Staff considered the idea on 6 June, and duly approved plans for theformationofthisspecialfightingforcewhichwouldcarryoutraidsonGerman-occupiedEurope.

BurningoiltanksatStamsundintheLofotenIslands.On4March1941,theNorwegianarchipelagowasraidedbyCommandosofNos.3and4SpecialServiceBattalions.Beforeleavingtheyblewupfishfactories,fueltanksand

militaryinstallations.

This force became the Commandos, named after the irregular Afrikaner formations

whichhadharried theBritish so effectivelyduring theSecondAnglo-BoerWar (1899–1902).Lieutenant-ColonelDudleyClarke,whofirstcameupwiththetitle,laterwrote:‘IsuggestedthenameCommandofromtheverystart…althoughitwasalongtimebeforeWarOffice circleswouldunbend sufficiently touse theword inofficial paperswithoutvisiblepain.’Apleaforvolunteerstoundertakespecialserviceofahazardousnaturewasanswered by thousands of servicemen, and themen selected to lead the newly createdbattalion-sizedCommandosand theirsubordinatessetaboutselecting theverybestmenthe British Army had to offer. The heads of this force were under intense pressure tolaunch thesemenon raids as quickly as possible, but after twounsuccessful operationscommonsenseprevailedandtheCommandoswereallowedthetimetheyneededtotrainandprepare.

Awell-armedsoldierofNo.3CommandoispicturedcrawlingthroughtheshrubberyofAchnacarryHouseduringanexercisethereinearly1942.HeisarmedwithaThompsonmachinecarbineandafearsome-lookingmachete.

Balaclavaswereoftenworninwinter.

All Commando volunteers went through a rigorous training process, designed toproducemenwho excelled at the demanding tasks theywould be set. Initially, training

was haphazard and ad hoc, but eventually a rigorous but highly effective trainingprogramme came into being.Someunits specialized in certain areas, such as parachutelanding, the use of canoes, warfare in the Arctic or demolition. After the war, theseformationsevolvedintoeliteoutfitssuchastheSASandtheSBS,whichstillexisttoday.Whatever formation they served in, Commandoswere known for their superb training,theirprofessionalismandtheirtoughness.EssentiallytheybecametheeliteoftheBritisharmedforces.

The first properlyplanned raidswere carriedout in1941, and the followingyear theforcewasexpandedtoincludetheRoyalMarines,whoseCommandoswerebrigadedwiththeir army counterparts.Despite initial teething problems, and a good deal of inter-unitrivalry,theysoonbecametheirequalintermsofprofessionalism.Togethertheylandedonthe beaches of Normandy, conducted raids in the Mediterranean and took part in thegruelling final campaigns of the War in the Pacific. Regardless of their origins, theseCommandos –BritishArmy andRoyalMarine – came to be highly regarded for theirprofessionalism,theirdedicationandimmensefightingspirit.

When the war ended, the Commandos had a fighting reputation second to none.However, they were then disbanded, save for a solitary brigade of Royal MarineCommandos,asitwasfelttherewouldbelittleuseforthiskindofwarfareinthepost-warworld. Ironically, the RoyalMarines, who havemaintained the standards of these elitefighting formations to the present day, subsequently fought in virtually all of Britain’spost-war conflicts. While these Marines maintain the legacy of the wartime BritishCommandos,theirforebears,themenChurchilldescribedinOctober1942as‘ahandofsteel’formedduringthedarkestdaysofWorldWarII,arenowregardedassomeof thefinestandbesttrainedcombattroopsofthewar.

CHRONOLOGY19393SeptemberBritainandFrancedeclarewaronGermany.

19409AprilTheGermaninvasionofNorwayandDenmarkbegins.

20AprilThefirstIndependentCompaniesformed.

MayLochailortSpecialTrainingCentreopens,forthetrainingofSpecialForces.

8Mayto8JuneFiveIndependentCompaniesparticipateintheNorwegianCampaign.

10 May Germany invades France and the Low Countries. Prime Minister NevilleChamberlainresigns,andissucceededbySirWinstonChurchill.

27MayThefirstAlliedtroopsareevacuatedfromDunkirk.

4JuneCompletionofOperationDynamo,theevacuationofDunkirk.

3–6JuneChurchillcallsforaforceabletostrikebackagainstGerman-occupiedEurope.

6JuneChiefsofStaffapproveChurchill’splansforstrikingcompanies.

12JuneLt.Gen.SirAlanBourneappointedasCommander,OffensiveOperations.

20June The call for volunteers, first issued in just two commands, becomes a generalone.

22JuneFrancesignsArmisticewithGermany.

24JuneOperationBlueCollar,anIndependentCompanyraidnearBoulogne.

JulyMiddleEastCommandosformedinEgypt.

3JulyOffensiveOperationsrebrandedastheCombinedOperationsDirectorate(COD).

14 July OperationAmbassador, a joint Commando and Independent Company raid onGuernsey.

17JulyAdmiralRogerKeyesappointedheadofCOD.

11NovemberSpecialServiceBrigadeformedunderBrigadierJosephC.Haydon.

1941FebruaryACommandoforce(Layforce)issentfromBritaintotheMiddleEast.

February–MarchAneworganizationforCommandosisadopted.

3MarchOperationClaymore,CommandoraidonNorway’sLofotenIslands.

17 May No. 51 (ME) Commando captures Commando Hill during the Ethiopiancampaign.

SeptemberAdmiralKeyesreplacedbyLordLouisMountbatten.

26–28DecemberOperationAnklet,thesecondraidontheLofotenIslands,carriedoutasadiversioninsupportofOperationArchery.

27December OperationArchery, Commando raid onVaagsø,Norway, proves amajorsuccess.

1942FebruaryCommandoBasicTrainingCentreopensatAchnacarrry.

February The First Royal Marine Commando unit (A Commando) is formed in DealBarracks,Kent.

28MarchMountbatten,nowavice-admiral,madeChief,CombinedOperations.

26–29MarchOperationChariot,CombinedForcesattackonStNazaireinNazi-occupiedFrance.

5MayOperationIronclad,CommandosparticipateininvasionofMadagascar.

JuneNo.10(Inter-Allied)CommandoformedfromAlliedvolunteers.

19 August Operation Jubilee, the Dieppe Raid, Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos carry outdiversionaryraids.

7OctoberASecondRoyalMarineCommando (BCommando) is formed inPembrokeDocks.BothRMunitsarelatercombinedtobecome40(RM)Commando.

18OctoberHitler issueshisKommandobefehl (CommandoOrder),statingthatcapturedCommandoswillbeexecuted.

NovemberOperationTorchbegins,theAlliedinvasionofNorthAfrica.

1DecemberACommandoMountainandSnowWarfareCampisopenednearBraemar.

7–10DecemberOperationFrankton,theCockleshellRaidcarriedoutagainstBordeaux,France.

194323March FourCommandos captured during theCockleshellRaid are executed by theGermans.

10 July OperationHusky begins, the Allied invasion of Sicily. Four Commando unitsparticipate.

9 September Operation Avalanche begins, Allied invasion of Italy, with landings atSalerno.2ndSpecialServiceBrigadeseesheavyfighting.

The Special Service Group is formed, amalgamating all Commandos (Army and RM)underonecommand.

November3rdSpecialServiceBrigadesenttotheFarEast.

19446 June Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of North-West Europe begins inNormandy.

28SeptemberCommencementofthethirdArakancampaignbeginsinBurma.

1NovemberOperationInfatuate,theAlliedlandingsonWalcheren,Holland.

6DecemberThetermCommandoofficiallyreplacesSpecialService.

1945January–February3CommandoBrigadeinvolvedinheavyfightingintheArakan.

8MayVEDay,thefinaldefeatofNaziGermany.

15AugustVJDay,thefinaldefeatoftheJapaneseisannounced.

1946TheArmyCommandosaredisbanded.

RECRUITMENTTheideaofaspecialraidingforceactuallypredatedtheformationoftheCommandos.On20 April ten Independent Companies were formed, drawn from volunteers from theTerritorial Army. Five of these companies duly saw action in Northern Norway. Thatsummer, they, aswell as all existingBritishArmy unitswere needed to defendBritainagainstaGermaninvasion.AstheWarOfficewasreluctanttoweakentheRegularArmyanymorethanithadto,itwasfeltthatChurchill’sstrikingforcewouldbeformedfromnewunitsratherthandenudingthealreadyoverstretchedarmyofexistingunits.Thiswasdonebyrequestingvolunteerswillingtoundertakespecialserviceofahazardousnature.Nothingelsewasspecified,apart froma listofrequiredattributes– theability toswim,drive and be comfortable on the sea. These volunteers would be made available forselectionforthenewunits,butastheWarOfficewasequallykeennottoweakenexistingunitsunduly,oneman in20 fromeachbattalionwasplacedamong thenumberofmenwhowouldbewithdrawnfromtheirunits.

The initial targetwas for aCommando forceof 40officers and1,000men, althoughwhenthenumberofvolunteersprovedmuchgreaterthananticipated,GeneralDill,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,permittedaforceof5,000mentoberaised,providedsuitablemencouldbe foundamong thevolunteers. ItwasDill’sassistantLt.Col.DudleyClarke–aSouthAfrican–whonamedthisnewforcetheCommandos.On12June,Maj.Gen.SirAlan Bourne, Adjutant General of the Royal Marines, was appointed as Commander,OffensiveOperations,andtasked,withClarke’shelp,withorganizingtheforce.Itwashewho issued theplea for volunteers andwho appointed the leaders of the first battalion-sizedCommandos.

However, after a couple of premature and abortive raids on the French coast nearBoulogneandonGuernsey–raidsChurchilldubbedsillyfiascos–Bournewasreplacedby Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, and his department re-named the Combined OperationsDirectorate(COD).Thismadelittledifferencetothebusinessofrecruitment.However,itdidreflect theupheavalstakingplaceinWhitehallat thetimeastheWarOfficetriedtolimit theeffectivenessof thisprivatearmy.Ingeneral, theBritishmilitaryestablishmenthad a distrust of shock troops, and it would be another year before the threat ofdisbandment was finally removed from the whole Commando programme.Meanwhile,the business of selecting men continued, training programmes were devised, and thecollectionofvolunteerswereturnedintoafirst-classfightingforce.

Arock-climbingexercisebeingcarriedoutneartheCommandotrainingcentreatAchnacarry.Inthisexercisethemostablerockclimberwentfirstwiththeknottedropeandthentherestoftheunitusedittofollowhimupthecliff

face.

Duringtraining,amphibiouslandingswerepractisedrepeatedlyonLochLochy,asealochclosetoAchnacarry.Often,thesewereopposedlandingsconductedunderfire.Inthisexercise,Major‘MadJack’Churchill,broadswordin

hand,leadshismenashorefromaEurekaboat.

Inearly1940asimilarselectionhad takenplacefor theIndependentCompanies,andmostoftheseearlierTerritorialArmyvolunteersbecameCommandos.TomTrevor,who

wenton to commandNo.1Commando,describes theprocedure: ‘The companieswererecruitedfromvolunteers.Eachbrigadefoundaplatoon,andeachbattalionasection.Thesections were led by officers. The Headquarters of the Independent Companies had asectionoftheRoyalEngineersunderanofficer,andanammunitionsection,providedbytheRoyalArmyServiceCorps…Therewasalsoamedicalsection…andanintelligencesection.’Intotaleachofthetencompaniesraisedthatspringhadapapercomplementof289,including21officers.

In September these men were amalgamated into the newly raised Commandoformations,althoughthemajoritywereusedtoformNo.1Commando.ThissystemwasdulyadaptedbySirAlanBourneandSirRogerKeyestoassuagefearsthatbytakingtoomanymenfromoneunittheywouldweakenitasitstoodpreparedtorepeltheGermaninvader.However,thiswasachievedsimplybyselectingCommandorecruitsfromallofBritain’sregionalcommands,andsospreadingtheburdenasevenlyaspossible.

RecruitmentfortheCommandosproperbeganinthesummerof1940,frommenwhoanswered the call for volunteers for special service of a hazardous nature. ThesevolunteersansweredinlargenumbersfromalltheregionalcommandsintheBritishIsles,andfromjustabouteverybranchofarmyservice.Thisincludedthenon-infantryservicessuchastheRoyalArmyServiceCorpsandtheRoyalEngineers,aswellasfromthefront-line services. To begin the process, a suitable volunteer officer was selected by theOffensive Operations Department (later the Combined Operations Department), andappointedasaCommandocommandingofficer,holdingtherankoflieutenant-colonel.Hein turn would choose ten officers to be his troop leaders, who either held the rank ofcaptainorwerepromotedfollowingtheirselection.Thesetroopleaderswouldthenhavethejobofrecruitingtheirmen,includingtwojuniorofficerswhowouldeachleadoneofthetroop’ssections.

Oneof these troop leaderswasCaptainYoungof theBedfordshire andHertfordshireRegiment, who was selected to join No. 4 Commando. He described the procedure asfollows:ItwasTuesday8th July1940when Iwas stationed inBognorRegis that Iwas interviewedbyColonelLegard,commandingNo. 4 Commando, and invited to command F Troop. I accepted his invitation… andwent to theSalisburyPlainareatochoosemenformytroop.IestablishedmyheadquartersintheGeorgeHotel,Amesbury,andfromthereIsetouteachmorningontheimportanttaskoffindingtherightmen…AlthoughtheLieutenantColonelusuallyspecifiedwhattypeofmenhewaslookingfor,eachtroopcommanderhadtheirownwayofselectingmenfromthevolunteers.Someselectedmenwhowereyoung,withnoties,whileotherspreferredformerBoyScouts,musicians,andthosewhodidn’tbragorboast.Lt.ColonelRobertLaycock,thefuturecommanderoftheSpecialServiceBrigade,advised‘Chooseyourotherranksmorecarefullythanyouchooseyourwife.’

Theselectionprocesscouldn’t test someof thevital requirements foraCommando, theability to swim, drive, avoid seasickness and awillingness to parachute.Nor could theapplicant’sabilitywithweaponsorleveloffitnessbeaccuratelydetermined,saveforwhatitsaidinhisservicerecords.Thetroop’scommanderssimplyhadtochoosethementheyconsidered themostsuitableandhope thatanyshortcomingscouldbedealtwithduringtraining. There was certainly no shortage of volunteers that summer, and roughly onevolunteerinsixwasselectedfortrainingasaCommando.

Thereasonmenvolunteeredforthisspecialservicevaried,butgenerallytheyfellintothree groups. Many wanted to have a go at the Germans and felt their existing units,

usuallydeployeddefensivelyaroundBritain’scoast,didn’toffersufficientscopeforthis.Theyvolunteeredbecausetheyfeltitwastheirdutytostrikebackattheenemy.RelatedtothiswasthefeelingofmanysoldierswhohadfoughtinFrancethattheRegularArmyhadletthecountrydown,andthishurttheirsenseofprofessionalpride.Theywantedrevenge,and special service offered them a chance for it. Others were men from support unitswhoseunitsormilitarydutiesprecludedthemhavingachancetofight.Volunteeringgavethemtheopportunitytohaveago.Aboveall,many–particularlytheyoungersoldiers–volunteeredbecauseitofferedtheopportunityforfunandadventure,somethinggarrisondutydidnotprovide.

ACommandoonMalloyIslandwatchesthefightinginVaagsøreachitsclimax,whilethebuildingsservingthesmallisland’sgunemplacementsburnbelowhim.TheVaagsøraidwascarriedouton27December1941and,while

Malloywascapturedfairlyeasily,theGermangarrisonofferedstiffresistanceinthevillage.

GermanprisonerscapturedduringtheraidonVaagsøareescortedbacktothelandingcraft.TheCommandoswereissuedwithwhitesnowglovesfortheoperation,andseveraloftheprisonerescortcanbeseenwearingtheminthe

photograph.

Themajorityofthevolunteersselectedwereyoungsoldiersintheirearly20s,althoughsomewereyoungerorevenolder–menwhohadserved in thepre-wararmy,andwhocouldbereliedontoprovideasteadyinghandtoyoungerandlessexperiencedsoldiers.Whilethesemencouldhaveremainedintheirexistingunits, theyvolunteeredinpart toescape the discipline and routine of regular army life. Some had even seen service inWorldWarI,orinthepolicingactionsoftheinter-waryears,andhadprovedthemselvesunderfire.Whileatfirsttheymightstruggletokeepupwiththeiryoungercomradesonmarchesor in assault courses, the selectingofficersknew that a fewof theseoldhandswouldprovearealboontotheunitiftheyweregoodandwillingoldsoldiers.

OnMalloyIslandthegunbatterieswerecapturedwithoutmuchresistance.Afterclearingthebarracks,theCommandosearchedtherockysnow-coveredislandforhiddenGermansbeforeadetachmentwassentacrossthe

fjordtoreinforcethefightforSouthVaagsø.

Aboveall,commandingofficersand troop leaderswantedmenwhowere fit,healthy,welldisciplined,professional,tough,resilientandcourageous.Thesetraitsweresoughtinall soldiers, but in addition the selectorswere looking formenwithother less commontraits. They sought men who ideally were highly motivated, self-reliant and intelligentenough to use their own initiative. In short, theywantedmenwhowould thrive in theCommandos,andwho,withtherightleadershipandtraining,couldbereliedupontodoextraordinary things. By the end of July 1940, as these new Commando recruits weregatheredtogetherintotheirnewunits,theprocessbeganofturningthemintowhatwouldgenerallyberegardedasthebest-trainedfightingtroopsofthewar.

TRAININGItwasclearthatthisnewtypeofsoldierneededtobetrainedinanequallyinnovativeway.All of thevolunteers selected for theCommandoshad alreadygone through their basicmilitary training, and sowere proficient in the essentials ofmilitary life.Now, though,theyhadtolearnnewskillsandwerecalledontorelyontheirowninitiativeratherthantheir blind obedience to orders. At first, training was as varied as were methods ofrecruitment.Inaway, thisreflectedtheindependentnatureoftheCommandosandtheirunorthodoxcreation.However,as thewarprogressedamorecoordinatedandstructuredtraining programmewas devised under the guidance ofBrigadier JohnDurnford-Slater.Whileauniformmethodoftrainingmighthaveproducedlessrandomresults,allsharedthe same characteristic of being tougher than any training scheme yet devised in theBritishArmy.

A ARMYCOMMANDO,1941–42

ThisyoungCommandosergeantwearstheuniformwornbymostCommandosduringthefirstyearsofthewar.Itconsistsofthe1938-patternbattledressblouseandtrousers,apairofwebbingankletswornoverhisammunitionboots,andasetof1937-patternwebbing.OnhisheadtheCommandowearsthewoollencapcomforterwhichbecameahallmarkof theCommando raider.Hiswebbingset is shown ingreaterdetail in (7)onthe left,andconsists of awaist belt, shoulder straps, ammunitionpouches and a haversack. Thiswas the equipmentmostcommonlycarriedduringanoperation.OverhisshoulderthesergeantcarriesanSMLEMarkIII*.

Tohis left isanarrayofequipmentusedbycommandosduring thisperiod. (1); ShortMagazineLee-Enfield(SMLE)rifle,Model1,MarkIII*,accompaniedbyitsattendantbayonetandscabbard,aswellasafive-roundclipof.303in.ammunition.Below itaretwoexamplesof theThompsonmachinecarbine,or ‘Tommygun’; (2)M1928variantand(3)M1921variant.Mostwerefittedwitha20-roundstickmagazine,buta30-roundstickanda50-rounddrummagazinewerealsoissued.(4)AMarkI*steelhelmet.(5)AFairbairn-SykesCommandoKnife,MarkI.

(6)Pack,1908model,withsupportstraps.(7)Fullsetof1937-patternwebbing,includingwaterbottleandcarrierand haversack. (8) Examples of unit shoulder patches. The No. 3 Commando patch carries a troop identifierbeneathit.TheovalpatchshowingasalamanderbeingconsumedbyfirewaswornbeneathNo.1Commando’spatch. (9)Model 1936HandGrenades (or ‘Mills Bombs’). (10) British Bakelite Identity tags. (11) Inflatable lifepreserverbelt.(12)Lightgrapplinghook(13).Togglerope.

ThetrainingregimeTheobjectofthetrainingregime,asdescribedbythecommanderofNo.2CommandoLt.Col.Newman,wastohaveavailableafullytrainedbodyoffirst-classsoldiers,readyforactiveoffensiveoperationsagainstanenemyinanypartoftheworld.Itstressedinitiative,physical fitness,mentalalertness, tactical skill andprofessionalism. It called for, amongother things, theability tomarch sevenmiles in anhour in full fightingorder, to climbcliffs, tooperateeffectivelyatnight, toemploystealth, touse fieldcraftand liveoff theland,andtoshowskillinboatworkandamphibiousoperations.Itcalledfortheabilitytoread maps, to drive vehicles, to use signals equipment and to deal with first aidemergencies. Above all it expected Commandos to be completely proficient in theeffectiveuseofarangeofweapons,bothBritishandenemy,aswellastoshowgreatskillinunarmedcombat, street fighting, theuseofknivesand in theoperationofexplosivesanddemolitioncharges.InshortthetrainingregimewasunlikeanythingelseintheBritishArmy.

Eventually, as the training programme became more established, the followingpercentage of training time was devoted to these various skills (all numbers arepercentages):

Weaponstraining(includingenemyweapons)andfiring 30Tactics,fieldcraftandtrainingexercises 16Speedmarches,climbingandnighttraining 14Firstaidandmapreading 10Unarmedcombat 10Boatcraft 9Mines,demolitionsandexplosives 4Trainingfilms 3Drill 4

This was in complete contrast to normal military training of the era, where drill wasprobably the single most important aspect of military training. Just as importantly,Commandos did not live in barracks like other soldiers, but boarded with the localcommunity. They were fed, not in military canteens, but by their landlady. This wasdesignedtofosterself-relianceandinitiative,anditworked.Anaddedbonuswasthatitcircumvented the need to waste time on unnecessary guard duties or other mundanebarrackroutines.So,moretimecouldbedevotedtotheveryspecializedformoftrainingtheCommandosweregiven.Whilepersonalhygieneandsmartnesswasencouraged,mostofthetimetheywereexpectedratherthanenforced.Mostmenhadtheirlandladieswashtheiruniforms,andsothisreducedthebullevenmore.IntheCommandos,theabilitytomarchatspeedoverlongdistanceswasconsideredfarmoreimportantthanprecisiononthe parade ground.The very nature of theCommandoswas such that normal standardswereseenasirrelevant.

Commandospractisedisembarkingfromanassaultlandingcraft(LCA)athighspeedwhileaBrenguncoversthemfromtheportsideofthevessel.Thisphotographwastakenduringatrainingexerciseinlate1940.

ACommandoequippedwithaBrengunpicturedduringthefightingfortheAnziobeachheadinearly1944.EachCommandosub-sectionwasequippedwithaBrenLMGoperatedbyatwo-manteam.NotethattheCommando

carriesspare30-roundboxmagazinesandhasaColtautomaticpistoltuckedintohisbelt.

Here, theability toovercomeallkindsofproblemsusing initiative,physicalprowessandextensivetrainingwaswhatmattered–andwhatwouldproducethefirst-classsoldierNewman and other commanders sought. In fact, only by avoiding distractions such asbarrackroutinesandunnecessaryparadesorkitmusterswastheresufficienttimeavailableto put themen through these often-rigorous training regimes. This daily routine, takenfrom theDailyOrders,wascarriedoutby themenofNo.4Commandoduring the latesummerof1940whiletheywerebasedatWeymouth:

0700 – Parade on the beach (whatever theweather), for PT and an earlymorningswim,followedbyarunbacktobilletsforbreakfast.Agoodstarttotheday.

0900–1230–Selectionfromthefollowing:

Weapon training (rifle andbayonet,Bren, tommygun,BoysAT rifle, revolver andgrenades–noheavyweaponsatthisstage).

Shortmarch (8–10miles), frequently to an areawhere fieldcraft,map reading andcompasstrainingcouldbecarriedout.

Midday meal in billets, cafes or haversack meal (e.g. sandwiches provided bylandladies).

14:00 – on Selection from: Boating, semaphore/signalling, cross-country running,demolitions,orbriefingfornightschemes,followedbyrehearsalsandpractices.

On really sunny days we often had more swimming followed by compulsorysunbathing.The lattermight soundbizarre,butCol.Legrandwasconvincedof thevalueofsuntreatmentwhenproperlysupervised,andalsoofthevalueoflearningtorelax.

This though, was subject to change. There was no such thing as a regular routine inCommandotraining.Sometrainingsuchaslongcross-countrymarches,tacticalexercisesor extensive boating and seamanship practice was usually an all-day affair, as wasweaponsfiringattherangesorthedevelopmentofspecialistskillssuchascliffclimbingoroperatingatnight.Thisoftenmeantsleepingawayfromthebillets–eitherinbarnsoremptybuildings,inbivouacsorelseontheopenground.

TheGoatleyfoldingboatwasacanvasandwoodcraftwhichcouldbeflat-packedforeasytransportinasmallboatorsubmarine.Intheoryadozenmencouldbetransportedinone.Here,Commandosrehearsedisembarkingonthe

shoresofLochLochy.

Onekeyelementwasphysicalandmentaldevelopment.Thesheerphysicaldemandsofthis training routine far outweighed the requirement expected by the Physical Training

(PT)ormarchingrequirementsoftheregulararmy.IntheCommandos,conventionalPT,wherethemenchangedintoshortsandvestswasgenerallyfrownedupon.Theideawasthatphysicalexercisewaspartofoveralltrainingandshouldbedoneinnormalmilitaryclothing.Thatwaytherewasnodivorcingofphysicaltrainingfromtherestoftraining.ACommando was expected to test his physical fitness on the battlefield rather than thesportsfield,andsoPTwascarriedoutinfullkit.Ofcourse,sportingcompetitivenesswasencouraged – eachTroophad its own football, rugby and boxing teams– but from thestartdemandingphysicalexercisewasseenasacomponentpartofCommandotraining.

ThedevelopmentofCommandoskillsWhileeachCommandodeveloped itsown training routine, allof themshared the sameemphasisoncoreskills–long-distancemarching,extensiveweaponstraining,boatworkandthecarryingoutoftacticalexercises.WherevertheCommandowasbased,thelocalpopulation became used to the sight ofmenmarching long distances, regardless of theweather.Thedistances themenmarchedweresteadily increased in lengthandduration,andtheywerealwayscarriedoutinfullkit–atotalaverageloadofaround60lb(27kg).Soon,marchesof30milesbecameanacceptedpartofregulartraining.Asvolunteershadcomefromarangeofunits,anearlyproblemwasthepaceofmarch.LightInfantrymenmarchedat140pacesaminute,Guardsat110,andtherestofthearmyat120paces.Thesolution,ofcourse,wasthateveryonewouldmarchatLightInfantryspeed.

Aswellasmarchinglongdistances,Commandoswereexpectedtomarchatspeed.Therequirement for speed marching was set at seven miles in one hour, wearing a basicfightingorderkit,andthemenwereexpectedtobeabletofightattheendofit.So,afteraspeedmarch,itwascommontofollowitwithsomerelevantactivity,suchascompletingan obstacle course, or firing practice.This fast pacewas achieved by a combination ofmarchinganddoubling–thepacesetbythetroopsergeantmajor.So,after10–15minutesof fast-pacedmarching, the order would be given to double for roughly half that timeagain,beforeslowingdownagaintothefastmarchingpace.ThisplacedgreatdemandsonthefitnessandstaminaoftheCommandos,butitwasdeemedanessentialskillwhenthemenwouldbecalledupontocarryoutaraid.

Longerdistanceswerecoveredatasteadyfastmarchingpace–thedemandbeingforfivemilesinonehourornineintwohourswhendressedinFullServiceMarchingOrder(FSMO, or full kit). The distance was gradually increased, so that the men couldeventuallycover15milesin4½hours,25milesin8hours,or35milesin14hours.Aftersuchamarch,themenwereallowedtwohours’restbeforetheywereexpectedtobeableto fighteffectively.Sometimeseven longermarcheswerecarriedout. In thesummerof1940,No.12Commandomarched63milesacrosstheNorthernIrishcountrysideinjust19 hours. What would once have been seen as an outstanding feat of marching hadbecome commonplace. To keep spirits up, the men were encouraged to sing as theymarched – anything from popular songs to bawdy ballads. Thiswas designed to boostmorale, which wasn’t always easy when the men were soaked through, and marchingthroughrain,snow,sleetorevenblisteringheat.

Equally importantwasweapons training.ACommandohad tobeutterlyproficient intheuseofawholearrayofweaponry–not just thestandard rifle,butalso themachinecarbine(sub-machinegunortommygun),theBrenlightmachinegun,theservicepistol,

grenades and even specialist weapons such as the Boys anti-tank rifle. In 1940,ammunitionwasscarce,butasthewarprogresseditbecamecommontotrainusingliveammunition.Rapidwell-aimedriflefirehadbeenatrademarkoftheBritishinfantrymanforhalfacentury,andCommandoswereexpectedtoattainarateoffireof15accuratelyfiredroundsaminuteusingtheshortmagazineLee-Enfield(SMLE).From1941onwardsthis weaponwas gradually replaced by the No. 4 Rifle, which was similar but had animprovedbayonetandbacksight.Thesamerateoffirewasexpectedfrombothweapons.

ACommandoBrenLMGteammovingacrossawireobstacleonthetraininggroundofAchnacarry.Theloaderhasthrownhimselfdownacrossthewire,allowinghispaltopasssafelyoverhim,beforedroppingdowntofire.

Presumably,theloaderwouldjoinhimafterhedisentangledhimself.

WhiletheriflewasthestandardweaponoftheCommando,everyonewasalsotrainedin the use of the tommy gun from the United States. Officially called the Thompsonmachinecarbine,thiswasaquick-firingshort-rangeweapon,whichprovedhighlypopularwiththeCommandos,andwasideallysuitedtothemduringtheirraids.By1940theBrenlightmachinegun(LMG)hadbeeninserviceforfiveyearsandwasapopularweapon.FortheCommandos,though,usingitasastaticfiresupportweaponwasn’tenough.Theyexperimentedwithusing itduring theadvance, firing from thehip like the tommygun,anditprovedeffectiveandaccuratewhenusedinthismoredynamicoffensiveway.So,theCommandosnot onlygainedproficiency in awide rangeofweapons, but they alsodevelopedtheirowntacticsbuiltaroundtheaggressivenatureoftheirrole.

TheruggedcountrysideoftheWesternHighlandsofferedtheCommandosasuperbtrainingground,withwoods,streams,bogs,hillsandcliffsformingavastobstaclecourse.HereaCommandomovesthroughaboggystream,

takingadvantageofitscovertoapproachhisobjective.

WhiletherestoftheBritishforcestendedtoconductweaponstrainingunderpeacetimeconditions, inCommando trainingmore realistic factorswere introduced. For example,ratherthanaconventionalconcentric-ringedtarget,human-shapedsilhouetteswereused,andfiringwasconductedmoreonsimulatedbattlefieldsthaninwell-establishedshootingranges. In the remoter patches of countryside Commandos would practise fire andmovement,shootingatmovingtargetslikethrownmetalplatesandpractisingfiringfromarangeofpositionsrather thanthebasiclyingpositionfavouredinarmyrifleranges.Itwasalldesignedtomakecombatfiringsecondnature.

From the start, Commandos were trained in boat craft and seamanship and wereexpected to be able to operate comfortably in a range of vessels, from canoes andinflatablerubberraftstocollapsiblecanvasGoatleyboats,rigiddoriesandlargervesselssuchaslandingcraft.Atfirstonlyafewlandingcraftwereavailable,andotherspecialistcraft didn’t exist, so the skillswere learnedon amotley collectionof small boats fromfishing vessels to rowing boats. Naval whalers, cutters and launches were usedextensively, and theCommandos soon became proficient in getting in and out of thesecraft. The emphasiswas on landing quickly and quietly, and formost it took time andexperiencetolearnthesenewmaritimeskills.

Othershadliedabouttheirabilitytoswimandhadtolearnfastwhentheyfacedaswimashore.Itwaseitherthatorriskbeingreturnedtounit(RTU).Swimmingsoonbecameanessentialpartoftraining.Atfirstlifejacketsweren’tavailable,butby1941thesebecamestandard issue. By then, the Landing Craft Assault (LCA)was becomingmore readilyavailableandthementrainedinoperatinganddisembarkingfromthese,bydayornight,in a variety of sea conditions, and on both sandy beaches and rocky coasts. The menwould race to assemble at their forming-up place (FUP) ashore before beginning theirmission.Embarkationwasseenasequallyimportant–theemphasisbeingonthespeedyandsafeextractionofaraidingpartyafteramissionwascomplete.

As well as the LCA, the 18ft dory proved an excellent raiding craft for smalleroperations,whileboththetwo-mancanoeandthecollapsibleGoatleyboathadtheirplacein more clandestine operations as both could be easily stowed away in submarines orsmallcoastalwarfarevessels.Troopslearnedtofiretheirweaponsfromcraftofallsizes,and soon amphibious landings were staged under realistic conditions – against LMGsfiringontheflanksorovertheheadsofthelandingforce.Hiddendummychargeswererigged to explode on landing beaches, or in the sea, to create an even greater level ofrealism. This exercise was known as Battle Inoculation, and, like many live-firingexercisescarriedoutduringCommandotraining,itwasdesignedtoaccustomthementobeingunderfireandtothesoundofbattle.

Commandoswerealsotaughttheartsofknifefighting,unarmedcombatandtheuseofexplosives and demolition charges. The Fairbairn-Sykes commando knife became asymboloftheCommandos,butitwasdesignedasapracticalkillingweapon–idealforsilencing enemy sentries. The philosophy here was that in war you can’t afford to besqueamish.Ifyoucan’tkillyourenemywithafirearm,thenyoushouldbeabletodoitwithabayonet,knife,macheteorwithyourbarehands.Instructorstoldtheirstudentsthatbystabbingthecarotidarterythevictimwouldloseconsciousnesswithinfivesecondsandbedeadshortlyafterwards.Whilesuchformsoffightingwererare,itwasimportantthatallCommandosknewwhattodowhenthemomentcame.

IntheCommandosbasedorestablishedintheMiddleEast,trainingsometimestookonaslightlydifferentslant.There theMiddleEast (ME)Commandoswerebased indesertcampsandmarcheswereconductedacrossthedesert.Fromthesecamps,marchesof30–50mileswereundertakenacrosssand,rocksordeserthills,andagaintheemphasiswasplaced on speedmarching despite the gruelling conditions.The aimwas to prepare themen for deep penetration raids around the desert flank of the enemy.However, for themost part the ME Commandos were expected to operate from boats, landing behindenemylineson theNorthAfricancoastor in theAegeanSea.Boat trainingwascarriedout on theGreatBitterLake or theRedSea, and as landing craftwere unavailable thesamewhalerswereusedforoffensiveoperationsintheDodecaneseinFebruary1941.

From the spring of 1941 onwards exercises became larger andmore involved. Theycould involve house-clearing, the destruction of enemy installations, approachmarchesacross difficult terrain, long-range reconnaissance, the capture of enemy prisoners andlargeamphibiouslandings.Inallofthese,theaimwastomaketheexercisesasrealisticaspossible,sothatthemenknewexactlywhattoexpectwhentheywerecalledupontodothe same thing in earnest.Later in thewarmore specialist training in junglewarfareor

operatinginarcticconditionswouldfurtherexpandtheCommandorepertoire.Aboveall,while the firstmonths of trainingwere carried out all around the countrywherever theCommandos were based, the establishment of dedicated training camps in Scotlandallowedthistrainingtobetakentoawholenewlevelofprofessionalism.

CommandoscrossingaropebridgemadeusingtoggleropesduringtrainingnearAchnacarry,c.1943.Theseshortropelengths,withatoggleatoneendandaloopattheother,werecarriedbyallCommandosandcouldbelinked

togethertoformlongerropesforclimbingcliffs,ormakingbridgeslikethis.

TrainingcentresInMay1940,afterpetitioningbyCaptainBillStirlingandhiscousinSimonFraser,LordLovat,theWarOfficerequisitionedInverailortHousenearthehamletofLochailortbesideLoch Eilt on the west coast of Scotland. This was first envisaged as a centre for thetrainingofirregularforcesand,afterbeingrebrandedasaSpecialTrainingCentre(STC),itwasusedasatrainingbaseforCommandos.TheIndependentCompaniesalreadyhadatrainingbaseatAchdalieuonLochEil,andthistoobecameaCommandotrainingcamp.LordLovathelpedsecureothercentres–AchnacarryHousenearLochLochyandInverieHouseatKnoydartonLochNevis.

AchnacarryHousewouldbecometheCommandoBasicTrainingCentre(CBTC),whiletheothertrainingcampswouldserveassatellitesformorespecialistformsofinstruction.ThedeerforestsbetweenAchnacarryandKnoydartwerealsocommandeered,givingtheCommandosthousandsofacresofruggedterrainaboveLochArkaigandLochNevistotrain in.Later, other auxiliary training areas became available atKnoydart,Arisaig and

Moidart.

At Inverary near Fort William a Combined Training Centre (CTC) was establishedwhereafleetofsmallboatsofvarioussortswerehoused,andwhereamphibiousexercisescouldbecarriedout in thenumeroussea lochs in thearea.AtLochailort the instructorsincludedmany soldierswhowould latermake names for themselves in outfits like theSOE,theSASandtheChindits.Forthemoment,though,theyprovidedatrainingcentrewhere intensive Commando training could be carried out. From July 1940 onwards,officersandselectedNCOsofthenewlyformedCommandounitsweresenttoLochailorttobe trained.Theywould then return to theirunits topasson theirnew-foundskills totheirmen.

However, Commando trainingwould always be associatedwithAchnacarry betweenLochArkaigandLochLochy.HerethetrainingfacilityconsistedofAchnacarryHouse–sometimescalledacastle–andaclusterofhuts.ThecentreopenedinMarch1942andbytheendofthewarover25,000menhadbeentrainedthere–notjustCommandos,butalsoAmericanRangersandvariousotherAlliedspecialforces.Here,fourtrainingtroopswentthrough the training routines pioneered since the summer of 1940, but with the addedadvantage that trainingwas carried out in a centre surrounded by lochs,mountains andruggedterrainofallkinds.Mock-upvillageswerebuiltandstormed,cliffclimbingwaspractised on nearby crags, boat training took place on nearby Loch Lochy, includingopposed landings,andcross-countrymarches ranged toBenNevisandbeyond.AnyonewhowentthroughtheCBTcoursewithoutbeingRTUdwasregardedasanexceptionallywell-trainedsoldier.ItislittlewonderthattheCommandoMemorialnowstandsclosetothis legendary centre ofCommando training just outside theHighland village of SpeanBridge.

B COMMANDOTRAININGINTHEHIGHLANDS,1942

ThismontageshowsvariousformsoftrainingcarriedoutatorclosetotheCommandoBasicTrainingCentreatAchnacarryHouse,nearSpeanBridge.ThecentreopenedinMarch1942andremainedinoperationthroughoutthewar. Traineeswere allocated to a training troop and then put through a rigorous programmeof physicaldevelopment,weaponstraining, long-distancemarches, rockclimbing,boattraining,tacticaldevelopmentandbattlefieldexercises.TheuppersceneshowsCommandotraineescrossingaropestrungacrosstheriverArkaig.Rock climbing was practised either on the nearby slopes, or farther afield in Glencoe. Weapons ranges weresituatedclose to thehouse,while close to the shoresofLochArkaig traineespractisedhouseclearing (shownhere),aswellasattacksonenemystrongpoints.

APPEARANCEWhen their units were first formed, Commandos wore standard British Army khakibattledress, which consisted of a 1939 pattern serge blouse and trousers. This wasnormally worn with the 1937 pattern webbing, which had begun to replace the earlier1908patternofwebequipmentwhenthewarbegan.TheCommandoworeapairofblackammunition boots (or boots, ankle, general service) of the 1936 pattern, which wereusually topped by webbing anklets. Headgear consisted of whatever was worn by thevolunteer’soriginalunit,sowhentheywerefirstmusteredCommandovolunteerssportedawidevarietyofheadwear.However,eachmanwasalsoissuedwithaMark1*typesteelhelmet, which was essentially the pattern introduced in 1916 modified with a Brodiepatternhelmetshellin1936.Fromlate1940thiswasgraduallyreplacedbythesimilarbutslightlyimprovedMarkIIhelmet.

Tired-lookingmenfromNo.4CommandopicturedafterdisembarkinginNewhavenontheSussexcoastfollowingreturnfromtheDieppeRaidofAugust1942.Ontheright,aGoatleyfoldingboatcanbeseen,showinghowlittle

spacethesecrafttookupwhenstowed.

In its basic form the webbing set comprised a belt, brace straps, which were worncrossedattheback,shoulderstrapsdesignedtosupportapackandammunitionpouches,whichwerelinkedtoboththeshoulderstrapsandthebelt.Otherwebbingitemsincludedanentrenchingtoolcarrier,awaterbottleandcarrier,ahaversack(smallback),abayonetfrog, a web pistol holster and a small ammunition pouch. Other related webbing wasdesigned forusewith specificweapons, suchas the ‘bandoleer,magazine,Sten’,which

had pockets for seven Sten gun magazines, with similar special ammunition pouchesdesignedforBrenLMGandThompsonmachinecarbinemagazines.Wirelessequipmentalsohad itsownwebcarryingcase,whileofficershad theirowndesignsofmapcases,pistol or revolver holsters and binocular cases. Finally, gasmaskswere carried in theirownpouches.

Other items of issued clothingwhichwere less suitable for Commando training andoperationsweretheArmy’slong,brown1939patterndouble-breastedgreatcoats,fatiguedress–a lightweightdenimversionof thebattledressblouseand trousers–andPTkit,whichconsistedofblue shorts andwhitevests (actuallyT-shirts).Asalreadynoted,PTwasusuallyconductedwearingstandarditemsofuniform.However,thebrownrubberandcanvasPTshoesprovedexcellentforusewhenstealthwasrequiredandsotheyremaineda useful part of Commando equipment. They were usually worn with standard greywoollen socks. Practicality and purpose were always considered more important thanappearance.

Gradually, theCommandoswere issuedwithmorespecific itemsofuniform. In1940they received their own version of the battledress trousers with an attachment for aFairbairn-Sykesdaggerscabbardontheleftleg.AdrabgreenCommandowoollenjumperwas issued from 1941 onwards – an item that was the precursor of the British forcesubiquitous ‘woolypully’.From1942ammunitionbootswithhobnailed solesaswell assteel heel and toe plates, were replacedwith bootswith rubber heels and rubber crepesoles.Originallydesignedforsoldiersworkingwithammunitionwherethehobnailscouldcauseaspark,therubber-soledbootswereadoptedbytheCommandosastheymadelittleornonoisewhenlandingonarockybeach.

TheraidonStNazairewascarriedouton27–28March1942by150menfromNo.2Commando,supportedbythenavy,plusengineerdetachmentsfromotherCommandounits.Losseswerehigh–64Commandoswerekilledand

over100captured–buttheraidwasdeemedasuccess.ThisaerialphotographtakenaftertheraidshowsthelandingareasaroundNormandieDock,thefocalpointoftheraid,seenhereasadiagonalrectanglelinkingtheinner

dockwiththeLoireEstuary.

Headgear remained varied in Commando units until 1942. Men reported for dutywearingwhateverheadwearhadbeenwornin theiroriginalunits– thefieldservicecap(orsidecap),foragecaps,Glengarrys,tam-o’-shanters,peakedcapsandberetsinvariouscolourswereseen.Asolutiontothislackofuniformitywastointroducethewoollencapcomforterasaformofheadwear.Thiswasagreenknittedtube,closedatoneend,whichwhenfoldedbackmadeapracticalheadcovering.Itwasdesignedtobewornundertheoldpatternof steelhelmet,but it soonbecameanemblemof theCommandos.Still,noofficialheadgearwasissuedthroughouttheearlypartofthewar,althoughNos.2and9Commandosadopted the tam-o’-shanter,despite itbeingadistinctivelyScottishformofheadwear.

InNo.1Commandoitwasdecidedtoadopt theberetas ithadnonationalaffiliationanditwaseasytostowawaywhennotworn.Aftersomedeliberationagreenberetwaschosen,andinlate1941aScottishfirmwascommissionedtomakethem.Whenaskedtoapprove the new unit headgear, Brigadier Laycock of the Special Service Brigadeconsidered it an ideal solution for all Commando units. However, theWar Office wasreluctanttoapprovetheissueofadistinctiveformofCommandoheadwear.Itcontinuedto resist it even after the younger and smaller Parachute Regiment was issued itsdistinctivemaroonberet.Finally,though,thegreenberetwasapprovedanddulyadoptedintheautumnof1942.However,thecapcomforter–orCommandocap–continuedtobeworn,asdidthesteelhelmet.

CommandoscomingashoreatSarandeonthecoastofAlbaniainSeptember1944duringOperationMercerised(theattackonSarande).IntheprowisBrigadierTomChurchill,commanderofthe2ndSpecialServiceBrigade.The

landingwaspartofanoperationconductedinsupportoflocalpartisans.

TheothermajorchangetotheCommandouniformwasalsointroducedinlate1942.Inthe Parachute Regiment, a khaki-drill smock had been designed to be worn over aparachutist’sbattledress.

MenofNo.40(RM)Commando,picturedon24September1944,preparingtomoveinlandfromSugarBeachatSarande,Albania.Thesemen,alongwithNo.2Commando,capturedtheareaafterabitterfight,whichinturnledto

theGermansurrenderofnearbyCorfu.

Named theDenisonsmockafter themajorwho firstdesigned it,based inparton theGerman jumpsuit used in 1940–41, this khaki-drill coverall was dubbed the ‘AirborneSmockDenisonCamouflage’,andwasfirstissuedtoairbornetroopsinearly1942.Initsoriginalformitwasatruesmockwhichhadtobesteppedinto,butitwaslateradaptedasajacketwithaziprunningdownitsfront.Thenalighterwindproofcamouflagedsmockwasdeveloped,whichresembledtheairborneDenisonsmockbutwasmadefromalightercotton. Itwascamouflagedwith two shadesofgreenandbrownover a tawny-colouredbase.Althoughdesignedtobewornoverthebattledress,itwasalsowornoverashirtandpullover. While the airborne Denison had a strap, which passed between the legs toprevent the smock riding up during a parachute jump, the lightweight smock issued toCommandoshadastraightbottom,edgedwithadrawstring.

During the lastyearsof thewarCommandounitswent intoactionwearingeither thebattledressblouseorthelightweightsmock.ThechoiceofclothingwaslargelydowntotheCommando’scommandingofficer,ortheSpecialServiceBrigadecommander.OutsideNorth-West Europe a variety of other forms of clothing were worn depending on thetheatre. For instance, ME Commandos often wore shorts with battledress blouses orpullovers,whilesand-colouredsuededesertbootsoftenreplacedblackammunitionboots.AlsolightweightkhakidrilltrousersandshirtswereworninNorthAfrica,SicilyandItaly.IntheFarEast,standardjunglegreenshirtsandtrouserswereworn.

Even inNorth-WestEurope theuniformcouldvary.During theStNazaire raid, kiltswith akhaki apronwerewornby someCommandos,while inoperations inNorwegian

waters warmer weather clothing was preferred, including greatcoats, balaclavas (wornundersteelhelmets),leathersleevelessjerkins,and–laterinthewar–whitesnowsmocksand trousers.From1941on, troopswere issuedwith theBergen rucksack– a farmorepracticalpieceofequipment than theolder largepackorhaversack.TheBergenhad itsownmetalframe,sotherewasnoneedtowearcumbersomesupportwebbingwithit,and,moreimportantly,itcouldbeeasilytakenoffwhentheCommandoneededtoappearlessvisible.Effectively,Commandoshadconsiderableleewaytowearwhattheywanted–oratleastwhattheirofficersallowedthemtowear.ThisallowedthemtoadapttheirdresstoagreaterextentthanmostotherunitsintheBritishArmy.

Finally,whentheCommandoswereformedtherewerenoguidelineswhenitcametounit insignia and so commanders forged their own path. As a result, various styles ofshoulder flasheswereworn.While theuseofunit identifyingnumberswasdiscouragedfor security reasons, thiswas circumventedby theuseof symbolsor uniquedesigns. Itwas also ignored. So, during the Vaasgø Raid of December 1941, men went ashorewearingshoulder flashes identifying their unit (e.g. 3Commando),with troop numbersunderneath.SomeunitsmerelyhadashoulderflashbearingthetitleCommando.InMay1943thesecurityrestrictionswererelaxedandunitnumberswereofficiallyincorporatedintothemen’sinsignia.RoyalMarineshad‘RoyalMarines’insertedbetweenthenumberand ‘Commando’,while theCombinedOperationspatchwasalso issued tobewornoneach arm. Then, in late 1944, a new triangular patch was introduced featuring a redcommando dagger on a blue background. In theory these insignia were designed toencourage unit pride. Formost, though, being a Commandowas a source of sufficientprideinitself.

RoyalMarineCommandosduringapauseintheiradvancethroughthemangroveswampsnearKangawinJanuary1945.Theadvanceofthe3rdCommandoBrigadeledtovictoryatHill170inwhatwasthedecisiveengagementof

theArakanCampaign.

EQUIPMENTWhentheywerefirstformed,Commandoswereissuedwithsimilarweaponrytotherestof theBritishArmy.Thischangedasnewweaponsbecameavailable,andbothunitandtroop commanders and even individual men were to some extent allowed to chooseweaponsthatsuitedboththemandtheirmission.ThebasicarsenalconsistedoftheshortmagazineLee-Enfield (SMLE) riflewith its18in.-longbayonet, theBren lightmachinegun(LMG),whichwasusedasasectionsupportweapon,andthehandgrenade–usuallytheMills No. 36 grenade. In addition, other weapons such as the Boys anti-tank rifle(ATR)andthe.38in.Smith&Wessonpistolwereissuedwhenrequired.

TheSMLEhadbeeninservicesincebeforeWorldWarIandwasabolt-action.303in.weaponwith a ten-roundmagazine. A Commandowas expected to fire 20 well-aimedrounds (two magazine clips) in a minute, and a combination of accuracy, range andfirepowermadeitanditsslightlymodifiedreplacement,theNo.4rifle,thecornerstoneoftheCommando’sarsenalthroughoutthewar.ItcouldalsobefittedwithacupdischargerandusedtolaunchNo.36grenades.Thismodification,whichturnedtheSMLEintotheEYrifle,hadaneffectiverangeofaround200yards.

OneoftheprincipalreasonsthesmallNorwegianportofVaagsøwasselectedasaCommandotargetwasthevalueofthefishprocessingandfishoilstoragefacilitiesthere.HereawarehouseisleftburningfiercelyastheCommandos

preparetowithdraw.

Anevenmoreuseful supportweaponwas theLMG.TheBrencould fireboth singleroundsor short bursts of .303in. ammunition andwas fittedwith a 30-roundmagazine,althoughonly28wereusuallyloadedtosavewearonthemagazinespring.Itwasfittedwithabipodmountandwasextremelyaccurate.Itsonlyreallimitationwasthatitsbarrel

overheated rapidly, and so Commandos carried a spare barrel that could be fitted in amatter of seconds. In the Commandos, the Bren was also fired from the hip whileadvancing, providing an advancing section with suppressive fire as it moved forward.Sparemagazineswerecarriedbyboththetwo-manLMGteamandothermembersoftheCommandosection,ensuringthatthisusefulweaponwaswellsuppliedwithammunition.

ThemainstreetofSouthVaagsøimmediatelyaftertheCommandosclearedthehamletofGermans.IntheforegroundaCommandodemolitionteamcanbeseen,whilesmokefromburningstoragefacilitiesonthe

waterfrontcanbeseeninthebackground.

In thelatesummerof1940, thefirstdeliveriesof theThompsonsub-machinecarbine(TSMCortommygun)arrivedfromtheUnitedStates,andprovedpopularweapons.Thissub-machinegunfireda.45in.snub-nosedround,whichgaveitagreaterstoppingpowerthantheSMLEortheLMG.Ammunitioncouldbesuppliedina50-rounddrumora20-roundstickorboxmagazine.Bothweretried,butthetendencyofthedrumtojammeantthatcommandossoonadoptedtheboxmagazine.Itwasaverypopularweaponbutithadthreeweaknesses.Officiallyitseffectiverangewaslessthan100yardswhiletheSMLEwasaccurateatover500yards.Inpracticeitwasdifficulttohittargetsmorethan50yardsaway.Thismadeitaclose-quartersweapon.Ithadahighrateoffire,whichmeantthatiftheuserwasn’tcarefulhecouldeasilywasteammunition.The longer theburst, the lessaccuratetheweaponwas,thankstoitsrecoilwhichforcedthegunupandtotheright.

JackChurchill(1898–1961)

BorninCeylon,JackChurchillservedasanarmyofficerfor tenyearsbefore leavingtheservicein1936.HerejoinedtheManchesterRegimentattheoutbreakofwar,andin1940becametheonlyBritishsoldieroftheconflicttokillanenemyusingabowandarrow.HevolunteeredfortheCommandosanddulybecameatroopcommanderinNo.3 Commando. During the Vaagsø raid (1941) he played his bagpipes during theapproach to the landing area and thenwielded a broadsword during the attack. Thisearnedhim the nickname ‘Mad Jack’.This broadsword appeared again inSeptember1943when, as commandingofficerofNo.2Commando,Churchillwielded it during

the Salerno landings. When asked why he carried the sword, he replied that in hisopinionanyofficerwhowentintoactionwithoutonewasimproperlydressed.HesawfurtherservicewithNo.2CommandointheAdriaticand,badlywounded,wascapturedinJune1944togetherwithhisswordandbagpipes.

PeterYoung(1915–1988)

AfterstudyinghistoryinOxford,Youngjoinedthearmyin1938andtwoyearslaterhefoughtinFrance.HevolunteeredfortheCommandosandinJune1940becameatroopleaderinNo.3Commando.AfewweekslaterhetookpartinOperationAmbassador–a bungled raid onGuernsey; the following year he led his troops into action on theLofotenIslandsandlateratVaagsø.Afterpromotion,andtheawardofaMilitaryCross,heparticipated in theDieppeRaid (1942)beforebeingsent to theMediterranean.HefoughtinSicilyandItalyandwasrewardedwiththecommandofNo.3Commando.Heled it ashore in Normandy (1944) and saw extensive action on the bridgehead’s leftflank. He was subsequently sent to the Far East as second in command of 3rdCommando Brigade where he saw further action during the Arakan Campaign inBurma.Heendedthewarasabrigadier.Afterwardsheresumedhishistoricalstudiesandwroteseveralkeymilitaryhistorybooks,includinganumberofMen-at-ArmstitlesforOsprey.Afoundingwargamer,healsowentontofoundtheEnglishCivilWarre-enactmentgroupTheSealedKnot.

Although it wasn’t a particularly accurate weapon, the Thompson could bedevastatingly effective at short range in the right hands and they were issued inconsiderable numbers to the Commandos as they were considered eminently suitableweapons tocarryon raids.Fromearly1941on, itwasaugmentedby themuchsimplerBritish-builtStenmachinecarbine(SMC,orsimplytheStengun).Itwasdesignedin1940when Britain was threatened with invasion and so was a mass-produced and crudeweapon, but it worked. The Sten fired a 9mm round, and was fitted with a 32-roundmagazine.Commandos,though,usuallyloadedjust30roundsintoitasafullloadplacedstressonthespringsandinducedjams.IthadallthedisadvantagesoftheThompson,andit was more prone to jamming. However, its smaller calibre round meant that moreammunition could be carried.Generally though,while bothweaponswere popular, thetommygunwaspreferredtoitscrudeBritishcounterpart.

The Boys ATR fired a .55in. armour-piercing round which came in a five-roundmagazine.However,itwasincapableofpenetratingthearmourofmostmoderntanksandsowasreallyofuseonlyindestroyingsupportvehiclesorhalf-tracks.Itwascumbersome,andwhenfireditkickedlikeamule.However,itwasusefulasasupportweaponthankstoitsextremeaccuracyatrangesofupto250yards.Itwaspredominantlyusedtoengageenemypillboxes,bunkersoroccupiedbuildings.Itwasneverapopularweapon,though,largelybecauseitweighed35lb(16kg)andwasawkwardtocarry,particularlyoverlongdistancesorwhenmovingatspeed.

BrigadierJohnDurnford-Slater(left,thedeputycommanderofCombinedOperations)andLieutenant-ColonelPeterYoung,commanderofNo.3Commando,picturedatLaPleininNormandy,duringtheCommando’sdefenceofthe

leftflankoftheNormandybridgehead.

In early 1943 it was replaced by the ‘Projectile, Infantry, Anti-Tank’ (PIAT). Thislightweightanti-tankweaponwasreasonablyeffectivebuthadamaximumrangeofonly100 yards. The Commandos also found it useful as a bunker buster. Another usefulsupportweaponwas the2in.mortar. It could firehigh-explosive (HE)or smoke roundswitharangeofupto500yards,althoughitseffectiverangewasalittleoverhalfthat.Itwasoperatedbyatwo-manteam,oneofwhomcarriedthemortarbombsinasix-roundcase.Other roundswere carriedby the crew inwebbingpouches.Themortarwas lightand could be set up and fired rapidly. One such weapon was attached to each troopheadquarters, and proved particularly useful in providing a quickly laid smokescreenduringanassault.

TheNo.36Millsgrenade(nicknamedthepineapple)wasanotherweaponofWorldWarIvintage,butitwasnolesseffectiveforitsage.Itcouldbethrownabout25yards,andwasfittedwithaseven-secondfuse,activatedwhenthesafetyleverwasreleased.During1942 theNo.69 andNo.77grenadeswere introduced.The first,with ablackBakelitecasingwaslighterthantheMillsgrenade,andcausedlessdamage,butitwasidealwhenthrownintoaconfinedspaceimmediatelybeforetheCommandosstormedin.Effectively

itwasahouse-clearingweapon.TheNo.77wasatin-casedsmokegrenade,whichusedphosphorous,which in turn caused burns to anyone inside its blast radius.Commandosalsousedstickybombsasanti-tankweapons,butthesewererarelycarried.

Other heavier support weapons were also used. From late 1942 onwards a HeavyWeapons Troop consisting of machine-gun and mortar sections formed part of eachCommando. The .303in. Vickers mediummachine gun (MMG)was a long-establishedinfantryweapon,aswasthe3in.mortar.TheMMGhadarangeofupto3,000yardsand,whileaheavyweapon, it could fire500 roundsaminute,giving theCommandos somevery useful supporting fire during an attack orwhen defending a position. The sectionconsisted of two detachments, each of one gun and four crew. TheOrdnanceML 3in.mortar LR had an effective range of 2,800 yards, and could fire both HE and smokerounds.These roundsweighed10lb and so everyone in theHeavyWeapons troopwentashorewithatleasttworounds,whilemorewerecarriedbyothermenintheCommandoasa reserve.Again, thesectionconsistedof twoweaponscommandedbyasubaltern,asergeantandaidedbyasignaller.Eachmortarhadafour-mancrew.

Finally,CommandoscarriedthefightingknifedesignedbyCaptainsWilliamFairbairnand Erik Sykes. It was primarily a thrustingweapon, but it could also be thrownwithsome accuracy. Initially manufactured by Wilkinson Sword it came in a number ofversions,but all shared its coldefficient simplicityofdesign.Otherweapons, includingknuckledusters, knives, machetes and even a Scottish broadsword (by ‘Mad Jack’Churchill)couldbecarried,butitwastheFairbairn-SykesfightingknifewhichwouldbeforeverassociatedwiththeBritishCommando.

ThemenofNo.3Commando,picturedatWarsashontheriverHamblenearSouthamptonon5June1944.Thatevening,theywouldembarkinthetransportsthatwouldtakethemacrosstheEnglishChanneltoNormandy.A

memorialnowmarksthespotwheretheCommandosboardedtheirinvasioncraft.

C EQUIPMENTUSEDDURINGCOMBINEDOPERATIONS,1942–44

As well as the basic weapons illustrated on pages XX–XX, Commandos employed a wide range of weaponsduringraids.Someofthemorecommonareshownhere.(1)TheVickersGOLightMachineGun(alsoknownasa‘KGun’), used as a supportweaponbyCommandos from1943. It fired a .303in. round. (2) The StenmachinecarbineMarkIIusedasanalternativetotheThompson.(3)CamouflagedcommandosniperequippedwithaNo.4RiflefittedwithNo.36MarkIItelescopicscope.(4)2in.Mortar,usedasatroopsupportweaponcapableoffiringbothHEandsmokerounds.(5)CockleMarkIIcollapsiblecanoe,asusedintheCockleshellRaidagainstshippinginBordeaux,December1942.Thecanoewas15ftlongandcouldseattwopeople.(6)ANo.36(HE)Grenade,alargerNo.69(HE)grenadeandaNo.77(Smoke)grenade.(7)Smatchetcombatknife,designedforbothstabbingandslashing.(8)Magneticlimpetmine,type6,MarkII,usedforsmall-unitCommandoattacksonenemyshippinginalltheatres.

CONDITIONSOFSERVICEItishardtopindownexactlywhateverydaylifeforaBritishCommandoentailedastherewas no such thing as a regular routine – only a round of preparations for actioninterspersed with operations, which could be planned and carried out at short notice.However, from the start it was clear to the volunteers that the military life they hadexperienced before their selection as Commandos bore little relation to what was nowexpected of them. From the beginning, it was decided that Commandos would not behousedinconventionalarmybarracksonanarmycampcutofffromtherestoftheworld.Instead they would be responsible for their own quartering and feeding. In the BritishArmy of the early 1940s this was a somewhat revolutionary idea, as soldiers wereexpectedtoliveinthedisciplinedenvironmentofanarmybasewhereparadegroundspitandpolishandanorderedroutinewerethenorm.

AgroupofmenfromNo.3CommandoinNormandy,havingliberatedsomelocallivestocktohelpaugmenttheirrations.Self-sufficiencywasencouragedintheCommandos,andsoforagingofthiskindwasviewedwithmore

tolerancethaninotherarmyunits.

Itwasestimated thatatanyparticular time,20percentofaBritish infantrybattalionstationedinabarrackswouldbeemployedonnon-combatantdutiessuchascarryingoutbaseguarddutiesorotherdomesticcampchores.FortheCommandosthiswasconsideredunacceptableas thesemenwere thereforenotavailablefor training.So,byrejecting theuseofbarracks,thefoundersoftheCommandosachievedtwothings.First,theyavoidedtheneedtowastetimeoncampduties.Second,theyfosteredaspiritofself-relianceand

self-sufficiencyamongtheCommandosthemselves.So,whenaCommandowasformeditwasallocatedahometown.Whenthemenarrived,theywereallocatedtemporarybilletsforafewdaysandissuedarationcardandadailysubsistenceallowance.Theywerethentoldtogooutandfindlodgings.Fortunately,therewerealwaysplentyoflocalfamiliesorlandladieswillingtodotheirbitandtheCommandosweresoondulybilletedaroundtheirunit’shometown.

AnAssaultLandingCraftintheUlvesundoffVaagsøisland.ItsembarkedCommandohalf-sectioncoveringthenorthernpartofSouthVaagsø,thehamletwhichwasbeingclearedofitsGermangarrisonbytherestoftheassault

force.

Typically, a landladywould charge 1 pound ten shillings (the equivalent of £1.50) aweekforprovidingboardandlodgings,andwhilethismayseemlownow,in1940,whentheaveragemanualworkerearned£5aweek, itprovedausefulboost toahousehold’sincome.With their largerallowances,officerssometimesboarded in localhotelsor innsand,astherewasnoformalofficer’smess,thehotelbaroftentookontheguiseofone.Inmost cases the soldiers paid a little extra to their landladies in return for washing andironing,orevenpolishingbootsandbrasswork.Inreturnthehouseholdhadtoputupwiththeir Commandos coming homewet and exhausted day after day. They also kept theirweaponswiththem,solandladiesbecameusedtogrenadessetonmantelpiecesandriflesproppedinthecorner.

The daily subsistence allowance was 6 shillings and 8 pence (the equivalent of 33pence)forallranksapartfromofficers,whoreceived13shillingsand4pence(66pence).These twobandswere issuedat a fixed rate, regardlessof rank–a regimental sergeantmajorreceivedthesameasanordinaryCommandoprivate,andthecommandingofficerwas awarded the same as a second lieutenant. The allowance remained the same

throughoutthewar,butaspriceswerecontrolledandfoodpricessubsidizedthisprovedreasonably adequate.The ration cardwas used by the landlady to purchase basic foodssuchasmeat,tea,dairyproductsorsugarforherlodger,whichwerethenusedtopreparemeals for him. Bread, milk, potatoes and cereals were not rationed, and so remainedreasonablyplentiful.Whentheycould,therationwasaugmentedbyitemsinshortsupply,such as eggs, chicken, sausages and pies.As theCommandowas often away from hislodgingsalldaywhile training, apacked lunchof sandwicheswasusuallyprovided forhim.Today thewartime ration allowance seems pitifullymeagre, particularly given theintensephysicalactivity theseyoungmenwereexpected toundertake.Theymightwellhavefaredbetterbeingcateredfor inbarracks,but thefreedomthisbarrack-freesystemallowedthemmorethanoutweighedanyminordisadvantages.

The lodging arrangements were always left up to the individual to organize. All aCommando’sofficersrequiredwasthathereportedwhenandwherehewasrequired,andingoodorder,andthathewasfullypreparedforwhateverwasexpectedofhim.Itwasupto him to find out where he had to report and inwhat uniform. Therewere numerousinstanceswheremendiscoveredtheirnextparadewastobeheldthefollowingmorningsomeconsiderabledistanceaway.Thisforcedthementoorganizethemselvesandmarchtotheassemblypointundertheirowninitiative.Asasystemitwasperfectfordevelopingbothself-relianceandasenseofunitspirit.ThisdomesticarrangementprovedextremelyeffectiveandwasrepeatedwhenevertheCommandounitmovedtoanotherlocation.

BritishCommandospicturedonthedocksofNewhaveninAugust1942afterreturningfromtheDiepperaid.Althoughtired,themenarecelebratingstrikingablowagainsttheGermans.WhileOperationJubileemighthave

beenadisaster,themenofNos.3and4Commandoacquittedthemselveswellduringtheoperation.

Thesubsistenceallowancewasstoppedonlywhenthemenweresenttoabarracksortransitcampandfedbythearmy,whentheywenttothemilitaryhospitaloronboardaship,andwhentheywentoverseas.Thesamebudgetwasalsousedtoprovidemoneyfortransport if required (although train tickets were issued when appropriate) and for anynon-militaryneedssuchasthepurchaseandrepairofcivilianclothingordomesticitems.IntheMiddleEast,CommandoslackedaccesstothesamedomesticarrangementsfoundinBritain.So,CommandoswereestablishedintentedcampsintheEgyptiancountrysideandmessed communally.However, even here the emphasiswas on training rather thancamproutine,anddistractingroutineswerekepttoaminimum.

Sometimes,whenCommandounitswereonlengthyexercisestheysetupbivouacsandstillusedtheircivilian-stylerations.Acookhousewascreatedandacookappointed.Hisjobwastocookadecentmealforallatmidday.Therestofthemealseachdayweretheresponsibility of each man, or rather each pair of men. In fact this system was usedregularlywhentheCommandoswereoperatingfromtemporarycampsorbivouacs,bothduringtrainingexercisesandinthefield.Wheninships, though,hotmealswereservednavyfashion,whileinthefieldeitherthefieldservicerationorthecompositerationpack

wasissued.Inthefirst,materialforhotmealswasprovided–fresh,frozenordehydrated–whichwas thenpreparedby themen.Themealswereaugmented,wherepossible,byfreshbread.Composite rationscame inawoodencrateandserved14menforoneday.Sevenbasicmenuswereprovided,oneforeachdayoftheweek,aswellasboiledsweets,biscuits,chocolateandcannedfruit.

Noneofthesecateringoptionswasofmuchuseduringaraid,orforthefirstdaysofalarger-scale invasion, before support facilities could be landed. In these cases theCommandoswereissuedwitha24-hourrationpack,alightweightandhigh-energygivingselection,which came in a small cardboard box.Twowere usually issuedperman andwere carried inside a mess tin stowed in the man’s haversack. The pack containeddehydratedmeat,porridge,biscuits,chocolate,meatbroth,sugar,tea,dehydratedmilkandsalt,aswellas foursheetsof toiletpaper.Themeatand thebrothcouldbeheatedonasmallportableheater,usingfueltablets,whichburnedsteadilywhenlit.Bothonexerciseand in the field, rationswereoftenaugmentedby foraging.Thiscoveredanything fromthecovert stealingofa farmer’schickens to fishing,poachingorhunting rabbits.Whilethis was officially discouraged, officers and NCOs tended to turn a blind eye to suchproceedings.Afterall,duringaraidCommandoswereexpectedtobeabletoliveoffthelandiftheyhadto,andthismeanttheyhadtobeabletoforageforfood.Whilethismighthave been the bane of local farmers, whose eggs and even poultry might disappearovernight, the founders of theCommandoswanted theirmen to function in unforeseencircumstances, when there wouldn’t be a regular supply organization available to keepthemprovidedforinthefield.

PrivateTomMcCormackofNo.2CommandoreceivedasevereheadwoundduringtheattackonStNazaire.AfterbeingtakenprisonertheyoungCommando,dazedandbleedingfromhisinjury,wascapturedbyaGermanarmyphotographerfromSignalmagazine.Hediedshortlyafterwardsbeforeanyattemptwasmadetotreathiswound.

Thetwo-manpairingforcookingmealsreflectedtheimportanceofthe‘meandmypal’system.TwoCommandosinthesamesectionwerepairedoffandsharedbasictaskssuchascooking,constructingbivouacs,andevensupportingeachotherinafight.Thesystemwasn’tnewandhadbeenfirstintroducedamongscoutingtroopsin1900duringtheBoerWar, but itworkedwell as themen looked out for each other,whether on the obstaclecourse, in a bar fight or under fire. When the Royal Marines formed additionalCommandostheyusedasimilarsystem,butthe‘pal’wasdescribedasan‘oppo’,fromthetermoppositenumber–thepersonwhowasonwatchwhileyouareasleep.‘Atnightinthefield,onemanbuilt thebivvy,whilehispalgotcrackingonthegrub.’Yourpalwassupposed to look out for you, and in the case of LMG teams this pairing became avaluableoperationalnecessity,asthetwomenwereinseparablewhenincombat.Itwasanefficientsystem,andworkedwellbothinactionandoutofit.

ThecreatorsoftheCommandoseffectivelyrejectedmilitaryconventionwhentheysetup their own system of lodging, catering and training. In doing so they created anenvironmentwhich nurtured self-reliance, independence and creativity – none ofwhichweretraitswhichweregenerallyexpectedoftheregularBritishsoldier.Theideawasthat

theCommandoswereaunitapart,andwereexpected tofunctionperfectlywellwithoutbeingtoldwhattodoallthetime.Thisofcourserequiredmenwiththeindependenceofmind,initiativeandtrainingtobeabletoliveoffthelandquitehappily,whethertheywereonexerciseintheScottishHighlandsortrudgingthroughthejunglesofBurma.

ONCAMPAIGNAll this trainingwas certainly needed to turn theCommando volunteers into first-classfighting soldiers. Still, nothing was quite as effective at welding a Commando unittogetherasactuallytakingpartinoperationsagainsttheenemy.However,theverynatureoftheCommandomissionmeantthatforthemostpartraidswereofveryshortduration.So, men spent very little time operating under campaign conditions, unless theirCommando formed part of a larger, longer operation such as the campaign in NorthAfrica,theinvasionofSicilyorItaly,orthecampaigninNorth-WestEurope.Atleastuntil1943,trainingwasthenorminterspersedwithshortfrenziedperiodsofaction.ItwasonlyaftertheAlliesbegantheirlarge-scaleamphibiouslandingsintheMediterraneanthatmostCommandosspentmorethanafewdaysinactivecampaignconditions.Theexceptions,ofcourse,weretheMiddleEastCommandos,whowhennotengagedinamphibiousraidingexpeditionsplayedtheirpartinboththefightforNorthAfricaandthefightingwithdrawalfromCrete.

Anon-commissionedofficerofNo.1Commando,photographedwhilehistroopwascarryingoutmountainwarfaretraininginGlencoeinNovember1941.Hewearsminimalequipmentoverhisbattledress,butcarriesaThompson

machinecarbineslungoverhisshoulder.

Thefirstraids–OperationsBlueCollarandAmbassador–demonstratedtheneedfortraining and preparation.AsLieutenant (laterBrigadier) PeterYoung pointed outwhendescribing the Guernsey raid, the crash boats used to land the raiders were unsuitablynoisy, knowledge of the area was minimal, and the inexperienced Commandos andIndependent Company men made a string of basic mistakes, such as accidentallydischargingtheirweapons,capsizingboatsandselectingmenwhocouldn’tswimfortheoperation.Churchilldubbedtheseraids‘asillyfiasco’,andtheycertainlyhighlightedtheneedforthoroughtrainingandpreparationbeforethelaunchofanothersuchoperation.

The raid also led to a reorganization of the Commandos, which took place in early1941. Now, a Commando consisted of six rather than ten troops, each with a fullestablishment of three officers and 62 men. Middle East (ME) Commandos had threetroops, but theywere double sized. The advantage of this new troop sizewas that theCommandoheadquarterscouldmoreeasilycontrolaforceofsixtroopsduringaraid–theten-troopforcehadproveditselftoounwieldy.Justasimportantly,asnewassaultlandingcraftbecameavailable,itwasfoundthatonetroopcouldfitneatlyintotwocraft.Withinamonth the new arrangement was put to the test when on 4 March Nos. 3 and 4CommandosraidedtheLofotenIslandssupportedbyanavalcoveringforce.Thejourneynorth from Scapa Flowwas an uncomfortable one. OneMarine recalled ‘The ship dideverything but turn upside down, and I am sure that everyone was seasick, even theCaptain’. For those who wanted a taste of action Operation Claymore was adisappointment,asthelandingwasunopposed.

CommandostrainingwiththeFairbairn-Sykescommandoknife.Theinstructors,coachedbyCaptainsFairbairnandSykesoftheShanghaiMunicipalPolice,trainedtheCommandostostabtheirvictims’necksifpossible,severingthe

carotidartery.Ifdonecorrectly,thevictimwouldbedeadwithin12seconds.

Themenlackedcold-weatherclothingandsousedtheirgascapesasbothcamouflageandprotectionfromtheelements.TheyapproachedthehotelwheretheGermangarrisonwerequartered;L/Cpl.KenPhillottofNo.4Commandorecalled:

AttheCommandoBasicTrainingCentreatAchnacarry,pyrotechnicswereusedtoenhancetraining.Inthisphotograph,explosivechargesinthewaterbesidethisassaultcourseobstaclesimulatefallingenemymortar

rounds.Nissenhutclassroomscanbeseeninthebackground.

‘Wehadbeentoldtoshootanyoneseenleavingbythatparticulardoor.Isayshootbutweweresocoldthatwecouldhardlyholdourrifles,letalonepullthetrigger.InfacttheonlyshotsfiredwereintheroomoccupiedbytwoGermanpropagandaministryofficials.Theywereasleepwhenacommandoshotoff theirdoor lock, thenshot theirchamberpot forgoodmeasure.’Theraidwasnotwithoutitshighlights.Lackingtransport,LordLovatofNo.4Commandotookabustotheisland’sGermanseaplanebasetoacceptitssurrender.The men burned what they could, including a glycerine factory, rounded up their 225German prisoners and 60Norwegian collaborators and re-embarked. The raid achievedlittleconcrete,butforthemenitmadethenextoperationalittleeasier.

Unsurprisingly, when the Commandos left Scapa Flow in December to carry outOperationArchery – the raid onVaagsø – the transporting flotilla ran into another badstormandwas forced to seek shelter inShetland. In fact, seasicknesswas an issue thatdoggedtheCommandosthroughoutthewar.NoamountofboatingandseamanshipcouldpreparethemforawinterstormintheNorwegianSea,orasuddengale-forcesiroccointheMediterranean.EvenonD-Day,BryanSamainofNo.45(RM)Commandorecalled:‘The sea was choppy in the English Channel. A vast armada of invasion craft battledunceasinglyagainsttherelentlessswell,swayingandrockingastheystrovetokeepinlineahead, and reach their objective.On board the craft themen tried to ease their aching,crampedlimbs.Theyhadbeenatseaforsomehoursnow,andtheirfacesweredrawnwithpainastheyfoughtbackthecontentsoftheirbellies,whichthreatenedtoretchupatanyminute.’

Inthisexercise,Commandosaresimulatingarapidadvance,chargingforwardunderthecoverofahastilylaidsmokescreen.Inanopposedlanding,theCommandosweremostvulnerablewhentheyweregroupedtogether

afterreachingthebeach.Chargingforwardtowardsthenearestavailablecover–oranenemydefensiveposition–wasmeanttoreducetheirexposuretoenemyfire.

Transport on board a larger landing ship was almost equally as uncomfortable. Forinstance,thecargoshipSSGlengylewasrequisitioned,hastilyconvertedintoanInfantryLandingShip(Large)andrenamedHMSGlengyle.Sheandhersisterscouldcarryalmost700 men and ten assault landing craft (LCAs), but they were cramped and singularlyuncomfortable.Somuchso,infact,thattheCommandosdubbedhertheAltmarkaftertheGrafSpee’sprisonship.TheGlengyletransportedtheCommandodubbedLayforcetotheMediterranean,andlaterinthewarshealsotransportedthe3rdCommandoBrigadefromCeylon toHongKong. EachCommando sectionwas split into groups of eightmen toformamess.Theirlivingspacecentredaroundawoodentableandtwobenches.Atnightthesewerestowedawayandhammocksslung.Thesetooksomegettingusedto,butmostmenfoundthemsurprisinglycomfortable.Eachmorning,on theorder lashupandstowtheywerepackedawayagainandthetableerected.Thesystemhadn’tchangedsincethedaysofNelson.

ACommandosub-sectionoftenmenpullingtheirAssaultBoatMkIII–orGoatleyboat–ashore.Sideropeswerealsoattachedtothewoodengunwale,allowingittobecarriedfairlyeasily.Thisfragilebutusefulcraftwaspropelled

usingshortpaddlesandalongersteeringoar.

Eachmessappointedacook,who,whenordered,wouldcollectthemessfoodfromthegalleyalongwithabucketof tea.Thiswould thenbedistributedandeatenat themesstable.AtroopdiaryinNo.4Commandorecorded‘Foodonboardwasnotgood,andinfactsomeofthebestappreciatedmealswerejustplainbullybeefandnavybiscuits(hardtack),withamugof tea.’Whentheshipwas in transit themenwouldexercise thebesttheycouldondeck,practiseclamberinginandoutoftheLCAs,andpractisesmallarmsfire.Theywouldalsoenjoywhatfreshairtheycouldbeforebeingsentbacktotheiroftenfetidmessdeck.Therewereotherteethingproblemstoo,includingmealsservedlaterthanarranged,which upset the carefully arranged training schedules on board. This though,waslargelyduetoinexperienceininter-serviceco-operation,andthesituationimprovedas thewar progressed. Incidentally,Commandos transported in regularwarships – evenbattleships–hadnothingbutpraiseforthewaytheywerelookedafter.

OncetheCommandosgotintoaction–especiallyonethatlastedmorethanadayorso– theyquicklysettled into theroutineof thecampaign inwhich theywereplaying theirpart.Bivouacswereestablished,patrolssentout,andtheunitmadeitsmark.Forinstance,duringtheBritishEastAfricancampaignof1941,No.52(ME)Commandowasattachedtothe9thIndianBrigadeandsetupacampneartheSudanesevillageofGallabat.Itbegananactiveprogrammeofpatrolsandreconnaissance,bothtodiscoverwhatitcouldabouttheItaliandefencesandalsotounsettlethedefenders.DavidSmiley,atroopcommander,

recalledonesuchpatrol:

On thenightof January19thwemarcheddown thebanksof theAtbaraRiver toKnorKumsa, about15miles from theEytie lines.We then layup all day, andwent again atnight.WhatfollowedwastypicaloftheseEastAfricanpatrols.

We crept past several camps, and even through themiddle of amule convoy. Eytiesweresinging,thesentriesidle,andweevenheardwomen’svoices…Weblunderedontotheroadsoonerthanweexpected,andjustasasupplyconvoywascomingdownit.

MenofNo.43(RM)CommandoinactionnearLakeCommachioinItalyduringthefightingthereinApril1945.ThislagoonborderingtheAdriaticcoastwasthesceneofheavyfightingforthemenoftwoRoyalMarineandtwoArmy

Commandos.

Theconvoywasdulyshotup,butthefiringalertedtheItalianstothepatrol’spresence:Wecreptbackpastthesamecamps–thistimechallengedbysentriesinalldirections.Wefiredonthemandwerefiredoninreturn…Wemarchedbycompassallthroughthenightandhittheriverataboutfirstlight.

The patrol had lost twomen killed and onemissing – a high price for what had beenachieved.Still, the resultwas todramatically increase Italiannervousness, and to lowertheenemy’smorale.

Patrols of this kind continued for the best part of a month, until the British finallycapturedGallabat,anddroveonintoEthiopia.

In May 1941, Layforce was sent to reinforce the British garrison on Crete, but onlandingwastoldthat theCommonwealthtroopstherewereinretreatandtheislandwasbeing evacuated. The news was ignored and the Commandos disembarked. BrigadierLaycock decided to set up a blocking position in the hills, covering the line of retreattowards the island’s south coast. Major Fred Graham remembers his briefing fromLaycock.Afterbeingtoldofthemission,theCommandobrigadieradded‘WellFreddie,youbettergetoffnow,asit’sagoodlonghike,anditlooksasifit’salluphill.Useyourdiscretionaboutdispositionsandadministrationwhenyougetthere–GoodNight.’Thatwasit.Grahamandhismengatheredwhatammunitionandsuppliestheycouldandsetoffup thewinding hilly road, as retreating troops streamed past them–Grahamdescribedthem as a ‘disorganized rabble’. No. 7 and 50/552 (ME) Commandos (temporarilyrenamedAandDCompanies)tookuptheirassignedpositionsbeforedawnandheldtheirgroundinthefaceoftheexpectedGermanattack.

ACommandopicturedonhisreturnhometoHastingsaftertakingpartinacross-channelraidinearlyJune1942.Heispicturedcarryinghisnavalissuelifejacket,withanarmyissueblanketdrapedaroundhisshoulderandhis

Thompsonmachinecarbineslungfromhisshoulder.

Then,at9.00pmthefollowingevening,theordercametowithdraw.Grahamcontinues,‘Thenbegan thewearymarch across themountains to theSphakia assembly areas in adeep gully.’ There, they were told to form the final rearguard around the evacuation

beaches.Theyhadwrittenorders tosurrenderandinthechaosof thefinalstagesof theevacuationtheordertowithdrawnevercame.OneyoungDCompanyofficerwasArthurDarby.Herecalledthesceneaftertheywereleftbehind:‘Oneyoungofficernearbywasintears,notforhimselfbutforhismen.Ismashedmytommygunagainsttherocksinafuryofdisgust.Iwas25yearsofage,andfouryearsofmyyouthweretobewastedinPOWcamps.’ The young officer’s anguish was understandable. No. 50 (ME) CommandocontainedanumberofSpanishvolunteers–menwhohadfoughtfortheRepublicduringtheSpanishCivilWar.Theyhadprovedexcellentsoldiers,but theynowfeared that theGermanswouldshootthemassuspectedcommunists.Forthemostparttheirfearsturnedouttobejustified.

Lieutenant-ColonelPeterYoung,commanderofNo.3Commando,briefingapairofCommandosnipersnearBrevilleduringthefightingontheleftflankoftheBritishbeachheadinNormandy.Thesnipersaredressedintheirregular

uniform,augmentedbyimprovisedsmockscapesandscrimnettingfaceveils.

Operations lasting more than a few hours or days were rare until Sicily, Italy and

Normandy.Thismeantthat,untilthen,therewaslittleneedtoremaininactionformorethan a fewhours.The need to conductmuch longer operations demanded a new set ofskills–theholdingofanightperimeterforinstance,orthediggingofdefensivepositions.Commandos like Bryan Samain of No. 45 (RM) Commando described the campaignroutine of digging slit trenches (slitters), a task performed with equal enthusiasm byCommandosinSicily,andoutsideSalerno.Hewrote:ItwastruethatwehadnotbeeninNormandyverylong–justamatterofhoursinfact.Butwehadalreadyrealizedthevalueofdigging.Oneofourmenoncesaidthatallasoldierneededwhenhegotintoactionwasabloodygoodrifleandabloodygoodshovel,whichturnedouttobetrueenough.Ourmenknewhowtodigtoo.Theyhaddonesomanytimesduringthepastfouryearsonexercises.OnemarinewasknownasDiggerJordan,as,whenthingsstartedandtheordercametodig,Diggerwouldalwaysbethefirstdowninacomfortableslittrench.Hisrecordwas15minutes–softsoilofcourse.

SamainandhiscompanionsspenttheirfirstnightinFranceintheseslitters.

Onceapositionwasestablished, andpatrolshadbeen sentout, casualtiesbecameallbut inevitable. That presented the problem of how to evacuate them, particularlywhenunder randommortar or artillery fire. InNo. 45 (RM)CommandoambulanceswereonhandtoevacuatethewoundedtothecasualtystationatLePlein,andaCommandoguidedthe drivers through the intertwined front lines, accompanied by four willing Germanprisoners.Samaindescribesonesuchevacuation, typicalofsomanyfromthefront linethroughoutthewar:TheeightcasualtiesandoneverybadlywoundedGermanprisonerwerethereforeloadedintothetwoambulances.This involved a stretcher party across a much-sniped orchard… but was successfully accomplished under theprotection of theRedCross flag. TheGermans, rather surprisingly, respected the flagwhen they saw it on thisoccasion,althoughthiswasnotalwaysthecase…theambulancesdrovesouthforLePlein,butonlyjustintime,forthebarnwheretheloadingtookplacewassetonfirefiveminuteslater.

RoyalMarineCommandosofthe1stSpecialServiceBrigademovinginlandafterlandingonSwordBeachonD-Day(6June1944).BothNos.41and45(RM)CommandoslandedthereatH+90minutes(90minutesbehindtheinitial

landingwave).

Despite the efforts of the Commando guide, the ambulances were captured by theGermans,and thewounded landedup inaGermanrather thanaBritishcasualtystationthatday.

Apatrolofmenfrom45(RM)Commando,partofthe1stCommandoBrigade,ispicturedmovingthroughtheruinsoftheGermantownofWeselontheeasternsideoftheRhine.ThetownwascapturedduringOperationPlunder,the

RhineCrossingsofMarch1945.Notethatthemenarewearingsmocksratherthanbattledress.

Theselittle instancesare typicalof theevents that tookplaceoncampaignduringthelonger operations conducted by theCommandos.However, passively holding defensivelinesorformingpartofalargerconventionaloperationwasnotreallywhattheyhadbeentrainedorequippedtodo.Theywereraiders,andmostofthetimetheCommandoslackedthe support elements available to their infantry equivalents. While superbly trainedsoldiers,theirskillswereratherwastedconductingpatrolsandholdingtheline.TheywerecertainlywastedwhentheCommandoswereleftbehindastheyhadbeenatCrete.Aboveallelse,theCommandoshadbeensetupasChurchill’s‘handofsteel’,andweresuperblytrained foramoreaggressive styleof fighting,whetherahit-and-run raid, actingas thehardenedspearheadofan invasionforceorservingasshock troops ina largerset-piecebattle.TheCommandoswouldbecalledontocarryoutallof thesemissionsbefore thewarranitscourse.

D THEDEMOLITIONOFAGUNBATTERYONMAALOYISLAND,VAAGSØRAID,1941

Onthemorningof27December1941,500menfromNos.3and4Commandoscarriedoutthefirst large-scaleraid of the war – an attack on the Norwegian island of Vaagsø. While the Royal Navy bombarded the localdefences,theCommandosmovedtowardstheirobjectives–thehamletofSouthVaagsøandthegunbatteryonthesmallislandofMaaloy.TwotroopslandedonMaaloyandsweptthroughtheisland,encounteringsurprisinglylittle resistance. Once the islandwas secured the raiders set about destroying theGerman gun battery there,whichconsistedoffourold105mmgunssetin19th-centurystoneemplacements.HerethedemolitionpartyissettingchargeswhileinthebackgroundMajorJackChurchillisusinghisradiomantosendanupdatetotheforceheadquarters.Thesmokeinthebackgroundcomesfromtheburningbarracksandstoresontheisland.

BELIEFANDBELONGINGFromthestart,theCommandoswereregardedasaneliteforce.Theywereanallvolunteerforce, until the RoyalMarines joined them, and volunteers were sifted and selected toinclude experienced soldierswho had already proven theirworth inmore conventionalunits, orwho showed the characteristics andpotential theCommando founderswanted.The Combined Operations Command who supervised their creation and operationdeclaredthattheamphibiousguerrillawarfarewhichlayattheheartoftheCommando’smission:‘Operatingonthesea,fromsmallboats,wassomethingtheBritishexcelledat–something towhich theywere, by temperament and tradition, particularly suited’. Thismighthavebeenmerehyperbole,butwith the right leadershipandplanning these raidsprovedaresoundingsuccess.

While theGerman PropagandaMinister JosefGoebbelsmight dismiss them asmereRedIndianRaids,theseoperationsachievedtwoveryimportantthings.First,theyprovedamarvellous boost forBritishmorale at a timewhen there seemed little to be cheerfulabout.While the first raidsweremere pinpricks that did little to diminish theGermancapacitytowagewar,theseweremerelythestartofaseriesofamphibiousoperationsthatledrelentlesslytowardstheinvasionofNorthAfrica,Sicily,ItalyandeventuallyFrance.WhileatfirsttheBritishmilitaryestablishmentmighthaveresentedthepresenceofthesenew units, andwere unsure how best to employ them, through their achievements, theCommandosdemonstratedtheirworthandpioneeredtheskillsthatwouldultimatelybearfruitonD-Day.

Menofthe1stCommandoBrigadepicturedmaintainingadefensivepositioninthecentreofOsnabrückinLowerSaxonyon4April1945.AlthoughtheGermansofferedrelativelylittleresistanceduringthecaptureofthebomb-

damagedcity,tensionsremainedhighthereforseveraldaysbecauseofthepresenceofdiehardNazielementsinthearea.

Theseskillsandthisprofessionalexpertisewasdevelopedthehardway–throughyearsof training, and through a number of ‘blooding’ actions in smaller raids on the Frenchcoast, and in theMediterranean. This professionalismwas based on three things. First,everyvolunteerhadalreadyundergonebasicmilitarytraining,andwasfamiliarwiththebattlefieldskillsexpectedofhim.ThevolunteersselectedfortheCommandoswerethosewho showed particular aptitude in these skills, orwho displayed sufficient initiative towarrant further training. Second, each Commando operation was analysed after themissionwas finished,andany lessons thatneeded tobe learnedwereapplied,basedonactualcombatexperience.Finally,Commandoshadthepickofanyavailableequipment,sotheyhadthetoolsneededtoperformtheirmissionaseffectivelyaspossible.

Thisconceptof‘lessonslearned’provedthekeytoCommandoprofessionalism.Unlikeregulararmyunits,whosawactionlessfrequently–ifatall–commandoswereabletolearn empirically, and so their tactical and professional skills increased as the warcontinued.Forexample,inadocumententitledLessonsLearnedinCombinedOperations(1943),theCombinedOperationsDirectorateproducedachecklistforuseintheplanningof future commando raids, or even larger-scale operations (e.g. Operations Husky,Avalanche and Overlord). On a strategic level it recommended avoiding planninginvolving awide range ofmilitary services – instead concentrating naval, army and airforce support under Combined Operations control. Training should be carried out onsimilarterrainorbeachestothosetobeencounteredintheraid,andalternatelandingsites

should be selected in case circumstances dictated a sudden change of plan. Above all,detailedintelligenceoftheobjectivewasdeemedessential.

KingGeorgeVI,accompaniedbyAdmiralSirRogerKeyes,watchasCommandosdemonstratethepreparationofanAssaultBoatMkIIIinAugust1941.TheroyalinspectionofCommandofacilitieswastimedtocoincidewithalarge-

scaleexerciseconductedonLochFynenearInveraray.

At the operational level it recommended the use of light artillery in any long-rangestrikeinland,theuseofotherheavyweapons,andtheprovisionofairsupport.Tactically,it emphasized the use of smoke, surprise, fire and movement and the deployment ofCommandosforspecialpre-plannedmissions,ratherthantheiruseasmeresupportsforalargeroperation.Theyshouldwear‘alightvariationoffightingorder’,andevenwentsofarastorecommendusingblackenedbayonets,identifyingsignsandthewearingofberetsrather than steelhelmets.Theseguidelines,basedon theempirical lessonsofdozensofearlier raids,helpedensure that theCommandosweregiveneverychanceof success intheirmission.

The result of this caucus of experience, aswell as the honing of skills over years oftraining,producedsoldierswithaprideintheirownabilities,andaunitespritdecorps.This was summed up perfectly by Captain Denis O’Flaherty, who had been severelywoundedduring theVaagsøraid in late1941,andspent twoyears inhospital.Whenherejoinedhisoldunit,henoticedabigdifference:‘Onethingthatiscleartomeisthat1CommandoBrigade,by1944,wasaveryfineprofessionalsetup,withcommand,control

andtacticalknow-howfaraheadoftheordinaryinfantry,andfaradvancedfromthegoodolddaysof1941.Atthesametime,andquiterightly,theyhadlosttheblinddashthatIthoughtwassoremarkableintheminoritywhowereactuallyengagedatclosequartersatVaagsø.Ihaveneverseenthatequalledinanyarmysince.’

TheCommodore,CombinedOperations,LordLouisMountbattenwelcominghometheVaagsøraidersonboardthetroopshipHMSPrinceLeopoldon29December1941,thedayaftertheCommandosreturnedtoScapaFlow.Thisraidprovedthevalueofwell-plannedCommandooperations,andsecuredMountbatten’spositionasthenewheadof

CombinedOperations.

This professionalism wasn’t achieved by issuing distinctive green berets, or specialuniformsandbadges.Thesewereadoptedmoreasaresultofthelessonslearnedduringpast operations than through the need to create some formof collective unit identity. ItwasclearthatCommandosknewtheywerespecial–acutaboveallothersoldiers–notbyanyfalsesenseofpride, indeedmodestywasconsideredavirtueintheCommandos,butthroughyearsofperseverance,rigoroustrainingandlearningfrompreviousmissions.By 1944, those who didn’t make the grade had been ‘Returned to Unit’, leaving aprofessional,hardenedbodyoftroopswhocouldbeutterlyreliedupontodotheirjobwithquietefficiency.

Atwo-manFolbotCanoe,orCockleMarkI,theforerunnerofthemoresuccessfulCockleMarkIIwhichwasusedtogreateffectduringtheBordeauxRaidofDecember1942.TheFolbotCompany,foundedin1933,madecanvasandwoodfoldingboatsfortheBritishleisuremarket.WhenthewarbeganthesewereadoptedbytheCommandosfor

useinsmall-scaleraids.

ACockleMarkII,togetherwithanumberofrubberdinghiesandpaddles,beingpreparedforstorageinalocalcoastalcraft,beforebeingtakenonasmall-scaleCommandoraidintheMediterraneanin1942.Numerousraidsof

thiskindwereconductedintheAegean,theAdriaticandalongtheNorthAfricancoastduringthisperiod.

E COMMANDORAIDERSLANDINGFROMAGOATLEYBOAT,LOCHLOCHY,1943

DesignedbyFredGoatley,amarinedesignerwhoworkedforSaunders-RoeLtd,aBritishengineeringcompanybasedonthe IsleofWight,theGoatleyboat,orAssaultBoatMkIII,was15ft longandcould,atapinch,holdaraiding party of ten men. It was built from wood and canvas and was ingeniously designed so when it wascollapseditwasjust4incheshigh.Inthisscene,araidingpartyisshowndisembarkingfromoneoftheseboatsduringatrainingexerciseonLochLochy.ItwasherethattheCommandosconductedmostoftheirboattraining,andcarriedout‘opposedlandings’.

BackinAugust1940,theWarOfficesaidoftheCommandos:Thecreationofsuchaforcecallsforthehigheststandardsoftraining,personalandcollectivediscipline,courage,skill,determinationandimaginationinallranks–backedupbyinspiredleadershipandorganisingabilityonthepartoftheircommanders.

Itcontinued:Trainingwillthereforeaimatproducing:

a.)Averyhighlydevelopedteamspiritandespritdecorps;

b.)Self-relianceandresourcefulnessonthepartofeachindividual.

Itisthegreatestmistaketosupposethatthesetwoaimsareincompatible,andeveryCommandoleadermustfosteracollectivespiritaswellasaspiritofindividualisminhisCommando.

AraidingpartymadeupofmenfromNo.6CommandoarepictureddisembarkingfromanAssaultLandingCraftnearHastingsafteraraidontheFrenchChannelcoastinearlyJune1942.Theraid,codenamedOperationBristle,was

carriedoutagainstGermancoastalinstallationsatStCecilyPlagenearLeTouquet.

Thishelpsexplains their success.Unlikeother so-calledelite forcesbanded togetherbyfighting skills, idealism, superior equipment, background or blind obedience, theCommandowasexpectedtothinkforhimself,andtomakesurethatheknewexactlywhatwasexpectedofhimwhenthemomentcame.Hecouldrelyonhispalstodothesame–menwith the skills to do just about anything thatwas required of themon themodernbattlefield,butwiththebrainstopre-emptordersbythinkingforthemselves.

AnearlyexampleofthiswasprovidedbytheDiepperaidof19August1942,wheretheattack on theHess battery nearVarengevillewas planned in great detail involving two

groups,butinevitablyelementsoftheplanwentawry.Thegunnerswerepinneddownbyathree-mansniperteam,whichincludedLCpl.Mann.WorkingonhisownhepickedofftheGermangunnerssoeffectivelythatthebatterywasunabletofireonthemainlandingbeaches in front of Dieppe. His initiative probably saved the lives of many Canadiansoldiers.Hewas soon joined by LSgt.McCarthy commanding a Bren gun group,whopinneddowntheenemysoeffectivelythattherestofNo.4Commandowereabletoworktheirway round the battery and attack it from the rear.Bothmen received theMilitaryMedalfortheiractions–andtheirinitiative.Beforethatmainassault,atrooperclimbedatelegraphpoletocuttheenemytelephone

wires,whichmeant thedefenders ofBatteryHess couldn’t call for reinforcements.Therestadvancedusingfireandmovementandcoveringsmoke,andusedgrenades,bayonetsand Tommy guns to overcome the defenders. In the attack NCOs found themselvescommandingwholeCommandotroopsas theirofficerswerewounded,andwereable tokeeptheassaultingforcemovinguntilthebatterywastaken.Intheafter-actionreport,theinitiativeofNCOsandtroopers,thehighmoraleofthemen,theirownconfidenceintheirabilitiesand thoseof their comrades, thoroughpreparationand training, andacompleteunderstandingofsmall-unittacticsallmadethisaclassicoperation–onewhichwaslaterstudiedasa‘textbook’assaultonanenemygunposition.

All through Commando training, and throughout the war, self-reliance andindependenceofmindwereencouraged,notattheexpenseofresponsibilityoradropindiscipline,butbyencouragingaveryhighlevelofprofessionalskillandphysicalfitnessso that men could undertake just about anything, mixed with an open-mindedness andinitiativewhichallowedtheCommandotocopewellwithwhateverchallengeorsetbackwas thrown at him. A belief in the individual, a belief in the team and belief in theCommando’sleadersallcombinedtocreateasoldierwhocouldbereliedupontodohisjobwithconsummateprofessionalism.

ApatrolfromNo.9Commandodisplayingoneofthe28GermanprisonerscapturedduringOperationPartridge–araidacrosstheGariglianoRiverinItalyon29–30December1943.Theoperationwasdesignedasadiversion,to

persuadetheGermansthatamajorassaultwasexpectedinthatsectorofthefrontline.

Merebraveryandtoughnessweren’tenoughtobeacommando.Thesewereexpected,but they were tempered with the ability of a soldier to read the battlefield and beaggressive,buttodosowithahighleveloftacticalskill,whichensuredtheenemywaskilledratherthantheCommandosattackingthem.Fromthebeginninganoffensivespiritwas fostered in the commandos. They were taught to defeat the enemy through theirsuperior trainingand tacticalskill,always toget theirman,andwhile raiding theywereencouragedtowreakasmuchdestructionaspossible,tomaketheirattackasdevastatinglyeffectiveaspossible.Certainly,aggressivenessledtoahighnumberofcasualties;ofthe28,000BritishCommandoswhoservedduring thewar,over1,700Commandosdied inaction.However, thewartimeCommandosmanaged to accrue an impressivenumberofvictories. In short, the Commandos were the war’s first true Special Forces, and theythoroughly livedup to the title.Theyknew theyweregood, and rather thanbragabouttheirachievementstheylettheirrecordspeakforitself.

F ROYALMARINECOMMANDOSADVANCINGINLANDFROMSWORDBEACH,D-DAY,1944

After landingonSwordBeachonD-Day,No.45(RM)Commandorendezvousedwiththerestofthe1stSpecialServiceBrigadeandthenheadedwesttolinkupwiththeBritishAirbornetroopsholdingPegasusBridge.Onceacross the river Orne, 45 (RM) Commando was sent north to Sallenelles where the river entered the EnglishChannel. Fromthere itmarchedwest towards thevillageofMervillewhereacoastalbatterywas located.Thisshowsahalf-sectionofCharlie Troop– theadvanceguardof theCommando–movingup the roadbetweenSallenellesandMerville.Atthispoint,thenearestGermanswereabouthalfamileaheadatthebattery,andsotheCommandos advanced cautiously, butwithout having tomake use of cover. In a fewminutes theywouldbehaltedthengiventheordersthatwouldleadtotheirattackonMervillevillage.

EXPERIENCEOFBATTLETheaimofthischapterisnottodescribeallthebattlesCommandosfoughtinduringthewar–thatwouldfillseveralvolumes–buttocapturesomethingofwhatbattlewaslikefor these young andwell-trainedCommandos, and to show how they functioned underfire. So, five operations have been selected – theVaagsøRaid (1941), theDieppe raid(1942), operations in Italy (1943), the Normandy campaign (1944), and the ArakancampaigninBurma(1945),allowingustoseewhathappenedonthebattlefield,andhow–ifatall–theCommandos’experienceofbattlechangedasthewarwenton.Forthesakeof proportion, two feature the exploits of Army Commandos, and a third follows theactivityofRoyalMarineCommandos.WhiletwomoreoperationsinvolvebothtypesofCommando.Ofcourse,Commandosfoughtineverytheatreofwar,fromthemountainsofEthiopia to the jungles of Burma, and from the snowy fjords of Norway to the sun-drenched Greek islands. The Commandos’ battle honours list 38 campaigns andengagements,sothesefivemerelyprovideaflavourofawiderangeofbattleswheretheCommandosputtheirtrainingintopractice.

TheStormBoat–arig-hulled18ftdory–hadaflattransomdesignedtohouseanoutboardmotor.Thecraftpicturedherewasoperatedbythe2ndCommandoBrigadeduringitsoperationsonLakeCommachioinItaly,April1945.In

somecaseswheretheglutinousmudborderingthelagoonpreventeddeploymentofheavyweapons,severalstormboatswerelashedtogethertocreatealargermorestablefightingplatform.

VaagsøOperationArchery,araidonaGerman-occupiedharbourofVaagsøincentralNorwaybymenofNos.2and3Commando,was launchedon27December1941.Theaimwas todisrupt German fish oil production, but its most important aspect was to serve as a‘blooding’of twoCommando formations.TheseCommandos landedat five sites in thearea, themost important being the small island ofMalloy,where a coastal batterywaslocated,coveringtheapproachestothehamletofSouthVaagsø.Thehamletconsistedofasinglestreet,withalineofwarehousesandfishfactoriesliningtheshoreofafjordtotheeast,andasteephilltothewest.Atfirst,threetroopswerelandedtosweepthroughthe

town,butasresistancemountedextratroopswerebroughtintohelpfinishthejob.

Stiff opposition was encountered in the hamlet, both from German soldiers in thebuildingsandfromsnipershidingonthehillsideoverlookingthetown.EachhousehadtobeclearedastheCommandosworkedtheirwaynorthwards.Brenteamscoveredthesidesof thebuildingsand thestreet,whileriflegroupsstormedeachbuilding,usinggrenadesand small arms. This account by Colonel Durnford-Slater captures something of theferocityofthefight:[Capt.]AlgyForresterwentofflikearocketwithhisNo.4troopdownthestreetofthetown,leavingatrailofdeadGermansbehindhim…Algywadingin,shoutingandcheeringhismen,throwinggrenadesintoeachhouseastheycame to it and firing from the hipwith his Tommy gun. He led an assault on theGerman headquarters in theUlversundHotel,andwasabouttotossagrenadeinwhenoneoftheenemy,firingthroughthefrontdoor,shothim.Ashefellhelandedonhisgrenade,whichexplodedasecondlater.

Acorporal,KnockerWhite,tookcharge,andfinishedtheclearingofthehotel,killing14moreGermansintheprocess.

CaptainPeterYoung,officercommanding6TroopofNo.3Commando,wassentinaspartofthereinforcements,and,togetherwithDurnford-Slater,hesurveyedthesituation.Youngdescribedthescene:Themain roadwasobviouslycoveredbyenemy riflemen…to the left the snow-cladhillsideat thebackof thetownlookedforbidding.Notfiftyyardsawaytotherightwastheicyfjord…IsuggestedthatIshouldtryandworkforward along thewaterfront… therewould be cover among thewarehouses…we rushed across in single file,running as fast as we could in the soft snow.We had not gone further through than the first of the dark highbuildingswhenweran into [Lieutenant]OFlaherty’sparty. In the firstwarehousewasaGerman lyingdead,anunexplodedstickgrenadeinoneoutstretchedhand.

Theyhadbeenlucky.Thencamethetaskofworkingnorthwardsthroughthehousesandwarehousesliningtheshore.Youngwrote:O’Flaherty pointed out a yellow house in which he suspected were Germans. In street fighting it is extremelydifficulttolocatetheenemy,andsoaswegottoawarehousewithareasonableviewIpostedLanceCorporalHallswithaBreninanupperwindow,fromwhichhecouldcoverouradvance.Therewasasmallbuildingabouttwentyyardsawaytoourleftfront,andthisImademynextbound.Wehadtodashoutthroughthedooroneatatime.Therewasnoentranceonourside,andasIranaroundthecornerIsawGermansinthedoorway.Theyvanishedwith the speed of light, and shouting ‘HändeHoch!’ I edged up to the door. Sheraton, a darkwell-built youngsoldier,on firewith excitement,pushedpastme, andcrouching in thedoorway, emptiedhisThompson into thebuilding.Thisdidthetrick.ThreeGermans,oneasailor,andaNorwegiancameoutandsurrendered.Thingsweregoingwell–butnotforlong.

Then,ashotrangoutandtwosergeantswerehit,onemortally.Therewasasniperhidingsomewhere.TheCommandoscouldn’tseethefiringposition,sotheyracedontothenextbuilding – a big red-painted warehouse. Young continues: ‘Suddenly a smart-lookingGermaninalongovercoat,steelhelmetandequipmentsteppedintoadoorwaylittlemorethan tenyardsaway,and flungastickgrenadeatme. It fell some ten feet tomyright.’MoregrenadesfollowedbeforetheCommandosreachedthewarehouse,oneofwhichfellatYoung’sfeetbutdidnotexplode.TheBritishbeganthrowingtheirownMillsgrenadesandthenenteredthedoor.Youngrecalled:‘Iwassilhouettedin thedoorway.Twoshotsflashed out from a point across the room tomy right. I fired and sprang back into theopen…Adirectassaultseemedunpromising,andI told theothers thatwemust tryandoutflanktheenemy.Easiersaidthandone.’

Commandosofthe1stSpecialServiceBrigadegoingashoreonSwordBeachonD-Day.ThebrigadelandedonSwordBeachbetweenLaBrècheandOuistreham,and,despitesufferingcasualtiesfromenemyartilleryandmortar

fire,theydisembarkedandpressedinlandwithcommendablespeed.

Lieutenant-ColonelJimMoulton,thecommanderofNo.48(RM)CommandodirectsthefireofaCanadianWolverinetankdestroyerduringtheattackonGermanstrongpointW26atLangrune-sur-MerfacingSwordBeach.Thepicturewastakeninthelatemorningof7June,andtheGermanstrongpointsurrenderedshortlyafterwards.Beyondthe

WolverineadisabledCentaurtankbelongingtotheRoyalMarinesArmouredSupportGroupcanbeseen.

Then, someone came up with the idea of burning the enemy out. A petrol can wasthrown and ignited by a grenade. The wooden building caught on fire and, as twoGermansranfromit, theywerecutdownbyfirefromaBrengun.Withthat,resistanceseemed to slacken and the Commandos continued their advance until the hamlet wascleared. All that remained nowwas some finalmopping up, the demolition of fish oilstoresandotherinstallations–includingthegunsonMaaloyIsland–andtheevacuationof the raiding party. In all, the operation had cost the lives of 17 Commandos, plus aNorwegian liaison officer, while 53 were wounded. It was a tough little fight, but theCommandoshadgivenaverygoodaccountofthemselves.Accordingtotheafter-actionreporttheraiddemonstratedthevalueoftraining,planningandinter-servicecooperation.In fact, it also highlighted a number ofweaknesses – the lack of tactical preparedness,poor air support, and unreliable battlefield communications being the most important.However,theaimofthereportwastoallowthecommandostolearnfromtheirmistakes.Intheorythenextoperationshouldhavebeenthatmucheasier.

DieppeUnfortunately, the next big operation – theDieppe raid –Operation Jubilee – suffered

frombothpoorplanningandbadexecution.Conceivedasamajorstrikeagainstenemy-occupied France, it involved bothCommandos and regularCanadian troops, aswell asnavalandairsupport.Effectivelyitwasaminiinvasion,albeitonedesignedtocarryoutavery limited‘hit-and-run’operation. Itwas too large tobeasuccessfulhitandrunraid,andyettoosmalltoholditsobjectiveinthefaceofaseriousGermancounter-attack.Theraid began on themorning of 19August 1942 and involved the landing of aCanadianforceof5,000menonthebeachesinfrontofthetownandeithersideofit.TheGermanregimentduginaroundthetownhelditsground,andmostoftheinvaderswerestoppedon thebeaches.Tanksboggeddownin theshingleorweredestroyedbyanti-tankguns,andwhilea fewgroupsofCanadiansmade it intoDieppe itself,overall theassaultwashaltedandthenthrownbackintothesea.Intheend,two-thirdsoftheCanadianinvasionforcewere either killed,wounded or taken prisoner.Dieppewas amonumental failure.TheonlybrightspotinthewholeoperationwastheactionoftheCommandos.ThelandingbytheCanadianswassupportedbyNo.3Commandoontheleft(east)and

No.4Commandoontheright(west).BothCommandoslandedatOrangeBeach–atthebaseofsteepcliffs.AtVarengeville-sur-Mer,LordLovat’sNo.4Commandocaptureditsobjective,abatteryofcoastaldefenceguns,andkilled150Germandefendersforthelossof12dead and20wounded, plus13moremissing.For the attack, theCommandohaddivided into two groups and, while one engaged the battery frontally, pinning thedefendersinafirefight,theotherworkeditswayarounditandthenassaultedthebatteryfromthe rear. Itwasa textbookmanoeuvre–onepractised repeatedlyduring training–and it was carried out with skill and daring. It almost failed when Lovat’s manoeuvregroup ran into a party ofGerman reinforcements in a farmyard, preparing to attack theCommandopinning group.TheGermanswere killed or driven off by a spirited assaultusinggrenades,andthewaywasthencleartolaunchafull-scaleattackontherearoftheGermanbattery.

CommandoslandingintheshallowtidalwaterssurroundingtheMyebonPeninsuladuringtheArakancampaign,January1945.Waterbornetransportwastheonlypracticalwaytomovearoundthisinhospitableregion,butthe

waterwasalsohometocrocodilesandwatersnakes.

OnapproachingtherearofthebatterytheGermansopenedfireasthecommandoswerecutting theirway through theperimeterwire.Undeterred, theCommandosassaulted theenemyundercoverofsmokeandheavysupportingfire.Thebattlesoondegeneratedintoabitter struggle around the battery’s buildings. In this hand-to-hand fight by the mainassaultingforce,MajorPatPorteousearnedtheVictoriaCrossforhisactions.Hiscitationdescribed what happened after Porteous was shot through the arm: ‘Undaunted,MajorPorteousclosedwithhis assailant, succeeded indisarminghim,andkilledhimwithhisownbayonet,therebysavingthelifeofaBritishsergeantonwhomtheGermanhadturnedhisaim.’Porteouswasn’tfinishedyetthough.

TheassaultontherearofthebatterybecameboggeddownbyGermanfireasanofficerand a troop sergeant major were killed. Major Porteous, as his citation read, ‘withouthesitation and in the face of a withering fire, dashed across the open ground to takecommandofthisdetachment’.Rallyingthem,heledtheminacharge,whichcarriedtheGermanpositionatthepointofabayonet.Hewaswoundedagain,butrefusedtobeledbacktothebeachuntiltheGermangunshadbeendestroyed.ThiswasaperfectexampleofthedriveandoffensivespiritinstilledintheCommandosduringtraining.

No.3Commandowas less fortunate.On theway toDieppe itencounteredaGermannavalpatrol in theEnglishChannel,andonly fiveassault landingcraftmade itpast theGermanstocompletetheirlandingonYellowBeachbelowBerneval-sur-Mer.MajorPeterYoungled18menupthecliffbutlackedthestrengthtotaketheenemygunbatterywhichwashisobjective.Later,Youngwroteabouthispart in theoperation: ‘Wecame in fiveminutesearly,foritwasgettinglightalltooquickly,andtoucheddownabout4.50am.We

crossedthenarrowbeach,reachedthefootofthecliff,turnedtotheleftandapproachedthegully.Thenarrowcleftinthecliffswascompletelychokedwithcoilsofwirewitharabbitwirefenceontheoutside,sometenfeetinfrontofit.’However,theymanagedtofindaclefttoclimbup,andreachthetopofthecliff.

RoyalMarineCommandos–probablymenofNo.45(RM)Commando–areshownmovingoffSwordBeachandheadingtowardsthecopsethatservedastheinlandrallyingpointforthe1stSpecialServiceBrigade.Fromtherethe

CommandoswouldmoveeastthroughCollevilletowardsPegasusBridge.

Youngadded:‘Onreachingthetopofthecliff,Icouldseethebackofanoticeboardwhichturnedouttohavethewords“AchtungMinen”writtenonit…Byabout5.10ammywholepartyhadreachedthetop,andIledthemintoasmallwoodnearby.’Youngsentoutscouts,thenadvancedtowardsthevillage,andthebattery.‘Whenwecameabreastofthechurchwewere suddenly fired on by aGermanmachine-gun post in the corner of theroad,andaboutsixtyyardsaheadofus…afirefightdeveloped,until[Lieutenant]SelwynputLance-CorporalBennettbehindthechurch,andengagedthisenemypostwithour2in.mortar.TheGermanmachinegunceasedfire.’

Theadvanceonthebatteryresumed,andwhenthemenwereinpositioninacornfieldonitsflank,Youngorderedthemtoopenfire.‘Wehadtofirefromthekneelingpositionbecauseoftheheightofthecorn,takingsnapshotsandmovingabout,soastoofferthemost difficult target to the enemy… I am very far from claiming we caused manycasualties… it was a harassing fire, more or less controlled.’ They were eventuallyrewardedwhenagunturnedroundtoshootbackatthem–onegunthatwasn’tfiringontheCanadianspinneddownoutsideDieppe.Eventually,withammunitionrunninglowandnosignofotherCommandosarrivingtosupporthim,Youngorderedhismentowithdraw.

While the Dieppe operation was a disaster, the Commandos performed very well,

particularly Lord Lovat and his men who captured their objective in such fine style.Despitethedebacle,DieppeservedasalessonforAlliedplannersinwhatnottodo.ThismeantthatwhentheAllieslandedinFranceagain,onD-Day,theywouldbemuchbetterprepared.

G ARMYCOMMANDOSTAKINGABREAKDURINGOPERATIONSINSICILY,1943

On10July1943,No.3CommandolandednearCassibleinSicily,alittlesouthoftheportofSyracuse.Threedayslater it re-embarkedandwas sentup the coast to landbehindenemy linesatAgnone.No.3Commandowascharged with capturing a vital bridge several miles inland, a feat it accomplished early on 14 July. As enemypressuremounted,theCommandowasforcedtowithdraw,and,aftersplittingintosmallgroups,themenbeganmakingtheirwayacrossthehillstowardstheBritishfrontlinenearAugusta.Theyweredoggedbyenemypatrolsas theywent,buteventually they joinedupwith theadvanceelementsof theBritishEighthArmy.This sceneshowsasmallgroupofCommandostakingashortrestbreakduringthewithdrawal.Inthebackgroundthetroopcommanders–alieutenantandasergeant–consulttheirmapandplanthenextphaseofthemarch.

ItalyFollowing thedefeatofAxis forces inNorthAfrica, theAllies launchedan invasionofSicily on 10 July 1943. CodenamedOperationHusky, the landingwas spearheaded byfourCommandos–Nos.2and3(Army),and40and41(RM)Commando.Theirjobwastosecuretheflanksofthemainlanding,andtosecurestrategicobjectivesfartherinland.Then on 9 September, No. 2 (Army) and 41 (RM) Commando (together with the USRangers)performedasimilarroleontheleftflankoftheAlliedlandingsatSalerno,ontheItalianmainland.CodenamedOperationAvalanche,thisamphibiousassaultcentredonthespeedy capture of the port of Salerno, while the Commandos and Rangers secured theSorrentoPeninsulatothewest,therebyblockingGermanreinforcementsreachingtheportfromNaples.

Theinitialpre-dawnlandingnearthefishingvillageofVietriwascarriedoutbyNo.2Commando led by Col. Jack Churchill. The Germans were driven from the village,allowingLt.Col.Lumsden’sRoyalMarineCommandosandBrigadier‘Lucky’Laycock’sbrigadeheadquarterstoreinforcethebridgehead,thenadvanceintothehillsbeyond.Theirobjectivewas theLaMolinaPass, throughwhich theNaples toSalerno road ran.Theyoccupied the hills overlooking the pass and dug in. The following day the Germansskirmished with them, but no large-scale attack was launched. That came on 11September,buttheCommandosheldtheirgrounduntilrelievedbyregularinfantryunits.Theywere pulled back, but were send back to the front line two days later, when theHermannGöringPanzerDivisionattackedinforce.

In the confused fighting that followed, No. 2 Commando was forced back fromDragoneaHilloverlookingthepass,astheGermancounter-attackreachedtheoutskirtsofVietri. TomChurchill, Jack’s younger brother, recalled a radiomessage from his oldersibling.Jacksaid:‘Thingsarenowabittrickyuphere.Enemyiscomingforwardunderarollingmortarbarrage,andthey’vegotthroughourlinesatseveralplaces.Amstilloutoftouchofmyforwardtroops’.Tom,attachedtoLaycock’sHQ,orderedimmediateartillerysupportandorganizedacounter-attack.AcompanyeachfromNos.2and41Commandoswent forward again, supported by American mortar fire. The hill was retaken but theCommandossufferedheavycasualtiesintheprocess.Officercasualtieswereparticularlysevere.

MenofNo.41(RM)CommandoadvancingintoWestkapelleduringtheWalcherenlandingsofNovember1944.Inthebackgroundthelighthouse,whichdominatedthecoastaltowncanbeseen;itwasfromtherethatsniperandmachine-gunfirewasdirectedagainsttheattackers.NotethattheCommandosareallwearingsmocksratherthan

battledress.

ThisactionwastypicalofthefightingaroundSalerno.Ifkeypositionswerecaptured,theCommandoslearnedtoexpectvigorousGermancounter-attacks,whichwerefollowedby immediate counter-attacks of their own using aggressive fire andmovement tactics,smokeandrollingartilleryormortarbarrages.WhilethefightingaroundSalernoragedforanother week, and the Commandos would see extensive action both near Vietri andPiegollele to the east, their ability toholdgroundand to launch spirited counter-attacksprovedvitaltothesurvivaloftheBritishsectoroftheAlliedbridgehead.

WhentheylandedonSwordBeachnearLaBrècheonD-Day,No.41(RM)Commandosufferedheavycasualtiesonlanding,andforawhilewaspinnedonthebeachasthedunesbeyondwereclearedofbothminesandtheenemy.

Here,LieutenantPaddyStevens(standing),commandingATroop,takestheopportunitytoaddresshismen.

The Commandos in the Mediterranean theatre went on to see further service in theAdriatic,bothontheItalianandtheAlbanianandYugoslaviancoasts.CommandosfoughtthroughouttheItaliancampaign,buttheirmostsignificantactioncameinthelastmonthsof thewar, nearLakeComacchio. FourCommandos (Nos. 2, 9, 40 and 43) of the 2ndCommandoBrigadetookpartinthehard-foughtbattlewhichleddirectlytothesurrenderof all German forces in Italy. During the fighting in Sicily, Italy and Yugoslavia thecombination of spirited butwell-planned assaults, and stubborn defensive tacticsmeantthattheCommandoswerearealboontotheAllies.Thesetacticswouldberepeatedninemonths later,whenCommandoswould take part in an even larger amphibious landing,followedbyalonglandcampaign,thistimeinNormandyandNorth-WestEurope.

NormandyInevitably,theCommandoswereheavilyinvolvedinthelandingsinNormandyonD-Day,6June1944.Effectively,theyweretobethevanguardoftheinvasion–thesteeltipoftheAlliedarmy.The1stSpecialServiceBrigade,commandedbyLordLovat,wasgiventhejobofsecuringtheleftflankoftheAlliedbeachhead.ItconsistedofNos.3,4,6and45(RM)Commandos,whileNos.41,46,47and48(RM)CommandosalsolandedonD-Dayoperatinginsupportofotherlandingforces.

AfterestablishingthemselvesashoreonSwordBeachnearLion-sur-Mer,Lovat’smenwereorderedtocrosstheCanaldeCaenandtheriverOrne,andtotakeuppositionontheextreme left flankof thebeachhead.Here thestory is takenupbyBryanSamain,of45

(RM)Commando.HisaccountprovidesuswithanexcellentflavourofthefightingonD-Dayitselfandalsothedaysthatfollowed.HerehedescribesthelandingonSwordBeach,90minutesafterthefirstwave(atH+90):The bottoms of our craft scraped ominously over treacherous underwater obstacles ofwire and concrete aswecoveredthelastfiftyyards.Suddenly,aGermanbatteryofanti-tankgunsopeneduponusfromaflank.Throughthehazeofthicksmokeandthedeafeningroarofthebattery–firingatalmostpoint-blankrange–someonewastryingtoshoutorders.Menwerescramblingfuriouslytoobey,butnosoonerhadtheyleapedtotheirfeetthantheyseemedtocrumplevisibly,fumblingwithdazed,frightenedhandsfortenderwounds.

Therewasathunderoussplashasthecraftbeachedontheedgeofthewreckage-filledwater,inmostcaseswithstillfouroffivefeetofwaterforward.Everyonebegantopileoutnow,afurious,desperatecollectionofmeningreen berets,white teeth grinning viciously across blackened faces.Holding their preciousweapons high abovetheirheadstheywadedashore,thecoldwatercominguptotheirchests,envelopingtheirheavyrucksacks,thesoft,silky sand giving little support to their struggling feet. The time was ten past nine in the morning. Forty-fiveCommandohadlanded.

LeavingtheircasualtiesbehindthemtheCommandosracedupthebeach,andcontinuedinlandtothebrigade’sassemblypoint–awood1,000yardsinland.No.6Commandowasalready there, and 45 (RM) Commando was soon joined by No. 3 Commando. Thebrigademovedon towardsColville to theeastand thenNo.6Commandopushedon toPegasus Bridge, followed by No. 2 Commando with the Royal Marines forming thereserve.Onlinkingupwiththe6thAirborneDivision,LordLovatdecidedtopushonoverthecanalbridgeandtheOrnebridgebeyond.Oneofthefewcasualtiesduringthecrossingof the twobridgeswasLt.Col.N.C.Reis,commandingNo.45 (RM)Commando,whowashit in the thigh, and evacuatedback to thebeachhead.The armycommandosweresenttoreinforcetheairbornetroopsfightingnearAmfreville,while45(RM)CommandoheadednorthtowardsMerville.ItpassedSallenelles,encounteringfairlylightopposition,and by late afternoon theCommandoswere approachingMerville.TheGerman coastalbatterytherewasanimportantobjective,buttheorderwastoclearthevillageandthendigin.

The following day (D+1), the Marines were ordered to capture the next village,Franceville Plage, while part of No. 3 Commando assaulted the battery itself. Onapproaching thevillage,CharlieTrooppeeledoffandclearedawoodto thewestof thevillage, while Baker and Easy Troops entered the outskirts. The main street wascodenamed ‘Piccadilly’, and one troop advanced through the houses on each side of it.Samaindescribedtheattack:‘AstrongGermanpillboxdominatedthewholeofPiccadilly,and was situated at the far end of the street. The two troops continued their advancetowardsit,withAblenowfollowingsomedistancebehind.’APIATteamwasbroughtupto suppress theGerman strongpoint, but theywere spotted and fired at.Aminor battlecommencedalmost immediately,with everyoneonboth sidesblazingaway furiously ateach other. An anti-tank gun fired down ‘Piccadilly’ and hit 45 (RM) Commandoheadquarters,whiletheunit’sownmortarswerenowfiringinanattempttosuppressthepillbox.

Then,‘AbleTroop,whichhadbeenfollowingBakerdown“Piccadilly”,suddenlycameunder intensefire fromahitherto-silentenemystrongpointon theright flank[i.e. to theeastofthevillage].Theyimmediatelyfannedoutintothehousesflankingthestreetandleap-froggedfromonehouse toanother,advancingwithout furtheroppositionuntil theycameuptosomeGermandugoutsontheextremeedgeofthebeachestothenorthofthe

town.’ By then it had become clear that theGermanswere launching amajor counter-attackfromtheeast inanattempt tocut theCommandosoff fromtherestof theAlliedbridgehead. ‘Major Nicol Gray, the acting commander of 45 (RM) Commando,immediately decided to fight his way out. Turning about we started to retreat down“Piccadilly”… a running fight ensued down the whole length of the main street, theGermansmakingfranticeffortstocutusoffbymovingtheirmainattackingforcedownaparallel street to our left.’ The Commandos withdrew to a defensive perimeter nearMerville.SoendedtheirseconddayinNormandy.It turned out No. 45 Commando had been attacked by elements of two enemy

Kampfgruppen from the German 711st Infantry Division, whose orders had been tosupporttheMervilleBattery.ItwaslittlewonderthattheCommandoswereforcedoutofFranceville-Plage.Bothsideshadtakencasualties,andbothwerenowbothexhaustedandshortofammunition.TheRoyalMarinecommandosheldtheirpositionsnearMervilleforanotherdaybeforemovingsouthtojointhefightaroundAmfreville.WhatisparticularlyinterestingaboutthebattleforthevillageisthatNo.45(RM)CommandousedthesametacticsusedbyPeterYoungatVaagsø twoandhalfyearsearlier– theadvance throughbuildingsratherthanmainstreet,theuseofcoveringfirefromenfiladingpositions,heavysuppressivefirefromLMGsandmortars,andtheuseofwell-armedassaultteamstodealwithenemystrongpoints.

AfinalinspectionofmenfromNo.41(RM)CommandobeforelandinginSicilyon9July1943.Themenwearinflatablelifejacketsovertheirlightkhakidrilluniforms,whilebehindthemastackofArmy-issuebicyclescanbe

seen,forusebyCommandoreconnaissancepatrolsoncetheinitialbridgeheadhadbeensecured.

In the fighting aroundMerville theCommandos reliedon their training, and skill, asuntil reinforcements could reach them, theywere effectively on their own. In the days

afterD-Day,whiletheCommandosfoughtwell,theysufferedfromtheirownintegrallackofheavyweapons.Theydid,however,havesupportingarmourintheshapeoftheCentaurtanksoftheRoyalMarines’ArmouredSupportGroup.Theverypresenceofthisarmouredforcewas an indication that Commandoswere not expected to play an integral part inlarge-scale amphibious operations, and even larger-scale land campaigns. The days ofcoastalraidingwerenowinthepast.

TheCommandosplayedavitalpartinholdingtheOrnebridgeheadontheleftflankofSwordBeach,andwhenthebreakoutfromtheNormandybridgeheadbegan,the1stand4thSpecialServiceBrigadesadvancedasfarastheriverSeine.AfteralmostthreemonthsofcontinualcombatthetwoCommandoBrigadeshadsufferedover50percentcasualties.The1stBrigadewassenthometorefit,whilethe4thSSBrigadespearheadedtheassaultonWalcherenintheScheldtEstuary–anoperationdesignedtoopentheportofAntwerpto Allied supply convoys. On 6 December the term ‘Special Service’ was replaced by‘Commando’,andsoitwasthe1stCommandoBrigadethatledtheRhineCrossingsnearWesel, while 4th Commando Brigade mopped up German resistance in Holland. Thisdrive intoGermanyendedwith the surrenderof theGermanArmy,but thewarwas farfromover.Infact,fortheCommandossenttotheFarEast,forthepastyeartheyhadbeenfightingtheirownprivatewarinthemangroveswampsofsouth-westernBurma.

AssaultLandingCraftcarryingmenofthe3rdCommandoBrigademoveuptheThegyanRiverinArakan,inJanuary1945.TheirobjectiveisalandingareasituatedclosetoHill170,apositionthatwasthekeytotheJapanesedefences

aroundKangaw.

H ROYALMARINECOMMANDO,1944–45

OntherightstandsaRoyalMarineCommandowearingthewindproofsmock–similartothegarmentissuedtoairborne troops–withoutany identifyingunit flashes.Onhishead is thegreenberet thatwasadoptedbyallcommandos,whilearoundhisneckhewearsagreenscrimscarf.FromthewaistdownheisdressedidenticallytotheArmyCommandoshownhere.HecarriesaThompsonmachinecarbine,whilespare20-roundmagazinesticksarecarriedinthepocketsofhissmockaswellasintheammunitionpouchesofhis1937-patternwebbing.

OntheleftisanarrayofequipmentissuedtoCommandosduringthelastyearsofthewar.(1)No.4Rifle–thereplacement for the SMLE, but largely similar in terms of function – together with a five-round clip of .30in.ammunition.(2)BayonetandscabbardfortheNo.4Rifle–considerablyshorterthanthebayonetissuedwiththeSMLE.(3) Fairbairn-SykesCommandoKnifeMark II andscabbard– similar to theearlierversion,butofamorecomposite construction. (4) Commando wearing a snow smock and trousers issued to troops operating in

Norwaytogetherwithwoollenkhakigloves.(5)M1911ColtAutomaticPistol–a.45in.-calibreweapontogetherwith a holster, ammunition pouch and a spare seven-round magazine. (6) Bergen rucksack – a welcomereplacementforthe1908-patternpack–whichwaseasytodiscardandspreadtheweightevenlybymeansofasmallmetalframe.(7)RoyalNavyissuepocketknife(withfoldingmarlinspike)andlanyard.(8)SteelhelmetMarkI*–identicaltothehelmetshownhere,butwiththeadditionofanettingcoverandscrimcamouflagestrips.(9)Bren Light Machine Gun with bipod mount extended. Its curved magazine held 30 .303in. rounds, althoughusuallyonly28wereloadedtoavoidjamming.(10)TheRoyalMarines’‘globeandlaurel’capbadgefollowedbyunitinsignia–theshoulderflashesofNos.40and45RoyalMarineCommandos,theRoyalNavyCommandoswhodirectedamphibious landings,andNo.3ArmyCommando.Beneath themare twoexamplesof theCombinedOperationsbadge introduced in1942,wornoneacharmbeneath theunit shoulder flash.Whensewnon, the‘Tommygun’alwaysfacedthefront.

ArakanInlate1943,the3rdSpecialServiceBrigadewassenttotheFarEast,toparticipateintheAllied counter-attack in Burma. These Commandos first saw action during OperationScrewdriver – a series of landings on the coast ofArakan (nowRakhine), on Burma’swesterncoast. InDecember thisculminated in thecaptureofAkyabIsland.Bythen theformation had been re-designated the 3rd Commando Brigade, and in January it led aseries of amphibious attacks on the Myebon peninsula. The aim was to cut off theretreatingJapanese54thDivision–anobjectivewhichwasachievedinlateJanuarywiththecaptureofHill170,andthebattleofKangaw.Thehillwascapturedandthenheldinthe face of a series of determined Japanese assaults. Still, the Commandos held theirground,andtheJapanesewereunabletoforcetheirwaypastthem.

PeterYoungdescribedonesmallprobehismenfaced:They[theJapanese]putinadeterminedattackonthetwoforwardtroopsof1Commando,hurlinggrenadesastheycame.One rather keen Jap came forwardwith a box of ammunition and planted it on the edge of a slit-trench,whichhappenedtobeoccupiedbyaCommandosoldier.ThatwasafatalmistakeontheJap’spart.SomemoreoftheenemyfoundtheirwaytoahutwhichwasoccupiedbyoneLance-CorporalLittletonandsomeofhisfriends,who,accordingtooneoftheSundaypapers,promptlystrangledtheJapswiththeirbarehands.Bethatasitmay,theycertainlyhadsomebodiestoshowthenextmorning.InthisfiercemidnightclashtheJapanesewerebeatenoff, leavingbehindninedead, includinganofficer.No.1Commandolostonemankilled,andanofficerandtenotherswounded.

AnanonymousRMCommando recorded thisaccountofanotherevenmoredeterminedJapaneseassault: ‘Soon theJapsappeared,clamberingupa little reentrant,at the topofwhichwehadthreesections,twofrommytroopandonefromthetrooponourleft…ThefirstwaveofJapswerenotverypersistent,andweresoontumblingdownthehillagain,havingcome face to facewith the steadyandaccurate fire fromour twoLMGs. Itwasevident thatwehadinflictedcasualties,as theexcitedNipsweresquealinginthepaddybelow,andnear the summitof thehill sicklygroanspunctuated theeerie stillness.’TheJapaneseattackedasecondtime,butdespitereachingwithinfiveyardsoftheCommandotrenchestheywerestoppedbyheavyfire.

ThisbattleforHill170provedtobethedecisivebattleoftheArakancampaign,foughtin appallingly difficult terrain – mangrove swamps, narrow alligator-infested rivers,swamps,paddyfields,ruggedhillsanddensepatchesofjungle.However,asineverythingelse, the men of the 3rd Commando Brigade had been extensively trained in junglewarfare,andsowereabletofightanddefeattheJapaneseinthisinhospitablelandscape.After this difficult operation the 3rd Commando Brigade was withdrawn for rest andrefitting,prior tobeingused in an invasionofMalaya.However, thewar in thePacificendedbeforetheinvasiontookplace.This,thelastcommandooperationofthewar,wasfoughtwith theskilland tenacityshowninallcommandooperations, from1941on.Assuch,Myebon,KangawandBurmabecamethefinalCommandobattlehonoursinalonglistthatbeganwithVaagsø,andendedwiththesehard-foughtstrugglesonthefarsideoftheworld.

COLLECTIONSANDMUSEUMSThestoryof thewartimeCommandosiscoveredinseveralmuseumsaroundtheUnitedKingdom. Foremost is the Imperial War Museum in Lambeth, South London, whichhousesavastcollectionofartefacts,weapons,uniforms,documentsandphotosrelatingtoBritain’sarmedforcesduring the twoworldwars.This includesasignificantamountofobjects relating to the Commandos, from rare examples of uniforms to the maps andorders used during particular commando raids. Themuseum also operates a secondarymuseumsiteatDuxfordAirfield,wherelargerobjectsarehoused.

ImperialWarMuseumLondon

LambethRoad

LondonSE16HZ

www.iwm.org.uk

ImperialWarMuseumDuxford

CambridgeshireCB224QR

www.iwm.org.uk

Also inLondon is theNationalArmyMuseum, located inChelsea.While it covers theentirehistoryoftheBritishArmy,italsohasasubstantialbodyofobjectswhichhelptellthe story of the Commandos. Themuseum has also staged specific commando-themedexhibitions,whilepartofitspermanentcollectionisdevotedtoSpecialForcesduringthewar. TheRoyalMarinesMuseum is housed in Southsea near Portsmouth, inwhatwasonce the Marines’ officers’ mess. It covers the entire history of the Corps from itsformationin1664untilthepresentday,butmanyofitsdisplaysaredevotedtotheRoyalMarine Commandos and their operations during World War II. The Combined ForcesMilitaryServicesMuseuminMaldon,Essex,iswellworthavisitasitcontainsasizeablecollectionofuniformsandequipmentrelatingtowartimeSpecialForces.TheseincludeararefullyrestoredGoatleyboat,onceusedbyArmyCommandos,andaCockleMarkIIcanoeofthekindusedduringtheCockleshellRaidonBordeauxin1942.

CombinedMilitaryServicesMuseum

StationRoad,Maldon,Essex,CM94LQ

www.cmsm.co.uk

NationalArmyMuseum

RoyalHospitalRoad,Chelsea,LondonSW34HT

www.nam.ac.uk

RoyalMarinesMuseum

EastneyEsplanade,

Southsea,Portsmouth,

Hampshire,PO49PX

www.royalmarinesmuseum.co.uk

InEdinburgh,theWarMuseuminEdinburghCastle,operatedbytheNationalMuseumofScotland, not only tells the story of the Scottish soldier but also covers CommandotraininginScotlandduringthewar.Themuseumhasanextensivecollectionandthecastleis also the home of two regimental museums. Two smaller museums in Scotland alsocover the story of the Commandos. In theWest Highland Museum in Fort William agalleryisdevotedtotheCommandos,andinparticulartothetrainingtheycarriedoutinthe area. A Combined Operations Museum existed in Cherry Park, in the grounds ofInveraray Castle outside FortWilliam, but it closed its doors in 1998, andmost of itscollectionwastransferredtotheObanWarandPeaceMuseum,whichdealswithactivitiesin theWesternHighlands during theworldwars. InAchnacarry a tourist trail from theClanCameronMuseumthereguidesvisitorsroundtheCommandotraininggrounds.

ObanWar&PeaceMuseum

CorranEsplanade,

Oban,Argyll,PA345PX

www.obanmuseum.org.uk

Finally, there is the Commando Memorial near Spean Bridge. Designed by ScottSutherland and erected in 1952, this powerful, simple yet moving monument featuresthree commandos looking over their World War II training grounds. It is close toAchnacarryHouse,thecentreofwartimeCommandotraining,andinthenearbyvillageofSpeanBridgethelocalhotelonceusedasawateringholebyoff-dutyCommandosnowhousesanimpressiveprivatelyownedCommandoMuseum.

TheCommandoMuseum

SpeanBridgeHotel

SpeanBridge

Inverness-shire,PH344ES

www.commando.speanbridgehotel.co.uk

BIBLIOGRAPHYAllan,Stuart,CommandoCountry(Edinburgh2007)NationalMuseumsofScotland

Brayley,Martin,andIngram,Richard,TheWorldWarIITommy:BritishArmyUniforms,EuropeanTheatre,1939–45inColourPhotographs(Marlborough,1998)TheCrowoodPress

Brayley,MartinJ.,BritishWebEquipmentofthetwoWorldWars(Marlborough,2005)TheCrowoodPress

Buckley,Christopher,Norway,TheCommandos,Dieppe(London,1951)HMSO(TheSecondWorldWarseries)

Bull,Stephen,CommandoTactics:TheSecondWorldWar(Barnsley,2010)Pen&SwordBooks

Chant-Sempill,Stuart,St.NazaireCommando(NewYork,NY,1987)PresidioPress

Churchill,Thomas,CommandoCrusade(London,1987)WilliamKimber&Co.Ltd

Dunnig, James, It Had to be Tough: TheOrigins and Training of the Commandos inWorldWar II (London, 2012)FrontlineBooks

Dunstan,Simon,Commandos:Churchill’sHandofSteel(London,2003)IanAllenPublishing

Durnford-Slater,John,Commando(London,2002)GreenhillBooks

Ladd,James,CommandosandRangersofWorldWarII(London,1978)BookClubAssociates

McDougall,MurdochC.,SwiftlytheyStruck:TheStoryofNo.4Commando(London,1988)Grafton

Macksey,Kenneth,Commando:HitandRunTacticsinWorldWarII(Chelsea,MI,1990)ScarboroughHousePublishers

Messenger,Charles,TheCommandos,1940–1946(London,1985)WilliamKimber&Co.Ltd

Neillands,Robin,ByLand and Sea: TheRoyalMarineCommandos: AHistory, 1942–1982 (London, 1987)GeorgeWeidenfeld&NicolsonLtd

Samain, Bryan,Commando Men: The Story of a Royal Marine Commando in North-West Europe (London, 1948)Stevens&SonsLtd

Westhorp,Christopher,TheCommandoPocketManual,1940–45(London,2012)AnovaBooks

Young,Peter,StormfromtheSea(London,2002)WrensParkPublishing

AUTHORAngus Konstamhails from theOrkney Islands, and is the author of over 80 books, 60 ofwhich are publishedbyOsprey. This acclaimed and widely published author has written several books on military and naval history,includingSalerno1943,Therewas a Soldier and Jutland 1916. A former naval officer andmuseumprofessional, heworked as the Curator ofWeapons at the Tower of London and as the Chief Curator of theMel FisherMaritimeMuseuminKeyWest,Florida.Henowworksasafull-timeauthorandhistorian,andlivesinEdinburgh,Scotland.

ILLUSTRATORGrahamTurnerisaleadinghistoricalartist,specializinginthemedievalperiod.HehasillustratednumeroustitlesforOsprey,coveringawidevarietyofsubjectsfromthedressofthe10th-centuryarmiesoftheCaliphates,throughtheactionofbloodymedievalbattles, to thedaily lifeof theBritishRedcoatof the late 18th century. The sonof theillustratorMichaelTurner,GrahamlivesandworksinBuckinghamshire,UK.

AUTHOR’SNOTEAllphotographsarecourtesyoftheStratfordArchive,unlessnotedotherwise.

ARTIST’SNOTEReadersmaycaretonotethat theoriginalpaintings fromwhichthecolourplates in thisbookwerepreparedareavailable for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should beaddressedto:

GrahamTurner,POBox568,Aylesbury,Buckinghamshire,HP178ZX,UK

www.studio88.co.uk

ThePublishersregretthattheycanenterintonocorrespondenceuponthismatter.

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