BRITISH

BATTLESHIPS

1919–1945

BRITISH

BATTLESHIPS

1919–1945

RABURT

SeaforthPUBLISHING

Titlepage:Ramilliesfreshoutofrefit,Devonport,April1927.

AcknowledgementsTheauthorisindebtedtothefollowingestablishmentsandpersons:

ThestaffoftheNationalMaritimeMuseum,Greenwich.ThestaffofthePublicRecordOffice,Kew.InparticularIshouldliketoextendsincerethankstoJohn

Robertsforallhishelp;toJ.Hitchon,A.S.NorrisandR.Wilsonforhelpwithmaterial;andappreciationisalsoduetoT.W.Ferrers-Walkerformaterialandforgreatencouragementthroughoutthepreparationofthebook.

Finallytomywife,Janice,whoputalotofeffortintothisbookinthewayofresearch,typingandchecking.

RABurt

Copyright©RABurt1993

ThiseditionpublishedinGreatBritainin2012bySeaforthPublishing,animprintofPen&SwordBooksLtd,47ChurchStreet,BarnsleyS702AS

Reprinted2013

www.seaforthpublishing.com

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ISBN9781848321304

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyany

means,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,oranyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpriorpermissioninwritingofboththecopyrightownerandtheabovepublisher.

TherightofRABurttobeidentifiedastheauthorofthisworkhasbeenassertedbyhiminaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.

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ContentsPreface

EvolutionoftheDreadnoughtPost-WarReorganizationandNavalTreatiesIntroduction

EarlyClassesthatSurvivedtheGreatWarIronDukeClassQueenElizabethClass

RoyalSovereignClassRepulseandRenownTheGenesisandDevelopmentoftheAircraftCarrier

FuriousGloriousandCourageousHood

NelsonandRodneyKingGeorgeVClassConclusion

BibliographyIndex

Preface

The period from 1919 to 1939, although a time of peace between themajorpowers,probablyproducedmorewartime ideas than thehostilities themselves.The naval treaties that brought a halt to capital ship construction (from 1921)meantthatthetimeandmoneyavailablewasspenteitheronthereconstructionof existing warships, or on basically new designs to be built as soon as newprogrammescouldbegin. Itwasa timewhen ‘Jack’could joinupand see theworldwithoutfearofhavingtofightforhiscountry(althoughalwaysreadytodoso).Commissions came andwent, bringing amuchneeded showingof the flag,

and no memories are fonder than when an old ‘salt’ recalls his happy daysaboardoneofHisMajesty’sbattleships.During thoseyears it seemed that theRoyalNavywasstill themajorforceontheoceans,eventhoughhershipshadreduced innumber toparitywith theUSNavy.TheUnion‘Jack’stillcountedfor something and theRoyalNavywas still the Senior Service inmorewaysthan one. Indeed, it had themost battle experienced ships and crews, and hadcarried out some of the most meticulous tests against old battleships everwitnessed.Althoughtherewasmuchchangesofarasreconstructionwasconcerned,on

thewhole theadministrationandpoliciesof theRoyalNavywere littlealteredandFleet practice and exerciseswere carried out in a fashion similar to thosecurrentduringtheFirstWorldWar.TheAdmiraltysawnoreasontochangeitsthinking in this regard; it considered the battleship to be supreme despite themanycriticswhobelievedthat thedayof thebigshiphadpassed.Theaircraftcarrier,stillnotfullydeveloped,cameintoitsownduringtheinterwaryears,butat that time the main strength was still envisaged as lying in straight battledivisionsthatwouldengageanenemylinewhenrequiredtodoso.True,futureactionwoulddifferfromtheGreatWar,giventhegreatlyreduced

numbersinthetype,buteventhoughJapanandtheUSAwerelookingtowardsthe aircraft carrier and submarine, all major powers still struck up a massiveconstructionprogrammeofbattleshipsduringtheyearsleadinguptotheSecond

World War. British battleship designs often take a knock, and lately it hasbecome trendy to highlight their faults, but this is probably because it iscomparatively easy to analyse a service that has such a long history of battleexperience. Most British battleships were a compromise – no battleship everconstructedwas perfect, but they contendedwith attacking aircraft, torpedoes,mines,submersibles,contemporarybattleshipsandfinallyallweathersinallseaconditionsthroughouttheworld.It is a simplematter to compare ship against ship statistics on paper, but it

meansvery little inpractical terms;actionsspeak louder thanwordsandwhenoneexaminestherecordoftheBritishbattleshipfrom1919to1945,theRoyalNavy’sdesigners,thecrewsservingthemandthevesselsthemselves,itbecomesclearthattheyhadlittlereasontopayheedtoderogatoryopinions.Theydidallthatwasaskedofthem–andsometimespaidaheavyprice.Aswarapproachedin1939theAdmiraltywasall tooaware that theRoyalNavywas illequippedandunready,butnaval treaties, politics and financial restrictionshad all takentheirtolloftheservicesince1919.WarwashardfortheNavythesecondtimearound,andby1941capitalshipshadbeenseriouslydepleted.Therewerefewnewshipsandmanyoftheolderoneswereingreatneedofmodernizationandlong-awaitedrefits.Thebattlewaspursued,however,andby1942thetidehadturned, but the battleship had taken second place to the aircraft carrier as themost important unit in the fleet. Policy and battle tactics in the Atlantic andPacific had altered drastically and it no longer seemed imperative to have amassive battlefleet as had been the case in 1939. The all-important weaponswere carriers and fast light AA cruisers to look after them. The new enemywouldnowcomefromtheair,notfromoverthehorizon.And what of the ships themselves, the mighty battleships – those floating

leviathansoftheworld’soceans,thathadinspiredtheserviceman,thejournalistand the general public for generations. The sight of a ‘friendly’ battleshipimparted a sense of visual pleasure and powerful reassurance. Crowds wouldflock to the sea front at Portsmouth and Devonport to see one return from acommission.OnmanyavisittoaforeignporthundredswouldgathertoseetheBritishFleet entering their harbour.Theywould glide in, gondola like, over asun-blessedseathroughschoolsofdolphins,whileoverheadconvoysofseagullskeptclosevigilfortitbits.Onboard,acacophonyofnoiseastheoff-dutywatchprepared to come up on deck.Manywere sun-worshippers, particularly thosethathadjustlefttheinclementweatherofPompeyorGuz.Hatchesandscuttleswere opened and the awnings would go up as soon as the anchor had beendropped.TheKing’sshipshadenteredharbourinalltheirglory–usuallywithmain armament at salute elevation – freshly painted in the light grey (almost

bleached white in the bright sunshine) Mediterranean colours. ‘Anchorsaweigh!’ sounded and the Fleet came to rest – ‘Jack’ was in for some well-earnedleaveashoreandhewouldhope,agoodstretchbeforehavingtoreturntoahomeport.Romanticitmaysound,anidyllicpictureitmayseem,butthiswasthescenethathadnotchangedforhundredsofyears;thiswasthelifetowhich‘Jack’ was accustomed (even though times in general were extremely hardduringthe1920sand1930s),andthesewerethebattleshipswithwhichhewassofamiliar.Lifewasneverdullforlongwhenservingonboardacapitalship–onedaynothingmuch,butthenextmightwellbringadoubleshift.Duringthelullincapitalshipconstruction(1919to1939)thecrewscarriedonregardlesswithwhatshipstheyhad.ThefollowingviewsshowalifestylethatwasfamiliartotheBritishmatelot.

HoistingatorpedoonRamillies.Carefulprocedurewasneededwhenhandlingtorpedoesbecauseaslipcouldmeanbrokenbodiesaswellasdamagetotheweaponitself–worthmorethan£2,000each.

‘Inforadip’–nothingwouldbemorewelcomeaftercoalingorheavyworkontheanchorpartythanarefreshingswim,especiallywhenatatropicalport.SomeoftheladsareshownhereworkingtheirwayalongaboomonRoyalSovereign,9August1920.

‘Alllitupatnight’.Afamiliarandspectacularsightinforeignportsandonethatisrememberedwithgreatfondness.Thesuperstructureandforward15inturretsofRamilliesareilluminatedwhileanchoredatAlexandria,1930.

‘Standeasy’.Afterworktherewasaperiodwhencrewscouldeitherrelax,playcardsorwriteletters,etc.HeresomeofthecrewareseenlazingontheforecastleofMarlborough.

‘Crossingtheline’.EverytimeashipcrossedtheEquatortherewereceremoniesandgamesonboard.Anynewratingorofficercertainlywentthroughit.ThephotographshowssomeofthecrewonRepulsereceivingaduckingc.1926.Notetheever-presentNeptuneontheextremeleft.

InJanuary1948,whenLordHallannouncedthescrappingofcertainships,hesaid: ‘The First Sea Lord and I feel like padres taking a funeral service for anumberofold friends.The ships theAdmiralty is scrappingareold friends ineverysenseofthewordtoeveryofficerandmanintheNavy.’Withoutdoubt,thiswasalsothefeelingofthegeneralpublic.Theperioditselfisprobablythemost popularwith naval historians, enthusiasts and collectors alike, andwhencasting bait to ascertain what kind of book they would next like to see, theanswer came back loud and clear – another battleship book, but with freshinformation ifpossible,newdrawingsanddifferentphotographs.The first tworequirements have not proved easy to furnish and the latter were even moredifficult.Therehavebeenafewbooksonthesubjectoverthepasttwentyyearsand a real ‘dig’ was needed to secure the required items. Masses of officialdocuments have been consulted, but unfortunately many have been eitherdestroyedorhavegonemissingovertheyearssoacertaindegreeofcontinuityin thematerial is lacking.Privatepapershavebeen includedand thedrawingsarefromofficialAdmiraltysourcesaswellasunofficialonesfromtheauthor’sarchives.Thephotographshavebeen carefully selected so as to avoid theoft-repeatedshots;thoseseenherewill,inmostcases,nothavebeenpublishedfor40years.Althoughthesailorsandthemaninthestreetwerefiercelyproudofthefleet,

theyprobablynevertookmuchaccountofthetechnicalchangesthatweretakingplace, perhapsbecause thegeneralwayof life itselfwasundergoingprofoundchange.Thisbookcontains,Ihope,ablendofingredientstointerestnotonlythe

technicalman,butalsotheenthusiast,navalphotographcollector,modelmakerandthegeneralpublic,andisatributetoallthecrewsthatservedintheRoyalNavy’scapitalshipsfrom1919untiltheendofthewarin1945.

R.A.Burt,Rayleigh

‘Theconcertpary’.Aspotoflightrelieftocheerupthecrewsandrestoremorale.Oftentheactingmemberswould‘sendup’theofficers,whichalwaysreceivedgoodapplause.RoyalOak.

ChristmasDayatsea.Thefestiveseasonwasnotthebesttimetobeawayfromhome.NeverthelessJackmadethemostofitandtherewasmuch‘splicingoftheMainbrace’andplentytoeat.

‘Footballteam’.Eachcapitalshiphaditsownteam,andtherewasfiercecompetitionbetweenthesquadrons.Oftentherewereperiodicalsforserviceuseonlytoshowwhowaswinningwhatinfootball,rowingorboxing.Repulse,BCS,1931.

Avisittoaforeignportandwelcomeshoreleave.HMshipsQueenElizabeth,Resolution,Revenge(indrydock),ResourceandaLondonclasscruiserareseeninthefavouriteportofMaltac.1935.

OneofJack’sfavouritepastimeswastogethisheaddownfor‘fortywinks’.Newcomerstohammockssaidthattheytookalotofgettingusedtobutoncemasteredtheyweremorecomfortablethanconventionalbeds.

EvolutionoftheDreadnought

Thebeginningofthe20thcenturysawthemetamorphosisinBritishbattleshipdesign that signalled a departure from the practice of the previous ten yearsduringwhichthebasicdesignhadadheredtoauniformlayout(Majestic,1893)with littleorno improvement (seeR.A.Burt,BritishBattleships1889–1904).By1902therewasagrowingappreciationoftheadvantagesoflongrangeanditwas being realized as a result of practical experience that action could becommencedatrangesupto10,000yardsratherthanthe3–4,000yardsthathadbeen the normup to this time. It also became obvious that fire controlwouldhavetoimprovegreatlyiftheall-importantaccuratespottingofthefallofshotwere to be achieved.Moreover therewas a need to give British battleships aheavier armament (only4×12in for the last tenyears) so that anenemyshipcouldbeoverwhelmedbyahugeweightofbroadsidebeforehecouldbringhisowngunstobear.In1904–5intelligencereportsfromtheRusso-JapaneseWarconfirmedmany

ofthesetheoriesandsuggestedthatitwouldonlybeamatteroftimebeforeoneoftheleadingmaritimepowersseriouslyconsideredbuildinganallbiggunnedshiptosuitlong-rangefightingrequirements.AfterhearingageneralintimationfromabroadthatRussiaandJapanwerethinkingalongtheselinesforanyfutureconstruction, and that the United States had indeed gone farther by actuallylayingdownsuchavessel,theAdmiraltyneedednofurtherstimulus.WhenAdmiralSirJohnFisherwasappointedFirstSeaLordinOctober1904,

thefirstthinghedidwastogatherastaffwhowereofthesamemindashimself–thatBritainshouldbethefirsttobuildthefirstnewtypeofship.HispositionanddriveensuredthataprototypewaslaiddowninOctober1905.NamedHMSDreadnoughtatFisher’sinstigation, thevesselwasbuilt inanunprecedentedlyshorttime(1yearand1day)andbecamethefirstallbiggunnedturbine-drivenbattleshiptogotosea.FredJane,theeminentnavalhistorian,onceasked‘WhatisaDreadnought?’

andforsomestrangereasonthequestionagitatedmanypeople.Inthecolumnsof The Scientific American during 1909, a Major Boerum Wetmore of

Allenhurst, New Jersey put forward the vessel Roanoke as the first trueDreadnought type and stated that with her two 15in and one 11in guns sheshould rightfully take this position in history. What he forgot to mention,however, was the fact that Roanoke was a converted frigate which had beenrazéed, plated with iron, armed with large guns and was, on the whole, veryexperimental. She also proved to be quite unsatisfactory. She was precludedfromserviceinConfederatewatersandalthoughservingwiththeNorthAtlanticSquadron for a year proved to be a terrible seaboat, the weight of her giantturrets making her roll dangerously and the thrust of her spindles alwaysthreateningtoforceheroutofkeelwhentheturretswerekeyedupforaction.

DREADNOUGHT

AMrPercivalHislam replied to theMajor’s letter, defending the claimsofearly British vessels and putting forward the Royal Sovereign of 1864 as acontender. ‘This ship was the first true Dreadnought type,’ he said. As wasRoanoke,RoyalSovereignwasaconvertedwoodenhulledshipwhichhadbeenironplatedandarmedwithfive10.5ingunsmountedalongthecentreline,andcouldrightfullyclaimtobethefirstBritishturretship.TheundauntedMajor returned thechargewithOnandanga, anothermonitor

authorizedbyCongress in1861.Hestated that, ‘…shewasofhigh freeboardand, armedwith two15inguns,must takepreference to theRoyalSovereign’.ThissmallwarofwordsswelledthecolumnsinthePressforsometime,anditseems as if the conclusion was that the definition of a Dreadnought was ‘aseagoingallbiggunnedship’inwhichcasetheUnitedStatescanrightfullylayclaimtohavinghadthefirstvesselsofthistype.In1859inhisbookTheNaviesoftheWorld,HansBusk,MAwrote‘AtalleventstheauthoritiesintheUnitedStateshavenotyetabandonedtheprincipleofbuildinggiganticvessels,inorderto carry a few heavy guns.’ The context referred to criticisms that had beenvoiced about the American idea, and predicted that it would be short lived.These ships were officially rated as 40-gun frigates, but actually carried onlytwelve, allmounted so as to ensure that seven could fire on either broadside.Theywere345ft longanddisplaced5,013 tons.The largestBritishwarshipofthe day wasMarlborough, a three-decker, 131-gunned screw ship displacing4,000 tons.Clearly, thoseAmerican ships embodied the principles of the trueDreadnoughtconcept.Although these facts should not be forgotten, the naval historian of today

whenaskedthequestion‘WhatisaDreadnought?’wouldalmostcertainlyreferto theBritishDreadnought herself, built in1906, andothers that followedherbeing loosely dubbed dreadnoughts or super dreadnoughts. This in no wayreflects on any of the vessels previously mentioned, but there is a differencebetweenmodifying and experimentingwith an existing vessel, and the designandconstructionofa trueseagoingallbiggunnedship. Itwould,however,beincorrecttoclaimthatHMSDreadnoughtof1906wasthefirsttobedesignedassuch,orindeedeventhefirsttobelaiddown.Nevertheless,whenonecomparesherinnovatoryfeatureswithexistingorevenproposeddesignsof1906,aclearmarginofsuperiorityisapparentandatthetimeofhercompletiontherewasnocomparable ship afloat; regardless of debate then and now, she can rightfully

claimherposition innavalhistoryas the first trueallbiggunneddreadnoughttype.WhenF.T.JanegavehisfirstopinionofHMSDreadnoughtin1906afterhe

had seen her in PortsmouthHarbour, itwas obvious that hewasmore than alittleimpressed.HisreactionspublishedinTheNavalandMilitaryRecordsayitall:

Asregardsthosedetailswhichmoststriketheeye,perhapsthechiefone is the bigness of everything. The mast, which is the mostconspicuousobject,hasapeculiarmassivenessabout it. It isa tripodaffair but each tripod-leg is like the trunk of some enormous foresttree.Similarlythefunnels.Theyarenotparticularlyhigh,andend-ontheyarenarrowtoreducewindresistance,butseenfromthebroadsidetheyhavethecharacteristicimmensenessoftheDreadnought.Aft,theeye is caught by a couple of square box-like erections. They areapparentlysomekindofventilator.Eachisaboutthesizeofthetowerofavillagechurch.Everythingisbig;everythingisonthegrandscale.

BELLEROPHONCLASS

Sheisnotinanywayone’sconceptionofaship.RegardedasashipIsupposesheisugly,becausesheisunconventional.Butheruglinessis that of one ofBrangwyn’s best pictures alongside the oleographiceffortof theconventionalR.A.There isnoAlma-Tademaabouther.Butshelookswhatsheis–theembodimentofpower,ofsolidity,ofall that we delight to call English and which some neurotics callPhilistine.One’sfirstandlastconceptionofheristhat.

It iswell documented thatDreadnought startedoneof the greatest arms raceseverknown,but for all that itwasGreatBritain that hadmanaged to lead thefieldinconstructiontechnologybythetimetheGreatWarhadstartedin1914.Suffice to say that never before had a single type of ship caused suchcontroversialmayhemandpracticalupset–andcertainlyneversince.From Dreadnought onwards the vessels remained a source of debate, but

remain theywould for the next forty years as the supreme capital ship in thenavies of the world. Toppled somewhat by the ever-increasing submarinewarfareandfinallythearrivaloftheaccurateairbornetorpedo-bomberlaunchedfrom aircraft carriers, the battleshipwas slowly relegated to subsidiary duties.Her demise was forecast as long ago as 1920 but she still served on withdistinctionthroughouttheSecondWorldWarandinfactwasstillatseaaslateas1991intheUSNavy,provingthattherehasbeenlittletocomparewithherpowerevenbymodernstandards;thebattleshiphasnoequalandattimesthereis still a demand for heavy gunfire – not a bad record for a type of vesselprimarilydesignedmorethan100yearsago.Someof theBritishbattleships that followedDreadnoughtwereasdifferent

fromherasshehadbeenfromtheMajesticof1893,buttheyallhadonethingincommoninthattheywerealldesignedtocarrytheheaviestpossiblearmamenton a load displacement. In fact, gun sizes increased dramatically from 12indiametertoamassive15ininjustashortperiodoftimewhenitwasrealizedthatmodernlayoutscouldonlymustertenbiggunsindifferentarrangementswithoutcramping the basic design. After Dreadnought in 1906 came the followingclasses:Bellerophon,StVincent,Neptune,Colossus,Orion,KingGeorgeV,IronDuke,QueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign.

STVINCENTCLASS

NEPTUNEAscompleted

HERCULESANDCOLOSSUS

ORIONCLASS

KINGGEORGEVCLASS

IRONDUKECLASS

QUEENELIZABETHCLASS

Three war purchases supplemented the Royal Navy’s inventory during thewar,Agincourt, Erin andCanada, and the world’s first battlecruiser was laiddown in 1906 (Invincible class) followed by the Indefatigable, Lion, QueenMary,Tiger,Renown,CourageousandFuriousclasses.During the Great War many improvements were made internally and

externallyofnecessitybecauseofactiondamage,andby1918theBritishcapitalshipwasthemostcapableofitstypeintheworld.TheearlyDreadnoughtssawlimited appearance changeswhichusually amounted to littlemore thanbridgeand searchlight development, but the vessels that escaped the great scrappingprogrammeof1921underwentdrasticmeasurestokeeppacewithmodern-dayrequirements.Withnonew ships (exceptNelson andRodney) entering servicefrom1920,itbecamedifficulttokeepsomeofthevesselsfitforfront-linedutiesandsomeofthedesignssufferedasaresult.Nevertheless,itwasataskthatallnavieshadtoundertake.It is difficult to give a comprehensive account of internal alterations made

from 1920 to 1945 because many of the refit documerits have been lost ordestroyed, but at least photographic evidence, where existing, shows us theexternalalterationsthatweremade,anditishopedthatthesmall-scaledrawingsin this chapter will give an insight to the procedure of development fromDreadnoughtin1906throughtoRoyalSovereignof1913(thelastbattleshipstobebuiltduringtheGreatWar).Someofthebasicchangestolookforare:

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

Extendedbridgework.Anti-torpedonetremoval.Drasticsearchlightredistribution.AAgunsadded.Searchlighttowersaroundfunnels.Removalofallflyingdecks.

Secondaryarmamentclosedinandgivensomeprotection.Firecontrolinstalled.Newheavyforetops.Reductionoftopmasts.Clinkerscreenstofunnels.Aircraftflying-offplatformsontopofmainturrets.

Post-WarReorganizationandNavalTreaties

AlthoughtheGreatWarhadhitBritain’seconomyhard,itwasrealizedthatnoreductioninhernavycouldbeplannedimmediatelyhostilitiesceasedbecauseofa great deal of uncertainty about the future. Burdenedwith amassive fleet itcertainlydidnotneedinpeacetime,theRoyalNavywasanxioustoreduceit,butbothAmericaandJapanwerebusyplanningmassiveconstructionprogrammes.Faced with these problems and the fact that the Treasury was not exactlyforthcomingwiththeappropriatefunds,theAdmiraltyhadtodecidewhetheritwouldbebeneficialtobuildnewshipsorreconstructsomeofthemanywarshipsinservice thatwere fastbecomingobsolete.Eithermeasure representedseverefinancial outlay, but, given its international commitments, the Admiralty waspractically forced into an uneasy situation of a battle fleet reconstruction.Thewar ended inNovember1918,but itwas anuneasypeace so far as theRoyalNavywasconcerned.WhatwastobedonewiththemassiveGermanfleetthathad just arrived in Scapa Flow – not tomention the crews aboard the ships?WritingfortheAdmiraltyReconstructionCommitteeSirWilliamMaystated:

TheworkoftheA.R.C.cannotbesatisfactorilyproceededwithunlessadefinitionofpolicyonwhichtoworkisdecidedupon.Themajorityof questions to be considered hinge exactly on the peace terms andconsequentlythestrengthatwhichtheNavyistobemaintained.Whatpeacetermsmaybeisimpossibletosaydefinitely,buttheymightbeonthetermsofthefollowing:

1.Apatched-uppeace,i.e.,onewhichwouldbelittlemorethananarmisticeandinwhichthenationswouldcontinuetodeveloppreparationsforpossiblefuturehostilities.2.Peacetermswhich, thoughapparentlylasting,wouldnotbindentirely, any or all of the opposing nations to a definitedemobilizationoftheirarmedforces,orwhichwouldentailonlyapartialreductioninthepreparationsforwar.

Itisnotthereforepossibleatthepresenttimetobaseareconstructionpolicy on the future terms of peace but it may be assumed thateconomicconsiderationswill govern thispolicy.Whatever thepeacenegotiations may determine, there can be little doubt that all thebelligerentnationswill,fromthefinancialpointofview,dotheirbestto reduce expenditure and cut down their armaments to avoidinvolvingthemselvesinfurtherexpenditureonwarrequirements.GreatBritainwithothernationswillhavetoreduceexpenditureon

the navy to the lowest possible point compatiblewith retaining it insuchastateofefficiencyandsuperiorityaswillenableittomeettheGermanNavyincaseoffurtherwar.

On21June1919theGermanNavyceasedtobeaproblemwhenitscuttleditshuge fleet while at anchor in Scapa Flow, but this was not entirely to thesatisfactionof theAdmiraltybecausetheGermanshipscouldhavebeenput togooduseintheRoyalNavybyusingmaterials,orbyscrappingthemandusingthefundstowardsfreshconstruction.ButtheHighSeasFleethadgone.

PortquarterviewofIronDukeinWeymouthBay,1929.

During thesecondpost-waryear (1920),however,asituationcameabout toprompt consideration of new construction at an unprecedented level so far as

battleshipsizewasconcerned.Itseemedthatthewarhaddonelittletoendthestruggle for naval supremacy, but merely substituted Japan for Germany.Moreover,Americawas preparing to rebuild its battlefleet completely tomeetanychallengeworld-wide.Onthedrawing-boardwere:America:sixbattleships(Indianaclass,43,000tons);sixbattlecruisers(Constellationclass,43,000tons);Japan:twobattleships(KagaandTosa,40,000tons);twobattlecruisers(AmagiandAkagi,43,000tons);twobattleshipscompletingwith16inguns(NagatoandMutsu,33,000tons).ItwasimpossibleforGreatBritaintoignoresuchathreatandpreparationsweremadetomeetthenewships.Early in1921ordersweregiven toscrapdozensof the1914–18veterans to

makeway fornewconstruction.TheoriginalDreadnought plus all battleshipsand battlecruisers built from 1907 to 1910 were sold – the largest scrappingprogrammeuptothatdate.AtastroketheRoyalNavyhadreduceditspowerofseasupremacytoanall-

timelow.Gonewasthe‘TwoPowerStandard’ofthelate1900sandthestrugglewasontomaintainasuitableleveltomeetdifferentrequirements.Bytheendof1921theDNCandstaffhadproduceddesignsforwhatwereprobablythefinestand most powerful warship to date. The 1921 battleships and battlecruisersmatched(inmostcasescompletelyoutmatched)anythinginforeignnaviesandmovesweremade to lay down four of them simultaneously (seeNelson classandG3designs).Whenthefiguresfortheseshipswerereleased,bothAmericaandJapanwere

less than pleased because it meant that they would have to build even largerships than envisaged. The only solution was to call a meeting to consider adisarmament policy that would considerably reduce what was perceived as afuturewarprogramme,withGreatBritain,America,Japan,FranceandItalyallinvited. The delegatesmet inWashington on 12November 1921 to discuss asuitable treaty andwithout going into the very difficult negotiations that tookplaceandthefactthatGreatBritainconcededmuchmorethananyothernation,it will suffice to show the actual results. The treaty made provision for thescrappingofaverylargeamountoftonnage:Americatoretaineighteencapitalshipswithanaggregateof500,650tons;GreatBritaintoretaintwenty-twowithan aggregate of 580,450 tons (America to retain a smaller number of capitalshipsbecausetheAmericanshipswere,ingeneral,laterandlargerthanthoseofBritain). Japan retained ten capital ships aggregating 301,320 tons. Themaximumforany replacement tonnagewas fixedat525,000 tons forAmericaandGreat Britain and 315,000 tons for Japan. France retained ten ships for atotal tonnage of 221,170 tons and Italy ten aggregating 182,800 tons. Each

nationwaspermittedtolaydownnewtonnagein1927,1929and1931.Each nation was allowed a replacement allotment of 175,000 tons. It was

agreed that none of the powers should build a replacement capital shipdisplacingmorethan35,000tonsandarmedwithgreaterthan16inguns,andtheagelimitforcapitalshipswasfixedattwentyyears.Itwasalsoagreedthatnopower should build more ships than the minimum required. After a heateddebate,andasaconcession toGreatBritain, theRoyalNavywaspermitted toconstruct twoshipsof35,000 tonsarmedwith16inguns(NelsonandRodney)because the American ships under construction (Colorado, Maryland, WestVirginia)andtheJapanesepair(NagatoandMutsu)werearmedwith16inguns.Theagreementwassignedon6February1922.ThereweremanyinGreatBritainwhosawtheWashingtonNavalTreatyas

theendoftheRoyalNavyasthesupremepowerintheworldsoceans,andinastrictsensethiswastrue.TheDNC,SirEustaceTennysonD’Eyncourt,wrote:

DearMrLloydGeorge,Iwish toplacebeforeyoumyviewson the subjectof thepresent

Conference atWashington, more particularly regarding the proposalforaNavalHoliday.Thereappearstobeatendencytosetononesidetheopinionofnavalandtechnicalmenonthesubject.This is very dangerous, and as Chief Technical Adviser to the

Admiralty,Ifeelitmydutytogiveyoumydefiniteopinion.Aten-yearnavalholidaywouldresult inacompletedebacleinthe

matter of efficient naval material. It would take us many years torecover the ground lost andwe should absolutely cease to retain theleadwehaveheldforsolonginthematterof thoroughefficiencyofourships.I need not weary you with all the details and arguments on the

subject,butitisinmyverycarefullyweighedopinionthatourpresentshipswouldbealtogetherobsolete ina fewyears.Someof themarenearlysonow,andweshouldbeunable toproduce thebest ships toreplace them after a long period of inactivity such as proposed.Wehavehadpracticallyfouryears’‘Holiday’already.You will never produce A1 material if you stop constructing;

withoutanA1Navywearefinished.TheFrenchare logical inasking thegreatpowers if theycangive

assuranceandguaranteesagainstaggressionfromGermany.IfnottheFrench say they must have the army they consider necessary. We

should be equally logical in saying ‘can you give us a guarantee atsecuringourcommunicationsourfood,etc.,incaseofwar?Ifnot,wemusthavetheNavyweconsidernecessary’Insistence upon a thoroughly efficient if not large navy should be

ourequivalentcrytotheAmericanMonroedoctrine,anditisfarmorevitaltous.Aten-yearNavalHolidaywouldrenderthisimpossible.There are those who wish deliberately to wreck our capacity for

producing efficient war material. That cannot be permitted, as weshouldbeatthemercyofotherEuropeanpowers–perhapsGermanyandRussiaoralatincombinationinthefuture.These‘peaceatanyprice’peoplemayarguethatwecanrestorethe

Navy at any future time; that is a delusion.When once it has beenallowed togodown, itwill takeyears to restore; thisapplies tobothmaterialandpersonnel.Itisthereforeabsolutelynecessarytocontinuebuildingata reduced rate,butnot tostop.TheNavy is thesole life-assuranceofthenation.Thecarefulhouseholdermayeffecteconomies inmanydirections,

butheneverallowshisinsurancepremiumstolapse.Possibly the old saying Si vis pacem para bellum requires

qualification, but the converse si vis bellum para pacem is certainlytrue.

During the years following the Washington Treaty there were constant talksaimedatfurtherreducinganyshowofnavalstrength:LeaguePreparatoryCommission,1925At theendof1925 theCouncilof theLeagueofNationsbrought intobeingaPreparatoryCommission to takeover theworkwhichhadbeengoingonsince1921. It stated that the maintenance of peace required further reduction ofnationalarmamentstothelowestpointofconsistency.Althoughagoodideainprinciple,itwasfoundthatitdidnotdoawaywiththe‘germ’ofrenewednavalcompetition. Itbecameasimplecase that thegreatmaritimepowerscouldnotagree on a suitable limit to tonnage and just howmanywarships of differenttypesshouldbescrappedandwhatshouldremain.GenevaConference,1927On20June1927Britain,AmericaandJapanmetagainforrenewedtalksonthefurther reduction of the armed forces of each nation. Italy and France did notattendintheirfullcapacitybutsentobserversinstead.Thefailureofthemeetinglayintheinabilitytoagreeoncruiserstrengthbecauseofeachnation’sdifferent

requirements.TheBritish suggestion that cruisers be divided into two classes:10,000 tonsand8inguns,andsmallercruiserswith6ingunsdidnotgodownwellwiththeAmericans.PactofParis,1928Apactbywhich56nationsagreedtorenouncewarasaninstrumentofpolicywassignedon27August1928.Anglo-Americanconversations,1929TalksbetweenRamsayMacDonald(PrimeMinister)andPresidentHoovertookplace during June 1929when the President stated: ‘Wemust find a yardstickwithwhichtomakereasonablecomparisons’ofnavalunits.Duringmostofthetalkssince1921ithadbecomeincreasinglydifficulttogetallthepartiestoagreeonanything.Eachcountrystillinsistedondoingwhatwasbestforitsownnavy.Therewasmuchtalkofconstructingsmallerbattleshipsthanwerereallyneededandscrappinglargerbattleshipsthatwerenotyetobsolete.BritainsawAmericaasbeingparticularlyawkwardandAmerica felt the sameofBritain. Japan,ontheotherhand,wasseentobebecomingmoredistantfromallpartiesconcerned.NavalTreaty,1930Talks finally evolved into action during the 1930 discussions when Britain,America, Japan, France and Italy all primarily agreed to limit warshipconstruction.

1.Thefivepowersagreednottobuildanynewbattleshipsbefore1936,butFranceand Italy coulduseup theirunused tonnageallotted to them from1927and1929.2.Americawouldscrap thebattleshipsUtahandArkansas.Britainwouldscrap thebattleships IronDuke,Benbow,Marlborough,Emperorof Indiaand the battlecruiser Tiger (Iron Duke and Arkansas to be retained astraining ships). Japanwould scrap thebattlecruiserHiei (shewas, in fact,retainedasatrainingship).

Furtherscrappingwouldtakeplaceoverthenextfewyearsaftertheconference.Aircraft carrierswere limited in size to10,000 tons (newconstruction) andaneventighterlimitationwasproposedoncruiserconstruction.FromthatdatethenavalsideofBritishaffairswaslefttodecayandmanyof

the skilledworkers, draughtsmen and shipbuilders left the service. Battleshipsthemselveswerethoughttobecompletelyobsoleteandtherewererenewedcallstoscrapthelot,butthesituationinGermany,wherethemilitaryelementwasonthemoveoncemore, led todisquiet throughoutEuropeandamong thePacific

powers.TherewastobenomorenewconstructionuntilJanuary1937bywhichtime

GermanywasbecomingarealthreatandJapanhadlonggoneherownwayandwas most secretive about her intentions. When the long capital ship holidayendedithadbeenagreedtolimitnewconstructionto35,000tonsand16inguns.This agreement was not at first favoured by the British who had instigated amovetowardsasmallerbattleshipwhichwouldhaveonly12inguns(seedesignnotes) and displace about 25,000 tons.America, however,would not agree tothisandacompromisewas reached.No limit to thenumberofnewshipswasfixed,but itwouldbegovernedbyfinancial restrictions imposedby individualnations.Freed from the treaties that had so hampered it during the twenties, and

thirties,theRoyalNavybeganapanicconstructionprogrammeinJanuary1937,but was never ever again on a par numerically with America whose largeresourceseasilyoutmatchedalltheothermaritimepowers.ThusGreatBritain’sbattleshipsenteredtheSecondWorldWarillequipped,underpoweredandatastageofmidconstruction.

Introduction

DesignAlthoughtherewerebasicideasregardingdesignthathadbeenformulatedinthelightofwarexperience,itbecamenecessarytore-evaluatetheentireissuewhenpreparing new ships, given the financial restrictions imposed after the war.Beforeandduringthewartypesofshipsweredevelopedforcertainbasicroles,butitwasfoundthattheyneededmanyadditionsandalterationsiftheyweretobe efficient inmultiple roles.Manynew typeswere built for special purposes(Renown class, etc.),but asBritishcapital shipshad tobeall thingsandcarryweaponsof all types, itwas seen asunnecessary to load a shipdownwith allsortsoffittingsitreallydidnotneed.Itwasarguedthatifashiphadamainrolethedesignerwouldhaveaclearerideaofwhatwasrequired.Thequestionaroseas to whether the differing qualities and functions of the battleship and thebattlecruiser could be combined in one ship as a compromise. It seemed thattherewasnoreasonwhysuchatypeshouldnotbemoreefficientthanthetwospecialist types–theheavilyarmouredslowshipandthelightlyarmouredfastship. The devastating outcome at Jutland, where lightly armoured ships cameinto contact with the enemy fleet before the slower, heavily armoured ships,madetheprospectofafast,heavilyarmouredshipanappealingone.After the war there was no shortage of personal opinions and the DNC’s

Departmentwasoftenbombardedwithsketchdesigns fromservingofficersaswellasfromtheprivatesector.OnesuchsketchdesigncamefromRear-AdmiralSirRichardPhillimore,KCMG,CB,MVO(PresidentofthePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,10October1919):

Is there any intention of radically altering the system on which ourshipshavehithertobeenarmouredandplacingthebulkofthearmourinahorizontaldeckcoveringtheships’vitalsinsteadofonthesideoftheship?Ifnot,pleasestatewhatreasonsareconsideredtomakethisimpossibleasthemainideaincapitalshipconstructionortomaketheplacingofarmourat20degreestothenormalpreferabletoplacingitat70degrees.WhatconclusionsweredrawnbytheDNCDepartment

from the trials recently carried out on HMS Swiftsure and a targetrepresentingarmouredprotectionofHoodabreastcertainmagazines?10 × 16in; 16 × 5.5in; 4 × TT; 6,000miles radius; speed 25 knotsmaximum;armour6inhorizontal; splinterproofcontrol structures;noconningtower.

In theAdmiralty corridors therewasmuch talkof submersibles carrying largeguns, super ships showing ridiculous features and, as always, the school ofthought that was inclined to ‘scrap the lot!’. After many months of post-wardebateitwasconcludedwithgreatclaritythatifthebiggunwasstilltobetheprimary weapon (which it was) the ship should be designed accordingly. 1.Makebattleshipsasstrongaspossible.2.Doawaywith torpedotubes in largeships (they were dangerous in case of direct hit). 3. Give priority to special-purpose ships – cruisers, destroyers, etc. The argument against having twodifferentweaponsofoffencerequiringdifferenttacticsandmakinglifedifficultfortheoperatorswasasoundonethatwasheededduringthosepost-waryears.Torpedo attacks were better made from specialist vessels: torpedo-boatdestroyers, submarines or torpedo-cruisers. Anyweight saved by deleting thisweaponfromcapitalshipscouldbebetterusedinprotectionqualities.The influence of theWashington Treaty on design in the Royal Navy was

profound,butBritainacceptedtheproposals,admittingthatwithregretshewasnolongerabletomaintainthe‘twopowerstandard’shehadenjoyedbeforethewar.Since1919theAdmiraltyhadbeenengagedinthewholesalescrappingofoldervessels,butmanyweregoodshipsthatneednothavebeenscrapped.TheWashingtonTreatyonlymademattersworse;aletterintheGermanGazettesaidit all: ‘TheWashington Conference may prove to be a milestone in the nextwar.’TheoutstandingfeatureoftheWashingtonTreatywasthatnavalstrengthwas

still classed in terms of capital ships, in complete disregard of the strongopposition that maintained that the day of the battleship was past. The ever-forceful Sir Percy Scott wrote in March 1922: ‘Naval strength is no longermeasured by the number of battleships a country has but by the number ofaeroplane carriers and aeroplanes.’ Clearly, however, it had been proved thatalthoughthesubmarinesandaircraftwereanessentialpartofthemodernfleet,theywerecertainlybynomeansasubstituteandfuturedesignswerepreparedaccordingly. Although no official sketches of a hybrid battleship/carrier wereprepared, many unofficial sketches were put forward and make interestingreading.Officialsketchesdrawnupduring1920/21beforetheWashingtonTreatytook

effect, show ships of massive proportions. The first few were merelydevelopmentsofHood,butlaterculminatedinacompletelynewtype(G3)with18inguns.Therewasobviouslyaneedforafastbattleshipandaslower,heavierarmoured battleship, and these early sketches reflected just that. Thebattlecruisertypehadinfactevolvedintoafastbattleshipandthebattleshipintoahuge,well-armed,heavilyarmouredandcapablewarship.Mostofthesketchessported18ingunsatthelargestand16inatthesmallest.ToreachfinallayoutsbyNovember1921(N3–G3)provedquitecomplexandthedesignshadmovedthrough more than eighteen stages (full development of type is described inRaven and Roberts’ Battleships of World War Two). They came to nothing,however,andnavaltreatieswereexpeditedtostoptheveryexpensive,overthetop,programmewhichnocountrycouldsustainfinancially.SomeofthedesignspreparedfortheG3groupandothersthatfollowedareshownintheNelsonclasschapter,buttherewerealsomassesofdesignsproducedinanendeavourtogetroundtheWashingtonTreatylimitationsandtheyseemtohavebeenproducedmerelyspeculativelyandtogoonrecordforfutureuse.When one considers the policy and strength of the Royal Navy during the

WashingtonTreatydiscussions,oneconcludesthattherewaslittlerealizationatthat time that the proposals as finally agreed would seriously restrict thedecisionsofthosewhowereresponsibleforthedesignandconstructionofmajorfightingunits. In fact the limitations,although feasibleonpaper,were justnotpracticable. AsNelson andRodney completed (1927) andwith a constructiongloomformanyyearsduringandaftertheirconstruction,itwasonlynaturalthatnewdesignsshouldbeproposed.Thosethatwere,however,wereacompromisestillbasedonsevereweightandsizerestrictionsandthesketchesshowthismostclearly.Unofficially the battleship/carrier (see sketch) ideawas being debatedandintheoryandpracticeitwasactuallyfeasible,butunfortunatelyitwasneverseriouslyconsidered.

DESIGNFORHMSHOODSubmittedbythePresidentofPost-WarQuestionsCommittee,1919

BATTLESHIP-CARRIERPROJECT

After debate, staff requirements in 1928 for new battleships showed animprovedNelsontype,butareturntofourtwinturretsmountedforeandaftaswasusualstandardAdmiraltypracticebeforeNelson.Twelve6ingunsremainedas secondary armament butweremorewidely spaced than inNelson (40 feetcentreof turrets asopposed toNelsons30 feet).The tertiarybatterywaseight4.7inguns,andgeneralfirecontrolwasarepeatofNelson.Tosaveweighttheaft DCT was omitted and control was to be from ‘X’ turret. In the past theprincipal objections to the directing turret were: 1. The directing gun had tocease fire, since the loading operation interfered too much with the directorlayer. 2. A human link was introduced into the elevation and trainingtransmission which introduced lag and errors into the system. Both theseobjectionswere largely discounted bymodernmethods of sighting turret gunsandhigh-speeddirectelectricaltransmission.Thesystemwasadmittedlynotsogoodasanindependentdirectorposition,butwasgoodenoughforararelyusedalternativeandcertainlysavedtheuseofpersonnelandofficers.Protection was similar to that of Nelsons, but the serious threat posed by

divingAPCshellsvis-à-vis,forexample,Nelsonsshallowbeltwasnowrealized.Nelsons arrangement of side armour had its advantages, but itwas consideredthat placing the belt inboard from the waterline could result in projectilesglancing down to explode inside the ship and possibly passing under thearmouredbelt (seedrawings).Nelsonsbeltwas severelycriticizedofficially in1927 and this fault was at last given serious consideration. The weakness,however, was never officially acknowledged. A meeting was held on 20November1928todiscussDesign545-A+Bandmostitemsontheagendawereprimarilyagreed.During those doldrum years it was necessary for Britain to watch foreign

trends closely and strongly resist any commitment to single types (such asDeutschlandandDunkerque)beinglaiddown.Certainlynogroupofshipswasplanneduntil itwas certain that thedesign couldmatch any foreign adversaryDisplacementandguncalibrewerefixed;thetworemainingfactorsbeingspeedandarmour.Inthisrespectitwasconsideredsoundpolicytogiveanynewshipsnormal battleship speeds and good protective qualities rather than strain thedesign for a high speedwhich, it was thought, usually fell off with age. Oneparticular point in all the designs forwarded was that the main armamentstrongly favoured the standard twinmountings as in theQueen Elizabeth and

RoyalSovereigngroups.AmeetingwascalledbytheFirstSeaLordon10January1934todiscussthe

questionofsizeoffuturebattleshipsinthelightoftheapproaching1935NavalConference.Thefollowingfactorsgovernedthesituation:1.AproposalmadeatGeneva byBritain to reduce the size of future battleships to 25,000 tonswith12inguns,oralternativelyshipsof22,000tonswith11inguns.2.Theproposalby Japan for a ship of 25,000 tonswith 14in guns. 3. TheAmericanwish topreservethepresentsizeofshipandgun,namely35,000tonsand16inguns.4.The recent construction by the French of a battlecruiser of 26,000 tons and13.5inguns(Dunkerque).5.TheexpressedwishoftheGermanstobuildalargerbattleshipthanDeutschland.Withseverefinancialrestrictionsinforceandanunwillingnesstobuildafleet

ofgiganticbattleshipswhenthetreatiesallowednewconstructionagain,itwasthoughtthattheUSNavymightbewillingtoagree,undergentlepressurethatis,toareducedsizeofcapitalship–about28,000tonswith12inguns.Theywereto be built to stand up against 16in gun fire, attack from 2,000lb bombs and750lb torpedoes. The Controller was asked to investigate designs of a shipcarryingeight,nineor ten12ingunswitha speedof23knots.Sketchdesignswere prepared (see table) accordingly and after some debate suitablearrangements were agreed. Unfortunately, however, no other maritime powershowedtheslightestinterestinconformingtosuchmoderatedimensions.The sketches for these ships were well laid out and some of the features

deservetobehighlighted:

1.Armourandprotection.Thebeltarmourwasplacedontheoutsideofthehull andnot, as inNelson andRodney, slightly inboard.ExperimentshadshownthattheventsprovidedintheupperportionofthebulgesofNelsonandRodney couldbeomittedwithoutdisadvantages.Theoutsidepositionof the armour belt necessitated a different form of bulge from that inNelson,butexperimentsshowedthatitwasaseffectiveasthatinthelatterships.2.Alowerandthinnerbeltwasproposedtobeplacedbelowthemainbelttomeet theimpactandexplosionof long-rangeprojectilesfallingshortasin number four round against the target Emperor of India and affordprotection to themagazines against such plunging shellfire hitting belowthemainbelt.3.Mainarmament.Verysimilar to that in theQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclassesbutbetterlocationarrangementsweremade.

4. Secondary armament. In most cases this was protected in turrets butsomeprovisionwasmadeforarmouringtheturretsandbarbettes.

The small battleship proposals having been dispensed with, the Admiraltyreturned to themain characteristics of the standard battleshipwhich had beenthoroughly worked out by November 1933. (For main dimensions see KingGeorge V class, 1937.) Designs on paper, although of great importance fortheory and the historical record, do not in fact mean a great deal. It iscomparativelysimpletooutlinerequirementsinasketchdesign,buttoputtheseinto practice, which means financial support and the solving of conflictingdesignrequirements,isanothermatter.Ascanbeseenfromthesenotesdesignstook many directions and in fact the 1933 capital ship designs were verydifferentfromthoseplannedduringthe1920swhentheAdmiraltywaslookingaheadtothetimewhenGreatBritaincouldrenewherbattlefleet.Thegoverningfactorindesignsalthoughnotstraightforwardareinfacteasytounderstand:1.Financial considerations have priority. 2. Information about developmentabroad. 3. Fleet and staff requirements. 4. Balanced design (well armed,protectedandgoodspeed).5.Unrestricteddisplacement.

Withoutafreehandonalltheserequirementsnomaritimepowerintheworldcouldhavebuilttheshipsthatitneededatthattime,andtheresultwasthatthoseshipsthatwerebuiltshortlybeforetheSecondWorldWarwereuntriedand,ifthetruthbetold,generallyleftmuchtobedesired.

ArmourWiththecessationofhostilitiesinNovember1918someofthelongestandmostimportant debates concerning standards in capital ship design began. Lookingbackatcertaindisastersduringthewaritwasconsideredatsomelength(since1916)thatviewsregardingprotectionwereover-influencedbythelossesofthebattlecruisers at Jutland.Apart from those tragic losses thewar ingeneral hadhighlightedthefactthatmodernbattleships’(bothBritishandGerman)armourhadwithstood gunfire verywell. In fact even shipswith pre-war standards ofprotection,whichonpaperdidnothavecompleteimmunityfromexistingattack,stillstoodupverywelltoseverepunishmentandinmostcaseshadmadeitbacktoportundertheirownsteam.Itwasconsideredthatthiscapacitytotakeheavypunishmentwasthecriterion

of a good design, and all protection beyond the requirement of being able towithstandheavyhitswasthoughttoamounttowastedweight.Whattherequiredprotectionratioshouldbe,however,variedagreatdealfromshiptoship.Sofaras armoured platingwas concerned theRoyalNavy entered thewar believingthat, at the fighting ranges favoured in 1914, 9in side armour and 4¼in turretroof plating was immune against 12in guns which the German battleshipspossessed in great numbers. In 1920, however, the Post-War QuestionsCommitteedismissedthesethicknesses,andalthoughsomefavourwasgiventomedium-range armour itwasquestionablewhether thepresent-day thicknesses(13ininQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign)wouldbeimpervioustotheever-increasingpowerofthelatestAPCshellsbeingdeveloped.BecauseithadstoodupsowelltoBritishshelling,theperceptionofGerman

armour as being superior had been exaggerated, the truth being that the oldBritishAPCshellswereincapableofpenetratingthemagazinesandothervitalareas of German heavy ships in a fit state for bursting, so not too muchimportance shouldbe attached to the fact that the shipswere able to return toharbour after having been hit. Defects in pre-1917 APC shells of 12in andgreater calibres were: 1. They broke up on oblique impact having only beenprovedatnormal;2.Thebursterwastoosensitivetobecarriedthroughathickarmourplate; 3.Some failed at proofTheGerman shipsnever faced theAPCshellsthatweredevelopedafterJutland.

LuckilyforBritishshipsitwasfoundthattheGermanshellswerenotalwaysuptomucheither;forexamplein1915an11inshellhitthebattlecruiserLionatDoggerBankand,althoughhavingpiercedthearmourplate,theshellwasfoundlying on the crown of one of the turretmagazines, the fuses having failed todetonate.ThelatestshipattheendofthewarwasthemightyHoodbutherprotection

hadfuelledcontroversyfromtheoutset,anditwasproposedthataseriesoftestsbeheldwithaviewtoimprovingherifpossible,andanyothercapitalshipthatfollowed.TheRoyalNavywaswellawareofdeficienciesinhorizontalarmourand as early as 1921 made the following statement: ‘We can lay down theimportantaxiomthatitmustbemadeimpossiblefortheenemytodestroyyourshipbyonefortunatehit,i.e.,itmustbeimpossibleforhimtoigniteyourstoreof explosives. Nothing else is of such vital importance as this. Hits whichdamage some of the engines and boiler rooms or turrets are of secondaryimportance. Accepting this principle it can probably be asserted that it isimpossibletoarmouralltheimportantpartsofashipcompletelyagainstthegunyoucarryandwhichitmustbepresumedtheenemywillalsocarry,butifyourdesign andmaterial are superior to the enemy’syouwill take correspondinglylessrisk.’Theformofprotectiontodate(1920)wasbasedontheprinciplethatarmour

fulfilleditsrequirementsifitremainedunholedafterattackbyshells,andtothisend the plates were so designed that their resistance to being holed wasmeasurable.Themeasurementofimperviousnesstoparticularshellswascalledthe‘limitofresistance’oftheplateagainsttheshell.Thepowerofattackupto1917made it possible to armour capital ships sufficientlywell to render themcapableofresistingshellattack(inmostcases)attherangesthenenvisaged.Theintroduction of the new APC shell greatly modified the values of shell andarmour and the subject of relative strength came under great scrutiny. It wasfound that ifnewconstructionwas tobe immuneagainstheavyAPCshellsof15incalibreandgreater,maximumarmourthicknesswouldhavetobeapplied.Thesefindings,however,didnotquitecoincidewithaquotefromtheDNC;‘Ifsuchprotectionaswillgive,onpaper,completeimmunityagainst18inattackbeadopted, there are bound to be methods of defeating the ship and it is notdifficulttopictureahuge,superblyarmouredvesselwithitssuperstructureandcontrolpositionsobliteratedanditsmachinerypersonnelgassed,driftingat themercyofthesubmarinesoraircraftattendingtheenemyfleet.Suchhoweverislikelytobethefateofashipinwhichoffensivepowershavebeensacrificedtodefence against a vessel in which superiority in offence has been the firstconsideration.’

AftertestshadshownjusthowgoodtheAPCshellswere,theentiredesignoftheNavy’s new shipswas open to question, and theConstructionDepartmentwas constantly engaged in design development. The new shellswould governnewstandardsofprotectionbecauseitwasobviousthatothermaritimepowerswould soon (if they had not done so already) reach adequate levels of shellability.Trials showed that a largeproportionof any targetwas representedbythe deck, and making a ship invulnerable to shell hits in this area wasexceedingly difficult within the limitations of capital ship design. Variousmodificationswere tried,but thegeneralconclusionwas thatunlesssomenewradical form of armour were developed it was impossible to improvearrangements in heavy ships other than by increasing armour thicknesses farbeyond the present level (1920 = 3in average) which would involveunacceptableweightaddition.It is impossible to deal with a single design feature, such as protection, in

isolation. The designer has to consider the ship as a whole, all featuresdepending upon one another. At that time (1920–21) speed was considered amost important factor in relation to other features of a ship, as it affected theotherelementsofthelayout,withtheexceptionofthearmament.Ifmachinerywere reduced the length of the machinery space, the length of the armouredcitadel, the amount of fuel, the amount of deck protectionwere also reduced,leading to, finally, a smaller hullwith fewer fittings and less equipment. Thiswasimmediatelyapparentwhenthedesignofabattleshipofsay22or23knotswascomparedtothatofabattlecruiserofsay30knotsanditwasatoncefoundimpossible togive the same thicknessofprotection to the faster shipas to theslower.InHMSHooditwasfoundpossibletoprovidetheprotectionandevenincrease itover thatof theRoyalSovereignclassbattleshipswhilemaintainingthesamearmamentandgivingthespeedof31knots,plusaveryheavyweightofunderwaterprotection.Thisresult,however,wasonlyachievedbymakingaverybigshipofgreatlengthandgoingtotheextremedimensionsthatthelargestdocks could accommodate, and it was here that British constructors came upagainst a difficult problem since the existing docks precluded ships of even aslightly larger size. Until larger docks were built (which they were not) theAdmiralty would have to content itself with vessels of no greater dimensionsthanthoseofHood.

Valiant1919,anchoredinScapaFlowoverlookingtheGermanbattleshipBadenwhichwouldlaterbeusedforfiringteststohelpevaluatearmourprotection.

IthadlongbeenknownthatthedeckprotectionofthelatestgiantbattlecruiserHood left a lot to be desired, and as she neared completion the Post-WarQuestionsCommitteecalledforaseriesoftrialsrelatingtoherdeckstrength.ItwasdecidedtousethenewAPCshell,whichwascapableofcarryingthroughandburstingabout40feetbeyondthefirstplatestruck,todetermineanycriticalweaknesses,themainquestionbeing,wassheadequateagainsttheNavy’s15inAPC shell? During the autumn of 1919 plates arranged to simulate Hood’sarmourweretested.Test1.Shellperforatedandburst40feetbehind7inarmour

in themagazine. Test 2.Withmagazine roof thickened from lin to 2in. Shellperforatedandburst34feet in rearof7inarmour.Roofplateblown topieces.Test 3. (See page 27). Target: 2in HT plate, 3in HT plate and 2in HC plate(magazine roof).Projectile15inAPC(weighted).Angleofdescent32degreesstrikingat1,350feetpersecond.Correspondingrange25,000yards.Aweightedshellwasusedandthe3inHTplatingrepresentingthemaindeckwaswrecked,buttheshelldidnotpenetrateandglancedoff.Thusthemodificationtothemaindeck (as seen in the drawing) gave fairly good protection to magazines fromshellshittingthesidearmour.

AttheconclusionofthetrialsitwasseenthattheweightavailabletoprotectHood’s magazines was inadequate against plunging fire unless the ship wererebuilt with a new deck of thick homogeneous plate. Later, however, it wasproposedthatmoretrialsbecarriedoutontheHooddecktarget,withthemaindeckbeing reinforcedby4¾in roofplatequality armour.Noapproval for thiswassanctioned,however,andalthoughthematterwasnotdropped,itwasseentobeimpossibletomodifyashipthathadbeendesignedto1916standards.Further tests were carried out against armour in the captured German

battleshipBaden in 1921 andHMSSuperb in 1922 (seeNelson chapter), andthese yielded an amazing amount of data for future use. It was concluded in1921–2thatamainbeltof14inanddecksof7½–8inwerenecessarytokeepout16inand18inAPCshellsatmodernbattle rangesand itwas these thicknessesthatwereenvisagedfor theG3design.By1937,however, ithadbeendecidedthat thicknesses would have to be greatly increased if they were to keep outmodernbombsand shells, and theprotectionof the laterKingGeorgeV class(1936) was designed accordingly but within the limits of a maximumdisplacementof35,000tons.

MODELTESTSFOR1928BATTLESHIPDESIGN

SomecomfortwasofferedinanotebyDNCTennysonD’Eyncourt:‘Lookedatbroadlyitisconsideredthattheactionoftheshellwillnotbequitesoseriousas the trials hitherto made would seem to indicate. The conditions of actualwarfaredonotingeneraltestsoseverelythearmourandprotectionofshipsasdo the trials specially made on the material. This is partly due to the angleincidenceoftheshellbeingfrequentlylessthanthattaken,andpartlytothefactthatinadditiontotheverticalordeckarmourwhichiserectedforspecialtrials,there is always the structure of the ship which adds very considerably to theprotectionafforded inpracticeand thechanceof theshellshittingsomeof theverysubstantialstructureofourcapitalships isaverygreatone,andthereforethethicknessoftheprotectiongivenonpaperisconsiderablyaugmentedbythestructurewhichismetwithinthepassageoftheprojectile.’Ingeneral thisapplied toships thatservedduring theSecondWorldWar. It

was to prove that shellfire was not the most important threat but aerial and

underwaterattackproved themost fatalof all.ThenewPrinceofWales’s 6inarmoureddeckwasnotpiercednorwasher14inor15inbelt,butshewasmosteffectivelysunkbeyondthearmourlimitations.(ForfurthertestsagainstarmourplatesseeOperation‘Bronte’inNelsonclasschapter.)

ChemicalWarfareGasandchemicalwarfarehadshowntheirdeadlypossibilitiesforthefirsttimeduringtheGreatWar.Themustardandrespiratorygases,thatcouldburn,blindorchokementodeath,wereobviouslyseentoposeamajorthreatinanyfutureconflict. Although never used at sea during the Great War, it had becomepossibletoattackshipsatseawithgasdroppedfromanaircraft,andtheproblemofanti-gasdefencewasmuchdebatedduringtheinterwaryears.The Admiralty set up a Chemical Warfare Committee which held its first

meetingon7July1920.Oneofthefirstbattleshipstoundergogas-attacktestswas Ramillies (Royal Sovereign class) during the winter of 1920 but resultsshowed that with her open bridge work and conning arrangements it waspracticallyimpossibletokeepoutpoisonousfumes,anditwouldbeanabsolutenightmareifpersonnelfacedsuchattack.Moretestswerecarriedoutduringthenext few years – themost notable being in the aircraft carrierCourageous in1922,butagain,becauseofhernumerousopeningsitwasquicklyrealizedthatitwouldbeextremelydifficulttorendermanycompartmentsgastight.InAugust1923 their Lordships received an article entitled ‘Protection of Capital ShipsagainstPoisonGas’whichhighlightedtestsandtrialsinwhichtheUSNavyhadbeenengaged.Thearticlehadthreeheadings:

1.Methodsofproducingagascloud2.Individualprotection3.Collectiveprotection

Methodsofproducingagascloud:1.Atime-fusedsmokefloat.2.Liquidgassprayedonthesurfaceof thewaterfromaircraftoutofgunrange.

Individualprotection:Thewriteradvocatedtheuseoffourdifferenttypesofmasksforthepersonnel:

DIVINGSHELLTESTS,HOODANDMALAYA

1.Manuallabourmask–containercarriedontheheadsoasnottoimpedethearmsorbody2.Diaphragmmask–foruseoftelephoneoperatorsetc3.Opticalmask–foruseofrange-takers,gun-layers,etc

4.Acombinationofbandc–forfirecontrolofficers

TheBritishAdmiraltyfavouredtheuseofasinglemaskforallranksandratingsandprovidedthatthisuniversaltypeprovedefficient(anewversionwasbeingdeveloped at that time) the questionof specialmasks for special dutieswouldnotarise. Itwassuggested thatanopticalmaskbebuilt in to rangefindersandtelescopes, one advantage being that the user would be better accustomed toaction conditions thanwould obtain from intermittent use of a personalmask.Serious considerationwould be given to this proposal should difficulties arisewiththenewversionoftheindividualmask.Protectiveclothingagainstmustardgas was considered and it was suggested that special overalls be issued inwartimeforactiononly.

OntheforecastleofBarham,showingsomeofthecrewundergoingchemicalwarfarepracticeandtheuseofgasmasks,c.1925.

Collectiveprotection:Thewriterdealtwiththissubjectexhaustively,varioussuggestionsbeingmadeas tohow topreventgasenteringa ship.Theopinionwas that thewhole shipbelow the upper deck should bemade gas tight including turrets, ammunitionpassages, secondary batteries, etc., and even engine and boiler rooms.Briefly,compartmentswere termedeithersemi-closedor fully-closed.For the first, theidea was to make the compartment as gas tight as possible with regard tofightingefficiencyandtopreventgasfromenteringbykeepingthespacesunderairpressure.Tokeeptheairpressureupandatthesametimefiltertheair,useof

the ‘seco spray’ machine was suggested. With regard to the fully-closedcompartments,theideaseemstohavebeenforanagentforabsorbingCO2andtoreplenishtheoxygenfromtanksorcylindersinthecompartment.Therewasemphasison theneed forcollectiveprotectioneverywhere toavoid the lossofefficiency resulting from thewearingof respirators by personnel.At the sametimeitwasadvocatedthatpermanentgasmasksbefittedaspartofrangefinders,gun-laying telescopes,etc.,whichshouldbeusedatall times, thusacceptingareductioninefficiencyoftheusersoftheseinstruments.TheAdmiralty took theview that thewriterhad lost sightof the fact that a

shipmaybehitduringanactionand that inalmostanycompartment thatwasnotwellprotectedcollectiveprotectionwoulddisappear.ItwasalsothoughtthatthewriterinhiseffortstobringthegasmenacetothenoticeoftheUSNavyhadratheroverstatedthecase.Suchconditionsashepostulatedmightbepossibleinthefuture,butnotatthepresenttimeandthefirstrequirementwastoexaminethe means whereby gas could be got into a ship and only then determinepracticalmethodsofdealingwithit.IntheDirectorofNavalOrdnance’sopinion,thecorrectlinetotakewas:

1.Stakeeverythingonagoodgasmask,andregardthisforthetimebeingastheprimaryandmosteffectivedefence.2.Carryoutfurtherresearchonmethodsofgettinggasintoashipinordertoascertainjusthowgreatadangerthenewthreatmightposeduringawar.3. Investigate systematically the means of making some of the moreimportantstationsgastight.

Itwasthoughtthatanyproposalstomaketheengineandboilerroomsgastightweresomewhatfantastic.Thesprayingofgasfromaircraftwasconsideredworthyofinvestigation,not

onlyfromthepointofviewofpossibleuseinanavalaction,butalsoasmeansofdefendingbeachesfromhostilelandings.Withregardtotheproposalstoprovideanti-gasapparatusofdifferenttypesto

suitspecificduties,Admiraltyexperiencetodatesuggestedthatitwaspossible,but itwashighly improbable thatanydefinitiveapparatuscouldbedevised. Itwasrealizedthatthechancesofaship’spersonnelbeinggassedwereprobablygreater in harbour than during any fleet action. It was therefore essential thateachmanbeprovidedwithpersonalanti-gasequipmentinthefirstplace;specialtypesforspecificdutiescouldbeconsideredwhenexperiencehadbeengainedintheuseofthenewtypeofrespiratorbeingdeveloped.

Theemphasisontheneedofprotectiveclothingagainstmustardgasandtheproposals to introduce an overall of protective material for use in action wassoundinprincipleandindicatedthelinesonwhichissueshouldbemadeassoonas suitable material could be developed. It was understood that this wasengagingtheseriousattentionoftheChemicalWarfareCommittee.US proposals followed generally the lines along which the Admiralty was

proceeding. The air purifier, the air filter and the use of compressed air forovercomingsmallleakswereallatthistimeunderconsiderationforuseinHMships.The lossof efficiency resulting fromclosing-inmightbe asgreat as, orgreaterthanthatresultingfromthewearingofgasmasks,especiallyattimesoflowvisibility,aconditionthatwouldfrequentlyprevailduringagasattack.Foritemssuchasturrets,secondarybatteriesetc.,itwasconsideredthatinviewofthegreatpracticaldifficultiesinmakingsuchspacesevenreasonablygastight,thepolicytorelyoninrespectofthesespaceswasthatofindividualprotection.It was clear that the main questions regarding collective protection thatconfrontedtheUSNavywerethesameasthosewithwhichtheAdmiraltywasfaced. In conclusion the Board considered that progress in protecting thepersonnelofshipsagainstgasshouldbemadealongthefollowinglines:Tostakeeverythingatthistimeonagoodgasmaskandtoregardthisasthe

primary andmost effective defence. The Board suggested that the sooner thefleetwascompletelyequippedandhadgainedsufficientexperienceintheuseofthepersonalgasmask, thebetter.Ordersweregiven tocarryout researchandexperimentstoascertainhowtogetgasintoaship,andtoinvestigatethemeansofmakingthemoreimportantstationsgastight.Theinvestigationswhichweretheninprogresswereconsideredtobeonsoundandpractical lines,butwouldprobablyrequiremodificationoramplificationinthelightofexperiencegained.Strictproceduraltrainingwascarriedoutduringthe1920s,theoutcomeseems

tohavebeenthatindividualsafetywasfavoured,ratherthantryingtomakelargeareasgastight.NelsonandRodney(andKingGeorgeVclass1937)werefittedwithlimitedgasfilterarrangementsintheir largesuperstructures,whichwouldatleastensurethatmostofthebridgepersonnelwouldbeprotectedfromseriousharm,butthatseemstohavebeenasfarasitwentinthedaysofbattleships.

TheArrivalofAircraftDuring the Great War The Times newspaper was always noted for its livelyreviews on military matters and this of course continued into peace time. InDecember 1920, however, a series of letters regarding capital ships and theextentoftheirusefulnesssparkedoffadebateinwhichpracticallyeveryonewho

was anyone in naval circles joined.The controversy quickly spread to officialcirclesandbecamethegreatdiscussionoftheperiod.Afirstarticlehadappearedon29November1920underthetitle‘TheNavy–

A Question for the Nation’ and although it is too long to recapitulate here,suffice to say that it pointed out that, as a consequence of the enormousconstruction programme being undertaken by the USA and Japan, the BritishBattleFleetwouldsoonbe relegated to thirdplace rather thanherusualprimeposition. It asked ‘are battleships really the capital ships for the future or aresubmersiblesandaircraftreallythenewweaponstoconquerall?’At the end of the war even Sir John (Jackie) Fisher himself stated: ‘The

greatestpossible speedwith thebiggestpracticablegunwas,up to the timeofaircraft, theacmeofseafighting.Nowthereisonlyoneword–submersibles.’One of the most prominent naval officers of the day, the gunnery expert SirPercyScott,wasquick to reply to the letter to addweight to thedoomof thebattleshipandinfacthad,asfarbackas1914,beensayingthatsubmarineshadentirelyrevolutionizednavalwarfare.ManyfamousnameswereseenonletterswhichfloodedintothecolumnsofTheTimes.AdmiralSirCyprianBridge,SirHerbertKingHall,LordSydenham,AdmiralW.H.HendersonandAdmiralR.H.Bacontonameafew.Themostformidableantagonisttothebattleshipwasofcourse Sir Percy Scott who then came up with an article ‘What Use is aBattleship?’ (13 December 1920), and to this there were literally dozens ofanswers,ofwhichhetooknonoticewhatsoever.SirPercy’sarticleread:

Sir–Willyouhelpmeinmyignorance?Icannotgetananswertomyquestion‘Whatistheuseofabattleship?’ShemustbeofsomeuseortheUnitedStatesandJapanwouldnotbebuildingbattleships.Alotofnavalofficershavewrittentomebuttheyonlytellmewhatsheisnotuseful for, theywillnot answermyquestion. Isherusea secret thatonly a few know and will not disclose?Will it be disclosed by theCommittee of Imperial Defence who are going to tell what theweapons of the new navy are to be? Admiral Hall, a young andvigorous officer, who had wide experience during the war, will notenlighten my ignorance; he is only telling the public what thebattleshipisnotusefulfor.Whatisthegoodofthat?Beforewespend109millions on battleships and another 100millions inmaking safeharboursforthem,weoughttoknowwhatusetheyare.Now,Sir,dotryandenlightenmyignorance.AskLordSydenhamorsomeoneelsewhoknowsallaboutnavalaffairs.

As can be imagined the political cacophony that followedwas unprecedented,but one of the best replies came from someonewho signed himself simply as‘navalofficer’:(15December)‘Sir,–InreplytoSirPercyScott,onthelinesofthewell-knownnurseryrhymeIwouldsaythecapitalshipis:Theshipthatsinkstheenemy’scapital ship, thatprotects thecruisers that sink thecruiserswhichprotectdestroyers, that sink the submarines that attack themerchant ships thatbringthefoodthatfeedsthepeoplewhobuildtheshipsthattransportthearmythatdefendsthehousethatJackbuilt–theBritishEmpire.’ThecolumnsofTheTimeswereablazeformorethantenweeks,butafterthat

theeditordecidedtoendthedebateasitseemedtobegoingnowhere.Infactithadgotoutofhand.Therewascertainlynoeasyanswertobehadbythewrittenword–practical tests, trials and lengthyexperimentswereneeded togive anydegreeoftruthtothequestionofhowmuchusewasthepresent-daybattleshipinthelightoffouryears’wartimeexperience.Ships had been set aside after the war, there being no shortage of surplus

vessels.TheAdmiraltyatfirstputforwardafewofthepre-dreadnoughtstoseehow they would stand up against modern technology (Swiftsure andAgamemnon),butultimatelyexperiencewasneededinthedreadnoughttypeandasaresultMonarch(Orionclass)wasusedfrom1923to1925;Centurion(KingGeorgeVclass)becameRemoteControlTargetShip(1927–37)andEmperorofIndia andMarlborough (IronDuke class) were used extensively as test shipsagainstshellsandexplosivesofalltypes.

Monarchaftershelltestsandinamutilatedcondition.Herfunnelhascollapsed,thebridgeworkiswreckedandtheforecastledeckhasalargeholeinit.

Probably the most experimental battleship during the 1920s wasMonarch.She was used extensively for tests to see how armour strength in Britishbattleshipswould standupagainst light,mediumandheavyshells (seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).Shewasalsousedingasandchemicalattacks,andlaterforspecialteststoseehowmachineryintheRoyalNavy’scapitalshipswouldtakeaknocktoitsvitals.On1August1923shewasanchoredinelevenfathomsofwaterandacharge

of 2,081 pounds of TNT was hung from a boom fitted 40 feet below thewaterline and7 feet 6 inches from the side superstructure.HermachineryhadbeenpreparedinaccordancewithAdmiraltyinstructionsandsteamwasraisedinnumbers A1, A2, A3, A5, B1, B2, B4 and B5 boilers. Auxiliary steam pipeswereatworkingpressurethroughouttheship.Oilfueltanksinusewerein‘A’BoilerRoom(keeltosecondlongitudinalport)and‘B’BoilerRoom(secondtofourthlongitudinalport).Becauseofbadweatherthetestwaspostponeduntil4Augustwhenthechargewasignitedat09.06.Aftertheexplosionthevesselwasboardedandthefollowingnoteswerecompiled:At themoment of explosionboiler pressurewas evidencedby the liftingof

safetyvalvesimmediatelypriortothechargebeingfired.Aftertheexplosion,asfarascouldbeseenfromoutsidetheship,themachinerywascontinuingtorunsatisfactorily, the pilot light on the aft superstructure showed that the dynamoenginewas functioning and the funnel discharge appearednormal.As soon aspersonnelwere allowed on board and prior to permission being given for theEngine Room staff to open up compartments and go below, listening at thevariousventilatingtrunks,seemedtoshowthatnormalrunningoftheauxiliaryengineswascontinuing.Soonaftertheyreturnedonboardtheyobservedthatthefunneldischargefrom‘A’BoilerRoomwasdiminishingand,suspectinglossofsuctionoftheoilfuelpumpbecausetheshipwaslistingabout11degrees,shutofftheoilfuelpumpandoilfilterdischargesof‘A’BoilerRoom.Theboilersin‘B’,asfarascouldbeascertained,continuedtofunctionsatisfactorily.Atabout09.40 the hydraulic pumping engine ceased to work and a thick vapour fromburningoilfuelwasrisingfromtheportafterfanintaketo‘B’BoilerRoom,thedynamoenginehadstoppedandsteamwasissuingtoaconsiderableextentfromthecentreEngineRoomventilatingtrunkintotheaftersuperstructure.Becauseoftheriskoffirein‘B’BoilerRoomtheoilfuelwasshutoffat10.00.At10.10the centre Engine Room was entered but the steam vapour was too dense tolocatethecause.Astheaircleareditwasseenthatthestarboardmaincondenserinboarddoorwassplitandseawaterwasspurtingfreelythroughthefissure.Allseaconnectionswereshutasquicklyaspossible,butitwasfoundthatthebilgehadalreadyflooded toadepthof justover three feet.Allseavalveswerestill

workingfreely.

AfterCenturion,Monarchwasthebattleshipmostusedforexperimentalpurposes.Hertestresultsfurnishedmuchneededinformationtowardscapitalshipconstruction.Shownhereshortlybeforebeingshelled,sheislistingtostarboardtoexposeherarmourstrake.Notethewhitebandsaroundthehull(rangetakingaids).1925.

Thesteampressurein‘A’BoilerRoomhadremainedat10psi,fanswerestillrunning,mainfeedpumpsstillmovingandallwatergaugeglassesintact;afewboilerswereshortofwaterbutA1boilerwasleakingbadlyatthestarboardandblowdownvalve.Allfloorplatesweredisplaced,butladdersandgratingswerestillinplaceandslightleakshadoccurredhereandthere.TheoilfuelhadcaughtfireinthedrippansofA5boiler,butthisburntoutshortlyaftertheentryoftheexaminationparty.‘B’BoilerRoompressurewasthesameasthatin‘A’andtheonly damage here was confined to a few leaks on the main steam expansiongland;asmalloilfirewasinprogressinthefrontofB5boilerbutthiswaseasilyextinguished.‘C’BoilerRoomappearedtohavesufferedmorefromshockthan

either‘A’or‘B’,nearlyalltheglassfrontsofthegaugesbeingshattered,floorplatesdislodgedandmuchdustshakendown.Theboilersthemselves,however,did not appear to have suffered.Most of the auxiliary machinery in the arearemainedintactexceptforafewfracturestosomeoftheseawaterpumps,butonthewholetherewasnodiscernibledamage.All engines inuseduring the testwere triedbyhandand stillmoved freely

andappearedundamaged.The damage as awholewasminimal, the only failure being a reduction in

water pressure. It was considered that all auxiliary machinery in thosecompartmentsnotdestroyedor floodedat themomentofexplosion,couldstillhavebeenkept inusehad immediate accessbeen allowed.With regard to themain propelling machinery, the leakage from the starboard main condensercoverwouldpossiblyhavebeendiminishedbypadsandshorestosuchanextentastoallowtheuseofthestarboardengineswithmaincirculatorbilgesuctionsinoperation.Hadtheturbinesbeeninrunningconditionitwasconsideredtheliftwouldhavebeenmuchdiminishedsothatifthebladinghadfouledtheresultingdamagewouldhavebeenslightandtheturbineswouldhaveremainedusable.Itwas submitted that if any further trials of a similar naturewere carried out itwouldbeanadvantagetofitgaugesandequipmentontheupperdecksothatitwouldbeeasytoseewhatwasgoingondownbelow.ThistrialwasjustoneofthehundredscarefullycarriedoutbytheRoyalNavy

totrytoascertainhowcapitalshipswouldfarewhendamaged.Whiletheseandmanyotherextremelyvaluabletestsweretakingplaceduringtheperiodof the‘WhatuseisaBattleship?’debate(althoughpublishedin1920itcertainlyneverlostitsappealforthegeneralpress),testswerebeingcarriedoutintheUSAonan oldGermanwar prize, the battleshipOstfriesland, by theUSAAF (UnitedStatesArmyAirForce).Thedebateovertheshipbecameafiascoafterthepilot‘Billy’ Mitchell (Brigadier General William Mitchell) claimed after he hadbombedtheshipthatthedayofthebattleshipwastrulypast.Thesagawaslong,butbrieflywhathappenedwasthis:MitchellhadsethissightsonwhathesawasmagniloquentAdmiralsandSea

Lordsonboth sidesof theAtlantic, andafterattackingallof themverbally inarticles appearing in journals, periodicals and newspapers,went on to test histheoriesinapracticalmanner.AfterknockingtheoldcoastaldefencebattleshipIndianatobits,hemademovestogetOstfrieslandallocatedasasittingtargettobe destroyed by aircraft. Trials started on 20 July 1921 when the ship wasattackedwith230lbbombs,butof33bombsdroppedonlyeighthitswerescoredon themaindeckanddid littledamage.Later, 600lband1,000lbbombswere

used but none seemed to affect thewater integrity of the old battleship.Nextday, however, six more 1,000lb bombs were dropped, but only two madecontact.Onecausednodamagewhatsoever,buttheotherwasanearmissontheport sidewhichcaused thehull tocave in fromthe ‘waterhammer’effect– itopenedheruptotheseaandshebegantosink.Disappearingbeneaththewavesinaboutfortyminutes,itlookedlikeavictoryforthearrogantMitchellandtheanti-battleship brigade. In fact the test had proved little so far as the BritishAdmiraltywasconcerned–amatterofanold,unmanned,sittingtargetsunkasaresultofconstantbombing.Wouldnotacrewaboardhavesavedherbyisolatingthe areaof damage?Would shenot havebeen amoredifficult target if underway and yet more difficult if firing at the attacking aircraft? The Admiralty,although taking note of the ‘interesting’ trial, concerned itself with moremethodicaltestswhichwouldfurnishthemwithsoundinformationregardingtherealstrengthofmodernbattleships.EventhecommitteesetupintheUSAhadregistered its verdict: ‘It cannot be said that the battleship has becomesuperfluous because of the possibility of bombing attacks by aircraft. Thebattleshiprepresentsthehighestandultimatefightingstrengthofthefleet.’In 1923 more debates took place in the House of Lords regarding the

capabilitiesofcapitalshipstodefendthemselvesagainstattackingaircraft,anditwasaskedwhetherthewingsofseapowerhadbeenclipped?Itwaspointedoutasusual thatnewnavalweaponshadbeendeveloped (namely submarinesandaircraft)whichgreatlyweakenedtheoffenceinmodernseapower.Forcescouldnot,asbefore,becarriedacrosstheseas.Aweakpowerwithoutanavycould,intheory,challenge thestrongestseapowersimplybyhavingastrongminefield,anadequateaircraftandahandfulofsubmarines.EventhegreatAdmiralVonScheer,whocommandedtheGermanHighSeas

Fleet,astaunchbeliever inbattleships,was forced toconcede thatby the timetheGreatWarended thesubmarinehadproved itsworthandcould, in theory,holdoffafleetofcapitalships.Itwasaknownfactthathadtherebeenafleetofsubmersibles present in the Dardanelles in 1915 it would have been almostimpossible for any surface ship to approach the beaches for bombardment, aswas sooften accomplishedduring that campaign.Whatmore couldbe said toprophesyandhastethedemiseandultimatedoomoftheworld’sbattleships?Itisobviousthattherewasmorethanadegreeoftruthintheargumentsofthe

anti-battleshiplobby,butduringthedecadefrom1920to1930therewasmoretotheaffairthanjustquestionsofwhatusewerebattleships,orwhatiftheywerefacedwithafleetofsubmarines,orindeedcouldtheydefendthemselvesagainstasquadronofhigh-levelbombingaircraft?Theentiresubjectofdefencehadto

beaddressed,andtheAdmiraltywasonlytooawarethatsomeofthequestionswerealmostimpossibletoanswer.Themainquestionofcoursewaswhatwouldreplace battleships if they were all deleted from the world’s battlefleets?Submarinesandaircraftcarriersatthattimewerenotyetdevelopedtotheirfullpotential–therewasstillmuchtobedoneinthatarea.Moreovertherewasstilla need of a strong, fast, heavily armed type ofwarshipwhichwas andwouldalwaysbeneeded toprotect smaller ships–especiallymerchantvesselswhichcouldnotbelookedafterbysubmarinesorindeedaircraftatthattime.AlthoughtheSecondWorldWarprovedtobethefinalfrontierforthebigbattleship,thetypeneverlostfavourwithmanyoftheworld’snaviesanditcontinuedtoserveuntilwellaftertheconflict.Today (2011)battleships as a species are extinctbut it does seem that even

with all themodern technology –missiles, aircraft and submarines – the ‘biggun’stillhasaplaceinanywar.Therewasmuchspeculationwhenduringthe1991GulfWaraSilkwormmissilewasheadingforthebattleshipMissouri,andan uninformed press release declared: ‘She would have been completelywrecked.Her fatewould have been sealed.’Alarming statements and rivetingreading,butinfactthesestatementsweremadebypeoplewhoobviouslydidnotknowthefacts.Ofcourseitwouldbefoolishtosaythattheshipwouldnothavesuffered superficial damage, but it is very doubtful that shewould have beensunk.Likeallbattleships,shewasdesignedto take(anddeliver)a tremendouspounding – and that is why the battleships survived the barrage of opinionduring the interwaryearsandwhy theyhavenotbeencompletelyerased fromthe US Navy. TheWisconsin was decommissioned in 1991 and in 1996 wasmovedtotheNorfolkNavyYard.In2006,alongwiththeIowa,shewasstruckofftheNavalVesselRegisterandtheyweretobecomemuseumships.However,theUSCongresswasdeeplyunhappyaboutthelossofheavynaval

gunfiresupport,andpassedaDefenceActthatrequiresthebattleshipstobekeptandmaintainedinastateofreadinessshouldtheybeneededagain,andfurthermeasures have been implemented to ensure thatWisconsin at least could bequickly returned to active duty in an emergency. It is possible then that thehistoryofthebattleshipisnotcompletelyover.

AircraftinBattleshipsAfter countless trials from 1920 to 1930, therewas general agreement by theearly1930sthataircrafthadadefiniterolewithinthefleetatsea,andmanyofthe older battleships were given hangars and catapults during theirmodernization.Therewasastronglobbyofofficialopinion,however,thatheld

that such aircraft should be confined to aircraft carriers. The late 1920switnessedmanydebatesonthesubjectandtheCommander-in-Chief,DirectorsofWar,StaffCollegesandTacticalSchool,DirectorofNavalOrdnanceandtheAir Ministry featured prominently in the discussions. In about 1933–4 thegeneralopinionwasthatfighterswerethebestdefenceagainstattackingaircraft–aviewwhichoftenchangedfrommonthtomonth.Whatwasfullyagreedwasthat theexpansionof theFleetAirArmwasofparamount importanceand theuseof aircraft in conjunctionwith battleships and cruisers for tradeprotectionwasworthyofseriousinvestigation.ThefollowingpointsoutliningtheneedstobeconsideredwereplacedbeforetheBoard.

1. Operational, including the types of operation for which aircraft areessential,thefrequencyofsuchoperations,andthescaleofrequirementsofaircraftinrelationtothestrengthoftheforcesengaged.2.Technical,includingtheeffectsontheship’sdesignofcarryingaircraftincapitalshipsandcruisers,andthelimitationsinherentupontheoperationofaircraftfromsuchshipsimposedeitherbyweatherorbytheshipherself.3. Financial, to determine the most economical method of carrying theaircraftrequiredfortheoperationenvisaged.

Operational. It was obvious that aircraft were required in practically everyoperationlikelytobeundertakenbythefleetasawholeorbydetachedforces.Moreover aircraft were viewed as essential for the effective control of seacommunications.

Aircraftonbattleships–beforethefittingofcatapults,theonlymethodofflying-offaircraftwasbymeansofarampfittedoverthemainguns.Theaircraftenginewaspitchedtohighspeedandthenflownoff.ThisphotographshowsaSopwithPupflyingofffromWarspitec.1919.

Valiantportamidshipsshowingheraircraftandflying-offequipmenton‘B’turretc.1920.

Technical.Thetechnicalaspectofcarryingaircraftoncatapultswasdominated

bytwomainfactors:

1.The technical limitationsof theaircraft itselfwithespecial reference toitsabilitytolandandberecoveredatsea.2.Thelimitationsimposedupontheshipherselfbyreasonoftheinclusionofthecatapultandthespaceandweighttakenupthereby.Ithadalsotobeborneinmindthatcatapult-launchedaircraftdependedtoagreatextentoncalmseaandweatherforrecovery,whichprecludedtheirdeploymentonahighpercentageofdaysintheyear.

The limitations imposed upon the ship by carrying aircraft on a catapultwerediscussedin1936.Themaintechnicaleffectswere:

1.Thecatapultandhangarsoccupiedapproximatelyone-sixthoftheupperdeck space between the forward and after gunmountings in any class ofship. The remaining space was therefore congested and limitations wereimposed upon the arrangement of the secondary or HA armament whichwasalreadydifficulttositesatisfactorilyclearofblast.2.Theweightoftheequipmentwasconsiderable(approximately160tonsin the 1936 battleship). It was thought that with qualitative limitation oftotaldisplacement, touse thisweight inshipswith thefleeton‘oneshot’aircraft was uneconomical and would detract from other importantcharacteristicssuchasprotectionoroffensivepower.3. The modern type of fixed catapult, necessitating operating machinerybetweendecks,affectedaccommodation.4. The aircraft on the catapult could not be arranged satisfactorily to beclearofblastfromthehigh-angleorsecondaryarmament(itwasassumedthattheaircraftwouldbeflownoffbeforethearmamentwasfired).Itwasconsideredextremelylikelythattheanti-aircraftgunswouldbefiredbeforethe aircraft was required to be flown off, in which case it could not beguaranteed that theaircrafton thecatapultwouldstillbeserviceableafteranairattack.

Financial.Itwasdifficulttoassesstherelativeannualcostofcatapult-borneandcarrier-borneaircraft, but itwas thought that the formerweremoreexpensive.Theinitialcostofacatapultwasapproximately£17,000.

Theargumentsforandagainstcatapult-borneaircraftwere:For

1. They provided an increase in the required number of fighters and/orfighterspotterscarriedinthefleetsinceasmuchaspossibleoftheexistingcarrierspacewasrequiredforreconnaissanceandstrikeaircraft.2.Thebattleshiporcruiserflagshipcarryingafighterspottercouldbeself-contained as regards air spotting (with its attendant increase in hittingpowerandtheabilitytocarryoutindirectfire).3.Itwasheldbysomeofficersthatimprovedresultswereobtainedbytheclosercooperationmadepossiblebetweenshipsandaircraft’spersonnel.4. The offensive power of ships for subsidiary operations would beincreased.5.Thereweremorebasketsfortheeggs.

Against1.Aircraftoncatapultswere‘oneshot’aircraftandmustberefuelledorre-ammunitionedaboardacarrieronexpiryoftheirenduranceorammunition.Carrier-borne aircraft were capable of continuous operation. Catapultaircraft could not be recovered inweather thatwould not preclude flyingfromcarriers.2.Inclusionoffixedcatapultsrenderedthearrangementoftheupperdeckand secondary and HA armament (for long or close-range defence)unsatisfactory.TheefficiencyoftheAAarmamentwasthereforeimpaired.3.AircraftoncatapultswereliabletoblastfromAAgunsandarrangementswereverydifficulttocircumventthis.4.Theweightofcatapultswasconsiderableandwouldneedtobemetbylimiteddisplacementfromotherservices.5.Airspottingentailedalargeorganizationforreliefsetc.,andthesecouldonlybearrangedfromcarriers.6.Trainingofobserverswasbettercarriedoutandmoreeasilyco-ordinatedfromcarriers.

In1933theCommander-in-ChiefoftheHomeFleetmadeastrongpleaformoreaircraftinthefleet,especiallyoffighterandreconnaissancetypes,andrequestedastatementofpolicy.Thefollowingareextractsfromremarkspromptedbyhisletter:

1.‘Ingeneralstowageforfightersisnotprovidedincapitalshipsowingtospace restriction and difficulty of launching, a spotting aircraft being theprimary consideration. It is therefore considered that the provision ofadditionalcarriertonnageistheproperpolicyforincreasingthenumberof

fleetfighters.’(DNAD)2. ‘As a general rule battleships do not work singly or in pairs but insquadrons or fleets and the right place for aircraft is in aircraft carriersattachedtothesquadronorfleetcontroller.3. ‘My conclusion is that it is unwise to neglect any opportunity ofproviding for the transportofa limitednumberofaircraft incapital shipsprovidedtheirmaincharacteristicsarenottherebyimpaired.’(ACNS)4. ‘I agree with the general view that we must have as many aircraftavailableasispracticable,especiallyinviewofthevulnerabilityofcarriers,andthesmallnumberofshipswehave.’(DCNS)5. ‘It is essential that we make every reasonable use of such aircraftcarryingpoweraswecaninvesselsotherthancarrierstostrengthenourairdefences.’(CNS)

A staff meeting was held on 26 May 1936 to further discuss the policy ofcarryingaircraftincapitalshipsandcruiserseventhoughthenewprogrammeofBritishbattleships laiddown in1936was showinghangars andaircraftwithinthedesign(KingGeorgeVclass).Thesubjectwasstillunderdiscussionatsomelength.Itwasagreedthattheaircraftwerebetteroffincarriertypes,butthefleetdidnotpossessenoughofthetype.Moreover,itcouldbearguedthataircraftinbattleships and cruisers would be capable of reconnaissance on a scale notpossible by other ships of the fleet (i.e., destroyers and scouts etc.). Theconclusiveresultsofthemeetingsawthestaffrecommendingthefollowing:

1.Thatbattleships andcruiserswith the fleet shouldnot carry aircraft oncatapultsbutthatallfleetaircraftshouldbecarriedincarriers.2. That the carrier building programme be accelerated to provide anadequate number of efficiently borne aircraftwith the fleet and for tradeprotectionduties.3. That the carrier building programme required immediate review in thelight of the above and that after arrears had been made up it should becorrelatedtotheprogrammeofothercategories.4. The development of the autogiro type of aircraft should be treated asurgentandmoneydevotedtothenecessaryexperimentsforthispurpose.

Thegeneralsummaryimpliedthatwhensufficientnumbersofarmouredcarriershad been built, other light carriers should be built which would enable thebattleships and cruisers to have their aircraft equipment removed. This policyhadtwogreatadvantages:1.Moreefficientuseofaircraftwiththefleet.2.More

efficientuseofweightandspaceinshipsforoffensiveanddefensiveweapons.Itwasconsidered,however,thatuntilthistimearrivedthepolicyofcarrying

catapultsinothershipswouldcontinue.TheController,R.G.H.Henderson,onhearingofthisgeneralconsensuswasnothappywithit:

Ifindmyselfinentiredisagreementwiththegeneralpolicyoutlinedinthis paper.Although I have nowish to be unjust to the appreciationprepared by the naval staff, I do think that the disadvantages ofcarrying aircraft in ships have been very much stressed, while theadvantagestherefromhavebeentreatedintheoppositeway.Firstly, I do not think it should be argued too strongly that the

existence of aircraft in battleships and cruisers is due to limitationshithertoimposedbytreaty,althoughnodoubtthetreatyruleshastenedthedevelopmentofsea-borneaircraft.Further,thoughtheremaynowbeno limitationby treatyas to thenumberofcarriers,wehave it inanother form, namely cost, if the number of aircraft for fleet use ismaintainedatahighlevel.Itmustberememberedthat,withthedesignof armoured deck carrier, the maximum number of aircraft to becarriedis36,and,assumingwehavetenofthesecarriersthenbroadlyspeaking, the FleetAirArmwould consist of only 360 aircraft, andthese might well be distributed all over the world for commerceprotection,diversionsandotheroperationswhichmustnecessarilybeawayfromthemaintheatreofthewar.Ishouldthinkthatinawartheaircraftcarrierswillbekeptbusyandthatevensubsidiarymovementsandperiodicalsweepswillnecessitateoperationsbysuchships;whenthey get back to their base they will want to rest and yet theCommander-in-Chief in his base will probably require dailyreconnaissance flights, which I suggest should be done by the ship-borneaircraft.

Onlyexperienceduringthefollowingconflict(1939–45)wastosettlethedebatewhenitwasseenthatthebattleshiphadmovedasideasthecapitalshiptogiveprideofplacetotheaircraftcarrierwithitsaircraftandtheirdeadlybombsandtorpedoes. Aircraft equipment in battleships was of some value forreconnaissanceat thebeginningof thewar,but theweightandspace involvedandthepersonnel–whocouldmorepracticallybeusedelsewhere–showedtheineffectivevalueof this typeof fitting inanythingbut thepropervessel.From1942allaircraftequipmentandcatapultswereremovedfrombattleshipsandthespacewastakenupbystores,boatstowageandanti-aircraftbatteries.

CamouflageAlthoughthisbookisintendedtocovertheperiod1919to1939andnotmerelywarhistory, it hasproved impossible to stop shortof the1939–45conflict (ascanbeseeninthemainchapters).Camouflageisawartimesubjectandoneofthemostpopularandinterestingitemsbyfarforseriouswarshipenthusiastsandmodellers alike, and to that end it is therefore worthy of some discussion.CamouflagewasfirstusedinwarshipsduringtheGreatWaralthoughin1915itwasapplied inasomewhathaphazard fashionso thatno twoshipswerealike.Therewerenohardandfastrulesastohowashipshouldbepainted,orindeed,astothetypeofcoloursthatshouldbeused.Someofficial interestwasshownduring1916–17andobservationunitsweresetupaftercertainvesselshadbeengivendifferentpaintapplications.Inthebeginningonlyafewcolourswereused–usuallyvariationsofgreyandblack,butlaterbluesandgreenscouldbeseen.Camouflage in big ships virtually disappeared at the end of 1917 and did notappear again until Lieutenant-Commander Norman Wilkinson, RNVRdeveloped his dazzle painting methods and the Admiralty set up a properCamouflage School at Burlington House in London where many tests usingmodelswerecarriedoutundercontrolledconditions.Theresultofthis,sofarascapitalshipswereconcerned,wasthatonlyafew

ships were given the treatment: Revenge, Ramillies and the aircraft-carryingcruiserFuriousallreceivedfullyfledgedschemes.Ramillieswasverydifferentfrom Revenge as was Furious, as can be seen from the paint schemes. ThebattlecruiserRepulsewaspaintedupinatwo-tonegreyattheendofthewarasan experiment, and the effectwas not unlike that applied to that ship in 1941onlyinlightershades.Attheendofthewarcamouflagetookabackseat,butwaspickedupagain

duringtheearly1930sandathoroughinvestigationwasmadeintothematterofhow to apply suitablewar paint to different types of ship.The subject provedextremely complex and exhausting and although the schemes appliedwere inmostcasesratherspectacular inthebattleships, theachievementofsatisfactoryschemes and patterns was not accomplished easily. At the outbreak of theSecondWorldWarafewbigshipsweregiven‘oneoff’examplesofcamouflagewhich tended to emulate the earlier dazzle types but with fewer colours(Ramilliessevencolours,Revengefive–1918)(seeendpapers).Althoughthereare a few photographs of these ships taken during 1939–40, little informationwas collated about the patterns or colours because in some cases the schemeswereonlyevidentforafewmonths(certainlyinthecaseofRevenge,RamilliesandRoyalSovereign)andthereforewereneverrecordedofficially,whichleaves

somedoubtastotheactualcoloursused.Whenexaminingtheofficialaccountsoftheuseofcamouflageitisessential

to be sure of the realmeaning of the word.When discussing camouflage theactual terms of description used are: ‘invisible’, ‘visible’, ‘conspicuous’ and‘inconspicuous’.Invisibleinplaintermsmeanssomethingthatcannotbeseenwiththenaked

eyebecauseofitsnatureandposition.Visibleobjectsarecapableofbeingseen–usuallywithoutaid;butsomecomplicationarisesherebecauseonecanhavegood visibility, moderate visibility and poor visibility. When dealing withcamouflagethisdescriptionisbestavoidedinreferringtohowvisibleashipis.Conspicuousmeans easy to see, obvious or striking to the eye. Inconspicuousmeansnotreadilyseen,notboldorprominentinappearance.Thesetwolastdescriptionsarebestwhendescribingcamouflagebecauseitis

easiertoexplainhowsomethingbecomeslessconspicuousthantodescribehowthepaintingofashipinstrongdisruptivecoloursmakestheshipseeminvisibleor of doubtful visibility. A ship can be very inconspicuous if painted in onecolour,butonlyincertainconditions–ineitherbrightordullconditionsshewillbemostconspicuous.Ontheotherhandinmanyconditionsacolourfulpatterntends to scramble the outline, and the characteristics that identify a ship areaffected to some extent. The tremendous difference in illumination betweensunlightandovercastconditionscanaffecttheappearanceofacamouflagedshipin many ways, as can a moonlit or moonless night. Moreover, light differsgreatly from ocean to ocean; the extreme haze to be encountered in sometropicalwaterscallsforyetmorealterationtocolourtones.Althoughearlycamouflage(1939–40)underwentmanyformsinbattleships,it

wasclearlyunderstood that the functionofapattern inseacamouflagewas toreduce the range of visibility of the ship from aerial observation and fromsurfaceobservation including the submarineperiscope.At certain long ranges,however,thepatternsceasedtobeapparentandtheshipbecameauniformtone.TheAdmiraltyendeavouredtoachieveanoveralltonetoblendinwithexistingconditionswherepossible–hencethemanycoloursforhomewatersandgreysand blues inmany foreignwaters.Additionally, itwas decided that an enemyobserverorlookoutwouldhavenodataagainstwhichtocheckamovingtarget,andhisdifficultiescouldbecompoundediftheshipwerebadlyangledfromhispoint of view. So anything that might blur his image would be more thanbeneficial in rendering a ship less conspicuous.Once a shiphadbeen spotted,however,agood,colouredpatterncouldachievetwoimportantresults:

1.Causeconfusionofidentity.

2.Causeconfusionofinclination.

Sopatternhadtheseusefulfeatures:1.Reductionofvisibilitycausedbyatleastonetoneharmonizingwithitsbackgroundandreducingtheapparentsizeoftheobject and the psychological effect of the shapes left possibly visible. 2. Theobliterationof theviolentlyarrestiveshapesof the‘natural’patternof theshipresultingfromthehardcoreofunavoidableshadows.FromJune1940thebigshipssportedmanyweirdandwonderfulpatternsin

various colours, but the most used tones were light and dark grey (507b and507c–seedrawingsandphotographs).

QueenElizabethAttheendofherreconstructionshe left thedockssportinganearlyAdmiraltydisruptive type scheme of five different shades. This wasworn until her refitafterbeingdamagedinAlexandriainDecember1942.BarhamDarkHomeFleetgreyuntilthesummerof1940whenshewaspaintedupinanunofficial two-tone scheme (black and white). Repainted all grey for a shortperiodthenrepaintedinblackandwhiteagainunderthedirectionofPeterScott.Lostinthiscondition.(Seephotographs.)MalayaDark Home Fleet grey until the summer of 1940, then painted in two-toneunofficial pattern (grey 507a and 507c). Repaintedmedium grey after leavingtheMediterraneaninthespringof1941.WarspiteDarkHomeFleetgreyuntilthewinterof1941,thenpaintedintwo-tonegrey(asMalaya)butwithdifferentscheme(unofficial).ValiantDarkHomeFleetgreyuntilearly1941whenpaintedupintwo-tonegrey(507band507corpossiblyB5).WornuntilChristmas1942.RoyalSovereignEnteredthewarinmediumgreytone.Summer1940paintedinunofficialfive-colour ‘dazzle’ type scheme. Altered during this period to another ‘dazzle’schemebutwithfewercolours.Repaintedintwo-tonegreybyNovember1940.RoyalOakMediumgreyuntilsunk(1939).

RevengeDark Home Fleet grey at beginning of war until repainted in unofficial four-colour ‘dazzle’ type scheme by October 1940. Repainted in early 1941 inanother‘dazzle’schemewithfewercolours.RamilliesEnteredwarinmediumgreyuntilrepaintedin‘dazzle’inNovember1940(twoshadesofgreyandwhite).Repaintedallgreyinearly1941.ResolutionDarkHomeFleetgrey from thebeginningof thewaruntil thewinterof1940whenshewasrepaintedinanearlyexperimental two-tonegreywithfalsebowwave.NelsonDarkHomeFleetgreyfromthebeginningofthewaruntilmid-1940whensheappearedinadarkershade.Lightergreyduringthesummerof1941.RodneyDarkHomeFleetgreyfromthebeginningof thewaruntil late1940whensheappeared a shade lighter (colour unknown – probably grey) – wore anexperimentalschemeforashortperiodinthespringof1940(seephotograph)RenownMediumgreyatbeginningofwar.DarkergreyduringForceHperiod.RepaintedinearlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeinthewinterof1941.

AfullbroadsideviewofRevengein1940,showingaone-offunofficialcamouflage.Itconsistedofabout

fourshades,thelayoutbeingverysimilartothoseusedinFirstWorldWardazzle,butitwasbasicallyanexperimentandnotcarriedforlong.

Asuperbclose-upviewofRevengeshowingclearlyher1940camouflageshades.Noradarisyetfitted.RevengeandResolutionweretheonlyunitsoftheclasswithfunnelcapsatthisdate.

RepulseintheContrastpaintwork,1941.Notethestrangelayout.

ArareviewofRodneyshowingherone-offunofficialcamouflagescheme(brown,greenandgrey)intheSpringof1940.Theschemedoesnotappeartohavebeencarriedforlong.

RepulseMedium grey from beginning of the war until early 1941 when she wasrepainted in black and white ‘contrast’ scheme. Lost in this condition (seedrawings).GloriousFromthebeginningof thewar inmediumgrey.Repainted ina two-tonegrey.Lostinthiscondition.CourageousDarkHomeFleetgrey.Lostinthiscondition.FuriousDark Home Fleet grey throughout the early years of the war. AdmiraltyDisruptive1942.KingGeorgeVFromthebeginningofthewarintwo-tonegrey(possibly507variation)untilthespringof1941whenshereturnedtooverallmediumgrey.PrinceofWalesMediumgreyuntilAugust1941when repainted inearlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetype.Sunkinthiscondition.DukeofYorkTwo-tone Admiralty disruptive type (experimental) until the winter of 1941

whenrepainteddarkgrey.

Duringlate1940therewassomeconfusionregardingcamouflagemethodsandthe Admiralty ordered that all schemes be painted out with a view to furtherinvestigations.InDecember1940,however,thecommandingofficerofRepulse(CaptainW.Tennant) sent a report on the subject of camouflage to theVice-Admiral commanding the Battlecruiser Squadron, pointing out these salientfeatures:

1.HTM288ordersthatcapitalshipsarenottobecamouflaged.Isuggestthatifcontrolledandcarefullyworkedoutbythosewhohave studied camouflage and not left to thewhimof individualcaptainsandexecutiveofficers therearecertainoccasionswhenconsiderablebenefitmaybeobtainedfromit.2.Capitalshipsaretoobigtoattemptconcealmentbycamouflageexceptpossiblyundercertainconditionsoflightandwhenagainsttheland;whichconditionsareunlikelytoapplyinaFleetaction.3.On theotherhand, it is consideredpossible thatbymeansofefficient camouflage it is possible tomake a ship amuchmoredifficulttargetonwhichtoobtainanaccurateinclination.4. The gunnery officer of this ship reports to me that recentlywhen carrying out an inclination exercise on the ex-USAdestroyers itwasexceedinglydifficult toobtain their inclinationduetotheircontrastsinpainting.5.Isuggestthatinthecaseofbattlecruisersmuchcouldbedonemerelybycontrastoftwoshadesofgrey.6. Commander E. B. Clark, RN (retired) of this ship, who hasstudied the subject, has independently produced the attacheddrawings of this ship giving some idea of what might be donewithtwoshadesofgrey.7.Iwouldsuggest that if it isdecidedtogivereconsiderationtocontrast painting of capital ships, his ideas, in greater detail,mightbeofservice.

Inanswer to this itwasconcluded thatalthoughavarietyofdesignshadbeentried and rejected since thebeginningof thewar, itwouldbe an advantage tocamouflagethebattlecruisers,butbeforeproceedingwiththeproposalitwouldbenecessaryforthesubjecttobeofficiallystudiedindetailwithdueregardtopreviousevidence.Thefollowingobservationsondazzlepaintingwereoffered:

1.Itcalledattentiontothepresenceofaship.2.Itmadeashipmorevisiblefromtheair.ThisoccurredwhenHMSNaiad(camouflaged)wasseenbySkuaswhereasHMSHoodanddestroyers(notcamouflaged)incompanyatthetimewerenotseen.3.Atshortandmediumrangesitcausedtemporaryconfusionregardingthetypeandclassofshipuntilshewasexaminedthroughglasses.4.Couldonlybesaidtohufftheinclinatorundercertainconditionsoflightandrangefavourabletotheparticularschemeofcamouflageinuse.5.Contravenedthewartimepolicyofdarkeningallsurfacessoastoavoidgivingaircraftanaimingmark.6.Considerationgiventovisibilityatnight.

It had been established over the past twelve months (1939–40) that dazzlepainting was of value only against a land background and that the presentsuggestion was not for dazzle but for ‘contrast painting’ which it was hopedwouldrenderinclinationdifficultbycontrastinglargemassesoflightanddark.Theprinciplesputforwardwere:

1.Onlyverylargemassesofcontrastwereofanyvalue.2.‘Cutin’linesdonottellandshouldbeavoided.Theentireconstructionalfeaturesoftheshipneededtobecontrasted.3. A bow and stern painted comparatively light did, in fact, confuse theinclinatorandthehulllineneededtobebrokenifpossible.

To test these theories, two models, of Repulse and Furious, were painted asstipulated. Itwas founddifficult toapproximate toseagoingconditionsbut theexperiment established that inclinationwasmoredifficulton them thanon thesamemodelspainteddarkgrey,particularlyincertainconditionsoflight.Alandbackgroundrenderedthemalmostunrecognizable.Repulsewaspaintedupinaverydarkandaverylightgrey–almostwhite;

both colours were similar to 507b and 507c but were extreme. After tests –althoughwhensailingwithdestroyers itwas said thatRepulsewasdifficult tospot at night during certain conditions – this type of contrast paintwork haddisappearedbylate1941(seedrawings).During1941theAdmiraltyintroducedtheDisruptivetypeofcamouflageona

suggestion from the Experimental Camouflage School, but not content withlimitedsuccessfurtherobservationtrialswerecarriedoutatScapaFlowin1941.Theobjectofthetrialswas:

1. To observe any effects that might be at variance with Admiraltycamouflagepolicy.2.Toobservewhetherfull-scaletrialsconfirmedmodel-scaletrials.3.Todetermine theadvisabilityofemployingcamouflagedesignssimilarin principle to Western Approaches designs for general-purpose ships,particularlycruisers,capitalshipsandaircraftcarriers.4.Todeterminetheeffectofpatternonconcealment.5. To obtain telephotometric readings for summer conditions in the areaobserved so that correlations between natural and artificial conditions asproduced in the experimental tank could be checked and, if necessary,developed.6.Togivedesignersfurtherexperienceoftheeffectsofcamouflageasseenunderfull-scaleconditions.

Manydifferent types of vesselwere used but the following observationsweremadeonKingGeorgeV,DukeofYorkandAnsonfromtheshore:KingGeorgeV at a 3-mile range had a slightly better concealment value thanAnson. TheCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, had earlier requested that the colour MS1shouldbesubstitutedby507Awhichgaveadifferenceof9percentreflectionfactoranditseemedtowork.Itneededtobeseen,however,howfarthestrongercontrastingpatternofAnsonwouldproducethesameeffectat,say,threeorfourtimesthisrange.Insunlightanddiffusedsunlightbothships,byreasonoftheirbroken-upsilhouettesandcertainly indiffusedsunlightbecauseof their lightermean tones, weremarkedly less conspicuous thanDuke of York. Only in oneparticular intensityofsunlightwasDukeofYorkobserved tobedefinitely lessconspicuousthantheothertwoships.

CAPITALSHIPS:Camouflage,1941ContrastPainting

RoyalSovereigninMarch1941,justoffBermuda,showingamodifiedcamouflagescheme.Thecoloursaresimplylightanddarkgrey.

Ramillies,November1940,showingherthree-tonegrey,dazzle-type(unofficial)paintwork.

RoyalSovereignatGibraltarNovember1940,showingatwo-tonegreypaintworkscheme.

Malayainanunofficialtwo-tonegreycamouflageschemewhilstoperatingintheMediterraneanduringOctober1940.Ramilliesisthebattleshipbehind.

Ingeneralthetrialswereverysatisfactoryandproducedsomedatawhichwasconsidered to be of considerable value. It was felt that the results provedbeneficial to designers who were enabled on several instances to see theirdesigns working satisfactorily, and in cases where designs were not sosatisfactory the reason why was usually pretty obvious and the lessons learntwould bear fruit. Observers felt encouraged by the general improvement incamouflagedesigns.Althoughtherewasstillmuchtobelearnedandfaultstoberemediedthegeneraltrendsuggestedadefiniteadvance.Itwasfeltthatthiswas

due inno smallmeasure to the fact thatdesignershadbeenable toview theirmodels under conditions that generally represented natural conditions veryclosely. Although it was felt that some slight improvement was probablypossible and even desirable in the tank, the close resemblance to naturalconditionswouldonlyserve togivedesignersconfidence in the tank’sgeneralperformance. The high degree of cooperation afforded to the trials by theCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, wasmost satisfactory, indicating as it did,thekeeninterest theadministrativeauthoritieswereshowinginthequestionofsea camouflage and its complex problems. Moreover, it was considered thatcamouflageobservationtrialswerenowestablishedasarecognizedelementoftheweeklyprogrammeoffleetexercisesanditwasfeltthattherewouldbelittledifficultyincooperatingfurthertrials.Further research work was carried out at the Paint Research Station in

Teddington during 1942 and finally brought about a standardization ofAdmiraltycamouflagecolours.Thisworkwasconcernedwitha seriesofnineshadesofgreychosenasstandardsforAdmiraltyuse.Ithadthefollowingmainpurposes:

1.Toestablishasastandardofreferencethecolourandbrightnessvaluesoftheninestandardcolourssupplied.2.Toestablish the tolerance inbrightnessvalueallowable in thepracticalproductionofthesecolours.3.Toprepareanumberofsetsofstandardcoloursforfutureuse.

Thegreyshadesweredividedintoabluishgreyseries:B15,B30,B45andB55.The greenish grey serieswere:G5,G10,G20,G30 andG55 – the number ofcoloursindicatingtheapproximatebrightnessvalue(thesenumbersreplacedtheoriginal designations MS1, 2 and 3, etc.). In setting up this range of colourstandards special attentionwas paid to the correct choice of brightness levels.Fromlate1942thebattleshipscarriedthefollowingtypesofcamouflage:QueenElizabethRepainted in Admiralty Intermediate disruptive scheme on reentering serviceafter Alexandria damage. Slight variations to this scheme by May 1943.RepaintedAdmiraltyStandard typeduring1944(bluepanelonhull; lightgreyonupperworks).(Darkgreyupperworksby1945).MalayaAdmiraltyDisruptive type (seepainting)until late1944.Allgreybyspringof1945.

WarspiteSameschemeasin1941exceptvariationinshades.Scrappedinthisscheme.ValiantUnofficial Disruptive scheme painted up in late 1942/early 1943. RepaintedAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeinMay1943.RepaintedAdmiraltyStandardtypein1945.Allgreybyendof1945.RoyalSovereignStill two-tonegrey.RepaintedAdmiraltyIntermediatetypeinSeptember1943.LeftforRussiainthiscondition.Repaintedtwo-tonegrey(darkhull,lightupperworks)1944untilscrapping(1949).

Howeinthebuilder’syardshowingheroriginalcamouflageascompletedinNovember1942.Thecolourswereslightlyalteredatthebowatalaterdate(seeHowepage401).

RevengeRepainted early 1942with unofficial two-tonegreywhich shekept until 1943whenshewasrepainteddarkgreyRamilliesNophotographicevidenceduring1942,butrepaintedinAdmiraltyIntermediatetypeduringthesummerof1943.RepaintedAdmiraltyStandardtype1944(darkgreypanelamidships).Allgreyagainbymid-1945.ResolutionEarlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeduring1942–3.Repaintedallgreyin1944.

NelsonTwo variations of Admiralty Disruptive type from 1942–4 (green type).RepaintedAdmiraltyStandardtype(bluepanel).AllgreyagaininaboutMarch1946.RodneyEarlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypefrom1942untilscrapping.RenownRepaintedinearlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeinlate1941.Variationofschemein1942until1944.AdmiraltyStandard type (bluepanel)1945.Allgreyagainshortlyafterwar.FuriousRepaintedinAdmiraltyDisruptivetypein1942until1943–4thenallgreyagain.KingGeorgeVMedium grey until mid-1942 when repainted Admiralty Intermediate type.Repainted in1944withAdmiraltyStandard type.Repainted inPacific colours(darkbluehull,lightuppers)1945.DukeofYorkMediumtodarkgreyin1942,thenrepaintedwithdarkgreyhullandlightupperworks (1943). Repainted Admiralty Standard type 1944. Repainted Pacificcolours(darkbluehull,lightupperworks)1945.AnsonEntered service with Admiralty Intermediate type 1942. Repainted AdmiraltyStandardtypelate1944.HoweEnteredservicewithAdmiraltyIntermediatetype1942.RepaintedinAdmiraltyStandardtype1944.RepaintedinPacificcoloursduringspringof1945.

By 1943 in ships as large as battlecruisers and aircraft carriers it had becomeobviousthatonlystronglycontrasteddesignshadbeenreallyeffectivebecausecomplete concealment of the shipswas out of the question. The experiments,continued throughout the war and in 1945 most big ships were still wearingcamouflage of some sort, but although the final conclusionwas on thewholeunfavourable tocamouflage, itwasnotedthatsomeof theschemeshadshownsomelimitedsuccess.

Radar

Radio direction-finding (or Finders) was not a product of war, but rather adevelopment ofW/T transmissions, although the SecondWorldWar certainlypushedtheideaforwardtoaremarkabledegree.Inabout1933thepolicywastopickupapproachingaircraftbeforetheycouldbeheardorseenandanavalRDFexperimental works was set up later in the 1930s. The work was directedtowardstwomainthemes:1.Long-rangewarningofaircraftusingawavelengthofafewmetres.Thiswasachievedusingawavelengthofaboutfourmetresandrangesupto40mileswereobtainedusingmoderatepower.Thenduring1937/8thewavelengthwaschangedtoaboutsevenmetreswhichledtotheType79X.During1939thewavelengthwasagainreducedtothreetofourmetres,leadingtoType281.Thissetcouldalsodetectsurfacecraftatrangesoftheorderof10to20miles.Atthattimeaircraftcouldbedetectedatabout70to100milesataceiling of 10,000 to 15,000 feet. 2. Detection of surface ships using a 50cmwavelength.AtfirsttheonlyvalvesavailablewereoftheACORDtypebutlatervalvedevelopment,notablytheGECseries,ledtotheintroductionoftheType282seriesforgunnery,shipandlow-levelaircraftdetection.After the war started there began a period of valve development which

eventuallyenabledhigherpowertobeobtainedonawavelengthof10cm.Henceby1942thereweresetsavailableforlong-rangewarningofaircraftandshorterrangeforsurfaceships(Types279and281);short-rangewarningandgunnery(Type282,etc.);short-rangeonsurfaceshipsandafewmilesonaircraft(Type271series).OntheW/TsiderapidadvancesininterceptionandDFenabledatechniqueto

bedevelopedwherebywavelengthofafewmetrescouldbeinterceptedatverylong ranges and their direction found. The development was not regarded asvital, partly because attention was focused on longer HF wavelengths for theAtlanticbattle.ResearchindicatedthelinetobepursuedifwavelengthsofafewmetresweretobecomevitalfromtheinterceptionandDFaspects.The first ofmany setsproduced from1938were experimental, butby1942

theRoyalNavy’sshipshadpossiblythebestRDFequipmentintheworld.Eachtypehad its own function andhadbeendesigned accordingly.Battleships andaircraftcarriershadavarietyofaerialsandstrange-shapedobjectstohousetheequipmentwithin.Spaceprecludesmentionof thehugenumberof radar typesandtheirfunctionthatwasdeveloped,butthemostimportantones(certainlyforbattleships)aregivenbelow.Thefirstnavalsetsweredevelopedforairwarning.Thenumbersinsetswere

not in sequence (e.g.,281,285)but inmostcases setsdeveloped for thesamepurpose had similar numbers. Numbers started at relatively high figures,

probably because of the many early sets being numbered in sequence withnormal W/T sets. At first the early heavy aerials could only be fitted at themasthead(toobtainadequateheight),andbothmastheadshadtobeused–oneforsendingandoneforreceiving.InNovember1940orderswere issuedforoperationalfittingofan improved

type of AW radar. Most of the earlier research had been directed towardscontinualimprovementofmeansofdetectinghostileaircraft(particularlyatlowlevel).ThenewairwarningsetwasdesignatedType281.ItwasanSWG(shipwarning and gunnery) set and could give ranges of surface targets accurateenoughforgunnery.Wavelengthwasthreemetresandfrequency85to94MHz.Anintermediateset–Type280–didnotcomeintogeneraluse.Thisoutfithada wavelength of 3.66 metres and a frequency of 82 MHz. The object wascontinuallytoshortenthewavelengthwithincreasingfrequency.Rangeswereasfollows: Type 280 – six miles against battleship target, five miles against acruisertarget,threemilesagainstadestroyertarget,fivemilesagainstaircraftat100feet,sixteenmilesagainstaircraftat1,000feet,65milesagainstaircraftat16,000 feet. Type 281 – twelve miles against a battleship target, eight milesagainstacruisertarget,fivemilesagainstadestroyertarget,twomilesagainstasurfacedsubmarine,seventoninemilesagainstaircraftat100feet,38–50milesagainst aircraft at 3,000 feet, 88–115 miles against aircraft at 16,000ft.Accuracy:Type280–plus50yardsbetweenranges2,000–14,000yards;Type281–plus100yardsbetweenranges14,000–28,000yards.Thesehigh-poweredsetshadremotelycontrolledrotatingaerialsatthemastheadtoenableall-roundsweeping. Singled rod reflectors were used. The aerials required tall, well-supported masts, and fitting took at least five weeks; if masts requiredstrengtheningoralteration,however,thisperiodcouldbetenweeks.In1940–1bothmastswereused(onefortransmittingandoneforreceiving),buttheaerialswerecombinedononemastbytheendof1942.

VARIOUSTYPESOFEARLYRADARAERIAL

These sets were first installed in cruisers; indeed the Royal Navy’s policyregardingradarconcentratedprimarilyonequippingcruisersastheycameinforrefitbecauseinallessentialstheywerethe‘eyesofthefleet’.Types79X,79Y,279and281wereallearlytypesandallrequiredverytallmastswhichinmostcasesinvolvedconsiderabletopweight.ThefirstsetforbiggunswasType284and it was only used for the main armament in capital ships. The aerial wasmounted on the director (also doubled up and surface warning equipment).Method of operation was: Permanent watch was maintained on long-range

warningsets(79X,79Y,281and286).OndetectingatargetType285wouldbetrainedintherequireddirectioninanendeavourtopickitup.Ifsurfaceactionwere expectedType284would also be employed. If aircraft attack developedType285wouldengageatlongrangeand282atshortrange.AsummaryofearlyRDFprocedurewas:

1.Masthead search sets picked up target at long range and all AA gunsweredirectedtobearingoftarget.2.Type275or285pickeduptargetandtransmittedtoRadarOffice.Guns(5.25inand4.5in)followeddirectorandfiredwhenwithinrange.3.Foraircraftmakingdirectdiveortorpedoattack,Types282,283and262pickeduptargetfor40mmor2-pdrs,whilelargerHAdirectors(Types285and275)indicatedtargetbearinginitiallytoLA.Oncelatterhadpickeduptargettheyworkedquiteindependently.

RadarsetsinstalledinQueenElizabethclass(othervesselssimilarlyfitted):

NovemberType792–1Valiant;1940Type28Malaya,Warspite,Barham;1941Types 297 (JanuaryQE), 285 (four sets), RB unit L10, Type 282 productiondelay,foursetsfittedbyJune,Type284ValiantatAlexandria,Warspitetowardsendofyear;1943Type285PMalaya;1945fromJanuaryType274onforeDCTQE,Valiant,Warspite,Types277,293addedlater.

Interestingexperimentswerecarriedoutatthebeginningofthewar,usingoneaerialwithanother.Testsweremade inNelsonduringJune1940 todeterminetherangethatcouldbeobtainedonsurfacetargetsusingthestandardType282transmitter and receiver with aerials situated on the main armament directorcontroltower.Theaerialswerelargeparaboliccylinderswithanapertureof11feet4inches×4feet1½incheseachhavingapowergainofaboutonehundredtimes, i.e.,about ten times thegainof theType282aerials.Beingfixedto thedirectortowerandrotatingwithit,theaerialswerekeptonthetargetopticallyorbyinstructionsfromtheAdmiral’sbridgebymeansofflexiblevoicepipes.Onsearchingforaconvoyatseaoneshipwaspickedupat36,000yardsandthreeothershipswerefirstdetectedat33,000yards.

Rodneybuildingupspeedafterleavingportduring1938.Notethatthe79YRDFaerialisinplaceatthisdate.

Althoughthesewereexperimentalteststheyservedtoshowthatifoneaerialbrokedowntheothercouldbeusedinitsplace.HoodwasfittedwithTypes282,284and285inScapaFlow,butinsuchhastethatmanyoftheinstallationswereincorrectly wired. Tests were carried out ranging onKingGeorge V with thefollowingresults:

OutwardRun.11,000yards…saturationoftarget;14,000yards…10timesthesignal;16,000yards…6to8timesthesignal;27,000yards…VAtimesthesignal;27,300yards…thesignalwaslost.Theechowasveryspasmodic from25,000yards,but theplotof the run takenfromRDFrangesandbearingswasaverygoodone.Inwardrun.KingGeorge V came in on an unknown bearing and was picked up at24,700yards; itwasthoughtthatitwouldhavebeenpossibletopickup the target earlier but for the fact that she came in on the samebearingaslandechoes.ThedestroyersescortingKingGeorgeVwerepickedupat16,300yards.

TypicalfaultsfoundwithType284were:

1.Thetransmitterandthereceiverneededtobeproperlytuned.

2.Thebrilliancycontrolontherangingunitfrequentlyburntout.3.Badjointscausedoperationtobespasmodic.4.Switchpanelswereoftenfaulty.5.Voltagecontrolboardsoftenmalfunctioned.6.Aerialswereoftenconnectedthewrongwayround, i.e., the transmitterwasconnected to the lowerarrayand the receiverconnected to theupperarray.

RevengewasfittedwithType279and testscarriedouton28April1941gavethe following results: Aerial height – 160 feet above waterline (both aerials);distance of separation between aerials – 116 feet; working frequency 42KHz.Typeofcraft:smallfishingvessel–4,700yards;averagesizemerchantship–8,000–10,000 yards; convoy of 41 ships – 13,900 yards. A certain degree ofsuccesswasachievedwhenusingthesetfornavigationalpurposes.AswarprogressedtheRDFsystemsbecamemoreandmorecomplexandby

1944–5 capital ships’ masts were literally covered with many different sets,some single-purpose, some multipurpose and IFF and TBS aerials were alsointegratedwiththeSWandAWsets.Injustfourshortyearsradarhadbecomeoneofthemostimportantfeaturesofaship.

——Throughout the lives of the battleships, their crews almost always hadaffectionatenamesfortheirownvessels.Someofthemwereobvious,othersnotso, as can be seen. Not all ships’ nicknames were recorded, but perhaps thiscouldberectifiedatalaterdate?

Thunderer(OrionClass) ‘ThunderGuts’Tiger ‘Tigs’IronDuke ‘TheDook’or‘IronDuck’KingGeorgeV(1913) ‘HMSNever-budge’Ajax ‘TheQueenofHearts’Centurion ‘Century’or‘Cento’RoyalSovereign ‘RoyalQuid’or‘TiddlyQuid’Resolution ‘RollingRessie’or‘Reso’RoyalOak ‘OldOak’Ramillies ‘MuttonChop’QueenElizabeth ‘Bessie’,‘Lizzie’or‘Nessie’

Warspite ‘Warspider’or‘OldLady’Repulse ‘Beecham’Hood ‘TheMighty’ood’orthe‘’oodhavethoughtit’Nelson ‘Nellie’or‘Nelsing’Rodney ‘Rodo’DukeofYork ‘DuckofYork’Howe ‘Anyhow’Anson ‘Andsome’Furious ‘Curious’Glorious ‘Laborious’Courageous ‘Outrageous’

EarlyClassesthatSurvivedtheGreatWar

AftercompliancewiththeWashingtonTreatyin1921,theRoyalNavywasleftwiththesmallestbattlefleetithadhadforhundredsofyears.Britishbattleshipsleftinserviceby1922were:

Orionclass: oneship(fourbuilt)Thunderer.KingGeorgeVclass: (fourbuilt)threeshipsKingGeorgeV,

Ajax,Centurion(Audacioussunk1914)IronDukeclass: (fourbuilt)IronDuke,Benbow,

Marlborough,EmperorofIndia.QueenElizabethclass: (fivebuilt)QueenElizabeth,Barham,

Warspite,Malaya,Valiant.RoyalSovereignclass: (fivebuilt)RoyalSovereign,RoyalOak,

Revenge,Ramillies,Resolution.

Battlecruisers suffered severely,with the type becoming almost extinct. Thereremained Tiger, Renown, Repulse, Glorious, Courageous and Hood. WithGlorious andCourageous looking towards full conversion to aircraft carriers,justfourofthetyperemainedinservice.The oldest unit to survive (with the exception ofColossus as non-seagoing

TrainingShip)wasThundererfromthe1909estimates.Theoutstandingfeatureof theOrion class was that they were the first to carry 13.5in guns and oncompletionwerethemostpowerfullyarmedbattleshipsintheRoyalNavy.Theweakest featureof theOrions andmanyof those thatwentbeforeherwas thelocationoftheforemastinfrontoftheaftermostfunnel.ThewholeclassservedwiththeGrandFleetfrom1914to1919.Conqueror,MonarchandOrionwereplacedonthedisposallistin1922under

the termsof theWashingtonTreaty,ConquerorandOrionbeingsold in1922.Monarchwassunkasatargetin1925(seenotes).ThunderercontinuedtoserveasaseagoingTrainingShipforcadetsfrom1921until1926whenshewassold.

ThefourKingGeorges followedtheOrionsandonlyjustsurvivedthe1921scrapping campaign. They were modified and slightly larger versions of theOrion group, but with the faults of the foremast/funnel being rectified. AllservedwiththeGrandFleetfrom1914to1919.Audaciouswassunkbyamineon14October1914.Survivingshipswereplacedonthedisposallistorrenderednon-effective in 1926 under terms of the Washington Treaty. Ajax andKingGeorgeVweresoldin1926.CenturionwasconvertedforserviceasFleetTargetShip in 1926–7 (see notes). Rerated as Escort Ship in 1940, she sawmiscellaneousserviceintheMediterraneanandontheEastIndiesandRedSeastations from 1940 to 1944. Shewas sunk as a breakwater for theNormandyInvasionin1944.

Theforward13.5ingunsandsuperstructureofThundererwhilstservingasaGunneryTrainingShipforCadets,1921–26.

ThundereranchoredinMaltac.1922.Shehadbeenextensivelyrefittedduring1921especiallyforserviceasaTrainingShip,whichincludedtheinstallationofnewbathroomsandmodernlaundryequipment.

TIGER1926SeenheretowardstheendofhercareerOftensaidtohavebeenthemostgraceful-lookingwarship–irrespectiveofthelaterHood-shewasthefinaldevelopmentoftheLionclassandassuchwasadistinctimprovementoverthoseships,butshewasabattlecrcuiserandinheritedthedefectsofthattype.Note:massivecompassplatformhousing,largecontroltop,threeequalfunnels,stumppolemainmastandratheroddsearchlightarrangements.

KINGGEORGEVArmouredlayout,1919

TheonlysurvivingmemberoftheOrionclassaftertheGreatWanThunderer,seenherein1923inVik,Norway,wasusedasaBoysTrainingShipformanyyearsupto1926.

TIGERArmouredlayout,1919

Tigeropentothepublicorperhapsafamilydayforthecrew.Notetheguntompions.

OntheforecastleofTigerwhilstanchoredinWeymouthBayc.1926.

TigerinWeymouthBaycirca1924.ShewasafrequentvisitortoPortlandandbecameafavouritesightthereduringthe1920s.Herpassingcausedanoutburstofregretinthepress,butitwastoolatetosaveherfromtheWashingtonTreatycuts.

ThebattlecruiserTigerwasthelastshipforwhichSirPhilipWatts,asDNC,wasresponsible.TheoriginaldesignwasbasicallyamodifiedQueenMarywithslightlybetterfeaturesallround.WhileadistinctimprovementoverQueenMaryandtheLions,overallprotectionwasstillinadequatetowithstandheavycalibreshellfireandonthebasisofJutlandexperienceTigerwasnotgenerallyregardedashavingbeenequaltotheGermanDerfflingerinall-roundfightingefficiencydespiteaheavierarmament.SheservedwiththeBattleCruiserForcefrom1914to 1918 and was paid off into Reserve status in August 1921. She served asGunneryTrainingShipatPortsmouthfromFebruary1924untilJune1929.AfterayearwiththeAtlanticFleetshewasagainpaidoffintoReservein1931underaclauseofthenavaltreaties(seenotesontreaties)andwasfinallyscrappedatRosythandInverkeithingfromFebruary1932.HerdeparturefromservicewasseenasthepassingofthemostgracefulandhandsomeshipintheRoyalNavy,regardlessofwhatwassaidofHood.WiththescrappingofTiger,EmperorofIndia,BenbowandMarlborough(see

IronDukeclassfornotesofthesethree),theRoyalNavy’scapitalshipswereatanall-timelowofjustfifteenvessels.CenturionasRadioControlledTargetShipBy 1927 the only unit of theKGV class left wasCenturion which had beenselected for Radio Controlled Target Ship to replace the ageingAgamemnon.Paid off into dockyard hands for conversion on 14April 1926 she reappearedstrippedofallsmallfittingsinJuly1927(seetable).Asshewasonlytobeusedfor fleet firing against shells up to 8in calibre her general appearancewas notdrasticallyaltered,butlater(1933)herrigwasfurtherreducedtoprepareherforhigh-levelbombingbytheRoyalAirForceandFleetAirArmina‘Navyversus

Aircraft’competitionwhichwouldfurnishinformationforthe‘VulnerabilityofCapital Ships’ debate.Many testswere carried out on the old shipwhichwascontrolledbyradiofromthedestroyerShikariwhichfromasafedistancetookaseriesofphotographsofthefallofshotandofbombsfromaircraft.Continuinginthisroleforaboutfouryears,sheservedherpurposewellbut

by1937waslookinglikeapatchworkquiltafterthemanyhitsonherhullandupperworks.Althoughthe testsdidnotgiveconclusiveevidenceof thedemiseofthebattleship,itdidhighlightthefactthatshipswerebecomingincreasinglyvulnerabletoaerialattack.

Amovingscenewitnessedonlybythecomplementsofthetwoshipsinthephotograph.CrewsofTigerandRepulsecomealofttocheereachotherasTigerfinishesherlastcommissionbeforebeingdecommissionedandfacingthescrapper’storch.ThelastcruiseofthebeautifulTigeriswellrememberedbyallwhosailedinhertothisday.April1931.

OneofCenturionslastappearancesinheroriginalconditionbeforebeingalteredasTargetShip.ShownhereatFleetReview,Spithead,26July1924.

AjaxsailsinMalta1921.

KINGGEORGEVCLASSCENTURION1914

Centurionindrydock,1920.ShewastemporarilyplacedinReserveatMaltainMarch1920butrecommissionedforfurtherservicewiththeMediterraneanFleetinAugustofthatyear

Testingthewaterlinearmouredbeltandbeingsaturatedbymedium-calibreshellfirewhilebeingmanoeuvredbythedestroyerShikari.

Close-upofCenturionaftertheGreatWar,c.1921,showingtheculminationofwartimeadditions.Notethetripodlegsontheforemast–lowdownconnectionwithsinglepoleonceabovethecharthouse.

CenturionnowpartiallystrippedforuseasTargetShip:nosearchlighttowersonsecondtunnel,all13.5ingunsandturretsout,nostumpderrickandnoupperworksormasts.22September1930.

In September 1937 a series of bombing testswerewitnessed by the cruiserCuracoa. The outstanding impression of the five days’ bombing was thedependenceofallbombingoperationsuponfavourableweather.Theweatheratthetimewasdescribedbyholidaymakersasideal,yetaperfectdayforbombingwas never to be had and on themost successful day littlemore than half theprogramme was carried out. It was found that high-level bombers required aclearskyandgoodvisibilityuptotheheightselected.Areasonablehorizonwasalsoarequirement.Aircrafthadtoassessthewindfromtheheightatwhichtheywereflying,dodgingcloudswhennecessary,andanyerrorinwindestimation,aswasonlytoofrequentandprobableonagustyday,hadaconsiderableeffectonaccuracy,giventhatthedurationofthebombs’fallwasintheorderof25to30 seconds. In fact, it was seen that precision bombing in gustyweatherwasalmostimpossible.Toofineweatherontheotherhand,withextremevisibility,laidtheattackersopentoaccurateanti-aircraftfirethroughouttheapproach.Inthisconnection,thefirstday’sbombingwasmostinteresting.Ittookplace

underidealconditions.(Therewasnoquestionoftacticsduringthetrials.)Thehazy weather introduced a not inconsiderable navigation problem and twoaircraftfailedtofindthetargetatall!TheaircraftthatdidfindCenturionwereabletobombfrom10,000feetinsafetybecausetheywerealmostinvisiblefromtheship.Ofthe21bombsdropped,however,onlyonehitthetarget.Onthelastafternoon,however,whenbombingfrom10,000feetseveralcrewsestimatedthewind from that height by means of a sea marker and then found themselvesforceddowntoabout8,000feetinordertomaketheirattack.Theerrorinwindsettingcausedbythiswassufficienttoannulanychanceofsuccessfulbombing.Itwasalsofoundthatdive-bombingwaslessdependentonvisibilityconditions,butitwasnoteworthythatgoodresultswerenotachievedinstrongwinds.Testswerecarriedoutat2,000feetandasexpectedtheresultsimprovedgreatly.Theconclusionsdrawnwerethatalthoughthedive-bombersachievedthebest

results, andhigh-levelbombingwas limited in itsuseat sea, attackingaircraftwould pay a heavy price when approaching a fully manned and fightingbattleship–butitwasconsideredtobeapriceworthpayingiftheshipcouldbesloweddownorcrippled.

Anotherholetorepairafterbeinghitintheafterfunnel.Ashellhaspassedstraightthroughthefunnelwithoutexploding,leavingalargegapinghole.Centurion,1930.

AnexcellentportbowviewofIronDukeasshesailedtowardsMalta,c.1921.Notetherangeclockonthecontroltop.

IronDukeClass

DesignTheoriginaldesignwasforamodifiedKingGeorgeV21-knotbattleshipwithfourbroadsidetorpedotubesandnosterntube.Five layoutsweresubmitted to theAdmiraltyby theDNCPhillipWatts,all

featuringamainarmouredbeltof12inthicknessandrunningfor360feetofthehull.AlthoughfollowingthelinesofKingGeorgeVingeneral–includingmainarmament, a distinctive retrograde stepwas seen in the sketch proposalwhichfeaturedareverseinthemast/funnelarrangementasintheearlierOrionclassof1909(seesketch).Duringpreparation,however,thedisadvantageswereforciblypointedout and the ideawasnotpursuedany further.Of the five layouts (seetable)M1Vwasapprovedandfundswereallocatedforfourofthetypewithoutquestion,awarwithGermanyseemingverylikelyandsoonerratherthanlater.EnlargeddimensionsovertheKingGeorgeVsandIronDuke(sonamedlater

during construction) represented the ultimate development of the basicOriontype fromwhich the designwas evolved through the interveningKGVs. TheywerethefirstBritishdreadnoughttypewitha6insecondarybatteryandthefirsttobegivenanytypeofanti-aircraftguns.As completed theywere nominally 2,000 tons heavier thanKingGeorge V

withincreasesof25–26feetoverallinlength,1footinbeamand6inchesonthedesigned draught. The marked rise in displacement was necessitated by theheavierandbetterprotectedsecondaryarmament,augmentedtorpedoarmamentandslightlyincreasedfuelcapacity.Therewasadesigncalled‘MV’whichwasthesameas‘MIV’butwithanarmouredbeltreducedto8inand7in,butitdoesnotappeartohavebeengivenanyfurtherconsideration.The additional length in this class was allocated over the forecastle and

quarterdeck,intheformercasetoprovidesomebuoyancyagainsttheweightofthe6inbatteryandsetitbackfromthebows,andinthelattertoaccommodatethe twomaindeck6ingunsaft.The freeboardwasconsiderably lower than inmanyof thepreviousBritishdreadnoughts and, in fact,wasnot equalleduntilthearrivaloftheRoyalSovereignclassin1913.Themainarmamentlayoutwas

practicallyidenticalwiththatofKingGeorgeVbutwithdirectorcontrolinalloftheclassascompleted.The6ingunhadlastappearedintheKingEdwardVIIclass(1906–7),butas

an auxiliary to the main armament rather than for anti-torpedo purposes forwhich12pdrsand3pdrswereprovidedand,inconformitywiththeideasoftheFirst Sea Lord (Admiral Fisher), none of the intervening classes had carriedanythingheavierthana4inanti-torpedoarmamentdespiterepeatedcriticismofitsineffectivenessagainstcontemporarydestroyers.As shown in the tables one of the original designs had featured a 4in

secondary armament, but a report prepared by Admiral Mark Kerr in 1909suggesting the change andnoting themajorityof serviceopinion favoured the6ingunforanytorpedoworkaswellasgeneraluseagainstheavyshipsduringclose-range action, made the 6in battery almost the principal feature of thedesign.

PROPOSEDM4DESIGN:IRONDUKE

Theywere the firstBritishdreadnoughts tobegivena ratioofprotection todisplacementequaltotheGermanKaiserclasswhich,infact,hadbeendesignedsome three years earlier. Theywere excellent ships as completed, and almostunequalleduntilthearrivalofthe15ingunnedQueenElizabethclassin1915.

BowviewofIronDuke,1929.

RigFulltripodforemastclosebeforeforefunnel.Talltopmaststeppedabaftcontroltop.Short topgallantmast stepped before, except in Emperor of India which

completedwithshortflagpoleonly.Heavyforwardstrutatstarfishbelowcontroltop.

Nomainmastascompleted.W/Taerialscarrieddirecttothesternoraftersuperstructure.Tallderrickstumpformainderrickfittedclosebehindsecondfunnel.Veryshort

stumpsabeamthis(P&S).Long derrick slung from each forward corner of after superstructure. These

could be topped up vertically or crossed against forward face ofsuperstructure.

The rigwasvery similar to that ofKingGeorgeV except that this classwerecompletedwith full tripod foremast.Theywere the lastbattleshipsbuilt forthe Royal Navy with the distinctive single masted rig which had been afeatureofthethreeprecedingclasses.

OnthequarterdeckofEmperorofindioshowing‘Y’turrettrainedtostarboard.Notethedarkergreycolouroftheship.

EmperorofindiaongunneryexercisesintheMediterranean,1921/22.

On-deckviewofironDuke–theboatdecklookingaft,1926.

TrainingandboatdrillonboardMarlboroughwhilstbeingusedasSpecialBoysTrainingShipin1927/27.

IRONDUKEArmouredlayout,1920

VerysimplebridgeworkascompletedwhichremainedmoreorlessunchangedthroughouttheGreatWar(seeauthorsBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).

AppearanceConsiderednotsuchgood-lookingshipsasKingGeorgeVmainlybecauseofthesmallroundfunnels.SternwalkfittedinallexceptEmperorofIndia.DistinguishablefromKingGeorgeVby:

1.Forecastlebatteryand6ingunoneachsideofmaindeckaft.2.Smallroundequal-sizedfunnels.3.Full-lengthtripodlegs(KGVsimilarfrom1917).

Individualdifferences(ascompleted):

IronDuke:Smallrangefinderoverbridge.Marlborough:Norangefinderoverbridge(1914only).Benbow:Shallowtriangularstruttoderrickstump.Emperorof India:Nosternwalk;nostrut tomainderrickstump(added1915–16).

AftertheNavalTreatyof1930itwasconcludedthattheIronDukeclasswouldbe scrapped with the exception of Iron Duke herself which would bedemilitarizedandputtouseasaGunneryTrainingShip.TherelevantclauseinthetreatystatedthatIronDukewastoberefittedassoonaspossible,infacttheworkwas to be commencedwithin twelvemonths of ratification of the treaty

andhad tobecompletedwithineighteenmonths.Agreatdealof thoughtwasgiven to her demilitarization and the question arose as to what smaller gunscouldreplacethe13.5inwhichweretoberemoved.Twin 8in were verymuch favoured at the time, but these would involve a

greatdealofrearrangementofthebarbettesandsupports,so6inand4.7inwerefitted,butsomeexperimentalfittingsweretestedthroughoutthethirtieswithaneyetorefittingotherbattleshipswithasuitablesecondaryarmamentwhentheirtimecameforreconstruction.Atotalof4,258tonswasremoved

IRONDUKECLASS:GENERALPARTICULARS,1919

Displacement(tons):26,300(load),31,620(deep)(averageforclass).Length:580ft4in(pp),623ft9in(oa)(averageforclass).Beam:90ft1in.Draught:28ft10in(load),32ft6in(deep).Armament10×13.5in45calMkV,12×6inMkVII,4×3pdr5×MG,2×3inAA,4×21in(submerged).ArmourMainbelt:l2–9–8in,bulkheads:6–4in,uppersidebulkheads:8in,barbettes:10–9–8–4–3in, turrets:11–5½–4in,CT:11–6–3in,decks: forecastle1 in;upper2–1¼in,main1½in,middle2½in-1in,lower2½,magazinescreens1½in.Searchlights: 8 × 36in, 2 × 24in signalling. Improved control arrangementfitted.AircraftRunwayson13.5inturrettops(‘B’and‘Q’).EmperorofIndiafittedfortowingkite (balloons). During post-war period aircraft not normally carried, butembarkedwhenrequiredforexercises.MachineryParsonsdirect-driveturbinesdriving4propellers.Boilers:18Yarrow(Babcock&WilcoxinIDandBenbow).SHP:29,000for21knots.Radiusofaction:8,100nmat12knots.Fuel (tons): 900 coal normal load, 1,050 oil, 3,250 coal max. Max. speedslightlylessthan20knotsduetoextraweightsadded.Rig: Short topmast and no topgallant. Very long forward strut at starfish inEmperor of Indio and IronDuke. TwinW/T spreaders on after superstructure(shortinEmperorofIndia,tallinotherthree).

AppearanceConsiderably altered and generally heavier-looking than in 1914 owing towartime modifications. SL towers added, enlarged control top, aircraftplatforms, reduced rig, turret scales painted up at end of war (painted out byearly 1919), range clocks on face of control tops and at rear of aftersuperstructure inIronDukeonly.Clinker screen to fore funnel inEmperorofIndiobutremovedbyearly1919.IndividualdifferencesBenbow: Small hood over director tower (only ship thus, removed 1921),shallowtriangularstruttoderrickstump(deepinothers).Marlborough:Longmiddlebridgewings(from1916).Emperor of India: Clinker screen to fore funnel. No sternwalk. Short W/Tspreadersonaftersuperstructure(tallinothers).Iron Duke: 6in director towers on lower bridge (upper in others). from IronDukeand202tonsofnewequipmentwereadded.

Benbow was placed on the disposal list in 1930; Emperor of India andMarlboroughin1931and1932respectively.From1932onlyIronDukewasleftinservice.ShewasdemilitarizedfromNovember1931untilSeptember1932.‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets removed (barbettes retained). 6in secondary armament

retained.Two4.7inAAaddedonquarterdeck,bothoncentrelineonandabaft‘Y’ barbette. 4in AA on after superstructure was removed. Small AA gunmounted on crown of ‘B’ barbette. Rangefinder on after superstructure wasreplaced byHAdirector. TT removed.Belt and side armour between ‘B’ and‘Y’barbetteswasremoved.Conningtowerwasremoved.Batteryarmour,deckand internal protection was retained. The forward group of boilers weremutilated and the remaining boilers converted to burn oil only. Speed wasreducedtoabout18knots.1933–5: 4in AA replaced on after superstructure; 4.7in AA on quarterdeck

wasremoved(autumn1935).1939: Twin 5.25in dual-purpose turret mounted abaft ‘Y’ barbette for

experimentalpurposes.1939–45: More or less unchanged except that some of the 6in guns were

removedandmanyAAgunswereaddedwhileservingasDepotandBaseAAShipatScapa.Although theNaval Treaty of 1930 dealt the death blow to the other three

ships of the class, it was advantageous to the Royal Navy in that these shipscould be used experimentally to determine the degree to which a modern

battleshipwouldstanduptobattledamageandretainherstructuralintegrity.Tothisend,itwasagreedtoplaceEmperorofIndiaandMarlboroughinthehandsofHMSExcellent,theGunneryTrainingSchool.Thefollowingtestsweremadeinthetwoshipsduringthenexteighteenmonths(from1931):

MARLBOROUGHAscompleted1914

1.Effectofgunfirefromdestroyersonbridgeworkduringnightfighting.2.Flashtightarrangements.3.Attackby13.5inshells.4.Aerialattack.5.Bridgeandcontrolpersonnelprotection,etc.6.Anti-torpedotests.7.Pressuretestsonhullandinternalbulkheads.

In1931EmperorofIndiaunderwentfiringtestsatseawhenshewashittwelvetimes and severely damaged. After practically sinking and being raised, shemanagedtoreturnandwasscrappedshortlyafterwards.Marlborough underwent a very different set of trials, mostly internal, and

thoroughblastventilationandbulkheadstrengthcomparisonswerecarriedoutinher. A small crew was left on board to photograph and make notes of theprocedures. Trial 1 was carried out on 21 July, Trial 2 on 24 July 1931, thepurpose being to determine how the explosion of an entire magazine – andpossible loss of the ship – could be prevented should one or more cartridgesignitenomatterwhatthecause.

EmperorofIndiaopensfirewithhermainarmamentduringoperationsintheBlackSeaagainstBolshevistforces,1919/20.

Sub-zerotemperaturesonboardMarlboroughinJanuary1920whilstanchorednearSevastopolevacuatingRussianrefugees.

IRONDUKECLASSMarlboroughmagazinetests,21–24July1931

IronDukeinWeymouthBay1927/8.

Close-upofMarlboroughin1929,showingherfinalbridgeandfunnelappearance.Ayearlatershewaslaidupwithaviewtobeingscrapped.

EMPEROROFINDIA1925

DEMILITARISEDIRONDUKE,1937

Some internal alterations were effected in Marlborough in that Trial 1represented the smallest 16inmagazine inNelson. Trial 2 represented the 8in

magazineinthecruiserNorfolk.Inbothtrials,one16inchargeof498lbofsize45MCcorditeplusthree16incartridgesinopencases(total249lb)wasplacedupagainstabulkheadofchosenvalue.Bothtrialswereextremelysuccessfulinthattheexplosionventeditselfoutof

the ship by the designed route and caused no fatal damage by re-routing andsettingoffothermagazineshadtheybeeninlocation.Thetestswererecordedonfilm, but the film has yet to be found! The explosions were heard (from thequarterdeck observers) as a faint rumble followed one second later by jets ofsmoke from ‘B’ 13.5in gunmuzzles.A half-second later high-pressure smokeissued from ‘B’ gunhouse including the turret aprons. After about nineteensecondsthesmokehadceased.Noflamewasobserved,butexaminationofthebulkheads later indicated that there had been flame and great heat in the areawhichwassprayedwithwaterforeightminutes.Onenteringtheareaabout1½hours later itwasevident that therehadbeenmuchdamage,particularly to thebulkheads, but the main explosion had vented itself from the handing roomthroughtheventplatesprovided(seedrawingsforlocation).

InMarch1939,withtheincreasinglikelihoodofwar,thequestionwasraisedofrestoringIronDuke toherformergloryandstrength,proponentsoftheideapointing out that the Japanese had worked wonders in modernizing to aremarkabledegreetheiroldbattlecruiserHiei.

AuniqueviewofEmperorofIndialayingjustoffPortsmouthafterbeingseverelydamagedandbottomedbyshellingtests,1931.Notethatallsmallfittingshavebeenremoved.Soonafterthephotographwastakenshewastowedawaytobescrapped.

IronDuke’s armourwas the first consideration and itwas proposed that an11inmainbeltberunbetweenherupperandmaindecks(KCarmour,1,750tonsor non-cemented, 1,200 tons); hull to bulged similarly to theRoyal Sovereignclass,and4inarmourtobelaidoverthemaindeck.The13.5inturretswouldbereplaced and the secondary armament completely renewed with four to eight4.5inor5.25inguns.Themainargumentagainst theprojectwas thequestionof speed; theentire

boiler/engine/machineryarrangementswouldhavetoberenewedtoachievethedesired increase, and with outside estimates ranging from £920,000 to£1,200,000,whichcouldbebetterspentonanewship, it isnotsurprisingthattheideawasdropped.

History:IronDukeAftertheGreatWartheIronDukeclassformedthe4thBattleSquadronandassuchwereveryeffective.(Fortheirservicehistory1914–19seeauthor’sBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne.)21November1918PresentinthesouthernlineatsurrenderoftheGermanHigh

SeasFleetofftheFirthofForth.

21 March 1919 Commissioned for service as flagship of newly reconstitutedMediterraneanFleet(4thBS)onabolitionofGrandFleet.

April1919RelievedSuperbasflagship,Mediterranean.April–June1919OperationsagainstBolsheviksinBlackSea.11August1919LeftAlexandriaforMalta.April1920SmallrefitatMalta,flagtemporarilyflowninAjax.June–July1920OperationsagainstTurkishNationalistsinSeaofMarmoraand

atConstantinople.July1920ShelledTurkishNationalistforcesatBeicos.9March1921RecommissionedatPortsmouthforfurtherserviceasflagship,C-

in-CMediterraneanFleet(4thBS).5April1922ReachedBosphorusfromMaltawithAdmiralSirJohndeRobeck

onhisfarewellvisit.14April1922LeftConstantinopleforMaltavisitingChanak,Mitylene,Smyrna,

Limassol,Haifa,PortSaidandAlexandria.28April1922ArrivedMalta.12May1922LeftMaltaforMarseilles.15May1922ArrivedMarseilleswhereflagofAdmiralSirJohndeRobeckwas

replacedbythatofAdmiralSirOsmondBrock.May1922ReturnedtoMaltaandlefttovisitAlexandriaandPortSaid.23May1922ReachedJaffawherethefollowingdayoneofhersignalmenwas

drownedwhilebathingfromthebeach.July1922VisitedHaifa,CyprusandSmyrna.12July1922ReachedConstantinople.31July1922WiththeFleetleftConstantinopleafterGreekthreattocityduring

Graeco-TurkishWar.20August 1922VisitedTuzlaBay (whereSultanSelimYavuzwas lying) and

KiliaLimanbeforereturningtoConstantinople.31August1922LeftBosphorusforroundofvisitsinAdriatic.2 September 1922 In Doro Channel when she received urgent instructions to

proceed to Smyrna to protectBritish interests during the rout of theGreekarmy.ReachedSmyrnathenextday.

9–13 September 1922 During the massacre and fire at Smyrna she wasendeavouringtomaintainorderandassistthevictimswithAjax.

3October1922CarriedAlliedrepresentativestotheMudaniaConference.5October1922CarrieddelegatestoConstantinoplefromMudania.6–8October1922LyingatMudania.

17 November 1922 Landed an armed guard at Constantinople to escort thedeposed Sultan Mahommed VI to the harbour for passage into exile inMalaya.

23December1922ReachedMalta.27December1922LeftMaltaforDardanelles.September 1924 Relieved as fleet flagship by Queen Elizabeth and became

privateshipin4thBS.1November19244thBSbecame3rdBS.9March1926Alter combined exercises inMediterranean transferredwithher

class to Atlantic Fleet as flagship of newly formed 3rd (Special Boys’Training)BS.Relieved inMediterranean byResolution andRoyalOak. 15May1928Relievedasflagship,3rdBSbyBenbow.

30May1928Paidoff intoDockyardControlatDevonport forextensive refit;transferredintoindependentserviceasseagoinggunneryfiringship.

7 June 1929 Commissioned for service as seagoing gunnery firing ship atPortland,relievingTiger.

11 June 1931 Carried out firing tests at her sister shipEmperor of India offBognor Regis, damaging her and causing her to settle on the bottom inshallowwater.

27 July 1931Arrived atRosyth to prepare for demilitarization under terms ofLondonTreaty.

10November1931PaidoffintoDockyardControlatDevonport.6 September 1932 Commissioned Devonport for further service as seagoing

gunnerytrainingshipandothertrainingduties(attachedtoPortsmouth).20February1935RecommissionedforsameserviceatPortsmouth.16 July 1935 Took part in Jubilee Naval Review of HM King George V at

SpitheadandafterwardsvisitedTorbay.21May 1936 Recommissioned at Portsmouth for further service as seagoing

gunneryfiringandtrainingship.20May1937PresentatCoronationReviewofHMKingGeorgeVIatSpithead.12August1939PresentatReviewofReserveFleetatWeymouth.

IronDukeafterbeingbadlydamagedbybombsin1939(seereport).ShebecameTenderShipinScapaFlowandremainedinthispositionthroughoutthewarSheisseenherein1943.NoteAAbatterieson‘X’and‘Y’positionsandonthequarterdeck.

BOMBINGOFIRONDUKEINSCAPAFLOW17October1939

August1939(laterpart)VisitedFalmouthandleftthreedaysbeforeshewasduetoreachScapaFlow.

September 1939–December 1945 Served as Base Ship at Scapa Flow and asFlagshipoftheAdmiralcommandingOrkneyandShetlands.

BattleDamageWhileinScapaFlow17October1939:IronDukewaslyingat‘C’Buoyinabout10fathomsofwaterwhenapower-diveattackwasmadefrom1,000to1,500feetbyfourbombersat 10.33 hours. One bomb (probably 500lb) which struck the watersomedistanceoutontheportbowshooktheshipandthrewmudandwater toaconsiderableheight;asecondbombfellsomedistanceoutontheportquarter.The major damage against ‘C’ boiler room appears to have been

caused by two bombs (probably 500lb) which were observed to bereleased simultaneously and struck the water not far out from theship’sside.Itispossiblethatthesebombscontactedshipssideneartheturnofbilgebeforeexploding.Theywerereleasedfromaplanewhichpower-diveddownsome1,000 feet inadirectionslightly inclined totheforeandaftlineofshiptravellingfrombowtostern.Athirdbombwas observed to be released immediately after the two releasedsimultaneously.Thereisnorecordwherethethirdbombstruckbutitprobablycausedthefurtherdamageaft.Shipheeledtoportquickly,readingamaximumangleofprobably

20–25°andappearedtosteadyatthatangle.Maindeckscuttleswereopen and these came awash when the ship heeled. Estimates of thetimetoreachthisheelvaryfrom2–5minutes,whenraidershadpassedcablewasslippedandshiptowedtoshallowwaterinOreBaybytugs.Shewasbeachedforwardabout40minutesaftertheattackandaboutanhourbeforehighwater,withdamagedsidetowardstheshore.Tugswerekeptuntilaboutonehourafterhighwaterhaulinginthesterntogetshipapproximatelyparalleltotheshoretogroundherforeandaft.With fall of tide she slowly righted,vibratingnoticeably, and finallytookupaheelof3–4°tostarboard(theundamagedside),presumablyinconformitywiththeslopeofthebankonwhichshegrounded.Shipwas secured by two 7½ ton anchors supplied by Metal Industries.Furthereffortsweremadeatthenexthighwatertogetthesternfurtherin. Bottom in sand and shingle. Divers reported 17.10.39 shipgroundedforwardtoaboutafterendofengineroomand18inchto2footclearattheaftercutup.

Sheremainedinthatpositionuntiltheendofthewar.

February1946SoldtoMetalIndustriestoberaisedandbrokenup.

19April1946RefloatedatScapaFlow.15August1946LeftScapaFlowboundforFaslane(Garetoch),awartimeport

acquiredbyMetalIndustriesforshipbreaking(takingpossessionon15th).19August1946ReachedFaslaneafterbeingdelayedfortwentyhoursbyrough

seasandhighwinds.

Jellicoe’sonceproudflagshipIronDukeonherlastvoyagetothescrapyard.1946.

QueenElizabethClass

DesignThe design of the ships of theQueen Elizabeth class caused a hiatus in thegeneral development of ‘Standard Admiralty battleship practice’. Instead ofmerelyenlargingandimprovingtheIronDukedesign,theshipsofthe1912–13estimatesdepartedfromthenormandfeaturedmanyrevolutionaryideas.Fromtheoutsetithadbeenintendedtoproducesomethingthatwouldconstitutea‘fastbattleshipdivision’.AlthoughofficialdocumentsdonotstatethatthenewshipsmighthavefollowedtheIronDukelayoutinhavingfiveturrets,itwasobviousthata ship that sported ten15ingunswouldbehighlydesirableand there isageneralfeelingwithintheAdmiraltypapersthatthiswasso.Despite theunusuallyhighspeed,about fourknotsaboveexistingbattleship

average, these ships were by no means a compromise featuring reducedprotection,aswerethecontemporarybattlecruisers,butrepresentedabona-fide,well-armoured fast battleship type, and their unique combination of fightingqualities and speed, on very moderate dimensions (the designers would havelikedanother5–6,000tonsincorporated)placedthem,oncompletion,inaclassapart.Fromthethreesketchdesigns(RIII,RIII⋆,RIV)RIII⋆waschosenasbeingthe

most suitable, and by November 1912 had become known as the QueenElizabethclass.Fourshipshadbeenplanned,butthegiftofabattleshipfromtheFederatedMalayStateswasquicklyandgratefullyaccepted.Theessentialfeaturesofthedesign,comparedwiththeIronDukes,were:

1.Nominal displacement at normal loadwas increased by approximately2,500 tons with an increase of 20 feet (oa), 6in beam, and 9in designedmeandraught.2.Mainarmamentwaseight15ingunsagainstten13.5inwithanincreaseof1,369lbinweightofbroadside.3.Secondaryarmament(asdesigned)wasincreasedfromtwelvetosixteenguns.

4.Armourprotectiondifferedmainly in increasing thickness atwaterline,turretsandanti-torpedobulkheads,withreductiononthemiddleandupperside.5.Designedspeedwasincreasedfrom21to25knots.6.Fuelcapacityof3,400 tonsoil inQE compared to3,250 tonscoaland1,600tonsoilinIronDuke,givingapproximatelythesamenominalradius.

Theoutstanding featuresof theQueenElizabethdesignand the innovations towhichitssuccesswasmainlydue,weretheadoptionofthe15ingunandoilfuel;theformerprovidingasubstantialincreaseinoffensivepoweronpracticallythesame armament weight as in the immediately preceding Iron Duke class; thelatterenablingtherequisitehighspeedtobeachievedonmoderatedimensionsandwithout undue sacrifice in fightingqualities. In the absenceof amidshipsturret,theforecastledeckcouldbecarriedaftto‘X’turretbyalightunarmouredstructureabaftthebattery,freeboardamidshipsbeingabout8feethigherthaninthe IronDukes.The forecastle sideswere recessedbefore thebattery to allowdirect ahead fire for the first three pairs of 6in guns. The sides amidshipsbetweenmain andupper deckswere slightly tumblehome, reverting to normalabove the upper deck. The increase in dimensions and displacement over theIron Duke class was almost entirely due to the additional boiler room spacerequiredforthehigherspeed.Weightofarmamentwaspracticallythesame,butthe lengthrequiredfor thiswasactuallysomewhat lessbecauseof thereducednumberofturrets.In accordancewith the 1921Washington Treaty restrictions on new capital

ship construction, allweremodernized in varyingdegrees from1934 to 1941,Queen Elizabeth, Valiant andWarspite being more extensively reconstructedthananyotherBritishbattleships.Thefollowingprincipalalterationscarriedoutfrom1924to1933were:

QUEENELIZABETHCLASSBATTLESHIPSDesigndrawing,1912–13

Oncompletion,greatthingswereexpectedoftheQueenElizabethwithher15ingunswhenshewassenttotheDardanellesin1915.Unfortunately,howeverherindirectfire,althoughspectacular;provedafailurebecauseofthelackofsuitablespottingandrangefinding.SheisshownhereleavingfortheDardanellesatfullspeed.

1.AAarmamentincreasedandafterpairoftorpedotubesremoved.2.AircraftcatapultfittedinBarhamandValiant.3.Anti-torpedobulgesadded(Barhamthelasttobefitted).4. Fore funnel trunked into the second to reduce some interference tocontroltop(Barhamthelasttobefitted).

Malaya was again modified from 1934 to 1936, AA armament being furtherincreased and hangar accommodation provided for aircraft with an improvedcatapult fitted.Warspite,ValiantandQueenElizabethunderwentasecondandmoreextensivereconstructionfrom1936to1941withaviewtobringingtheir

offensive and defensive qualities as far as possible into line with modernrequirements.

1.Elevationandrangeof15ingunsincreased.The6insecondaryarmamentinWarspitewasreducedtoeightguns.Newdual-purpose4.5insecondaryarmamentwas fitted inValiant andQueen Elizabeth. AA armamentwasfurtherincreasedinall.2.HangarsandcatapultfittedasinMalaya.3.Gearedturbinesandnewhigh-pressureboilersinstalled.4.Fuelcapacityslightlyincreased,butsteamingradiuswasincreasedby75per cent as a result of the greater economy of the new machinery andboilers,especiallythelatter.5.Theformerbridgework,conning towerandheavytripodforemastwerereplacedbyalargecontroltower.

Warspitecompletedin1937,Valiantin1939andQueenElizabethin1941.During theGreatWar the classhadbeen famous for forming the5thBattle

Squadron in the Grand Fleet from 1915 to 1919, being attached to thebattlecruisers at Jutland in 1916. Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn from thesquadroninJanuary1917toreplaceIronDukeasFleetFlagship.Theywereallemployed from 1939 to 1945, mainly for bombardment and escort duties inhomewaters,Atlantic,Mediterranean and IndianOcean.QueenElizabeth andValiantalso tookpart inoperationsagainst theJapanesein theEastIndiesandPacificduring1944and1945.AftertheGreatWar,whenthetimecamefortheirfirstreconstruction,itwas

notwithoutsomeoppositionfromtheirdesignerSirPhilipWattswhopullednopunches when dealingwith the DNC, Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt. In alettertotheAdmiraltyWattsstatedhiscase(29November1923):

DearSir,I amnow informed that as the ships of theRoyal Sovereign class

havenowallbeenfittedwithbulges, it is intendedtofit theshipsoftheQueen Elizabeth class with similar bulges in accordance with adecisionrecentlycometoandthattheWarspitewouldbeshortlytakenin hand for this purpose. Itwas necessary to fit bulges to theRoyalSovereigns as their deficient instability would have caused them tocapsizewhendamagedatorbelow thewater linewhichwouldhaveresulted in flooding of adjacent compartments, but the QueenElizabeths in common with previous dreadnoughts had and have

amplestability.Thiswasprovedinthewar:MarlboroughandInflexiblewerebadly

hit by a torpedo and adjacent compartments flooded, but theyremainedafloatandinnodangerofsinkingfromtheattack.Ifbulgeswereadded to theQEs theywouldbe scarcely less liable todamagefromunderwaterorabovewaterattack.Moreover,theirspeed,whichisalreadyonthelowside,wouldbeconsiderablyreducedandIsubmittherewouldbenoadvantageinmakingthechange.

Having received no reply by December, Watts sent a letter to the DNC (29December1923):

I saw a newspaper report some time back to the effect that theWarspitewastofollowtheRoyalOakatPortsmouthandbefittedwithbulgeswhichIassumedwasincorrectbutvisitingSirOswynMurrayshortlyafterwardsIwasverymuchsurprisedtolearnfromhimthatitwascorrect. I thenwroteMr.Amerya letter.Mr.Ameryhasbeenagreatdealawayfromhisoffice,butIunderstandhewillseetheletteronhis return in a fewdays. I still think theremustbe somemistakeaboutthematter.

Tennyson D’Eyncourt seemed to tire of Watts’ constant heckling which hadprevailedoverthelastfewyears.Neverthelesshekeptcalmandwrotetotheex-DNCon1January1924:

Thankyouforyourletterofthe29th.Itwasdecidedalongtimeagoandhassincebeenconfirmedtofit

bulgestotheQueenElizabethclasswheneveropportunityoffersitself,andIshouldthinkitisverydoubtfulwhethertheywouldgobackontheir decision. The fact is that the weight of the charge of moderntorpedoes has increased three-or four-fold since the design ofQueenElizabethandexperiencehasshownthattheunderwaterprotectionasoriginally designed is insufficient defence against amodern torpedo.By adding bulges this defence can be increased sufficiently to beeffective against amodern torpedo. I do not therefore see that therecan bemuch objection to this addition to the protection and it is noreflectionwhatever on the original design. There is a certain loss ofspeed amounting to about ¾ kt, on the other hand there is theadvantagethatasthebuoyancyaddedbythebulgesisgreaterthanthe

weight, thedraughtof the shipswill be reducedbyover1 foot.Thevesselswereratherdeepfromtheverystartandbyvariousadditionshave become deeper and at low tide they sometimes ground atPortsmouth.

In the faceof these technicaldetails,Wattshadnoalternativebut towithdrawhiscriticism.

ArmamentWhen designwork began utmost secrecywas paramount; one of the assistantDNCs,E.N.Mooneywritingon4May1912:‘Thisdesignistoberegardedassecret and neither the design as a whole nor any features of it should bementioned, either inside or outside of the office to anyone whatever exceptpeople actually engaged on the design.’Moreover, the guns themselves wereregarded as top secret for some time after the design had been completed.Mooney, 20 June 1912: ‘Every effort is to be made to keep the nature ofarmamentsecret,thelargegunmustbespokenofandwrittenaboutasthe14inexperimental.’The adoption of the 15in gun was the outstanding feature, and one of the

factors primarily responsible for the success of the design. The advance incalibrefrom13.5inof theprecedingclasses issaid tohavebeeninfluencedbytheintroductionofthe14inguninthelatestAmericanandJapanesebattleships.Atthisstageinthedesignwork,however,a15ingunwasnotavailable,buttoget the design under way quickly it was decided to accept the 15in gun inprinciple,adeparturefromallpreviousAdmiraltypractice;ifthegunprovedafailureitwouldbethefaultandresponsibilityoftheAdmiraltyalone.Atestgunwasproducedandtestedandtheresultssoondispersedanydoubts

andfearsthathadprevailedduringitsconstruction.Thegunprovedremarkablyaccurate and its performance in general was unequalled by any other Britishheavy gun to date. Shortly after completion the guns proved their worth atJutlandinMay1916andscoredhitsat19,500yards,arecordinnavalgunneryat that date, especially at high-speed targets. With a broadside 1,360 poundsheavier than IronDuke’s and aplus50per cent increase indestructive effect,they were without doubt themost capable heavy gun at sea during the GreatWar.Themainarmamentasfittedconsistedofeight15ingunslocatedinfourtwin-

mounted turrets, all on the centre line, two on the forecastle and two on theupperdeckaft, the innerpairsuperfiringover theoutermountings.Turretarcs

were: ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets 300° bearing direct ahead to 60° abaft the beam oneachside;‘X’turret310°bearingdirectasternto65°beforethebeamoneachside;‘Y’turret300°bearingdirectasternto60°beforethebeamoneachside.Theoriginalsecondaryarmamentwasforsixteen6inguns,andtwenty12pdrs

(see sketch). The 6inwere all located on themain deck level, but the 12pdrsweretobeplacedontheforecastleandshelterdecksforwardandaft.Altersomedebate,however,itwasdecided,becauseoftheweightfactor,andtheunsuitableshell weight of the 12pdr gun that the entire 12pdr armament should beeliminated.The6ingunswere an increaseof four over that of IronDuke, theextragunsbeinglocatedonthemaindeckaft(paireachbeam).QueenElizabethandBarhamwerecompletedlikethis,butaftertrialsinDecember1914thegunswere found to be practically useless and were frequently washed out even inmoderateseas.ByMay1915 twoof thegunshadbeenremovedand theothertwo remounted behind shields on the forecastle deck abaft the second funnelwheretheyhadanexceptionallyhighcommandandgoodarcsoffire.Allotherunits of the class were modified accordingly. These remounted guns wereremovedin1916because theguncrewswere inadequatelyprotectedand therewasaninadequatesupplyofshellstothenewposition.

Forward15ingunturretsofQueenElizabethshowinggunsatmaximumelevationduringgunnerypractice,5October1922.

ArmourThebasicarmourlayoutwasanimprovementovertheIronDukedesign,butingeneralwasnot fullyadequateagainst the15ingun.The13instrake,although

being thickenough,was inadequate in itscoverageandwas reduced to8inonthe loweredgeand6inat theupper level. Itmustbeborne inmind,however,that sacrifices had been made to secure a high speed and together with theheavier armament it was obvious that on the given original displacement itwould be impossible to apply a thicker armour on a greater displacement.Internal protection was very fine and more complete than in any Britishbattleships to date, the longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads being continuousbetween forward and aftermagazines for the first time sinceNeptune (1911).Despite theexceptionallyhighspeed,all-roundprotectionwasverystrongandquite equal to existing average battleship standards, although armouring wasgenerally lighter than in thecontemporaryGermanbattleshipKönig,especiallyonthemiddleandupperside,whilethegreaterbeam(96ft9inagainst90ft6in)oftheGermanshipsallowedforamoreeffectiveunderwaterprotection.The ability of the Queen Elizabeth class to withstand severe punishment

without significant loss of fighting efficiency was strikingly demonstrated atJutlandwhere four of the class (5thBS)were for some time heavily engagedwith German battlecruisers and the van of the High Seas Fleet battleships.Althoughsubjectedtoaheavyandconcentratedfire,theirefficiencywasinnocaseappreciablyimpaired,mainarmamentandmachineryremainingintactinallfourships.Later in theactionWarspite,asaresultofa jammedhelm,becameagainheavilyengagedatarangeofabout12,000yardsandwashitseventimesby 12in shells which caused much structural damage although no turret waspermanently disabled andmachinery still remained intact. The principalweakpoints in the protection were: 1. Inadequate height of heavy armour abovewaterline.2.Absenceofrearscreensto6inbatterygunsandinsufficientinboarddepth(only15feet)oftraversesbetweenthese,deficiencieswhichwerelargelyresponsiblefornearly100casualties inMalayaatJutlandwhen theflashfromignited cordite charges, stowed in the passage behind the shallow gun bays,swepttheentirestarboardbatteryandputallitsgunsoutofaction.

MachineryThe ships were intended to form a special fast battleship division and thedesignedspeedwas2or3knotshigherthaninanycontemporarybattleshipandnotequalledintheBritishNavyuntilafterthewar.Thehorsepowerrequiredfortheincreaseofnearly4knotsovertheIronDukeclasswasmorethan2½timesthatinthoseships,anunprecedentedclass-to-classincreaseforbattleships,andwasobtainedonaverymoderateriseindisplacementlargelybytheadoptionofoilfuelonly.Itwasestimatedthatwithmixedfiring(coalandoil)notmorethan

about 22 knots could have been obtained on the displacementwhile 25 knotswould have necessitated either: 1. Undesirable sacrifice in offensive and/ordefensivequalities.2.Substantiallyincreasedsizeandcosts.Theywerethefirstbattleshipstohaveoilfuelonly.Apartfromtheabilityto

produce increased power on a given boiler weight, oil fuel also offered thefollowingadditionaladvantagesascomparedtocoal:

1.Speedcouldbeincreasedmorerapidlyandmaintainedmoreeasily.2.Steamingradiusincreasedabout40percentonagivenweightoffuel.3.Simplifiedandfastrefuellingwithnostrainonpersonnel.4.Absenceofsmoke.

Despite these very considerable advantages the decision to adopt oil onlywasnot finally taken without considerable apprehension regardingmaintenance ofsupplyinwartimeandwassubjectedtosomecriticismonthegroundsthatitwashighly undesirable to build ships whose mobility was entirely dependent onoverseasfuelsupplies.AlthoughintendedtobeafastdivisionwhenjoiningtheFleet, itwas found that their extra speedwasnot as advantageousaswas firstenvisaged. As they were completed in wartime none of the class ran properspeedtrials,butifofficialdocumentsarestudieditcanbeseenthatnoneofthegroupeverreachedthehighof25knots.

QUEENELIZABETHArmouredlayout,1919

ThegeneraloverallappearanceoftheQueenElizabethclass,exceptforminordetails,isshownhereasQueenElizabethherselfpassesbyin1922.Notetheimprovedcompassplatform,rangeclocksandcontroltops.

ReplacementPlansin1933StandardAdmiraltypracticeheldthattheaveragelifeofabattleshipwasabouttwenty years which meant that the Queen Elizabeth class was due forreplacement in or around 1935. This would also apply to the slightly newerRoyal Sovereign class, and there were discussions about this during the early1930s. As there was no question of building new ships because of the navaltreaties in force, it was agreed that something had to be done about the twogroupsofexistingbattleshipsiftheyweretoremainfront-lineunits.In a paper presented to their Lordships by the DNC, A. W. Johns, it was

pointedoutthattheQueenElizabethclasshadallbeenbuiltduring1915–16andthereforehadpre-warexperienceworkedintotheirdesign.Theyhad,however,undergonelimitedmodernizationandhadlaterandbetterbulgesthantheRoyalSovereignclass.Armour protection was practically the same in both groups, that forRoyal

Sovereign being slightly superior in the way of the main belt. There was,however,lessspacebetween‘B’and‘X’turretsinRoyalSovereignandthisleftlittle room for additionalAAguns and similar fittings.The stability ofQueenElizabethwas slightly superior to that ofRoyal Sovereign.Radiiwere:QueenElizabeth18knotsgiving3,650;RoyalSovereign18knotsgiving2,950;QueenElizabeth20knotsgiving3,000;RoyalSovereign20knotsgiving2,150nauticalmiles.Thebridgesweregivensomemodernizationduringearlyrefitsandweretherefore roomier and more handy than those in the Royal Sovereign class.QueenElizabethwaseasiertohandleandthefullspeedoftheclasswasmuch

greater:23.9knots(Barham)against21.9knots(Revenge).AfterconsideringtheDNC’spointsitwasprovisionallyagreedthattheRoyalSovereignclasswouldbe scrapped before theQueen Elizabeth class, and a table was prepared thereplacementprogrammewasasfollows:

STEAMTRIALS:19MAY1922Typeoftrial:2hoursfullpower. Draught(mean) MeanRevs HP Bottom SpeedMalayo: 32ft5in 301 79,844 foul 24.1ktsWarspite: 32ft8in 296 75,200 clean 24ktsValiant: 32ft7½in 292 69,140 clean 23.9kts

VALIANT:ASINCLINEDIINOVEMBER1940

Displacement: 29,696 tons (light ship); 33,903 tons (half oil fuel on board),draught 30ft 7¾in; 35,698 tons (deep load), draught 32ft 1⅛in; 36,513 tons(deeppluswaterprotection),draught32ft9½in.GM:6.93ftindeepload;6.10ftwithhalfoil.Stabilityrange:61.1°withhalfoiland68.5°indeepload.

STEAMTRIALS:1926TO1933(MAXIMUMSPEEDSATTAINED)Warspite: 26March1926 76,742shp=24knots.QueenElizabeth: 14September1927 71,753shp=23.45knots.Malaya: 26January1929 75,784shp=24.45knots.Valiant: 7November1930 67,555shp=23.3knots.Barham: 20November1933 65,644shp=22.5knots.

BARHAM:INCLINED4THNOVEMBER1933(STABILITYANDGM)ANDCOMPAREDWITHRESTOFCLASS Warspite QE Valiant Malaya BarhamDisplacement(tons): 35,060 35,480 35,710 35,380 35,970MeanDraught: 32ft6in 32ft2in 32ft2in 31ft11in 32ft6inGM: 7.01ft 6.92ft 6.9ft 6.9ft 6.78ft

Maximumstability: 40° 37° 37° 37° 33°Stabilityvanishes: 73° 69° 69° 69° 69°TwoRoyalSovereigns(RoyalOakandRevenge)1940.TwoRoyalSovereigns(ResolutionandRoyalSovereign)1941.RamilliesandQueenElizabeth1942.TwoQueenElizabethclass1943.RemainingQueenElizabethclassandRepulse1944.OneQueenElizabethclassandRenown1945.Rodney1947.Nelson1948.

Itwasconsidered that if the treatysituationaltered toallowfreshconstructionsoonerthanhadbeenenvisaged,replacementcouldbeginmorequicklythanthetable implied,butat the time that itwasdrawnup theonly thingpossiblewasseriously to consider amassive reconstruction programmewhichwould injectnewlifeintotherapidlyageingvessels.Itwasagreedthatthis,tosomeextent,wouldbringthebattlefleetintothenewageandprepareitforcombatagainstallothercapitalshipsexceptthoseofcompletelynewconstruction.

GENERALPARTICULARS,1919

Displacement(tons):30,430(load),33,625deep(Valiant,otherssimilar).Length:Ascompleted(639ft9into643ft9in)unchanged.Beam:90ft6inascompleted,unchanged.Draught:33ftaverageatdeepload.Armament:maingunsunchanged(8×15in)Secondary12×6inunchanged.Original3ingunschangedforlarger50calibre.SearchlightsMalaya,QueenElizabeth,Warspite:8×36inBarham:7×36in.Valiant:6×36in.2×24insignallinglampsinall.AircraftAirplaneplatformson‘B’and‘X’turretinallexceptQueenElizabeth.BarhamandQueenElizabethfittedfortowingkiteballoons.Inpeacetime turret aircraftwerenotusuallycarried,butembarkedspecifically

for exercises. Runways were removed from one or both turrets from end of1919.Platform removed from ‘X’ turret in Queen Elizabeth 1924, Valiant 1930,removedfrombothturretsinall1933–4.Armour: unchanged except for some additional protection to turret roofs andmagazines,etc.Machineryunchanged.Generalappearancewasratherheavierthanoriginalowingtowartimeadditionstobridgework, includingSL towersaround second funnel.The removalof themain topmast detracted considerably from their former symmetrical profile.DeflectionscalespaintedoutafterwarRangeclocksfittedinvariouspositionsinclass.Maindeckcasemates(6in)notyetplatedoverArmourandMachinery,1919Main belt 13in reducing to 8in at lower edge, ends 6–4in, bulkheads 6–4in,barbettes10–9–7–6–4in,turrets11–13–5in,decks:forecastle1in,upper2–1½–1¼in,main 1 in, lower 3–2–1 in, CT 11–6–3in, anti-torpedo screens 2in, CTtubes4in,secondarybattery6in,secondarygunshields,3in,tunneluptakes1½–1in.Armourprotectionunchangedby1919exceptforadditional1inplatingaroundthemagazineareaafterJutlandin1916and,asopportunityarose,turrettopswereincreasedfrom4¼into5in.MachineryParsonsreactionturbinesfittedinQueenElizabeth,WarspiteandMalaya;othertwohaddirectturbines.4shafts,4propellers.Boilers:24Babcock&Wilcoxinfirstthree;YarrowinWarspiteandBarham.Workingpressure:235psi.Pressureatturbines:175psi.Lengthofboilerrooms:144ft.Lengthofenginerooms:83ft11¼in(each).DesignedSHP:56,000from23knots;75,000for25knots(overload).Fuel(tons):650oilnormal,100coal.3,400oilmaximum.Radiusofaction:5,000nmat12knots;3,800nmat18knots;1,600nmatfullspeed.Machinery unchanged from1915, but speed reported to have dropped slightlyowingtoincreasedweightsduringthewarExtra signal yard fitted on main topmast (lower yard carried close abovestarfish).

WideW/Tyardfittedlowontopgallantmast.

BRIDGEALTERATIONSANDTHEIREFFECT,QUEENELIZABETHCLASS,1915–37

BridgeWorkAlterationsandtheirEffectAs completed in 1915–16 theQueen Elizabeth class featured the simplest ofbridges consisting of very basic platforms fitted up and around the foremasttripodlegs.DuringtheGreatWar,however,experienceshowedthattherewasagrowing

needofabetterlayoutwithinthegroup.Practicalevidencewasforthcomingandtherewasnoshortageofcriticismfromofficersservinginthevessels,whomadeit quite clear that there were inadequate fittings aboard. Lack of space forrequisite equipment to control the guns, searchlight facilities, overcrowdingofstaff in confined areas and protection for personnel when exposed on thecompassplatformwere just a fewof thegrumbles that found theirway to thecorridorsoftheAdmiralty.The Admiralty, in turn, was not oblivious of these shortcomings, and

measures were being prepared to alleviate some of the problems as the shipscame in for refit during hostilities.During the refits, bridgeworkwas built up

and platformswere extended in length andwidth. In some ships a small roll-backroofwasplacedoverthecharthouseplatformtoprotectpersonnelfromrainatleast.Possiblybecauseofalackofasuitabletypeofglass,nowindowswerefitted in this position until after thewar because it had been suggested that itwouldimpairgoodall-roundvisionwhichwasparamountforlookoutpersonnelin the bridgework. The personnel, it seems, did not like being closed in.Althoughdrawingonpracticalexperiencewhenaltering theships, thefinishedresultwasnotalwaysuptoexpectationsanditbecameacaseoftrialanderrorwhenaddingtotheupperworksincapitalshipsingeneral.By 1919–20 the bridgework had almost doubled in size and had a very

cluttered appearance. There were searchlights, rangefinders and a mixture ofcanvasandsheetmetalcoversaroundthebridgeworkduringtheearlyyears,butthe first successfulmethodswere really appliedduring the refits from1924 to1930when the funnelswere trunked together and thebridgeworkwasgivenafacelift in general.Levelswere extended around the tripod legs now that theywere free from smoke interference, and additional shelter was provided forcharthousestaff.Therewasalsotheprovisionofalargecharthouseatthebackof thecharthouseplatformwhichwasbuiltaround theforemast.Theproblemsofthestaffwerenotaltogethersolved,however,andtheyarehighlightedinthefollowingreports:InValianton12November1930,theopportunitywastakentoobserve the ship: ‘Theweatherwascoldandwindyand the raisedcompassplatform was uncomfortable especially with a wind on the bow. The screenaroundtheplatformisabout5ft6inhighandtheflareofthisscreenthrowsupthe wind so that a portion of the platform immediately behind the screen isshelteredfromthewind.Thedraughtdescendsatapoint5ft6inabaftthescreenat theheightof thepelorussothat it isextremelydifficult to takeasightfromtheinstrumentundertheseconditions.Theforcingdownofthewindisprobablyduetotheexistenceofthetorpedocontrolpositionaboveandslightlyabafttheroundcompassplatform.Thedown-comingdraughtisdividedbythecharthouseandplatformofficeabaft the raisedcharthouseplatform,andsweepsalong thetwosidesofthecharthouseproperwithsuchforcethatstandingismadedifficultwithouthangingon,andinvolvesconsiderabledifficultyinworkinginstruments.Some mitigation of discomfort could be by increasing flare of screen. It isthoughtthattheonlywaytoeliminatethiswindistofullycovertheplatform.’

AftertheGreatWanmostofthebigshipswentthroughaseriesofsmallrefitsandtheQueenElizabethswerenoexception.Valiantisshownindrydockhavinghadherbottomcleanedandageneraloverhaul,Rosyth,1920.

TheQueenElizabethclassonavisittoCherbourg,2April1919;aphotographtakenfromBarhamwithValiantinbackground.

AmoreconclusivesetoftrialswerecarriedoutinMalayaaftershehadbeenpartiallyreconstructedin1936.On4Novemberduringseatrialsataspeedof15knots,thefollowingobservationsweremade.

There is an unpleasant back draught around the charthouse platformespeciallyaroundthefloor.Therearenowindowsaroundtheplatformbutspacehasbeenprovidedforthem.Windspeedsreached30to40knotswhentheshipincreasedspeedto20knots.Anexperimentwascarriedoutandaflatscreenwasplacedoverthecharthouseonalightframework. It was tilted at various angles and things did improve.Owing to the extreme wind, however, the canvas ripped and it isrecommended thatwindows be fitted all round, and the after part ofthecharthouseclosedin.

FurthertestsinMalayawerecarriedouton8January1937(seedrawings)afterwindows had been fitted, and experimental small screens positioned at thecornerstodeflectthewindupwardsawayfromthecharthousearea.Thescreensfitted in the first trials proved of limited success, butwhenmodified the testscarriedouton31January1937provedmuchbetter,andthegeneralfeelingwasthat the best had been accomplishedwithwhatwas available. The conclusionwas that thewindowsaround thecharthouseneeded tobekept shut ifdraughtwas to be excluded completely, but on amoderate day some of thewindowscouldremainopenwithlittleornobackdraught.ThequestionofbackdraughtwasaparticularpointinthetrialsofBarhamin

1934after shehadbeengivenanewbridgeandcompassplatformwhichwascompletelyclosed in.Commentsmadebystaffwho first tested theshipon25September1934referred to thecompassplatformandthat itwasdraughtyandgenerallyuncomfortable.

Ifthewindowswereleftopenaroundthecompassplatformitwasnottoobad,butifabackdoorwereopenatthesametime,theconditionbecamealmostintolerableiftherewereanysortoftailwindfollowingthe ship. The new bridge, which was now fully closed in, wasconsidered only partially successful because its defensive qualitieshindereditsoffensivemeasures.

The bridge had to be habitable in all weathers and provide the best all-roundvision,butasfittedBarhamandothersoftheclass,withtheirroofed-inbridges,proved extremely difficult to reflect this feature and still be tenable whenwindowswereopened.Thewindowsdefinitelyhadtobeopenatcertain timesand caused all sorts of problems inside.Requirements for better conditions inbridgeworkandcompassplatformswererecordedasfollows:Captain’sbridge:armouringwasdesired and the control office should also be armoured to give

some sort of protection against aircraft attack; searchlight control, star shellcontrolandtorpedocontrolshouldallbewithinreach.Itwasfeltthatthebridgeshould be free from serious draughts. The shape was not always correct andinsteadofbeingsquareitshouldberoundedoffsoastocheatthewindfromallangles.Moreover,itwouldbeadvantageoustobeabletoseeboththebowsandsternofthevesselfromthisplatform.Obviouslytherewasmuchtobedonebyway of improvements, but in practice, no matter how well layouts weredesigned,theresultswerenotalwaysacceptable.Even when Warspite was fitted with her new bridge structure after

reconstructionin1937theproblemswerenotover.On23September1937theC-in-C was invited to inspect the mockup bridge for the reconstructedbattlecruiser Renown, and at the same time look over the new bridge ofWarspite.AfterathoroughinspectionatPortsmouthhewrotetotheDNCtosaythat the conning tower (within the superstructure housing) was too lightlyarmouredandthatitshouldbecapableofwithstandingclose-rangeattackfrommediumcalibreshells.InWarspite,thefrontandsidesofthenewconningtowerwereonly3inwitha

2inback,1½inroofandlinfloor.SimilarprotectionwasintendedforRenown,QueenElizabethandKingGeorgeV.TheprotectioninWarspitewasintendedtogiveimmunityagainstshellsandbombsburstinginthenearvicinity,butitwasnot intended to give protection against direct hits. To keep out shells of 4.7incalibre at 2,000yardswould require4inNCarmour;6in shells at 4,000yardswouldrequire6½incementedarmour,and8inshellsat4,000yardswouldneed9¾incementedarmour.Atthisstage,ofcourse,progressivedemandsforextraarmourcouldnotaffect

Warspite, but in any future reconstruction it would be most advantageous.Nevertheless, tomake the increasesmentionedabovewould require4,9½and18 tons inweight respectively, andwould require additional framework. ThisextraweightwouldnotbesignificantinRenown,WarspiteandQueenElizabeth,but it would be in the newKing George V. As regards the draught factor inWarspite,thenewlargestructureasfittedwasavastimprovementoverpreviouslayoutsbutstillnotabsolutelyfreefrombackwindsifanydoorswereopen.Valiant’s bridge as reconstructed in 1939 received a slightly better review:

‘TheCOwasverypleasedwith thebridgewhichwas free fromvibrationandunpleasantdraught.Thedraughtatthesearchlightsightswasslight.TheCOdid,however, complain that the chart tablewas too large resulting in the compassplatform being too cramped. Considerable draught was experienced by thelookouts through openings, with wind on all bearings. The doors to these

positionshad,however,beentakenoffforguntrials,andwhenthesearefittedandcloseditisanticipatedthatthingswillbebetter.Ingeneral,theCaptainandstaffwerepleasedwiththeship’ssplendidbehaviour.’

FunnelExhaustProblemsWhentheshipswerebeingreconstructedduringthe1920sthetwinfunnelsweretrunkedandsmokeproblemstothebridgeweremoreorlesscorrected.During1938, however, it was brought to the DNC’s attention that complaints werebeingvoicedaboutgasesfromthefunnelenteringthemainboilerintakeandthetwoaircrafthangarsoneitherside.ExperimentswereconductedattheNationalPhysicalLaboratory’sAerodynamicsDepartmentwithamodelbuilttoascaleof⅛in=1foot.Thesamemodelwasusedtorepresenteachofthefourships,onlythe funnel being altered as necessary. There was some initial difficulty inestablishingasuitableproceduralmethod.Thefirstnecessitywastointroduceanidentifiablesubstancewhoserouteafter leaving the funnelcouldbe tracedandquantified. To this end a measured quantity of finely powdered cork wasprojected into the funnel discharge for four seconds during each test.Subsequently itwasnecessary tomodify themodelso thatheatedaircouldbedischargedatscalevelocities,andaboilerintakewasconstructedintowhichaircouldbedrawnatappropriaterates.Anyparticlesofcorkdrawnintotheboilerintakepassedalongatubeandweredischargedoutsidethewindtunnelontoasmall sticky detector to which they adhered. Whenever possible the particleswere counted so as to form a table of comparison for the various conditionstested.Theexperimentsestablishedtheexistenceofalargeeddyingregioncausedby

the mast and neighbouring structure, and indicated that gas from the funnelwouldbedrawnintothiseddyingregionandintothemainboilerintake.

Voliantundergoingherfirstmajorreconstructioninwhichhertwinfunnelsweremergedintoone,June1930.

MALAYA,QUEENELIZABETH,VALIANTANDWARSPITEModeltestswindeffectonfunnelgasesatbridge

MalayoAn analysis of the flow in the region of the funnel and hangars is shown in

drawings1and2.Thisanalysis,ofatestwheretheairwasheatedbyhotwires,showedanextensiveeddycausedbythemastandnearbystructurewhichgaverise to a considerable back flow in the first few feet above the deck, somedistance aft of the funnel.DrawingNo.2wasbasedonobservationsmadebyplacing¼in strips of gummed paper one at a time across themodel ship at apoint5.2inchesbehindtheafteredgeofthefunnel.Forthefirst2inchesabovethedeckthestripsweremountedwiththestickysidefacingaft,whileinthetop3inchesthestickysidefacedforward.Thecorkdustdepositonthetop3inchestherefore came directly from the lower fringe of the funnel stream on to thedetectors,whereasthatonthelower2inchesturnedintheeddyandtravelledinthedirectionofmotionoftheship.Asaworstpossiblecondition, theequivalentofawindspeedof17feetper

secondandaboilerintakeof8.5cubicfeetperminutewereselected,andtestsweremadeasdescribed.Itwasfoundthatfromeachchargeintroducedintothefunnelstreamsome300to370particleswerefoundonthedetectorattheexitsof the boiler intake. An experiment was then conducted with the mast andsurrounding structure removed. With the ship in this condition no depositwhateverwascollected.A number of tests wasmade in the course of which the funnel height was

progressively increased.Theresultsof these testsareshownbelow,and itwillbe seen that the addition of some 5 inches (40 feet)would be required to thefunnelbeforeallgaswascarriedsafelyaway.Tests were also made of two sloping funnel tops, but the amount of cork

depositedwasnotnoticeablyreduced.Fromthemannerinwhichcorkparticlesweredepositedondetectorsplaced

nearthefunnel,itwasstronglysuspectedthatthetroublesomegaswascomingfromtheedgesof thefunnel,whereelementswereprobablydischargedat lowvelocityandcarriedroundintotheboilerintake.Itwasconsideredthatiftheseedgeconditionscouldbemodifiedandtheoffendingparticlesforcedupintothemain funnel stream an improvement might be effected. Some attempts atbringing this about by means of baffles and deflectors were unproductive,chieflybecausetheinfluenceofthemastandotherstructuresmadeitimpossibleto collect enough air to influence conditions at the funnel without drawing itfrom the main stream, which would entail the use of baffles or guides of anunacceptablesize.Itwasdecided, therefore, toendeavourtoblowtheedgesofthe funnel clean by means of a current of air obtained mechanically.Accordingly, an outer casing or jacket 0.1in (9.6in) in width was constructedroundthetopportionofthefunnel,andthebottomofthecasingwassealedsoas

toformanannularchamber.Intothisasupplyofairwasfedfromtheinsidebyablower,andwasdischargedfromthetopofthefunnel,completelyencirclingthenormalfunneldischarge.

HeightofFunnel Depositatboilerintake (percentageoforiginal)Original    100Lengthened 1in(8ft)    82   ” 2in(16ft)     3   ” 3in(24ft)    23   ” 4in(32ft)    10½   ” 5in(40ft)     1½WarspiteTests similar to those described aboveweremade on the funnel ofWarspite.Thisfunnel,whichwasdividedverticallyintothreesections,wastestedwithandwithoutjacket,andineachcasethefrontandrearcompartmentswerealternatelyinuse.QueenElizabethandValiantThefunnelwasdividedintotwocompartmentsonly,andtestsweremadewiththese alternately in use.With the original funnel the experiments showed thatwhen the rear half of the funnel was in use relatively no trouble wasexperienced,butthatwiththeforwardhalfinuseaheavydepositwasrecorded.The same deposit was obtained when both sections were workingsimultaneously.

BARHAM1920Profileanddecksascompleted

Warspite,QueenElizabeth(andValiant)A comparison of the results obtained on the Queen Elizabeth (and Valiant)funnelwiththoseobtainedforWarspiteshowsthatwhileintheformercasetheforward section of the funnel gave trouble, in the latter case it was the rearportionwhichprovided theheavydeposit.This result isalmostcertainly tobeattributed to the different placing of the funnels with respect to themast, theWarspitefunnelbeingmuchfurtherforward.

Theconclusionof theexperimentswereforwarded to theDNCbutwhetherornotanythingwaseverdone to right the situation isnotevident–certainlynotfromrecordsorevenphotographs.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsQueenElizabethNo other British class of battleships changed their appearance more than theQueenElizabeths.At theendof theGreatWar theywereconsidered tobe thebest-looking battleships in the Royal Navy. Their twin amidships funnels,heavilybuilt-uptripodforemastandfourtwin15in-gunnedturretsgavethemasymmetricallookunequalledbymostothersintheheavyweightgroup.In1918thebridgeworkwas similar in all five, but thereweremany small differences,anditwasquiteeasytotellthemapartandidentifytheindividualships.QueenElizabethandBarhamweremoreeasilyidentifiablethantheotherthree.

Queen Elizabeth: No aircraft platforms on turrets (added February 1919); a

topmasttoeachmast.Barham: Searchlight fitted on small platform close below control top; small

platform close below control top (abaft mast); lower yard on foremast atstarfishlevel;Gaffbelowstarfish(onmain).

Malaya:Loweryardonforebelowstarfish;Gaffwellbelowstarfish.Valiant:Strutsatstarfishinplaceofyards;gaffbelowstarfish;navigatinglight

onmainstarfishwasbelowmast.Warspite: Lower yard on fore at starfish; gaffwell below starfish; navigating

lightabaftmast.Queen Elizabeth: 1919–20: Foretop enlarged; large base rangefinder fitted at

rear of ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets; deflection scales on turrets deleted; tworangefinderclocksfittedbelowforwardcontroltopandover‘X’turret;high-angle rangefinder fitted on fore control top (original, small rangefinder).Original small rangefinder on torpedo tower replaced by medium baserangefinder; aircraft platforms on ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets in place by February1919;1921–22:topgallantfittedtomainmast;1922–3:searchlightsremovedfrommainandaftersuperstructures(platformretained);1924–6:rangeclocksremoved; 3in guns replaced by 4in (two fitted August/September 1924(£2,000));aircraftplatformremovedfrom‘X’turret;aftersuperstructurebuiltup at rear, and sternwalk replaced; refit June 1926–October 1927: (cost ofbulgesandbridgework,£195,000);underwaterbulgesaddedwhichincreasedbeam; control top enlarged andmodified; two extra 4in fitted; after controltop removed; range clocks retained over ‘X’ turret only; high-anglerangefinder retained on control top, extra high-angle rangefinder added insmall tower over bridge; torpedo control tower removed and rangefinderremountedonsmallplatform;RDFequipmentfitted;DFcabinetfittedatrearof director platform with aerial over control top; 36in SL removed frombridge;bridgeworkgreatlymodifiedand funnels trunked intooneunit; flagsignalling transferredfromfore tomainmast,aftersuperstructurebuiltup toaccommodatesignalstaffandequipment; fore topmast, togetherwithsignalyardandsignalstrutsatstarfishremoved,tallertopgallantfittedtomainmast.

Warspitewasthefirstoftheclasstoundergomajorreconstruction.During1926shereappearedlookingmuchheavier;withthemassivetrunkedfunnel.ThephotographshowsherinApril1926leavingPortsmouthfortrials.

ReconstructionofBarham,Dec1930toOct19331.BeamanddisplacementchangesasQueenElizabeth.2.Rangeclocksover‘X’turretremoved.Multiple2pdrAA(eightbarrels)addedport and starboardon raisedplatformabeamfunnel.Multiple0.5inAA (four barrels) added port and starboard on superstructure abeamconning tower. HA-RF on control top replaced by HA director andremounted in small tower over bridge.HA director fitted on platform onmain tripod legs. AA lookout position added port and starboard belowcontrol top. After pair of torpedo tubes removed. Torpedo rangefinderremovedfromaftersuperstructure.3.RDFequipmentfittedasinQueenElizabeth(1930typeaerial).4. SL towers around funnelmodified but arrangement of SL unchanged.Two 24in signalling SL remounted on lower bridge (ex forwardsuperstructure).5. Training type catapult fitted on starboard side of ‘X’ turret roof withstraight armcrane abeammainmast on starboard side.Aircraft platformsremovedfromturrets.6.Anti-torpedobulgesfittedasinQueenElizabeth.7.BridgeenlargedandmodifiedandfunnelstrunkedasinQueenElizabeth.

Upper bridge completely enclosed in addition and lower bridge extendedfurtheraftthanintheotherships;entirebridgestructurenowmergingwithtripodlegs.8.TripodlegsfittedtomainmasttosupportHAdirector.Arrangementofsignalstrutsbelowcontroltopmodified.

Modifications,BarhamMarchtoJune19381. Single 4in AA replaced by twin enlarged shields. HA-RF over bridgeremoved.2.36inSLreplacedby44in.

SecondReconstructionPeriod,1934–41In 1934 a secondmodernization programme for the classwas initiatedwith aview to bringing the ships in line with existing requirements, especially inrespecttoincreasedhorizontalprotectionagainstplungingfireandaerialattackbythepowerfulmoderngunsandbombstowhichallolderbattleshipswereveryvulnerable.Themenaceofaircraftattackandthenecessityforimproveddefenceagainst this, both by guns and armour, had by this date become a particularlyvital factor in battleship design. Underwater protection against increasinglyefficienttorpedoesandmineswasalsoconsideredtorequirestrengtheningasfaraspossible.MalayaandWarspiteweretakeninhandin1934andcompletedin1936 and 1937 respectively. Valiant andQueen Elizabeth followed in 1937,Valiantbeingcompletedin1939andQueenElizabethin1941.Modifications inMalaya, however, were limited, being confined mainly to

increasedAAarmamentandprovisionofhangaraccommodationforaircraftandan improved type of catapult; protection, machinery and boilers remainedunchanged. But the additional top weight imposed, and for which no realcompensation was made, resulted in some loss of stability associated with asubstantialincreaseindisplacement,deeperdraught,reducedfreeboard,drynessandspeed.Displacement increasedbyapproximately1,000tonsandmaximumspeedreducedtojustover22knots.

QUEENELIZABETH:LEGEND,1927AFTERREFIT

Displacement (tons): 31,300 (standard), 35,480 (deep) (without waterprotection),36,295(withwaterprotection).Length:644ft3in(oa).Beam:104ft.Draught:28ft4inforward,29ftaft(standard),31ft5in(deep).

Freeboard:26ft1inforward,16ft3inamidships,17ft10inaft.Heightof15ingunsfromwater:‘A’,31ft;‘B’,40ft11in;‘X’,33ft1in;‘Y’,23ft.Speed:(estimated)23?knots.Totaloilcapacity:3,500tons.

Armour:16ft above water line at load displacement, 4ft below. Main belt unchanged.Bulkheadsandbarbettesunchanged.Turrets11infaces,roofsincreasedto5in.Decks: forecastle 1 in, upper 2–1¼in, main 1¼in, middle 1 in (2in overmagazines),lower3–1in.Generalweightsbeforeandafterrefit(tons): 1918 1927 Armour 17,500 21,110 Armament 4,550 4,950 Machinery 3,950 3,890 Generalequipment 750 700 Fuel(min.) 650 650

1930: Range clocks removed from over ‘X’ turret. High-angle rangefinderreplacedbyhigh-angledirector.ImprovedtypeDFaerialfitted(earlyin1930).1933–4:Aircraftplatformsremovedfrom‘B’turret.Otheroftheclasswereallverysimilarduringthisperiod(seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).

WARSPITE:REFIT,18JULY1924–APRIL1926

Weightadded(tons):bulgeplatings 575(totalweightofbulge1,140tons)Transverseframing 280Longitudinalframing 125Bulkheads 55Woodfilling 15Bilgekeels 50Rubber 17

Pipingandvalves 5Paint,etc. 18Additionaldynamos 304×4ingunsandammunition 602pompoms 35

Increaseindisplacementfrom1919to1924wasapproximately200tons.33,625tons (deep) 1919. Displacement (tons) after bulging (1926): 30,380 (light),31,300(legend),34,970(deep),35,770tonswithwaterprotectioninbulges.

Typicalrefitforthewholeclassduringthisperiod.Warspiteasfollows:Controltopenlargedandmodified.Aftercontroltopremoved.Rangeclocksretainedover‘X’turretonly.HARPretainedoncontroltopwithextrapairaddedinsmalltoweroverbridge.36in SL removed from bridge and SL platforms from mainmast and aftersuperstructure.ForsmallerrefitsseeBattleshipsofWorldWarOne.

The reconstruction ofWarspite was considerably more drastic, the primaryobjectbeingtosecureasubstantialadvanceinoffensiveanddefensivequalitieswithout additional displacement and further loss of speed,maintenance of theexisting 24 knots being considered essential in view of rising battleshipstandards in this respect. Inaddition to themodifications inAAarmamentandaircraft accommodation as carriedout inMalaya, elevation and rangeofmainarmamentwasincreased,secondaryarmamentwasreduced,AAarmamentwasfurther increased, horizontal protection materially strengthened, internalsubdivisionimproved,speedmaintainedandsteamingradiusextendedby75percent. This was accomplished on an estimated reduction of 500 tons indisplacement (see table), mainly by the adoption of improved and lightermachineryinboilerswhichconstitutedthegoverningfactorinthewholeschemeofreconstruction.

MALAYA1919

ThemodernizationofValiant andQueenElizabeth followedsimilar lines tothat ofWarspite, but was evenmore extensive, incorporating an entirely newdual-purpose (HALA) secondary armament and some modifications in detail.Estimated displacement increased by 420 tons in Valiant and 1,600 tons inQueenElizabethwithcorrespondinglyincreaseddraughtandreducedfreeboardascomparedtoWarspite.Althoughithadbeenplannedtomaintainthespeedof24knots,itwasreducedtoabout22/23knotsasaconsequenceofthesubstantialrise indisplacement.Bridgework, superstructure, general layout and rig in allthreeshipswasdrasticallyaltered,thenewdesignrepresentinginthisrespectaprototypefortheKingGeorgeVclass.Althoughall-roundefficiencyinthesethreeshipswasofficiallyconsideredto

have increased by 50 per cent, subsequent war experience indicated thathorizontal and underwater protection was still below modern requirements.BarhamwastohavebeenmodernizedafterValiantandQueenElizabeth,buttheoutbreak of war in 1939 precluded this. It had been intended to re-modifyMalayaasinValiantandQueenElizabeth,buthereagainthewarintervened.QueenElizabeth1935,JulytoOctobermodifications.Twomultiple2pdrAA

(eight barrels) added on superstructure abeam bridge; two multiple 0.5in AA(fourbarrels)addedonaftersuperstructure;aircraftspottingpositionfittedportandstarboardbelowcontroltop.

Close-upofWarspite’ssuperstructurelookingbackfromtheforecastle,1926/8.

ReconstructionofMalaya,Oct1934toDec1936Reconstructioninvolved60percentofstructure.

1. Draft and displacement increased by 8in and 944 tons respectively byadditionalweightsimposed.Theconsiderableextraanduncompensatedtop

weight, especially the heavy hangar structure, involved a slight loss ofstability which was accepted because of the increase in original stabilityresultingfromtheadditionofbulgesonthefirstreconstruction.Thedegreeof stability was quite low, however, and would not have been approvedunderlaterstandards.Asaconsequenceofreducedfreeboardtheshipwasverywetinanyseawayafterreconstruction.2.The6indirectortowerswererelocatedportandstarboardonextensionsofthe15indirectorplatformabaftthetripodlegs.Thesingle4inAAwerereplacedbytwin4ininlargeshields,theafterpairbeingsponsonedoutatsides.Multiple2pdrAA(eightbarrels)wereaddedportandstarboardonahigh platform abeam the funnel. Multiple 0.5in AA (four barrels) wereaddedportandstarboardon‘X’turret.HARFoncontroltopwasreplacedbyHAdirector(raisedwellclearof top)andaseconddirectorwasaddedon the after superstructure.HARFover bridgewas removed.Remainingtorpedo tubes (forward pair)were removed togetherwith torpedo controltowerandRF,torpedoarmamentbeingreportedasnotworththespaceandpersonnelitabsorbed.

Close-upofQueenElizabethshowingimprovedbridgeworkandtrunkedfunnelafterrefit,November1927.Notetheheatshieldonthebaseofthefunnel.

GENERALPARTICULARSFORCLASS1934

Displacement(tons):QueenElizabeth36,295(deep)(asinclinedAugust1927).Length:634ft6in(wl),643ft9in(oa)(Warspite).Beam:104ftoverrubbers.Draught:29ftto34ftmax.(variedinall).ArmamentOriginalmaingunsunchanged,secondarygunsasin1918.

4×4inAA. 16×2pdrs(2×8barrels)inBarham. 8×2pdrs(1×8barrels)inValiant. 8×0.5inAA(2×4barrels)inBarham.

Protection:Asoriginalexceptforbulgesaddedandsomeadditional

OriginalsalutinggunsandMGs. armouronturrettopsandaroundmagazines(seerevisedlegendof

2×21inTT(forward). QE1927afterrefit).RadiodirectionalfindersinBarham,QueenElizabethandValiant.

Machineryandboilersasbuilt.

Searchlights:4×36inonfunneltowers,2or4×24insignalling.

Speedreducedslightlytoapprox.23.6average.

AircraftTraining catapult in Barham and Valiant. One Fairey III reconnaissanceseaplane.BarhamcarriedaWalrusamphibianforashortperiodin1934.

GeneralAppearanceEnlarged and modified bridgework in all, which extended right round tripodlegs. Upper bridge completely enclosed in Barham and Valiant. Fore funneltrunked into second. Anti-heat plate fitted on lower part of funnel. TripodmainmastinBarhamonly.SternwalkinQueenElizabeth,BarhamandWarspite.Signal struts at starfish below control top (very short in QE) and no yard onforemast.Yard at starfish onmain inMalaya,QueenElizabeth andWarspite,with extra signal yard on topmast above this in Queen Elizabeth. Asreconstructed,theywereverydistinctiveandnotablyheavierandmorepiledupthanin1918.Theunbalancedrig(lowonforemastandhighonmain)detractedfrom their original symmetry, althoughwith a reversed arrangement to that in1918andaconsiderablymoremarkeddisparitybetween relativeheighton theforeandmainmasts.

Theprincipalfeatureswere:Largetrunkedfunnel.Enlargedbridgework,extendedcompletelyaroundtripod

legs. Heavy control top and director platform below. Prominent waterlinebulges. Catapult on ‘X’ turret in Barham and on quarterdeck right aft inValiant. Low rig on foremast and high on main. Tripod mainmast withdirector tower on legs in Barham. DF aerial abaft control top in Barham,QueenElizabethandValiant.

Thetrunkingofthefunnelshadbeenwellarranged,andtheresultantenormousflat-sided fittings constituted amost imposing feature, being less unsightlythanmighthavebeen thecase.Mainmast,with topmastand topgallant,wasverytall,andtheheightwasaccentuatedbytheabsenceofanyforetopmast.

Easily distinguished from the Royal Sovereign class by trunked funnel, noshelterdeckamidships.Shorter6inbattery,notcarriedabaftamidships.

Directorplatformonforemastwasnoticeablylower.Individualdifferencesin1934Barham: (1)Tripodmainmastwith director tower halfway up tripod legs. (2)Catapulton‘X’turretandcraneabeammainmast(portside).(3)Lowerbridgeextended fartheraft than in theothers. (4)Projecting lips toSL towersaroundfunnel. (5) Sternwalk.QueenElizabeth: (1) Enlarged after superstructure. (2)Extrayardonmaintopmast.(3)Sternwalk.Valiant:(1)Catapultandcraneonquarterdeckrightaft.(2)StronglyprojectingliptoforwardpairofSLtowers.(3)Nosternwalk.Warspite:(1)Sternwalk.(2)Flagpoletotopmainmast.Malaya:(1)Nosternwalk.(2)Noflagpole.

BARHAMProfiles,1928and1937

MALAYAProfiles1926and1930

QUEENELIZABETH,MALAYAANDWARSPITEModifications,1920–37

Malaya’srevampedbridge(donein1936refit)photographedin1939.

3.MD/DFequipmentwasfitted,amodifiedtypeofDFaerialbeingfittedonmaintopmast.4.The36inSLwerereplacedby44inandtheirdistributionmodified,two(port and starboard) on superstructure before funnel and two (port andstarboard) on platform abaft funnel. Former control towers around thefunnelwereremoved.5.Twoaircrafthangarswereprovided(portandstarboard)insuperstructureabaftfunnel,openingattherear.Astraightarmelectriccranewasfittedontopofeachhangarandafixedathwartshipscatapultontheupperdeckabafthangars. Accommodation for four aircraft (maximum): two stowed inhangars,oneondeckoutsideandoneoncatapult.SwordfishT/S/Rand/orWalrusAmphibianscarried.Firstbattleshiptohavehangaraccommodationforaircraft.6.Originalmachineryandboilersretained.Speedwasreducedasaresultofextraweightsaddedinreconstruction(shipunabletomaintainstationwithValiantandWarspitein1940/41).7. New type, completely open, upper bridge fitted, this design beingotherwise only adopted in Royal Oak (see notes on bridges). Aftersuperstructure abaft mainmast was enlarged. Boat stowage rearranged toaccommodatehangarsandcatapult, themajorityofboatsbeingstowedon

top of hangars and handled by aircraft cranes. The original main boatderrickwas removed.Accommodation,ventilationandgeneral equipmentwasmodernizedbuthabitabilityatseasufferedfromthereducedfreeboard.8. Main topgallant mast replaced by flagpole. Forward and after strutsremovedfrommainstarfishandyardraisedwellabovethis.

ReconstructionofWarspite,March1934toJune19371. The estimated draught and displacement was reduced by 4in and 500tonsrespectively,mainlybecauseofthereducedweightofnewmachineryandboilerstogetherwiththeremovaloffour6ingunsandtheirarmourandthe original heavy conning tower. Original stability was adequatelymaintained.Forecastle flarewasextendedaft almost to ‘A’ turret and thedeck was widened so that the side flushed with what was formerly thesecond6ingunport.Thesidewasplatedupovermaindeckcasematesaftanddeckedover.Hullstrengthwassatisfactorilymaintainedandalthoughthe removal of heavyweights amidshipsduring reconstruction caused thehulltobepermanentlyhoggedtotheextentof4½intheshipstoodupwellunderveryseveretests.Theextensionofforecastleflareandplatinguptotheforwardpairofbatterygunportstendedtoassistdrynessinheadseas.2.Elevationof the15inguns increased to30°, themaximumprovided inany capital ship to that date for guns of 12in or higher calibre. Rangesubstantially increased from approximately 23,400 yards to 32,200 yards.Newfirecontrolandrangefindingequipmentwasfitted,witha15ftand9ftrangefinder.Newandmuchlarger(15in)directorwasfittedontopofanewbridge tower.ThearmouredRFposition formerlyover theconning towerwas transferred to the after superstructure.The forward and after pairs of6inguns removed toaccommodateadditionalAAarmament, and thehullside was plated up flush over the vacant gun positions. This was notconsidered to involve any loss in actual fighting qualities becausesecondarygunsthatwereunavailableforuseagainstairaswellassurfacetargets had become virtually obsolete. The 6in director towers wererelocatedportandstarboardonthenewbridgetowerbelowandabeamthe15indirector.Thesingle4inAAwasreplacedbytwin4ininlargeshields.Fourmultiple2pdrAA(eightbarrels)wereadded.Twoenlargedsponsonswere fitted on top of the superstructure amidships abeam and abaft thefunnel,theafterpairbeingcarriednoticeablyhigherthantheforwardpair.Fourmultiple0.5inAAwereadded,twoportandstarboardon‘B’and‘X’turrets.HAdirector for 4inAAwas located port and starboard at rear of

bridge tower below and abaft the 15in director. The remaining torpedotubeswere removed togetherwith the torpedo control tower andRF; thetorpedoflatswereusedforextraammunitionstowage.3.MF/DFequipmentfitted,DFaerialateachmasthead.4.The36inSLwerereplacedby44inanddistributionwasmodified: twoport and starboard on sponsons at sides of bridge tower, two port andstarboardonplatformagainstforesideoffunnel.Theformercontroltowersaroundthefunnelswereremoved.5.AircrafthangarsandcatapultwereinstalledasinMalaya.6. The 6in battery was removed from vacant gun positions and the afterbatterybulkheadwasshiftedforwardoftheoriginalafterpairofguns.Theoriginalmaindeckcasematesaftwereplatedup,butcasematearmourwasretainedtoformanirregular-shapedbulkheadbetweenship’ssidesand‘Y’barbette. Horizontal protection was considerably improved, but warexperienceshowedthistobestillinadequateagainstmodernhigh-poweredbombs, the ship being badly damaged by a 500lb bomb off Crete on 22May1941andcompletelydisabledbya3,000lbgliderbombatSalernoon16 September 1943 (see battle damage).On the first occasion one boilerroom had to be temporarily evacuated while on the second the bombpenetratedsixdecksandburstinNo.4boilerroom,completelydemolishingthis and flooding all the others. Armour modifications comprised: maindeck from ‘A’ barbette to forward bulkhead increased from 1¼in to 3in.Middledeckincreasedfromlinuniformto5½inovermagazinesand3½inover machinery and boilers. Total horizontal protection over magazines6¾in(1¼inupperdeckand5½inmiddledeck).Totalovermachineryandboilers5¾in (lin forecastle,1¼inupper and3½inmiddledecks).Armouronboilerroomuptakesincreasedfrom1½into4in.Originalconningtowerand lowernavigatingpositionwas removedandanewarmouredpositionplacedhighupinthebridgetowerattheforwardendofNo.3platform,thisbeing fitted as a new lower navigating position with armouredcommunication tube to the base of the tower. Splinter protection wasprovided for bridge personnel and at 2pdr AA positions. Internalsubdivision was extensively modified and improved. Existing bulgeprotectionwasretained,butsubdivisioninsidethelongitudinalanti-torpedobulkheadswassubstantiallyincreased.Acentrelinebulkheadwasfittedinmachinery and boiler spaces with eight watertight compartments inmachineryandsix inboilerspace. In theeventofheavydamageportandstarboardengineroomscouldbecompletelyisolatedfromoneanotherand

thepumpingcapacitywasincreasedfrom950to9,050tonsperhour.

WARSPITE:AFTERRECONSTRUCTION,1937

Before AfterArmament 4,970tons 5,264tonsMachinery 3,691tons 2,300tonsEquipment 1,287tons 1,420tonsArmour 5,431tons 5,980tonsHull&ProtectivePlating 16,250tons 17,130tonsOilfuel 3,431tons 3,735tonsReserveFeedWater 497tons 267tonsDraughtForward 33ft2inmeanDraughtAft 32ft1inGM 6.63ftnormalload 6.82ftdeeploadDisplacement 33,842 tonshalfoilcondition, 34,228tonsordinarydeepcondition, 31,446tonsstandard, 36,911tonsdeep (includingwaterprotection)Boilerweights 1,461tons 900tonsEngineRoom 1,737tons 967tonsConningTower 339tons 102tonsBatteryProtection 339tons 105tonsDeckover(protective) magazinesforward 260tonsDeckover(protective) magazinesaft 189tonsDeckover(protective) EngineRooms 253tonsDeckover(protective) BoilerRoom 456tons

Hullweights 16,250tons 17,130tons

WARSPITE:GENERALPARTICULARS,1939

Displacement(tons):36,911(deep)asinclined.Lengthandbeamasin1934.Forecastleflarelengthenedgivingincreaseddryness.Sideplatedupoveroriginalmaindeckcasematesaft.Armament:Mainarmamentasoriginal.8×4inAA(twin).32×2pdr(4×8barrels).16×0.5inAA(4×4barrels).OriginalsalutinggunsandMGs.Notorpedoarmament.Radar:MF/DFequipmentfitted.Searchlights:4×44in,2×24insignalling.ArmourAsoriginal,plusincreasedhorizontalandinternalprotectionandminusoriginalconningtowers.Newbridgeprotection:3inplates(NC)onfrontandsides,2inback,l½inroof,1infloorNewbridgetoweralsomadegasandchemicalproofasfaraspossible.Totaldeckarmour:6¾inovermagazines,5¾inovermachinery.Eightwatertightcompartmentsinmachineryandsixinboilerspaces.MachineryParsonsgearedturbines.6Admiraltytype3-drumboilers.Fuel:3,730tons.General:LargetowerstructurereplacingformerbridgeworkandconningtowerBoat stowage rearranged, accommodation, ventilation and equipment allmodernised.Rig:Lightpoleforemastwithtopmastandtopgallant.Shortpolemainmast.Nocontroltop.DFaerialonpoleateachmasthead.Reconstructioncosts:£2,800,000.Complement:average1,183.

GunnerypracticeatseaduringannualFleetmanoeuvres,1934.ThephotographshowsMalayanearestthecamera,thenWarspite,RodneyandNelson.

ExcellentviewofWarspite’snewlayoutafterhercompletereconstruction.SheisseenonherwaytojointheMediterraneanFleetatMalta,January1938.

7.Theshipwasre-enginedandreboileredbyParsonswithParsonsgearedturbines and six Admiralty three-drum high-pressure boilers arranged inthree compartments, grouped together. The original arrangements ofturbines and propeller shafts were retained. Horse power increased to

approximately 80,000shp for 24 knots. Separate diesel driven generatorswereprovided,thesebeingentirelyindependentofthemainsteamsystem.Generating capacity increased from 700kW to 2,400kW. Because of thereduced number of boilers (six against original 24) the original forwardboiler room was no longer required and became available for otherpurposes, including diesel oil tanks, bomb and sub-calibre magazines,secondarywirelessand telegraphyoffice, telephoneexchangeandHACP,turbo-generator rooms, SL stabilizing room and stores. Total saving inweightandspaceonmachineryandboilerswasapproximately1,480 tonsand4,540squarefeet(seetable).Concentrationofallthreeboilerroomsinonegroupwasaweakpointasallsteampowerwascutoffwhenthesewereflooded by bomb damage at Salerno in September 1943. Fuel capacityincreased by 300 tons and nominal radius increased from 7,670miles to13,500milesat10knotsbythegreatereconomyofthenewgearedturbinesandmoreefficientboilers,especiallythelatter.8. The former bridge work and conning tower was replaced by a largesplinterandgasprooftower,amodificationofthetypefirst introducedinthe Nelson class (1925), designed to meet the requirements of a fleetflagship and accommodating the fire control top and director positionformerly locatedon the tripod foremast.Arrangementof tower frombaseupwards: shelter deck – general reading room and oilskin store; No. 1platform–Officers’seacabins.CPOs’readingroom,midshipmen’s’study;No.2platform–seacabinsforAdmiral,ChiefofStaffandCaptain,MasterofFleetandNavigatingOfficer,twobathrooms;No.3platform–loweredarmoured navigating position in face. Signal officeDF and cipher office,signalofficer’scabin,SLandlookoutpositionatsides;Admiral’sBridge–Admiral’s shelter and charthouse at forward end, remote control office,plottingoffice,6inandHAdirectorsat rear; theroof–15indirector.Thetrunked funnel was replaced by a single much smaller funnel, affordingspaceforadditionalAAarmamentwithcleararcsoffire.Boatstowageandhandling arrangements were modified as in Malaya. Accommodation,ventilationandgeneralequipmentwascompletelymodernized.

Warspitestrippedrightdowntothehullforcompletereconstruction.SeenhereatPortsmouthshowingnoupperworksexceptforthenewlowersuperstructuretakingshape.

Warspitealmostcomplete.Thenewguiseisnowonview.‘Newwineintooldbottles’onecriticstated.Nevertheless,almostnewshewas.Close-upofsuperstructureandfunnel.March1937.

9.Rigmodified.Originalheavytripodforemastwasreplacedbylightpolesteppedat therearofcontrol towerwithshort topmastand topgallantandtall DF aerial pole (actual light pole was part of original mainmast). Nocontrol top.ShortpolemainmastwithDFaerialathead.SignalandWT

yardonforemast.WTyardonmain.

ValiantleavingGibraltarinApril1931.Overagainstthemole,Renown,TigerandRepulsecanbeseen.

Warspitestarboardbowview,March1937.

ReconstructionofValiant,March1937toNov1939Reconstructioninvolved90percentofstructure.

1.Nominaldraughtanddisplacementincreasedbyapproximately3½inand420tonsbyadditionalweightsimposedonreconstruction,whichwerenotentirely offset by the lighter machinery and boilers and weight of itemsremoved as had been the case in Warspite. Nominal displacement asreconstructed about 920 tons heavier than Warspite. Compared to pre-constructionfigures,theestimatedweightofhullandarmourincreasedby1,163 tons, armament by 596 tons and equipment by 87 tons.Machineryandboilerweightsreducedby1,485tonsgivinganestimatednet increase

of361tons.Asaconsequenceoftheremovaloftheentire6inbattery,theforecastle side modifications were considerably more extensive than inWarspite.Theoriginalrecessedforecastlewasbuiltoutintoanormalcurveextendingtoapointabaftamidshipswhereitangledintothecentrelineof‘X’turretasbefore.Thesidewasplatedupovermaindeckcasematesaftanddeckedoveras inWarspite.Specialmeasureswere taken in this ship(and Queen Elizabeth) to prevent any hull distortion (hogging) as hadoccurred inWarspite during reconstruction as a result of the removal ofheavyweights(machineryandboilers)amidships.

QueenElizabeth.FleetReviewswereafavouritepublicgatheringandnonemoresothanwhenthebigshipswerepresent.QueenElizabethisshownhereduringthe1935Review(thelastforHisMajestyKingGeorgeV).

VALIANTProfiles,1924and1940

VALIANT:PARTICULARS,1939

Displacement (tons): 35,698 ordinary deep condition, 36,513 (includingwaterprotection).Lengthandbeamasin1934.OriginalrecessedforecastleandflareasinWarspite.

ArmamentMaingunsasoriginal.20X4.5indual-purpose(10twinturrets).LightAAasinWarspite.OriginalsalutingandMGs.Notorpedoarmament.Radar:AWType79Z,MF/DFaerial.Searchlights:6×44in,2×24insignalling.

ArmourMain belt as original. As refitted same as reconstructedWarspite except: 4inspecial ‘D’ armour on upper sides amidships in place of original 6in battery.Maindeckarmourincreasedto4¼inaroundouterfaceof‘Y’barbette.Increasedsubdivisioninboilerandmachineryspaces.

MachineryParsonsgearedturbines.8Admiraltytype3-drumboilers.Fuel:asWarspite.

GeneralSameasWarspiteexceptforbridgeslightlydifferentinshape.Rig: Same asWarspite except light tripod legs to foremast.Reconstructioncosts:£3,000,000(approx).Appearance:SimilartoWarspiteexcept:Secondaryturretsportandstarboard,no6inbatteryupperpartofbridgetowerextendedfartheraft,tripodforemast,nosternwalk.

QUEENELIZABETH:PARTICULARS,1941

Displacement(tons):37,696(deep)(includes699tonswaterprotection),35,930averageactioncondition.Lengthandbeamas1934.ArmamentasValiant.

Radar:AWType279fittedJanuary1941,improvedMF/DFasValiantAllotherfeaturesalmostidenticalwithValiantanddifficulttotellthemapartatcertainangles.

GENERALPARTICULARSFORCLASSIN1944

Malaya in Reserve from October 1944 owing to relatively unmodernizedcondition compared to QueenElizabeth, Valiant andWarspite.Displacement(tons)QE::37,385(deep)June1944;38,450(deep)1945.Valiant:35,647(deep)1944;38,908(deep)1946.Malaya:37,710(deep)1945.Lengthandbeamas1939.

ArmamentMainandsecondaryas1939.Malaya:48×20mmAA(singles)(plus32×2pdrs).Warspite:35×20mmAA(plus32×2pdrs).QueenElizabeth:32×2pdrs.54×20mmAA.Valiant.32×2pdr47×20mmAA.

RadarType284formainguns.Type285for4inAA.Type282forlightAA.AWType281.SWType273(Type284replacedby275).VariousIFFaerialsplusType650anti-missileaerialsseeninMalayaandWarspite.Searchlights;asin1939.Aircraft:allremovedandareausedforotherequipment.Catapultsremoved.Protectionasin1939.Machinery:asin1939.Speed:Greatlyreducedowingtomanywartimeadditionsanddoubtfulitanyofthe surviving vessels could sustain more than 22 knots for long periods.Warspite reduced in speed even more after hitting mine in 1944 (about 16knots).AllHACSequipmentgreatlyimprovedfrom1939to1944.

Allvesselsoverweightby1944andverywetinaseaway

2.MainarmamentandfirecontrolmodificationswerepracticallythesameasinWarspite.The6insecondarybatterywasreplacedbytwenty4.5inDPHA/LA guns in ten light twin turrets of a special gas-tight pattern withmushroomcrownsarmouredagainstaerialattack.Theturretswerearrangedfiveport and starboard amidships in twogroups, threeon forecastle deckabeambridge tower and funnel and two further aft on upper deck abeamafter superstructure. Rate of fire was about 18 rounds per minute undergood conditions. The turrets revolved on weather deck with tween deckmountingstravellingonrollerpathsondeckbelowandpermittingbothflatandhightrajectoryfire.Blasteffectsbetweenturretswasoftenreportedassevereandspecialarrangementsweremadetopreventcatapultfrombeingdamaged by blast from the after pair of turrets when trained ahead. Thegunswerecontrolledfromfourdirectors,twoportandstarboardonbridgetowerabaft15indirectorandtwoportandstarboardonaftersuperstructure.Ammunitionwassuppliedbyendlesschainhoists.The4inAAarmamentwasremoved.

Thechangetodual-purposegunsmarkedthebeginningofanewcycleofcapitalshipsecondaryarmamentintheRoyalNavyinwhichdefenceagainstairattackwastotakeprecedenceoversurfacetorpedoattack.Mediumcalibreguns,whichcouldnotbeusedagainstbothairandsurfacetargets,werenolongerconsideredworththeweightandspacetheyabsorbed,andscreeningcruisersanddestroyerswere relied upon to break up enemy destroyer attacks; 4in–5in guns beingconsidered adequate against smaller torpedo craft, these guns being also welladaptedforhigh-anglefire.ThegunsselectedforValiantandQueenElizabethwere4.5in insteadof the5.25inof theKingGeorgeVclassbecause the largergun could not have been carried in adequate numbers on their length anddisplacement.LightAAarmamentwas increased to thirty-two2pdr in four 8-barrel mountings, two port and starboard on superstructure amidships aroundfunnel,plussixteen0.5in in four4-barrelmountings, twoeachon ‘B’and‘X’turrets. Light AA directors were fitted port and starboard at the sides of thebridgetowerabaftfunnelandontheaftersuperstructure.Thediameterofthesedirectorswas only about 2in less than that of the 8ft platformsonwhich theyweremountedandthefittingswerereportedtobeverycomplicated.Additionalspace for the considerably increased light ammunition supply required wasobtained by removal of the remaining torpedo tubes and a reduction in boilerroomspace.

VoliontenteringGrandHarbourMalta,August1935.NotethelightgreyMediterraneancolours.

3.Airwarningradar(Type79Z)wasfitted(November1939),withanaerialon each mainmast. She was the second British capital ship to haveoperationalradar(fittedinRodney1938).4.The36inSLwerereplacedby44inandthenumberwasincreasedfromfour to six, twoport and starboard lowon faceofbridge tower; twoportandstarboardonplatformagainstrearoffunnel;twoportandstarboardonaftersuperstructurebeforemainmast.5.Aircraftequipmentaddedas inWarspiteexceptbent insteadofstraightarmcranes.6.The6inbattery andcasemate armourwas removed,partiallyoffsettingincreased weight of new secondary armament and ammunition supply.Specialveryhigh-tensile‘D’-typesteelarmourwasfittedonsidesinplaceofbatteryarmourbelowforwardgroupofsecondaryturrets.Improvementsin horizontal and boiler uptake protection was as inWarspite with thefollowingadditions:maindeckincreasedfrom1¼into4¼inaroundouterfaceof‘Y’barbette;lowerdeckincreasedfrom3into3½inoutsideforwardbulkhead;totalhorizontalprotectionovermagazines,machineryandboilerspaces asWarspite plus the extra 3in onmain deck around ‘Y’ barbette;conning tower modifications as in Warspite; existing bulge protectionretained, but internal subdivision and pumping capacity improved andextendedasinWarspite,internalsubdivisioninboilerspacesbeingfurtherincreased.7.Re-enginedandreboileredbyFairfieldwithParsonsgearedturbinesandeight Admiralty three-drum boilers in four compartments. The originalarrangementof turbinesandpropeller shaftswas retained.Thenumberof

boilers increased by two as compared toWarspite and the arrangementextended to four compartments instead of three to provide greatersubdivision.Horsepowerincreasedto80,000shpforprovisional24knots.SeparatedieseldrivengeneratorswerefittedasinWarspite.

QUEENELIZABETHArmoureddeckasreconstructed,1940

Malaya.Firstofthefinalreconstructions,MalayaisseenhereinDevonporton10Novemberl936ThiswasasfarasreconstructionwentforMalaya,andsheneverreceivedtheextensivealterationsgiventoWarspite,QueenElizabethandValiant.

8.Bridge,conningtower,funnel,boatstowageandhandlingmodificationswereasinWarspiteexceptthattheupperpartofthebridgetowerextendedfurther aft. Accommodation, ventilation and general equipment werebroughtuptodate.9.Rigmodified to light tripod foremastwith topmastonlyandshortpolemainmastwithouttopmast.Aradaraerialonashortpolewasfittedateach

masthead.

ReconstructionofQueenElizabeth,Aug1937toJan1941Reconstructioninvolved90percentofstructure.

1.Nominaldraughtanddisplacementincreasedby14inand1,600tonsbyadditional weights imposed on reconstruction which, as inValiant, wereonly partially offset by the lighter machinery and boiler weights. Hullmodificationswere as inValiant. The lengthened bow flare and built outforecastle side tended to assist dryness in head seas although inQueenElizabeth this was offset to some extent by the considerable increase indraftanddisplacementwithacorrespondinglossoffreeboardandstability.ArmamentmodificationswereasinValiant.2.AirwarningradarwasfittedinJanuary1941(Type279),withanaerialateachmasthead.ImprovedMF/DFasinValiant.3.SearchlightmodificationsasinValiant.4. Aircraft equipment as in Valiant except straight instead of bent armcranes.5.ProtectionmodificationsasinValiant.6.NewmachineryandboilersasinValiant.7.RigmodifiedasinValiantexceptthat tripodlegs(rakedforward)wereaddedtomainmast.Hullsuperstructureandfunnelwerecamouflaged.

ModificationstoOtherShipsoftheClassType79ZairwarningradarinValiantreplacedbyType279(byMarch1940).MaintopgallantremovedinMalayaandshorttopmastfittedtoforemast.CamouflagepaintedupinMalaya(1940),deletedinJune1941.

1941–3:1.Radarcontrol(Type284)fittedformainarmamentinallexceptBarham(1941). In Queen Elizabeth Type 285 (high angle) aerial used inconjunctionwiththe284set.ValiantandWarspitedidnothavethisintheMatapanaction,28March1941(fittedatAlexandria later).RadarcontrolType285fittedfor4.5inand4inAAinallexceptBarham.FittinginQueenElizabethcommencedFebruary1941,otherslater.FittedinMalayabyJuly1941.Bridgework added around4inAA inMalaya. LightAAgenerallyincreased. Multiple 2pdr (four barrels) added on ‘B’ turret in Barham(1941). Multiple 2pdr (eight barrels) added port and starboard on aftersuperstructureinMalaya(1942–3).0.5inremovedandvaryingnumbersof

twin and single 20mm AA added on superstructures, turrets andquarterdeck, right aft.Quarterdeck20mm inQueenElizabeth replacedbyDFaerial(1943).ValiantandWarspitecarried20mmonallturretsin1943,MalayaandQueenElizabethon‘B’and‘X’only.Radarcontrol(Type282)forclose-rangebarragefirefittedfor2pdrsand

twin20mm.FittedinQueenElizabethJune1941.LAAdirectorsaddedinWarspiteasforQueenElizabethandValiant.InMalayathesewerelocatedincupolasportandstarboardoverbridge.2.Airwarning radar (Type281) added inBarham,Malaya andWarspiteaerialateachmasthead.Surfacewarningradar(Type273)added1942–3.Aerial on maintop in Malaya, on foretop in others. Improved MF/DFequipmentfittedinMalayaandWarspite(asQueenElizabethandValiant).Aerial and after superstructure inMalaya and on face of bridge tower inWarspite. Additional DF aerial fitted on quarterdeck right aft in QueenElizabeth,replaced20mmAA.3. Prominent ventilating trunks added at base of mainmast in Malaya(1942–3).SternwalkremovedinQueenElizabeth1943.4.CamouflagepaintedupinMalaya,ValiantandWarspite(seecamouflagechapter).

1944:1.Aircraftnotcarriedafter1944.Hangarsandcranesretained.2.Pacific-patterncamouflagepaintedupinQueenElizabethandValiant(inEasternFleet).

1945:ProposedinJanuary1945tofitimprovedradarinQueenElizabethandValiantasopportunityoccurred.GunneryType284tobereplacedbyType274.Surfacewarning Type 273 by 277. Surface warning Type 268 (navigational) and air-surfacewarningType293added.ThesemodificationsactuallycarriedoutonlyinValiantduringarefitin1945–6.

BattleDamageBarham,torpedoed28December1939Whileonazigzagcourseat19knotsoffthewestcoastofScotlandinposition58°47’N,8°05’W,Barhamwastorpedoedontheportsideabreast‘A’and‘B’shellrooms(48station)atadepthofabout18–20feet.Acolumnofsprayshotuptoabout150–200feetandfellbackonthevessel,inundatingthebridge,boats

andpersonnelinthevicinity.Allwaterprotectioncompartmentswerefullatthetimeoftheexplosionwhichoccurredattheforwardendofthebulgewheretheprotection offered was necessarily less because of the ‘run in’ of the bulgestructure. Generally all compartments abreast ‘A’ and ‘B’ shell rooms on theportsidefloodedimmediately.‘A’shellroomand‘A’magazinefilledquickly,butsixofthetenoccupantsescaped.‘B’shellroomand‘B’magazinefilledupslowly.Atthetimeoftheexplosionwatertightdoorswereinthecruisingstate,i.e.,‘X’and‘Y’doorswereclosedandclippedexceptafewthathadbeenleftopen by special permission of DCO of the Watch. Damage control workedperfectly.

WARSPITEProfileandInboardasReconstructed,1937–8

ImmediatelyaftertheexplosionBarham tookaheelof7°toportwhichwasquicklyarrestedbytransferofoilfuel.Nowaterwasadmittedintotheshipforcorrectionofheel and trimuntil she returned todock.Themain engineswerestillworkingsatisfactorilyandshemadeoffat10knots increasingto16knotslater.Distance toportwas about380nauticalmiles zigzagging.Therewasnofailureofprimarylightingandthesecondarylightingwasgenerallysatisfactory.The explosion caused no damage to the primary or secondary high-anglearmamentexceptthatofflooding.Therewasnofireonboardandnosecondaryexplosion.Noneoftheventplatesonthebulgeinthevicinityoftheexplosionwereblownofforstrained.Structuraldamage:Ingeneral thebulgeplatingwas rupturedand thrownaway from39 station to55½station–alengthof32feet.Verticallythemainruptureextendedfromtheloweredgeofthebulgetotheloweredgeofthesixthstrakeofbulgeplating–averticaldistanceofabout17feet.Theapproximatecentreofthedamagewasat

48 station.Here theouterbottomwas turnedupand forced inboardabove thethirdlongitudinal,andheavilycorrugatedbelowthethirdlongitudinalasfarasthemiddle line.Thedamage fadedoutataboutstations36and60. Inboardoftheruptureinthebulgeplatingtheship’souterbottom(40lb)andinnerbottom(14lb)plating(andframing)wasmissingorturnedinboardoveranareaalmostidenticalwiththatoftheruptureintheouterbulgeplating.Thethickbulkhead(two in number, 40lb HT) was forced inboard and torn away at its bottomconnection.Atthepointofmaximumdeflectionitwasforcedbacksufficientlyfar to have touched the magazine shellroom longitudinal bulkhead (port), butwaslatermadeabout12inchesclearofthatbulkhead.Themaximumdeflectionat48stationwasabout78inches.

WARSPITEAsReconstructed1937GeneralArrangementsandRigProfile

The thickbulkheadhad twomajor ruptures,onealmostexactlyopposite thecentreofthedamagerunningthefulldepthofthebulkheadandwithamaximumopeningofabout12inches;thesecondstartedatthebottomedgeatabuttat42station.Thethirdlongitudinalbulkhead,inboardofthethickbulkhead,wasalsoset in and ruptured.Generally transversebulkheadsbetween36 stationand68stationwerebuckled.Casualties:fourkilledandtwowounded.

BARHAMTorpedoDamage,28December1939

Thegeneraleffectoftheexplosionwaslocalizedtoaremarkableextentandthedamageinnowayaffected thefightingefficiencyof theship.Thedamagecontrolofficerof thewatchhadkeptapeggedrecordof thedoorswhichwereopenandhadmenstandingby toshut themassoonas theorder todosowasgiven.Damagecontrolarrangementsnotonlyworkedperfectly,butanengineerofficer hadbeendetailed especially for this task and for threemonthsprior tothisincidenthadhadnootherdutiesexceptwatch-keeping.Oneparticularlyinterestingfactwasthatnoneoftheventplatesinthebulge

had blown off or even showed signs of strain. The fact that they werespecificallydesignedtoblowoutonsuchanoccasionindicatesthatthetheoryofventplatesdidnotnecessarilyholdupinpractice.Draughtofshipbeforeexplosion31ftmean;afterexplosion,41ft6inforward,

27ftaft.Onenteringdock,35ft2½inforward,32ft11inaft.

MalayaTorpedoedbyU81offCapeVerdeIslands,20March1941WhileonconvoydutiesMalayawashitbyatorpedoontheportsidejustabaft82bulkheadabreasttheforebridge,andsustainedconsiderabledamage.Draughtbeforetheexplosionwas33ftforwardand32ftaft,butonehourafterthehitthisincreasedto35ftand33ftrespectively.Theshiplisted1½°toport.Thetorpedo

track was seen from the upper conning tower deck at about 50 yards,approaching from Red 70°.The track was visible for about two seconds andappearedalmost tohave reached the shipwhen theexplosionoccurred. Itwasconcluded that the torpedo had been running at a shallow depth setting andtherefore had been fired at the convoy from long range and not specificallyaimedatMalayawhichatthetimewasmakingonly7knots.On reaching Trinidad divers were put over to inspect the damage although

conditions were not good for a thorough survey at that time. The followingdamagewas noted however: 1.Three armour plates had been forced in aboveturtle back, and ship’s side immediately below had a horizontal splitapproximately14feet longand4incheswide.2.Ship’ssidewasbadlydentedbelowsplit.3.Alladjacentupperandlowerbulgeshadbeenblownaway.Nomajordamagewasdonetoanyofthearmament.15inch:Thefloodingof

No. 2 hydraulic room necessitated changing over to duplicate pressure in ‘B’turret,andmeant thatonly threepumpswereavailable for the four turrets.Nomachineryintheturretswasinanywayaffected.6in:P.4mountingwasjammedfordirector trainingby the shockof the explosion, and thiswas rectifiedaftertwo hours’ work by the ship’s crew. The remaining mountings were quiteundamaged but P.2 and P.3 jumped teeth on the director elevating drive andblack pointer adjustmentswere necessary. The entire battery could have beenusedat any time inGunlayer’s firing.4in andclose range:Nodamageof anykindsustained.

BARHAMTorpedoDamage,28December1939

AsuperbaerialviewofBarhamduringthespringcruiseofMarch1937.

EngineRoom:smallleaksanddripswerenotedinmanyofthecompartmentsforward of 82 Station and below armoured deck (middle). These leaks werepresentwherepipes,ventilationshafts,etc.,passedthroughthearmoureddeck.It appeared that as the armoured deckwas laid on top of the originalmiddledeck,watercouldcirculateinthespacebetweenandthuscauseleaks.Leakswerenotedin:forwarddressingstation;lowerconningtowerflat;‘A’

space;‘B’space;searchlightstabilizingroom;gunner’sstore.After temporaryrepairsMalayasailedfor theUSAwherepermanentrepairs

keptheroutofactionforfourmonths.

WarspiteandValiantDamagedByEnemyAirAttackoffCrete,22May1941Warspite andValiantwere bombed byMesserschmitt Bf 109s and both shipssustainedmore than superficialdamage.Warspitewas flying the flagofRear-AdmiralH.B.Rawlings,OBE,andwas incompanywithValiant,Gloucester,Fijiandsevendestroyers(Napier,Hero,Hereward,Isis,Decoy,GreyhoundandGriffin).InresponsetoarequestforassistancefromRear-Admiral,15thCruiserSquadron inHMSNaiad, theshipsweresteamingonanortheasterlycourseat20 knots, and had just passed through the Kithera Channel. Considerable airoppositionhadbeenmetduringtheforenoon,andasmanyhostileaircraftwereinsightatvaryingdistances,theship’scompanywasatRetireStations,withallHAArmamentandsupplymanned.ThreeMesserschmittBf109sweresightedrightaheadcomingoutofthehaze

at about 2,000 yards, having already commenced their dive on the ship. Eachaircraftdroppedonebombestimatedtobeofatleast500lbcalibre.Thebombswere dropped within a few seconds of one another from a height ofapproximately800feet,almost immediatelyafter theaircrafthadbeensighted.About120roundswerefiredfromthemachine-guns,butthepompomsdidnotfire. Before avoiding action had become effective a hit was received on thestarboardsidenexttotheforemost4ingunmounting.Thesecondbombfell50yardsclearofthestarboardside,thethirdfellabout100yardsrightahead.The first bomb passed through the forecastle deck about 6 inches from the

ship’s side just before the starboard forward twin 4inHAgunmounting, thenpassedthrough112batterybulkheadunderthebeam,hittheupperdeckat116station1inchfromship’sside,shotslightlyinboard(notpiercingthedeck)andbursteitheron125batterybulkheadorupperdeckatapproximately124station12 inches from ship’s side.Angle of descent 44° to 45°.Distance of point ofstriketopointofburstapproximately29feet.Thicknessofplatesthroughwhichthe bombpassed, and particulars of other obstructions between point of strikeandpointofburst:1.Forecastledeck,linHTand½indoubleplatingforforward4inHAmounting;2.Batterybulkhead,1½inHT;3.Upperdeck,1¼inand¾inHT.Majordamagesustained: forecastledeck,holed in stringerand twoadjacent

strakes of plating between stations 114 and 137, with beams under blown upwithdeck(destroyedoveranareaof90ft×30ft);bentupbetweenstations98and140,approximatemaximum1ft4in;betweenstations112and125theforeandaftgirderunderdeckdistortedandpartlyblownaway;upperdeck,holeinstrake adjacent to stringer plate between stations 120 and 126 (upper deckbulgeddownwardsoveranarea130ft long×30ftwide);blowndownbetweenstations86and146,approximatemaximum2feet;beamsbrokenatstations122and124;foreandaftgirderdistortedfromstations106to118;pillars,maintoupper decks distorted at stations 100,106,112,124 and 134;No. 3 boiler roomintake between forecastle and fan casings blown in; ship’s side plating,forecastle to upper decks, stations 103 to 118, plating hinged from forecastledeckandblownoutboard;stations118to127,platingblownoutfromforeend;118 bulkhead betweenmain and upper decks compressed; starboard after 4inHA guns support – plating holed and stiffeners distorted (size of holeapproximately1foot×10 inches);batterybulkhead,112station,distortedandinboardendblownforwardapproximately5ft6in;batterybulkhead,115station,shatteredfromship’ssidetoverticalweldedbutt,18inchesawayfromdoorwayand blown aft. Door to bulkhead blown aft, weld round hinges on bulkheadsheared.6ingunplatebracketsupportsunderupperdeckatstations105and118

distorted. Starboard forward pom-pom gun support and deck liftedapproximately12inches.Minor damage: main deck bent down between 120 and 126 stations for a

diameterof5feettoadepthof5inchesandpiercedinthreeplacesbyholesof1ft×3in,6in×2inand3in×1½in;bulwarksplinterprotectionblownofffromforward face of forward 4in HA gun to 130 station. Shelter deck bent upapproximately1footoneachsideofpom-pomreadyusemagazineandholedat124 station.Superstructure bulkheads abovepoint of burst, split anddistorted.Pom-pomplatformblastscreensholedanddistorted.Deckofforwardpom-pomready use magazine holed, size 1 foot × 4 inches. Divisional bulkheads ofwarrant officers’ and gun room messes, pantries, galleys and drying roomseverely damaged. Warrant officers’ mess wrecked. Gunroom mess severelydamagedandgalley-fittingssmashed(ovensremainedinquitegoodstate).Note:The damage abaft 125 bulkhead was mostly caused by fragments from thatbulkheadwhenitwasshattered.Bakerybulkheaddistorted,ovenstornoutandfittingsdamaged.Scupperpipefractured,maintoupperdeckat124station.Firemain,freshandsaltwaterservices,heatingsteamandothersmallpipesfracturedand damaged in vicinity of explosion. Large amount of ventilation trunkingincludingthatofNo.3dynamodestroyedinvicinity.Extent of damage caused by blast effect: ship’s side, 103 to 127 stations,

blown out (forecastle to upper deck); forecastle deck bent up between 98 and140 stations approximatelymaximum 1 foot 4 inches; upper deck bent downbetween86and146stationsapproximatemaximum2feet,distortingbeams,etc.andS.3andS.4platebracketsupports;118bulkheadbetweenupperandmaindecks compressed; 112 battery bulkhead blown forward and inboardapproximately 5 feet 6 inches; divisional bulkheads ofwarrant officers’mess,galleys, drying room and bakery distorted; shelter deck, superstructurebulkheads, pom-pom gun decks and blast screens distorted; No. 125 batterybulkhead on fragmenting, pierced after 4in HA gun support and divisionalbulkheads at 141½and158 stations, also cutting ship’s side from154 station;freshandsaltwaterservicesdamagedinvicinityofexplosionandbyupperdeckbeing bent down; No. 3 boiler room fan downtake casing blown out fromforecastledecktofancasings.Extentofdamagecausedbysplintereffect(bombappearstohavefragmented

thoroughly):On112and125batterybulkheads, insideship’ssideandondeckplating and beams under forecastle deck were numerous pit-marks of sizesvarying from ½in to 2in diameter approximately. Splinters round edges offorecastle and upper decks holed plating. 112Battery bulkhead holed in three

places, sizes 3in × lin, 2in × ½in and ¾in diameter. Ship’s side plating(forecastle toupperdeck)oneholeof4indiameter at 123 station,4 feet fromdeck.Beamsat112–144stationswerepiercedinseveralplaces.Pom-pomgunblast screens pierced with about eight holes of approximately 1½in diameter.Superstructure,severalpit-marksandthreeholesof2½indiameter.Effecton fightingefficiencyof armament:Starboard6inbattery, twoof the

fourgunscompletelyoutofaction.Tworemaininggunsinactionwithprimarycontrolandimprovisedtelephones.TheSquadronwasturnedtothesouthwardandallfurtherattacksonWarspite

weremadebyhigh-levelbombersonly.ThedamagetothefansupplyofNo.3boiler caused very thick black smoke to emerge from the funnel, but thiswasstopped inabout tenminutes.Downbelow, the fireandrepairparties,assistedbyextrahandsfromthemessdecks,putoutthefewsmallfiresthatoccurredinthebattery, and then started removing thedead andwounded and clearingup.Thedeadwereburiedatseaatabout20.00hours.Thewoundedweredistributedamongtheboys’messdeck,thechurchandofficeflatsnearthemarines’messdecks,andapartofthemarines’messdeckitself.Damage to structure: The large expanse of forecastle deck and ship’s side

whichwereblownawayprovidedagoodventingwhichsaved furtherdamagedownwards.Thethickforecastledeck,coupledwiththeobliqueangleofimpact,the low vertical velocity, and the thick upper deck also prevented furtherdownwarddamage.Itisinterestingtocomparethelargeexpanseofupperdeckdisheddownwards (130 feet×30 feet)with the small hole (6in×8in) in thatdeckimmediatelyundertheburst.Temporary repairswere completed in onemonth, but full repair of damage

undertakeninUSAfromAugusttoDecember1941.Valiantwasthetargetofastickoffourbombs,estimatedweight50kg,fuzed

directactionandreleasedfromabout15,000feet.Thedirecthitswerescoredontheupperdeckportside,onejustabaft196stationandtheotherjustabaft210station. One nearmiss bomb burst about 4 feet belowwater and close to thebulge plating on the port side abreast 126½ station. Another nearmiss bombburst off the port side between 50 to 60 stations and caused no damage.Detonationwascomplete,onlyafewsmallfragmentsbeingfound.Firsthit,structuraldamage:Thebombstrucktheupperdeck(30lbHTon30lb

HT)portsidejustabaft196stationabout12feetfromtheship’ssideandburstonimpact.Itmadeaholeabout4feetsquareinthedeckandsplintersperforatedthe 20lb superstructure side plating and fittings in the vicinity. The 10lbWTbulkhead196betweenthemainandupperdeckswasfracturedanddistortedand

the top boundary angle was torn away and fractured. A number of rivetsconnectingtheanglestiffenertothebulkheadweresheared.The14lbmaindeckwas perforated in four places and dented in numerous other places. Themesstablesandstoolsonthemaindeckinthevicinityoftheburstweresmashedandthe 7lb pantry bulkhead at 192 stationwas perforated. A 15lb hatch coamingabout15feetfromthepointofburstwasperforatedbysplintersandthedrumoftheportafterdeckwinchwasfracturedanddistorted.Electrical damage: The shore leads to No. 8 dynamo used to supply

degaussing ‘M’ coil, supply and control wiring cables for Nos. 6 and 8 deckwinches,permanentemergencyleadsfromtheportafterbreakercompartmenttomaindeckandanumberofsmallercablesweredamagedbysplinters.Incendiaryeffects:Therewerenoincendiaryeffects,butthickpungentsmoke

andfumeson themessdeckabaft196bulkhead,port,wereclearedrapidlybyopeningtheupperdeckhatch.Effectonfightingefficiency–nil.Secondhit,structuraldamage:Thebombstrucktheupperdeckportsideatthe

junction of the 30lb deck stringer plate and the 25lb sheer strake of the shellplatingjustabaft210station,andburstonimpact.Itmadeaholeabout3feet×1feet6inchesinthedeckand3feet×1footintheship’ssideanddestroyedthe3½in×3½in×10lbdeckboundaryangleinwayofhole.The‘Z’barframeandbulb beam at 210 stationwere distorted. The rivets in the flanged connectionwereshearedandthebracketdistorted.A15lbhatchcoamingabout30feetfromthe point of burstwas perforated by splinters.The guard rail stanchions in thevicinityof theburstwere fracturedandapartofonewasblownadistanceofabout 150 feet to the hangar top where it pierced the side of the 45ft motorlaunch. The barbette armour of ‘Y’ turret was scored in numerous places, insomecasestoadepthofhalfaninch.Thedegaussing‘Q’coil,whichwaslaidonthedeckinboardoftheguardstanchions,wassevered.

WARSPITEBombDamage,May1941

OneofWarspite’sfirstknockswaswhenshewasattackedoffCreteinMay1941andhitby100lbbombs.Thedamageshownisthatonthebatterydeck.Notethe6incasemateandgun.

Effectonfightingefficiency–nil.Nearmiss, structuraldamage:Thebombburst about4 feetbelow thewater

closetothebulgeplatingportsideabreast126½stationandcausedaholeabout

4 feet wide × 7 feet deep in the 30lb ‘H’ strake of the upper bulge platingbetween125Kand127Kstations.Between127Kand129Kstationstheplatingwasforcedinwardsandtherivetsinthetopandbottomlapsweresheared.Intheupperbulgethe20lbWTbulkheadat125Kstationwasdistortedandleaked;therivets throughtheouterboundaryangleconnectionwereshearedandtheangledistorted.Thechannelbarframeat127Kstationwasdestroyed.Thechannelbarframeat129Kstationwasdistorted, three rivetswere shearedand the flangedbracket at the bottom of the framewas distorted. The ship’s side armourwasunmarked except for one small indentation. In the lower bulge the 22.5lb topstrakeofplating forming thecrownof thebulgewasdished toamaximumofabout3inchesbetween125½to127½stationsandthebuttat126½stationwasopenedtoamaximumofabout2½inchesat thecentre.Therivets throughthedoublerivetedbuttstrapwereshearedontheforesidewhilethoseontheaftsideremainedintact.Damagewasrepairedintwomonths.

AdramaticviewofBarham‘takingitgreen’,c.1930.TheshipsoftheRoyalSovereignclasswerenotoriouslywetinaseawayandtheQueenElizabethsnotmuchbettenasthisphotographshows.MalayaandArgusfollow.

LossofBarhamWhilecruisinginsinglelinewithQueenElizabethandValiantataspeedof17knotsandzigzagging,BarhamwastorpedoedbyU331offtheLibyancoast32°29’N,26°27’Eat1630on25November1941.Thefollowingreport is fromValiantwhichwasatadistanceofjustunderthreecables.At1625theOfficeroftheWatch,Sub-LieutenantD.FTrench,RN,wastakingthedistanceofBarhamwith theStewart’sDistanceMeter,whenheobserveda largeexplosionon theportsideofBarhamabreastthemainmast.HerealizedimmediatelythatBarhamhadbeenstruckbyatorpedofiredfromsomewhereontheportside,andquitecorrectlyordered‘hard-a-port’.

1.Iwasnotonthecompassplatformatthemomentoftheexplosionbutonreachingthefrontofittensecondslater,Iobservedaverylargecolumnofwaterand smokealongsideBarham, only theafter endofthequarterdeckbeingthenvisible.2. I immediately ordered ‘Full speed ahead together’; at the same

timetheOfficeroftheWatchinformedmethatthewheelwashard-a-port,andIobservedthattheshipwasjustbeginningtoswingtoportundertheinfluenceoffullportrudder.3.Aboutfifteensecondslaterasubmarinebrokesurfacebetween50

and100ontheportbowatadistanceofapproximately150yardsandmovingfromleft toright.BythenValianthadswung8°toport,andwasthereforeheadingapproximately260°.Thesubmarinewassteeringbetween050°and060°;herspeedappearedtobeabout4knots.4. Immediately on sighting the submarine I ordered ‘Amidships’,

andthen‘Hard-a-starboard’inanendeavourtoramher,butbeforetherudderwashardover itwasobvious that itwouldnotbepossible tocheck the swing toportbefore shewasacross thebow.Actually theswingwas just about checkedwhen the submarine passed down thestarboardside,andshesubmergedagainwhenabreastValiant’sbridgeatadistanceofabout50yards.AssheappearedonthestarboardsideS.lpom-pomfired19roundsatherwithmaximumdepression,butallroundsappearedtopassoverher.ThewheelwasthenagainreversedsoastokeepclearofBarham.5.Theonlyportionof the submarinewhichappearedabovewater

was theperiscopeandabout2or3 feetof theconning tower,whichwasflattopped.Acertainamountofdisturbedwaterbeforeandabaftthe conning tower indicated the fore and after ends of the hull, and

enabledanaccurateestimateofhercoursetobemade.6.As soonas the smokeand sprayhadclearedawayandBarham

becamevisibleagain,itwasseenthatshehaddevelopedaveryheavylisttoport,probablyabout20°to30°,asitwasobservedthatthewaterwas levelwith theafterscreendoor into the lobbyat the foreendofthe quarterdeck. She appeared to hang in this position for about aminute,whenshebegantorolloveronapproximatelyanevenkeel.7.Shecontinuedtorolloverandsinkdeeperinthewateruntilthe

waterwasseentobeenteringthefunnel.Amomentortwoafterthisthere was a loud explosion amidships, and a very large column ofblackandbrownsmokewithflamefromtheexplosioninthemiddleofit shot into the air. This explosion occurred at 1630, or 5 minutesapproximatelyafterthetorpedoeshit,whenBarhamwasjustabaftthebeamfromValiant’sbridge.8. All observers are agreed that, as the torpedoes hit, there were

threeexplosions,afirstone,followedaboutoneor twosecondslaterby two in quick succession, and that the explosions all occurredamidships between the funnel and the mainmast. It was not certainwhatcausedthefinalexplosionbutthegeneralopinionwasthatitwasthe6inmagazine,anditwascertainlynot‘A’or‘B’magazine,asthecentreof theexplosionwasabaft thebridge,andIamof theopinionthatitwasnotasfaraftas‘X’magazine.

BarhamsinkinginNovember1941TwoofthemostdramaticshotstakenduringtheSecondWorldWarshowBarhammortallywoundedaftertakingthreetorpedoesinherportside.Thefirstshowsheraboutoneminuteafterthehitsandalreadyheeling;thesecondshowsherheelingmoreandpassingthepointofmaximumstabilityNotethatsheisstillsteamingatspeed.

[Signed)C.E.Morgan.Captain

Reportbylieutenant-commanderHMSBarham:1. At 1610 hours 25th November, 1941, I took over the watch asP.C.O. and A.D.O. Having received reports from all the armamentclosedup,Ienteredthecharthousetoseethecyphersandtoacquaintmyselfwiththegeneralsituation.2. Soon after I entered the chart house I heard and felt a violent

explosion. Iwas just outside the chart house on the port side of thebridgewhen I felt twomore explosions about half a second apart. Iwas lookingup for aircraft sodidnot seewhere the explosions tookplace(6indirectorfouledmyviewaft). Icontinuedmycourse to theA.D.P.and reached theafterendof thebridgewhenI felt the fourthexplosionandsawacolumnofwaterandwreckagethrownupabreastthemainmastontheportside.WhenIreachedtheA.D.P.Iobservedfromthemainmastthattheshiphadalistof7°or8°toport.Thenasubmarine broke surface bearing red 120 about 150–200yards awaypointing towards our stern. I could not communicate with the 6inarmament from theA.D.P. andbefore I couldget through to the4inarmament the submarine had dived. (Valiant was also foul of the

range.) Valiant fired a burst of pom-pom at the swirl where thesubmarine dived and made good shooting but the overs reachedBarham’sside.3. I lookedaftagainandsawthat the listhad increasedslightly in

spiteofthefactthattheshipwasalteringcourserapidlytoPort.Ithengavetheorder‘Onlifebelts’andthiswaspassedbyS.P.telephonetoall quarters although we could not know whether the orders werereceived. I then told the director’s crew to come down and sent theA.D.P.’screwdowntothestarboardside.Atthistime,theportsideofthe boat deck aft was under water and the ship was slowly turningover.4.AlltrafficfromalofthadceasedandIwasleftintheA.D.P.with

MidshipmanD.N.A.Coxandonerating.Wewerenotabletogodownsohauledourselvesuptothestarboardsideandwaitedfortheseatotakeusout.Ourlifebeltswereonandinflated.5.Wewatched thewater swirlingover theport sideof theA.D.P.

and come up to us in about one second. I had no control over mymovementsinthisswirlingwaterandexpectedsoontobeclear.SoonIfeltthreeorfourropesfoulmeroundmystomachandIwasdrawndown.Whilst Iwas trying to decide the bestmeans of escape theseropes,whichmusthavebeenthesignalhalyards,partedandIstartedswimming for the surface. I could see that I was going towards thelightbutitlookedalongway.Itouchedtwoorthreeothersboundinthesamedirectionbutdonotknowwhotheywere.AftersometimeIthoughtoftakingoffmyclothesbutdecidednottoasIshouldhavetotakeoffthelifebeltfirst.Istillseemedtohaveaverylongwaytogowhen I tookmy first mouthful of water and spat it out. Then camecomplete darkness and silence. I couldn’t remember anythingof thistypeinthevariousstoriesIhavereadsoIopenedmymouthandtookin three gooddeepbreaths of air. I hadno time to think any furtherbeforeIwasinwateragainandcouldseethelightalongwayabove.Iwenttowardsthelight.

QUEENELIZABETHProfileandPlan:asReconstructed,1940

Eventually I came to amassof feet – itwasquitedark and I hadgreat difficulty in finding a space to get through. However, I brokesurfaceintimeandwasseizedbytheleftarmbyaratingwhotriedtoholdmeup.Ipersuadedhimtoletgoandfindmyownwreckage.6.Thegeneralbehaviourofthemenwasofthehigheststandard.In

theship theywerecheerful,quietand tried tohelpeachotherand inthewaterthiswassotoo.Theytalkedtoeachotherquietlyandwaitedpatientlyfortherescuingboats.TherewasnorushingthewhalerfromHotspurwhichwasnearestto

mebutanorderlyqueueofmenwaitingtheirturn.Whentheboatwasfilled a number of us held on to the lifelines at the sides and weretowed to Hotspur where we were welcomed with every possibleattentionandkindness.7.OfficersandmenofHotspurgaveupblanketsandclothesforour

benefitandprovidedcigarettesandrefreshment.8. Since the number rescued in Hotspur was nearly twice the

complement of the ship the supply of blankets was short. It issuggestedthatdestroyersandcraftusedinrescueworkshouldcarryastockofblanketsforuseinsuchanemergency.9.OnarrivalinAlexandriatheunwoundedwenttoResourcewhere

webathedandwerefedandgivenshipwreckbags(RedCross).Asfaras possible the men were kitted up in the clothing store and allreceivedaverywelcome£E.2withwhichtobuysuchlittlenecessitiesandcomfortsascouldbeobtainedfromthecanteen.Thiswasgreatlyappreciated.

[Signed)Lieut.CommanderR.N.

[Signed)Lieut.CommanderR.N.

AccountbyLieutenantG.M.Wolfe,RNAtthetimeof thefirstexplosion,IwasjustoutsidemyofficewhichwasontheportsideoftheA.D.O.Flat,–thatisthefirstdeckabovetheboatdeckonthebridgestructure.SinceIwasleavingtheoffice,Iwasfacingaft,andsawtheflashof

theexplosionwhichappearedtobeimmediatelyabaftthefunnel.Afteraslightpause, twofurtherexplosionsoccurred,bothslightly

furtheraft.I crossed immediately to the starboard side, where a crowd was

already gathering on the upper deck, and gavemypocket knife to aP.O.whowastryingtounlashtwoCarleyFloatswhichweresecuredatthebottomoftheladderuptothepom-pomdeck.IwentrapidlybacktomyofficeformyBurberry,andthenreturned

to the starboard side with some difficulty as there was already anappreciable list. I descended to the upper deck, where the ship’scompanywasalreadygoingovertheside.Ishoutedtoallnearmetofollow their example – rather unnecessarily as therewas little panicandthemenwerenotwastinganytime.Thelistwassteadilyincreasingandaseveryoneaboutmewasover

theguardrail,Iwentoveralsoatapointlevelwiththeforwardendofthebridge,andsliddowntothebilgekeel.By now shewas going over fast, and I reached the bottomof the

ship, now an almost vertical wall. Here I hesitated, owing to thedifficulty of keeping my balance because the final jump appearedhazardouswiththebottomcominguptomeetme.Itwasthenthatabigexplosiontookplaceaft,andtheshipplunged

overso rapidly that Iwas flungbackwards into thewaterwithmanyothers.Afterbeingsuckeddown,weeventuallysurfacedandIswamover

toaCarleyFloatwhichappearedcloseathand.All traceof theshiphadvanished.IdiscardedmyBurberry,blewupmy lifebelt, andheldon to the

sideof the floatwithmanymoreuntilpickedupbyH.M.S.Hotspuronehourlater.

[Signed]G.M.Wolfe

DamagetoQueenElizabethandValiantatAlexandriaWhile lying at anchor in Alexandria on 19 December 1941, both QueenElizabeth and Valiant were successfully attacked and seriously damaged byItalian‘humantorpedoes’.QueenElizabethwasanchoredin‘S’berthinadepthofabouteightfathoms.

At approximately 0615 on 19December 1941 therewas an extremely violentexplosionundertheareaof‘B’boilerroom.TwoItalianfrogmenhadmanagedtobreakthroughdefencesandplacetorpedoesagainstthehulloftheship.Thechargewasestimated tobeabout500poundsandhadbeenslungbetween thekeels of the vessel. ‘B’ boiler room flooded immediately and ‘A’ boiler roomfloodedwithin30 seconds. ‘X’boiler room.Nos.1and2dynamo rooms, ‘A’and ‘B’ hydraulic rooms and a fewother compartments in the area also filledveryrapidly,andtheshiptookalistof4½degreesstarboardandsettledbythebowtoabouteightfeet.Althougheveryeffortwasmadetocounter-measuretheflooding, it slowly spread to ‘Y’ boiler room and into compartments beforenumber82bulkhead.Thelowersteeringpositionhadalsofloodedcompletelybytheeveningofthe19th.Theconditionoftheshipbeforetheexplosionwas:draught:33ft5inforward,

32ft 7in aft; after the explosion: draught: 41ft 10in forward, 33ft 10in aft.Damagetohull:Theouterlinplatingandtheinnerbottomincludingtheverticalkeel, longitudinals and frames were badly distorted and fractured between 82and 120 stations, from ‘D’ strake port to ‘F’ strake starboard. The greatestdamagewas between 100 and 118 stations from ‘C’ strake port to ‘C’ strakestarboard, both inner and outer bottoms being badly upturned and set up fordistances of approximately 22 feet and 16 feet respectively at 112 stations.Between65and132stationstheouterbottomwasbuckledfrom‘E’strakeportto ‘H’ strake starboard. The framing between 81 and 82 bulkheads and thepitometer logcompartmentwasdistortedbetweentheinnerbottomandmiddledeckbetweenthethirdlongitudinalbulkheads.100 bulkheadwas distorted and fractured to a height of 7 feet above inner

bottom, between fifth starboard longitudinal and third port longitudinal. Thestiffenersandbracketsweredistorted.118bulkheadwasdistortedandfracturedbetween third longitudinal port and starboard to a height of six feet above theinnerbottom.Thethirdlongitudinalbulkheadfrom82to118stationsportsidewas slightly buckled between the inner bottom and platform deck and brokenaway from thebottomboundary anglebetween100 and118 stations.The fifthlongitudinal port and starboard sideswere distorted between the inner bottomandtheplatformdeckfrom82to116stations.Thestarboardbulkheadwasbadly

buckledbetween100and118stationsnearthebottom.The following compartments flooded immediately or very rapidly: ‘A’, ‘B’

and‘X’boilerrooms;airspace81–82;‘B’hydraulicroom;Nos.1&2dynamorooms;pitometerlogcompartment;oilfueltanksBl–8,C1and3,C5and8,Dland3,D5and8;DBCs(68–154)thirdlongitudinal(P)tothirdlongitudinal(S).Bulges79½–109½starboard,109½–119½port;WingDBCs91–118port,109–118starboard.The following compartments flooded slowly and, in some cases, only

partially:Nos.3,4and5dynamorooms;Cable leadpassagesabreast ‘A’, ‘B’and ‘X’ boiler rooms; ‘A’ hydraulic room and searchlight stabilizing room;boiler store;Forward4.5inmagazinesport and starboard, andcentrelineupperandlower4.5inmagazines;DBC(68–82)thirdlongitudinaltosixthlongitudinalport and starboard; oil fuel tanksC2, 4, 9, 12,D2, 4, 9, 12; oil fuelworkingspacesNos. 1, 3 and 7; hammock and kit locker roomsNos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7;builders coaming round boiler uptakes; lower steering position; low powermachineroom;protectednavigationplot;mainswitchboardroom;foremedicaldistributingstation;No.2W/Toffice;medicalstore.Ondockingthefollowingmainitemsofdamageaffectingfightingefficiency

werefound:

(a)Shipunseaworthy.(b)‘A’,‘B’and‘X’boilerroomsoutofaction.(c)Allevaporatorsoutofaction.(d)Twohydraulicpumpsoutofaction.(e)AllLPcompressorsoutofaction.(f)Nos.1,2and3HPcompressorsoutofaction.(g)Alloilfueltanksabreast‘A’,‘B’and‘X’boilerroomsoutofaction.(h)Mainengineroomtelegraphsoutofaction.(i) Forward 4.5in turrets except S.3 out of action through flooded pumpsanddistortedrollerbearingpaths.(j)Only40percentstowageavailableinlowercentre4.5inmagazine.(k)Forwardsectionsofringmainoutofaction.

QUEENELIZABETHItalianLimpetMineDamageatAlexandria,19December1941

(l)Nos.1,2,3and5dynamosoutofaction,(m)No.2transmittingroomoutofaction.(n)Onlyonesetofmachineryavailableforeachtransmittingroom.(o)Bothautomaticplotsoutofaction.

Damagecontrol:No.82bulkheadwasshoredwherepossibleontheforeside.No.136bulkheadwasshored from inside ‘Y’boiler room. ‘A’and ‘B’boiler roomhatches, ‘A’and ‘B’ hydraulic room hatches, Nos. 3 and 5 kit locker room hatches andhatches to escape trunks inNos. 3, 5 and 7 kit locker roomswere all shoreddown. All portable pumps were employed in keeping down the water incompartmentsadjacenttothosethatwerefullyfloodedbythedamage.Heelwascorrectedby flooding fourbulgesbetween139and179stations.Theshipwaslightened by every possiblemeans such as de-ammunitioning, defuelling fromsoundtanks,de-petrolling,disembarkingallspareanchorsandcables,etc.Theshipwasdockedfortemporaryrepairstofitherforpassagetoarefitting

yard. Itwas estimated that shewould be able to steam on ‘X’ and ‘Y’ boilerrooms. Main armament would be usable in an emergency. The after 4.5inarmamentwouldbe100percentefficientandaproportionoftheforward4.5ingunswouldbeavailable.VouantOnthatfatefuldayValiantwasmooredatBuoyB2ineightfathomsofwater.The explosion took place at 0606 and caused severe damage to the ship’sbottom.Draughtbeforetheexplosionwas33ftlinforward,33ftlinaft;afterthe

explosionitwas38ftforwardand31ft6inaft.Heel4°The port 4.5in supplymagazine flooded through a split inNo. 36 bulkhead

andtheelectricitystoreimmediatelyabovethemagazinebegantofloodthroughtheelectriccableglandwhichblewoutof thedeck.Thesecompartmentswerepumpedout and36bulkheadwas shored.Eleven further splits in36bulkheadmade it necessary to abandon the4.5inmagazine, butpumpingwas continuedandwaterwaskepttoaminimuminthesecompartments.‘A’turretspacewasfloodedtoadepthof4feetthroughsplitsinthelowerdeckcausedbytheheadofapillarprotrudingthroughthemagazine.Thiscompartmentwaspumpedout.Thepostmaster’sstorewasfloodedtothemaindeck.ThegunnersStore(36to52stations,lowerandplatformdecks)werefloodedthroughaventthathadnotbeenfullyclosed.SmallquantitiesofwaterseepedthroughbetweenthearmourintheplatingofthemiddledeckintovariouscompartmentsadjacenttoNo.52bulkhead.Allpipesandfittingsintheareawerebadlydistortedandpumpswerejammed.Platingontheportlowerbulgecompartmentwasholedandanareaofapproximately60feet×30feetbetween29and52stationswasdamaged.Theouterbottomplating(25lb)between29and52stationswassplitinmanyplacesandpiercedbytheplateframes.Abovetheturnofthebilgethebottomplatingwas crushed into contact with the longitudinal protective bulkhead. The innerbottomwasbulgedupwards3to4feetandtherewere18inand16insplits.Thekeelwasarched toanaverageof8 inchesbetween29and52stations.No.36bulkheadwasbuckled.No.29wasbulged.Theplatformdeckin‘A’magazinewasbulgedupwards.Deckbeams in the areawere badly distorted.The lowerdeckin‘A’turretwasalsosplit.Therewasmovementinjointsofarmourat‘A’barbetteandtheforecastledeck,‘A’turretshield,‘B’barbetteonmiddledeck.Therewas nomachinery damage.Armament damage: lower part of ‘A’ turretwasdistorted.

VALIANTItalianLimpetMineDamageatAlexandria,19December1941

DamagetoWarspitefromanti-shipmissiles(TypeSK1400),14Sept1943On14September1943WarspiteproceededtoSalernoincompanywithValiantand a destroyer flotilla to support Fifth Army landings by bombarding the

beaches. After steaming at 23 knots throughout the night, Salerno Bay wasreachednextdayandenemypositionswereattackedduring theeveningof the15th despite air attacks. After daybreak on the 16thWarspite was detailed toproceed to the area of operations of the previous day, but at 1410, after oneshoot, she steamed past the southern swept channel to take part in a furtherbombardmentatposition‘AvalancheNorth’.At1425Warspitewasattackedby twelveFw190swhichdivedon theship

outof thesun.Threebombswereseenoverheadclosetogetherat6,000–8,000yardsontheportbeam.Theparentaircraftwerethenabovetheshipataheightof 20,000 feet. When directly overhead the bombs turned and dived at greatspeed towards the ship. One hitWarspite and after penetrating various decksburstinthereservefeedtankbelowNo.4boilerroom.Theothertwowerenearmisseson thestarboardside.Oneabreast thebulgemidshipswas thecauseofconsiderable near-miss damage (water hammer), the other caused no apparentdamage.At the timeof attack the shipwasmaking10knots in approximately177fathoms.Avoidingactionwasimpossibleinthecongestedareaandwould,moreover,havebeen ineffectivesince the time fromsighting thebombs to thehit was only about ten seconds. From the size of the hole of penetration theweapon used was adjudged to be a radio-controlled Type FX1400 weighingabout3,000poundswitha600lbcharge.Theshockwasveryviolentanditwasthoughtatfirstthattheship’sbackwasbrokenandthatthemastswouldcrashtothedeck.Numbers2,3,4and6boiler roomsfloodedalmost immediatelyandNo.5floodedshortlyafterwards.Theshipwasabletoproceedslowlyunderherown steam,main steering being available until 1500whenNo. 1 boiler roombecamecontaminatedwithseawaterandallsteamfailed.Warspitewasinaserioussituation.Unabletosteam,shehaddriftedintoan

unswept area andhad shippedabout5,000 tonsofwater. In addition, shewasonlya fewmiles fromSalernoand liable to furtherairattacksatanymoment,the RDFwas out of action and it was not knownwhether hostile submarineswere in the area. The AA armament was intact, good weather prevailed andsome counter-flooding had brought the main deck (starboard side) above thewaterline. Air protection was required, but none was available until nextmorning. US salvage tugs (Hope andMarino) hadWarspite in tow by 1700.WithHMSDelhiactingasRDFship,WarspiteproceededtoMaltaatspeedsofupto4knots.At1930EuryalusandScyllajoinedandtheformertookWarspiteintow,butthelineparted.At1800nextdaytheonlychangewasthatthelisttostarboard had increased to 4½ degrees, but the spread of flooding had beencurtailedbythepumps.

WarspiteenteringMaltainJanuary1938.Althoughlookingamuch‘stumpier’shipthanbeforereconstruction,hermastswerestill150ft6inabovethewaterline(fore)and127ft8in(main).

Completelyreconstructed,Warspiteunderwentafullsetoftrials.Shemade23.84knotsduringspeedtrials,onlyhalfaknotslowerthanwhenoriginallybuilt.SheisseenhereintheMediterraneanonherwaytoMaltain1938.

Thebombthathitthatshiphadapproachedatabout20degreestotheverticaland15degreestothecentrelineplane.Itstrucktheboatdeck,passedthroughtheporthangar,wardroom,galley,stokers’aftermessdeck,kitlockerflat,andNo.4

boiler roombeforebursting inadoublebottomreserve feed tank.Thicknesseswere10lb(MS)plus40lb(HT),50lb(HT),14lb(MS),100lb(NC),40lb(HT),20lb (MS),a totalof6¾ inches.Thehole in theboatdeckwas roughly5ft6insquareandcentredabout11feetfromthecentrelinetoportandextendingfrom128 to130stations.TheForecastle,upperandmaindeckswereholed (2ft9indiameter) on the port side, stations 126 to 128, 18–19 feet from centrelinerespectively. The middle deck (100lb NC on 40lb HT) was holed (2ft 9indiameter). The outer bottom was holed over A, B and C strakes, port sidebetween123and133stations,theaperturebeing20feetlongby7–14feetwide.Theinnerbottomwasblownupwardsoverthesameareas.Themaintransversebulkheads 100 to 154 (20lb (MS)) both leaked.Themain transverse bulkhead136was holed.Other bulkheadswere badly damaged in the area of the blast.Thenearmisshitthewaterclosetotheship’ssideandburstnearthebottomofthe bulge at station 140, starboard side. The bulge plating (22½lb MS) wasrupturedandbulges themselvesbetween111and159 stations.Splits in seamswereevident.Theouterandinnerbatteryplatformwascorrugated(maximum6inches)over theareaunderNo.5boiler roomandbothwereholed.Thebilgehad been fractured. The compartments on the middle deck from 118 to 154stationswereflooded.

WARSPITEDamageSustainedatSalerno,16September1943

WarspiteenteringMalta,January1938.

Beforetheattackdraughtswere33ft9inforward,32ft6inaft,nolist;onehourlater,36ft6inforward,35ft6inaft,slightlist;after3½hours,38ftforward,36ft6inaft, 3degrees list; 17½hours after theattack,39ft forward,37ft6inaft, 4degreeslist.OnarrivalatMaltaon19Septemberdraughtwas38ft6inforward,36ft1linaft.Beforetheshipwashitalldoorshadbeenclosedanddamagecontrolstations

were at second degree readiness. No. 4 boiler room had been completelywrecked, themainarmamentwasoutofactionby the lossofhydraulicpowerandWTandRDFwerealsooutofaction.The Captain’s (Captain Packer) report on the incident makes interesting

reading:Aswewere threadingourwayslowly through theshipping tocommunicate

withtheHQshipBiscayeneandtoAvalancheNorthforafurtherbombardmentouroldfriendstheFw190sroaredinoutofthesunandattackeduswithbombs–nohits.Justastheyfinisheddeadoverheadwesuddenlysightedthreenewobjects–

gliderbombs–Irealizedatoncewhattheywere.Theywereflyinghorizontallyinformationforacoupleofsecondsatabout8,000ft,andthendowntheycameabsolutelyverticallyat terrific speed. Itwasclear theyweregoing tohitus. Ittook twoseconds.Therewasnothing tobedoneand Iwatchedcarefully.Thefirsttoarrivemissedusstarboardsideamidshipsbyafewfeet–afractionofasecondlateronehitusjustabaftthefunnel.Thethirdnearmissedthestarboardside.IwasnotthrownoffmyfeetbutforafractionofasecondIhadakindof‘blackout’likewhenyoutakeahardtossatfootballoroffahorse.Icouldseeand think perfectly clearly all the time. Black smoke and then dirt from the

funnelsandthehellofanoise.Ithoughtthewholemastwascomingdownasitrockedandbentandwhipped.ImustsaythatforamomentIthoughtwewereprobablysunkandwasquitepreparedfortheshiptobreakintwo.No-onelosttheirheadsorshoutedoranythingon thebridge– theywereall firstclassandtheAAgunswhichhadopenedfirekeptonfiring.Thatwasgood.Then therewasacalmafterthestorm.Ifoundtheshipcouldsteer,theenginesweregoingahead.Ibegantothinkthatwehadnotbeenhitafterall,onlynearmisses.Afirewasreportedinthehangar,‘Putitout’Isaid.Thentoguns,moreforeffectthananything, ‘Ifwecansteamandshootwewillcarryoutourfinalbombardmentafterall.’Isetcourseupthechannelandthenreportsbegantocomeinallverycalmandaccurate.Fourboilerroomsoutofsixflooded–steamforslowspeedon starboard engines only – I kept going at 6 knots. Then the shipwould notsteer,wewereinthesweptchannelandwesteeredroundinacircle.Istoppedengines.Wewereheadingstraight into themines.Aminesweepersentviolentsignals to get out of it. I could not for helm was hard over and finally thestarboardengineroomdiedouttoo.Sotherewewereonceagaingoingroundincircleswithourwaycarryingusandquitehelpless.Steam jointshadbust andtheengineroomwasuntenable.The5thboilerroomfloodedleavingonlyone.Gotshiftedover tosteeringfromthetillerflatbyelectric.Thetug, theOrpi,aYank,cameroaringupandsoonhadmeintowandstraightenedoutandImadeup my mind to set off to Malta at once – speed 3 knots. The prospect wasunattractive.Outsidewereatleast6submarinesreportedinthearea.Ihadonly4destroyerswithme,furtherairattackswereobviouslyonthecards.Theextentofthedamagewasunknown, the shipwasbeginning to list andwewerealreadytwo or three feet deeper in the water. But off we set. I calledDelhi as AAprotectionandaskedforspecialfighterprotectionfromN.C.W.N.F.F.,AdmiralHewitt,USNand for tugs.Another tugcameupbutwouldnot staybut I toldhim I had orders fromAdmiralHewitt that hewas to.Nowwe had two tugstowingusintandem.Weweremaking3½knotsand300milestogo.

Warspite’shull,showingsomeofthedamageshereceivedatSalerno.

WorspiteintroubleagainafterbeinghitbyaerialbombsoffSalernoinSeptember1943.SheisshownherelimpingintoMalta,downbythehead.Notethatthedraughtingeneralwasgood–despitethefactthatshehadthousandsoftonsofwaterinsideher.

Casualties6killedandabout20wounded.Received message from N.C.W.N.J. To Warspite, ‘Deeply regret the

casualties and damage you sustained. Am grateful for your efficient support

whichhasaidedsomuchtheforceashore.WhentheyarerelievedpleasesendHopiandMarinatomehere.Bestofluck,Hewitt’Friday17thSeptember–Isaidafewwordstothesailorsoverthebroadcaster.

Acommonhazardofwar–wehaddonewhatwesetouttodoandhadbeenhit– we had scared the hell out of the German Army and braced up our ownsoldiersandshouldn’tbesurprisedifwehadn’tturnedthescale.Admiredtheirgoodhumourandhardwork.Wewouldgetthe‘oldlady’backtoMalta.

Warspitemined,13June1944On 13 June 1944 Warspite was on passage from Portsmouth to Rosyth,accompaniedby thedestroyersSouthdown andHolmes ata speedof16knots.Theweatherwasslightlyovercastwithaseaof3.1.Warspitesdraughtwas33ft10in forward, 32ft 10in aft. The degaussing equipment was working at thecorrectsettingsandtheSAgearwasoperating.At0748,whentheForcewasinposition 51° 52’ N, 1° 41’ E, that is, just off Harwich, a heavy explosionoccurredofftheportsideabreastWarspite’s‘X’and‘Y’15inturrets.Thedepthofwaterinthispositionwasabout17fathoms.Eyewitnessesreportedanareaofviolently disturbed water close to the ship’s side and stated that water wasthrownupgenerallytoupper-decklevel,butthattherewasathincolumninthecentrerisingsomedistanceabovethislevel.Therewerenumerousgasbubbles.Theyestimatedthatthecentreoftheexplosionwasabout20feetfromtheportside.Warspitewasveryseverelyshakenbytheexplosionwhichwascausedbythedetonationofanacousticor‘Sammy’groundmine,TypeGC,containingachargeof1,500poundsofaluminizedhexanite.Immediately after the explosion there was a partial loss of electric power

which caused many lighting failures; allW/T and radar sets were put out ofactionthroughlossofpower,orbyshockdamage;theportoutershaftseizedup,andextensivefloodingoftheafterportionoftheportlowerbulgecompartmentscausedtheshiptolist3½°toportwithinfiveminutes.Thelistlaterincreasedtoamaximumof4½°.Themainmachinerywasshutdownforhalfanhourforexamination,during

whichperiodthenecessarydamagecontrolmeasureswereputintoeffect.WhenthemachinerywasrestartedneithertheportouternortheportinnershaftscouldbeturnedandtheshipwasforcedtoproceedtoRosythusingherstarboardshaftsonly. The maximum speed attained was 10 knots and Rosyth was reached atabout2130on14June.Structuraldamage:Outerbottomplating(25to40lbMS):Although no rupture occurred therewas extensive dishing between frames, of

maximumdepression3inches,withintheareaboundedbystations160and230,andtheport6thandstarboard5thlongitudinals.Theintensityofthedishingwasmuchgreateron theportsideandsomeof theplatingseamsonthatsidewereleaking.Afewrivetsweremissingfromtheconnection to theouterbottomofthebulgeportionsofinlettubespassingthroughtheouterbottomofthebulge.Portbulge(22½lband30lbMS):A few small ruptures of the bulge plating were caused by its being forcedinwardsagainstthebulgeframing;thelargestoftheserupturesmeasured2feet×5inches.Inadditiontherewasextensivedishingofthisplatingoverthewholeareaof the lowerbulgebetween stations160and237, that isover a lengthof145feetandadepthof36feet.Thedamagewasparticularlysevereoverthe44-footlengthbetweenstations202and223½;inthisareaplatingwasforcedintoamaximumdistanceof 2 feet andbulge framing anddivisional bulkheadswerewrecked.Betweenthesameframestations,inlettubeswereleftstandingproudfromthebulgeplating.Platingseamsoverthewholeofthedamagedareawerebadlystrainedandnumerousrivetsweremissing.

WARSPITEMineDamage,13June1944

Starboardbulge(22½lband30lbMS):There were no ruptures in the starboard bulge plating, but there was slightdishing between frames, of maximum depression 1 inch at the bottom of thebulgefromstations189½to220,thatisoveralongitudinaldistanceof60feet.Innerbottomplating(20lbMS):Noruptureoftheinnerbottomplatingoccurred,buttherewasslightdistortioninplaceswithin theareaboundedby stations160and230, andbetween theportand starboard 3rd longitudinals, due to the upward movement of the bottomframinginthisarea.

Transversebulkheads:The10lbMScofferdambulkheadatstation197wasdistortedandbulgedaftamaximumdistanceof2feet.

Overashortdistanceontheportsidethe14lbMSbulkheadatstation212andthewatertight frame beneath it were strained andmade non-watertight by thelowerportionsbeingtornawayfromtheboundaryanglesconnectingthemtotheinner andouter bottomplating.Thewatertightness of the after bulkheadof theportplummerblockspaceatstation216wasdestroyedbythebulkheadglandofthe port inner shaft being torn from it by the eccentricity of the shaft. Theforward bulkhead of the port plummer block compartment at station 230wasalsorenderednon-watertightbythelowerportionbeingtornawayabout2feetfromtheboundaryanglesconnectingittotheinnerandouterbottoms.

AfteranhourWarspitewasunderwayagainatabout10knots,andreachedportnextday.Shewasoutofactionfortwomonths.

QueenElizabethJune1943showingmid-warappearance.

History:QueenElizabethNaval terms of armistice with Germany arranged on board at Rosyth 15

November1918.Became flag new Atlantic Fleet on post-war reorganization April 1919 (seeBarham).

Beatty promoted Admiral of the Fleet and hoisted Union Flag in Queen

Elizabeth4April1919.GrandFleetofficiallyabolishedandBeatty’sflaghauleddown7April1919.ATLANTICFLEET(fleetflag)April1919toNovember1924.SpitheadReview26July1924.Transferred to Mediterranean Fleet with rest of class 1 November 1924,

replacingIronDukeasfleetflag(seeBarham).MEDITERRANEANFLEET(fleetflag)November1924toMay1926.RelievedbyWarspiteMay1926andpaidoffatPortsmouth for reconstruction

26MayafternearlytenyearsasflagoftheprincipalBritishfleet.ReconstructedatPortsmouthMay1926toDecember1927.Commissionedfortrials16August1927.Commissioned at Portsmouth 2 January 1928 for further service as flag

MediterraneanFleet.MEDITERRANEANFLEETJanuary1928toAugust1937(flagtoJune1937).VisitedConstantinopleOctober1929asflagofthefirstBritishsquadrontoenter

TurkishwaterssincethesigningofthePeaceTreaty.Squadron comprised Queen Elizabeth (flag), Courageous, Wanderer, WildSwan,VeteranandBryony.

RefitPortsmouthNovember1929toMay1930;temporarilyreplacedasflagbyWarspiteduringthisperiod.

FlagrehoistedatPortsmouth27May1930.Sent to Alexandria, with Ramillies, July 1930 to support local forces during

riots.RefitPortsmouthNovember1932 toMarch1933; temporarily replacedas flag

byResolutionduringthisperiod.SeniorflagshipatJubileeReview,Spithead,16July1935.Stationed at Alexandria October 1935 to summer 1936 during Italo-Ethiopian

crisis.CoronationReview,Spithead,19May1937.Relieved by Barham 9 June and paid off at Portsmouth for reconstruction 1

August1937.Reconstructed at Portsmouth and Rosyth August 1937 to January 1941;

transferred from Portsmouth to Rosyth for completion in December 1940becauseofriskofaircraftattackatPortsmouth.

RecommissionedatRosyth31January1941for2ndBSHomeFleet.JoinedFleetatScapa21Februaryforworkingup.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoMay1941.Transferred toMediterraneanFleetMay1941.LeftGibraltar forAlexandria 6

May,making first part of passage throughMediterranean in companywithForceHandconvoyforMalta.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)May1941toJune1942(flag1StBSand2ndfleetflagMaytoAugust1941;fleetflagfromAugust1941).TookpartindefenceandevacuationofCrete,May1941.With Barham and destroyers, supported air attack on enemy airfield on

ScarpanteIslandbyaircraftfromFormidable26May.Becameflag1stBSand2ndfleetflag27May,replacingBarhamforrepairsto

bombdamagesustainedduringthisoperation.BecamefleetflaginAugust1941onreturnofBarhamfromrefit.FlagC-in-ChadbeenflownashoreatAlexandriafrom24JunewhenWarspite

leftforrefitinUSA.BadlydamagedbyItalianlimpetmineatAlexandria19December1941(seefull

report). Temporarily repaired at Alexandria December 1941 to June 1942,continuingtoserveasfleetflagduringthisperiod,beingrelievedbyValiantforashorttimeinApril.

Admiral Harwood hoisted his flag in succession to Admiral Cunningham, 20May.

LeftAlexandria27June1942forUSA,viaSuezCanal,tocompleterefit.ArrivedNorfolkNavyYard6September.Refitted at Norfolk Navy Yard September 1942 to June 1943; selected for

EasternFleetwhileunderrefit.LeftNorfolkforhome26June1943.ArrivedDevonportJulyandcommissionedthere25JulyforEasternFleet,being

temporarilyattachedtoHomeFleetforworkingup.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JulytoDecember1943.WorkingupatScapa.

QUEENELIZABETH1941:CrossSections

LeftPortsmouth23December1943tojoinEasternFleet,viaMediterraneanandSuezCanal.

Arrived Trincomalee 28 January 1944 and hoisted flag C-in-C (AdmiralSomerville).

EASTERNFLEET(flag1stBSandfleetflag)JanuarytoNovember1944.Unit of force supporting carrier attacks onSabang,Sumatra 19April 1944by

aircraftfromIllustriousandtheUSSSaratoga.TookpartinbombardmentofCarNicobarandPortBlairintheAndamanIslands30Apriland1May.SupportedcarrierattackonSourabayabyaircraftfromIllustriousandSaratoga

17May.SupportedcarrierattackonSabangbyaircraft fromIllustriousandVictorious 25 July and, with Valiant, Renown, the French Richelieu anddestroyers,carriedoutsurfacebombardmentfollowingthis.

RefitDurbanOctobertoNovember1944.On22November1944shipsselectedtoremainintheSouthEastAsiaareaafter

the formation of a Pacific Fleet,whichwas commenced on that date,wereredesignatedastheEastIndies

QUEENELIZABETH1941:InboardProfileandUpperDeckPlan

Fleet, the battle squadron for this comprising Queen Elizabeth, Valiant andRenownandbecomingthe3rdBS,the1stBSbeingallocatedtothePacific.QueenElizabethflag(VA)3rdBSandfleetflagEastIndiesFleet.

EASTINDIESFLEET(flag)November1944toJuly1945.TookpartinfurtherbombardmentofSabangJanuary1945.BurmaoperationsJanuarytoMay1945.SupportedlandingsonRamreeIsland21January.LandedmarinesonChedubaIsland26January.TookpartinoperationsagainstRangoonApriltoMay1945.RelievedbyNelson12July1945andreturnedhome.ArrivedPortsmouth7August1945andpaidofftoreservetoRosythonthe10th.RESERVE(Rosyth)AugusttoOctober1945.AttachedtoHomeFleet22OctoberasAccommodationShip.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)October1945toMarch1946.EmployedasAccommodationShipatPortlandandPortsmouth.Revertedtoreserve,PortsmouthMarch1946.RESERVE(Portsmouth)March1946toMay1948.DecisiontoscrapannouncedinParliamentJanuary1948.SaletoBritishIron&SteelCorporationarranged19March1948.Shipfinallypaidoff15May1948.AllocatedtoArnottYoung,Dalmuirforscrapping.

ArrivedDalmuir7July1948.HulksubsequentlytowedtoTroonfordemolition.

History:WarspiteATLANTICFLEETApril1919toOctober1925(2ndBStoMay1921;IstBSsubsequently).SeeBorham.SpitheadReview26July1924.PaidoffatPortsmouth31October1924forreconstruction.ReconstructedatPortsmouthOctober1924toApril1926.RecommissionedatPortsmouth6April1926torelieveQueenElizabethasflag

MediterraneanFleet(seeBarham).MEDITERRANEANFLEETApril1926toMay1930(fleetflagtoJanuary1928.FlagIstBSand2ndfleetflagJanuarytoSeptember1928.1stBSMarchtoNovember1929;fleetflagsubsequently).RelievedasfleetflagbyQueenElizabethJanuary1928andreplacedBarhamas

flag1stBSand2ndfleetflag.DamagedbygroundingintheAegean12July1928.Returned home September 1928 for repairs, flag 1st BS being transferred toBarham.

RefitPortsmouthSeptember1928toJanuary1929.RecommissionedatPortsmouth22January1929asprivateship1stBS.Leftfor

Mediterranean14March.Fleet flag Mediterranean November 1929 to May 1930, relieving QueenElizabethforrefit.

FlagstruckatPortsmouth26MayandWarspitetransferredtoAtlanticFleet(seeBarham).

WartimeviewofQueenElizabeth(January1941)havingjustbeenmovedfromPortsmouthDockyarduptoRosythbecauseofenemybombingasshewascompletingherfitting-outstageaftercompletereconstruction.

ATLANTICFLEET(flag2ndBS)May1930toMarch1932.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(flag2ndBS)toDecember1933.RammedbyRoumanianSSPeleusinmouthofTagus21March1933.RepairedatPortsmouthandrejoinedfleet5June.Relieved byBarham and paid off at Portsmouth for second reconstruction 23

December1933.ReconstructedatPortsmouthMarch1934toJune1937.Commissioned at Portsmouth 29 June 1937 as flag Mediterranean Fleet, but

departure for station delayed by steering defects and ship not ready forserviceuntilJanuary1938.

LeftPortsmouthforMediterranean5January1938.MEDITERRANEANFLEETJanuary1938toOctober1939(fleetflagfromFebruary1938).RelievedBarhamasfleetflag8February1938.TransferredtoHomeFleetOctober1939.LeftAlexandriaforhome28October,viaMaltaandGibraltar.

WarspitepassesRevengeonleavingtheMediterraneanFleet(forhome)withmanycheersfrombothcrewsasshesailsby,14March1930.

ArrivedGibraltar6NovemberanddivertedtoHalifaxforescortduty.Arrived Halifax 14 November and left on 18th with convoy for United

Kingdom.Detachedfromconvoy24thtotakepartinsearchforScharnhorstfollowingsinkingofRawalpindibythatshiponthe23rd.

SearchedinDenmarkandIceland–Faroesareauntilendofmonth.ArrivedClyde4DecemberandhoistedflagC-in-CHomeFleetatGreenockon

6th, relievingNelson for repairs tomine damage sustained on the 4th, andpendingreturnofRodneyfromrefit.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBSClydeandScapa)December1939toApril1940(temporaryfleetflagtoJanuary1940).Home fleet base transferred from Scapa to Clyde October 1939, pending

completionofadequatedefencesatScapa.RevertedtoScapaMarch1940.UnitofcoveringforceforfirstCanadiantroopconvoyDecember1939.FlagC-in-CHomeFleettransferredtoRodney1January1940.TookpartinNorwegianoperationsApril1940;on13April,aSwordfishaircraft

fromWarspite,whileonreconnaissancepriortosecondbattleofNarvik,sankU64inHerjangsfiord(Narvik).

As flag (VA) led force of nine destroyers (Kimberley, Bedouin, Foxhound,Cossack,Eskimo,Punjabi, Icarus,Hero andForester) for secondattackon

GermandestroyersinNarvikFiord13AprilandassistedinsinkingdestroyerKoellner

For this operation,Warspite flying flag Vice-Admiral Battlecruiser SquadronHomeFleet,transferredfromRenownonthe12thandwhichwasretainedintheshipduringsubsequentoperationsagainstNarvikuntil24April.

TookpartinbombardmentoftheportofNarvikanddefencesonthatdate.OrderedbacktoMediterraneanonsamedaybecauseofincreasingthreatofwar

withItaly.Left Clyde 30 April, arrived Alexandria 10 May and hoisted flag C-in-C

Mediterraneanonthe11th.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(flag)May1940toJune1941.Flagofsquadron(Warspite,MalayaandRoyalSovereign)inactionwithItalian

battlesquadronoffCalabria9July1940,whilecoveringMaltatoAlexandriaconvoy,andwasonlyBritishshipabletogetwithinrangeoftheenemy.

ScoredhitonItalianflagshipGiulioCesareat26,400yardswhichcaused115casualties and severe damage which kept Cesare out of action for fourmonths.

Tookpartinvariousbombardmentsin1940–1,mainlyinsupportofthearmyintheWesternDesert.

With Malaya, Ramillies and Kent bombarded Bardia and Fort Capuzzo 15August1940.

Flagof supporting force (Warspite,Valiant,Malaya,Ramillies anddestroyers)covering attack on Italian fleet at Taranto by aircraft from Illustrious 11November1940.

WithValiantbombardedValona18December1940.WithBarham andValiant took part in bombardment and capture of Bardia 3

January1941.Maltaconvoy7–11January1941;starboardanchorhitbybombon10thduring

thisoperation.Nomaterialdamage.Matapanaction28March1941.Assisted in the sinkingof Italian cruisersFiume andZara; five, if not all six,

shellsoffirstbroadsideweredirecthits.WithBarhamandValiantbombardedTripoli21April1941.Flag(RA)special

forceorganizedfordefenceandevacuationofCreteMay1941.FlagC-in-CflownashoreatAlexandriaduringtheseoperations.DamagedbybomboffCrete22Maywhilecoveringevacuation; starboard6in

batteryand4inAAknockedout–speedreduced.

TemporarilyrepairedatAlexandriaJune1941,revertingtofleetflagduringthisperiod.Furtherdamagedbynearmissbombwhileunderrepairindock.

Left Alexandria 26 June for Bremerton Navy Yard USA to complete refit,proceededviaSingapore,HonoluluandEsquimalt.

ArrivedBremerton11August1941.Refit Bremerton August to December 1941. Recommissioned at Seattle 28

December1941asflagEasternFleet,basedatCeylon.LeftSeattle7January1942forTrincomalee,viaSydneyArrivedTrincomalee22March1942andhoistedflagC-in-CEasternFleetthere

on27th.EASTERNFLEET(flag1stBSasfleetflag)March1942toMarch1943.Fleet based at Colombo until April 1942, then transferred to Kilindini (East

Africa).ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January1944.Warspiteonlyunitof1stBSactuallywithEasternFleetduring1942–3.QueenElizabeth and Valiant earmarked for this in 1942 but did not join untilJanuary1944.

3rdBSEasternFleetinMarch1942comprisedfourRoyalSovereignclass.ConveyedGeneralWavell fromBombay to Colombo to confer with Admiral

Layton (C-in-C Ceylon) following Japanese attacks on Ceylon on 5 and 8April.

Withotherunitsoffleet,coveredpassagethroughIndianOceanoftroopconvoycarryingAustralianDivisionhomefromMiddleEastinFebruary1943.

OrderedhomeinMarch1943andreturnedviaDurbanandFreetown.Arrived in the Clyde 10 May 1943 and attached to Home Fleet to work up

bombardment practice at Scapa prior to joining Force H for invasion ofSicily.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)MaytoJune1943;workingupatScapa.LeftScapa17June1943forGibraltarwithNelson,RodneyandValiant.JoinedForceHatGibraltar23rdandhoistedflagRA2ndincommand.FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoSeptember1943(2ndflaguntil12September).TookpartininvasionofSicilyandItalyJulytoSeptember1943.BombardedbatteriesdefendingCatania(Sicily)17July.WithValiant,bombardedcoastaldefencesatReggio(Italy)2Septemberpriorto

landings.UnitofcoveringforceforSalernolandings9September.

Flagofforce(Warspite,Valiantandsevendestroyers)escortingsurrenderedItalianbattleshipsVittorioVenetoandItalia, sixcruisersandeight

destroyerstoMalta10September,followingItalianArmistice.Relievedas2ndflagForceHbyHowe12September.Escorted second group of surrendered Italian warships, including battleshipGiulioCesare,toMaltaonsameday.

Left Malta for home, with Valiant, 14 September but diverted to Salerno tosupportarmy.

BombardedenemypositionsatSalerno15and16September;62roundsof15infiredonbothdays,atlongrange,35fellexactlyontargetandeightfellwithinonehundredyards.

Badlydamagedbygliderbombsonthe16th(seereport)Nearmissedbyonebombandhitabreastfunnelbytwootherswhichpenetrated

boilerroomsandblewoutbottom,floodingallboilerrooms.Allpowerlost,shipunabletosteerandallarmamenttemporarilyoutofaction.

Towed to Malta by two British and two American tugs and salvage vesselSalveda,reachingthereonthe19th.

TemporaryrepairscarriedoutatMaltaSeptembertoNovember1943.Left1November1943intowforGibraltarandarrivedthereonthe8th.FurtherrepairsatGibraltarNovember1943toMarch1944.LeftGibraltarforRosythunderownsteam9March1944andarrivedthere16th

tocompleterefit.Required for service to prepare for Normandy invasion before refit could be

completedand,afterworking-upinForthduringApril,joinedHomeFleetatScapa2Maywith‘X’turretandoneboilerroomout

ofactionalthoughshipabletomake21knots.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoNovember1944.Working-upinForthandatScapaduringAprilandMay.Unit of heavy bombardment force supporting Normandy invasion June to

September1944.Initially allocated to SwordBeach (Eastern) area.WithRamillies andmonitorRoberts neutralized German heavy batteries at Benerville, Villerville andHoulgateon6and7June;fired73roundsof15inatVillervillebatteryonthe6th,scoringninedirecthits.

Supported US forces in Utah andGold Beach areas on 10 and 11 June. Leftinvasion area forRosyth (viaChannel) on 12th to replaceworn 15in guns,and was first capital ship to pass through the Straits of Dover since

ScharnhorstandGneisenaubrokethroughinFebruary1942.MinedoffHarwichon13th,whileenroute,butabletoreachRosythunderown

steamonthe14th,drawing42ftaft.RepairedatRosythJunetoAugustsufficientlytoresumeoperationsbutableto

use only three propellers and speed reduced to 15½ knots. Returned toNormandy25August and supported attack onBrest on that date, engagingbatteries at 30,000 yards and sustaining some damage from splinters.SupportedattacksonLeHavreAugusttoSeptember,bombardingenemygunpositionsatabout32,000yardson10Septemberwithaircraftspotting.Theseoperations concluded the work of the heavy bombardment force inNormandy.

On9SeptembershiporderedtoreducetoCCategoryReserveinconclusionofthe Normandy bombardments, but selected in October with the monitorsErebusandRobertsfortheattackonWalcherenIslandintheScheldtEstuary.SupportedWalcheren landings 1November 1944, this being the ship’s lastoperationalservice.

Attached toAlliedNaval Expeditionary ForceCommand (ANXF) PortsmouthNovember1944.PaidofftoReservePortsmouth1February1945.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)February1945toJuly1946.LaiduponMotherbank.PlacedonDisposalList,Portsmouth31July1946.Sold toBritishIron&SteelCorporationFebruary1947andallocated toMetal

IndustriesLtd.,Faslaneforscrapping.LeftPortsmouth18April1947intowforClyde.Brokeadriftinheavyweatheron20thandgroundedinMountsBayonthe23rd,

becomingatotalwreck.WrecksoldtoBennet&Brewis,Bristol28August1947.RefloatedJuly1950andbeachedatMarazion.HulkresoldtoWolverhamptonMetalCo.Ltd.,September1955andbrokenup

asitlay.During twowars,1914–18and1939–45Warspite accumulated fourteenBattle

Honours,includingJutlandMay1916,andby1945hadmorethananyothershipintheBritishNavy.

History:BarhamOn post-war reorganization, April 1919, Grand Fleet broken up and new

Atlantic,HomeandMediterraneanFleetsformed.

Atlantic Fleet comprised two Battle Squadrons, the Royal Sovereign classforming the 1st BS and theQueen Elizabeth the 2ndBS.Queen Elizabethfleetflag,Revengeflag1stBDandBarhamflag2ndBS.

ATLANTICFLEETApril1919toNovember1924(flagBStoMay1921;flag1stBSfromMay1921).Flag(VA)ofsquadronpayingceremonialvisittoCherbourgApril1919.InMay 1921, 1st and 2ndBSmerged into one, 1stBS, theRoyal Sovereigns

formingthe1stDivisionandQueenElizabethsthe2nd.QueenElizabeth remainedas fleet flag,Barhambecameflag(VA)1stBSandRevenge2ndflag.

SpitheadReview26July1924.On 1 November 1924, the Queen Elizabeths were transferred to the

Mediterraneanasthe1stBS,withQueenElizabethasfleetflagandBarhamassquadronflag,theRoyalSovereignclassremainingintheAtlanticFleetasanew2ndBSwithRevengeasfleetflagandResolutionsquadronflag.Thisdistribution of theQueen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes remainedunchanged until March 1926 whenResolution andRoyal Oak went to theMediterraneantoreplacethefourIronDukeclass(3rdBS),transferredtotheAtlanticFleet.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toNovember1929(flagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagtoJanuary1928andfromSeptember1928toMay1929.2ndflag1stBSJunetoNovember1929).SenttoAlexandriawithMalaya,May1927duringunrestinEgypt.WithRamillies, carried out special ‘flag showing’ cruise along west coast of

Africa December 1927 to February 1928, visiting Sierra Leone, Sekondi,AccraandLagos.

Relievedasflag1stBSbyWarspiteJanuary1928.RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoJuly1928.ReplacedWarspite as flag1stBSSeptember1928when latter camehome for

refitaftergroundinginAegeaninJuly.RelievedasflagbyRevengeJune1929.In November 1929 Barham, Malaya and Valiant transferred to the Atlantic

Fleet,forming,withRodney,the2ndBS.WarspitetemporarilyretainedintheMediterraneanasfleetflag,pendingreturn

ofQueenElizabethfromrefit,andjoined2ndBSAtlanticFleetinMay1930.With exception of Queen Elizabeth (fleet flag Mediterranean), all QueenElizabeth class then in Atlantic and all Royal Sovereigns in the

Mediterranean.ATLANTICFLEET(flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag)November1929toDecember1930.PaidoffatPortsmouthforreconstruction2December1930.ReconstructedatPortsmouthDecember1930toOctober1933.Recommissioned Portsmouth 11 January 1934 to relieveWarspite as flag 2nd

BSHomeFleet(exAtlanticFleet).AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag)January1934toAugust1935.Early in 1935 it was decided to revert to the 1924 distribution of theQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclassesandtostationalltheQueenElizabethsin the Mediterranean and all the Royal Sovereigns in the Home Fleet, asopportunityoccurred.

Barham andValiant exchangedwithRoyalSovereign andRamillies toAugust1935;MalayaandWarspitewithResolutionandRevengeSeptember1936toJune1937.

BarhamcommissionedatDevonportforMediterranean30August1935.MEDITERRANEANFLEETAugust1935toDecember1939(1stBStoFebruary1935.FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruarytoNovember1936.)FlagRA1stBSNovember1936toMay1937.FleetflagJune1937toFebruary

1938.FlagRA1stBSFebruary1938toJanuary1939.FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagfromJanuary1939.

RelievedRevengeasflag1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruary1936.30November1936,flag(VA)2ndincommandMediterraneantransferredfromBarhamtoHood,flagBS,Barhamreducingtoflag(RA)1stBSonly

CoronationReview,Spithead19May1937.HoistedflagC-in-CMediterranean9June1937,replacingQueenElizabeth for

reconstructionpendingarrivalofWarspiteonthestation.RelievedasfleetflagbyWarspite8February1938andrevertedtoflag1stBS.RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoMay1938.Became 2nd flag (VA) Mediterranean January 1939 on withdrawal ofHood

fromMediterranean.TransferredtoHomeFleetasprivateship2ndBSDecember1939.Rammed and sank destroyer Duchess in North Channel 13 December 1939

whileenroutehome.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)December1939toNovember1940.NorthAtlanticconvoydutyDecember1939.TorpedoedinbowsbyU30offHebrides28December1939.ReachedLiverpool

underownsteam29th.RepairedbyCammellLaird,BirkenheadJanuarytoApril1940.Detached 28 August 1940 for Dakar operation as flag Force M (Barham,Resolution, Ark Royal, Devonshire, Cumberland, Fiji, ten destroyers andminorcraft)andHeadquartersShipforoperation.

ArrivedGibraltar2September.BombardmentofDakar23–25September1940;hitfourtimesbyfirefromshore

batteries on second day of bombardment.Bulges flooded on starboard sideamidships.Repeatedlyhitonthirdday,nomajordamage.

TowedResolutiontoFreetownafterlatterdamagedbytorpedoon25th.TransferredtoMediterraneanNovember1940.Arrived Gibraltar 7 November and left for Malta and Alexandria same day,

being attached to ForceH for first part of passage and carrying troops forMalta.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1940toNovember1941(flagIstBSand2ndfleetflagDecember1940toJune1941andAugusttoNovember1941).WithValiant andWarspite tookpart inbombardment and captureofBardia3

January1941.Matapanaction28March1941;assistedinsinkingofItaliancruisersFiumeandZaraduringthisengagement.

WithValiantandWarspite,bombardedTripoli2April1941.Use,withaCclasscruiser,asblockshipatTripoliproposedbyAdmiralty15

April 1941 but idea abandoned following strong objections by C-in-CMediterranean.

TookpartindefenceandevacuationofCreteMay1941.WithQueenElizabethanddestroyers,supportedcarrierattackonenemyairfield

onScarpanteIslandbyaircraftfromFormidable26May.Damagedbybomboff Crete 27Maywhen retiring from this operation. ‘Y’ turret hit and firestarted.Alsofloodedinbulgesbynearmiss.

Refitted at Durban June to July 1941. Completed refit 30 July and rejoinedMediterranean Fleet in August. Torpedoed and sunk by U331 off Libyancoast 25 November 1941 while on patrol, with fleet, between Crete andCyrenaica.Shiphitbythreetorpedoesandrolledovertoportbeamends.An

explosionoccurred in the6inmagazineamidshipsandshesankoneminutelater.Fifty-sixofficers(includingcaptain)and806ratingslost.Vice-Admiralsurvived.

History:ValiantAtlanticFleetApril1919toNovember1924.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toMarch1929.RefitDevonportFebruarytoJuly1927.PaidoffatPortsmouthforreconstruction23March1929.ReconstructedatPortsmouthMarch1929toDecember1930.RecommissionedPortsmouth2December1930 for2ndBSAtlanticFleet (seeBarham).

ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)December1930toMarch1932;AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toJuly1935.TransferredtoMediterraneanJuly1935,exchangingstationswithRamillies(seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)July1935toMarch1937.PaidoffatDevonportforsecondreconstruction1March1937.ReconstructedatDevonportMarch1937toNovember1939.Commissioned at Devonport 30November 1939 and attached to theAmerica

andWest Indies Station forworking-up atBermuda prior to joiningHomeFleet.

UnitofescortforsecondCanadiantroopconvoytoUnitedKingdomDecember1939.

JoinedHomeFleet(2ndBS)atScapa7January1940.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoJune1940.With Malaya, escorted third Canadian troop convoy to United Kingdom

February1940(arrivedClyde7February).NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.WithRepulsecoveredtroopconvoyforNarvikexpedition11–15April.Escorted

troopconvoysfromNorwaytoClydeafterevacuationduringJune.Transferred to Force H (Gibraltar) on its formation 28 June 1940; joined at

Gibraltar2July.Took part, with Resolution, Hood, Ark Royal, Arethusa, Enterprise and

destroyers,inattackonFrenchFleetatMers-el-Kebir(Oran)3July1940.

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetAugust1940.LeftGibraltarforAlexandriaon29th.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)August1940toMay1942(temporaryfleetflagApril1942).WithWarspite,bombardedValena18December1940.Tookpartinvariousbombardmentoperationsduring1941,mainlyinsupportof

armyinWesternDesert.WithBarhamandWarspite tookpart inbombardmentandcaptureofBardia3

January1941.Malta Convoy 7–11 January 1941. Sustained splinter damage from aircraft

attackonthe10th;onekilledandtwowounded.Matapanaction28March1941;assistedinsinkingofItaliancruisersFiumeandZarainthisengagement.

WithBarhamandWarspitebombardedTripoli21April1941.Took part in defence and evacuation ofCreteMay1941; damaged by aircraft

bombing22Mayduringtheseoperations.Hittwice,aft,butwithoutseriousdamage.

RefittedatAlexandriaMaytoJulyProposedAugust1941fornewEasternFleet(seePrinceofWales).

Badlydamagedby Italian limpetmines atAlexandria 19December 1941 (seefullreport).

Duringthedockyardtroublesofthe1920s–especiallyinLiverpool–itwasacommonsighttoseeabattleshipmooredalongsidesothathervastcrewcouldbeseenandusedtosettleproblemsofunrestinthe

dockers’disputes.Valiantisshownalongsidethelandingstage.

Bow-onviewofValiantinsummer1939afterhercompletereconstruction,givingheraverydifferentappearancefromheroriginalstate.

RepairedatAlexandriaDecember1941toMay1942.TemporarilyrelievedQueenElizabethasfleetflag1April1942.Completed refit at Durban May 1942 and transferred to South Atlantic

Command,Freetown.ArrivedFreetownJune1942;employedonHarbourSecurityService.WESTAFRICACOMMAND(Freetown)JanuarytoFebruary1943.RefitDevonportFebruarytoMay1943.Selected for Eastern Fleet April 1943 but attached to Force H (Gibraltar) for

Sicilyinvasiononcompletionofrefit.Carried out special work-up at Scapa May to June 1943 for bombardment

operations.LeftScapa17JuneforGibraltar,withNelson,RodneyandWarspite.JoinedForceHatGibraltar23June.FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoOctober1943.TookpartininvasionofSicilyandItalyJulytoSeptember1943.WithWarspitebombardedcoastaldefencesatReggio2Septemberprior to the

landings.UnitofcoveringforceforSalernolandings9September.

WithWarspiteandsevendestroyers,escortedItalianbattleshipsVittorioVenetoandItalia,sixcruisersandeightdestroyerstoMalta10SeptemberfollowingItalianarmistice.

LeftMalta forhomewithWarspite14Septemberbutdiverted toSalerno latersamedaytosupportarmyfollowingenemycounter-attack.

BombardedenemypositionsatSalerno15and16September.ReturnedhomeOctober1943forrefitpriortotransfertoEasternFleet.RefitDevonportOctobertoDecember1943(completed1December).LeftDevonportforstation23December,viaMediterraneanandSuezCanal,and

joinedEasternFleetatTrincomalee27January1944.EASTERNFLEET(1stBS)JanuarytoNovember1944.Unit of force supporting carrier attack on Sabang, Sumatra 19 April 1944 by

aircraftfromIllustriousandUSSSaratoga.Took part in bombardment of Car Nicobar and Port Blair in the Andaman

Islands30Apriland1May.

Valiantascompletelyreconstructed,1939.AlthoughthereconstructiongenerallyfollowedthestyleofWarspite’s,Valiantinfactlookeddifferentfromthatshipwhenherreconstructionwascompleted.Sheisseenhereduringthetrialperiod.

SupportedcarrierattackonSourabayabyaircraftfromIllustriousandSaratoga17May.

SupportedcarrierattackonSabangbyaircraftfromIllustriousandVictoriouson25JulyandwithQueenElizabeth,Renown,FrenchRichelieuanddestroyers,carriedoutsurfacebombardmentfollowingthis.

BadlydamagedbybucklingoffloatingdockatTrincomalee8August(collapseof dock variously reported as due to damage by Japanese aircraft attack in1942 and to amechanical defect not connectedwith this). Three propeller-shaftAframesbent.

Two damaged propellers removed at Suez and ship returned to duty on

remainingtwo.Left Trincomalee for home October 1944, via Suez, but draught too deep to

enterCanal(groundedoffsouthernentrance21October)andshipremainedatSuez.

Transferred to East Indies Fleet (3rd BDS) at Suez 22 November 1944 (seeQueenElizabeth).

EASTINDIESFLEET(3rdBS)November1944toFebruary1945.LeftSuezforhomeDecember1944viaCapeandFreetown.ArrivedDevonport1February1945andpaidofftoreserveforrefit.RESERVE(Devonport)February1945toFebruary1948(attachedtoImperieusefromJune1946).RefitFebruary1945toApril1946.AttachedtoImperieuseEstablishmentasSeagoingTrainingShip24June1946.DecisiontoscrapannouncedinParliamentJanuary1948.PaidofftoDisposalListJanuary1948.SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCorporation19March1948.AllocatedtoArnottYoung,Dalmuirforscrapping.LeftDevonportforClyde11August1948.ArrivedCairnryan16August.HulktransferredtoTroon10March1950forfinaldemolition.

History:MalayaATLANTICFLEETApril1919toNovember1924(2ndBStoMay1921,1stBSsubsequently).SeeBarham.Unitofsquadronpayingceremonia!visittoCherbourgApril1919.ConveyedInterAlliedNavalCommissiontoGermanyJanuary1920.LeftPortsmouth14JanuaryflyingflagsofBritish(VA),French(RA)andItalian

(RA) Admirals representing their respective powers on the CommissionwhichwastoinspectthecarryingoutofthePeaceTreatyterms.

AtWilhelmshaven,theGermannavalensignhoistedandgivenatwenty-onegunsaluteforthefirsttimesince1914.

ReturnedtoPortsmouth28January.FlyingflagVA,conveyedDukeofConnaughttoIndiaandpaidspecialvisitto

MalayStatesDecember1920toMarch1921.Detached in September 1922, with Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge and RoyalSovereign,toreinforceMediterraneanFleetduring

TwoviewsofValiantshowingherone-offcamouflageschemeoftwo-tonegrey.Thebroadsideviewwastakeninlate1941;sternviewinOctober1942.

NearEast trouble,and, inMarch1923,conveyeddeposedSultanofTurkey toMalta.

SpitheadReviev26July1924.Transferred to Mediterranean, with rest of class, 1 November 1924 (seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toSeptember1927.SenttoAlexandria,withBarham,May1927becauseofunrestinEgypt.Paid off at Portsmouth 20 September 1927 for reconstruction. Reconstructed

Portsmouth September 1927 to February 1929. Recommissioned atPortsmouthforMediterranean21February.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)FebruarytoNovember1929.TransferredtoAtlanticFleetNovember1929withBarhamandValiant.ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)November1929toMarch1932.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toOctober1934.PaidoffatDevonportforsecondreconstruction20October1934.ReconstructedDevonportOctober1934toDecember1936.Transferred to Mediterranean on completion under 1935 reorganization (seeBarham).

CommissionedforMediterraneanFleetatPortsmouth19January1937.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)January1937toOctober1939(squadronflagJune1937toFebruary1938).In collision with Dutch SS Kertesene off Oporto February 1937 en route to

stationandsustainedsomedamage.RepairedatDevonportandleftPortsmouthforMediterranean1July.JoinedMediterraneanFleet5July.Temporary Flag (VA) 1st BS June 1937 to February 1938, replacingBarham

(whichsee).FlagrevertedtoBarham8February1938.SenttoHaifaSeptember1938(relievingRepulse)becauseArab-Jewishtroubles.Detached to Indian Ocean, with Glorious 6 October 1939 as an additional

huntingforce(ForceJ)tosearchforGrafSpee.ArrivedAden14October.EASTINDIESCOMMAND(ForceJ)OctobertoDecember1939.LeftAdenonfirstpatrol14OctoberandoperatedinSocotraareathroughout.

AnexcellentviewofValiantshortlyafterreceivingnewcamouflagein1943.AllherRDFisvisiblehere(Types273,279,284,etc.).

ForceJbrokenup6DecemberandMalayatransferredtoNorthAtlanticEscortForce,leavingAdenforHalifax,viaUK,onthe7th.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(3rdBSHalifax)December1939toMay1940.InNovember1939,a3rdBattleSquadronhadbeenformed,comprisingthefourRoyalSovereignclassbattleshipsengagedonescortdutiesoutsidetheHomeFleet (2ndBS) andMediterranean (1st BS) commands. This squadronwasorganized for administrative, rather than tactical purposes, the ships beingindependentlyemployed,whererequired.In1942, the3rdBSwasallocatedto the Eastern Fleet, as a tactical unit, and in November 1944 to the EastIndiesFleet(exEasternFleet),bywhichdatetheRoyalSovereignshadbeenwithdrawn.MalayaattachedwhileservingintheNorthAtlanticEscortForce1939–40.

Employed on North Atlantic convoy duty. With Valiant, escorted the thirdCanadiantroopconvoytotheUnitedKingdomFebruary1940(arrivedClyde7February).

RejoinedMediterraneanFleetMay1940becauseofthreatofwarwithItaly.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoDecember1940(temporary

fleetflagMay1940.FlagIstBSand2ndfleetflagfromJuly1940).FlagC-in-CMediterranean hoisted inMalaya at Alexandria 5May 1940, the

ship being the only battleship there at that date; transferred toWarspite onarrival11May.

Engaged mainly in escort work and bombardment of enemy bases in NorthAfrica.

Unit of squadron (Warspite flag,Malaya andRoyal Sovereign) in actionwithItalian battle squadron off Calabria 9 July 1940 while covering Malta toAlexandria convoy. OnlyWarspite able to get within range of the Italianshipsonthisoccasion.

WithWarspite,RamilliesandKentbombardedBardiaandFortCapuzzo15August.Unitof supporting force (Warspite flag,Malaya,Valiant,Ramillies and destroyers) covering attack on enemy ships at Taranto byaircraftfromIllustrious11November1940.

Transferred to ForceH (Gibraltar)December 1940 following the reduction inItalian battleship strength as the result of the Taranto raid which enabledMalayaandRamilliestobewithdrawnfromtheMediterraneanFleetforotherduties.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)December1940toMarch1941.WithRenown and Sheffield bombardedGenoa 9 February 1941while aircraft

from Ark Royal attacked Leghorn and La Spezia as part of the sameoperation.

SouthAtlanticconvoydutyMarch1941.SightedScharnhorstandGneisenauinCapeVerdeIslandsarea8MarchwhileescortingFreetown-UnitedKingdomconvoy,herpresencesavingtheconvoyfromattack.TorpedoedbyU81offCapeVerdeIslands20March.

Repaired at NewYorkNavyYardMarch to July 1941. Transferred toHomeFleetoncompletionofrefitandescortedHalifax–UnitedKingdomconvoyenroute.

ArrivedClyde28July.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JulytoOctober1941.RejoinedForceH27October1941.FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1941toApril1942(flagfromNovember1941).ReplacedRodneyasflagForceHNovember1941.DetachedApril1942asflag(RA)ForceFforoccupationofMadagascar.LeftGibraltar1April1942forDurban,viaCape.

ReplacedinForceFbyRamilliesatDurban22AprilandwithdrawnfromthisoperationfortransfertoNorthAtlanticCommand.

EarlyinthemonthMalayahadbeenproposedasareinforcementfortheEasternFleetbutrejectedbytheC-in-Casunsuitablebecauseofherrelativelysmallsteamingradius.ArrivedatGibraltar15MayandattachedtoForceH.

FleetmanoeuvreswiththeHomeandMediterraneanFleets,March1938.Malaya(nearest),WarspiteandNelsoninbackground.Notethecontrastinpaintwork.

TwoviewsofMalayaatBermudainJuly1941,afterrepairstohertorpedodamage.

Malaya’sfinalguise,1944,showinghercamouflage,whichshekeptuntiltheendofthewar

Valiant(left)andRevengeastrainingships,Devonport1947.

NORTHATLANTICCOMMAND(attachedForceHGibraltar)MaytoOctober1942.EmployedonsearchoperationsagainstVichyFrenchshipslatterpartofMay.ReturnedhomeearlyJunetoescortMaltaconvoy.LeftClydewithconvoy5June.MaltaConvoy6–16June.FreetowntoCapeconvoyJulytoAugust.RefitClydeOctobertoNovember1942;attachedtoHomeFleetoncompletion

ofthis.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1942toDecember1943.DetachedforUK-FreetownconvoyFebruarytoMarch1943.Because of her relatively unmodernized condition, as compared with QueenElizabeth, Valiant andWarspite, itwas decided, in July 1943, thatMalayashouldbewithdrawn fromservice to releasecrew fornewer shipsalthoughshedidnotactuallypayoffuntilDecember.Usedastargetfordummyattacksbymidget submarines, trainingLochCaimbawnAugust 1943 for attack onTirpitz;shipmooredbehindnetsintheLochfortheseexercises.

Paidofftoreserve,inCare&Maintenance,3December1943.RESERVE(Care&MaintenanceClyde)December1943toJune1944.InWesternApproachesCommandduringthisperiod.RefitMarchtoMay1944.Recommissioned 22 June 1944 for operational service in Home Fleet as unit

bombardmentforceforNormandyinvasion.HOMEFLEET(NormandyBombardmentForce)JunetoOctober1944.Carried out various bombardments during Normandy campaign, including

bombardmentofenemy-heldislandsoffSt-Malo1September.RevertedtoreserveOctober1944.RESERVE(Portsmouth)October1944toJune1947(attachedtoVernonfromMay1945).AttachedtoVernon15May1945asAccommodationShipandknownasVernonII.

PlacedonDisposalListJune1947.Sold to British Iron & Steel Corporation 20 February 1948 and allocated to

MetalIndustriesLtd,Faslane,forscrapping.ArrivedFaslane12April1948.

RoyalSovereignClass

DesignThe Royal Sovereign class were the first ships for whose design EustaceTennysonD’Eyncourtwaswhollyresponsible;hehadbeenofferedthepositionofDNCbytheLordshipoftheAdmiralty,andwasanxioustoshowthathewasworthyoftheirconfidence.HeacceptedthejobinalettertotheAdmiraltydated9July1912.

Withreference toourconversationofyesterdayIhave thehonour toinform you that I have now consulted my directors and they haveconsentedtoreleasemefrommyengagementatElswickatsuchtimeasyoumayarrangewithme.Iamthereforeinapositiontoacceptthepost of Director of Naval Construction which you have offered meuponthetermsthatyouhavementioned,thatistosaythesalaryistobe £2,000 per annum whilst Sir Philip Watts acts in an advisorycapacitytotheAdmiraltyandistobeincreasedto£3,000perannumwheneverthearrangementwithSirPhilipWattsceases.

His main problem was that the Board could not make up its mind in whichdirectiontogo.WouldtheybebetteroffwithanimprovedQueenElizabethtype(ten15inguns,25knots)orwouldareturntoaslower,lessheavilyarmedshipbemoresuitable?Thevesselswouldhavetobeatleastequalinspeedtoexistingbattleships(21

knots)and justaswellarmedandprotected.Aftermuchdebatewhichshowedthat it was almost impossible to come up with a satisfactory design to theBoard’s limited specification, a few sketches were produced. Because of thegreaterlengthandcosttherecouldbenoquestionofincreasingthearmamenttonineortengunsasfirstenvisaged,butallagreedthatthenewshipshouldhave15in guns, and armour strakes equal to those ofQueen Elizabeth. Moreover,because of the apprehension regarding maintenance of oil supply in times ofwar, a lower speed together with other disadvantages attendant on coal wasacceptedasthepriceofsafety.Later,however,theshipsweremodifiedtoburn

oil only (late 1914), the changes beingmade on the initiative of Lord FisherimmediatelyontakinguphisappointmentasFirstSeaLordinOctober1914On 31 March 1913 the Board approved a layout (marked Tl) for a vessel

carrying eight 15in guns with speeds of up to 21–22 knots, but other detailsremained to beworked out.A reduction in dimensions fromQueen Elizabethwasmadepossiblebecausethelowerspeedenabledmachineryandboilerspacestobereduced,butotherprincipalrequirementsweresimilartotheQEs.Theforecastleextendedaft to ‘X’ turretas inQueenElizabethbut thesides

beforethebatterywerelessstronglyrecessed,theflarebeingunbrokenasfaraftas‘A’turretinRevengeand‘B’turretintheothers.Owingtotherearrangementof the battery, the after endof the forecastle angled in to the centre line fromconsiderablyfartherforwardthanintheQueenElizabeths,thequarterdeckatthesidesbeingabout70feetlongerthaninthoseships.Alightshelterdeckforboatstowage(notprovidedintheQueenElizabeths)

wasfittedamidships.Metacentricheightandstabilitywerereducedwithaviewto securing a steadier gun platform than in some of the earlier dreadnoughtclasseswhichsuffered froman irregularmotionbecauseofexcessivestability.ComparedtotheIronDukeclass,metacentricheightwasreducedfrom5½feetto3feetwith1½feetlessbeamonthesamelength(pp)and6inchesdeeperinthenominaldraught.ThisfigurewaslowerthaninanyoftheprecedingBritishdreadnoughtswhichhadametacentricheightof5–5½feet,andspecialmeasuresweretakentominimizetheriskofextensivefloodingintheeventofwaterlinedamage. These comprised: 1. Raising the height of the strongly protectedfreeboardbyplacingtheprincipalarmoureddeckatmaindecklevel,wellabovedeep loadwaterline, and carrying amaximum thickness of belt armour up tothis.2.Provisionofa longitudinalarmouredbulkheadbetween themiddleandmaindecksoneachsideamidships.

TheGreatWarhadshownthataccurategunneryatsealeftalottobedesiredandtheinterwarperiod(1920–39)wasatimewhenmuchwasdonetoimprovethis.Resolutionisseenhereongunneryexercisesfiringafullbroadsidewithher15inguns,C.1923.

The addition of bulges (fitted inRamillies while building and in the otherslater) raised the metacentric height and improved stability but this was againreducedbytheextraweightssubsequentlyimposed.EarlyreportsthatthebulgesbeingfittedtoRamillieswereaspecialstabilitytypeintendedmainlytoreducerollingwere thought to be erroneous, but in fact itwas quite true.Thebulgesfitted in all five ships were specifically for anti-torpedo purposes, but it wascalculated that the improvementwouldenhancestabilityespecially if thebilgekeels were retained. To assist manoeuvrability a small auxiliary rudder wasfitted,butitprovedineffectualandwaslaterremovedfromtheclass.

RoyalSovereign,thelastclassofBritishbattleshipstobebuiltintheGreatWar.Theyemergedfromthatconflictvirtuallyunaltered,withtheexceptionofsomebridgeandsearchlightalterations.RoyalSovereignisshownhereoffPortsmouthinAugust1920.Notetherangeclocksonforetopandtherangefinderoverthecharthouse.

Afterthebasicdesignhadbeenreleased,theformerDNC(P.Watts)accusedTennysonD’Eyncourtofstealingoneofhisdesignsandclaimedthathehadinfactbeenworkingalong thesame lines foranewlayoutbefore leavingoffice.No evidence of or reply to this outrageous accusation has been found. It wasgenerally known that Watts did not approve of Tennyson D’Eyncourt’sappointmentasDNC.On completion in 1916 (Ramillies not until 1917) the class augmented the

Grand Fleet with a powerful presence, but the records show that from thebeginning they never enjoyed a reputation as good as that of the QueenElizabeths or indeed even the IronDukes. Theywere fine ships, though oftenaccusedofbeingwetshipsgiventhereducedfreeboard–but thensowere theQueenElizabethsandtheIronDukesinanythingotherthanamoderatesea.After the war (1919) an exhaustive examination of the captured German

battleshipBaden(Germany’sfinalanswertotheFirstWorldWardreadnoughts)revealedthatinmanywaysRoyalSovereignwassuperiortotheGermanvessel.Protectiontowaterlineamidshipsandarmamentwasverysimilarinbothships,weightofverticalarmour,excludingturretandconningtower,was19.8percent

ofdisplacement inRoyalSovereign against21.8percent inBaden.HorizontalprotectionwasstrongerinRoyalSovereignat9.6percentagainst7.2percentinBaden,andunderwaterprotectionat2.3percentinRoyalSovereignagainst2.6percentinBaden.ThestabilityofunderwaterstrengthwasslightlylessinRoyalSovereign, but the fitting of bulges more than compensated any advantagesenjoyedbytheGermanvessel.MuchhadbeensaidoftheGermanships’abilitytoretainasuitablecondition

whendamaged,andtheyaregenerallyadmiredfortheirstayingpower,buttestscarriedoutin1921provedintheoryatleastthatBritishshipsweremoreorlessonaparwithcontemporaryGermandesigns–equal(thoughsometimesinferior)insomeareas,slightlysuperiorinothers.WhenAdmiralJohnJellicoeboardedRevengeinApril1916hewasnotatall

impressedwithsomeofherspecifications:

Iamenclosingafewcriticismsasaresultofashortvisit toRevengeandconversationwithherCaptain.She isextraordinarilywet. Iprefer toalterherforalternativeFleetFlagshiptowaitingforRoyalOakasthelatterwillbesometimebeforesheisefficient.Wecandotheworkhere,Ithink,quitesatisfactorilyandcertainlyatInvergordon.It is a very great pity and a very great retrograde step that the vessels

havebeenprovidedwith twomastsand thesameofcourseapplies to theQueenElizabeth class. I can see no possible reasonwhy the boat derrickshouldnothavebeenworkedfromastumpmast,justabaftthefunnel.Thiswouldmeetallrequirementsandwouldpreventthetwomastsbeingusedastheywillbenow,toenabletheenemytoascertainourcourse.Isuggestthatin any ships now building, if it will not delay their completion, thisalteration be effected. The conning tower is very cramped and also verydifficult of access and egress. Considering the restricted views aft it isessential that theAdmiral should be able to get out of the conning towerquickly in order to observe the movements of the Fleet. This is quiteimpracticable inRevenge as he has to crawl in and out of two holes andwheninside,thespaceavailableisinsufficientfortheFlagshipoftheC-in-CandisconsiderablylessthanthatintheconningtowerofIronDuke.Iamoftheopinionthatagoodmanyofthecommunicationscouldbeplacedinthespacesbelowtheconningtowerinordertogivemoreroom.Thebridgearrangements are thoroughly bad compared with Iron Duke and QueenElizabethclasses.Theship’scharthouseisonedecklowerthannecessary.TherearenofacilitiesfortheAdmiralonthebridgeatall.Itispresumablyintended that he should work the Fleet from the bridge on which his

charthouseislocatedbutitshouldbeobviousthatheismuchtoofarawayfrom the Captain and the compass in this position. I am fitting in theRevengeanAdmiral’scharthouseonthebridgebelowthestandardcompassplatformandplacingsignallingsearchlightsonthatbridge.ItisthepositionfromwhichtheFleetmustbeworked.ThepresentAdmiral’scharthouseisbeing converted into an Admiral’s upper deck cabin leaving the presentupperdeckcabinfortheChiefofStafforCaptainoftheFleet.

OnboardRoyalSovereignduringgunnerypracticec.1923/4.Notethetallcharthousewithrangefinderontheroof.ComparethisviewwiththatofRoyalOakin1925.

Therearemanyotherpointsinthedesignwhichmightbeenlargeduponbut it is perhaps too late to do so now, but there is one point which iscertainlywrongandthatisthattheshipisasusualdownbythebowsandowingapparently tohernotbeingsufficientlywaterborneforward isevenwetter ina seaway thanherpredecessors. Itappears froma reportof theCaptainthatwhenpitchinginaheadseasheoffersnoresistancetodippinguntiltheflareoftheupperdecklevelgetsunderwater.Ourshipsinfactaretoo fine forward, and this combined with the heavy weight of the twoturrets forward renders them unacceptable of keeping their bows abovewaterwhenpitching.

It would appear that the class was never fully modernized and there were anumberofreasonsforthis:

1.Alldocumentsonthesubjectshowthattherewasadistinctlackofroomfromthebridgetothemainmastandanyincreaseinthelengthwouldhavetobeaddedinthisarearatherthanattheends.Thiscouldnotbeachievedby simply removing equipment from the upper deck; extensive internalstructuralchangeswouldhavetobemade.2.Thefact that theshipshadavery lowGMmade itdifficult toaddandsubtractitemswithoutupsettingtheships’generalseaqualitiesandalteringtheiroriginalstabilityasaconsequence.3. Themain reason seems to have been simply the enormous amount oftimeandexpenseinvolved.

Many papers discussing their modernization were put forward during theinterwaryears, but all aremarkedwith a reminder that the shipsweredue forreplacementfrom1935.All weremodernized to some extent from 1924 to 1939, but their reduced

stability made then unsuitable for reconstruction on the same scale as waspossible in theQueenElizabeth class, and the shorter, narrower hullwas alsomoredifficulttoadopttomodernrequirements.

Principalmodificationscomprised:1.IncreasedAAarmamentwithimprovedcontrolequipment.2.Removaloftorpedotubesinmajority.3. Addition of aircraft catapult in Resolution, Royal Oak and RoyalSovereign(removedfromRoyalSovereignin1936–7).4. Addition of deep bulges inRoyal Oak andRamillies. Shallow bulgespreviously fitted in Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge and Royal Sovereignandremainedunchangedinthelastthreeships.5.Modifiedandmuchenlargedbridgework.

Inviewoftheirlimitedmodernizationandrelativelylowspeeditwasproposed,earlyin1939,thattheshipsbediscarded,butofcoursethiswasdroppedontheoutbreakofwar.In1941Churchillproposedconvertingtwoormoreoftheclassto super monitors for projected operations in the Baltic and on the enemy’sNorthSea coast, and for thebombardmentof Italianports.Oneor two turretswere to be removed,AA armament augmented, deck protection increased andwider bulges fitted. Designs were prepared for this, but the idea wassubsequentlyabandonedonthegroundsthattheshipsmightbeofgreatervalueinprotectingconvoysagainstsurfaceattackbyheavyships,andtheworkwould

interferewithotherandmoreurgentrequirementselsewhere.All served in theGrand Fleet from 1916 to 1919. From 1939 to 1945 they

were employed mainly on escort duties. With Warspite (Flag) Ramillies,Resolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereignformedthe3rdBattleSquadronoftheEmergency Eastern Fleet organized in the Indian Ocean in March 1942followingthefallofSingaporeandbasedatColomboandKilindini.RoyalOakwarloss1939.Resolution and Revenge reduced to reserve late 1943 and employed on

SubsidiaryService.Ramilliessimilar,late1944.Royal Sovereign transferred to Russia on loan in 1944 and renamed

Archangelsk. Returned to the Royal Navy 1949. Placed on Disposal List andsoldin1949(seeHistories).Ramillies,ResolutionandRevengeplacedonDisposalListandsoldin1948.

ArmamentMainarmamentdetailswerethesameasthoseoftheQueenElizabethclasswithonlyminoralterations.Duringthedesignstageitwassuggestedthatitmightbepossibletohaveten

15ingunsmountedasinIronDuke,butthisideaseemstohavebeendismissedonthegroundsthateightgunsconstitutedtheidealnumberforcontrolpurposesand that an extra pair would not provide an increase in offensive powerproportionate to the additional size, weight and cost involved. But seriousconsiderationwasgiven to a suggestion that itmight bepossible tohavenineguns if ‘Y’ turret couldbe fittedwith a triplemount.Therewouldhave tobesomealterationtothehullshapeafttoaccommodatethelargerturret,butatthattimeitwasconsideredessentialtohaveasmanybiggunsaspossibleinanynewdesign.Investigationsintothisthemerevealedthatthereasonsforrejectingtenguns were equally valid for nine, and to produce a triple turret at such shortnoticewouldmeanagreatdelayinconstructiontimes.Thesamethingappliedtothesecondaryarmament.The6ingunsnumberedtwofewer thanin theQueenElizabethsasdesigned

butwerethesameasinthoseshipsafterthe1915modifications.Atthedesignstage, however, it hadbeenhoped to fit amorepowerful battery than theoneaccepted. In the Tl layout, a variation showed a 2-tier 6in battery, shorter inlengthandplacedmoreamidships.The design featured some differences from that of the completed Royal

Sovereign: 1. a 12in main belt; 2. barbette armour increased; 3. hull shape

alteration with thicker armoured belt extensions. In the forward battery thereweretwogunsontheupperdeckabreast‘A’barbette.Themidships6inwereonthe upper deck, two firing right ahead, six guns on the forecastle, two on themaindeckabreast‘Y’barbette,i.e.,eightgunsfiringrightahead(RSonlysix);sixgunsrightastern(RSonlyfour).The increased dimensions to include these proposalswere unfortunately not

favoured at the time and amore conventional layout similar to that ofQueenElizabethwas approved by theBoard.As completed,when firing the aft 15inguns in these ships, it was reported that the wardroom and gunroom wereseverelyshakenupwhenthemuzzleswereonaforwardbearingandfiringfullcharges. Thiswas never remedied throughout the ships’ careers and seems tohavebeennormalinallbattleshipsoftheperiod.Theall-round6inarmament,ascompleted, was an improvement over the Iron Duke and Queen Elizabethclasses,butthebatterywasstillverywetandmostdifficulttofightinaheadsea.Thesewere the last capital ships for theRoyalNavy to have a tween deck

battery for secondary armament and also the last to carry any guns below theupperdeck.

ArmourFollowing the lines ofQueen Elizabeth, theRoyal Sovereign group was verysimilarinarmourqualities(seeWWlbook).Mainbeltstrakeswereincreasedattheloweredge(8ininQueenElizabeth)tomakea13inuniformthickness,andarmouredwidthalsoincreasedfrom13ft9in(QE) to15ft1½in.Elsewhere,ontheverticaltherewassomealterationinplateapplicationaswasthecaseinthedeckarmourwhentheprotectivedeckwasraisedtomaindeckleveltoimprovearmouredfreeboard.Ascompletedtheirverticalprotectionwassecondtonone.The reduction in thicknessof theanti-torpedobulkheads (from2in to1½–lin),and the fact that theshipsweregiven lowstability,provedmostadvantageouswhen the fitting of bulges was first discussed. Although Ramillies was theexperimental ship with regard to bulges for battleships (see bulges andunderwater protection), her bulgeswere primarily for protection although theydidindeedimproveStabilityperformance.

ROYALSOVEREIGNArmouredlayout,1919

Othersoftheclass,however,weregivenadifferenttypeofbulgeinthesensethatthelowersectionconsistedofsingleWTchamberswithoutanyofthetubecompartmentsorlargerchambersasinotherbulgedvessels.Theupperportionwasfilledwithcompartmentscontainingcementandwood.ResolutionandRevengewerefittedwiththeirsin1917–18asanexperiment,

andagainitwasfoundthatstabilityandrollinghadimproved.Later(1929)thebulges were fitted with water and air compartments abreast the magazinesfurther to improve their effectiveness against torpedo attack.After completionand the bulge protection had been fitted, no extra protectionwas given to theclass for many years, the ships being completely by-passed in favour of theQueenElizabethclass.Duringthe1930s,however,itwasconsideredsuitabletofitextradeckprotectionand in1934RoyalOakwasgiven4inNCplatesoverthemaindeckaroundthemagazineareaand2½inNCoverthemachinery.In 1939 Royal Sovereign and Ramillies were considered worthy of

modernization,beingviewedasthebesttwooftheclass(otherthanRoyalOak).Approvalwasgiventofit4inand2½inplatesasinRoyalOak,butlackoftimeandsuitablematerialsmeantthatthiswasnotdone.Again,in1941,thequestionarose regarding their weak deck protection and, forced into the situation, theAdmiralty calledRoyal Sovereign,Resolution andRamillies into the dockyard(when opportunity arose) to fit 2½in NC plates over the magazines. Fromofficialrecords,however,itappearsthatResolutionwasonlypartiallyfittedandRevengenotatall(400tonswasfittedinRamillies).

UnderwaterProtectionandBulgesFrom1906Britishbattleship constructionhadprogressed fairly rapidly, but in

the area of underwater protection the steps takenwere retrograde in themain.Therewasnostandardpracticeappliedtothisaspectofaship’sconstructionandtheexperimentalapplicationsinvariousshipshadbeenhaphazard.Manyvesselshad only partial internal bulkheads running down from the main deck to theinsideofthehull;othershadfull-lengthinternalbulkheads.Allwereofvariousthicknesses.While Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign were under construction,

however, the matter of underwater protection was addressed seriously. Thetorpedohadbecomeaverypotentweaponanditwasrealizedthatitwasvitaltotry to prevent an explosion in the hull proper, and to strengthen the internalbulkheadssurroundingthevitalsoftheship.Testswerecarriedoutonsomeoftheoldershipsprior to1912,butnow(1912)Haslar,ChathamandCambridgetestcentreswereallworkingonsuitableprotectivemeasures tobeappliednotonlytoshipsunderconstruction,buttoshipsalreadyinservice.

RoyalOakportamidshipsgivingaclearviewofhermassiveanti-torpedobulgeswhichriseuptothe6insecondarybatteryOnlyRamillieswasthesame,theotherthreehavingbulgesfittedmuchlower1925/6.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:ANTI-TORPEDOBULGES,ASFITTED.Variationsonatheme

The first important testswere carried out on the old pre-dreadnoughtHood(RoyalSovereignclass,1889)whichwassenttoPortsmouthforthatpurposeon27February1913.Theexperimentswereasfollows(seealsodrawings):

1.Explodechargeof280lbwetguncottonincontactwithship’ssideat111station, twelve feet below the surface. Compartments (111 to 123) to befilledwith oil and some other compartments in the area to be left empty(101–111). This experimentwas to show the value ofQueen Elizabeth’sunderwater protection (as fitted in design) and the value of oil or emptycompartmentsagainstexplosion.2.Explodechargeof280lbwetguncottonagainstsideatstation73,twelvefeetbelowsurface.Compartmentsweretobeleftemptytoshowwhattheeffectswouldbe.3.Place charge of 280lbwet gun cotton at station91 to test ‘A’ and ‘B’compartments.4. Fire 2lin gun cotton warhead charge in contact with net defence inposition of opposite side to experiments 1, 2 and 3. The tests werecompletedandinJune1914thefollowingconclusionswerereached:

W.Gard.Portsmouth.1.Athickbulkheadshouldbeplacedattheouterpositionasinthe1stexperiment so that there shall be a greater possible chance of theinnermost bulkhead remaining practically intact after the explosionoutboard.2.The inner bulkhead should be connected to the thick bulkheadbyties only so that any deflection on the latter should not be directlycommunicatedtotheinnerbulkhead.

3. A thick bulkhead constructed in the principle adopted for theseexperiments can be made sufficiently homogeneous to resist suchextensivedeformationaswouldcausetheERorBRtobethrownopentothesea.

Theprojectileeffectnoticedinthe1stexperimentwasabsentinthesecondapparently due to thewings and outer bunkers being filledwithwater. Itseemsdoubtful,however,whetherthewaterinthewingswasanadvantageand whether the general result would not have been better if the middlecompartmentsorouterbunkeronlyhadbeenfilled.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:BULGES

Although this and other experiments furnished much data regarding theprovision of more suitable internal underwater protective bulkheads in newships,aletterfromJ.D.DickfortheDNOindicatedthatitwasnotenoughtohavejustaninternalbulkhead:

The two experiments carried out with 280lb wet gun cotton were

inconclusive.Themoderntorpedocarries400lbofwetguncottonorTNTwhich is equivalent to 500lb ofwet gun cotton, and presumably the newGerman23.6intorpedoreportedbytheN.I.D.willbemuchlarger.It is considered that thepresenceofoil andwater in the compartments

has a very important bearing on the effect of the explosion and muchvaluableinformationwouldbegainedfrommoretankexperiments.

Taking note of this and other reports that were received from the variousdepartments, attention was turned towards providing not only a good internalbulkheadbutanexternaloneintheformofablisterbulgewhichcouldbefittedto new ships and older vessels if thought necessary. But it was impossible torushtheexperiments,andbothQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignwerelaiddownandcompletedwithoutexternalbulges.Theydid,however,benefit fromtheHood tests in the way of a thicker andmore complete internal protectivebulkhead.By 1915 tests had been carried out using 400lb TNT, not against the hull

proper but against various external steel shapes which were so placed as toprotect the inner parts of the ship itself. On 30 April the DNC (TennysonD’Eyncourt)wrote to theDNOexplaining someof themethods thathadbeentried:Ihavemadecareful inspectionof thedifferentsmall–scale targetsandsectionsofshipswithbulgeprotection,etc.,againsttorpedoeswhichhaverecentlybeenexperimented with by Professor Hopkinson in conjunction with Vernon. Thepreliminaryconclusionsare:

1.Systemofbulgeprotection,thebulgebeingkeptentirelyoutsidetheship proper, is very much more efficient than similar amounts ofprotection inside thebodyof a ship and experiments generally showthat the permanent bulgeswe have put onMonitors and theEdgars(cruisers) and also the temporary attached bulge arrangement on theoldRevengewillbeefficienttopreventseriousdamagetotheship.2.Averyefficient formofprotectionhasbeenevolvedbymeansofusing layersof tubes– eachbeing sealed at the ends, in conjunctionwith timber sheathing inside the tubes against the ship’s side properand the sheathing also carried round outside the tubes. Thisarrangementperhapsinvolvesconsiderableweight,butaveryefficientprotectionagainsttorpedoattackcanbeattainedbyatotalthicknessoftubesandtimberofabout4to5feetwhichshouldpreferablybeintheformofabulgeexternaltotheship.

As mentioned in the DNC’s letter, a number of ships were fitted withexperimentalbulgesinanendeavourtodeterminetheoptimumbulgeshapethatwould inhibit the effects of the explosion of a torpedo, while exacting aminimumlossofship’sspeed.ThecruisersEdgar,Endymion,TheseusandGraftonwere fittedwithbulges

ofenormousproportions(seedrawings)whichinpracticeprovedveryefficientindeed.Becauseoftheirsize,however,theywereoflimitedvalueandrestrictedtheshipstoslowspeedsandaffectedmanoeuvringqualities.Edgar,GraftonandEndymion were all torpedoed but returned safely to port afterwards – proofenoughthattheworkofProfessorHopkinshadbeensuccessful.

ThecentreengineroomofRoyalSovereignTheupkeepofthenumerouswheelvalves,pressuregauges,dialsandpipeworketc.,wereaconstantsourceofhardworkfortheERstaff

With regard to the fitting of bulges in the battleships, yet another set ofexperiments had been conducted. The battlecruisersRenown andRepulse hadbeengiven internalbulgeson thedrawing-board at thedesign stage,but thesewereshallow,muchsmallerfittingsandofcoursewerelesseffective.Thoseforthe large cruisersGlorious and Courageous were very similar and had beenincludedinthedesign.Furious’sbulgeswerelargerthanthoseofhertwohalf-sistersbutofmoreorlessthesametype.FortheRoyalSovereigngroupRamillieswasthetestshipandshewasgiven

themostelaboratebulgesfittedtodate(1917).Ascompleted,hershallowtube-filled bulges proved very successful and also gave the stability a boost bydamping the rolling of the hull to some effect. Approvalwas given to fit the

others of the class, but those forRevenge andResolutionwhen fitted in 1918were,infact,differentfromthoseofRamilliesinthattheyhadnotubes.RoyalSovereignherselfhad6intubesinthebulgeswhentheywerefittedin1920.Althoughvisuallythebulgesappearedthesamethroughouttheclass,thefact

is that no two ships were identical and all of them underwent muchexperimentation and alteration to the underwater protective system (seedrawingsandBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).Asthepoweroftorpedoesincreased the effectiveness of bulges and indeed the whole of the underwaterprotective system in many of the older battleships became less effective.Nevertheless,RamilliesandResolutionbothtookserioustorpedohitsduringthewar(seebattledamagesection)andsurvived–atributeindeedtothestrengthoftheinternalstructureoftheshipsandthedesignofthebulgesingeneral.RoyalOak, however, was sunk very effectively, having taken at least three hits justbelowthebulgeandarmouredbelts(seebattledamagesection).Examinationoftheholesinherhullshowwhyshesankinaboutthirteenminutes(seedrawing).

MachineryOriginallydesignedascoal-firedships,followingthepatternoftheIronDukesrather than repeating the propulsive system of Queen Elizabeth, they werenaturallyslowerships.SHPwasfixedat31,000for21knotsandtheywerelaiddownassuch.OnLordFisher’s return to theAdmiralty, however, one of his earlymoves

was to instigate the fittingofoil-firedboilers tonewshipson the stocks.Thisincreased their SHP to 40,000 for 23 knots and it was achieved with theminimumoffussorinterruptiontothecontinuityofconstruction.HavingfewerboilersthanQueenElizabethorIronDuke,theshipscouldbefittedwithonlyasingleuptake, the firstBritishdreadnoughts tohave this feature.Ascompletedtheclassallputupagoodturnofspeedandalthoughtheusualfullsetoftrialswerenotcarriedoutbecauseofwartimeconditions,itwasreportedthattheyallmadeinexcessof21–22knots–notquiteuptoexpectationsbutcertainlyasfastasmost British capital ships and adequate for Grand Fleet duties. The fastestshipoftheclasswasRevengewithRoyalOakaclosesecond.Theirmachineryand boilers were never updated and consequently in 1939 they were sadlylackinginspeed;ifthehullswerefoul,theywereluckytoreach19knotsonfullpower.

BridgeworkAscompletedtheclasswerefittedwithatripodforemastandsimplebridgework

differentinappearancefromtheQueenElizabethsbutidenticalinarrangement.TheGreatWarsawmanyadditionstothebridgeandupperworksinthewayofSL towers,extrawingextensions,covers,windows, rangefinders, rangeclocksand charthouses, etc., so that their appearance became rather unique and theycouldeasilybedistinguishedfromoneanotherbythedifferentbridgefittings.Duringthe1920sand1930sthecanvassurroundswereremovedandinmany

casesreplacedbylightgaugesheetmetal;thebridgesweregivencanvascoversand sometimes completely enclosedwith similar plating (end of 1930s, not inall).Extrawindowswereinstalledaroundthecharthouseandthetripodforemastwasalmosthidden fromviewandcouldbecalledovercrowded–by1939 thetripodwasinfacthiddenexceptforthesectionreachinguptothecontroltop.Althoughthestaffservingtheseshipswerealmostalwaysatthemercyofthe

elements, therewas never any general complaint because the simple fact wasthat although the bridge and charthouse positions were draughty, wet andgenerallyuncomfortable,theall-roundviewandmanningpositionsatalllevelswere much preferred to a completely enclosed position. By 1940manymoreextrashadbeenaddedincludinglightAAgunsatthebaseofthebridgeandallupperworks becoming overcrowded with RDF aerials of many kinds. Themanning of the ship from open bridge workwas still preferred, however oneofficer commenting: ‘We like to see what the Germans are throwing at us’.During thisperiodRamilliesandRoyalOakhad thenewestandmostspaciousbridgeswithResolutionandRSfollowing.

Aclose-upofResolutionin1924showingclearlyhowtheupperbridgecharthouseprojectedforwardofthetripod.Notethesearchlighttowersincorporatedattherearofthesuperstructure(upperandlowerlevels).

ReportfromtheBridgeinRamilliesafterherrefitinJuly1934:Duringtheperiodofthetrialstheweatherwasfineandwarm.Conditionsonthebridgewerequitepleasant.TheDNEandCommanderWadhamboth

visited the ship and were on the bridge during full power runs. AlsoCommanderTush representingDofN.TheCO (CaptainR.Leatham)oftheshipstatedthatfromanavigationalpointofviewthebridgewouldbereported upon favourably but from a tactical standpoint hewould not beable to make a report until the ship had had exercises with attackingaircraft.Heopenedall thewindowson thebridge indemonstration to theDNE and conditionswere not unpleasant, the inevitable draught being atabout the height of the windows and not low down as was the case inValiantbeforethecompassplatformwasenclosed.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

Withregardtotheopencornersofthecompassplatform,theawningshadnotyet been fitted and therefore could not be tried. Captain Leatham made thesuggestionthattheopeningswouldbemoreeffectiveifstoolswereprovidedsothat theobserver’sheadcouldbe taken to just above the levelof the roof.Healsosuggestedthattheopeningsmightbemuchsmaller(justlargeenoughforanobserver to place his head through) rectangular in shape and fitted with abulletproofshutter.

RoyalOakin1925lookingaftfromtheforecastleupon‘A’and‘B’15inturretsandsuperstructure.(Notetheaircraft.)Duringthisperiod,bridgesonthisclassgavearathergrimandaggressiveappearance.

TheviewoftheforecastlefromthebridgeisquitegoodenablingtheCaptainandNavigatingOfficertowatchoperationsondeck.

HandlingandManoeuvrability

As completed the class did not have a bad reputation in either handling ormanoeuvringqualities,althoughtheytendedtorollslightlymorethanhadbeenintendedinthedesign.Afterbeingbulgedconditionsimprovedtoadegreeandthesubjectwaspracticallyforgotten.Astheybecameolder,however,andmanyweights had been added, they became rather awkward to handle in certainconditions.Althoughthiscouldbesaidofmanyoftheolderbattleships,itwasalmostcustomarytopaylipservicetotheRoyalSovereignsanditisonrecordthatsomeofthem‘playedup’especiallyatslowspeeds.During theearlymonthsof theSecondWorldWar theCaptainofRamillies

(H.T.Baille-Grohman)hadnothingbutpraisefortheoldshipandsomeofhiscommentsdispersecriticismwhichinmanycaseswereunfounded:

No difficulty was experienced entering or leaving Fremantle, butimmediatelyafter leaving theportat06.30onThursday21stDecember itwas found necessary to anchor owing to overheated condensers. Thisoverheatingwascausedbyimmensequantitiesofparticularlystringyweedwhich had entered the condensers. It would appear that Fremantle asdredgedisnotsuitableforwarshipsofthisdraught.Strong headwindswere experienced on the first part of the voyage to

Melbourneandsubsequentlyafairlyheavyswellonthestarboardbeamorquarter.Thisnecessitatedan increased inrevolutions inorder toarriveontimeasarranged.TheshiparrivedatMelbourneat13.45onChristmasDay,Monday25thDecember1939.TheshipremainedinMelbournefor63hourswhichtimewasnotenough

to allow boilers to cool down sufficiently for work to be carried out onthem.

ThedistancesteamedbyHMShipundermycommandinDecember1939isofinterest, and likely to be a record up to date for a month’s steaming by abattleshipofanyNavy,withalsoapossiblerecordforthebestday’srun.

Distancesareasfollows:

OnpatroltoAden(1stand2ndDecember)500miles.AdentoWellington,callingatSocotra(4thto31stDecember)8,985miles.Totaldistanceformonth9,485miles.Averagespeedforwholedistance16.5knots.Bestday’srun:(24thDecember)464miles.Averagespeedforbestdaysrun19.3knots.FastestrunwasfromFremantletoPortPhilipHeads,1,757miles.

Averagespeed19.2knots.Thedistancesteamedforthefirstyearofcommissionwillbeover40,000miles.Acomparisonwithpeacetimesteamingisasfollows:Average annual distance steamed for period 1930–1938, 6,861 miles at an

averagespeedof11.5knots.Ramillies was docked 28th October to 6th November 1939 at Alexandria,

otherwiseshehashadnorefitsinceFebruary1939.

Handling:Although anR class battleship is notoriously unsteady at slow speeds and inshallowwater,theshiphandledverywellthroughoutbothpassages.Recoursetoworking the engines to overcome incipient sheerswas only necessary on twooccasionsonthepassageSouthandononeforthepassageNorth.ThegreatestcarewasrequiredwhenenteringarestrictedportionoftheCanalfromawider.

Close-upoftheRoyalSavereign’sbridgeafterrefitMay1938.Notethattheundersideofthebridgehasbeenenclosedtoalleviatethedraught,andthebridgehasbeenroofedin.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETEDConstruction

Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedRoyalSovereign PortsmouthDY 15.1.1914 29.4.1915 8.4.1916.RoyalOak DevonportDY 15.1.1914 17.11.1914 1.5.1916.Revenge Vickers 22.12.1913 29.5.1915 24.3.1916.Resolution Palmers 29.11.1913 14.1.1915 7.12.1916.Ramillies Beardmore 12.11.1913 12.9.1916 5.5.1917.

Displacement(tons):27,970tonsload,31,130tonsaveragedeepload.DimensionsLength:580ft3in(pp),614ft6in(wl),620ft6⅞in(oa).(Ramillies).Beam:88ft6in(88ft7inRevenge).Draught:30ftload,33ft7indeep.Armament8×15in42calMkI14×6in45calMkXII2×3inAA4×3pdrQF10Lewis4×21inTTinsubmergedtubes(21torpedoes).ArmourMainbelt13inamidships;Forwardstrakes6–4–1 in;Aft strakes6–4in;Uppersideamidships6in;Barbettes10–9–7–6in;Turrets13–11 in;Bulkheads6–4in;Decks:forecastle1in;upper1½in;main2in;middle4–3–2in;lower2½in.MachineryParsonsreactionturbinesdrivingfour3-bladedpropellers(diaminner10ft,outer9ft3in).18Babcock&WilcoxboilersinRevenge,RamilliesandRS,Yarrowinothertwo.Engineroomsize69ft11in.Boilerroomsize.No.1:37ft11¾in,No.2:38ft,No.3:38ft1in,6boilerseachroom.Weightofmachinery:2,550tons(approx).Mainfeedoutput:(verticalsteamreciprocatingcylinder)71.4tonsperhour.Auxiliaryfeedpumpoutput:35.7tonsperhour.Averagedesignedrevs300rpm.DesignedSHP:40,000for23knots.Fuel(tons)oilnormal,3,400max.

Radiusofaction: 7,000nmat10knots, 3,600nmat18knots, 2,700nmat fullspeed.Searchlights:8×36ininall(11×36inRamilliesascompleted).Complement:909RoyalOak,910Resolution;938Ramillies.Costs: £2,570,504 (Royal Sovereign), Ramillies being the most expensive at£3,295,810.

Itwasfound,asintimated,thattherudderhastobeusedgenerouslyandquickly. The wash caused by the ship did not appear to be any moreexcessivethanthatcausedbyamoderatesizedvessel.

Thiswasawonderfulreportforanoldshipwhich,accordingtotheAdmiralty,was due for scrapping in about 1935 and especially given that the design hadreceivedlittleornoreconstructionsince1917.Bytheendof thewar(1944),however,manymoreweightshadbeenadded

(extra bridgework, radar, AA guns, etc.) which proved too much for the oldshipsasthefollowingreportshows:

By1944Ramillieshadincreasedherdraughtfrom29½ftto34½ftandwasexceedingly difficult to manage. Coming home through Suez it wasimpossible to steady ship for amoment.Shehad tobe carriedwith largerudderandfrequentreversalsofoneengineforhourafterhouranddespitea tug she took the ground 4 times. 8 knots seemed to be the mostmanageablebutnotgoodatthat.

AppearanceChanges,RefitsandModificationsWell-proportioned, fine-looking ships, they were characterized by the singlelarge flat-sided funnel which gave then a most impressive appearance. TheywereeasilydistinguishablefromtheQueenElizabethclassby:

1.Singlefunnel.2.Upperbridgenotextendedbacksomuch.3.Navigatingplatformprojectednoticeablyfurtherforward.4.Longer6inbattery,moreamidships.5.6ingun(P&S)onforecastledeckoversecondbatterygun.6.15indirectortoweronplatformbelowcontroltopinsteadofoverthis.

Theirappearancein1919wasratherheavierthanoriginallyasaconsequenceof

the1916–18wartimeadditions,includingenlargedcontroltops,enlargedbridge(ResolutionandRevenge),SLtowersandaircraftplatformsonturrettops.Anti-torpedobulgesinRamillies,RevengeandResolutionwerenotveryprominentatthisstage.

CombinedannualmanoeuvresoftheHomeandMediterraneanFleetsinMarch1937.Resolutionnearest,thenBarham,QueenElizabeth,RoyalOak,NelsonandRodney.

Individualdifferences:Ramillies LowSLtowersabeamfunnel.

Loweryardonforemastatdirectorplatform.Others: TallerSLtowersatrearoffunnel.Loweryard.Revenge Forecastlesiderecessedabaftoutfaceof‘A’barbette(shaft‘B’

inotherfour).Upperbridgeextendedbacktonearfunnel.Middleandlowerbridgesextendedbackandwasconnectedbycurvedscreen.

Resolution MiddleandlowerbridgesasRevenge,onlytwoshipsthus.Verylonggaffatstarfish.

RoyalOak Flangehighupbetweentripodlegs(onlyshipofclasswiththis).Bridgesnotextended.Verylonggafffromheeloftopmast.

RoyalSovereign

BridgesasRoyalOak.Signalstrutsforwardfromforestarfish.Shortergafffromheeloftopmast.

RoyalSovereignRefit,May1921toSeptember1922:1.LargebaseRFfittedatrearof‘B’turret.2.RFremovedfrombetweenSLtowersatrearoffunnel.

3.Rangeclocksaddedover‘X’turretandextraonefittedovercontroltop.4.HARFfittedonsmalltoweroverbridge.5.SLtowerabaftmainmastremoved.6.Anti-torpedobulgefitted,similartothoseinRevengeandResolution.

RoyalSovereign1924–5:3inAAgunsreplacedby4inAA.RoyalSovereignRefit,October1927toJune1928:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsandcasematesremoved.3.Extrapairof4inAAadded.4.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.5. Extra signal struts fitted at starfish below control top and at directorplatform.

RoyalSovereign1931:HARFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirector.RoyalSovereignRefit,JanuarytoNovember1932:

1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Multiple2pdrAAadded (8barrels)on raisedplatformP&Son shelterdeckabeamfunnel.3.AAobservationplatformaddedeachsideof15indirectorplatform.4.Aftertorpedotubesremoved.5.NewrectangularSL towers fittedaround funnel,withafterpairofSLsraisedaboveforwardpair.6. 24in signalling SL remounted on small platform (P&S) abeam lowerbridge.7.Trainingcatapult(McTaggarttype)fittedonquarterdeck,rightaft,withcrane(straightarm)abaftthis.8.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets.9.Bridgemodifiedandenlarged.10.Deepsupportingflangesaddedbelownavigatingplatform.11.LowerbridgeextendedbackaroundfunneltomeetSLtowers.

RoyalSovereignMaytoJuly1935:1.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedP&Sabeamconningtower.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1919Displacement(tons)

Revenge:29,590(legend),32,460(deep),32,820(extradeep);Ramillies:30,400(legend),33,200(deep),33,570(extradeep).DimensionsLength unchanged. Beam: Ramillies (bulged) 101ff 5½in; Revenge andResolution(bulged)101ft6in;RoyalSovereignandRoyalOakascompleted.Draught:29ft3½in(legend),31ft11in(averagedeep).Armament:unchanged.Machinery:unchanged.Searchlights:8×36in;2×24insignalling.Improvedcontrolequipmentfitted.AircraftPlatform fitted over ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets in all.Revenge fitted for towing kiteballoon. In post-war period aircraft not normally carried, but embarked onlywhen required forexercises.Runwaysover15ingunsgenerally removed from1920.ArmourAsoriginalwiththeexceptionofextraplatingovermagazinesandturrettopsasa result of Jutland. Armoured casemates added to upper pair if 6in guns inResolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign.Machineryandboilers:unchanged.Speed:About22knotsfull.Fuelandradius:unchanged.Rig:Asoriginal,plusstrutsforwardfromstarfishbelowcontroltopinRamilliesandRoyalSovereign.W/T:Type1–16,32,2–34,9and31.Complement:Revenge,1,240;Ramillies,1,213;RoyalOak,1,215.

GMANDSTABILITY

RoyalSovereignafterbulging(figurestakenfrom1924incliningtests)ConditionA(legend)Displacement(tons) Draught GM Max.stability29,710 29ft5in 5.22ft 35°ConditionB(deep) 32,570 31ft11in 5.52ft 36°ConditionC(extradeep) 32,930 32ft4in 5.66ft 36½°ConditionD(light) 28,520 28ft4½in 5.30ft 34½°ComparedtoRoyalOakwithherlargerbulges,June1924.ConditionA(legend)29,160 28ft3½in 6.3ft ConditionC(extradeep)32,800 31ft4½in 6.3ft

2.HARFoverbridgereplacedbyhighopentower.RoyalSovereignbyMarch1937.Multiple 2pdr temporarily removed (some 2pdrs from Royal Sovereign werefitted in the aircraft carriersGlorious andCourageous). Royal Sovereign wasgiven new guns. 36in SL replaced by 44in. Catapult and crane removed.Catapultbaseonquarterdeckretained.RoyalSovereignRefit,June1937toFebruary1938:

1.Single4inAAreplacedbytwinmountinlargeshields.2.HAdirectoroncontroltopraisedclearoftop.3.AfterHAdirectorfittedinplaceoftorpedocontroltower.4.Remainingtorpedotubesremoved.5.RDFequipmentfitted(aerialatheadofmaintopmast).6. Large open platform added over bridge, extended back around tripodlegs.

7.Maintopgallantmastremoved.8.HARFonbridgeremoved.

Royal Oak 1922. SL removed from towers abaft mainmast. Towers remaineduntil 1924–5. (SL remounted on middle bridge in Ramillies only, otherssuppressed.)

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

REVENGEGeneralArrangementsasCompleted,1916

REVENGEGeneralArrangementsasCompleted,1916

FleetmanoeuvresintheAtlantic,March1934.Manoeuvrestookplacequiteoften,butduringthoseof1934HMshipsencounteredsomeoftheheaviestseasduringanexercise.RoyalOakisshownalmostcompletelyconcealedbyspray.

RoyalOakRefit,September1922toJuly1923:1.LargebaseRFfittedatrearof‘B’turret.2.RFremovedbetweenSLtowersatrearoffunnel.3.Rangeclocksaddedover‘X’turret.4.HARFmountedinsmalltoweroverbridge.5.Veryprominentanti-torpedobulgesfittedwhichcarriedalmosttoupperdeckamidships.6.Middlebridgelevelwasextendedbacktofunnel.

LegendforRoyalOakafterrefit(1924).Length:620ft6in(oa),Beamoverbulges:102ftlin,Draught:26ft6inforward,29ft6inaftFreeboardtotopofdeck:28ftforward,16ftamidships,17ftaft.Heightofturrets:

‘A’31ft9in‘B’41ft6in‘X’32ft9in‘Y’22ft6inSHP40,000andstillcapableof21.75knots.Complement1,188.Armament:Eight15in;fourteen6in;two4inAA;four21intorpedotubesWeights(tons)GeneralEquipment 720Armament 5,020Machinery 2,710Fuel 900oilArmourandhull 19,650

RoyalOak,1924–5:36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge:RoyalOak,Refit,March1927toJune1927:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Rangeclocksovercontroltopremoved.3.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casemateretained).4.Extrapair4inAAadded.5.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.6.Extrasignalstrutsfittedtostarfishbelowcontroltop.7.Topgallantfittedtomainmast.

RoyalOak,byApril1932:1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Forecastledeck6incasemateremoved.3.HARFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirector(ApriltoJuly1932).

RoyalOak1933:Afterpairoftorpedotubesremoved.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets:RoyalOakRefit,June1934toAugust1936:

1.6indirectortowersrelocatedP&Sonnewplatformsonforemastbelow15indirector.2.4insinglesreplacedbytwinmountingsinlargeshields.3. Multiple 2pdr (8 barrels) AA added P&S on raised platform abeam

funnel.4.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)AAaddedP&Sabeamconningtower.5.AARFremovedfromcontroltopandoverbridge

ResolutionatanchorinWeymouthBayc.1936.Notethetwin4inHAmountingontheforecastledeckabeamthefunnel,fittedforexperimentalpurposes(seedrawing).

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1927Displacement(tons)Royal Oak 29,160 (legend), 32,800 (extra deep); Revenge 30,244 (legend),33,008(extradeep);RoyalSovereign29,710(legend),32,930(extradeep).DimensionsLength:unchangedexceptwhenfittedwithsternwalk(625ft).Beam: unchanged except Royal Oak (bulged) 102ft 6in; Royal Sovereign(bulged)101ft11½in.Draught:RoyalOak28ft3½in(legend),31ft4½in(deep).RoyalSovereign29ft5in(legend),31ft11in(deep).Stability: Angle of maximum stability: 35/36½°, Vanishes at 62/68½° GM:5.22/5.66ftArmour:unchangedexceptwaterprotectionaddedtobulgesin1927andtubesremovedwherefitted(Ramillies).Machinery:unchanged.TrialfiguresRamilliesafterrefit,July1934:

4Hours,TollandMile.Displacement:29,540tonsloadcondition.Draught:28ft8in.Speed:22.03knots.

6.HAdirectorplatformfittedontripodlegs(directornotfitted).7. Four 21in torpedo tubes fitted (2 P&S) in recessed ports in forecastlebefore‘A’turret,forexperimentalpurposes.8.RemainingpairofsubmergedTTremoved.9.RDFfitted(aerialonmaintopmastwithDFcabinetonstarfish).10.36inSLreplacedby44in.11.NewSLtowersfittedasinRoyalSovereign.12.Trainingcatapult(McTaggarttype)andcrane(largebentarm)fittedasinRamillies.13.Bridgeenlargedandmodified.Upperbridgeanewandcompletelyopendesign,adoptedonlyinRoyalOakandMalaya.14.LowerbridgeextendedaroundfunnelasinRoyalSovereign.15.TripodlegsfittedtomainmasttosupportHAdirector.16.Maintopgallantremovedandtopmastreduced.

RoyalOakRefit,byApril1939:1.Largeopenplatformaddedoverbridgeextendedbackaroundtripodlegs.2.Smallshieldaddedatlowerbridgelevel.

RamilliesinJuly1934afterextensiverefit.Notethelargebulges,tripodmainmastandcatapulton‘X’turret.Afterthisrefitsheachieved22.03knotsonherfour-hourtrialsontheTollandMileat29,540tons.

Revenge1922:1.SLremovedfromtowersabaftmainmast.2.Armouredcasematesfittedtoupperpairof6inguns.

Revenge1924:1.RFremovedfrombetweenSLtowers.2.3inAAreplacedby4inAA.

Revenge1925–6:1.Rangeclockaddedover‘X’turret.2.36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge.3.Two24insignallingSLexbridgeremountedonforwardsuperstructureand extra 24in SL temporarily mounted on ‘B’ turret (removed spring1926).4. Signal distributing and remote control office added at rear of upperbridgeandscreenbetweenmiddleandlowerbridgesremoved.5.Topgallantfitted.

Revenge1926–7:1. 24in signalling SL transferred from forward superstructure to lowerbridge.2.Officeatrearofupperbridgeconsiderablyenlarged.3.Tallertopgallanttomain.

Revenge1927:One24inSLmountedonsmallplatformlowdownbeforebridge.RevengeRefit,January1928toJanuary1929:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsandcasematesremoved.3.Extrapairof4inAAadded.4.AAobservationpositionfittedP&Sbelowdirectorplatform.5.RDFequipmentfitted.DFcabinetatrearofdirectorplatform.6. Forward section of each SL tower enlarged and forward pair of SLbroughtfurtherforwardfromfunnel.Aftersectionraisedbringingafterpairtoahigherlevel.7.24inSLandsmallplatformbeforebridgeremoved.8.Aircraftplatformsremovedfroma‘X’turret.9.Bridgeenlarged.10. Flag signalling transferred from fore to mainmast and aftersuperstructureenlargedtoaccommodatesignalstaff.11.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.12.Tallertopgallanttomain.13.Signalyardatheadmaintopmastandcloseabovestarfish.

RevengeRefit,MaytoDecember1931:1.Multiple2pdr (8barrels) addedon raisedplatformsideof shelterdeckabeamfunnel(starboardonly,noneonport).2.AfterpairofTTremoved.3.ModifiedtypeDFfitted.4.BaseofSLtoweronstarboardsideoffunnelcutawaytoaccommodatemultiple2pdrs.5.24insignallingSLremountedonsmallplatformlowonmainmast.6.Signalstruts(rakedwellaft)fittedatstarfishbelowcontroltop.

Revenge1933:Aircraftplatformsremovedfrom‘B’turret.

RevengeRefit,July1936toMarch1937:1.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.2.36inSLreplacedby44inSL.Letters‘RE’paintedonturrettops.3.Underwaterbulgesinspectedandreconditioned.

RevengeRefit,winter1938toAugust1939:1.Single4inreplacedbytwingunsinlargeshields.2.Multiple2pdraddedonplatformonportsideabeamfunnel.3. Multiple 0.5in AA (4 barrels) added P&S on superstructure abeamconningtower.4.HAdirectoroncontroltopraisedwellabovetop.5.AfterHAdirectoraddedinplaceoftorpedocontroltower.6.DFaerialremovedfromovercontroltop.7.Modifiedtypeofaerialfittedatheadoftopgallantmast.8.BaseofSLtoweronportsidecutawaytoaccommodate2pdrs.9. Signal distribution office and remote control station at rear of bridgereplacedbysmallopenplatformbuiltaroundtripodlegs.10.Clinkerscreenfittedtofunneltop.11.Signalyardremovedfrommaintopmast.

Ramillies1919–21:1.LargebaseRFaddedatrearof‘B’turretandslightlylaterin‘X’turret.2.Rangeclock,exfaceofcontroltop,relocatedonpoleovertop.

Ramillies1922:SLremovedfromtowersabaftmainmast.Remountedonmiddlebridge.Ramillies1923–4:

1.Rangeclockremovedfromovercontroltopandrelocatedover‘X’turret.2.SLremovedfrommiddlebridge.3.Armouredcasematesfittedtoupperpairof6in.4.Short topgallantmast added tomainand signal struts to starfishbelowcontroltop.

RamilliesRefit,September1926toApril1927:1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casematesretained).3.Extrapairof4inAAaddedonshelterdeck.4.HARFmountedonsmalltoweronbridge.5.36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge.

6.24inSLtransferredfromforwardsuperstructuretolowerbridge.7.Newhigh-fittingbulgesreplacingsmalleroriginalones.8.Highslopingrooffittedtoupperbridge.9.Foretopmastandloweryardremovedfromforemast.

Ramillies1931–2:1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Forecastledeck6incasematesremoved(byAugust1932).

RamilliesRefit,January1933toAugust1934:1.Multiple2pdrAAaddedP&Sonraisedplatformabeamfunnel.2.Multiple0.5inAAaddedabeamconningtower.3.HARF on control top replaced byHA director and afterHA directoraddedonplatformonnewlyfittedtripodlegs.4.AAobservationpositionsfittedateachsideof15indirectorplatform.5.AfterpairofTTremoved.6.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.7.NewSLtowersasinRoyalOak.8.Trainingcatapult(McTaggarttype)fittedonportsideof‘X’turretroof,withcrane(straightarm)onportsideofsuperstructure.9.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrettops.10.Bridgemodifiedandenlarged.11.Lowerbridgeextendedaftaroundfunnelandupperbridgemoresteeplyslopedandprominentwithsupportingflangesaddedbelow.

REVENGE1927–39

Ramillies,1935:HARFoverbridgereplacedbyhighopentower(AugusttoOctober).Ramillies:byMay1937.

1.36inSLreplacedby44in.2.Toweroverbridgereplacedbylargeopenplatformextendedbackaroundtripodlegs.Red,whiteandbluestripespainteduponturretsinall.

RamilliesRefit,byJune1938:1.Single4inAAreplacedbytwinsinlargeshield.2.RemainingpairofTTremoved.3.RDFfitted.4.Catapultremoved,craneretained.5.Maintopgallantreducedinlength.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1939Displacement(tons):31,560(load),33,200(deep)(averageforclass).Length:unchanged.820ft(oa)625ftRevengewithsternwalk.Beam:unchanged.101ft11½inRoyalSovereign;102ft6inRamillies.Armament:Maingunsunchanged.Secondary:12×6ininupperdeckbattery8×4inAAintwinshields16×2pdrAA(2×8barrels)8×0.5inMGAA(2×4barrels)

4×3pdrsaluting4×21inTTabovewater(RoyalOak),2×21insubmerged(Revenge).Radar:MF/DFequipmentinall.Searchlights:4×44in;4×24insignallinginRevenge,2inothers.AircraftCatapult (training)on ‘X’ turret inResolution andRoyalOak.OneFairey IIIFreconnaissanceseaplane.ArmourAsoriginalexceptforadditionstoRoyalOakin1936refit.Machineryandboilers:unchanged.Speed:reducedtoabout20knots.Ramilliesunabletoexceedthisby1940.Radius of action/(tons per hour): 6,000nm at 10 knots (5.1), 5,500nm at 12knots(6.7),4,650nmat14knots(9.2),3,850nmat16knots(12.7),3,050nmat18knots(18.0),2,250nmat20knots(27.4).Rig:Noforetopmast.Shorttopmasttomaininall.Topgallant tomain in all exceptRamillies (tall inRevenge, shorter in others).Tall flagpole to fore inResolution. Short flagpole to each inRoyal Oak. DFaerialonmaintopmastortopgallant.Signalstrutsatstarfishbelowcontroltopinall.Appearance:Generally notably heavier andmore piled up than during 1920sowing tomany post-warmodifications,mainly from 1927 onwards, includingenlarged control top, bridge and searchlight towers, heavy multiple AAmountingsamidshipsandprominentdirectorsovercontroltopandonmainmastor on after superstructure. Director on control top raised well clear of top inResolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign.Clinkerscreen to funnel inRevengeand Resolution, Royal Sovereign fitted 1940, Ramillies fitted 1941. TripodmainmastinResolution,RamilliesandRoyalOak.Controltoppaintedverylightin all, contrasting noticeablywith dark-grey (Home Fleet colours) of hull andsuperstructure.IndividualdifferencesRamillies:Deepflangesbelowdirectorplatformonforemast.Highdomedroofover upper bridge. Very prominent bulges. Tripod mainmast with directorplatformonlegs.Resolution: HA director raised well above control top. Original type upperbridge(onlyshiptoretainthis).Clinkerscreentotunnel.Catapulton‘X’turret.TripodmainmastanddirectorasinRamillies.Revenge: HA director raised as in Resolution. Deep flanges below directorplatformasinRamillies.

HAdirectoronaftersuperstructure.Lowerbridgewingsnotcarriedbackaroundfunnel (only ship thus). Small SLplatform lowonmainmast (only ship thus).Sternwalk(onlyshipthus).Topgallanttomainnoticeablytallerthanothers.DFaerialatheadmaintopgallant(ontopmastinothers).RoyalOak:6indirectortowersonplatformbelow15indirector(onlyshipwiththis).Wideflangebetweentripodlegscloseabovebridge(onlyshipwiththis).Square-facedopenupperbridge.Catapulton‘A’turret.Recessedtorpedoportsinforecastleside(onlyshipthus).Very largeprominentbulges asRamillies.LargeDFcabinetonmaintop (onlyshipthus).Royal Sovereign: HA director raised as in Resolution and Revenge. Shallowflanges below main director platform. Prominent vertical strut on each sidebelowdirectorplatform(onlyshipthus).HAdirectoronaftersuperstructureasRevenge.Verydeepflangesonfaceofbridgebelownavigatingplatform.

Resolution1919–20:1.LargebaseRFfittedover‘B’turretonly.2.SmalltorpedoRFoncontroltowerreplacedbylargerRF.3.Longforwardstrutsfittedtoforestarfish.

Very few alterations toResolution except those similar to others of her class(rangeclocks,SLalterations,etc.)duringtheearly1920s.Resolution:ClinkerscreenfittedtofunnelJulytoOctober1924.ResolutionRefit,December1926toDecember1927:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Rangeclockaddedover‘X’turret.

RoyalOakduringthestormyFleetManoeuvresintheAtlanticduringMarch1934.

3.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casematesretained).4.Extrapair4inAAadded.5.Trainingcatapultaddedtoquarterdeck.6.Foretopmastandyardbelowremovedfromdirectorlevel.7.Extrasignallingstrutsfittedtostarfishbelowcontroltop.8.Topgallanttomainmast.

ResolutionRefit,December1929toMarch1931:1.Forecastledeck6incasematesremoved.2.HARFoncontroltopremovedandreplacedbyHACS.3.AfterpairofTTremoved.4.Starboardforward4inreplacedby4inLAHAexperimentalguninnewtypemounting. Gun andmounting provedmost successful after trials on20–21February1931offPlymouth.5.Catapultremovedfromquarterdeck.

ResolutionbySeptember1933:1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Multiple0.5inAAaddedabeamconningtoweronshelterdeck.3.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets.

ResolutionRefit,December1935toSeptember1936:1.Platformformultiple2pdrfitted(noguns).

RoyalSovereign,July1928,afull-lengthportraitviewshowingthesimplicityoflayout.Notethenewcontroltop.

2.HAdirectorplatformfittedontripodlegsofmainmast,nodirector.3.HARFoverbridgeremoved.4.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.5.NewSLtowersfittedaroundfunnelasinRoyalSovereign.6.Trainingcatapultandcrane(bentarm)fittedasinRamillies.7.Largeopenplatformextendedbackaroundtripodlegsaddedoverbridge.8. Lower bridge carried back around funnel as in Royal Sovereign. 9.TripodlegsfittedtomainmasttosupportHACS.

ResolutionJanuary1938modifications:1.Single4inexperimentaltypereplacedbytwin4inAA.2.Multiple2pdrsaddedP&Sabreastfunnel.3.AfterHACSfitted.4.RDFequipmentfittedasinRoyalSovereign.5.Maintopgallantreduced.

ResolutionTallflagpolefittedatrearofcontroltopbyAugust1939.

WartimeModificationsRamillies:Two0.5inAAremovedandten20mmAAaddedonsuperstructure,shelterdeckandquarterdeckrightaft.Clinkerscreenfittedtofunnel1941.Twoquadruplepompomsfittedon‘B’and‘X’turretslate1941.ModifiedtypeofDFaerialfittedtofaceofbridgein1942.Maintopgallantmastremoved1942.Eight single 20mmAA added on and around superstructure plus four extra

fittedonquarterdeckbyApril1943.Two20mmAAaddedon‘B’and‘X’turret1944.Totaloftwenty-two20mmAAby1944.

VHF equipment Type 650 RDF added, prominent aerials on aftersuperstructure(Ramilliesonly).OthersfittedverysimilarlytoRamilliesthroughoutthewar.

Resolution: Proposed increase in 15in elevation to 30° never carried out.Twoforwardpairs6ingunsremoved(fromall1942–3).Ninesingle20mmAAadded1941.Quadruplepompomsaddedto‘B’and‘X’turret1942.RoyalSovereign:Eightsingle20mmAAplus twoonquarterdeckadded1941.Fourteen 20mmAA added 1942. Sixteen twin 20mmAA added inUSA refit1943.

Revenge:Quadruplepompomsaddedon‘B’and‘X’turret1942.Light AA guns uncertain for Revenge after 1941 due to lack ofphotographicevidence.ExtensiveRDFfittedinallshipsofclass.Types284formainguns,Type273SW;Type285for4inAA;

Types79and279forAW.Type282for2pdrs.

Resolution:catapultremovedfromturret1944.AlllightAAgunsremovedfromResolutionandRevenge1944.15ingunsremovedfromResolutiononly.

ProposedSuperBulgingandRe-ArmouringTheoriginalproposalforsuchamovewasbroughtbeforetheBoardinFebruary1940 at a time when it seemed almost certain that Great Britain would beinvadedfromacrosstheChannel.

ArareviewofRamilliesinAlexandriaduring1940andshowingherunofficialthree-tonegreycamouflagescheme.

RAMILUES1932

ROYALOAK1939

ROYALSOVEREIGN

‘A’and‘B’15inturretsandnewlymodelledsuperstructure.

OnboardRoyalOak,October1937.Lookingaftovertheboatdeck,showingthetripodandnewlyfittedcrane.

Therearofthefunnel,boatdeckandsearchlighttowers.

Auniqueviewinsidethecontroltop,showinginstrumentscrammedintoeverycorner.

TheideawasfortwoRoyalSovereignsandtwoQueenElizabethclasstobetakeninhandforaroughandreadyjob,usingflamecutarmourthatwouldbesupported inpositionaswell as couldbeexpected in suchcircumstances.Thewhole programme was scheduled to take about twelve months. The situationacross the Channel altered throughout 1940, however, and the matter ofreconstructionwasdroppedforthetimebeing.InOctober1940,afterResolutionhadbeendamagedbyatorpedooffDakar,

considerationwas again given to a similar scheme on the above lines, but forResolutiononly.Thealterationswouldtakeplaceconcurrentlywithherdamagerepairsandapproval toproceedwasgivenat theController’sConferenceon8October1940.Thefollowingplanswereforwarded:

1.Sheerdraughtofnewsuperbulge.2.Generalarrangementsandrollingsizesof4inarmour.3.ArrangementofWTbulkheadsinupperandlowerbulge.4.Structuralsectionsofnewbulge.5.Bodyplanshowingbulgekeel.6.Pumpingarrangementsfornewbulge.7.Considerationforprotectiontoupperdeckopenings.8.Boilerroomuptakesanddowntakes.

Protection was proposed by fitting 5in drilled NC plates in uptakes and by

extending4inarmouroverdowntakes.Itwasplannedtoreplacetheboilerroomforced draught fans by turbine-driven units and renew the boiler fronts andpressure feeds to enable the SHP to bemaintained. (Armouring all round theuptakes and inmany cases over themwould have reduced the SHP by about10,000)Proposalstofit4inprotectionoverallopeningsofmorethan17½incheswere

putforward.Armourcoversforallhatches,escapemanholesandcertainhatchesintheupperdeckwereplanned.Theestimatesofeffectof‘superbulging’onspeedweregivenas:speedfor

40,000shpasrebulged20.3knots;speedfor30,000shpasrebulged18.5knots.Estimated added weights for 4in armour (leaving upper deck openingsunprotected): 1,990 tons. Protection for upper deck openings: 71 tons. Newbulge:930tons.EstimateddeepdisplacementbasedonRoyalSovereigndeepof33,235 tons,with newbulges, deck armour, vertical protection to uptakes anddowntakeswas36,420tons.Draught:32ft;GM:8.69ft.

RoyalOakinanactingmood,playingtheElMiranteinthemotionpictureon21February1937.Sheisshownhereinclining,tofeignsinking.

Finally,however,becauseofthetimeinvolved,cost,materialandgeneralageof the ship, the Controller decided on 27 December 1940 that work onResolutionbeconfinedtomakinggoodthetorpedodamageandaminimumofAAs (which did include, however, increasing the two foremost 15in turrets’elevation to 30 degrees, but was never actually carried out). It would appearfrom official documents that the story did not end in 1940 because another‘suggestion’wasmadeinfavourofResolutionbecominga‘SuperShoreBatteryShip’inOctober1942.Thefollowingwasplanned:

1. Reinforced steel platform erected over deck to cover all vital parts.Sufficientthickness–5in.2.Heavy torpedo nets (twelve feet from ship’s side) to run 40 feet deep(250tonsinweight).

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1945Displacement(tons):Ramillies 34,032 (average action), 35,385 (deep); Royal Sovereign 33,491(averageaction),34,836(deep);Revenge 32,200 (average action), 33,500 (deep); Resolution 33,159 (averageaction),34,520(deep).LengthandbeamunchangedDraught:32ft4into33ft8inaverageforclass.Armament:Maingunsunchanged.RamilliesandRoyalSovereign:8×6in8×4intwinAA24×2pdrAA(8barrels,2×4barrels)12to22×20mmAA(twinsandsingles)ResolutionandRevenge:8×6in8×4intwinAAAllsmallergunsremoved(seechangesfordetailsofwartimeAA).RadarType284for15inguns,Type285for4in,Type282forlightAA,Type79AWinRamilliesandResolution;Type279AWRevenge;Type273SWinall.Type650VHFequipmentinRamillies.Searchlights as in 1939. Aircraft: none. Armour as in 1939. Machineryunchanged.Fuel(tons):1,875oilaverage,3,220max.Radius of action (tons per hour): 4,500nm at 10 knots (6.8), 4,260nm at 12knots(8.6),3,960nmat14knots(10.8),3,570nmat16knots(13.7),2,900nmat18knots(19.0),2,280nmat26.2knots(26.2).Speed:Barelymanaging19knotswithsquadronspeedfixedat18knots.GM:3.90ftaverageaction,4.15ftdeepload.Rig:Shorttopmasttoforeandmain.Notopgallants.Radaraerialatheadofeach

mast,andonmaintop.Appearance:Nomajorchangesfrom1939,butshipsveryclutteredwithlightAAgunson‘B’and ‘X’ turrets, superstructure and quarterdeck (removal in Resolution andRevenge), prominent RDF aerials over conning tower, on HA directors, onmaintop(lanternscreen)andatmastheads.Twoforward6ingunsoneachsideremovedfromall.Clinkerscreentofunnelinall.Ramillies,RoyalSovereignstillcamouflaged,ResolutionandRevengerepaintedinallgreyafterarrivingatDevonportasTrainingShips.Individualdifferences:Ramillies: Deep flanges below 15in director platform. High domed roof overupper bridge. Small tower at base of mainmast. Prominent aerials at base ofmainmast.Tripodmainmastwithdirectorplatformonlegs.Resolution:No15ingunsinturrets.HAdirectorraisedwellabovecontroltop.Tripodmainmastanddirectorplatform.Revenge:No 15in guns in turrets.Deep flanges below15in director platform.HAdirectoronaftersuperstructure.Lowerbridgewingsnotcarriedbackaroundfunnel.SmallSLplatformlowonmainmast.Sternwalk.Royal Sovereign (Arkangelsk): HA director raised well above control top.Shallowflangesbelow15indirectorplatform.Prominentverticalstruteachsidebelowdirectorplatform.HAdirectoronaftersuperstructure.Verydeepflangesonfaceofbridgebelownavigatingplatform.

3.All tophampercutdown–bridges,etc.Mainmast shortenedandmainderrickremoved.

Againtheplanwasdropped.Thefinalproposal forResolutioncameinJuly1943when itwasdecided to

renewherbridgecompletely,removeall6ingunsandremovetheconningtowerandassociatedarmour.Thisplanalsowasrecordedforfuturereferencebutwasneveraccomplished.

LossofRoyalOakAfter the sinking of Royal Oak a committee was appointed to ascertain thecircumstancesleadinguptoherloss(18to24October).Afullreportcoveringallaspectsoftheincidentwouldrequireabookinitselfbecausethereweretwomain topics of discussion: 1. the actual loss of the ship; 2. the entry of theGerman submarine into Scapa Flow. The report by Admiral Drax, however,

sumsupthesalientpoints:At 0104 on 14th October 1939 H.M.S. Royal Oak was lying at singleanchor in Scapa Bay when an explosion occurred right forward on thestarboard side below water. Its effect was to break all the slips on bothcableswhich allowed the port cable to run out to a clinch and let go thestarboard anchor.The explosion itself and the effect of the cable runningout woke most of the officers and some of the ship’s company. TheAdmiral,Captain,Commander,EngineerCommanderandothershurriedondeckputtingonafewclothes.Manyofficerswhowereaftthoughtthattheexplosionwasinorundertheafterpartoftheship,thisbeingaccountedforbythevibrationeffectfromtheotherendoftheship.

RoyalSovereignthenRevengeandRamilliesaftertheWeymouthFleetReview,21June1938.

Witnesses in the A.D.P. and on the Flag Deck state that a column ofwaterwasshotupthestarboardsideforwardanddrenchedtheforepartofthe forecastle.Through thehole in the sideanumberof shores andothertimbermayhavedroppedorbeenblownout.

TheCaptain, on turning out,went on to theW.D. and being informedthattheslipsonthecablehadpartedwentforwardtotheforecastle.Itwasafineclearnight, the seawascalmand the skywas litupby theNorthernLights.Hearrivedontheforecastle, lookedat thecables,receivedreportsfrom various Officers, and sent the First Lieutenant down to inspect theforward compartments. He remained on the forecastle a fewmoments inorder to ascertain whether the ship was in any way affected by what hethought was an internal explosion in the Inflammable Store. As the shipwasneither listingnor settlingdownby thebowshewentdown theafterforecastlehatch and forward to the cable locker flat.Herehemet severalOfficers,includingtheEngineerCommander,andreceivedreportsthattheInflammable Store was venting through the breather pipe showing thatwater was entering that compartment and that there was no fire. Thecompartment immediately abaft it, the CO2 room, was intact. Up to thistime no one had thought that the ship might have been torpedoed, thegeneral impression being that there had been an internal explosion, orpossiblyabombingattackbyaircraft.UndertheCaptain’sdirectionordersweregivenforstartingsalvagepumpsandpreparingtoopenandexaminedamagedcompartments.Noordersweregivenforclosingwatertightdoorsordeadlights.InthemeantimetheS.O.O.turnedoutandwenttotheAdmiral’scabinat

0106. The Admiral had already turned out. S.O.O. made a quickexaminationoftheafterpartoftheshipandreturnedtoreport‘Nodamageaft’.ThiswasconfirmedafewmomentslaterbytheEngineerCommanderwho had also made an inspection of the after compartments. S.O.O.accompanied the Admiral on deck, but the latter then went forward andS.O.O. went on to the Marines’ Messdeck. He did not see the Admiralagain.The ship’s company generally were not much disturbed by the first

explosion,andthereareseveralrecordsofmenhavingturnedoutandthenturnedinagainbetweenthefirstandsecondexplosions.Duringthisintervalthe launch and picket boat were called away, the Drifter Daisy II wasorderedtoraisesteam,andtwoprisonerswerereleasedfromthecells.At0116theCaptainwasstillneartheCO2roomwithseveralofficers.In

hisownwords,‘IhadnothoughtotherthanthatalocalexplosionhadtakenplaceintheInflammableStore.ThiswasbackedupbythereportIreceivedthat the CO2 room was intact. I had not even thought of the ship beingtorpedoed.Ifeltnouneasinessaboutthesafetyoftheship.’Suddenlythere

was another ‘shattering’ explosion, followed at very short intervals by athirdandfourth.Theseexplosionsoccurredonthestarboardsideoftheshipapproximately between ‘A’ and ‘X’ turrets, and had an immediate andcatastrophiceffect.Theshipatoncestarted toheel tostarboardand,withonly a slight ‘hang’ for perhaps three or four minutes, heeled over withincreasingvelocityuntilshecapsizedatabout0129.From the moment at which the second explosion occurred it was

practicallyimpossibletodoanythingeffectivetosavetheship,norwasitpossibletobroadcasttheorderto‘AbandonShip’asthelightswentoutandpowerfailed.Officersinvariouspartsoftheshiptoldthemennearthemtosave themselves. The Captain was still in the cable locker flat. He toldOfficers andmen to clear out of the flat andwalked aft to theMessdeckwhichwasindarkness.Hesentthemenuptotheforecastleandfollowedthemup.Ontheforecastleherealisedthattheshipwasgoingoverasshewas heeling so quickly and felt sure that the only thing left to dowas tothrowover theside theCarleyfloats,etc.,andasmuchwoodaspossible.TheCaptainandCommandergottoworkonthisassistedbyafewmen,buttheship turnedoverso rapidly that littlecouldbedone. Ina fewminutestheyfoundthedeckbecomingimpossibletostandonsoclimbedovertheportguardrailsanduptheportsideuntiltheyslippedorwereflungintothesea.Theshipcapsizedandfinallysankat0129,twenty-fiveminutesafterthe

firstexplosionandthirteenminutesafterthesecondexplosion.AnOfficerwhohadclimbeduptheportside,overthebilgekeelandontothebottomcheckedthetimeat0133beforetakingtothewater.Thesecond,thirdandfourthexplosionswereobservedbymenstationed

in the A.D.P. These explosions were accompanied by columns of waterwhich fell on the A.D.P., also a flash which was seen round the funnelcasing,andaquantityofblacksmokewhichcovered theafterpartof theshipforashortperiod.AfterthefirstexplosiontheAssistantTorpedoOfficerwenttotheMain

Switchboard, thenon to theMessdeck,wherehe reported to theEngineerCommander and met the Warrant Electrician. The Assistant TorpedoOfficer andWarrantElectrician againwent down to theSwitchboard andthence to Nos. 4 and 3 Dynamo Rooms, where everything was normal.WhilestillinNo.3DynamoRoomthesecond,thirdandfourthexplosionsoccurred. The second seemed to be well forward, the third abreast theBoilerRooms,andthefourthclosetoNo.3DynamoRoom,butforwardof

it,probablyatthestarboardwingEngineRoom.Afterthesecondandthirdexplosionsorange-colouredflamesappearedatthetopofthedynamoroomhatch. After the fourth explosion the forward bulkhead of the dynamoroom,betweenthedynamoroomandthewingengineroom,begantobulgeinwardsandsteambegantoescape.ThetwoOfficersandtheWatchkeepermadetheirwayuptheladder.Thelightsthenfailedandtheflamesbecamelessintense.BythetimetheyreachedtheMarines’Messdecktheshiphadlisted about 25 degrees to starboard. TheMessdeck was full of chokingfumesandburninghammocksandothermaterial.

RoyalOakleadstheclasstoseaaftertheWeymouthFleetReview,21June1938.Notehowimpressivetheseshipswerewhenviewedhead-on.

Fromotherreports itappears that,after the thirdandfourthexplosions,theMarines’Messdeckwassweptbyflamesandfullofsmokeandfumes.Several hammocks caught fire andwere extinguished bymen near them.Thereisalsoevidencethatholesappearedinthedecksandthat thedeckscavedin.Aslidinghorizontalhatchabaft‘A’turretslidacrossandjammedinthe

closedpositionduetotheheeloftheshipandtothefactthatthewirestropused to hold it open had not been properly secured. Men in thiscompartmentmay not have had time to escape by another route. Slidinghatchesinotherpositionsmayhaveclosedsimilarly.Duringthisperiodthereareseveralreportsofmenbeingblownthrough

doors,uphatches,andoutofscuttles.BythetimetheshipcapsizedalargenumberofmenhadreachedthewaterviatheForecastleandQuarterDeck.ItappearsthatfewmenweresavedfromtheEngineandBoilerRooms.The Admiral had been on the Boat Deck where the Engineer

Commander,onhiswayaft,reportedtohim.LatertheAdmiralwasseenontheQ.D.bytheCaptain’sMaltesesteward,whohadcomeupfrombelowandcollected a lifebuoy from the starboardguard rails.This steward sawthe Admiral amidships calling to the men on the Port side to jumpoverboardfurtherforwardbecausetheywerelikelytoinjurethemselvesbyjumpingontothepropellers.ThestewardclimbeduptowardstheAdmiralandaskedhim to comeoverboardwithhimashehada lifebuoy,but theAdmiralrefused,saying:‘Don’tworryaboutme;trytosaveyourself.’Heremainedtherehelpingthementosavethemselvesandwasnotseenagain.Men who tried to man the launch at the starboard lower boom had a

terrifyingexperience.Theycouldnotcastoff fromtheboomandsawtheshipturningoverontopofthem.Metalfromtheforetopfellintothelaunchandsankher,andthefunnelcamedownintothewaterbetweenthelaunchandtheship’sside.Onemanfromthesunkenlaunchwaspartiallysuckedinto the funnel and thenblownout again.Others saw ‘A’ and ‘B’ turretsswingroundand‘fallintothesea’.After the ship capsized she rolled over to about 160 degrees, possibly

rightedalittle,andisnowlyingbottomupatanangleof40degreesfromtheverticalwithatrimof2degreesaft.ConclusionsoftheBoardGreatreliancewasplacedontheScapaAirRaidWarning,andifanairraid

warninghadbeenreceived,scuttlesanddeadlightswouldhavebeenclosedand riding lights extinguished.No suchwarningwas received and itwasnot until the second, third and fourth explosions occurred in quicksuccession that anyone realized that an enemy attack had been made.Consequently, no additional precautions were taken after the firstexplosion; after the other explosions light and power failed and the shipheeled over and sank so quickly that nothing could be done. Individuallifebeltshadnotbeensuppliedtotheship,sothatmenhadonlythelimitedquantity of floats,wood, etc.,which had been thrownor floated over thesidetohelpthem.Thesewereveryinadequate.

RoyalOakinWeymouthBay,June1939.Shewasprobablythebestshipoftheclassafterherrefitin1936.Shewastotakethreedirecttorpedohitson14October1939,makingherthefirstcapitalshipcasualtyofthewar.

ROYALOAK:TORPEDOED14OCTOBER1939Divers’Report,October1939

Considering that theshipwas inharbourand that theseawascalm thelossoflifeappearstohavebeenveryheavy.Weputthisdowntothefactthat the ship was at Air Defence Stations, so that an abnormally largenumberofmenwerestationedbelowthemaindeck.Theirescapefromtheshipwas probably impeded by the number of watertight doors that wereclosed.Ithasalsobeenstatedthatanumberofmenprobablytookshelterunder armour andbetweendecks in the belief that an air raidwas takingplace,astheyhadbeentaughttodoso.WethinkitprobablethattheattackwasmadebyaSubmarinewhichgot

inatoneofthesevenentrancesandworkeditswayalongtheEastshoreofthe Flow between Skerry Sound and Scapa Bay, until the CommandingOfficer sighted two ships ahead which, from air reconnaissance, heprobablyconsideredtobeRoyalOaknearestandRepulsebeyond.Wethinkitlikelythathefiredasalvoatthefurthership,actuallyPegasus,andthatoneofthesetorpedoesstruckRoyalOakinthebows.HethenreloadedandfiredasalvoofthreeatRoyalOakwhichallhit.Therewereprobablyfourexplosions,onerightforwardonthestarboard

side,theremainderextendingfrom‘A’to‘X’turretsonthestarboardside.Alltorpedoesseemtohavehittheside,andthereisnoevidencetosuggestamagneticpistoloranyexplosionunderthebottom.Wehaveinvestigatedthesuggestionthatthepresenceofbaulksoftimber

floating past the shipmay have had something to dowith the attack, butbelieve this may be explained by the fact that recently a number of

telegraphpoleshavebeenwashedupon the shoresof theFlowandmayhavefloatedoffagainonthehightideofthisnight.Also,acertainamountoftimber,shores,etc.,mayhavedroppedoutof,orbeenblownoutof,theship’sforwardcompartmentsbythefirstexplosion.

[Signed]G.C.MUIRHEADGOULD,Captain.[Signed]R.H.T.RAIKES,Vice-Admiral[Signed]R.E.E.Drax,Admiral(President).

ReportofDiversafterInspectionofShipDiverscarriedoutexaminationofRoyalOak.Shipislying40°frombottomup.Trim2°aft.Forwarddamagestarboardsidestarts80’to100’fromstemandextends40’to45’aftdepthof3platesstartingoneplatebelowwaterline.Platingisblowninboardandextremeedgesbentin.Damagesurveyedaft starts 10’ abaft after end of bilge keel and extends fromwater line tobilgekeel.Holeabout30’×50’.Platingbentinboard.Bilgekeelisblownaway and bent outboard. Midship section of the ship was not surveyed.Diverssurveyedvicinityofmastandfoundnotraceofsubmarine.Natureofbottomsoftsiltandmud.Inadditiondiversbroughtuppartofwhatwasalmostcertainlypartofthebalancechamberorafterbodyofatorpedoandothersmallfragmentsofinternalparts.

BattleDamageResolutionTorpedoed25September1940On 25 September 1940 the Resolution was struck abaft the port beam nearstation97byatorpedo.Itseemsprobablethatthedetonationoccurredbeforethetorpedopassedtheouterbottombecausethearmourplatesnearthestrikingpointwereforcedinwards.Depthofhitwasabout8feetfromthewaterline.

1. A very large splash was observed and the Spotting Top’s Crew werewetted,largequantitiesofwaterfellontheBoatDeck,andtheafterHighAngle Director was filled with water to a depth of two feet. The greatheight and width of the splash was probably caused by the fact that thebulgewassplitalongthetopedge,andthishadaneffectontherisingwatersimilar to that producedwhen a thumb is placed over the open end of agardenhose.

Resolution,Torbay.8August1939,showinghergeneralappearancesatthebeginningofthewar.RevengeandResolutionweretheonlyunitsoftheclassatthisdatewithfunnelcaps.NotethatthereisnoRDFinstalledatthisdate.

2.Thetorpedodetonatedwithaheavythudwhichwasmistakenbypeoplewhohadnot seen the approaching tracks, andwhodidnot appreciate thesignificanceofthesuddenlist,eitherasahitbyaheavyshellorevenonlyasthefiringofabroadside.Therewasnosubsequentvibrationorshakingof the ship.Therewereno failures in communicationor lighting, nordidanybreakerscomeoffasaresultoftheshockofthedetonation.3.Onbeingstrucktheshiplistedveryquicklyto12½°,withamomentarypartialrecoverywhenthewheelwasputamidships,buttheshipthentookupandkeptalistof12°.TheTurretscouldnottrainowingtothelistandtheshipthereforewithdrewoutofactiontothesouthward,maintainingtherevolutions at 252 (19 knots) until out of gun range. Speed was laterreducedto12knots.

RESOLUTIONTorpedoDamage,October1940

4.A.4BoilerwasshutdownwhentheChiefStokersawoil fuelsprayingnear it.Waterwasalso spraying from theportbulkheadon toA.3Boilerandtheresultingsteamledtothebeliefthattubeshadgone;A.3Boilerwasthereforenext shutdown.By this timeoil fuelwasbeing scattered round

aboutA.4Boiler,andoilvapourwasrisingfromtheBoilerCasingsanditwas therefore decided to close down all Boilers and evacuate the BoilerRoom.5. Damage Control Parties soon localised the main damage as beingbetween87and108Bulkheads.TheMainDeckMessdeckbetween theseBulkheads flooded fast and a submersible pump was brought to try andkeep this under control. A second pump was brought later. Surroundingcompartments were shored up. A leakwas seen high up in the outboardcorner of Number 2 Diesel Dynamo Room (87 Bulkhead) but althougheveryendeavourwasmadetochecktheflow,itwasinaccessiblebehindthesilencerandpipes,andthiscompartmentslowlyflooded.6.Soonafterbeinghit,oilfuelwassluicedfromportinnerandoutertankstoDoubleBottoms, andwas pumpedover to theStarboard fuel tanks, tocorrect the list. No counter flooding was carried out. Later, the waterprotectioncompartmentsontheportsidewerepumpedout.Sixinchreadyuse Shell and Cordite and all movable gear was transferred from portbatterytostarboard.Atalaterstage,whenpowerbecameavailableturretsweretrainedtoportandgunsrunin,and15inShellweretransferredfromporttostarboardbinsin‘X’and‘Y’Turrets.Afew(12)15inA.P.C.Shellwerejettisonedfromtheportbinsof‘A’bymeansoftheaftercapstan.Theaircraftwasmovedalongthecatapulttoitsextremestarboardposition.Thewreckage of the Second Cutter (which was completely shattered by thesplash of the explosion) was thrown overboard. On Thursday, 26thSeptemberfivetonsofaviationspiritwerejettisonedtocorrecttrim.7.Withinanhourofthetorpedohitting,itwascertainthat‘A’BoilerRoomwasonfire.BoilerRoomintakeswereallcoveredwithcanvaswithhosesplaying to improve the air seal, but nothing could be done to block thefunnel uptake.From1130 to 1400 ‘A’BoilerRoom safety valve escapeswereblowingoff and the smoke from the funnelgradually changed fromblack to grey and then to dirty white: the smoke thinned during theafternoon. At 1230 fire broke out in Number 20 Store and also in theHammockCompartment, starboard87 to108.The temperatureof theSixInchMagazinewasrising,butfromfeelingtheheatofadjacentbulkheadsitseemedthat‘A’BoilerRoomwasfloodingupslowly.8.At1057/25thSeptemberaFrenchaircraftGlenMartin,approachedfromtheportbowataheightof9,000feetanddroppedonelargebombwhichfell300yardsonourstarboardbeam.9.At1345on25thSeptember,owingtoafailureofthelubricationsystem

duetothelist,MainEngineshadtobestopped.By1400on25thSeptemberEngines were started again except for the port outer which was halfstopped. Revolutions at first were for 6 knots, and were increased to 10knots at 1439 on 25th September. At 1400 ‘B’ Boiler Room had to beevacuated owing to the heat from ‘A’. At 1915 speed was increased torevolutionsfor8knots.10.Oneofthegreathandicapswasashortageofpowerbefore‘A’BoilerRoom.Steamwasnotavailableowingtotheburstpipewhichcouldnotbegotatowingtofire.Number2Dynamowasflooded.Number1wasshortoffuel:thepumpforrenewingthefuelsupplywasin‘A’andevenasupplybybucketwasnotfeasibleasaccess to theshaleoil tankwasthroughtheHammockcompartmentwhichwasonfire.TheRingMainandEmergencyMainontheportsidewereflooded,andthecablepassageonthestarboardsidewasinthehottestpartofthefirein‘A’BoilerRoom.Electricalpowerforwardhadalltobesuppliedbyemergencyleads:secondarylightingandhandtorcheswereinvaluableintheshortageofhighpowerlighting.11. At 0220 on 26th September Main Engines had to be stopped aslubricationhadagain failed.By0445 itwaspossible toproceedat2 to3knots, and at 0615 at 4½ knots, but Engines had again to be stopped at0624. At 0641 the Engines were moved ahead again, but seemed to beunreliableaslongastherewasaheavylist.12. On Thursdaymorning ‘A’ Boiler Roomwas opened up, but the firerestarted.Itwasthereforenotpossibletoinvestigatedamagefurther,andasthereseemedtobenoimmediateprospectofcorrectingthelistandtherebyrestoringthereliabilityoftheMainEngines, itseemedbest tobetakenintow. HMS Barham accordingly took the ship in tow at 1145 on 26thSeptember and went ahead with HMS Resolution in tow with Enginesstopped.Speedwasgraduallyincreaseduntil7knotswasbeingmadegood.13.Duringthedayof26thSeptemberandthenightof26/27thSeptemberbuoyancywasmaintainedand the listwasgradually reduced to8°,partlybypumpingoutpartiallyfloodedcompartmentsortheMainDeckbefore87andabaft108,partlybypumpingout theairspaceportsideof‘B’BoilerRoom and similar compartments, partly by gradual consumption of fuelfromporttanks,partlybythefloodingofHammockcompartmentstarboardside(87to108)toputoutthefire,andvariousothermeasures.14. At about 0900 on 27th September, tide rips were encountered andsteering became difficult. At 0915 the starboard slip parted, the cablerenderedonthebrakeandshortlyafterwardstheport5½”wirepartedasit

wastakingallthestrain.Aftertheporttowpartedasecond6½”wirewaspassedandsecuredby1140.OngoingaheadHMSBarhamworkeduptotenknotsandHMSResolution(beingnowmoreupright)steamedwiththeinner shafts at revolutions for 5 knots. Before dark it was necessary tochangeovertoafueltankwhichmightbecontaminatedwithwater,andinordertoavoidpossiblyhavingtostopsuddenlyandtherebythrowanextrastrain on the cables, HMS Resolution stopped engines for the night andHMSBarhamreducedtorevolutionsfor8knots.15.Bythemorningof27thSeptemberfiresintheHammockcompartmentandNumber20Storewereoutand‘A’BoilerRoomBulkheadswerelesshot.TheBoilerRoomwasenteredintheafternoonandthefirewasfoundto be out; the water level (and oil) was half way up the air lock on thestarboardside.16.At 0815 on 28th SeptemberHMSResolution went ahead on the twoinner shafts and the two shipsworked up until HMSBarham was doingrevolutionsfor10knotsandHMSResolutionrevolutionsfor6knotsontheinner shafts; speedmadegood7knots.At1120HMSResolution stoppedandHMSBarhamreducedto8knots;at1450HMSBarhamreducedspeedandat1554towwasslipped.Thenceforwardspeedwasmaintainedatabout4to5knotsonallshaftsasrequisiteformakingCapeSierraLeoneLightandforenteringharbouronthefirstoftheebb.17.ThetugHudson,whichhadmettheshipthepreviouseveningandhadbeenstandingbyallnight,tooktheshipintowat0530on29thSeptemberoff theFiarwayBuoy, the ship passed the gate at 0615 and anchored offKissyat0753,handytoashelvingbeachshouldthisbenecessary.Thelistwas5°andmaximumdraught38’6”.

Resolutionlimpinghomelistingheavilytoportafterbeinghitbyatorpedoin1940.

Resolutionlistedenoughforheraircrafton‘X’turrettobeindangeroffallingoff,anditwasdecidedtoflythemachineoffthecatapult.

Resolutionsitsinthewaterwhilstbattledamageproceduresarecarriedout.

Ramillies,8August1939.ComparethisviewwiththatofResolutiononsamedateandnotethedifferencesatthisstage.Shehad400tonsofdeckarmouraddedinMarchofthisyear.

18.BySunday13thOctoberallcompartmentsbefore87andabaft108hadbeen cleared of water exceptWatertight Compartments 75 to 87. (WaterProtectionCompartment74 to87.+P.3.outer fuel tank.)Divers reportedthat87bulkheadhadtornawayfromtheinnerbottomatthesideandinthe

absence of any means of pumping out the compartment this was leftflooded.19. The following recommendations arose from experience after thetorpedoing:

(i)Easilytransportablepumpswereinvaluable.Thebestwaytodealwithafire is to catch it early; much the same applies to a flood. SeveralCompartmentssuchastheStokerPettyOfficers’Mess(74to87Bulkhead)and P.1 and P.2 electrical lead passages were flooded and considerabledamagedonewhichcouldhavebeenavoided if smalleasily transportablepumps had been available. The rate of flooding in these and similarcompartments was such that ‘snorers’ or Worthington Simplex’s couldeasilyhavestemmedthefloodwhilethedamagewasbeingrepaired.(ii) Large compartments with only self-contained pumping arrangementsshould be capable of being pumped from undamaged adjacentcompartments.(iii)AccesstrunkstocompartmentssuchasDynamoRooms,etc.,shouldbelargeenoughforapumpandmentopasseasilythrough.IfthetwotrunkstotheDynamoandHydraulicRooms(bothofwhichRoomswerefloodedand always will flood together until some means is found of makingwatertightthesecuringofHydraulicpumps)therewouldhavebeenenoughroom.(iv) All electrical fittings which were watertight and which were withinreachoffloodingfromfueltanks,shouldbemadeoiltightbyuseofsomesubstanceotherthanrubber.(v)Moreoxy-acetylenecuttingandweldingequipmentshouldbesuppliedtotheship.(vi)Anelectricweldingplantshouldbeinstalled.(vii)Doorssuchasthosetooilfuelworkingspacesshouldbeopenagainstanyfloodingfromoutboard.(viii)Itwouldhavebeenanadvantagetohavefacilitiesandnecessarytoolsforoperatingpneumaticdrillsandcuttingmachinesthroughouttheship.(ix) Finally, the old story, greater care was necessary to ensure that allelectricalneeds(andgearing)throughbulkheadsweremadeproperlytight.

Theshipwasoutofactionforelevenmonths.

RamilliesTorpedoed30May1942

At2025on30thMay1942,whileRamillieswasatanchorintwelvefathomsoffthe inner harbour atAntsirano inDiegoSuarezBay, an explosion on the portside forward shook the ship, putting out all lights for a fewminutes. She hadbeenhitbyatorpedofromaJapanesemidgetsubmarine.

The centre of the explosion was at about 39 station Port. The explosionholedthebulgeandbottomplatingandtheprotectiveplatingoveranareaapproximately twenty feet in diameter, extending between 33 and 43stations from the Lower Deck to the bottom of the Hold Flat. Extensivefloodingwascaused in thevicinity; themaindamageeffectbeing feltbytheupperandlower4inmagazinesPort.DraughtandHeeloftheshipbeforeandaftertheExplosion:Beforethe

explosion thedraughtwas34ft11inforwardand32ft3inaftand theshipwasonanevenkeel.After thehit the trimincreasedrapidly toabout13ftand theship listed

overto4½°Port.TheDamageControlOfficerthenfloodeds.4InnerBulge177–208Stocounteractandheelwasreducedto3°port.Atdawnon31stMaydraughtwas42ft6inforwardand30ftaft.Heelwasreducedto1°on31stMaybytransferofoil-fuelandwaskeptbetween1°and2°thereafter.

On1stJune640tonsofoilfuelweretransferredtodestroyersandfrom31stMayonwardscablewasfleetedafttothestarboardsideoftheQuarterdeckandthe gear in the forward Boatswain’s Store transferred to the after end of theStarboardBattery.The sheet anchor and ‘B’ shell and cordite were taken out and 6in shell

removed to the after end of the batteries.When the ship sailed 3rd June thedraughtwas39ft6in forwardand30ft7inaft andonarrivalatDurbanon9thJune38ftforward29ft9inaft.Variouscompartmentswereemptiedbeforeleavingandduringpassageandat

Durban, and finally air pressure was applied to the Gunsight store, 42–588Middle,‘B’pumpspaceand27–44PMiddleandthewaterwasblownout.TheremainingcableandthetwoanchorswereplacedontheQuarterdeckand

6in shell and cordite, Pom-Pom ammunition and ‘X’ and ‘Y’ cordite werelanded.Six compartments aft were flooded, and all bulges and forward W.P.C.5

pumpedoutwherepossible,andthedraughtondockingon15thJunewas36ft2½inforward,30ft8inaft.Temporary repairs to enable the ship to proceed to the United States were

carriedout;andtheshipundockedonWednesday29thJuly,draughtbeing29ft

linforward,31ft8inaft,heel2°toPort.Aftercompletingwithfuel,ammunition(except ‘A’ and Port 4) and storesRamillies sailed on Thursday, 6th August,withadraughtof33ft5inforward,33ft11inaft.Speedofship:Theshipwasatanchor.SpeedonpassagetoDurban11to13knots.

BulgeThe hole extended from the top strake of the bulge plating down to C strakebetween32and47stationswithatearcontinuingdowntoAstrakeat38station(1& 4). The extremities of the holewere blown in on all sides, carrying theouter bottom plating in wake. Bulge plating, which was 20lb and 30lb plate,between24½and53 stationswas corrugated to a varying degree and framingbetweentheselimitswhichwasof9in×3½in×23lbbulbangle,waswreckedordistorted.The9in×3½in×3½in×23lbchannelbar forming the topof thebulgewaspulledawayforabout12ftand thebuttstrapat37station in the topstrakewas parted, the rivets shearing, leaving the ends of the plating hangingfree.Thelooseendoftheaftersidewasturnedoverexposingdistortedframing(2and3).The intercostal stringer 15in wide of 20lb plate with 3½in × 3½in × 10lb

angleswasdestroyedordistortedwithinthesamelimits.Thebulgebulkheadsof20lb plate at 39½ and 41½ stationswere destroyed.Boundary angles to thesebulkheadswere3½in×3½in×10lb.The longitudinalbulkheadseparating theinner and outer bulge compartments was destroyed or badly distorted to 50station. Itwas of 20lb plate. The boundary angle along the lower edge of thebulgeof6in×6in×37lbwasverydistorted.In the outer bottom plating the hole was bounded by 33 and 45 stations

betweentheLowerdeckand‘D’strake,being20ft×16ftinextent.Distortionofplating and framingoccurred between28–49 stations and the distorted platingwas blown against theLongitudinal ProtectiveBulkhead in the vicinity of thehole.Distortionofplatingandframingbehindthearmourextendedtotheupperdeckandtearsintheplatingoccurredinthewakeofcertainarmourbolts,at33station from the Lower Deck extending upwards for 2ft and at 3ft above themaindeckat43station.Thelowerboundaryanglebehindthearmourwasof6in×6in×28½lb.TherivetsconnectingthisangletotheLowerdeckwereshearedbetween 28 and 44 stations and the side plating and armourwere blown in amaximum of 11in. The 15lb plate frames in wake were buckled. Across thebottomoftheholeaslopingshelfofdamagedplatingwasformedbyblast.Outerbottomplating in thewakeofdamagewas20,25and30lbwith25lb

H.T.behindarmourandtheframingwas6in×3½in×3in×14lbZbarbetween

31and41stationsfromthe4th longitudinal to theLowerdeck.Belowthe4thlongitudinal 20lb bracket frames with 5in × 4in × 15lb angles existed. Theseweredistortedbetweenthe1stand4thlongitudinals.The14lbinnerplatingwasdistortedinwakeofthe4thlongitudinalbetween

34and42stations.Thedistortedboundaryanglebetweenthosestationswas4in×4in×15lb.Abaft42stationtheinnerbottomplating,whichcontinueduptheLower deck, was blasted and torn to 47 station with severe distortion to 50station. The lightened plate frames of 20lb plate were wrecked or distorted,between42and50stations.BulkheadsThePortLongitudinalProtectiveWingBulkhead,constructedoftwothicknessesof plating, 40lb outboard and 20lb, was destroyed or very badly distortedbetween27and50stationsandtheraggededgeswereblowninwards(4,5).Thetopboundaryangle6in×6in×28½lbwastornawayfromthedeckhead(Lowerdeck) with the bulkhead which was blown to within 8ft of the middle linecorrugatingandcompressingthePlatformdeckinitswake.Rivetstoedgeandbuttstrapsweresheared.Ajaggedholeofabout4ftdiameterwasblowninthebulkhead in the vicinity of the old torpedo tube.Apiece of the 60lb blankingplatetothetorpedotubeaccessmeasuring18in×10inapproximatelywasblownfromthissectionofthebulkhead.Itpassedthroughthemiddlelinebulkhead,2ftbelow the lower deck at 38 station and damaged gear rods behind. The holemadeinthisbulkheadwasbulgedbyblastamaximum5in.Thestiffeningtothemiddlelinebulkheadwasbyverticalchannelbarsof6in×3in×3in×12lb.

TorpedodamagetoRamilliesin1942.Notethattheouterbulgeandinnerhullhavebeenblownawayandthe1½in-thickprotectivebulkheadhasheldfast;6inarmouredplateshavebeendislodged,buttheshipneversufferedanyrealseriousinternalflooding.(Seereportanddrawing.)

Otherbulkheadsintheareaweredamagedalso.DecksThe hold of 4in magazine flat of 14lb chequered plate supported on 15lbbracketsand2½in×5inbulbangleswasslightlydistortedinwakeofprotectivebulkheadbetween34and42stations.Platformdeckof14lbplatesupportedby9in×3½in×3½in×26lbchannel

bar was wrecked to within 12ft of themiddle line and distorted a further 3ftthroughouttheupper4inmagazine.Therewasdistortionbeyond42bulkheadfor

6ftoutboardofthemagazinebulkhead.Thisflatwasof10lbplatesupportedby7in×3in×16lbbulbangle.The lower deck of two thicknesses of 20lb plate was distorted along the

stringerplatesbetween28and48stationsandthesupportingbulbanglebeams9in × 3½in × 23lbwere distorted inwake of damaged plating. The deckwaslightlybulgedinthesparearmatureroomalongtheedgesof thestrongerplateandfasteningsofbracketstotheslopingdeckwereloose.Between 29 and 45 stations, four 240lb armour plates were displaced a

maximumof4inoutboardat thetopand11ininboardat theloweredgewhichrestedonthelowerdeck.ExtentoffloodingAsaresultoftheexplosionallcompartmentsbelowthemaindeckbetween27–58 bulkheads were flooded except 7–58 Starboard Middle and 42–58 PortMiddleoutsidetheslopingprotectivedeck.Forward of 27 bulkhead the Fresh Water tank 24–27 Lower was flooded

throughafracturedfilledpipeandNo.3ProvisionRoom22–27Middleupto2ftofwaterthroughminorleakswhichwereplugged.InNo.2CO2Roomthebrinepipe leading toNo.3CO2Roomwasfracturedandroomwaspartially floodedbutcontrolledby‘A’50Tonpump.Aftof58bulkheadanumberofsmallleaksthroughcableglands,aventilation

valvefromtheairpurifierto‘A’spacethatwasnotcompletelyshut,hydraulicpipe glands and the doors between ‘A’ and ‘B’ shell rooms caused somefloodingat alldeckswhichwascontrolledby ‘D’pumpaidedby theportablepumps.Thiswasworst in ‘B’ spacewhere thedrainsonStarboard side led to‘A’draintank–whenthesewereshutthestudswerefoundtohaveshearedandthesevalveshadtobeboxedincementbeforetheleakwasstopped.Asaresult,with the list to Port some 3ft–4ft of water accumulated on the Port side andcauseddamagetoL.P.generatorsandthe15inT.S.The main deck was flooded to about 2ft between 27–42 stations by water

leaking throughahole in thePort side in theaft cornerwhere thearmourhadbeen displaced and an armour bolt had been torn away and also through thecasing of ‘D4’ fan supplying the deck below. These were both plugged withcementandwaterpumpedout.EngineeringMainmachinerywasnotaffected.GunneryThe flooding of ‘A’ and ‘B’ spaces had considerable effect on the fighting

efficiency of the ship.With the consequent loss of lowpower, the armamentswerereducedtothefollowingdegreesofreadiness:15in.Three turrets inquartersfiringcontrolledbymeansofaVickersrange

clockandaDumaresqintheG.C.T.withcommunicationthroughtheemergencytelephoneintheG.C.T.6in. All guns in quarters firing, firing by percussion. Controlled from the

Tops,orders,rangesanddeflectionsbeingpassedbyvoicepipetothecabinetsandthencetotheguns.4in. Forward H.A.C.S. in action with either Port or Starboard guns, power

beingobtainedbyemergencyleadsrunfromthelowpowerbatteriestothefuzepanelsintheforwardH.A.T.S.Air Defence: Air defence telephones being all sound powered were not

affected.

RAMILLIESTorpedoDamage,30May1942

Effectonfightingefficiencyoftheship.Electrical:damagetoringmainalsooccurredwithcommunicationandswitchboardsputoutoforderbyfloodingorshock.Armour:fourarmourplatesbetween29and45stationsweredisplacedtoamaximumof4inbutwerenotdistorted.Asmallnumberofarmourboltswere

sheared.

Shipwasoutofactionfortwelvemonths.

History:RoyalSovereignATLANTICFLEET(1stBS)April1919toJanuary1921.1stBSdetachedtoMediterraneanJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishNationalistsatConstantinopleandinthe

BlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.CollisionwithTigeratPortlandautumn1920.Considerablydamaged.ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouthJanuary1921forrefit.RESERVE(Portsmouth)January1921toSeptember1922.ExtensiverefitPortsmouthMay1921toSeptember1922.RecommissionedatPortsmouth3October1922for1stBSAtlanticFleet.ATLANTICFLEETOctober1922toDecember1926(1stBStoNovember1924,2ndBSlater).Again detached to Mediterranean with Ramillies, Resolution and Revenge,

September1922toreinforceMediterraneanFleetduringfurthertroubleintheNearEast.

StationedatConstantinopleandtheSeaofMarmara.Rejoined Atlantic Fleet September 1923, being the last of the Atlantic Fleet

shipstoreturnhome.Under reorganization 1 November 1924, became 2nd BS Atlantic Fleet (seeRamillies).

TransferredtoMediterraneanDecember1926.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)December1926toApril1935(2ndflag1stBSApriltoAugust1927).Stationed at Port Said June 1927 during unrest in Egypt. Extensive refit

PortsmouthOctober1927toJune1928andJanuarytoNovember1932.StationedinGreekwatersduringrebellionearly1935.TransferredtoHomeFleet1935,exchangingstationswithBarhamandreplacing

herasflag2ndBS(seeRamillies).HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)April1935toOctober1939(flag2ndBStoJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935).

Attached to Portsmouth Training Service January 1936 as Seagoing TrainingShipforboysandRNROfficers(seeRamillies).

RefitDevonportJune1937toFebruary1938.Recommissioned 18 February 1938 and relievedResolution as Boys’Training

Ship.TransferredtoNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax)October1939.NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(flagRAHalifax)October1939toMay1940(3rdBSfromNovember1939.SeeRamillies).RefitDevonportDecember1939.Transferred to Mediterranean Fleet May 1940 because of threat of war with

Italy.

RoyalSovereign,CapeTown,20October1940,showingearlycamouflage(two-tonegreyandreminiscentoftheGreatWardazzleschemes).

Noslackingeveninperiodsoff-duty.PhysicaltrainingwasaregularfeatureintheNavy–especiallyonabattleship.RoyalSovereign’squarterdeckc.1936/7.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoAugust1940.Unitofsquadron(Warspiteflag,Malaya,RoyalSovereign)inactionwithItalian

battlesquadronoffCalabria9July1940,whilecoveringMaltatoAlexandriaconvoy,althoughonlyWarspitegotwithinrangeoftheItalianships.

Left Mediterranean August 1940 to rejoin North Atlantic Escort Force,proceedingviaSuezCanal,Aden,Durban,CapetownandGibraltar.

RefitDurhamSeptembertoOctober1940.ArrivedHalifaxDecember1940.NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(flagRA3rdBSHalifax)December1940toAugust1941.EscortedCanadiantroopconvoytoEnglandFebruary1941.RefitNorfolk,VirginiaMaytoJune1941.SelectedinAugustforEasternFleet(seeRamillies).RefitGlasgowAugusttoOctober1941.TransferredtoEasternFleetOctober1941.EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)October1941toNovember1943(Colomboto

April1942Kilindinilater).EasternFleetbasedatColombotoApril1942.TransferredtoKilindiniApril1942.ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January

1944.EmployedmainlyonIndianOceanconvoyduty.DetachedSeptember1942for

refitintheUSAandproceededviaCapeandFreetown.RefitPhiladelphia1942toOctober1943.WithdrawnfromEasternFleetoncompletionofrefitandreturnedhome.Paidoff toCare&MaintenanceReserve atRosyth5November1943 toMay

1944.LenttoRussia30May1944andrenamedArkongelsk.This transfer carried out under an agreement concluded in lieu of the handing

overofaproportionofthesurrenderedItalianFleetwhichhadbeenclaimedbyRussia.

Other ships transferred on loan were: US cruiser Milwaukee, nine ex-USdestroyers (previously transferred to Britain under Lend Lease) and fourBritishsubmarines(onesunkinerroronpassage).

LeftScapaforMurmansk17August1944.OfficiallyhandedbacktoRoyalNavyatRosyth9February1949andplacedon

DisposalList.Sold to British Iron & Steel Corporation 5 April 1949 and allocated to

T.W.Ward&Co.Ltd.forscrapping.ArrivedInverkeithing18May1949.

RoyalSovereignLoantoRussia,1944HMSRoyal Sovereign, theUS cruiserMilwaukee, nineBritish destroyers andfourBritishsubmarineswerelenttoRussiain1944inlieuofaproportionofthesurrenderedItalianfleet.ThetransferofItalianshipstoRussianportswouldhavebeeninconvenientat

thattimebecauseofimpendingAlliedoperations,andwouldhavepreventedtheusefulroletheItalianssubsequentlyplayedduringtheperiodofco-belligerency.Aspiritofnon-cooperation in the ItalianNavyat this timemighthavehadanadverseeffectonOperations‘Overlord’and‘Anvil’.Royal Sovereign having just been placed intoReserve on her return from a

refit in theUSAwasmore thanreadyforsuchamove.After theceremonyofhanding her over in Murmansk the British crew left the ship as quickly aspossible.Little isknownofher serviceduringher staywith theRussian fleet.

She remained in Russian hands until 1949, the Russians having frequentlyintimatedthattheywouldliketokeepherpermanently,andinfact,anythingelseinthewayofforeignwarships.On23January1948WinstonChurchillaskedthePrimeMinisterwhetherornottheshipwasinfacttobereturnedtothiscountry.ThequestionwasraisedduringadebateonForeignAffairs,andthereplywasasmight be expected given the public interest concerning the loaned vessels andtheseveremistrustoftheRussiansduringtheimmediatepost-waryears.ThePrimeMinistersaid:‘Icanseenoreasonwhywe,inreturnforsuchhelp

toRussiaandItaly,shouldleaveourshipsinRussianhands.Weareentitledtogetthoseshipsback;andthescrapwouldbeextremelyusefultousatthepresentmoment.’TheAdmiralty considered that the ships, especiallyRoyal Sovereign,would

havesoonbecome ineffectual through lackof suitable replacementequipment;duringtheperiodoffouryearsthatshehadbeeninRussianhandsshehadneverreceivedthemajorrefitthatwouldbeneededifsheweretoserveoninanyfleet.ButtheprestigeoftheRoyalNavywasatstakeandthematterofherrecoverywaspursued.Aftermuchhassleanddiscontentonthepartof theSovietNavy,RoyalSovereignwashandedback to theRoyalNavyatRosython9February1949.ShewasimmediatelyplacedonthedisposallistandfinallysoldtoBritishIron and Steel Industries and allocated to T.W.Ward and Co. She arrived atInverkeithingon18May1949,beingthelastunitofherclassnotalreadyunderthecutters’torch.

History:RevengeATLANTICFLEET.April1919 toJanuary1928 (Flag1stBSand2nd fleet flag toMay1921.2nd

flag 1st BS May 1921 to November 1924. Fleet flag November 1924 toOctober1927.2ndBSfromOctober1927).

1stBattle Squadron detached toMediterranean January 1920 because ofNearEast crisis. Took part in operations against Turkish Nationalists atConstantinopleandinBlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.OnreorganizationMay1921,Revengebecame2ndflag1stBS(seeRamillies).Again detached to Mediterranean, with Ramillies, Resolution and RoyalSovereign September 1922, to reinforceMediterranean Fleet during furthertrouble in the Near East. Stationed mainly at Constantinople and in theDardanelles.

RoyalSovereignleavingPhiladelphiaNavyYard,USA,on14September1943afterrefit.TheAdmiraltywantedmorerefitsinAmerica,butUSshipyardsweresobusywiththeirownwareffortthattherewaslittletimetoconsidertheshipsofGreatBritain.

RoyalSovereignshortlyafterbeinghandedbackbytheRussianFleetinwhichshehadservedsince1944.Notemodificationsandpaintwork(hulldarkgreyandupperworkslightershadeofgrey).February1949.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetMarch1923.Became Fleet FlagAtlantic Fleet 1November 1924 on transfer of theQueenElizabethclasstotheMediterranean(seeRamillies).

RelievedasflagbyNelsonOctober1927andbecameprivateshipinthe2ndBS.PaidoffatDevonport11January1928forrefituntilJanuary1929.RecommissionedDevonport2January1929forMediterraneanFleet.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)January1929toFebruary1936(flag1stBSand2ndfleetflagfromJune1929).JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

Revenge,8August1939.Thissuperbfull-lengthviewofRevengefirstappearedinJane’sFightingShipsfor1939.Itshowsallthemodificationsmadeduringherrecentrefit.

StationedatAlexandrialatterpartof1935duringItalo-Abyssiniancrisis.Paid off at Portsmouth 6 February 1936 for extensive refit untilMarch 1937.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth1June1937for2ndBSHomeFleet.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)June1937toAugust1939.EmployedasSeagoingTrainingShip forBoysandRNRofficers,with special

complement, for some months during 1937 (see Ramillies). Present atPortlandReviewofReserveFleetbyHMtheKing9August1939.

AssignedtoChannelForce(Portland)underWarOrganizationAugust1939.CHANNELFORCE(HomeFleetCommandPortland)AugusttoOctober1939.OrderedtojoinSouthAtlanticCommand(Freetown)1October1939following

sinking of SSClement byGraf Spee.Orders cancelled 5October and shiptransferred to North Atlantic Escort Force (Halifax), with Resolution, forconvoyduty.

LeftEngland5October,carryingbulliontoCanada.NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCEOctober1939toAugust1940(3rdBSforNovember1939)(seeRamillies).UnitofescortforfirstandsecondCanadiantroopconvoystoEnglandDecember

1939.TransferredtoPlymouthCommandAugust1940becauseofanticipatedGerman

invasion.PLYMOUTHCOMMAND(BaseShipDevonport)AugusttoNovember1940.

BombardedCherbourgfrom15,700yards,October1940.RejoinedNorthAtlanticEscortForceNovember1940.NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(3rdBSHalifax)November1940toAugust1941.Took part in search for Bismarck 23 to 27 May 1941 (left Halifax for this

operation23May).SelectedfornewEasternFleetAugust1941(seeRamillies).ProceededtoColomboviaFreetownandCape(atFreetown31August).EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)August1941(ColombotoApril1942.Kilindinilater).Eastern Fleet based at Colombo toApril 1942. Transferred to Kilindini April

1942.ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January1944.EmployedmainlyonconvoydutyinIndianOcean.Unit of escort for large convoy carrying Australian division from Suez to

AustraliaFebruary1943.ReturnedhomeSeptember1943.ArrivedClydeSeptemberandreducedtoreserveforSubsidiaryService.

RESERVE

September 1943 to March (Clyde to January 1944, Southampton January toDecember1944,Devonportlater).

EmployedasStokers’TrainingShipthroughoutalthough,inamemototheFirstLordinNovember1943,WinstonChurchillcommentedthattheshipshouldbeputtoahigheruse.

DetachedNovember1943totakeChurchilltoMalta,enroutetotheCairoandTehranConferences.

LeftClyde14November.ArrivedMalta17th.TransferredtoPortsmouthCommandatSouthamptonJanuary1944.Main armament removed May 1944 to provide spare guns for Warspite,Ramilliesandmonitorsofthe

NormandyBombardmentForce.AttachedtoImperieuseTrainingEstablishment,Devonport17December1944.PlacedonDisposalList8March1948.SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCo.Ltd.July1948andallocatedtoT.W.Ward&

Co.Inverkeithingforscrapping.ArrivedInverkeithing5September1948.

History:ResolutionATLANTICFLEETApril1919toMarch1926(2ndflag1stBStoApril1921andSeptembertoNovember1924.Flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagfromNovember1924).DetachedtoMediterraneanwithrestofclass(1stBS)January1920becauseof

NearEastcrisis.TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishNationalistsatConstantinopleandinthe

BlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.1stand2ndBattleSquadrons,AtlanticFleetmergedintoone,1stBS,May1921

(seeRamillies).AgaindetachedtoMediterranean(withRamillies,RevengeandRoyalSovereign)

September1922toreinforceMediterraneanFleetduringfarthertroubleintheNearEast.

EmployedmainlyintheDardanellesandSeaofMarmara.FlagofBritishsquadronsenttoSmyrnaFebruary1923todemonstratefollowing

TurkishdemandforevacuationofthatportbyAlliedwarships.RejoinedAtlanticFleetAugust1923.Becameflag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagNovember1924(seeRamillies).TransferredtoMediterraneanFleet(withRoyalOak)March1926toreplacethe

fourIronDukeclass,transferredtotheAtlanticFleet.Became2ndflag1stBSonjoiningMediterraneanFleet.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)March1926toDecember1935(2ndflag1stBSMarchtoNovember1926.FleetflagNovember1932toMarch1933andJulytoSeptember1935).StationedatAlexandriaduringEgyptianpoliticalcrisisJune1926.RefitPortsmouthDecember1926toDecember1927.Recommissioned30December1927.With destroyersKeith, Basilisk andBulldog, carried out reliefwork following

earthquakeinMacedoniaandThessalySeptember1932.Temporary fleet flag November 1932 to March 1933 whileQueen Elizabeth

refitting.JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.AgaintemporaryfleetflagJuly(afterReview)toSeptember1935whileQueenElizabethrefitting.

StationedatAlexandrialatterpart1935duringItalo-Abyssiniancrisis.Paid off at Portsmouth 10 December 1935 for refit to September 1936.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 15 September for Home Fleet (ex AtlanticFleet,renamedHomeFleetMarch1932).

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)September1936toAugust1939(flag2ndBSAugusttoOctober1937).Temporarily replacedRoyalOak as flag 2ndBS and 2nd fleet flagAugust to

October1937.Employed as Seagoing Training Ship for Boys and RNR officers 1937 to

February1938(seeRamillies).RefitDevonportMarchtoJuly1938.Recommissioned22July1938.AssignedtoChannelForce(Portland)underWarOrganization,August1939.CHANNELFORCE(HomeFleetCommandPortland)AugusttoOctober1939.OrderedtojoinSouthAtlanticCommand(Freetown)1October1939following

sinking of SSClement byGraf Spee.Orders cancelled 5October and shiptransferredtoNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax)withRevenge.

RevengeindrydockinMaltac.1933/34.Drydockingwhentheshipswereservinginwarmwaterswasessentialtokeeptheconstantbuild-upofplanktonatbay.Thiscouldnotonlyslowtheshipdownbutcouldalsofoulthepropellersifleftunchecked.

ResolutioninPhiladelphiaafterrepairstotorpedodamage;thephotographwastakenon11September1941.

LeftEngland5October,carryingbulliontoCanada.NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(Halifax)October1939toApril1940(3rdBSfromNovember1939)(seeRamillies).UnitofescortforfirstandsecondCanadiantroopconvoystoEnglandDecember

1939.RejoinedHomeFleetApril1940forNorwegiancampaign.HOMEFLEET(2ndBSApriltoJune1940).Norwegian operations. Took part in capture of Bjerkvik 12 May during

operations against Narvik. Carried tanks and motor landing craft for thisattack.DamagedbybombatTjeldsundetlaterinthemonth.Twokilledand27wounded.

TransferredtoMediterraneanJune1940.LeftScapaforGibraltar4JuneandjoinedForceH(Gibraltar)onitsformation

28June1940.FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoSeptember1940.Tookpart(withValiant,Hood,ArkRoyal,Arethusa,Enterpriseanddestroyers)

inattackonFrenchFleetatMers-el-Kebir(Oran)3July.Unit of ForceM (Resolution, Barham, ArkRoyal,Devonshire flag,Cornwall,Cumberland,Australia,tendestroyersandminorcraft).

BombardedDakar23to25September.EngagedbyRichelieuandshorebatterieson24th,hitfourtimes.TorpedoedbyFrenchsubmarineBévézierson25thandconsiderablydamaged.

TowedtoFreetownbyBarham,arrivedthere29th.Temporary repairs carried out at Freetown and Gibraltar September 1940 to

March 1941, ship being transferred to South Atlantic Command while atFreetown.

LeftGibraltarforPortsmouthMarch1941.Attackedbyaircraftenroutebutnothit.LeftPortsmouthforUSAApril1941tocompleterefit.RefittedatPhiladelphiaNavyYardApriltoSeptember1941.SelectedfornewEasternFleetAugust1941,whileunderrefit(seeRamillies).Completedrefit6September,worked-upatBermudaandleftforDevonport(via

Clyde)27September.TemporarilyattachedtoHomeFleetonreturn.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)OctobertoDecember1941.Hoistedflag(VA)3rdBSEasternFleetDecember1941.LeftColomboviaCape,January1942.ArrivedColombo26March1942,being

lastshipoftheclasstojoin.EASTERNFLEET(flag3rdBSand2ndfleetflag)December1941toSeptember1943(seeRamillies).UnitofescortforlargeconvoycarryingAustraliandivisionfromSueztoAustraliaFebruary1943.ReturnedhomeSeptember1943.RefitRosythSeptembertoOctober1943.ReducedtoreserveforSubsidiaryServiceoncompletionofrefit.ReserveOctober 1943 toFebruary 1948 (Southampton to June 1944, attachedImperieuseEstablishmentDevonportfromJune1944).

EmployedasStokers’TrainingShipthroughout.InamemototheFirstSeaLordinNovember1943thePrimeMinistercommentedthattheshipshouldbeputtoahigherusethanthis.

PortsmouthCommand,SouthamptontoJune1944.Main armament removed May 1944 to provide 15in guns for ships of the

Normandybombardmentforce.Transferred to Devonport 30 June 1944 and attached to the Imperieuse

Establishment.PaidofftoDisposalList2February1948.Sold to British Iron& Steel Corporation 5May 1948 and allocated toMetal

IndustriesLtd.,Faslane,forscrapping.ArrivedFaslane13May1948.

History:RoyalOakATLANTICFLEET(1stBS)April1919toMarch1926.1st BS detached to theMediterranean in January 1920 because of Near East

crisis.TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishnationalistsatConstantinopleandinthe

BlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.ExtensiverefitatPortsmouthSeptember1922untilApril1924,thefirstshehad

receivedsincecompletionin1916.TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetMarch1926untilMay1934.RefitatDevonportMarchtoJune1927.ReturnedtoMediterraneanFleet.PaidoffagaininMay1934andtransferredtoDevonportforextensiverefit,June

1934untilAugust1936.HomeFleetAugust1936untillostinOctober1939.CommissionedforMediterraneanFleet7July1939butneverjoined,remaining

withHomeFleetonWarOrganizationinAugust1939.TorpedoedandsunkbyU47whileatanchorinScapaFlowon14October1939,

thefirstBritishcapitalshiptobelostintheSecondWorldWar.

History:RamilliesATLANTICFLEETApril1919toAugust1927(1stBStoNovember1924,2ndBSlater).FirstBSdetachedtoMediterraneanJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishNationalistsatConstantinopleandinthe

BlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.RejoinedAtlanticFleetAugust1920.InMay 1921 1st and 2nd BSmerged into one, 1st BS, theRoyal Sovereigns

formingthe1stDivisionandtheQueenElizabethsthe2nd.Queen Elizabeth remained as fleet flag, Barham became flag 1st BS andRevenge2ndflag.

RamilliesagaindetachedtoMediterranean,withResolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign, September 1922 to reinforceMediterranean Fleet during furthertroubleintheNearEast.

EmployedmainlyintheDardanellesandSeaofMarmara.RejoinedAtlanticFleetNovember1922.RefitRosythJunetoSeptember1924.

On1November1924theQueenElizabethclasstransferredtotheMediterraneanas1stBSwithQueenElizabethfleetflag,theRoyalSovereignsremainingintheAtlanticFleetasanew2ndBSwithRevengeasfleetflagandResolutionflag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag.Thisdistributionofthetwoclassesremainedunchangeduntil1926.

UnderwentextensiverefitatDevonportSeptember1926toMarch1927.Recommissioned1March1927.TransferredtoMediterraneanFleet(1stBS)August1927toJune1932.WithBarhamcarriedoutspecialflag-showingcruisealongwestcoastofAfrica

December1927toFebruary1928.StationedatJaffaOctober1929duringtroubleinPalestine.PaidofftoreserveatDevonportforrefitJune1932toAugust1934.ExtensiverefitFebruary1933,completed31August1934andrecommissioned

forMediterranean17SeptembertoJuly1935.Earlyin1935itwasdecidedtoreverttothedistributionoftheRoyalSovereign

andQueenElizabethclasseswhichhadbeenadoptedin1924andtostationall theRoyalSovereigns in theHomeFleetandtheQueenElizabeths in theMediterranean, as opportunity occurred. Royal Sovereign and RamilliesexchangedwithBarham andValiantApril toAugust 1935;Resolution andRevengewithMalayaandWarspiteSeptember1936toJune1937.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)July1935toFebruary1939.JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.Collision with German steamer Eisenach in gale off Dover 31 August 1935;

damagetobows.DuringperiodJanuary1936 toSeptember1939,all theRoyalSovereign class,

with the exception of Royal Oak, employed at various times as SeagoingTraining Ships for Boys and RNR officers, with special complements,althoughremainingwithinthe2ndBSorganizationwhileservingassuch.

RamilliesemployedthusFebruary1936toDecember1937.CoronationReview,Spithead19May1937.RefitDevonportJuly1938toFebruary1939.Recommissioned atDevonport 22 February 1939 forMediterranean Fleet (1st

BS)toJuly1939.TransferredtoHomeFleet(2ndBS)July1939toOctober1939.EmployedasSeagoingTrainingShipforBoysandRNRofficersJulytoAugust.PresentatPortlandReviewofReserveFleetbyHMtheKing9August.LeftClydeforAlexandria,viaGibraltar,5September1939asSeniorOfficerof

thefirsttroopconvoyofthewar.StationedatGibraltarSeptembertoOctober.OrderedtojoinNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax)5Octoberbutrecalledon

the6thandjoined1stBSMediterraneanFleet,replacingMalayadetachedtoIndianOceantotakepartinsearchforGrafSpee.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)OctobertoNovember1939.TransferredtoEastIndiesCommand(3rdBSAden)forconvoydutyNovember

1939.InNovember1939a3rdBattleSquadronwasformed,comprisingthefourRoyal Sovereign class battleships engaged in escort duties outside theHomeFleet(2ndBS)andMediterraneanFleet(1stBS)Commands.

MalayaalsodetachedforashorttimewhileintheNorthAtlanticEscortForceDecember1939toMay1940.

Thissquadronorganizedforadministrativeratherthanfortacticalpurposes,theshipsbeingindependentlyemployed,whererequired.In1942the3rdBSwasallocated to theEasternFleet and inNovember1944 to theEast Indies (exEastern)Fleet.

VisitorsaboardtheRoyalOak.ThepublicwerealwayskeentoinspectHMShipsandespeciallyabattleshipwhentheygotthechance.Notethattheanchorcableshavebeenpaintedwhite,whichwouldhavebeenaverytedioustaskforthecrewinvolved.

ArelaxedatmosphereaboardRamilliesduringherAtlanticFleetperiodc.1920.

RamilliesanchoredoffRosythin1941,anexcellentaerialshotshowingearlywartimeguise.Notethedisruptivecamouflage,funnelcapandarmourplatingonthebridgeroof.SheisalsosportingTypes273,279,284and285RDFinstallations.

OnthequarterbackofRamilliesin1936duringherperiodasBoysTrainingShip.Heretheladsarequeuinguponpayday.Placingtheircapsonthetabletoreceivethememorywasanold-fashionedformofsalutefortheoccasion.

EASTINDIES(3rdBSAden)November1939toMay1940.Attached to Force J (Malaya andGlorious) in Indian Ocean November 1939

duringsearchforGrafSpee.Later escortedAustralian andNewZealand troop convoys toAdenDecember

1939toApril1940.TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetMay1940viaSuezCanalbecauseofthreat

ofwarwithItaly.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoNovember1940.WithMalaya,Warspite andKent bombardedBardia 15August 1940.Unit of

supporting force for attack on enemy ships at Taranto by aircraft fromIllustrious 11 November 1940. Transferred to North Atlantic Escort ForceNovember1940followingreduction inItalianbattleshipstrengthasa resultof theTaranto raidwhichpermittedRamillies andMalaya tobewithdrawnfromtheMediterranean.

Attached toForceH27Novemberwhileonpassage throughMediterranean toGibraltarandwaswiththisforceduringconvoyactionwithItaliansquadron

offCapeSpartiventoonsamedatealthoughnotactuallyengaged.RefitDevonportDecember1940toJanuary1941priortojoiningNorthAtlantic

EscortForceatHalifax.LeftDevonport12JanuaryforHalifax,viaClyde,toescortMiddleEastconvoy

oninitialstage.ArrivedHalifaxlateJanuary1941.NorthAtlanticescortforce(FlagRA3rdBSHalifax)JanuarytoAugust1941.

EmployedonBermuda-Halifax-UnitedKingdomconvoyduty.Sighted by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 8 February 1941 when those ships

attempted toattackconvoy;presenceofRamillies causing them toabandontheattack.

Detached from a convoy 23 May 1941 to take part in operations againstBismarck.BecauseofthethreatofwarwithJapan,itwasproposedinAugust1941thatallfourRoyalSovereignsshouldbesenttotheIndianOceanbytheendoftheyearastheinitialinstalmentofanew,EasternFleetforthedefenceofthatarea.

ThisforcewastobebasedinthefirstinstanceatColomboandwouldlatermoveto Singapore after it had been brought to full strength which could not bedone before March 1942. It was proposed to reinforce them withNelson,RodneyandRenown inDecember1941orJanuary1942,but thiswasnevercarriedout.

InOctober1941,asaconcessiontotheviewsofthePrimeMinister,PrinceofWales,RepulseandIndomitablewereselectedasafaststrikingforceof theEasternFleet, to be based at Singapore for offensive operations against theJapaneseintheeventofwar.

Prince of Wales andRepulse arrived there on 2 December but were sunk byJapaneseaircraftonthe10th,twodaysaftertheoutbreakofwar.Indomitableneverjoinedtheforce.

Following the loss of these ships, the Royal Sovereigns, which arrived atColombo between October 1941 and March 1942, remained in the IndianOceanuntilthesummerof1943,constitutingthe3rdBSEasternFleet,withWarspiteasfleetflagfromMarch1942toMarch1943.

FleetbasedatColombountilApril1942,Kilindini (EastAfrica)April1942toJanuary1944,TrincomaleefromJanuary1944.

RamilliesrefittedatLiverpoolAugusttoNovember1921.Hoistedflag(RA)3rdBSEasternFleetinClyde2December1941andleftfor

Colombo.EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)December1941toDecember1943(2ndflag

3rdBStoApril1942).AttachedtoForceFApril1942foroccupationofMadagascar.ArrivedDurban

22April,replacingMalayaasflag(VA)ForceF.Tookpartinbombardmentand occupation of Diego Suarez (Madagascar) 7 May 1942 and remainedtherefollowingthesurrender.

‘Standclear’astheforetopofRevengeistoppledfromthesuperstructureassheiscuttopieces,1949.

Torpedoed and considerablydamagedby Japanesemidget submarine atDiegoSuarez30May.MidgetwasoneoftwolaunchedfromtheparentsubmarinesI16andI20.

LeftDiegoSuarezforDurbanforrepairs3June.ArrivedDurban9th.Temporarily repaired at Durban June to August 1942. Completed refit at

DevonportSeptember1942toJune1943.RejoinedEasternFleetatKilindini(EastAfrica)July1943,beingthentheonly

battleshipremainingonthestation.LeftColombo28December1943forhometotransfertoHomeFleet.JoinedHomeFleetJanuary1944.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)January1944toJanuary1945.UnitofbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasionJune1944.BombardedbatteriesatVillerville,BenervilleandHoulgateuntil7June.AgainattackedHoulgatebatteryon17June,puttingitoutofaction.Unit of bombardment force for invasion of southern France August 1944.

BombardedbatteriesatentrancetoToulon25to28August.

ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouth31January1945toDecember1947.AttachedtoVernonEstablishment15May1945asAccommodationShip(withMalaya)andknownasVernonIII.

Placed on Disposal List December 1947. Sold to British Iron & SteelCorporation 20 February 1948 and allocated to Arnott Young Ltd. forscrapping.

ArrivedCairnryan23April1948.

RenownandRepulse

DesignOriginallyproposedasbattleships,Renown andRepulsewere laiddownunderthe1914estimatesasslightlyimprovedvesselsoftheRoyalSovereignclass.On19December1914,however,theDNChadthefirstintimationthatanew

battlecruiserandnotabattleshipwasrequired;theshiptohaveaspeedofabout32knotsandbearmedwithatleastsix15ingunsfittedinpairs.ThebasicconceptofthedesignwasconceivedasadirectresultoftheBattle

of the Falkland Islands in December 1914 and an earlier battle at HeligolandBight(inAugust)whichshowedtheimmensevalueofhighspeedcoupledwithlong-rangepowerfulgunfireandalargeradiusofaction;factorswhichenabledashiptorundownanyenemyshipunderalmostanycircumstances,andacceptordecline action at will. These features of course could only be obtained at theexpenseofgoodarmourprotection,andwith thebattlecruiser type inmindnoimprovementwasdemandedbeyondthatgiventotheoriginalbattlecruisersbuiltin1906(Invincible).Althoughthiswasseenbymanytobeadangerouspolicy,especially as the latest battlecruisers completingwere sporting a 9in armouredbelt,themovetogettheshipsapprovedwasgivenpriority.By21December1914thedimensionsofthenewshipshadbeendetermined

andbyChristmasEveamodelhadbeenmadeand inspectedbyAdmiralJohnFisherwhowasmakingeveryefforttoseethattheshipswouldmaterialize.On28DecembertheDNCwasnotifiedthatthemodelhadbeenapprovedandthatconstruction should start immediately. It being essential that the ships becompletedattheearliestpossibledate,theDNCsuggestedthatthebattlecruiserTiger’smachineryinstallationberepeatedtoavoidanydelaystothefinallayout.Atthistime,RenownandRepulsewerestillonthestocksasbattleships,and

were in the early stages at the yards of Palmer and Fairfield. Because of thegreater lengthof thenewbattlecruisersPalmer’scouldnotundertake theworkand after compensation for materials used, Repulse was passed over to JohnBrown’sShipyardonClydebank.The rapidity of the design and construction was indeed remarkable as the

followingtableshows:

19December1914:Firstintimationgiventhatbattlecruiserwasrequired.21December:Dimensionsestablishedforgunsandspeed.24December:LordFisherinspectsmodelofproposedshipinDNC’sroomand

askedforcertainmodificationsbeforeshowingittotheBoard.26December:Modelcompleted.28December:DNCinformedthatmodelagreedonandorderedtoproceedwith

design.29December:ContractorsinterviewedbyFisherhimselfandordersplacedwith

theclause that theshipswere tobebuilt infifteenmonths.Action takenbyDNC’sdepartmentregardingtheorderingofmaterialandwhatstockcouldbeusedfromPalmer’syardthathadbeenputintoplacefortheimprovedRoyalSovereign-type battleship.Materialwas re-directed to JohnBrown’s almostimmediately. Modification of keel plates from battleship to battlecruiserpresentednoproblems.

17 January 1915: Fairfield and John Brown’s were supplied with completeinformationtoenablethemtobuildmidshipsportionofshipoutoftheturnofbilgeandordermuchmaterial.

25January:Keelslaiddown.

LEGEND:ASORIGINALLYDESIGNEDASBATTLESHIPS,1914Displacement:27,750tons.Length:580ftBeam:88ft9inDraught:28ft6inFreeboard:16ftforward,18ftaft.Fuel:900/3,000tonscoal.Armament:8×15in;16×6in;4×3inAA;4×21inTT.Armour:mainbelt13in,ends6in,barbettes10in,turrets11in,CT11in,3–1in.Weights (tons):Hull 8,400; armour 8,600; armament 4,550;machinery 2,550;generalequipment700;BM50.

DESIGNSPROPOSEDAFTERTHEORIGINALLEGENDABOVE(‘C’AND‘D’ACTUALLYWORKEDONWHENA

BATTLECRUISERWASGIVENPRIORITY). ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’Length(ft) 720 760 760 780Beam(ft) 90.6 100 90 100Draught 25 26 24 25Displacement(tons) 28,500 28,000 27,000 31,500Speed(knots) 29 25/26 30 28SHP 90,000 70,000 90,000 90,000Armament 8×15in 8×15in 6×15in 8×15in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in TT:2×21in TT:2×21in TT:2×21in TT:2×21inArmour 12–5in 12–5in 12–5in 12–5in

31 January: Both firms supplied with sufficient data for preparing all mainstructural drawings: Hull specification; Midships section; Part profile anddeckflats;sectionsofprotectivedeck;Sketchofarmouredplating.

15February:250feetofthekeelonblocks,4,000tonsofmaterialordered.28February:Drawingsalmostcomplete.15March:375tonsonblocks,3,000tonsofsteelonpremises.30March:Hullspecificationcompleted,800tonsonblocks.12April:Alldrawingscompleted,1,200tonsonblocks.8January1916:Launch.15August:Preliminaryseatrials.

Thanks to Lord Fisher’s drive and a high degree of cooperation between theConstructor’sDepartment and the contractors, both vesselswere completed in19to20monthswhichat that timeconstitutedaworldrecordforshipsof thissizeandnoveldesign.

ONEOFTHEPROPOSEDDESIGNSAFTERROYALSOVEREIGNCLASSDesign‘C2’and‘C’,January1916

The ships were the largest and among the most noteworthy laid down andcompletedduringtheGreatWarandcanberegardedasthelastrepresentativesoftheoriginalbattlecruisertypebuiltfortheRoyalNavy.InthesucceedingHood,asredesignedafterJutland,thecharacteristicsofthe

battleship and battlecruiser were merged into one ‘fast battleship’ type bysubstantially increasing displacement to allow for additional protection. Bothships turned out remarkably well, within the limits of the design, and it isreported that the Americans were so impressed that their Constellation classwere redesigned along similar lines. But war experience emphasized that,althoughusefulforpurelycruiserworkagainstweakerships,suchasperformedby Invincible at the Falklands, their weak protection rendered them quiteunsuitableforemploymentagainstothercapitalships.InthelightofJutlandandthe battlecruiser losses, this deficiencywas subjected to severe criticismwhentheshipsjoinedthefleetlatein1916,andatAdmiralJellicoe’sinstigationtheyweresentbacktotheshipyardwhereanother504tonsofprotectionwasworkedintothedecksaroundthemagazinearea(carriedoutatRosythbythebuilders).Ascompletedtheyhadanaveragedraughtof25ft9½in,about3½indeepof

the design figure and an extra deep of 29ft 8in with 4,243 tons oil. Afteralterations(October1916)thenormaldraughthadincreasedto26ft2inanddeepto30ft0½in.ThecommandingofficerofRepulsereportedthattheshipbehavedverywellinaconsiderableAtlanticseaandhadanevenmotion.Withregardtotheflareatthebows(whichcausedconsiderablecommentatfirst)whichexceedthat of previous ships, he was of the opinion thatRepulse wouldmakemore

progressagainstaheavyseathanashipofsimilarfreeboardwithouttheflare.In service the ships proved very popular even though they were poorly

armouredandwhileonacruiseafter thewar thecorrespondentLionelHalseysentthisreporttotheDNCon29June1920:

MyDeard’Eyncourt,IknowyouareinterestedinRenown.The ship is a perfect marvel to me. She steams beautifully and is

extraordinarilyeconomical.Sheonlyburntalittleover1tonofoilperknotat 20 knots and she is perfectly wonderful in heavy weather – in fact, Ineverknewanyshipcouldbehaveas shedoesandshe isnotabnormallywet, in fact, in head seas, she is wonderfully dry, but her steadiness isextraordinary.Wehadarealgaleandheavyseasandshemadegoodweatherofit.

ArmamentAlthough it iswellknownthatRenownandRepulsehadsix15inguns in twinturrets because of their availability and a directive to complete the ships infifteenmonths,thefactisthatthenumberofgunswasacompromiseandnotatallpopularinmanynavalcircles.ButLordFisherhadbeendirectlyresponsiblefortheshipsandtheirconstruction,andashewasaveryimportantandpowerfulmanwhocouldmovemountainstogetwhathewanted,nobodywasgoingtobefoolhardyenoughtocriticizehim.Sixgunsinpairsmadefordifficultywithfirecontrolandsalvoshooting,and

thesingleturretafttookupalotofspaceinternallywhereasforafewfeetmoreanother turretcouldhavebeenworked in togive fourguns in two turrets.Butonlysixgunsforeachshipwereimmediatelyavailablesothislayoutwasgiventhego-aheadandthedimensionswereworkedaroundit.Beforethelayouthadbeendecideditwassuggestedthateight15ingunscouldbecarriedonahullof780ft (pp) × 92ft × 27½ft, displacing 27,100 tons and having a speed of 31knots. Six guns in twin mounts reduced the figures of 750ft × 90ft × 26ft,displacing25,750tonsonaspeedof32knots.Therewasmuchcorrespondenceonthesubjectwith theDNC(D’Eyncourt),butalthougheightgunsweremostdesirabletheincreaseddimensionsalsohadsomeswayinthematteranditwaseasyforFishertopersuadetheBoardintovotingfornodelay.

Renown,showingdetailsofthebridgeandfunnelsinearly1920,whenshewasusedtoconveyroyaltyontripsaroundtheworld.Notethehousingbetweenfunnelsandtheboxonthecharthouseroofforroyalviewing.

Repulseopensfirewithherforward15ingunsduringbattlepracticec.1928.

The secondary armament was also a compromise, the 4in gun having long

been discredited as being too small effectively to stop some of the largerdestroyers in theGermanNavy.Fisherdidnot likeheavygunsasasecondaryarmament,however,andsawthe4inasthemaximumsizethatcouldpossiblybeincorporatedintothenewships.Tomakeupforthisthegunswerefittedintriplemounts so as at least to give saturation fire, but in practice the guns provedawkwardtoworkbecauseofthe‘bunching’ofbreechesattherearoftheopenturret. And the turrets were not popular because they offered little or noprotectiontothecrewsservingthem.During thedesignstage ithadbeen the intention to fit the shipswithmines

(July 1915, 25 Vickers Automatic Submerged mines No. 20), but when theconstruction staff studied the requirements it was found that it would provedifficultinworkingthemfromthequarterdeckbecauseofthesternanchorandthefactthattheminerailswouldreachbackacrossthequarterdeckbeneaththe15inmuzzlesandwouldalmostcertainlybedamagedbytheblastfromtheguns.To fit them internally would have caused immense problems withcompartmentationandalterationoftheprotectiveplatingattherearoftheship,andhavingminesinsidetheshipsoneartotheconventionalgunmagazineswaspotentiallydangerous.AlthoughtheFirstSeaLordfavouredtheidea,itprovedacaseof‘toomanyeggsinonebasket’andthematterwasdropped.

ArmourAs theprotection for such large shipswas sopoor, the actual thicknessof thearmour (6in)waskept secret foras longaspossible– ‘HushHush’ ships theywereformorereasonsthanthesobriquetsuggested.

RENOWNAsre-armoured,1923–6

REPULSEArmouredLayout,1919

As ships armed with 15in guns it was obvious that in time they wouldprobably face enemy ships with a similar armament, a prospect that caused

shudders at the Admiralty. Although the epitome of the battlecruiser type,JutlandinMay1916hadprovedthattheseshipshadnoplaceinthebattlelineatanydistanceandthetypequicklybecameobsoleteafterthebattle.Morearmourwas asked for, but itwas no easymatter to re-armour a ship in practically allareaswithoutextensivealterationsandaseriouseffectonstability.Duringtheirlifespanthescaleofprotectionwasimprovedtosomeextent(see

tablesanddrawings),but throughouttheirexistencetheyremainedtheweakestofallBritishcapitalships.Butuntil1940theycouldoutrunanythingpowerfulenoughtosinkthem,andoutshootanythingthatwasfastenoughtocatchthemwhichwasexactlywhattheyhadbeendesignedtodo.

STEAMTRIALS

Repulse23August1916 Repulse6March1936FirthofClyde.ArranCourse. MeasuredMile.Displacement:28,200tons. TollandCourse.Draught:26ft2inforward,27ft7inaft. Wind:4–5Diameterofpropellers:13ft6in:Pitch:13ft6in. MeanSHP:112,400Expandedsurface:100sqft. Meanspeed:28.36knots.Meanrevolutions:273.5MeanSHP:116,992Speed:31.31knots.

Renown:10,11,24and25July1939TollandCourse.Displacement:31,424tonsDraught:26ft11⅝inforward,27ft6¾inaft.Diameterofpropellers:(3-bladed)13ft6in;Pitch:12ft11in.1,250tonsballastonboardplus lowerbulges flooded.Designed rpm275 for 30.1knots but notactuallyreached.Bestspeedwith120,951shpwas29.926knots.

9knots 15knots 18knots FP:32,252tons 32,262tons 32,272tons 32,790tons27ft8⅝in 27ft8¾in 27ft11⅞in 28ft2⅜inSea:3 Sea:3 Sea:3 Sea:287½rpm 137rpm 162rpm 278rpm3,742shp 13,061shp 22,128shp 120,951shp9.877knots 15:633knots 18.530knots 29.926knots

Thefollowingcomparestheirthinscaleofarmourwithvariousships(1917),allbattlecruisers:

Inflexible: 2,020tonsarmour,1,200tonsplating(decks,etc).PrincessRoyal: 3,900tonsarmour,2,300tonsplating.

Tiger: 4,750tonsarmour,2,300tonsplating.Repulse: 2,440tonsarmour,3,300tonsplating.Hood: 6,750tonsarmour,7,500tonsplating.Seydlitz: 5,200tonsarmour,2,400tonsplating.

MachineryBecauseofthespeedatwhichtheshipswereconstructedtherewasnoquestionofanyalterationfrom‘standardAdmiraltypractice’regardingmachinery,whichhadbeenuseduptoandinthebattlecruiserTiger(1911).TheTiger layoutwasvirtually repeated,butwithoil-firedboilers insteadof

coalandtheadditionofthreeboilerstoattaintherequiredhighspeed.Designed as battlecruisers, they were naturally fast ships but being lightly

constructedonsuchafinehullthereweresomeproblemswithvibrationduringfull-powersteaming.Thefault,however,wasrectifiedduringtheearlyrefitsasshown in Renown during 1932 when fitted with HACS I and foremaststrengthenedbetweenthe15inspottingtopand15indefenceposition:

On the day of trial the seawas smooth to slight and observations of thevibrationofthe15inspottingtopand4incontrolplatformweremade.The structure at the top of the mast vibrated at a frequency of

approximately 2/3rds of a second. The vibration was transverse notlongitudinal,nooscillationofthemastwasobserved.Itwasconstantforallspeedsoftheship.Thevibrationonastraightcoursewasveryslight.Whenhelmwasputover,however,thewholetopvibratedmuchmore.InordertotestthesightinginstrumentsItookaseatintheH.A.C.S.and

trainedandelevatedtheinstruments–landmarksontheIsleofWightandasmallsteamerprovidedsuitabletargets.Itwasfoundthatitwasreasonablyeasytokeepthesightsontargetevenwhenvibrationwasnoticeable.Theship’sgunneryofficersweresatisfiedwithconditionsonthetop.

BridgeworkHaving been completed with open bridgework in much the same way as theQueen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes, the personnel serving thosepositionsweresubjecttoallweathers.Levelswereaddedandplatformscoveredintovaryingdegreesthroughouttheyearsfrom1916totheearly1930sduringtheirrefits,butseverityofbackdraughtandfoulweatheralwaysposedproblemsandoccasionallycauseddifficultiesinconningtheship.Afterreconstructionin

1936Repulsehadbeengivenanew,remodelledbridgeandcompassplatform,amoreclosed infittingwithflatsides inanendeavour todeflect thewindawayfromstaff.Twoviewswereexpressedabouttheship’supperworksduringhertrialsafterrefit:

31January1936.1hourfullpowertrials.At high speeds, head to wind there was considerable down and back

draught over the bridge, especially at the after end. At the fore end, thewinddeflectorshadsomeeffectbuttheyonlyextendedfor12inorsoabovethe top of the bridge plating. The Watch Officer standing at the Gyrorepeater experienced the full force of relative wind in his face. There istroublesomeeddyingatthepositionoftherevolvingcharttable.Theeffectsare due partly to the large platform over the bridge. The 4in directorplatformappearstothrowdownthewindontotheafterendofthebridge.Fullpowertrials6March1936.The covered in bridge appeared to be quite comfortable but crowded.

Front windows were kept open while doors at back of bridge were keptclosed.Theplottinghousebeingusedasanairlock.Withthisarrangementtherewas very little draught on the compass platform. The height of theroofcouldbelowered.4incontrolplatform–theconditionsherewereuncomfortableduetolow

screenandheavydowndraughtcausedbystructureoverheadandabaft.15indirectorplatform–no instrumentsare fittedexcept insidedirector

tower.15in spotting top – conditions quite comfortable – abaft the H.A.C.S.

tower, however, conditions were not so good owing to air stream beingdeflecteddownwardsbyH.A.C.S.H.A.C.S.aftcomplainedofvibrationbutnoneforward.

After her complete reconstructionRenown sported a brand-new smooth-facedsemicircularbridgewhichdrewthefollowingcommentson25July1939:

Theopencompassplatformwasgenerallysatisfactory.Withawindof65feet per second, 10 degrees on starboard bow the wind stream passedoverhead at a height of about 8–9ft. TheH.D.O. and SL sights abaft thecompass platformwere draughty due towind striking the 15inDCT andbeingdeflecteddown.OnturningtheDCTonbeam,conditionswerebetter.Thefairingonthe

foresidewouldbebetterremoved.Itwasfoundthat lowbulkheadsabout

2fthighacrosscompassplatformatforwardedgeofchart tablepreventeddraughts along floor in vicinity of pelorus. Throughout the trials notendencyforfunnelsmoketobedrawndowninthevicinityoftheflying-off space or quarterdeckwas observed. The extra height of funnels afterexperiencewithWarspiteappearstohavebeenmosteffective.

ForefunnelandbridgeofRepulseduringtheWorldCruiseandshownhereinAustraliawithdozensofboyscoutsgettingtheirfirstchancetoseeaBritishbattlecruiser,1924.

Researchwithaview toachieving theoptimumdesign inbridgework forcapitalshipscontinuedattheNationalPhysicalLaboratorythroughoutthewar.Satisfactory reports hadbeen received from several ships fittedwithsemicircularbridges,butwindtunneltestsonmockbridgeworktodifferentscales showed the superiority of square-faced bridges. The square, openbridgehadaseriousdisadvantage,however,inthatthedegreeofefficiencyof its protection was variable; a bridge that was good in head windssometimes suffered from oblique draughts at angles between 15 and 35degrees.Thedetermining factor appeared to be the height of themassivesuperstructure.Thesemicircularformofbridgewhilenotassatisfactoryasthesquarecouldbemademoreeffectivebyroofingitinorfittingsuitablewindbafflesashadpreviouslybeenfittedinmanyoftheolderbattleships.Itwas noted that the twin 15in turretswere an obstruction to the smoothflowofairupandaroundthebridgework.

RENOWNANDREPULSE:PARTICULARS,1919Construction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedRenown: Fairfield 25.1.1915 4.3.1916 Sept1916.Repulse: JohnBrown 25.1.1915 8.1.1916 Aug1916.Displacement(tons)31,592/32,220(average),32,500(load)ascompleted.Repulseafterrefit36,780(ordinarydeep),37,780(extradeep).Length:750ft(pp),787ft9in(w2),794ft1½in(oa).Beam:90ftascompleted,Repulseafterrefit102ft8in.Draught:Renown26/30ft(mean);Repulse27ft11in(load),31ft1in(deep).GM: as completed 3.5ft (load), 6.2ft (deep);Repulse after refit 4.95ft (load),6.5ft(deep).Armament6×15in42calMk1120rpg17×4in44calMkIX200rpg2×3inQFHA1×12pdr4×3pdr5Maxims10Lewis8×21inabovewaten2×21insubmergedTT.Armour(seeRepulserefitforheralterations)Main belt 6in, ends 6–3in;Bulkheads 4–3in;Barbettes 7–4in;Turrets 11–9–7–4¼in;CT10–6in;Decks:forecastle1⅛–¾in;main1in;slopes(overmagazinesonly)2in;lower2–1¼in;funneluptakes1½–1in.Machinery:BrownCurtisImpulseturbinesdriving4propellers.42Babcock&Wilcoxboilers,275psi.DesignedSHP:112,000for31.5knots.Fuel:1,000/4,200tonsoil(average).Radiusofaction:4,700nmat12knots,2,700nmat25knots.Searchlights:8×36in,2×24insignalling.Complement:Repulse1,057;Renown1,223.AircraftFlying-off platforms on ‘B and ‘Y’ turrets. In post-war period aircraft not

normally carried on turrets, but embarked when required for exercises. KiteballoonequipmentfittedinRepulse.Enlarged bridgework since completion. Otherwise not much change in basicappearance.Rig:Renownshorttopmasttoforeandmain(stumponlytofore);Repulseshortforetopmast.Nomaintopmast.Individualdifferencessincecompletion:RenownRangeclockstofaceofcontroltop.Shorttopmasttoeachmast.RepulseRangeclockondirectorplatformbelowcontroltop.Nomaintopmast.Renown,legendparticularsafterrefit,1923–6Displacement(tons):37,210(deep),32,520(asinclined).Beam:102ft4in.Draught:31ft3in(deep),27ft9in(asinclined).Freeboard:29ft9inforward,21ff3inamidships,16ft9inaft.Fuel:1,000tons/4,289tonsoil.ArmamentMaingunsunaltered15×4in(200rpg)4×4inHAAA(150rpg)4×3pdr(64rpg)5Maxims10LewisArmourMainbelt9in(over460ft),7ft3inabovewater;4ftbelowatnormaldraught,2instripbelowthis;4inarmourforward,3inaft;bulkheads4–4–3in;turrets9–7in;verticalbulkheads2in;maindeck4–3inflat(overmagazines),slope4in,lowerdeck4in.

RenownalongsideatPortsmouthwaitingforthePrinceofWalestocomeaboardforhistourtoIndiaandJapan.Theshipisfreshlypaintedandfullydressedforthetour,whichtookplacefrom26October1921to20Junethefollowingyear

Renown’s bridgewas, as alreadymentioned, a new structure, that had beendevelopedasaresultofmanyteststhroughoutthe1930s.Itstood56feetabovetheforecastledeckandprojectedslightlyforwardofthemainverticallineofthesuperstructure. Itwas twelvefeet indiameterat the topandthirteenfeetat thefloor level. Baffleswere fitted during the end of her reconstruction and thesewere found to give sufficient wind protection to the bridge personnel. Thebaffleshad3ft6incompartmentsandwerefittedaroundthemouthofthebridgeand in fact made conditions over the all-important pelorus position mostsatisfactory; itwas stated that therewasnodefinitedeterioration in conditionsthroughout thewholearea,andonlyslightdraughtswerefeltat therearof thebridgeworkwhencatchingthewindatobliqueanglesorwhenthrownupfromtheturretsbelow.

RENOWNANDREPULSE:PARTICULARS,1934Displacement (tons): Renown 34,540 (load), 37,630 (deep) (after 1926 refit32,520(load),37,210(deep));Repulse34,880(load),38,100(deep).Length:unchanged;Beam;both102ft8in.Draught:26ft8in/31ft9inmean(average).Armament

OriginalmainarmamentSecondary12–15×4inSingle4inmountingsinbothships.4×4inAA8×2pdrOriginalTTinRenown;8×21inabovewaterinRepulse.Searchlights:6×36in,2×24insignalling.AircraftRenown: Fairey IIIF reconnaissance seaplane (with catapult); Repulse: Stillcarriedflying-offplatforms.Armour:seeAlterationsfordetails.Machinery:unchanged.Speed:slightreductionowingtoadditions.Bothfittedasflagships.Rig:Noforetopmast;topmastandtopgallanttomain.Averagecomplement:1,181/1,200.Appearance:asin1918butwithmodifications.Renown:Original line of unbrokenmain deck scuttles. Large aircraft catapultabaftsecondfunnel.Prominent HA director on control top. Large deckhouse on port side ofshelterdeck amidships. Bulges carried up to main deck level. Smooth face tobridgework.Twocompasstablestobridgeface.Repulse: Side armour higher in position. (6in upper belt). No upper row ofscuttles (between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets). No catapult. Small RF on control top.Bulges not visible above waterline. Complicated and messy bridgework withcommunicationpipesrunningdownfromcompassplatform.

AppearanceChanges,RefitsandModificationsAscompleted theywere exceptionally fine-looking shipswith amost gracefulhull.Withtheirequalheightfunnelsintheearlymonthstheywereadesigner’sdelight, and even the raising of the forward funnel did not detract from theirgood looks. The superstructure was simple, but rather piled-up in appearanceand the searchlight arrangement on the funnels was rather unique. Anotherdistinctivefeaturewasthedoublerowofscuttlesalongthehull–indicatingthelackofarmourofcourse–whichwereveryeye-catching.Principlecharacteristicsoftheclasswere:1. Marked upward sheer forward and aft with strongly curved stem and

deepbowflare.2.Longdoublerowofscuttlesalongmainandupperdecksides.3.Unusuallyhigh superstructure forwardwithwingscarriedaft to abeamforefunnel.4.Short,equal-heightflat-sidedfunnels(forefunnelraisedbeforeenteringservice).5.Small,stronglyprojectingsearchlightplatformsonfunnels.6.Two15inturretsforwardandoneaft.7. Prominent triple 4in mountings abeam fore funnel and on centrelinebeforeandabaftmainmast.8.Tripodmastswithshorttopmastoneach.

Asuperbfull-lengthviewofRepulseassheleavesPortsmouthafterherpartialreconstructionandatacostof£1,377,348,April1936.

During the Great War they both received the usual modifications that othercapitalshipsweregiven(seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne),butthisdidnot drastically alter their appearance. The superstructure was built up slightlyand searchlight towerswere added around the second funnel.Both shipswereusedforexperimentswithcamouflagepaint.Repulsewasthefirstofthetwotobeconsideredforrefitafterthewar,plans

forthishavingbeenmadewellinadvanceofthecessationofhostilities.RepulseRefit,December1918toOctober1920

1.High-tensileplatingworkedintomaindeck,adding1intotheflatand2inontheslopes.Thelowerdeckreceived1inplatingoverthemagazines.2.Themain6inarmouredbeltwasremovedfromitsoriginalpositionandplacedonedeckhigher.Anew9instrakewasfittedintheoldposition.

3. New, wider anti-torpedo bulges were fitted, rather like those fitted toRamillies and were filled with crushing tubes. There were 6ft 4in widerthantheoriginalfittings.4.2½inplateswereaddedaroundtorpedoports.5. Submerged torpedo tubes were removed, having been foundunsatisfactoryathighspeeds.6. Eight 21in above-water torpedo tubes were added in four twinmountings, two P&S in ports on upper deck; forward pair close abaftsecondfunnel,afterpairabaftmainmast.7. Large-base rangefinder added over control positions on conning towerandatrearof‘A’and‘Y’15inturrets.8. Single range clocks fitted over control top and at rear of after controlpositiononmaintripodlegs.9.Maintopmastreplacedwithtopgallant.10.Searchlightswere removed fromafter pair of towers but towerswereretained.

Armourprotectionincreasedby4,300tonsinweight.This was the last refit forRepulse until hermajor refit of 1936, butminor

changesweremade:1924–5single4inanti-torpedogunsonshelterdeckabeamconningtowerwerereplacedby4inAA.Original3inAAwasreplacedby4inincreasingAAarmamenttofour4in.Navigatingplatformenclosed.1925deckhouseaccommodatingsquashcourtforroyaltourbythePrinceof

Walesaddedonstarboardsideofshelterdeckbetweenfunnels.1926Newtypecontroltop.Signaldistributionofficeaddedatrearofupperbridge.Foretopmastremovedandsignalstrutsadded.RenownRefit,July1923toSeptember1926Followingalong the linesof the1918–20refit thathersisterhad received,hermain6inbeltwasremovedandreplacedbya9instrake.Theoriginal6inbelt,however,was not re-installed but the new 9in belt was placed slightly higherthan inRepulse. Thiswas because of the deepening thatRenown had alreadysufferedasaconsequenceofadditionaltopweightsincecompletionin1916(seedrawing).Protectivehigh-tensileplatingwasaddedtothemaindecksothatthetotalthicknesswas2½inamidshipsand4inoverthemagazines(againstlinand1–3ininRepulse).Platingwasalsoaddedtothelowerdeckasprotectionagainstend-onfire.

RenownenteringthePanamaCanalon8November1921duringtheRoyalTour;onherwaytoTrinidad.Notethecrestontheroyalviewingplatform.

Anewtypeofunderwateranti-torpedobulgewasfitted,beingmuchlighter,andwassimilartothatfittedinWarspite.Thecrushingtubeswereomittedalongmostofthebulgebutwereretainedinwakeofthemagazines.Asmall2instripof armour was fitted underneath the main 9in armour plates to assist indeflectingdivingshells.Anewtypeofsquare-shapedcontrol topwasfitted; itwas considerablydeeper than theoriginalone.Single rangeclockswere fittedover‘Y’turret.Theaftertriple4inmountingwasreplaced.Thesingle4inanti-torpedo guns were removed. AA guns as in Repulse. Flying-off platformreplacedon‘B’turret.Searchlightsremovedfromafterpairoftowersbuttowersretained.Upperbridgeenlargedandmodified.Signaldistributionofficeaddedat

rear of bridge. Foretopmast removed. Short signal struts added below controltop.Topgallantfittedtomain.Theconsequenceofthesealterationswasanetsinkageofabout3incompared

with12inforRepulse.Thiswasattainedattheexpenseofthecrushingtubesinthebulgesand thecomplete removalof theoriginal6inarmour. ItwasagreedthatalthoughRepulsewasthebetterarmouredshipofthetwo,thenewpositionof the9inbelt inRenown had its advantages.Weights:896 tons removed (6inoldmainbelt);1,050tonsaddedforbulges;1,020tonsaddedinarmourplating;1,430tonsaddedinnew9inbelt.The alterations greatly improved the ship’s protection against fire at long

ranges and in certain circumstances at short ranges. The deck, which alwaysformedthegreaterpartof the target,wasstated tobeproofagainst15inshellsbecause of its ability to deflect themat 15,000yards andunder.Although thenew9inbeltwasnotconsideredquiteequaltothatofa4inarmoureddeckitwasstated that it should either breakup a 15in shell during its path of flight or atleastexplodetheshellatamoderatedistanceinsidethearmouredbeltsothatitwouldnotreachtheship’svitals.Someoftheex-Eagle’sarmouredplateswereusedinthisrefitastheywerein

thatofRepulseduringher1918–20refit.EstimateofcostsRenownrefit,1923–6:labour£404,000,materials£114,000,

total£518,000.January1927.Shortflagpolefittedabaftcontroltopandtomaintopmastfor

royal tour (January to June 1927).Deckhouse replaced on port side of shelterdeckamidshipsautumn1927(afterreturnoftour).

1929.Fittedasflagship.1930–1.Rangeclockover‘Y’turretremoved.September 1931 to June 1932. Refit: midships triple 4in removed to

accommodateaircraftcatapult(fittedlater).Multiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedon starboard side of superstructure abeam fore funnel. HARF on control topreplacedbyHAdirector.Flying-offplatformremovedfrom‘B’turret.AfterpairofSLtowersabeamfunnelremoved.1932–3. Aircraft catapult (McTaggart Training type) fitted abaft second

funnelinplaceofmidships4intripleguns.OneFaireyIIIDseaplanecarried.Nospecialcraneprovided,aircraftbeinghandledbyboatderrick.

RepulseenteringValettaHarbour,Malta,inMarch1937.NotetheSpanishCivilWarstripeson‘B’turret.

RENOWNANDREPULSEBridgework

RENOWN1921and1933

Both shipswere reconstructed to various degrees during the period 1934 to1939 with a view of bringing them more nearly in line with modernrequirements. The modifications in Repulse were in fact quite limited, beingconfined mainly to increased AA armament and provision of hangaraccommodation for aircraft with improved type of catapult. Against this, theadditional topweight, for which no compensation was made, resulted inincreaseddraughtanddisplacementwith some lossof speed, stability,drynessand freeboard. Reconstruction of Renown was considerably more drastic, theprimaryobjectbeingtosecurethemaximumpossibleadvanceinoffensiveanddefensive qualities without additional displacement or any appreciable loss ofspeed.Itprovedimpracticabletobringthelevelofverticalarmouringuptomodern

requirementssosuchmodernizationasdidtakeplacewasmainlyintheinterestsof retaining high speed combined with strong AA defence and ability towithstandaerialandunderwaterattack.Therewasstillnoquestionofhereverfacingshipsarmedwithlargercalibregunsifitcouldbeavoidedbecauseofherweak(9in)sidearmour.InadditiontothemodificationsinAAarmamentandaircraftaccommodation

and equipment carried out inRepulse, elevation and range ofmain armamentwasincreased,anentirelynew,dual-purpose(HA/LA)secondaryarmamentwasmounted, light AA guns were further improved, horizontal and underwaterprotectionwasstrengthened,speedwasmaintainedandradiusslightlyextended.Bridgework,layout,superstructureandrigwereallmateriallyaltered.RepulseRefit,April1933toMay1936Midships4intriplemountingtakenouttoaccommodateaircraftcatapult.

AAarmamentincreasedtoeight4in,sixteen2pdrsandeight0.5inMG(the4ingunswereintwotwinandfoursinglemountings).

Theforwardsuperstructureand15ingunsofRepulse(noteEtnastrippingondeck),duringapublicopendayc.1928.

Renownc.1931during4inAAgunnerypractice.The4ingunasoriginallyfittedwasconsideredatroublesomemounting,whichrequiredtoolargeacrewtoserveeachtriplemount.

Repulse,lookingdownfromthe30ftrangefinderovertheforecastleduringapublicopendayc.1928..

RenownentersGrandHarbour,MaltaduringherthirdRoyalTourwithH.R.H.ThePrinceofWales(26October1921to20June1922).

Renownon6January1927asdetachedfortheRoyalTourNotethemodificationsafterherlargerefit.ShecarriedtheDukeandDuchessofYorkonyetanotherRoyalTourtoAustraliaandNewZealand,returningtoPortsmouthon27June.

Repulse,1928,lookingaftoverthesecondfunnelandmainmast.

REPULSE1922and1933

REPULSEAsReconstructed,July1936

The twin mountings were a prototype turret used later in the reconstructedbattleships of theQueen Elizabeth class andRenown (prototype turret alsocarried in Resolution). HA directors added on control top and on highpedestalabaftmainmast.FormerHA/RFoncontroltopwasremoved.MF/DFequipmentfitted.

DFcabinetfittedonmainmast.Searchlights redistributed;24insignalling lamps retained.Twoaircrafthangars

provided(P&S)insuperstructureabaftsecondfunnel,withopeningatrear.Straightarmelectriccranefittedontopofeachhangar.

Fixed athwartships catapult fitted on upper deck abaft hangars, shelter deckbeingcutawaytoaccommodatethis.

Accommodationforfouraircraft: twoinhangars,oneondeckoutsideandoneoncatapult.

Highsuperstructurecontaininghangarsbuiltuparoundandabaftsecondfunnel.Heavyboatsstowedontopofhangars,allhandledbyaircraftcranes.SeaboatscarriedindavitsP&Samidshipsasbefore.Exceptfor longersignalstrutsatbaseofcontrol top,herbasicappearancehad

not changed since 1933. The Bridge face was slightly remodelled, givingsmoother-lookingfinish.

REPULSE:PARTICULARS,1937

Lengthandbeamasoriginal.Displacement(tons):34,600(load),38,311(deep).ArmamentOriginalmainSecondary12×4in6×4inMkXVAA16×2pdr16×0.5inAA8×21inTTAircraftTwo hangars with fixed athwartships catapults amidships. Capacity for 4SwordfishTSRorWalrusamphibians.Radar:MF/DF.Armour:seeAppearancenotes.Machinery:asoriginal,butcompletelyoverhauled.Speed:slightreductionfromoriginal.Searchlights:6×36in,2×24insignalling.GeneralBoatstowagerearrangedtoaccommodatehangarandcatapult.Majorityofboatsstowed on top of hangars. Accommodation, ventilation and equipmentmodernized.Rig:Asin1932exceptshortermaintopmastandtopgallant.DFaerialsonmaintopmastandatheadofmaintopgallant.Appearance:

Generallymorepiledupandheavier-looking.Smooth face to bridgework. Height of superstructure accentuated by cuttingawayofshelterdeckabaftit.LighttwinturretP&Sabeammainmast.LargemultipleAAmountingsP&Sonsuperstructureamidships.Prominentdirectorovercontroltopandhighpedestalabaftmainmast.ProminentDFaerialandcabinetonmainmast.OtherthanrigalterationsduringearlyyearsofwanRepulsechangedverylittlein appearance up until the time of her sinking in 1941. According to 16mmofficial movie film, her contrast camouflage was painted out before she wassunkinDecember1941.Trialsafterrefit,1936–7:1hourFullPower31.1.1936.Windof15–20mphandshortsteepsea,longestwavesestimatedat120×15ftGoing aheadwas verywet forward of breakwater Gunnery officer stated thatwater had penetrated between turrets and barbette armour at ‘A’ position andreacheddowntoshellrooms.Nospeedrecorded.Fullpower:June1936.Wind4–5TollandMile.Meanfigures:112,400shpfor28.36knots.Repulsewasfittedtotake15insuperchargedshells5/10CRHandmagazinesandshellroomsweremodifiedtoaccommodatethese.(20rpg).Date:25.6.1941.

RenownRefit(majorreconstruction),September1936toAugust1939Superstructurerazedtoupperdecklevel.15inturretsremoved.4insecondaryarmamentremoved.Funnelsrazedtoupperdecklevel.Foremast(tripod)andmainmasttakenout.Original bridgework and conning towerwas replaced by large splinterproof

and gas-proof control tower, similar with variations in detail to that fitted inWarspiteasreconstructedin1937,andrepresentingafurtherdevelopmentofthetypefirstintroducedintheNelsonclass.Platforms sited within the tower were: 1. Accommodation and recreation

spaces.2.SeacabinsforAdmiralandcertainseniorofficers.3.Armouredlowernavigating position, signal, direction-finding and cipher offices. Navigatingplatform, main and secondary directors were fitted on top of this tower.

Searchlight,signallingandlookoutplatformswerefittedinthesides.New streamline funnels fitted, slightly thicker and flatter than original pair,

andsetclosertogether.36in searchlights replaced by 44in lamps. Four 24in signalling (2×P&S) on

lower platform on control tower. Horizontal armouring was improved overmagazinesandmachinery,but itwasacomplicatedeffortwithexistingplatingbeing removed in some cases and amixture of high-tensile andnon-cementedarmourbeingusedtomakeupcertainthicknesses.Acertainamountof‘D’typesteel was used for the protection of the secondary armament. Basically itamountedtofitting4inarmouroverthemagazinesand2½inelsewhere.Forbestresultsinapplicationseedrawingasreconstructed.Original4insecondaryarmamentreplacedbytwenty4.5indual-purposeguns

in ten turrets (fiveper side): forwardgroupof turretsoneachsideabeamforefunnel;aftergroupoftwoabeammainmast.Light AA increased from sixteen to twenty-four 2pdrs in three 8-barrel

mountings.Re-engined and reboilered with Parsons all-geared turbines and eight

Admiralty3-drumboilers.NewmachinerybyCammellLaird.SHPincreasedto120,000 for nominal speed of 29 knots. Fuel capacity slightly increased usingouterwingbunkers,andradiusofactionincreasedasaconsequenceofgreatereconomyofnewequipmentinstalled.Otheritemsasfitted(orremoved)were:

1.Type71W/Tremoved.2.Type511buzzeroutfitinstalled.3.CombinedHA/LAcontrolandcalculatingposition,eachgroupconsistedof one HACS Mk IV, HA/LA director, AFC clock and one HACScalculatingtablewithpewswitchinstallation.4.Newpom-pomdirectorMkIIandwindspeedanddirectionequipment.5.NewFirecontroltablesfittedwhererequired.6. Underwater TT removed and flat subdivided to accommodate coolingmachinery.7.Newabove-water21intorpedotubesfitted.8. Improved pumping arrangements and seven new 350-ton dischargepumps.9.Wirelessofficesredistributed.10.NewandimprovedW/Tfitted:Types36c;49c;52c(2sets);75c;and7dtogetherwithrack-mountedreceivinggear.

11.Newventingarrangementstomainarmamenthandingrooms.12. New anemometer, magslip indicator and other meteorologicalequipmentfitted.13.Newairdefencepositionsfitted.

Aclose-upofRepulseasreconstructed,1936.

RenownseenhereleavingPortsmouthaftercompletereconstruction(September1936toJune1939)whichcostapproximately£3,008,008.Shehasyettoreceiveafreshcoatofpaint.

RENOWN1939AsFitted

14.Newwirephonesfitted.15.Existingfiresystemswereupdatedandrenewedincertainareas.16. Provision for electrical power for motor-driven auxiliary machineryfitted,alsomodernlightingequipmentinmanyareas.17.NewmodernD/F(FTWa/TType405)equipmentandback-upsystemfitted.18.Oldtorpedocontrolpositionsremoved.19.Bulgescoatedwithbitumasticsolutionandenamel.20.Modernizationoffeedwatersystems.21.Oldsteamcapstanremovedandnewmotor-drivenmachineryfittedforanchors.22.Newringmain,newcables,releaseswitches,dynamosandnewmainscontrolboardfitted.23.Distributionboxesrenewed,andregroupingofexistingboxes.24.Removalof200tonsofsteambilgeejectors.25.Redistributionofoilfuel.26.Rudderindicatorandsupplyrenewed.27.Signaldeckcompletelyrefittedandmodernized.28.Accommodationforcrewimproved.29.Six44inpower-controlledsearchlightsfitted.30.15in turrets cut away togivegreater elevation (increased from20° to30°).

RENOWNArmourLayoutasReconstructed,1939

31. New rig modified to light tripod foremast, stepped through rear ofcontrol tower, but well clear abaft upper part. Short pole mainmast. Nocontrol tops. Topmast to foremast with DF aerial pole at head. Nomaintopmast. DF aerial (starfish type) at head of mainmast. Cost ofreconstruction:£3,088,008.

RepulseRefit,September1938toJanuary1939Twin4in turrets replacedby single4in inopenmountings.Eight 0.5inAA (4barrels)addedondirectorplatformonmaintripodlegs.SpecialaccommodationprovidedinternallyforroyaltourtoCanadabytheKingandQueen,butitwaslaterdecidedtouseCPSEmpressofAustraliawithRepulseasescort.Renown,1939–451941Radarcontrolfittedformainandsecondaryarmament,Types284formainand285for4.5insecondary.Multiple2pdr(4barrels)addedon‘B’15inturrettop.Radarcontrol(Type282)fittedforlightAAguns(2pdrs);directorslocatedP&Sontopofcontroltowerandabeamforefunnel.ASWradaradded;AWType281withaerialateachmastheadSWType271

withaerialinlantern(forprotection)onforetop.Original271settransferredtocorvette Verbena at Rosyth in September 1941, replaced by new set later.ImprovedD/Fequipmentfitted,withaerialonfaceofcontroltower.Tripodlegsand topmast fitted to mainmast for Type 281 RDF. Elaborate camouflagepaintworkschemeevident.

Renown,July1942–August1943modificationsSeventy-two 20mm AA in 23 twin and 26 single mountings, located on ‘B’turret (two twins), on platforms at sides of control tower (four twins), onsuperstructure forward,midships and aft and in catapult space amidships (twotwinandtwosingleoneachside).Deck sponsoned out abreast catapult space to accommodate these guns.

AdditionallightAAdirectors(282RDF)fittedonsuperstructureamidshipsandaft.February–June 1943 Refit: Catapult removed but cranes were retained.

Hangarspaceconvertedforuseasoffices,etc.Aircraftnolongercarried.Boatstowagerearrangedoncatapultdeck.Renown,1944–520mmAAremovedfrom‘B’turret(byMarch1945).PreviouscamouflagereplacedbyAdmiraltyStandardtype(Pacificcolours).

RENOWN:PARTICULARS,1939

Hullanddimensionsunaltered.Displacement(tons):(averagesince1916)1917 32,220, 1926 37,150,1936 38,105, 1939 33,725 (average action), 36,080(deepload).Armament:Original15inunchanged(turretscutawayforgreaterelevation)Secondary:20×4.5indual-purposeintwinturrets400rpg24×2pdrMkVIII(3mounts,8barrels)l,800rpgTT:8×21inMkIVandIV0Depth-charges:24TypeDMkVII4×0.5inMGAA2,000rpg6×6pdr100rpg2VickersMG5,000rpg12×Lewis2,000rpgSearchlights:4×44in,4×24insignalling.Armour:seeAppearance,Refitnotesanddrawing.MachineryParsonsgearedturbines.4propellersBoilers:8Admiralty3-drumtype,300psiSHP:120,000for29/30knots.Fuel(tons):1,000/4,860oil.Radiusofaction:6,580nmat18knots.

Alterationssincecompletion:(average)1916: 32.58knots. 27,900tons.1919: 29.85knots. 31,820tons.1939: 29.93knots. 32,800tons.GM:5.07ftaverageactionload,5.76ftdeepcondition.Stabilityvanishesat:averageaction700,deepcondition760.GeneralLarge tower structure replacing former bridgework andCT.Boat stowage andhandlingasinRepulse.Accommodation,ventilationandgeneralequipmentallmodernized.Rig:Light tripodforemastwith topmast.Nocontrol top.Shortpolemainmast.D/Faerialsateachmasthead.Nomainderrick.Boats:2×50ft steampinnaces;1×42ft sailing launch;1×36ftpinnace;2×32ftcutters;2×30ftgigs:2×27ftwhalers;1×16ftand1×13ftbalsarafts.

RENOWN:PARTICULARS,1944

Displacement(tons)35,240(averageload),37,600(deep)Draught:29ft11½inforward,29ft9inaft(average).Hullanddimensionsasin1939.ArmamentMainandsecondaryunchanged28×2pdr68×20mmAA.AlllightAAlandedbyJuly1945Forwardgroupof4.5ingunsremovedbyMay1945.TT:asin1939.Allgunsexceptsingle20mmAAradarcontrolled.Radar:Types284formainguns,285for4.5in,282or283forlightAA,AWType281,SWType271.Searchlights:asin1939.Armour:asin1939.Machineryasin1939.Speed:slightreductionduetoadditions.AfterthelossofHoodin1941RenownwasthefastestcapitalshipintheRoyalNavy.Aircraft:Approvaltoremovecatapultgiven19January1943.

InRenownthiscamouflagealsofeatured15inturretspaintedblueandgunsgreyon top and white and blue beneath. Blue strip of camouflage on hull wasrepainteddark-greybeforereturninghomefromPacificinApril1945.

ArmamentreducedinJuly1945aftershippassedintoReserve.Forwardgroupoftwelve4.5ingunswereremoved.AlllightAAlanded,mountingsretained.Repulse,1939–41,additionsandalterations.Radarcontrol(Type284)fittedformaingunsAugust1941(proposedNovember

1940,approvedFebruary1941).4intriplemountingonsuperstructureabaftmainmastremoved.Single4inAAP&Son forecastledeckamidships remountedon topofhangar

(byMay1941).Multiple 2pdr AA (8 barrels)mounted on after superstructure in place of 4in

triple(approvedFebruary1941,fittedbyJuly1941).Single20mmAAaddedP&Son‘Y’15inturret.Unusualcamouflagepaintedup(contrastpainting,seecamouflage).The followingwere proposed forRepulse but it is not certain if theywere all

donebeforeherlossinDecember1941.May1940:DGcablesfollowingthelineoftheforecastledeckfromthebowto

one-thirdofthelengthfromthebow,andfollowingthelinesoftheupperandforecastle decks from the stern to one-third of the length from the stem.InternalDGcablesalsofitted.

September1940:RDFTypes279or281proposed.GaffforAdmiral’sflag.Foretopmast to be fitted when aerial (radar) was shipped. November 1940:

ProposedRDFequipment.Type284formainguns(completedin1941);twosetsType282forward,onesetType285forward,twosetsType285aft,onesetType282aft.

December1940.Reportonperformanceatsea:‘Inaheadwindsuctionofthefunnelgasesintotheafterpartofthebridgewhere

the torpedo, SL and starshell control positions are situated is clearlynoticeable. I consider that the question of fitting a cowl on the foremostfunnel or lengthening it must be thoroughly investigated before furtherextensionsaremadetothebridgework.’[Captain]

January1941.Itwasreportedthatwithlightwindonthebowtheoppositewingof the bridge was distinctly affected by funnel fumes. Addition of 3-footextensiontoforefunnelwassuggested.

February1941.AlterationsandadditionsapprovedbytheAdmiralty:

All4inmountingstoberemoved.Proposedtofitseven4intwinmountingswithfourteen4inMkXVI⋆guns.LightAAtocompriseof three2pdr(8barrels)withdirectorsandfour0.5inMG.RadaroutfitforRepulsefinallyamended:OneType281set;threeType282sets;oneType284set;twoType285sets.August1941:Type284setfittedandoperational.

March 1941: Conning tower deck was arranged to accommodate HArearmament. Type 281 office was built into this deck and two offices forTypes282and285wereplacedontheflagdeck.

May 1941: Zarebas of protective plating to be fitted around 4in mountings.Protectivescreenproposed,1fthigh,for0.5inAAMG.

June1941:Cowlforfunnelagainsuggested.July1941:MaintopmastredesignedforType281RDF.DFoutfitTypeFM2to

befitted.Cowlforfunnelfinallyapproved.September1941:Armamentrefit in theUSAproposed:Three-corneredcontrol

ofHAguns.TwoHAtowersaft,andoneforward.HalfTTarmamenttoberemoved.Type271tobefittedbeforerefit.

36inSLtoberepositionedonmainmastwhenafterHAtowersfitted.Convertgunstofireextremelylong(67in)6CRFshells(termedMkIIIB)which

justfittedinhoistcage.

History:RepulseAlternatedwithRenownasflag(RA)1stBCS1917–18.FromSeptember1917toMarch1918,flag1stBCS,alsoservedasflagGrand

Fleetcarriers(seeRenown).TookpartinHeligolandBightoperation17November1917.On this occasion, 1st BCS & 1st BS supported sweep by Courageous andGlorious, 1st and 6th LCS and destroyers to attack enemy minesweepersworkinginHeligolandBightunderbattleshipprotectionalthough,apartfromRepulse, none of the British battlecruisers of 1st BS actuallymade contactwithenemyforces.Detachedfrom1stBCStocovertheretirementofthe1stLCS after appearance of the German battleships Kaiser and Kaiserin andbecame engaged with these ships and light cruisers. Scored one hit onKönisbergwhichpassed through three funnels andupper deck andburst incoalbunkerstartingbadfire.

Was the lastBritish ship inactionwithGermancapital shipsduring theGreatWar.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforextensiverefit,2December1918.Recommissioned at Portsmouth 1 January 1921 for BCS Atlantic Fleet (see

Renownrepost-warreorganization).ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)January1921toNovember1923.Detached, with Hood, August 1922 to represent Royal Navy at Brazilian

Independence Centenary Celebrations in Rio de Janeiro and subsequentlycarried out flag-showing cruise in the West Indies. Left Devonport 14August;returned23November1922.

WithHoodandSnapdragonvisitedNorwayandDenmarkJunetoJuly1923.AgaindetachedNovember1923asunitofSpecialServiceSquadroncomprisingHood (flag),Repulse and1stLCSDelhi,Danae,Daundess andDragon forEmpireandworldcruise.

SPECIALSERVICESQUADRON(WorldCruise)November1923toSeptember1924.Squadron left from rendezvous off Plymouth on 27 November, proceeding

outwards via Cape and Indian Ocean and returning across the Pacific.ItineraryofthebattlecruisersandlightcruisersvariedinsomeinstancesandfinallyseparatedafterleavingSanFranciscoon11July1924,onreturnleg,the former passing through the Panama Canal while the latter proceededaround South America. Squadron reformed again off the Lizard on 28September1924,theshipsarrivingbackathomeportsonthe28thand29th.

PortbroadsideofRepulseatfullspeed(takenfromHood)asthetwoshipssteambetweenLasPalmasandGibraltarinNovember1922.

HoodandRepulsevisitedSierraLeone,Capetown,Zanzibar,Trincomalee,PortSwettenham, Singapore, Fremantle, Albany, Adelaide, Melbourne, Hobart,Jervis Bay, Sydney, Wellington, Auckland, Fiji, Honolulu, Vancouver,Victoria, San Francisco, Panama, Colon, Kingston (Jamaica), Halifax,Quebec, St. John’s (Newfoundland). Repulse arrived Portsmouth 29

September1924andrejoinedAtlanticFleet.ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1924toMarch1925.With Hood represented the British Navy at Vasco da Gama celebrations at

LisbonFebruary1925.DetachedMarch1925forPrinceofWales’stourtoWestandSouthAfricaand

SouthAmerica.LeftPortsmouth25March,visitingBathurst(Gambia),SierraLeone, Takoradi and Lagos. Arrived Capetown 1 May where Princedisembarked for inland tour, rejoining ship on 29 July. Proceeded to St.Helena,Montevideo,BuenosAiresandWestIndies.ReturnedPortsmouth16October1925.

Repulsefullydressed,May1937.

Repulsefromanoddangle,showingtherearofthesecondfunnelandboatdeck,c.1938.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)October1925toMarch1932(flagBCSApril1929toJuly1931).RefitPortsmouthNovember1925toJuly1926andJulytoSeptember1927.RelievedHoodasflagBCSApril1929(Hoodtorefit).

FlagrevertedtoHood11July1931.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoJune1932.PaidofftoreservePortsmouthJune1932priortoextensiverefit.RESERVE(Portsmouth)June1932toApril1933.PaidofftoDockyardcontrolatPortsmouthforrefit1April1933.ExtensiverefitPortsmouthApril1933toApril1936.Commissionedfortrials14January1936.CompletedfullcrewPortsmouthApril1936forBCSMediterraneanfleetunder

1935FleetReorganizationplan(Renown).LeftPortsmouthforMediterranean8June1936.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(BCS)April1936toSeptember1938.ProtectedBritish interests inwesternMediterranean duringSpanishCivilWar

1936–8.Embarked fivehundred refugees atPalma,Majorca, forMarseilleslate1936.

CoronationReview,Spithead,20May1937.SenttoHaifaJuly1938becauseofArab-Jewishdisturbances.Relieved by Malaya August 1938. Selected to convey King and Queen to

Canada and USA in May 1939 and withdrawn from Mediterranean FleetSeptember1938torefitpriortothis.

RefitPortsmouthOctober1938toMarch1939.Recommissioned at Portsmouth March 1939 for Home Fleet, BCS having

revertedtothisinFebruary1939.HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoOctober1939.Becauseoftheuncertainpoliticalsituation,originalplansfortheRoyalvisitto

Canada and theUSAwere latermodified, theRoyal party travelling in theCPSlinerEmpressofAustralia,RepulseactingasescortforfirsthalfoftheAtlanticcrossing.LeftPortsmouth5May1939.

WithNelson,RodneyandArkRoyal,carriedoutpatroloffNorwegiancoast7–12SeptembertointerceptenemyshippingandenforceBritishblockade.

Took part, with Hood, Sheffield, Aurora and four destroyers in search offStadlandetforGneisenau,Kölnanddestroyers8–10Octoberfollowingsortiebytheenemyforce.Nocontactestablished.

Detached, with Furious, to America and West Indies Command 21 October1939 to cover Halifax-UK convoy and later to patrol area south-east ofNewfoundlandfollowingreportsofenemyheavyshipsintheNorthAtlantic.

ArrivedHalifax3November.AMERICAANDWESTINDIESCOMMAND(Halifax)OctobertoDecember1939.LeftHalifax23NovembertotakepartinsearchforScharnhorstaftersinkingofRawalpindi,butdamagedbyheavyseasandforcedtoreturn.

With Resolution and Furious, escorted first Canadian troop convoy to UKDecember1939.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)December1939toOctober1941.NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.Reinforced Renown on patrol off Vestfiord 9 April to intercept enemy ships

attemptingtoreachNarvik.EscortedcruiserSuffolkfromStavangertoScapa18April,Suffolkhavingbeen

heavilydamagedbyaircraftbombingattackwhenretiringfrombombardmentofStavangeron17th.

SenttoFaroes–Icelandarea,withRenown,5JunetoinvestigatereportofenemyheavyshipsbeingsightedofftheFaroes,possiblyintendingraidonIceland.Reportprovederroneousandon the10thRepulse joinedcovering force fortroop convoys returning fromHarstad on evacuation ofBritish forces fromNorway.

With Renown, 1st Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, endeavoured tointerceptGneisenau, reportedenroutefromTrondheimtoGermany27July1940.Nocontactmade.

WithHood, three ships of 1st CS and six destroyers, covered approaches toBrest and Lorient during search for Scheer after sinking of Jervis Bay 5November1940.

Unit of covering force for raid on Jan Mayen Islands November 1940 whenGermanscientificmissioncapturedandWTstationdestroyed.

WithNigeria,patrolledAtlanticconvoyroutesfollowingattackontroopshipoffFinisterrebyHipperon25December1940.

TookpartinsearchforScharnhorstandGneisenauinNorthAtlanticJanuarytoMarch1941.

Diverted fromsailingwithGibraltar convoy fromClyde22May1941 to takepartinsearchforBismarckandPrinzEugen.

Covered Halifax convoys in Newfoundland area June 1941 after Bismarckoperation.

RefittedonClydeJunetoAugust1941.DetachedfromHomeFleetoncompletionofrefit toescortMiddleEastTroop

ConvoyandleftClydewithconvoy30August1941,viaCape.

Repulsepreparingforwar,1939.

ArrivedDurban3OctoberandtransferredtoEastIndiesCommand.

Repulseshowingcontrastpaintwork,5July1941,onlyfivemonthsbeforeshewaslost.During1942/3thereweremanyunsubstantiatedreportsthattheJapanesehadsucceededinraisingRepulseandputtingherinaserviceablecondition.ThesourceofthismisconceptionappearstohavebeenofChineseorigin.

EASTINDIESCOMMANDOctobertoNovember1941.VisitedEastAfricanportsduringOctoberandNovember.Transferred to Special Striking Force of new Eastern Fleet 11 November

1941.Because of the threat of war with Japan, consideration had been given, in

August1941,tothereinforcementofBritishNavalForcesintheIndianOceanand East Indies and the eventual formation of a powerful Eastern Fleet. TheChiefsofStaffrecommendedthat,bymid-September1941,onebattleshipfromtheMediterranean,eitherBarhamorValiant,shouldbesenttotheFarEastandthatthefourRoyalSovereignsshouldfollowbytheendoftheyear.Oneaircraftcarrier, probablyEagle,was alsoproposed, but itwasnot considered that anyadditionalcruisersorfleetdestroyerscouldbesparedimmediately.ThisforcewastobeinitiallybasedatCeylontoprotecttheIndianOceantrade

routes,forwhichpurposeitwasregardedasadequate,forthetimebeingatleast,andwastoconstitutethefirst instalmentofanEasternFleet,comprisingsevencapital ships, one carrier, ten cruisers and about 24 destroyers, which it wasplannedtobuildupintheIndianOceanbythespringof1942whenitwouldbetransferredtoSingapore.TheFirstSeaLordhadproposedsendingtheRoyalSovereigns totheIndian

Ocean immediately, reinforcing them with Nelson, Rodney and Renown inDecember1941orJanuary1942.ThePrimeMinister (WinstonChurchill)didnotapproveeitherproposalbut

urgedinsteadthatasmall,powerfulgroupoffastmodernbattleshipsshouldbe

sent to Singapore at the outset; their presence, he suggested, would probablydeterJapaneseaggression.ThisplanwasstronglyopposedbytheFirstSeaLordonthegroundsthatnoneoftheKingGeorgeVclassbattleshipscouldbesparedfromhomewaters.Thebasicdifferenceinthetwopointsofviewlayinthefactthattheforcethe

Admiralty had in mind would be defensive in character, but well placedstrategically, in the centre of the important Simonstown–Aden–Singaporetriangle,while that proposed by the PrimeMinisterwas potentially offensive,based far forward in an area which the potential enemy was threatening todominate. It was found impossible to reconcile these opinions and thematterwas dropped for the time being, although, the gradual transfer of the RoyalSovereignsonlytotheIndianOceanwasbegunwithRoyalSovereignherselfatthe end of August, and in September Repulse was sent to Durban. In mid-October, however, the further deterioration in the political situation vis-à-visJapan led to the question being considered by the Defence Committee at therequestoftheForeignOffice.TheCommittee,supportedbytheForeignOffice,endorsedthePrimeMinister’splaninprincipleandsuggestedtotheAdmiraltythatonemodernbattleship(KingGeorgeVclass),togetherwithRepulse(thenintheIndianOcean)andoneaircraftcarrierbesenttoSingaporeasafaststrikingforceforoffensiveoperationsintheeventofwarwithJapan.TheFirstSeaLordwasstillopposed,butagreed tosendPrinceofWales to

Capetown to await a final decision while the new carried Indomitable wasearmarkedtofollowwhenready.Asaconsequenceofgroundingwhileworking-upintheWestIndies,Indomitablewasdelayedandneverjoinedtheforce.On25October1941PrinceofWales, flying theflagofAdmiralPhillips(CinCoftheproposedStrikingForce) left theClyde forCapetown accompaniedby thedestroyersElectraandExpress.On11NovembertheAdmiraltyfinallyacceptedtheDefenceCommittee’srecommendationandPrinceofWales(stillenroutetoCapetown)andRepulsewereorderedtorendezvousatColomboprior togoingon to Singapore. Prince of Wales reached Capetown on 16 November andColomboonthe28th.RepulsealsoreachedColomboonthe28thandtheforcewasgiventhecode-nameForceZ.ArrivedSingapore2December1941andobviouslyintendingalandingonthe

eastcoastofMalaya,whichitaccomplishedonthenightof7/8th.EASTERNFLEET(ForceZSingapore)NovembertoDecember1941.Repulse leftSingaporeon5Decemberwith twodestroyers for a short visit toDarwin,butwasrecalledthefollowingdaywhenaJapaneseconvoywassightedsouthofIndo-China,steeringwest,

On the 8th, Force Z, comprising Prince of Wales (flag), Repulse, Electra,Express,Vampire andTenedos leftSingapore to attack the supply lines of theJapaneseinvadingforces.Theremainingtwodestroyers,JupiterandEncounter,wererefittingatSingaporeanddidnottakepartintheoperation.

Captain Tennant’s official Report on the sinking of Repulse, 10December1941.We spentOctober andNovember onwhat really amounted to a yachtingtripintheSouthIndianOceanandduringthistimehadtwoshortvisitstoDurbanwhenIthinktheship’scompanyenjoyedthemselvesmorethanatany other port they visited. Toward the end of November we foundourselvesrushedofftoCeylon.RepulsewaslyingatTrincomaleeandIgotasignalfromtheCinCEasternFleet(whohadthenarrivedatColomboinPrinceofWales) tellingme thathehad toflyon toSingapore toattendaconference there and that I had to take the Eastern Fleet there. Thisconsisted of Prince of Wales, Repulse, four destroyers Electra, Express,Jupiter andEncounter. We arrived by 1st December. There was a greatflourishoftrumpetsandmuchpublicitybythepressaboutourarrivalandhowwehadcommandoftheseasinthesewaters.BeforeIgoanyfurthermany of us are hesitant to attribute blame for the loss of the two capitalshipsbutIwouldliketotelltheinnerhistoryofthispoliticalmove.JapanwasgettingmoretroublesomeandboththeBritishandUSForeignOfficesandalsothelocalgovernmentonthespotdeclaredthatifweonlyshowedforceandsentsomecapitalships to theFarEastJapanwouldpipedown.TherewasnotimetocollectabalancedFleetofaircraftcarriers,cruisers,destroyers,etc.,andsotoa largeextentwewerebluffingandinthiscaseour bluff was called. The PrimeMinister practically admitted this in theHouseofCommonssodonotbe temptedtoattributeblamehastily to theAirMinistryortheAirForcesonthespotforthiswouldbe,Ithink,unfair.AweekafterarrivaloftheEasternFleetwarwasdeclaredandtheJapanesestarted bombing our aerodromes on the north coast of Malaya and alsocarriedoutlandingsthere.Thequestionweallaskedintheshipslyingthereat theNavalBasewas,what arewegoing todoabout it?HowcouldweremainsittinginSingaporeHarbourwiththeenemylandingonourshores?So the C in C (Admiral Phillips) after asking for such air protection ascouldbeprovideddidtheonlypossiblething.He went to sea and tried to cut their communications between Indo-

Chinaand theNorthEastCoastofMalayaalongwhich route convoysoftroopswererunning.JustbeforedarkonMonday8thDecemberPrinceof

Wales, Repulse, Electra, Express, Vampire and Tenedos sailed from theNavalBasewiththeintentionIhavejustmentioned.Itwasabout30hours’runtoreachourobjectiveofftheNorthEastCoastofMalayawhereitwasintendedtoarriveneardawn.Theconvoysandanyshippingwewouldfindandthensweepingdownthecoastat26knotsandsohome.Thenextdayatsea,except that itwaswarm,wasverymuchNSweather, lowcloudsandheavyrainstorms,visibilitysometimesdowntohalfamile.Thiswasagreatadvantage to us as we did not wish to be located by Japanese aircraft.However,atabout16.45hourstheskyclearedconsiderablyandtheForcewas very soon being shadowed by at least three aircraft. We were thensteamingtothenorthwhichtheAdmiralcontinuedtodountildarkwherehemadealargealterationofcoursetothewestincreasingspeedto26knotswiththeintentionofshakingoffourshadowers.Atabout8o’clockIgotasignalfromhimsayingthataswewerebeingshadowedhehaddecidedtocancel the operation for if we now persisted and went into the enemylandings the next morning we should probably find our ships heavilyattackedbysubmarines,aircraftandpossiblydestroyersandsowestartedtoreturnhome.Afewhoursafterwehadturnedbackareportwasreceivedsaying that a landingwas taking place atKuanton.NowKuanton is only150milesfromSingaporewhereasSingariandKateBahru,wherewehadintendedtobeatdawn,aresome400milesfromSingapore.TheAdmiraldecidedtoinvestigatethislandingatKuantononhiswaybackandtoarriveoff that place at dawn. Thiswe did and found nothing but at about 6.30hoursRepulsesightedareconnaissanceaircraftwhichIreportedbyflagstothe Prince of Wales. This I think was the aircraft who put the torpedo-bombersontousfortheyarrivedsomefourhourslaterwhichwouldallowforthemtocomefromsouthIndo-China.At about 10.45 we went to first degree HA readiness.Repulse’s RDF

shortly afterpickedup formationsof enemyaircraft.The first aircraftwesightedabout11.00hours.Iwillnowdescribethevariousphasesofaircraftattack which finally caused the destruction of theRepulse andPrince ofWales. They are divided in five separate attacks with varying periodsbetweenthem.Theintervalsbetweentheseperiodswerebetween10and20minutesbuttheperiodbetweenthefourthandfifthattackwasveryshort.The first attack developed shortly after 11.00 hourswhen 9 aircraft in

closesinglelineabreastformationwereseenapproachingRepulsefromjustaboutGreen50andofaheightofabout10,000ft.Firewasatonceopenedon themwith the long-rangeHAbyPrinceofWales andRepulse. Itwasvery soon obvious that the attack was to be entirely concentrated on

Repulse.Theformationwasverywellkeptandbombsweredroppedwithgreataccuracy.Onenearmisson thestarboardsideabreast ‘B’ turretandonehit on theporthangarsburston the armourbelow themarines’messdeckandcausedminordamage.Theremainderofthesalvo,itwasthought7bombsweredroppedaltogether,itfellveryclosetotheportsideandthisconcluded this attack. There was now a short lull of about 20 minutesduringwhich thedamagecontrolpartiescarriedout theirduties inamostefficientmannerandfireswhichhadbeenstartedbythisbombhadallbeengotundercontrolbeforethenextattackandthebombhavingburstonthearmour,nodamagewassufferedbelowintheengineorboilerrooms.Itisthoughtthatthebombsdroppedwereabout250lb.ThesecondattackwassharedbyPrinceofWalesandRepulseandwas

made by torpedo-bomber aircraft. They appeared to be the same type ofmachinebelievedtobeMitsubishi86or88.Iamnotpreparedtosayhowmany machines took part in this attack but on its conclusion I had theimpressionthatwehadsucceededincombingthetracksofalargenumberoftorpedoes–possiblyasmanyas12.Weweresteamingat25knotsatthetime.Imadeasteadycourseuntiltheaircraftappearedtobecommittedtothe attack when the wheel was put over and the attacks providentiallycombed. Iwould like to recordhere thevaluableworkdonebyallbridgepersonnelatthistimeincalmlypointingoutapproachingtorpedo-bomberswhich largely contributed to our good fortune in dodging all thesetorpedoes.Prince ofWales was hit on the port side right aft during thisattackanda largecolumnofwaterappeared tobe thrownup, larger thansubsequentcolumnsofwaterwhichwerethrownupwhenRepulsewashitlateron.Thethirdattackwasahigh-levelbombingattackagainconcentratedon

Repulse. Possibly the enemy were aware, and particularly if they wereusing 250lb bombs, that these bombs would have little chance ofpenetratingPrinceofWales’shorizontalarmour.Iwasmanoeuvringathighspeedatthetimeandwewereactuallyunderhelmwhenthebombsfell.Nohitswerereceived.Therewasonenearmissonthestarboardsideandtheremainderfellclearoftheportside.Theattackwascarriedoutinthesamedeterminedmanneraswasthefirst.AtthistimePrinceofWalesappearedtobeintroubleandhad[notundercontrol]ballshoisted.ImadeasignaltotheC in C about her damage but got no reply and at that timemade anemergency report to Singapore that the enemy aircraft were bombing,followed immediatelybyanamplifyingreportwhichwas justabout tobetransmittedatthetimetheshipsank.

Thefourthattacknowstartedtodevelopandabout8aircraftwereseenlow on the horizon on the starboard bow. Being low down it signifiedanothertorpedoattackimpending.Whenabout3milesawaytheysplitintotwoformationsandIestimated that thoseon the righthandwould launchtheir torpedoes first and I started to swing the ship to starboard. Thetorpedoesweredroppedatadistanceof2,500yardsanditseemedobviousthatweshouldbeoncemoresuccessful incombing their tracks.The left-hand formation appeared to bemaking straight forPrince ofWales whowasatthetimeabaftmyportbeam.Whentheseaircraftwerealittlebeforemy port beam at a distance of approximately 2,000 yards they turnedstraightatmeandfiredtheirtorpedoes.ItnowbecameobviousthatifthesetorpedoeswereaimedstraightatRepulsetheywouldalmostcertainlyhitasanyotheralterationtocoursewouldhavecausedmetobehitbythetracksofthosetorpedoesIwasinprocessofcombing.Onetorpedofiredfrommyportsidewasobviouslygoingtohittheshipanditwaspossibletowatchitstracks for about 1½minutes before the act took place. The ship was hitamidships port side. The ship stood this torpedo well and continued tomanoeuvreandsteamatabout25knots.Therewasnowonlyaveryshortrespitebeforethefinalandlastattack.Torpedo-bombersappearedfromalldirectionsandasecondtorpedohit

theshipinthevicinityofthegunroomandapparentlyjammedtherudderandalthoughtheshipwasstillsteamingatover20knotsshewasnotundercontrol.Shortly after this at least three torpedoeshit the ship, twoon theportsideandoneonthestarboardside–Iknewshecouldnotsurviveandat once gave the order for everyone to come on deck and cast off looseCarley floats.When these final twoor three torpedoesdetonated the shiprapidlytookalisttoport.Menwerenowpouringontothedeck.Theyhadall been warned 24 hours before to carry or wear their life-saving gear.Whentheshiphada30degreelistI lookedoverthestarboardsideofthebridge and saw the Commander and 200 to 300 men collect on thestarboardside.Ineversawtheslightestsignofpanic.Itoldthemfromthebridgehowwelltheyhadfoughttheshipandwishedthemgoodluck.Theshiphungforatleast1½to2minuteswithalistofabout60to70degreestoportandthenrolledover.DestroyersVampireandElectraclosedtopickupsurvivors.WhenIwasinthewaterIfirstsawourfightersappear.Mysignal,enemy

aircraft bombing, was in the hands of the AirVice Marshal in about 25minutes and6minutes later the fighters left thegroundand they covered

the150milestoreachourpointinanother40minutes.About900survivorswerepickedupfromRepulsewhichwaswonderfulconsideringthespeedatwhichtheoldshipwentdownattheend–shewas26yearsold.About400menandofficerswerelost.In conclusion, looking back at the action I think that if 50 or 60well

trained torpedo-bombers can be launched to attack capital ships who arewithout adequate aircraft protection andwith very fewdestroyers, capitalshipswill be seriously up against it. I found dodging the torpedoes quiteinterestingandentertaininguntilintheendtheystartedtocomeinfromalldirectionsandtheyweretoomuchforme.PrinceofWalesandRepulsehadbothbeenwithoutseriousanti-aircraftpractice forsomemonthsandIamafraid the shooting was not good – torpedoes were mostly fired outsidepom-pomrangeatabout2,500yards.I am convinced that we have all got to realize that bursts behind the

targetofshort-rangeAAfirewhichweremissingastern is justawasteoftimeandmightaswellbethrownovertheside.Ibelievethat90%ofshortrangestuffthatisbeingfiredatanyaircraftgoesbehindthem.

History:RenownATLANTICFLEET(BCS)ApriltoJuly1919.RefittedatPortsmouthJuly1919.DetachedJuly1919forPrinceofWales’soverseastoursuntilOctober1920.FirsttourNewfoundland,CanadaandUSAAugusttoDecember1919.Left Portsmouth 5 August 1919, escorted byDauntless andDragon. Arrived

ConcepcionBay,Newfoundland11August.HRHtransferredtoDragon forpassagetoSt.John’s(Newfoundland)andHalifax.

Renown arrived Halifax 13 August where HRH re-embarked for passage toQuebec. Arrived Quebec 21 August where HRH left ship for rail tour ofCanadaandtheUSAAugusttoNovember.DuringthisperiodRenownvisitedWest Indies, South American ports and New York. HRH rejoined at NewYork in November for return home, left Halifax 25 November, arrivedPortsmouth1December.

Renown specially refitted at Portsmouth January toMarch 1920 as ‘yacht’ forlatertours.

SecondtourNewZealandandAustraliaMarchtoOctober1920.Left Portsmouth 16 March 1920 proceeding via Barbados, Panama Canal,

HonoluluandFijiIslands.

Visited Auckland, New Zealand, various Australian ports, and Hobart,Tasmania.

ReturnedviaPanamaCanal,WestIndiesandBermuda.ArrivedPortsmouth11October1920.

PaidofftoReserve(CareandMaintenance)atPortsmouth5November1920.RESERVE(Portsmouth)November1920toSeptember1921.Refit1921.Recommissioned Portsmouth 15 September 1921 for Prince of Wales’s third

tour. Left Portsmouth 26 October 1921, proceeding to Bombay viaMalta,SuezCanalandAden.ArrivedBombay17November1921.HRHleftshipatBombay for fourmonths’ tourof India.During this period,Renown visitedPersian Gulf ports, Colombo, Bombay and Karachi. HRH re-embarked atKarachi on 17 March 1922. Proceeded to Japan via Colombo, PortSwettenham,SingaporeandHongKong.HRHleftshipatYokohamaduringthisperiod.

Returned home viaManila, Labuan, Penang, Trincomalee, Suez Canal,MaltaandGibraltar.

ArrivedPortsmouth20June1922.PaidofftoreserveatPortsmouth28July1922toSeptember1926.ExtensiverefitPortsmouthJulytoSeptember1926.BeganrefittrialsJuly1926.Recommissioned3September1926forBCS,AtlanticFleet.ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1926toJanuary1927.DetachedJanuary1927forDukeofYork’stourtoAustralia.LeftPortsmouth6

January1927,proceedingtoAustraliaviaPanamaCanal.ReturnedviaSuezCanal.ArrivedPortsmouth17July1927.

Refit,PortsmouthJulytoSeptemberandrejoinedAtlanticFleetoncompletion.ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1927toSeptember1931(flagJuly1929toJuly1931).RelievedHoodasflag(RA)BCSJuly1929(Hoodtorefit).FlagrevertedtoHood11July1931oncompletionofrefit.PaidoffatPortsmouthforrefit11September1931.RefitPortsmouth1931toJune1932.RecommissionedatPortsmouth2 June1932 forBCSHomeFleet (exAtlantic

Fleet,renamedHomeFleetMarch1932).From1932,BCScomprisedHood,RenownandRepulseonly.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)June1932toJanuary1936.CollisionwithHoodduringexercisesoffSpanishcoast23January1935,struckHood’s starboard quarter. Stem casting fractured with structural damageabove and below waterline. Temporary repairs carried out at GibraltarJanuarytoFebruaryandshipleftforPortsmouth18February.

CompletedrepairsatPortsmouthFebruarytoMay(completed18May).

InMarch1935itwasdecidedforthesakeofhomogeneity,graduallytoseparatetheQueenElizabeth andRoyal Sovereign classes, stationing the former in theMediterranean and the latter in the Home Fleet. Because of the heavyreconstructionprogrammeintheQueenElizabethclass,theMediterraneanFleetwouldloseonebattleshipbythechangeandtheBattlecruiserSquadronwastobe transferred to the Mediterranean to offset this. Squadron initially dividedbetween Home and Mediterranean Fleets April to September 1936, and notfinallytransferredtoMediterraneanuntilSeptember1936.

RenownpresentatJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

Because of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, theBattlecruiser Squadron, comprisingHoodandRenown(Repulsereconstructing)wassenttoGibraltartoreinforcetheMediterraneanFleetalthoughremainingasaHomeFleetunit.

HoodremainedatGibraltaruntilJune1936whenshereturnedhome.RenowntransferredtoAlexandriainJanuary1936andwasattachedto1stBattle

Squadron,MediterraneanFleetuntilMay1936.Returned home May 1936 and rejoined BCS Home Fleet. Replaced in

MediterraneanbyRepulseJune1936.HOMEFLEET(BCS)JunetoSeptember1936.PaidoffatPortsmouth2September1936for reconstruction thereuntilAugust

1939.Recommissioned at Portsmouth 28 August 1939 for Home Fleet, the

BattlecruiserSquadronhavingrevertedtothisinFebruary1939.HOMEFLEET(BCS)AugusttoOctober1939.WithHood,twocruisersandfourdestroyers,carriedoutpatrolbetweenIceland

and the Faroes 7–12 September to intercept enemymerchant shipping andenforcetheBritishblockade.

Detached2OctoberasunitofForceK(RenownandArkRoyal)totakepartinsearchforGrafSpee.

FORCEK(SouthAtlanticCommandFreetown)October1939toMarch1940.ForceoperatedintheFreetown-PernambucoareaOctobertoNovember1939.Diverted to Cape area to join Force H (Eagle, Cornwall and Dorsetshire)

followinglocationofGrafSpeeinIndianOcean.

Renown,April1928,onFleetmanoeuvreswiththeBattlecruiserSquadronoffPortland,watchedbyKingAmanullahofAfghanistanandcarriedoutinhonourofhispresence.

Renown’ssuperstructureasseenonapublicopendayc.1932.ComparethisphotographwiththatofRepulsein1928;RenownhadtwocharthousetablesasagainstoneinRepulse.

Patrolled area south of Cape of Good Hope 28 November to 2 December inorder to intercept the German ship if she broke back into the Atlanticalthoughshedidnotdoso.

SankGermanSSWatussi offCape2December1939after the latterhadbeen

interceptedbySussex,setonfireandabandonedbycrew.ForceorderedbacktoPernambuco–Freetownareaonsameday,afterGrafSpee

againlocatedinSouthAtlantic,andwasoffPernambucowhenSpeebroughttoactionbyExeter,AchillesandAjaxofftheRiverPlateon13December.

RejoinedHomeFleet4March1940.HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoAugust1940(flagBCSand2ndfleetflagfromlateMarch).Detached February 1940, with Ark Royal, Galatea and destroyers, to assist

FrenchforcesininterceptingsixGermanmerchantvesselsexpectedtobreakout fromVigo. All but two of these captured or scuttled, onewrecked offNorwegiancoastandonereachedGermany.

BecameflagVABCSand2ndfleetflaglateMarch,relievingHoodforrefit.Norwegian operations April to June 1940; covered minelaying operations by

destroyersinNorwegianwaters5–8April.BrieflyinactionwithScharnhorstandGneisenauintheNarvikarea9Aprilin

badweather.ScoredthreehitsonGneisenauat18,000yards,disablingforeturretandmainarmament firecontrol.Hit twicebyenemyfirewithoutanymaterialdamage.

Enemyshipsbrokeoff actionafter about tenminutesandcontact lost in thickweather.During this engagement,Renown reached 29 knots in heavy seas.FlagVAWhitworthtemporarilytransferredtoWarspite10AprilforsecondattackonenemydestroyersatNarvikbythatshipandadestroyergroup.RefitRosyth(repairstoactiondamage)20Aprilto18May.SenttoFaroes–Icelandarea, with Repulse, 5 June to investigate reports (subsequently foundincorrect) of enemy heavy ships being sighted off the Faroes, possiblyintendingraidonIceland.

UnitofcoveringforceforNorwegianevacuationconvoysJune1940.With Repulse, 1st Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, endeavoured to interceptGneisenau,reportedenroutefromTrondheimtoGermany27July1940butnocontactmade.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)August1940,relievingHoodasflag.FlagVAtransferredatScapa10August.RenownjoinedatGibraltar20August.

FORCEH(Gibraltar,flag)August1940toAugust1941.Ordered to intercept French cruisersGeorges Leygues, Gloire andMontcalm

aftertheyhadpassedthroughStraitsofGibraltar11September1940enroutetoDakar,butnotdespatchedintimetodoso.

Temporarily detached 6 November to reinforce Home Fleet for operations

againstScheerintheAtlantic.RejoinedForceHbythe15th.From 15 to 19 November Force H covered Argus carrying the first fighter

aircraft reinforcements(Hurricanes) forMalta, thesebeingflown-off fromapositionsouthofSardinia.

As a consequenceof inadequate trainingofpilots, only fourof twelve aircraftreachedMalta,theothersrunningoutoffuelandbeinglostatsea.

On27November1940ForceH,comprisingRenown(flag),ArkRoyal,Sheffield,Despatchandninedestroyers,reinforcedbyRamillies,Berwick,Manchester,Newcastle, Southampton, Coventry and four destroyers from theMediterranean Fleet, fought an indecisive action off Cape Spartivento(Sardinia) against an Italian squadron comprising two battleships, fivecruisersandsixteendestroyers.

RenowninOctober1936,starboardquarterview(notecatapultamidships).

RenowninOctober1936,showingherfinalappearanceintheoldguisebeforetotalreconstruction.Close-upofbridgeworkandfunnels.

The enemy retired following a short engagement between the cruisers, beinglater unsuccessfully attacked by aircraft from Ark Royal. Renown brieflyengagedwiththeItaliancruisersat longrangebeforetheactionwasbrokenoff.ConvoyreachedMaltaintact.

Maltaconvoy7–9January1941.WithMalaya and Sheffield bombarded Genoa 9 February 1941 while aircraft

fromArkRoyalcarriedoutsearchforScharnhorstandGneisenauinAtlantic8–28March 1941 after the enemy ships had been sighted by aircraft fromMalaya while latter escorting Freetown to UK convoy. Renown and ArkRoyaljoinedconvoyonthe10thandremainedwithituntilthe19th.Searchoperations broke off on 28th after Scharnhorst and Gneisenau located atBrest.

ForceHescortedimportantconvoycarryingtanksandsuppliestoarmyinEgyptforfirstlegofpassagefromGibraltartoAlexandria5–9May1941(convoyhandedovertoMediterraneanFleetescortsouthofMalta).

WithArkRoyalandSheffieldtookpartinsearchforBismarck24–27May1941.Intercepted German supply ship Gonzenheim in Atlantic 4 June 1941.Gonzenheim, which had been intended to work with Bismarck and PrinzEugen,scuttledandfinallysunkbyNeptune.

Maltaconvoy21–23July1941.ReturnedhomeforrefitAugust1941,speedbeingrestrictedto20knotsbytorn

plating in starboard bulge; leftGibraltar 8August, arrivedRosyth on 14th.FlagForceHtransferredtoNelson.

RefitRosythAugusttoNovember1941.Proposed, inAugust 1941, as unit of new Eastern Fleet but not sent out (seeRepulse).

Transferred to Home Fleet on completion of refit and rejoined at Scapa 22November1941.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1941toOctober1942(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag,December1941toApril1942).ReplacedDukeofYorkasflagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag9December1941

whenlatterdetachedtotakethePrimeMinistertotheUSA.SecondflagofHomeFleetcomprisingKingGeorgeV(flag),Renown(flagVA),Duke of York, Victorious, Berwick and twelve destroyers providing specialcover for outward andhomewardRussia convoy from6 to 10March1942duringsortiebyTirpitz.

Contact with Tirpitz established by aircraft from Victorious off the LofotenIslands,but torpedoattackby these failedandTirpitz able to return tobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

FlagrevertedtoDukeofYork3April1942.LeftClyde14AprilasCommodoreinCommandForceW,comprisingRenown,Charybdis, Cairo, four British and two US destroyers, escorting the UScarrierWasp with fighter reinforcements (Spitfires) for Malta. Fifty-sevenaircraftflown-offsouthofSardiniaon20AprilandallbutonereachedMalta.ForcebackatScapaby27th.Similaroperationcarriedoutbysameforceon9May1942whenaircraftflown-offfromEagleandWasp.

ForcerejoinedHomeFleet15May.

Renownnowfullyreconstructed,shownhereinGibraltarNovember1940,asflagshipofForceH.Earlieron4April1940shewasinactionwiththeGermanbattlecruiserScharnhorstatextremerange(18,000yards)andactuallyhittheGermanship.Theenemytookadvantageofasnowstormtobreakofftheaction.

RENOWNBridgeWindTests,1943

AnaerialviewofRenownon25June1942,showingintermediatedisruptivecamouflage.

Based atHvalfiord (Iceland)May to June 1942 as cover forAtlantic convoysagainstpossibleattackbyenemyheavyships.

ReturnedtoForceHOctober1942forNorthAfricainvasion.FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1942toFebruary1943.TookpartinNorthAfricainvasionoperations1942.Force H employed in covering initial British invasion force and follow-up

convoys against attack by Italian or Vichy French forces. Returned homeFebruary 1943. Arrived Rosyth 7 February for refit until June 1943.TransferredtoHomeFleetoncompletion.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JunetoDecember1943.Detached toHalifaxAugust 1943 to bringPrimeMinister andChiefs of Staff

home from Quebec Conference. Left Scapa 24 August, arrived Clyde 19September.

Again detached November 1943 to take Prime Minister, Admiral A. B.CunninghamandUSAmbassadortoAlexandriaforCairoConference.

LeftPlymouth12NovemberviaGibraltar,AlgiersandMalta.WeatherlyqualitiesathighspeedinheavyweatherinBayofBiscay,enroute,

notedbyAdmiralCunningham.RejoinedHomeFleetatRosyth2December1943.

Transferred toEastern FleetDecember 1943 as flagVA1stBS and 2nd fleetflag. Hoisted flag at Rosyth 18 December, left Scapa 23 December withconvoyforFastEastviaMediterraneanandSuezCanal.ArrivedColombo27January1944.

EASTERNFLEET(FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflag)December1943toNovember1944.Unit of force supporting carrier attacks on Sabang (Sumatra) by aircraft fromIllustriousandUSSSaratoga19April1944.

TookpartinbombardmentofCarNicobarandPortBlairinAndamanIslands30Apriland1May1944.

Unit of force supporting carrier attacks on dockyard and oil refinery atSourabaya (Java) by aircraft from the same two carriers 17May 1944 andsubsequentairattackonPortBlairon21June.

UnitofforcesupportingcarrierattackonSabangbyaircraftfromIllustriousandVictorious25July1944,andwithQueenElizabeth,Valiant,FrenchbattleshipRichelieuanddestroyers,carriedoutbombardmentfollowingthis.

Renown’sbridgeworkinMay1943.Notetheroundnessofthebridgeface,designedespeciallytowardoffbackdraught.

Renownin1942.WithArkRoyalandthecruiserSheffield,sheledthebombardmentofGenoaon9February1941,causingconsiderabledamagetotheharbourworks.

TookpartinseveralairstrikesandbombardmentoftheNicobarIslandsfrom17to19October1944.

On22November1944,shipsselectedtoremainintheSouthEastAsiaareaafterformation of a Pacific Fleet, which was commenced on that date, weredesignated the East Indies Fleet, the Battle Squadron for this comprisingQueenElizabeth,ValiantandRenown,andbecomingthe3rdBS,the1stBSbeingallocatedtothePacificFleet.

Onthesamedate,flagVAtransferredfromRenowntoQueenElizabethasflag3rdBSandfleetflag,Renownbecomingaprivateship.

Ahistoricmeeting,ontheforecastleofRenownasshelayoffPlymouthSoundon2August1945,betweenHMKingGeorgeVIandPresidentTruman.

RenownleavesPlymouthforthescrapyardinMarch1949.

Renown’slastdaysasherremainsarefinallycuttopieces,6July1949.

EASTINDIESFLEET(3rdBS)November1944toMarch1945.RefitDurbanDecember1944toFebruary1945.RejoinedfleetatTrincomalee7March1945.Recalled homeMarch 1945 to reinforce the depleted Home Fleet against the

possibilityofafinalsortieintotheAtlanticbytheremainingGermanheavyships,eitherthroughtheChannelor

theNorthernpassages,althoughitlaterbecameknownthattheenemyfleetwastheninnoconditiontoattemptthiseveniforderedtodoso.

Left Colombo 30 March via Suez Canal, arriving at Scapa on 14 April andRosythonthe15th,havingsteamed7,642nauticalmiles in306hoursatanaveragespeedof20knots.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoMay1945.RefitRosythApriltoMay.IntendedtorelieveRodneyasflagHomeFleetbutthiscancelledfollowingend

ofhostilitiesinEuropeon8May.Conference held on board at Rosyth on 11 May, German Naval delegates

bringingdetailsoftheirminefields,buoysandsweptchannels.ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouth15May1945.RESERVEMay1945toJune1948(PortsmouthtoJuly1945,Devonportlater,CCategoryfromOctober1946).Partially disarmed at Portsmouth July 1945; six 4.5in turrets removed and all

lightAAlanded.

TransferredtoDevonportJuly1945.MeetingbetweenHMtheKingandPresidentTrumanheldonboardatPlymouth

on3August1945whenTrumanenroutehomefromPotsdamConferenceintheUScruiserAugusta.

ReducedtoCCategoryReserveOctober1946.Decisionfordisposalannounced21January1948.PlacedonDisposalListatDevonport1June1948.SoldtoMetalIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,August1948.LeftDevonportintowforFaslaneforscrapping3August1948.

Renownin1941,asuperbaerialviewshowingoverallchangesasaresultofherreconstruction.Duringtheearlymonthsof1941shesearchedtheAtlanticinvainforanothercrackatScharnhorstorGneisenau

TheGenesisandDevelopmentoftheAircraftCarrier

Theuseofaircraftconcomitantwithwarshipspre-datestheGreatWar,theUSNavyhavingbegunexperimentsinflying-offaircraftfromwarshipsasfarbackas1910,andachievedsuccessinUSSBirminghamwhileanchoredinHamptonRoads.Aflightplatformhadbeenfittedovertheforecastleofthecruiserandthepilot, Eugene Ely, can claim the first successful flight from the deck of awarship.Alandaircraftwasusedthroughoutmostof these testsandarrestergearfor

landing comprised of wires stretched between sandbags which engaged withhooks on the aircraft’s undercarriage. A successful landing was made on thecruiser Pennsylvania in the following year (landing deck fitted over thequarterdeck).Thisdemonstratedthepracticabilityofsuchflightsatsea,buttheUS Navy then dropped all experiments for the time being and furtherdevelopmentwaslefttotheRoyalNavy.

ARKROYALLaterPegasus

ARKROYAL

LaiddownbyBlythShipbuildingCo.7.11.1913;purchasedbytheAdmiraltyinMay1914;launched:5.9.1914;completed:10.12.1914.Displacement(tons):6,900(load),7,450(deep).Dimensions: Length 352ft 6in (pp), 366ft (oa).Beam: 50ft 4in.Draught: 17ft6inmean.Mercantilehullconsiderablylengthenedinconversion.Armament: 4×12pdr in single openmountings, 2 p&sbefore bridge, 2 p&srightaft.2×MG.Aircraft:8seaplanesin1915.LatermanytypeswereinuseincludingSopwith2-seatersandSopwith‘Tabloids’.Machinery:Onesetofverticaltripleexpansionenginesdrivingasinglepropeller.Cylindricalboilers.Speed:11knotson3,000shp.Fuel:500tonsoil.Complement: 180RN andRFC as completed. Later reduced to 139 as depotship.Costofconversion:£80,000(unofficial).RenamedPegasusinDecember1934toreleasenamefornewcarrierUsedasCatapultandRepairShipfrom1939to1945.FinallysoldtoBelgianyardforpossibleconversiontocommercialserviceand renamedAnita I.WorkcommencedatCardiffbut later towed toAntwerpfor completion. Nothing done and later sold to Dutch scrappers (June 1949).Resold to T.W.Ward and arrived in Grays Essex for scrapping on 15 April1950.

In January 1912 Lieutenant Samson made a successful flight from theforecastleof thebattleshipAfrica at anchor inSheerness (seePre-dreadnoughtbook)andtheninMayofthesameyearmadethefirstsuccessfulflightfromthebattleshipHiberniawhileunderwayatabout12knots(usinggearfromAfrica).Thiswasthefirstoccasionwhenanaircrafttookofffromamovingwarshipandaseaplanewasusedthroughoutthetests.Thecrafthadwheeledtrolleysfittedtothefloatswhichfittedintoapairofelevatedrailsfittedovertheforecastleandforeturret.Noarrangementsforlandingsweremadeandtheaircraftcamedownin the water and was hoisted aboard by derrick. This equipment was thentransferred to HMS London in May 1912 for further tests. None of these

arrangements(USorBritish)wasconsideredpracticableforregularusebecausethelaunchinggearprecludedanyuseoftheforwardorafterturretswhenerectedoverthetop.Theequipmentwasdismantledinallshipsaftercompletionofthetests.In May 1913 the old cruiserHermes was commissioned for service as an

experimentalseaplanecarrier.Canvashangarswerefittedforwardandaftandaflying-offrailwasfittedforwardovertheforecastle.Noprovisionwasmadeforlandings,theaircraftbeingliftedfromtheseabycrane.Successfulexperimentswereconducted inHermes andshe joined the fleetasa seaplanecarrierat thestartofthewar;shewastorpedoedandsunkinOctober1914.Manyindependentshipbuilders were keeping abreast of developments and a proposal was putforwardbyBeardmorefortheconstructionofagenuineseaplanecarrier,butnodecisions were taken pending the results of the trials inHermes; furthermoreconstructionworkwaslimitedtofinishingoffanycapitalshipconstructionthenunderway.The first practical and far-sighted specification for an aircraft carrier was

made byDr P.W. Lauchester and appeared inEngineering on 20November1914.Hisproposalswere for a ship tocarryabout50or60aircraft, andgunspowerfulenoughtorepelanyshipuptolightcruiserstatus.Displacementwastorun to about 20,000 tons, speed to be 20 knots and, with a view to smokeproblems,dieseloilwassuggested.On the outbreak ofwar, therewas suddenly an urgent demand for seaplane

carriers and the quick answer to the problemwas conversion. The Admiraltypurchased a tanker and converted her into a seaplane carrier and renamed herArk Royal. She was fitted with a hangar and workshops, etc., and was givenderricksforhandlingaircraft.Shealsohada160ftflushforecastlefromwhichaircraftcouldbeflown-offbythetrolleyandrailmethod.ShewascompletedinDecember 1914 and sent to the Dardanelles where she was also used as arecoveryandworkshopshipforcrashedaircraft.ShewasthefirstgenuineaircraftcarriertobebuiltfortheRoyalNavy(orin

fact any other navy). Given her slow speed, it was not intended that shemanoeuvrewiththefleet,butbebasedinanareaadjacenttothefleet.Shewasthe first ship to have permanent hangar accommodation built in and the firstfromwhichaircraftcouldbe flown-off.Shehad the160ft flightdeck forward,but there seems to be no record of any flight beingmade from this deck; theseaplaneswerealwayshoistedoutontheirownfloatstotake-offfromthewater.The hangar was located amidships below the bridge and the aircraft weremanhandledthroughanopeningbeneaththis.Therewereeightseaplanesaboard

in 1915 when she went to the Dardanelles. She was not employed as anoperational carrier after 1920, and from1928 onwards shewas used for trialswithcatapultsandsealandingmats.TheAdmiraltywas quick to commandeermercantile ships then completing

forconversion toseaplanecarriers; they included thesmall, fast steampacketsEmpress, Engadine, Riviera, Ben-My-Chree, Vindex, Manxman, Nairana,CampaniaandPegasus.ThefirstthreewerecharteredbytheAdmiralty,buttherestwerepurchasedoutright. In1914littlewasknownabout the techniquesofusing aircraft from warships and when the war started it seemed that theadaptationofthesesteampacketswouldprovidethefleetwithanairborneback-up.Theequipmentinthefirstthreeconverted(Empress,EngadineandRiviera)merely comprised of some light removable canvas shelters for the aircraftforward and aft, and the ship itself remained little changed. Following thesuccessfulraidonCuxhavenon25December1914theaircraftaccommodationinthesethreewasimprovedandtwomoreshipsweretakenup(Ben-My-ChreeandVindex).Becauseofthelimitationsofseaplanes,however,Vindexwasgivenashortflying-offdeckforwardfromwhichsmallfighteraircraftcouldtakeoff.Thelastthreeships(Manxman,NairanaandPegasus)weresimilarlyfittedbutwithsomeadditionalaircrafthandlingequipment.Theaircraftcapacityinthesethree was increased to nine as against the four or five in the earlier ships.Becauseoftheirlackofsize,carryingcapacity,speedandgeneralradius,noneoftheconvertedpacketseverprovedverysuccessfulasaircraftcarriersandtheywere,onthewhole,unfitforworkwiththeGrandFleet.Oncompletion,thefirstthreewereattached to theHarwichForce, anddidnotoperateasaunitof theGrandFleetalthoughtheydidcarryoutvaluablereconnaissanceworkduringtheearlymonths of thewar. Themajority of naval air raids on enemy bases andairshipstationsfrom1914to1916werecarriedoutfromEmpressandEngadine.Riviera andVindex were also used at times, but repeated failures led to theirbeingabandonedpendingthecompletionoflargeraircraftcarriers.

EMPRESSAsCompleted

The main reasons for the lack of success were: 1. Low performance ofseaplanes,difficultyinhoistingtheminandoutandtheirinabilitytotake-offinaverage North Sea weather; 2. Low speed of the carriers which made itdangeroustokeepthemstanding-byinthevicinityofanenemycoasttopickupthe aircraft after a raid. Ben-My-Chree performed some useful service at theDardanellesin1915andEngadinewasactuallyattachedtotheGrandFleetandpresent at Jutland in 1916, but later, after tests had been carried out in theconvertedFurious,thesevesselswereusedlessandless.Theywerelaterrefittedandreturnedtotheiroriginalowners.Duringthespringof1917thelargecruiserFuriouswascompletedasapartial

aircraft carrier with hangars and a flying-off platform forward in place of aforward turret. Aircraft were successfully flown-off from the platform in thesummerof1917,butattemptsatlandingprovedextremelyhazardous.Shewasmodified as a proper aircraft carrier fromNovember 1917 toMarch1918 andfittedwithasecondhangarandlandingdeckaft.Shehadacapacityfortwentyaircraft. As modified, however, she retained the original tripod foremast,bridgework and funnel on the centreline, and air eddies causedby thesemadelanding on the after deck extremely difficult. It is reported that only threesuccessfullandingswereevermadeonFuriousinthiscondition,soshewasnotregarded as a satisfactory aircraft carrier at that time andwasusedmainly fortraining purposes during the latter part of 1918. Another conversion was thecruiserVindictive, a smaller ship of theHawkins class.Themodification tookplace while she was under construction and she was completed in September1918asacruiser-carrierwithahangarandshortflying-offplatformforwardandlandingdeck aft.Her capacitywas six aircraft.She retained fourof her sevenguns from the original and continued to be rated officially as a cruiser (seedrawings). She was not very successful in the role and during 1925 she wasreconvertedtoapropercruiseroncemore.

VINDICTIVEShowingDazzleCamouflage

CONVERTEDPACKETSTEAMERS

Empress,Engadine,Riviera,Ben-My-Chree,Vindex,Manxman,NairanaandPegasusEmpress: CharteredbyAdmiralty

11.8.1914.Commissioned25.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Engadine: CharteredbyAdmiralty11.8.1914.

Commissioned13.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Riviera: CharteredbyAdmiralty11.8.1914.

Commissioned13.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Ben-My-Chree:

CharteredbyAdmiraltyearly1915.

CommissionedMay1915forEasternMediterranean.

Vindex: TakenoverbyAdmiraltyMarch1915.

Commissioned26.3.1915forHarwichForce.

Manxman: TakenoverbyAdmiralty1917. Commissionedin1917forHarwichForce.

Nairana: TakenoverbyAdmiralty1917. CommissionedSeptember1917forGrandFleet.

Pegasus: LaiddownbyJohnBrownandpurchasedbyAdmiraltyonstocks.

Commissioned14.8.1917forFlyingSquadron,GrandFleet.

Campania: TakenoverbyAdmiraltyNovember1914.

CommissionedApril1915forGrandFleet.

Dimensions:Empress:311ft(pp)×40ft1in×15ft6inmean.2,540tons.Engadine:316ft(pp)×41ftIin×15ft6inmean.1,670tons.Riviera:316ft(pp)×41ft1in×15ft6inmean.1,670tons.Ben-My-Chree:375ft(pp)×46ft×18ft6inmean.2,550tons.Vindex:350ft(pp)×42ft×16ftmean.2,900tonsManxman:330ft(pp)×43ft×18ftmean.2,030tons.Nairana:315ft(pp)×45ft6in×13ft3inmean.3,070tons.Pegasus:330ft(pp)×43ft×13ft6inmean.3,070tons.Campania:601ft(oa)×65ft×27ftmean.18,000tons.Armament:

Thearmamentwasveryvariable anddifficult to trace especially in the earlierexperimental ships, but was usually a combination of 12pdr LA/HA and/or3pdrs.Empress:2×12pdrplus2×3pdrEngadine:1×12pdrLAplus2×12pdrHA.2×3inHAaddedlaterRiviera:AsEmpress(12pdrswerelaterremoved).Ben-My-Chree:2×12pdrLAplus2×12pdrHAand2×3pdr.Vindex:AsBen-My-Chree.Manxman:2×12pdrLAand2×12pdrHA.Nairana:2×12pdrLAand2×12pdrHA.Pegasus:AsNairana:Campania:7×4.7in.Aircraft: First eight ships carried various types of aircraft but usually nevermorethansix(allseaplanes).Campania: carried various types including Sopwith ‘Baby’ and Sopwith‘Schneider’.Capacityfor13machines.Machinery:Amixofboilersandturbinesinall.Speed(knots):Empress,Engadine,Riviera,Vindex22.5.Manxman20.5.Nairana19.Ben-My-Chree24.5.Campania22.Fates:Allreturnedtoownersandreconverted.(Pegasuskeptinaircraftroleandfinallyscrappedin1931.CampaniacollidedwithRoyalOakandGloriousandsankon5November1918.

AIRCRAFTEQUIPMENTINBRITISHWARSHIPS

(Conversioncompleted1914)

1.1.15 1Short(CantonUnne),2Wight,3Sopwith2-seaters,2Sopwith‘Tabloid’

2.15 1Short2-seatseaplane(200CantonUnne),WightandSopwithseaplanes

Ben-My-Chree(Converted1915)

11.5.15. 1Sopwith‘Schneider’

21.5.15 2ShortS184torpedoreconnaissanceseaplanes

12.6.15 2Short 17.9.16 ShortCantonUnne,Sopwith

‘Baby’ 1917 SopwithseaplanesMinerva 12–

20.4.15 1Sopwith‘Tabloid’

Doris 25–30.4.15

1Sopwith2-seater

4.15 1Sopwith‘Schneider’Roberts 9.15 1ShortS184Raglan 10.15 1ShortS184Arethusa 2.6.15 1Sopwith‘Schneider’Engadine(Takenover8/14) 1914 3Shortseaplanes(160hp) 4.7.15 1ShortS184,3Sopwith

‘Schneider’ 4.5.16 Sopwith‘Baby’ 31.5.16 2ShortS184,2Sopwith‘Baby’Riviera(Takenover8/14) 1914 3Shortseaplanes(160hp) 4.7.15 4ShortS184Vindex(Takenover1915) 3.11.15 2BristolLandplane1-D‘Bullet’,

3ShortS184,2Sopwith‘Baby’seaplanes

4.5.16 4Sopwith‘Baby’only 24.6.16 Allremoved 2.8.16 1BristolI-D‘Bullet’Landplane 22.10.16 2ShortS184Campania(Completedconversion1916) 30.5.16 3ShortS184,3Sopwith‘Baby’,4

Sopwith‘Schneider’ 1917 Fairey‘Campania’Killingholme 3.16 Sopwith‘Schneider’Brocklesby 3.16 Sopwith‘Schneider’Manxman(Enteredservice1916)

12.16 4Sopwith‘Baby’

29.4.17 4Sopwith‘Pup’Furious(Converted1917) 7.17 3Short225,5Sopwith‘Pup’or

couldcarry10seaplanes,hoistedinandout

3.18 14SopwithI½-Strutter,2Sopwith‘Pup’

7.18 7Sopwith‘Camel’Slinger 6.18 1Fairey3CAurora 5.11.15 1DeperdussinE22 4.16 1Sopwith‘Schneider’.Yarmouth(Modificationstocarryaircraftcompleted6.17)

6.17 1Sopwith‘Pup’

Repulse 10.17 1Sopwith‘Pup’ 3.18 1SopwithI½-StrutterArgus 1918 Sopwith‘Pups’,Sopwith1½-

Strutters(49a/ctotal) 19.10.18 1SqdnShortSeaplanes(310hp

engines) 1918 Sopwith‘Cuckoo’,Blackburn

‘Blackbird’Hermes 1913 Caudronbiplaneseaplanes

Africa 1912 Shortbiplanelandplane

The first really successful carrierwasArgus, completed in September 1918withacapacity for15 to20aircraft.Shewasoriginally the Italian linerConteRosso, building in theUK on the outbreak ofwar and later purchased by theAdmiraltywithaviewtoconvertinghertoacarrierwhentheopportunityarose.Shehadacompletelyunobstructedflightdeckwhichwasachievedbysitingthenavigatingbridgeetc.forwardbeneaththedeck,thecharthousebeingraisedandloweredbyhydraulicpower.Furnacesmokewasexpelledbyfansthroughlargehorizontalducts in the sideof thehangar, right aft or alternatively at the afterextremityoftheflightdeck,andlightcollapsiblemastswerefittedateachsidefortheWT.Thedecisiontoabandonallmasts,funnelsandsuperstructureabovetheflight

deck was a consequence of practical experience with Furious (1917–18) andspecialexperimentscarriedoutonshore,bothofwhichemphasizeddifficultyinlandingsafelyinthefaceofseriousairdisturbancescausedbyhotfurnacegasesand eddies from upperworks. The proposals to fit horizontal ducts instead offunnels originated from Captain Onyon, an engineer on the DNC’s technicalstaff. The Admiralty had little confidence in this system and a normal set ofuptakes and funnels were constructed for Argus in case it failed. Thearrangement as built proved satisfactory on trials, but the various inherentdisadvantages(internalcomplications,extracost,andexcessiveheatdevelopedintheafterhangarandcurtailmentinwidthofthiswithcorrespondingreductionin aircraft capacity) led to experiments being carried out in late 1918 with adummyislandsuperstructureerectedontheextremestarboardsideoftheflightdeck to ascertain the possibility of ‘landing on’with these present. The trials,whichresultedintheadoptionofasimilarplaninEagleandHermes,thenunderconstruction, showed that anarrow superstructure and funnels, setwell outonthestarboardbeam,wouldleaveampleflightdeckspaceandthataireddiesfromthis would not cause interference as had been the case with the centrelinestructureinFurious.Argus’sflightdeckwas550feetlongby62feetwideandabout 60 feet above thewaterline at normal load.Windbreaking palisades (14feethigh)werefittedatthesides,toprotecttheaircraftondeck,andthesewereloweredflushwiththedeckwhennotinuse.Alandingnet(about200feetlong)was laid over the flight deck and ‘dog leash’ grabs were fitted to theundercarriages togrip theneton landing, check speedandprevent theaircraftfrombeingblownoverthesideafterlosingflyingspeed.Anexperimentalsetofretarding gear originally fitted proved unsuccessful in rough weather landing

trialscarriedout in1920,butwith themodifiedequipment80percentof500subsequent trial landings were entirely satisfactory. Although the clear flightdeckwasidealforoperatingaircraftthearrangementoftheuptakesabsorbedagreatdealof internalspaceandalsocausedconsiderableheating in thehangarspaces,whileabsenceofclearall-roundviewfromthenavigatingpositionmadehandlingoftheshipadifficultmatterattimes.

STEAMPACKETSCONVERTEDTOSEAPLANECARRIERS

CAMPANIAShowingDazzleCamouflage

ARGUSConvertedCarrierDazzleCamouflage,Sept.1918

ARGUS

LaiddownbyBeardmore,workstoppedonoutbreakofwarPurchasedbyAdmiraltyin1916.Commissionedforservice14.9.1918.Displacement(tons):14,450(normal),16,400(fullload).Dimensions:Length560ft(wl),565ft(oa).Beam75ft9in.Draught21ftmean.Armament:2×4in50calMkV,2×4inAA,4×3pdr,4×MG.Aircraft:FirstBritishcarrierwithflush,entirelyunobstructedflightdeck,15to20aircraftcarried.(CarriedSopwith‘Cuckoo’torpedoaircraftascompleted.)Machinery:Parsonsturbinesdriving4propellers.12cylindricalboilerswithforceddraught.22,000shp20.5knots.Fuel:2,000tonsoil.Complement:370(490RNandRAFascompleted).Costofconversion:£1,307,615Fate:Soldforscrapin1946.

It isperhapsusefulat thispoint toreferbriefly tomeansadoptedduringthewarforoperatingaircraftfromshipsotherthancarriers.Inthesummerof1915some light cruisers of the Harwich Force had large platforms for launchingseaplanesfittedovertheforecastlealongthelinesofthe1912tests.Thesewerevery cumbersome and completely masked the forecastle guns and they wereremovedafterashorttime.During1917–18themajorityofcapitalshipsintheGrand Fleet were fitted with small platforms over one or more turrets withrunways extending out over the guns. A Bristol Fighter was carried on theseplatformsandbysteamingtheshipfastheadtowinditwasabletotakeoffwiththelengthofrunprovided.Itcouldnotofcourselandonboardagainanditwasfrequentlynecessaryforthepilottocrash-landintheseaclosealongsidewherehecouldbepickedupandtheenginepossiblysalvedaswell.Insomecasestheimportanceof themissionwasconsideredsufficient tocompensatefor thelossoftheaircraft.Theplatformsandrunwaysformedanintegralpartoftheturretconcernedand

didnotinterferewiththeguns.Variousarrangementsforcarryingsingleaircraft

were also adopted in certain light cruisers and included forecastle platformsraisedwell clear of bowguns, hangar belowbridge fromwhich aircraft couldtake-off, standing by, steaming ship fast head towind and revolving platformamidships.Some important operations were carried out by British carriers during the

GreatWar, including: the famous raidonCuxhavenon25December1914bythreepacketcarriers,threeaircraftwererecoveredofthenineflownoff;theraidonHoyer inMarch1916byVindex, twooffiveaircraft recovered; theraidonTondern,May 1916 by two packet carriers, one of the two aircraft recovered.The Short seaplane from Ben-My-Chree torpedoed and sank a Turkishminesweeper in the Dardanelles in August 1915, the first ship to be sunk byaerial torpedo.Engadine, attached to thebattlecruiser fleet,GrandFleet,madereconnaissanceflightsduringtheearlystageoftheBattleofJutlandon31May1916 but accomplished nothing because of poor visibility. The raid on theZeppelinshedsatTondernbyaircraft fromFurious inJuly1918wasthemostsuccessfulairraidofthewar.Lossescomprised:Ben-My-ChreesunkbyTurkishbatteries, January 1917;Campania sunk in collisionwith the battleshipRoyalOakatScapa,November1918.At the end of 1918British carrier strength totalled ten ships ofwhich only

one, Argus, could be regarded as fully satisfactory for all-round aircraftoperations,butherspeed(20knots)wastooslowforfleetwork.OftheothersArkRoyalwas actuallynothingmore thana seaplane tender, the sevenpacketcarriers had very limited range and capacity and were unable to land theiraircraft. Furious, however, possessed excellent speed and range and hadadequateaircraft-carryingcapacity,buttheaircraftcouldonlylandonherwithgreat difficulty so she was unsuitable for general carrier service. The cruiserVindictivesufferedfromasimilardisabilityandwasinfactnotofficiallyratedas a carrier. It should be noted that all these ships were converted types, notdesignedasacarrierfromthekeelup.During1919allthepacketcarrierswiththeexceptionofPegasusrevertedtomercantileservice.

Arguswasconvertedfromamerchantshipandassuchstillshowedlongrowsofscuttles.Hardlyagood-lookingship,sheprovedquitefunctionalinservice.Thisphotographshowsherafterthefittingofbulges,etc.,in1927.

LookingdownontheconvertedAlmiranteCochrane–HMSEagle–intheMediterraneanduring1930.Notethelayoutoftheflightdeckandoftheaircraftlifts

EAGLE1924ConvertedBattleship

HermeswasthefirstcarrierproperbuiltfortheRoyalNavy.SheisshownhereatPlymouthinSeptember1933.Featurepointsarethegiganticsuperstructureandincrediblylowanchorports.

Priorto1920aircraftcarrierconstructionwasconfinedalmostentirelytotheRoyalNavy.TheGermansreliedontheZeppelinairshipsforbothmilitaryandnavalworkandtheotherpowersappeartohaveadoptedthepolicyof‘waitandsee’.But therewasnodoubtby this time that theaircraftcarrier representeda

perfectly practicable, useful typewhich had come to stay, and in 1920 carrierconstructionbeganintheUSAandJapan.InApril 1920 the firstBritishpost-war carrier,Eagle, began trials.Shehad

been laid down in February 1913 by Armstrong-Whitworth as the Chileanbattleship Almirante Cochrane. All work ceased on the outbreak of war inAugust 1914 and the ship lay on the slip until February 1918 when she waspurchasedbytheAdmiraltyforconversiontoanaircraftcarrier.Theconversionbegan immediately andwas completed in September 1923.As a result of thetrials that had been carried out in Argus, Eagle was given an islandsuperstructure,withtripodmastandtwofunnelsontheextremestarboardsideofthe flight deck, an arrangementwhich proved quite satisfactory and has sincebeengenerallyadoptedinpreferencetotheArgusplan.Withadisplacementof22,600 tons,Eagle was on completion the largest carrier extant although hercapacity (21 aircraft)was relatively small and her speed (25 to 26 knots)wasinsufficient for fleetwork.Herflightdeckwas667feet longby100feetwideand extended the full length of hull andwas wider than any previous Britishaircraftcarrier.On her first trials run during the summer of 1920, in a very incomplete

condition,withoutarmamentorforefunnel,tripodormasts,theshipturnedoutonly aqualified success and, as a carrier, inferior toArgus.As a consequencemodifications were effected from March 1921 to September 1923 and theseconsiderably enhanced her all-round value and as modified she proved verysatisfactoryalthoughherspeedwasstill tooslowformodernrequirementsandheraircraftcapacitywassmallinrelationtodisplacement.Oneof themost important innovationsand improvements in thedesignwas

thedownwardcurveat the tailof the flightdeckwhichgreatly facilitated safelanding.Eaglewasfollowedin1924byHermes,thefirstaircraftcarriertobedesigned

andbuilt as such.Withadisplacementofonly10,850 tons, speedof25knotsand capacity for fifteen aircraft, this ship embodied the moderate dimensionstheoryasappliedtocarriersand,withinthelimitsofthedesign,turnedoutverywell although again her speed was too low for fleet work under modernconditions,andexperienceindicatedthatallessentialcarrierrequirementscouldnotbefulfilledonthisdisplacement.FulladvantagewastakenoftheexperiencegainedwithFuriousandArgus in1918,and improvementswereeffectedafterHermes was laid down which resulted in considerable delay in completion.Special features of the design included: 1. Exceptionally high forecastle withheavy‘flare’continuousoverthewholelengthandlowercounterstern.2.Novel

typeofsquare-leggedtripodmast(theexactpurposeofthisisnotclear).3.Boatstowage inboardwith fixed overhead derricks instead of davits. In service theshipprovedverysatisfactorywithinthelimitsofthedesign,butwasfoundtobetoo small for efficient handling of aircraft; she was a splendid sea boat andremarkablysteady;infact,sheprovedabetterseaboatthanalltheotherBritishcarrierspriortoArkRoyalin1939.In1925Furiousemergedfromherthirdandfinalmodificationswithaclear

end-to-endflightdeckandarrangementssimilartoArgus,beingthelastBritishcarriertohavetheunobstructedflightdeck.

EAGLE

Laid down February 1917; launched 8.6.1918; commissioned as carrier26.2.1924.Displacement(tons):22,600(load),26,500(deep).Dimensions: Length 667ft (oa). Beam 92ft 9in waterline, 100ft flight deck.Draught:25/27ftmean.9×6in50cal,5×4inAA,4×MG.Aircraft:Capacity21.Flightscarried:1927–8.TwoSOneF/FOneTB.OneSR(FaireyIII).OneFF(Flycatchers)1937–9:TwoT/B(18Swordfish).Machinery:Brown Curtis all geared turbines driving 2 propellers.Boilers: 32 small-tubeYarrow.SHP:50,000for24knots.Armour:9inmainbeltwasremovedonconversion.Belt4½in,bulkheads4in,1½inflightdeck.Bulgedin1921.Complement:450RNascompleted.Cost:£4,617,636by1927.Fate:OnMaltaconvoyswhen shewas torpedoedon11August1942byU73andhitfourtimes(portside).Sankineightminutestakingwithher260ofthecrew(900survivors).

HERMES

Laid down by Armstrong 15.1.1918; launched 11.9.1919; commission19.2.1924.Displacement(tons):10,850(load),12,900(deep).Dimensions:length548ft(pp),598ft(oa).Beam90ft(flightdeck).Armament:6×5.5in,3×4inAA.Aircraft:Twenty(carriedFlycatchers,FaireyIlls,OspreyandSwordfishduringthelate1920sand30s).Armour:sides2–1½inabreastmagazinesandmachinery,I inoverflightdeckinareasofmagazinesandmachinery,Iingunshields.Machinery:Parsonsallgearedturbinesdriving2propellers.Boilers:Yarrowsmall-tube.SHP:40,000for25knots.Fuel(tons):1,000minimum,2,100max.Complement:664.Fate:SunkbyJapaneseaircraftoffCeylon9April1942;268men,19officerslost.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSConvertedBattlecruisers

The last of the British conversionswere the large cruisersCourageous andGlorious, half-sisters toFurious, whichwere taken in hand for conversion tocarriers in 1923–4 and completed in 1928 and 1930 respectively. Both these

ships embodied the island superstructure arrangement as opposed to the clearflightdeckinFurious.Incontrasttotheearlycarriersthearmamentcomprisednothingheavierthan4.7in(largeDP)andmarkedthefinalabandonmentbytheAdmiraltyofanyideathatcarriersmightbecapableofengagingsurfacevesselslarger than torpedo-boat destroyers, and the acceptanceof the theory that theyshould rely mainly on their own aircraft and escorting ships for protectionagainst surface attack by cruisers or capital ships. Prior to this there had beenconsiderableconfusionofthoughtbothathomeandabroadonthisquestion,andcalibresup to8inhadbeenmounted inUSand Japanesecarriers although theAdmiraltyhadnevergoneabove6in.Duringtheimmediatepost-warperiodvariousproposalswereputforwardfor

battleshipandcruisercarriertypesinwhichthefunctionsoftherespectivetypeswerecombinedusuallybymountinga50percentnormalgunarmamentforwardanddevotingtheafterpartoftheshiptoaircraft(seedesignnotes).Theobviousdisadvantages of such a type soon became apparent, however, and none evermaterialized with the exception of the small Swedish cruiser carrierGotland,completed in1927– theonlyvesselof the typeactuallydesignedandbuilt assuch,sheprovedalimitedsuccess.Following the completion of Courageous and Glorious, British carrier

construction was suspended until 1935 when Ark Royal was laid down andcompletedin1938.Thedesignof thisship, thefirst largepurpose-builtBritishfleetcarrierembodiedexperiencegainedwiththeprecedingconvertedshipsandformed the basis for development of a new series of fleet carriers of theIllustriousandIndomitableclasses.The final designwas approved on 21 June 1934 andwas prepared in close

collaboration with the Air Ministry. Alterative plans considered ranged from12,000to24,000tonswhichshowedthatasmallshipwouldberelativelyveryexpensive because of the limited aircraft capacity, and that all majorrequirements could be satisfied on a displacement of 22,000 tons which wasaccordinglyapproved.TheWashingtonTreaty restrictionsstill in force limitedstandardcarrierdisplacementto27,000tonsandtotalcarriertonnageto135,000tons,conditionswhichmade itdesirable thateach individual shiphavea largeaircraftcapacity.ForsometimepriortotheexpirationoftheWashingtonTreatytheAdmiraltyhadadvocatedareductionintheindividualdisplacementlimitto22,000tons,ArkRoyal’sdesignbeinginfluencedtosomeextentbyanticipationthat thiswouldbe themaximumagreedupon if theTreatywere renewed.TheLondonTreatyof1936,however,whichreplacedtheWashingtonTreaty,fixedamaximum at 23,000 tons and Ark Royal was correspondingly below the

permittedlimit.

HERMES1925

FURIOUSAppearanceChanges

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSFlightdeckandFunnelArrangements(Furiousdimensionsalsoshown)

ARKROYAL,1937AsCompleted–noteshortfunnel

Theprincipalfeaturesofthedesignincluded:1.Incorporationofflightdeckinhullstructureandshortwaterlinelength,withverylongoverhangofflightdeckaft,combininganeasilymanoeuvredhullwithgreatlengthofdeckforflyingoperations.2. Exceptionally roomy hangars with about 20 per cent greater capacitythan in the Courageous class, and especially elaborate fire-fighting

equipment. Provision of three fast-running double platform lifts ensuringrapiddeliveryofaircraftfromhangarstoflightdeckwithtwocatapultsforlaunchingaircraftifshipwerenotunderway.3.Location of entire armament high up, at flight deck level, givingwideskyarcsandmaximumfightingefficiencyinroughweather.4. Three-shaft machinery arrangement providing economy in weight andspaceandmateriallyassistingmanoeuvrability.

Theflightdeckwasapproximately62feetabovethewaterline,800feetlong×95feet,andextendedfromthestemto40feetbeyondthestern.Theforwardandafterextremitieswereroundeddowntoimproveairflowoverthedeckandassistflying on and off. Arrester wires were fitted at the after end with the usuallongitudinalandtransversewindscreens(hingeddownflushwithdeckwhennotinuse)forwardtoprotectaircraftpreparingforflight.Thefunnelwasspeciallydesigned and stiffened to obviate any necessity for guyswhichwould impedeflying space.On trials the smokewas found to comedown lowover thedeckand obscure the landing area, but thiswas overcome by raising the funnel byeightfeet.

ARKROYAL

Laid down by Cammell Laird 16.9.1935, launched 13.4.1937, commissionedDecember1938.Displacement(tons):22,000(load),27,500(deep).Dimensions: Length 721ft 6in (wl), 800ft (flight deck). Beam 94ft 9in 97ft(flightdeck).Draught23ft(normal),27ft6in(deep).Armament: 16×4.5in dual-purposeHA/LA,32×2pdr (as completed), 32×0.5inMG.Aircraft:Capacity72(6Squadronscarried)(4T/S/R).Armour:Mainbelt4½in,deck2½–3½in3½–2¼in,bulkheads2½in.Machinery:Parsonsgearedturbinesdriving3propellers.Boilers:6Admiralty3-druminthreecompartments.SHP:102,000for30¼knots.Fuel:4,620tonsoilComplement:860RN,770FAA.Fate:Torpedoedabout30milesfromGibraltarbyU81.Hitbelowbridgebutonlyoneratingkilled.Startedtosinkslowlyfrom15.40hoursonI3November1941,butaftergettingallhercrewoff(1,540savedbydestroyerLegion)didnotfinallysinkuntil06.13hourson14November

ThenewestcarrierintheRoyalNavyattheoutbreakofwarin1939,thedesignofArkRoyalwastheculminationofmanyyearsofexperimentsonFurious,CourageousandGlorious.ThisrareshotshowsherinGibraltarNovember1940.

Victorious(Illustriousclass),atspeed.

ILLUSTRIOUSCLASS(3SHIPS)Construction:

Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedIllustrious: Vickers 27.4.1937 5.4.1939 16.4.1940.Victorious: Vickers 4.5.1937 14.9.1939 March1941.Formidable: Harland&Wolff 17.6.1937 17.8.1939 Oct.1940.

Displacement(tons):23,100(asdesigned)Illustrious27,950(ontrials),28,210(deep),31,190(deep)by1946.Dimensions:Length673ft(pp),740–743ft(oa).Beam:95ftDraught:24ftload,27ft6indeep.Armament:16×4.5inDP48×2pdr8×20mmAAAircraft:Capacity for 36 as designed, later increased to 54, ranging from Swordfish,Albacores,FulmarstoCorsairs,HellcatsandFireflysthroughouttheircareers.(Manyothertypescarried.)Armour:Mainbelt4½in;Hangarsides4½in;Flightdeck3½in;Outsidehangarwas3–1in‘D’qualitysteel;Partialbulkheadatends2½inNC;3inoversteeringgearMachinery:Parsonsgearedturbinesdriving3propellers.Boilers:6Admiralty3-drum,400psi.SHP:110,000for31knotsFuel:4,800tonsoil.Cost:originalestimate(official)£4,050,000.

ThefollowingIllustriousclasswereaslightlyenlargedversionofArkRoyal,butnotnecessarilyanimprovedversionbecauseofthefactthatArkRoyalwasstillunderconstructionwhen theplans for Illustriouswerebeingpreparedandanyfailingsonthepartoftheformerwerenotyetmanifest.Intheolderaircraftcarriers includingArkRoyal to some extent, the hangars and flight deckwereessentiallysuperstructureinthatthehullwasstructurallyacompleteunitandtherestwassimplyaddedaboveit.InIllustrious,however,thearmouredflightdeck

togetherwiththearmouredhangarsidesformedanintegralpartofthestrengthofthehull–formingasitwereagiganticgirderrunninglongitudinallythroughtheship.Designed by Sir ArthurW. Johns and prepared in the spring of 1936, the

sketch plans were approved by the Board extremely quickly, in fact, in onlythreemonths.Theprovisionofanarmouredflightdeckhadnotpreviouslybeencontemplated, butwas adopted at the insistenceof theController,AdmiralSirReginaldHenderson,whowasalsomainlyresponsiblefortherapidpreparationandapprovalofthedesign.Thereducedaircraftcapacityinthedesign(36)andprovisionofsingleinsteadofupperandlowerhangarsasinArkRoyalwastheresultoftheincreasedtopweightofthearmouredflightdeckalthoughtherewasamaximumcapacityof54aircraftwhentheflightdeckwasfullyloaded.IllustriousandhersistersFormidableandVictoriousprovedverysuccessful

carriersandstoodupexceptionallywellunderextremelyhardandconstantwarservice. From the converted steam packets of the Great War through to theSecondWorldWar’sIllustriousclass, theFleetAirArmhadcomealongwayandhadprovednotonlythatitwasaforcetobereckonedwith,butthatinfactthecarrierhadcompletelytakenovertheroleofthecapitalship.

Furious

DesignandConversionFurious was the first battlecruiser type to be considered for conversion to anaircraft carrier and so she is dealtwith beforeGlorious andCourageous. Heroriginaldesignwasdeveloped tosuitLordFisher’s requirements foraslightlymodifiedGlorious to enhancehis projectedBaltic operations.FuriousdifferedonlyslightlyfromGloriousandCourageous inthewayofmainarmamentandwas at first fitted with two 18in guns instead of four 15in. The secondaryarmament was also different with eleven 5.5in as against eighteen 4in in theearliertwo.Furiouswaslaiddowntothisdesignandwaspracticallyreadyfortrialsinthespringof1917.Herunsuitabilityintherole,however,madehertheobviouschoiceforconversiontoamuch-neededaircraftcarrieranddiscussionstoworkthisouttookplace.Itbecamealltooobviousthatthelightunprotectedframework and big guns did notmake her suitable for battlefleet work and ahangarandforwardflightdeckwereapprovedaftertheremovaloftheforward18in gun and subsequent equipment. She completed in this guise. TheconversionwasrecommendedbyaspecialBoardappointedbyAdmiralDavidBeatty and theGrand Fleet Aircraft Committee in January 1917 to determinefleetpolicy,andwasapprovedbytheAdmiraltyinMarch1917.TheconversionalthoughacceptedwasatfirstopposedbyBeattyunlesstheshipcouldretainhertwo18inguns,butthiswasoverruledbytheBoard.Asacruiserhervaluewasatbestproblematical.Asacarriershehadthesizerequired,andthefastspeedneededformanoeuvreswiththeGrandFleet.HerdesignwasotherwiseunchangedandsheenteredserviceinJuly1917.Herforwardflying-offdeckwasapproximately228feet×50feetwithahangarbeneathittoaccommodateaircraftandalthoughtheaircrafttookoffsuccessfullytheycamedownontheseaandwerepickedupbytheconvertedpacketsNairanaandManxman.On3August1917SquadronCommanderE.H.DunningflyingaSopwithPuppoweredbyan80hpleRhoneengine,achievedthefirstsuccessfuldecklandingevermadeonashipatseabyside-slippingontotheforwardlandingdeck.Astheaircraftpassedoverthedeckofficersgrabbedtheundercarriageinabidto

haulitdownintherightdirection.Atthesecondattempt,however,atyreburstandtheaircraftwentoverthesideandDunningwasdrowned.Thismishap,coupledwiththefactthataircraftaccommodationwasinsufficient,ledtotheremovaloftheremaining18ingunandthefittingofanafterflightdeck.Gangwayswerefittedoneachsideofthefunnelandsuperstructuretoconnectthelandingandflying-offdecksandtheaircraftcomplementwasmorethandoubled,theconversionbeingcompletedinMarch1918.Arrestergearwasfittedontheafterlandingdeckcomprisinglongitudinalsteelhawsersstretchedtightandendingatarampattheforwardendofthedeck.TheSopwithPupswerefittedwithskidsinplaceofwheelswithhooksatthesidestocatchinthewiresandpreventtheaircraftfromgoingovertheside.Thehawserswereraisedaboutonefootabovethedecktoenabletheaircrafthookstopassbelowandengageifthemachineroseagainafterlandingascouldhappeninagustofwind.Alargenetwasplacedattherearendofthefunneltopreventaircraftflyingintoit,butthiswaslaterreplacedbyverticalropes.Becausethefunnelsandsuperstructurewereretained,however,thelandingsprovedveryhazardousasaconsequenceofseriouseddiessetupbythesefittings,andthehotgasesfromthefunnel.Inthisguisetherewereafewsuccessfulifhazardouslandings,butsomeaircraftbrokeuponlandingorcrashedforwardandslippedovertheside;thepilotshadthechoiceofattemptingtolandondeckorcomedownonthewatertobepickeduplaterbycrane.Notsurprisinglymanypilotschosethelatter.Furiouscontinuedtoserveasaflying-offcarrierfortherestofthewarandsuccessfullydeliveredthefirstattackfromacarrieronaland-basedtarget,theZeppelinshedsatTondern.SevenSopwithCamelsattackedanddestroyedtwolargeshedsandthreeZeppelinsinJuly1918.Shewaslaidupafterthewarwithherfutureindoubt,butgiventhegreatneedofaircraftcarriersintheRoyalNavyitwasproposedthatshebefullyconvertedtoacarrierproperinMarch1921.

Furious1918.Convertedtoaircraftcarrierin1918butstilllimitedinpracticebecauseoftheretentionofthefunnelandsuperstructureamidships.Notethesmallliftdoors.

ThejobproblemfelltotheDNC(EustaceTennysond’Eyncourt)whoassuredtheBoardthatasuitableshipwouldevolvefromtheconversion.InamemototheBoardhepointedoutthesalientfeatures:

23rdMarch1921.The scheme provides for clearing the vessel down to the floor of the

presenthangar andbuildingadouble-deckedhangar,with the funnels ledfore and aft at the sides of these hangars, eventually discharging at thestern,somewhatasinArgus.Theupperhangarcantake33SopwithTorpedoCarriersfolded,andthe

lowerhangar28,total61,oralterativesasshownonsheet2.Twoliftsareprovidedtoservethesehangars,andinadditionmachines

canbetakenoutveryquicklythroughtheforwardendoftheupperhangarand flown-off at that level, so that machines may get away from threepositionsatthesametime.TheNavigatingArrangementswillbeverymuchbetterthaninArgus.A

Wheelhouse will be provided on each side of the ship, with a platformoutside giving a view right aft. The two houses will be connected by aBridgeorGangwayfromwhichitwillalsobepossibletolookaftovertheflyingdeck.The armament will comprise ten 5.5in and six 4in H.A. guns, with

controlpositionsoneachsideoftheship.

Verymuchheavieranchorsandcableswillbesupplied,butnoalterationwill be made in the power of the machinery or the fuel capacity. Thepresentfullspeedof31knotswillbemaintained.AccommodationwillbearrangedasaFlagship.Theflying-ondeckwiththetwohangarswillonlybeabout3feethigher

fromthewaterthaninArgus.

GeneralReconstructionasanAircraftCarrierItwasagreedthatarrangementsforlandingaircraftwouldembodytheresultsofthe latest experience and reports from Argus, and such mechanicalimprovements to the arresting gear as emerged during the course ofdevelopment.Thelengthofthearrestingwireswouldbeapproximately350feet.

1.Thenavigatingarrangementswouldbefittedattheforeendoftheupperhangar,somewhatasinArgus,duplicatedoneachsideofthevesselwithagangwayconnectionbetweenthem;thesehadamuchbetterall-roundviewthancouldbeobtainedfromacentralposition.2. The siting of the standard magnetic compass was a matter of greatdifficulty, because of the influence of the ship’s magnetic field, andnecessitatedexperimentalworkbeforeadecisionwasreached.3. The principal armament proposed was ten 5.5in guns, five on eachbroadside,andsix4inHAguns,fourforwardandtwoaft.4.Notorpedotubesweretobefitted.5. The gunnery control positions were to be situated abreast the upperhangar just abaft the navigating positions. The port and starboard controlweretobequiteseparatealthoughtherangefinderineachpositioncouldbeelevatedforuseoneithersideoftheship.6.Theproposedsearchlightequipmentconsistedof four36insearchlightswith Evershed Control and rod control up to 90°, four 24in signallingsearchlightsandanumberof10insearchlights.7.Theconsiderableriseinfreeboard,offeringamuchgreaterexposedwindsurface, necessitated, as inArgus, much heavier anchors and cables thanwould be required for the vessel’s displacement and this necessitatedconsiderablealterationsforward.

FuriousinJune1925.BeingtowedoutofthedockyardinhernewguiseasafullyfittedaircraftcarrierFuriousshowstheworldhersleeklines.Notethepalisades.

Furiousc.1926.Auniqueviewofherrearend,showingcranesandthehangardoorwhichisjustclosing.Notetherowsofventsunderneaththeflightdeckandthelargeholesinthesidejustbeforethecranes–allfortheextractionoffunnelexhaust.

8. Themachinery and boiler room installations remained belowwater asbefore, but in addition to the new horizontal funnel arrangements fordischarging gases aft, considerable modifications were required to thearrangement of trunks and fans for supplying air to these spaces, and forengineroomexhaust.9.Thematterofboatscausedconsiderabledifficulties.Itwasnotpossibletocarry thecomplementofboatsusuallyassigned toavesselof this size

anditwasnecessarytosupplyalargerproportionofrafts.

Bulkstowagewasprovidedintwoseparatecompartments(oneforwardandoneaft) for 24,000 gallons of petrol and 4,000 gallons of lubricating oil. Steampumpsdeliveredthepetroltothehangarsandtopositionsontheflightdeck.Aspecialroomwasprovidedinwhichtoapplydopetoaircraftfabric.Twolargehangarswereprovided,oneabovetheother.Thelowerhangarwas

irregular in shape and contained store rooms, workshops and offices, etc. Itsinternalwidthvariedfrom35feetto50feetanditwasapproximately550feetlong.Thewidthoftheupperhangarwas50feetanditwasapproximately520feet long.Theminimumclearheight in eachhangarwas15 feet.Thehangarswere subdivided for fire purposes by steel roller blinds or curtains. At theforward end of the upper hangar large hinged doors were fitted to enablemachinesofupto50ftwingspantoflystraightout.Thisposition,togetherwiththetwopositionsontheflightdeckinthevicinityofthelifts,gavethreeflying-off positions.Two lifts, serving both upper and lower hangars,were installed,eachabletotakea46ft-longaircraftof47ftwingspan(35ft,wingsfolded).The length of deck available for fitting arresting gear was about 340 feet.

Safety nets were provided on each side, and although palisading was notindicated on the original design, it was planned for a later date. Cranes wereprovided at the after end of the ship for the working of seaplanes andamphibians.Thegunneryandsearchlightcontrolwerecentralizedandduplicatedoneach

side of the vessel. The navigating arrangementswere duplicated on each sidewithabranchcommunicationtoaprotectedlowerconningtowerfromwhichtheshipwouldbe steered.The charthouse, signal offices, sea cabin, etc.,were allarranged in the vicinity of the bridge and adjacent to a cross-gangwayconnectingthetwonavigatingpositions.Thenoseoftheupperflightdeckwasroundedoff,afterexperimentsattheNPLshowedthattherewasatendencyforsteadieraerodynamicconditionstoprevail(withsuchaformforsmallanglesofyawofthewind).Endurancewiththeexistingfuelwas4,300nauticalmilesat16knots,butitwashopedthatthiscouldbeincreased.Ampleaccommodationwasprovidedfortheaircraftpersonnel.TheentirereconstructiontookfromJune1921 until September 1925 and she emerged from the dockyard in a verydifferentformindeed.Throughoutthenexttenyearsshewasinconstantuseforexperimentsand tests andmuchexperiencewasgained towards improving theRoyalNavy’swingsatsea.

FURIOUS:LEGEND

Displacement:(legendcondition)22,130tons.Length:735ft(pp),768ft6in(oa).Beam:88ft(waterline),170ftatnavigatingbridge.Draught:22ft9inforward,25ft3inaft.Widthofflightdeck:92ft;lengthofflightdeck:576ft:lengthofupperflying-off deck; 150ft; length of lower flying-off deck: 200ft; area of lower hangar:23,500sqft:areaofupperhangar:25,400sqft.Armament:10×5.5in,6×4in,4×2pdrSearchlights:4×36in,4×24in,4×10in.W/T:Type36,Type34,Type9,DFtype.Endurance:4,300nmat16knots.Complement:893RNofficersandmen;with24aircraft,251RAFpersonnel;with36aircraft,325RAFpersonnel.

FURIOUS:GMANDSTABILITY,ASINCLINEDLightcondition: 1925ascarrier 21,830tons. GM:3ftDeepcondition: 1925. 26,800tons. GM:3.60ftLightcondition: 1932. 22,400tons. GM:2.30ftDeepcondition: 1932. 27,125tons. GM:2.91ft Stabilityrange Vanishesat 1925: Light 520 Deep 650 1932: Light 500 Deep 620

AlterationsinAircraftEquipmentTo reach the stage of being a carrier proper was a lengthy process as far asFuriouswasconcerned,andthefollowingnoteswillshowthatthetechniquesofusingaircraftatseawereamatteroftrialanderror.Furiouscompletedin1917asacarrier-cruiserwithahangarfittedforwardof

the bridge and a flying-off deck over this. The flying-off deckwas about 220feet long and sloped downwards, tapering to a point at the stem. Collapsiblepalisadeswere fittedalong thesidesandacross thedeck toprotect theaircraft

while they were being prepared for flight. Two derricks (port and starboard)werefittedtohandletheaircraftandasingleliftwasfittedattheafterendofthehangar.AscompletedinthisroleFuriouscarriedthreeShortseaplanesandfiveSopwithPups (foldedwings)which could be brought up from the hangar andflownoffinaboutthreeminutesapiece.Theseaplaneswereeasilyflown-offbythe‘trolleyandrail’methodinwhich

floatsmountedasatrolleyrunningalongaslottedtubeinthedeckwerecaughtattheendoftherunbyadevicewhichpreventeditgoingoverboard.Flying-offoperationsprovedsuccessfulduringtheautumnof1917butlandingbackprovedtobedisastrous.Thefirstsuccessfullandingontheshipwasmadeon3August1917,butithighlightedtheunsuitabilityoflandingaircraftontheforwardpartof the ship. Further conversion made the ship into a carrier proper when alanding-on deck was fitted over the quarterdeck (November 1917 to March1918).Theforwardflying-offdeckremainedthesame,butanotherhangarwasfittedaftofthefunnelwhichgaveheracapacityforabouttwentyaircraft.Aliftwassetslightlytostarboardattheafterendofthehangar.Thelandingdeckwasconnectedtotheflying-offplatformbyanarrowcurvedrunwayoneachsideofthefunnel.Theseaplanesweretransferredfromonedecktotheotherbymeansofatrolleyonrails.The first aircraft shipped after these modifications had in place of wheels

skids which slid along troughs laid over the flying deck. Primitive ‘arresterwires’werelaidoverthelandingdeckanda‘stoppingnet’wasfittedacrossthedeckimmediatelyabaft thefunnel tostopanyaircraft thatoverranthedeckonlanding.Air eddies set up by the superstructure and funnel, however, still tended to

makelandingdifficultwhentheshipwasunderwaysothecarrierwasseenasonlyaqualifiedsuccessinthisrespect.Itwasreportedthatonlyafewlandingswereevermadeinthisguiseandtheoldermethodofcomingdownonthewaterandbeinghoistedaboardwasrevertedtoinmanycases.WiththecompletionofthecarrierArgusnomorelandingswerecarriedoutonFurious.

Auniquebow-onviewofFuriousshowingjusthowmuchtheaircraft-carrieradditionssatonheroriginalcruiserhull.

Furiousathighspeedin1928.Havingafairturnofspeed,Furiousprovedsuccessfulinhernewroleandcouldoperatewithallthecapitalshipsorcruisers.

Theproblemswithaireddieshadbeenlookedintoasfarbackas1917whenaproposal for securing a clear flight deck by use of telescoping funnels and anelevator for the charthouse had been submitted by Armstrongs, but theAdmiralty was not interested in this and none of the usual experiments wereapproved.Furiouswasfinallytakeninhandforconversionintoafullcarrier(June1921

to September 1925) when the funnel, superstructure andmasts were removedandshewasgivenaclearflightdeckthroughoutthree-quartersthelengthofthe

hull. The forward section sloped slightly upwards to slow down the aircraft,which had no brakes at that time. Arrester wires were abandoned. The flightdeckwasalmostashighfromthewaterlineastheoriginalfunnelhadbeen,andsome 30 feet higher than the original flying-off deck as fitted in 1918.Manysteel barricades (known as palisades) were fitted along the sides of the flightdeck to prevent aircraft from going over the side. The original flying-offplatformforward(considerablybelowthemainflying-offdeck)wasretainedasa‘take-off’platformandwasintendedtoflyoffsmallfightersfromtheforeend.Aircraft could be flown-off from both deck levels, those from the lower deckturningtostarboardandthosefromthemainupperdeckgoingovertoport.Atthe forward end of the flight deck was fitted a telescoping charthouse whichcould be lowered until the top was flush with the deck level. Collapsiblepalisadeswerefittedaroundthedeckoverhalfitslengthandtheyfoldeddownintorecesseswhennotinuse.Two15ft-highhangarswereprovided:upper520ft× 50ft, lower 550ft × 35–50ft, which were sectioned off by large steel rollershutters(electricallyoperatedandfireproof).Thefunneluptakesfromtheboilerswerecarriedwelloutoneachbeam,but

they took upmuch valuable spacewhich could have otherwise been used foraircraftfacilitiessotheaircraftcapacitywasnotasgreatashadbeenenvisaged.Ascanbeseenfromtheofficialrecords(originallegend,etc.)provisionwas

madeforabout60aircraftbutascompletedFuriousneverseemstohavecarriedmorethan36.Duringreconstruction therehadbeenplans togivehera large funnelatone

sideoftheflying-offdeck,liketheUSSLexingtonandSaratoga,butasFuriouswas too far advanced at the time of submitting the proposal, itwas not done;Glorious and Courageous were later modified to have this form of fumeextraction.Although shewas reratedas anescort carrier in1942,Furious continued to

serveuntilas lateas1947,provingthatherconversionhadmorethanjustifiedthecontentionthatshewas‘valueformoney’.

ArmourPracticallynoprotectionbeyondthatgiventoalarge,lightcruiserexceptflightdeck (⅝in) and underwater bulges similar to those as fitted to the battleshipRoyalOak(ratherlarge,full-belliedbulges).

Mainbelt:2inHTplus1inMS.Bulkheads:3in–2in.

Protectivedeck:1in–¼in.Flightdeck:⅝in.Funneluptakes:1inatopening,thenmildsteelcasing.Longitudinalscreensoutsidebulkheadsabreastengineandboilerrooms:1in.

ArmamentOriginally designed to carry two single 18in guns, one forward, one aft, butprovisionwasmadetochangeover to twotwin15in ineachturret if required.Thesingle18ingun,stillfittedaftatthistime,wasnotatallsuccessfulbecause,being only lightly framed, the hull of the shipwas liable to be badly shaken.Moreover, a single gunwasnot suitable formodern requirements norwas therateoffireuptomuch.

ARMAMENTASCOMPLETED,19171×18in40calMkI1I×5.5in2×3inAA(singles)2×3pdr2 × 21 in TT (on part-conversion 1918, 16 × 21 in above-water tubes added,(twoeachsideonupperdeck)1925:10×5.5in6×4in4×3pdr4xMG10×Lewis1939:12×4inHA/LAMkXVI(400rpg)MkXIXmountings4pompomsMarkM.MkVIImountings2×0.5inMGmountings(4barrels)4×3pdrsaluting4xMGFrom 1939 onwards the armament remained virtually unaltered except theadditionofapproximately22×20mm

FURIOUS1927AsConvertedtoAircraftCarrier

JustpriortohertrialsitwasdecidedtostiffenthebowsoftheshipbecauseofweaknessfoundinGloriousandCourageous.Whileundergoingthisrefititwasdecidedtoconverthertoa‘cruiser-carrier’type.Theforwardturretandbarbettewereremovedandaflightdeckwasfittedforward.Hersecondaryarmamentofeleven5.5inwasanewsizefortheRoyalNavy,

having first appeared in the cruisersChester andBirkenhead which had beentakenoverfromGreecein1914.Sparegunsfromthesetwoshipswereutilizedfor Furious and later the battlecruiserHood. After conversion her secondaryarmamentstillconsistedofthe5.5inguns,butvariousAAgunswereaddedandremovedoveraperiodoftime(seeappearancechanges).During the early thirties itwasdecided that guns that couldnot fire at both

low-andhigh-leveltargetshadnoplaceatsea(secondaryarmament)anditwasdecidedtofitFuriouswithamoresuitableAAdefence.AmeetingwasheldintheDirectorofOrdnance’sroomon8June1936todiscussthisissue.Ithadlongbeen agreed that the new gun should be the latest 4in HA/LA piece in twinmounts,buttheproblemwaswheretoputthemsoastogivethemsuitablearcsof fire against both air and surface targets.Amethodwas suggestedwherebymostofthegunssimplyreplacedtheold5.5in,buttheDNOpointedoutthatthiswouldnotbesuitablesince:1.Theforwardgunswouldseverelyblastthe2pdrpompoms and their crews. 2. The midships gun (in place of number 25.5in)would have very poor arcs of fire in elevation. 3. The after gun on thequarterdeckwouldbefrequentlyuntenablebecauseofsmoke.Morediscussionsfollowedanditwasagreedtomountthreegunsonthelower

flying-offdeck:oneamidships right forwardand twoP&S just forwardof thepresentgunpositions.Tomountoneonthequarterdeckwheresuitable.Toadoptoneofthefollowingpom-pompositions:1.Mounttwopompomson

thestarboardsideof the flightdeckwitha smallcontrolplatformcarrying thedirectorbetweenthem.2.Tomounttwopompomsontheflightdeck,oneeachside,eachwithitsdirectorinthepositionitalreadyoccupied.3.Tomountfourpompomswiththeirdirectorsontheflightdeck,twoeachside.Itwasrealizedthattoaccepttheabovewouldvirtuallycreateanislandonthe

sideoftheflightdeck,andflying-offfromthelowerplatformwouldhavetobeabandoned.Greatconsiderationwasalsogiventoammunitionsupplyandaftermoredebatethefollowingwasfinallyagreed:1.Threetwinmountingsfittedonthelowerflying-offdeckandoneonthequarterdeck.2.Two2pdrMpompoms,with theirdirectors, tobefittedonan islandon thestarboardsideof theflightdeck.3.Two2pdrMpompomsfittedatstation32,P&S.Thedirectorsfortheseto be the existing ones outside thewing navigating positions. 4.OneHACS Ifittedontheislandonthestarboardsideoftheflightdeckandoneonthelowerflying-offdeck.5.Chainhoistsfittedfromthemagazines.6.Stowageprovidedas follows: 4in guns, 240 rpg (in bottle rack stowage); 2pdrs, 2,780rpg in themagazineand400rpbarrelinready-usestowage.Thefollowingequipmentwasremoved:1.Threesingle4inHAguns(twofromlowerflying-offdeckandonefromthe

quarterdeck); 2.Two2pdr from lower flying-off deck; 3. 5.5in guns and theirammunition fromNo 1 position; 4. Hangar doors from forward end of upperhangar (plated inafterwards);5.Sponsons toexisting single4inmountings.6.Windscreensonlowerflying-offdeckandoperatinggear.

MachineryBeingcompletedaslarge,lightcruiserstheywerenaturallyfittedtogiveagoodturnofspeed.Itwasstipulatedveryearlyintheirdesignthattheirmainfunctionwouldbetooutrunalmostanythingthatfloated,largeorsmall,andthiswastomake them that much more suitable when considering their reconstruction asfullyfledgedaircraftcarriers.Theywerefittedwithsmall-tubeboilersandwerethe first large warships to have geared turbines (Furious, Glorious andCourageous).AscompletedFuriousneverunderwentafullsetofseatrialsbecauseofwar

restrictionsandunfortunatelytherearenofullsetsoffiguresavailabletoshowhowsheperformedinherearlycruisercarrierrole.On reconstruction in 1925, although trialswere carried out, very few speed

figureswere recorded, the performance of the engines apparently beingmuchmoreimportant.Althoughtheship’scoverdoesnotshowaspeedforfullpowerruns,officialdataelsewherestatesthatshemade30.06knotswith90,600shpon

321 revolutions per minute. After her machinery/boiler installations wererefurbishedin1931furthersteamtrialswerecarriedoutin1932(seetable).Oncompletionasacarrier in1925shewasreported tobe‘rather light’and

pronetorollmorethansheshould(asaconsequenceofweightremovalduringrefit).Herconditiondidimproveshortlyafterwards,butitisunclearwhethershewasgivensomesortofballastornot.

SeaTrialsasAircraftCarrier,1925Her reconstruction as an aircraft carrier completed, she naturally underwent afullsetofseatrials:Monday31August:Inspectionat10.00hoursAdmiralSuperintendent.Tuesday1September:Commissionedforsea.Thursday3September:Finishfuelling.Monday7September:MovevesselintoNorthDockfrombasin.Wednesday 9September:LeaveSound and carry out 8-hour full power trials.

Gunnerytrialsandparavanetrialsalsototakeplacewhileatsea.AnchorinSoundoncompletionoftrials.

On7Septemberthe10-knottrialswerecarriedout:

Run Speed(knots) SHP1: 10.105 3,0732: 9.527 2,7313: 10.404 3,2434: 9.288 2,855

Duringthetrialssmokewasejectedthroughthesideopeningsandtheeffectonthe quarterdeck and hangarswas very bad. To prevent smoke getting into thehangars the after fire curtain had to be closed. Observations of deflection ofbulkheadsandtemperatureinhangarsweretakenduringthetrial,alsotestswithdraughtsthroughthehangarsandvariousarrangementswiththefirecurtainsandlifts, etc. (see table).During full power trials smoke got up through the flightdeckbuthadverylittleeffectonthequarterdeckorhangar.Trialsofthehangardoorswere successful, and thedoors couldbeopenedandclosed in about tenseconds. Full power trials tookmore than twohours to develop and themeanSHPreachedwas91,485onadisplacementof23,900tonsbutnospeedswerelogged(30.03knotsbybearings).

FULLPOWERSTEAMTRIALSAFTERCOMPLETERENEWALOFMACHINERYPARTSANDBOILERSRE-TUBEDDURING1932(seelistforworkdone).Trial:EnglishChannel.I6February1932(4hour).Draught:26ft4½inforward,26ftIinaft.Displacement:24,970tons.Bottomofship:slightlyfoul.Wind:20kts.Sea:4to5slightswell.Fuel:ConsumptionperHPperhour:1.15lb;pressure(oil):124psi.Propellers:3-bladed.11ft6indiameterlift6inpitch.Totalexpandedareaofeachprop:78ft6in.Surface:bright.Immersionofupperedgeatcommencementoftrials:inner:13ft4⅞in,outer:13ft0⅛in.Revolutions: inner shaft: port 314.1, starboard 318.4; outer shaft: port 315.2,starboard319.1.Meanofallshafts:316.7.ShaftHorsePower:innershaft:port22,841,starboard:22,813;outershaftport22,213,starboard:21,887.TotalSHP:45,054port,44,700starboard;89,754shp.Speed(takenbybearings,notlog):28.8knots.

Effectofdraughtthroughhangars:1.Liftsatflightdeck.Hangardoorsfullyopen.Allfirecurtainsclear.Windscreensoutsidehangardoorsup.

Slightdraughtthroughhangarsofabout2–3mph.Sulphurfumesinhangar.Quarterdeckclearofsmoke.

2.Asaboveexceptwindscreendown.

Windthroughupperhangar15mph(afterend).Nofumesinhangar.Temperaturefellconsiderably.

3.Forwardliftatflightdeckandafterliftatupperhangardeck.

Windspeedatafterendoflowerhangar.Slightdraughtabout3mph.

Allfirecurtainsclearedexceptat75upperhangar,whichwasclosed.Windscreensup.

Lowerhangarandquarterdeckquiteclear;upperhangarnofumesordraught.Temperaturerising.

4.Asabove(3)exceptwindscreendown.

Windspeedinlowerhangar16mph.Bothhangarsanddecksquiteclearoffumes.Temperaturesrisinginupperhangar.Nodraughtinupperhangar.

Itwasseenfromthese trials thatso longas therewasaslightdraught throughthehangarsthefumeswerekeptclearoftheship,butwhentherewasnodraughtatall,thefumesfoundtheirwayupthroughtheliftwellintotheupperhangar.Whenthecurtainswereclosedinsomecasesthetemperatureinthehangarroseveryrapidly.

EngineandBoilerRoomRefitPropellingmachinery:Allturbinerotorslifted,HPscompletelyrebladed,LPsaheadandasternpartially

rebladed.Carbonpackingrenewed,manoeuvringvalvesfitted.Gearwheelsandpinionsexaminedandteethtrimmed.Propellershaftingalignedandsterntubesre-wooded.Mainthrustblocksopenedoutandpadpiecesrefitted.Underwaterfittingsexaminedandrenewedifnecessary.Maincondensersexaminedandnewdoorsfitted.Newglands,sectionalvalves,etc.,renewed.Allauxiliarymachinerycheckedandrenewedwherenecessary.

Boilers:Boilers, 18 in number, were re-tubed and new circular water pockets fitted.

Boiler casings modified to suit new water pockets. Brickwork renewed.Uptakesrepairedwherenecessary.Newfeedvalvesfitted.Oilfuelheatersre-tubed.Newfeedheatersfitted.Modificationtoboilerfrontsandnewtypeofoilfuelsprayersfitted.

Durabilityofboilers:steamreservoirs,5years;waterreservoirs,10years;boilertubes,7years.

Flying-offTrialsSpithead,6April1925.FuriousTheDirectorofTechnicalDevelopment’sdeck landingand launching trialsofnew typesofaircraftwerebegun inApril1925andcontinueduntil theendofOctober.Thefollowingaircraftweretested:

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongV-bottomedwoodenfloats.FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedwoodenfloats.FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithshortflat-bottomedduralfloats.FlycatcherSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedduralfloats.FlycatcherAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyres.Flycatcheraeroplanewithskids.BlackburnSeaplanewithwoodenfloats.FerretAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyres.FerretAeroplane(Jaguar).FerretAeroplane(Jupiter).HendonAeroplane.DartAeroplanewithoverheadrailandaxleguides.Trialswerealsomadewithcertaintypesoftrolliesformovingseaplanesabout

thedeckhangars.FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongV-bottomedwoodenfloatsThis machine was picked up on the special handling trollies provided. Fourtrollieswereused,twotoeachfloat.Eachtrolleyhadfourwheelswhichcouldbeadjustedtomoveinanydirection.Thetrollieshaddropaxleswhichcouldberaisedbyaratchetactionandthuslifttheseaplane.Thetrolliesprovideddidnotfittheparticularseaplaneandtookalongtimetoadjust.Thesmallwheelsofthetrolliesledtodifficultiesinpassingoverthewindscreens,becauseofholesinthescreensandvariousprojections.The seaplane was flown-off from in front of the windscreen on the upper

hangar deck using a quick release, the deck to the bow being covered withgrease.Forparticularsofrunsforlaunchingandlandingseetable.Inflying-offthemachinetookthewholeavailablelengthofrun,andthepilot

apparentlydidnotpullheroffthedeckalthoughhestatedthatheattemptedtodoso.Itwasthoughtthatthedistanceofthestepwhichwassomeway(about12inches)aftof thecentreofgravitymightmake itdifficult to tilt theaircraft toobtain the required angle of attack, but another pilot in the Fairey IIID flat-bottomedfloatexperiencednodifficultyinpullingthemachineoff.

Inmaking landings thearrestinggearwasnotused.The lengthof runwhenlanding proved to be greater than had been anticipated from the trials of theFlycatcherSeaplanewithflat-bottomedfloatscarriedoutinHermesthepreviousyear, andwasactuallygreater thanwithwheels.Thiswaspossiblybecauseofhighspeedofapproach,andpossiblybecauseoftheattitudeofthemachine,thelongtailportionof thefloatpreventingthetailcomingdownandthuslimitingthe angle of attack of thewings.Other factors that could have influenced thelengthofrunwhenlandingwerethegreaseonthebottomofthefloatsadheringafter flying-off, andapprobable reduction in airvelocityunder the lowerwingcausedbytheriseintheflightdeckattheforwardend.Thewoodenfloatswereprotectedwithsteelrunnersontheforwardportion,butwereunprotectedonthetail portion. Surprisingly little damage was done to the floats despite passingovermanyprojectionsonthedecks.Theunprotectedtailportionreceivedmostofthedamage.After the first launching a second type of trolley, primarily intended as a

launching trolley,was tried formoving theseaplaneabout.This trolleywas inone piece and had four small wheels, two for each float. It was found to bequickertousethantheprevioustrolley,butneededseveralminutestofitit,andexperienced difficulty in passing over obstacles and the windscreen. NolaunchingsweremadewiththistrolleyAfterthefirsttwodays,thetrollieswerenolongerusedanditwasfoundpossibletopushtheseaplanesaboutonthebaredecksufficientlyquicklywithoutthem.FaireyIIIDwithlongflat-bottomedwoodenfloatsThismachinewas flownoff the upper hangar deck, using a greased deck andquick-releaseslip.Forthefirstflighttheentireavailablelengthwasused,butontherestofthelaunchingsthepilotpulledthemachineoffbeforetheendofthedeck.The third landingwasabadone, themachinecoming inwithdrift.Theafterendoftheportfloattouchedtherounddownoftheflightdeckrightaftanddetached the brass tail-piece, and the machine slewed to port. Both floatstouchedthedeckbeforecrossingthestepinthedeck,wellontheportsideofthedeckandmakinganangleofabout10°totheforeandaftline.Iftheaircrafthadbeen an aeroplane (i.e.,with awheeledundercarriage) itwouldprobablyhavegone over the side. Before reaching the deck edge the machine suddenlyswervedtostarboardandstopped.Thearrestinggearwasnotused,andthiswasthecase,withafewexceptions,throughoutthewholeseriesoftrials.Thefloatsweremoreextensivelydamaged than in thepreviousmachine.Thestepof thefloatwasdamagedinpushingthemachineoveroneofthestanchionsroundtheliftopening.Oneofthefloatrunnerswasdetachedbyalugonthedeckusedfor

bowsingdownthearrestinggearwires.

Furious’sportbowinDevonport,January1932.Notetheoriginalcruiserbowhighlightedinthisview.

TheboilerroomofFurious.Likeallwarshipswithlargemachineryinstallations,aclosewatchwasnecessaryathighspeedsincaseofmechanicalfailure–itwasnoeasytasktokeepthislotingoodorderasanyoldstokerwilltellyou.

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithshortflat-bottomedduralfloatsThismachinewas flown-off the after end of the forward lift,without using aquick-release, ina38½-knot relativewind.Themachine liftedbefore reachingthewindscreen;approximaterun54feet.Nogreasewasused.Thelandingsweregood,andverylittledamagewasdonetothefloats.FlycatcherSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedduralfloatsThis machine made very good landings, and the dural floats stood upextraordinarilywelltotheroughtreatmentinpassingoverobstaclesonthedeck.Themachinewasflown-offbothwithandwithoutusinggreaseandnotroublewasexperiencedinpullingoffthegreaseddeck.

FLYINGOFFTRIALS,1925 Weight

(lbs)Relativewindspeed(knots)

Lengthofrun(ft)

Remarks

MachineFaireyIII.D

4,874 40 70 FlownoffU.H.D.usinggreaseandQ.R.

Seaplane, SwervedtostarboardandhitlongV-bottom

stanchionstayeyebolt.

woodfloats 4,862 38 95 Ranstraight.FaireyIII.D.

4,898 35 90 FlownoffU.H.D.usinggreaseandQ.R.

Seaplane, Didnotpulloffdeck.longflat-bottom

woodfloats 4,860 36 70 Hangardoorshut.Didnotpulloffdeck. 4,837 37 60 H.D.open.Pulledoffdeck. 4,638 35 50 H.Dshut.Pulledoffdeck.

FaireyIII.D

38½ 54 Fromflightdeck,nogrease,noQ.R.

Seaplane,shortdural

flat-bottomfloats

Flycatcher 3,277 34 39 Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.Seaplane,long

Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.

flat-bottom 3,253 31 30 Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.duralfloats 3,232 39 27 Pulledofffromungreaseddeck.Flycatcher 3,454 34 48 UsingQ.R.Amphibian, 3,447 35 60 Otherlauncheswerewithout

Q.R.frompositioninwhichmachinestopped.

WithV-bottomfloats

&solidtyre.

Flycatcher 2,732 31 30 UsingQ.R.(Jaguar) Otherlaunchesweremade

withoutAeroplane manhandlingfromposition

machinelandedin.withskids. Blackburn 6,232 37 98 Tookofftopofwindscreen.Seaplane withwood floats. 6,302 32½ 77 Ferret 4,772 38 75 UsingQ.R.Amphibian 4,761 36 84 Tookoffwindscreen.(Jaguar) 4,754 31 78 4,744 34 78 4,735 34 78

Ferret 4,228 28 84 Aeroplane 4,221 28½ 64 (Jupiter) 4,214 29 84 4,207 32 55 4,198 35 55 4,186 32 65 Hendon 6,866 32 92 Withtorpedo.Torpedo 6,847 38 80 Withtorpedo.aircraft 6,837 32½ 68 Withtorpedo.Dart 25 109 Ran21ftbetweenguides.Torpedo 27 65 Ran27ftbetweenguides.aircraft 24½ 85 Ran27ftbetweenguides.

FlycatcherAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyresThismachinemade a numberof good landingswithout the arrestinggear, themachine camepractically to rest and the pilot thenopenedup the throttle andflewoff againwithout the aircraft beingmanhandled.The new feature of thismachinewas thenew shapeofwoodenV floats and the solid tyres.Thedecklanding qualities were quite satisfactory but themilitary load appears to havebeenreducedtopracticallynothing.FlycatcherAeroplanewithskidsThismachinefittedwithskidsinlieuofwheelsbehavedperfectlysatisfactorily.Theintentionwastoaddfloatswhichcouldbeshedduringflight ifnecessary.Thedesignofafloat-cum-skidmachinewasinvestigatedbyMessrs.Fairey.Theplane was flown-off after each landing except the first without beingmanhandled.BlackburnSeaplanewithwoodenfloatsThismachinemade successful landings. The step and heel of the floats weredamaged by obstacles on the deck. It is understood that this seaplane wasunsatisfactoryingettingoffthewater.FerrettAmphibian(Jaguar)Thismachinemadeanumberofverygoodlandingswithoutthearrestinggear.The view from pilot’s seatwas satisfactory. It is understood that themachinewasunsatisfactoryintakingofffromthewater.FerretAeroplane

This machine behaved satisfactorily, both with the Jaguar and the Jupiterengines.Theflexibilityoftheundercarriage,whichinthepreviousArgus trialsinSeptemberwaspronounced,wasnotsoprominentonthisoccasion,butstillobservable.Hendon2-seaterTorpedoAircraftSometrialswiththismachineweremadeinArgus,butwerediscontinuedasthepilotwasnotgettingthebestoutofthemachine.ThelandingsinFuriousweremoresatisfactory.Owingtothehigh-liftslottedwingsthelandingsareapttobeabitbouncy.DartTorpedoAircraftThismachinewaslaunchedfromtheupperhangardeckusinganoverheadrailtosupportthetailandaxleguidesonthedeck.Thetrialswereforthepurposeoftestingtheprincipleofflying-offmachinesinthismanner,sothatifsuccessfulanumberofmachinescouldbeflown-offinrapidsuccession.Thetailsupportwasnecessarytopreventthepropellerstrikingthehangarroof.Thetaildroppedafterleaving the overhead rail. The trials were successful, and it was consideredsufficienttojustifyalteringthehangarheadroomclearancetoenableothertypesofmachinestobeflown-offinthismanner.Conclusions

1.Thetrialsshowedthatanytypeofaircrafthavingalowlandingvelocityandgoodcontrolat lowspeedcouldbe landedonandflown-offFurious.Seaplanes, Amphibians and Aeroplanes with wheels or skids appearedequallysatisfactoryinthisconnection.2.Throughoutthetrialsthearrestinggearwashardlyusedanditappearedto be established that the improved airflow over the deck of Furioustogether with the high speed of wind rendered the use of arresting gearunnecessary,exceptpossiblyinveryhighnaturalwindsorwithrollingandpitchingmotionontheship.Since,however,thearrestinggearundoubtedlygaveconfidence topilots, itwasconsidered thatarrestinggearshouldnotbe omitted until some alternative such as power-operated palisades at thedeckedgeswerefittedinlieu.3. If seaplaneswere tobeoperated fromCarriers itwasessential that thedeck should be made flush, and all obstructions such as stanchions,eyebolts,fittingsatheeloffirecurtainsetc.removedfromtheflyingdeckandhangars.Itwasforconsiderationwhetherseaplanesshouldbeusedaslongasthearrestinggearwasretained,althoughthetrialsrathersuggestedthat the damage done in passing over the arresting gear hurdles was not

verygreat.

FlightdeckofFuriousc.1928/30.Notethewindbreakersflatondeckandtheopenliftdoor:

FURIOUS:MASTDIMENSIONS,APRIL1925Length:Signalmast:27ft6inSignalyards:9ftSteaminglight:20ft6inW/Tmasts:38ft6inOutriggersforW/T:8ftAircraftsignalbooms:17ftJackstaff:19ft10inEnsignstaff:24ftGuestwarpbooms:50ftSoundingbooms:30ftSternboom:6ftSeaplanebooms:50ftHighestpartofsignalmastswhenextended:84ft4inHighestpartofW/Tmasts:forward90ft1in,amidships92ft,aft92ft.

FlightsCarried1927–29: One Fleet Fighter; two Spotter; one Spotter Reconnaissance; two

Torpedo.(In1928(October)alsoreportedascarryingSixFlights.Single-seatDart torpedo aircraft and single-seat Flycatcher fighters. 3 or 4-seatBlackburnorBisonforspottingand3-seatFaireyIIIFreconnaissance.)

FURIOUS:CRUISERANDAIRCRAFTCARRIER,DATAASCOMPLETEDAscruiser:Construction:Armstrong-Whitworth;laiddown8.6.1915;launched18.8.1916;completed26.6.1917.Displacement(tons):19,513(load);22,890(deep).Length:735ft2¼in(pp),786ft9inoa.Beam:88ft0⅝inatwaterline.Draught:24ftmean.Armour:Main belt 2inHT plus 1 inMS.Bulkheads 3–2in,Barbettes 7–6–3in, Turrets11–9–7–4¼in,Decks:forecastleIin,upperIin,mainI¾–1in,lower3–1in,CT10inface6–3inelsewhere,FunneluptakesI½–1in.Machinery:BrownCurtisgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.DesignedSHP:90,000for31.5knots.Boilers:18YarrowFuel:750/3,160tonsoilRadiusofaction:6,000nmat20knots(design).Complement:737ascompleted;890in1925(RNandRAF).Costs:£1,050,000forhull.Asaircraftcarrier:Displacement(tons):22,500(normal);26,500(deep);28,430by1939.Lengthunchanged.Beam:107ftoverflightdeck.Draught:27ft3inmean.Armour:seenotes.Machinery: unaltered except for renewal of many items (see notes on 1931machinery/boilerrefit)Radius:4,300milesat16knots.Armament:seearmamentnotes.Aircraft: see aircraft list (carried Barracuda aircraft at end of SecondWorldWar).Complement:738RNplus468RAF.(1932)IncreasedlaterandduringthewartoaccommodateextraAAgunsandaircraftasrequired.

Nofullfigureavailable.Costs:about£6,000,000spentonshipupto1939.

Furious–arareviewoftheloweraircrafthangarwiththeliftabouttoconveyanaircraftuptotheflightdeck.Notethegreatheightbetweendecklevels.

Furiousin1939withhernewisland.Shewasnotanewcarrierbutherrolewasmostimportantduringtheopeningmonthsofthewarpendingthearrivalofthenewcarriers.

1930–32: Two F/F (Flycatchers); three S/R (two Fairey IIIF, one Blackburn);twoTorpedo(oneDart,oneRiponII).

1933:OneF/F(nineNimrodorFlycatcher);oneS/R(twelveFaireyIIIF);OneT/B(twelveRipon);twoTorpedo(oneDart,oneRiponII).

1934:Asin1933lesstwoTorpedo.1935:OneF/F(sixNimrods);oneF/R(threeOsprey);oneT/3(twelveBaffin);

oneS/R(twelveFaireyIIIF).1936:OneF/F (nineOsprey); oneT/B (twelveSwordfish); oneT/S/R (twelve

Swordfish).1937to1939:Alltypescarriedfortrainingpurposes.1939onwards:EighteenSwordfish.

AppearanceChangesInherbattlecruiserroleFurious’sappearancewaslessthanpleasing.Herflightdeckforward, largefunnelamidships(withsuperstructure)andsingle18ingunaft gave her a rather unsymmetrical profile. As reconstructed to an aircraftcarrier proper, although changing drastically her appearance remained ratherodd.Thesuperstructure,tripodmastandfunnelwereremovedandahighclearflyingdeckwasfittedovermostoftheship.Theabruptterminationoftheflyingdeckinadome-shapedoverhangwellshortofthestem,withslopingflying-offplatform lower down forward of this, presented a particularly awkwardappearancewhen seenbowson.Ascompleted for trials thehangar sides frommidshipstoaftoverthesmokeductswereplatedinwithfourrowsofscuttlesforventing, but the plating was removed after trials and before the ship enteredservice.Asmallcharthouseontheforwardendoftheflightdeckwastelescopicand lowered flushwith the deckwhen operating aircraft. Lower deck scuttlesforwardandaftwereextendedfurthermidships.Rig:Short,lightpoleportandstarboardonflightdeckrightforward.ThreecollapsiblelatticeW/Tpoleseachside flightdeck spacedwell apart. Easily distinguished fromArgus by amuchlongerhull,curvedstem,flightdecknotcarriedrighttostemandstern,andgunsinshieldsalongforecastledeckside.1926–39period,asrefittedSeptember1930toFebruary1932:

OverheadviewofFuriousatwarandcamouflagedallovendeckincluded,10July1942.

AAarmament increased to three4in, sixteen2pdrs (8barrels).4in in singleopen mountings on afterdeck of flying–off platform and one right aft onquarterdeck.Structurebelowflying–offplatformwasmoreenclosed.1937–8:Forwardendofflying–offplatformraisednearlyhorizontal.

AsrefittedJanuarytoMay1939:5.5ingunsreplacedbytwelve4indual-purpose(HA/LA)withenlargedtwinshields.

General details 1939:Hull as in 1925;HA director on flying–off platform onisland. Guns increased to thirty-two 2pdrs. Aircraft equipment: As in 1925except that flying–off platform forward no longer used for this purpose.Machineryandboilersasoriginal.Appearancegenerallyas in1925except forthe short island superstructure with RDF aerial pole and HA director onstarboard side of flying–off deck amidships. Prominent AA guns and HAdirector on flying-off platform forward. Quarterdeck raised to forecastle decklevel.Rearofshipabaftsmokeductspaintedblack.1939–45:asrefittedinUSASeptember1942toApril1943.20mmAAadded

portandstarboardonforecastleinsponsonsatsidesofflightdeckaft.Type275RDF toHAdirectors. 1943–4: Somemultiple 2pdrs removed.Type 281RDFfittedbyNovember1943.

History:FuriousOriginallyintendedasalarge,lightcruisershewaslaiddownattheArmstrong–Whitworth Yard at Newcastle–on–Tyne but was never actually completed assuch.Sheenteredserviceasahybridtype,beinghalfcruiserofaverypowerfultype (18in gun), the forward part of the ship serving as an aircraft take-offplatform.Shewas subjected tomany experiments throughout theGreatWar andwas

fittedwithanafterlanding–ondeckin1918.Finallycompletelyreconstructedasa carrier proper when she entered the Royal Dockyard at Devonport in June1921. The refit was completed in August 1925 and she rejoined the AtlanticFleettorelieveArgus.UnderrefitagainatDevonportfromSeptember1930untilFebruary1932after

whichshejoinedtheHomeFleet(exAtlanticFleet).HomeFleet:March1932untilMay1934.ShewastemporarilyattachedtotheMediterraneanFleetfromMaytoOctoberin

1934.RejoinedHomeFleetinOctober1934untilNovember1942.EmployedasTrainingCarrier1937toMay1939.RefitatDevonportDecember1937toMay1938.AttheoutbreakofwarshewasbasedatRosyth.Halifax Convoy duties October 1939 and escorted Canada convoy to UK in

December1939(arrivinginClydeon17th).

Norwegian Campaign April–June 1940. Her aircraft attacked a torpedo–boatdestroyeron11Aprilanditisthoughtthatthiswasthefirsttimethatcarrier-borneaircrafthadattackedasurfacewarshipatsea.

Underwentturbinerepairsduringthisperiod.At theendofJune1940shecrossedtheAtlanticcarrying£18,000,000ofgold

bullion.SheleftHalifaxon1JulyandarrivedatLiverpoolonthe7thwith49Americanaircraftandsparesonboard.

Furious,1941/42.

FuriousinroughweatherAfterthelossofGloriousandCourageousin1939/40,FuriouswastheoldestcarrierservingwiththeRoyalNavy.

During September 1940 she took part in anti-shipping strikes at Tromso andTrondheim,Norway, losing six aircraft and suffering casualties during thiscampaign.

FerriedaircrafttoWestAfricaduringNovember1940.ReturnedtoLiverpoolon15December.InJanuary1941sheagaintookaircrafttoTakoradi,WestAfrica.BombedbyenemyaircraftwhilerefittinginBelfaston4Maybutsustainedno

seriousdamage.LeftforGibraltar,arrivingon12MayandcontinuedtoferryaircrafttoGibraltar

andMaltauntilSeptemberof1941.At theendof Julyheraircraft attackedPetsamo,Finland,butfoundthebaseemptyofshipping.Insteadtheyattackedthequays,oiltanksandshipyarditself;threeaircraftlost.

Anti–shippingoperationsinAugust1941andinOctoberarrivedatPhiladelphia,USA,forrefit.

ReturnedtoUKinApril1942.TookpartinNorthAfricalandingsinNovemberaftermanymoretripstoMalta

fromAugusttoOctober.InNovember1942becamepartofForceHandcontinuedoperationsonNorth

Africancoast.ForceHNovember1942untilFebruary1943.HomeFleetFebruary1943untilSeptember1944.July1943engagedincampaignsoffthecoastofNorway.RefitinLiverpoolAugust1943andspenttherestoftheyearworking–up.During 1944 Furious carried out various anti-shipping attacks including two

majorattacksontheGermanbattleshipTirpitzintheNorwegianfiords.InSeptembertookpartinminingoperationsoffNorway.ReturnedtoUKinSeptemberandpaidoffintoReserve.ReserveFleetSeptember1944toApril1945.PaidoffApril1945.BerthedatLochStrivenduringthisperiodandusedfortargetpractice.FinallysoldtoBritishIronandSteelCo.forscrapping.TowedtoCairngorminJune1948(ArnottYoung).HulltowedtoTroonforfinaldemolitionwhichtookuntil1954.

GloriousandCourageous

DesignandConversionDuring1921andthroughouttheWashingtonTreatymonthsthewholequestionofaircraftcarrierswassubjecttoconsiderabledebate.Itwaspointedoutthatatthat time the only fleet aircraft carrier was Argus – 14,500 tons, 19 knots –whichwasattachedtotheAtlanticFleet.Pegasus,3,000tons,20knots,wasintheMediterranean and carried only a few seaplanes which had to be hoistedaboardat thestern.ArkRoyal,7,080 tons,11knots,wasclassedasaFloatingAircraftDepotShipwithagoodworkshoparrangement,aflying-offdeckandahangar.Threeaircraftcarrierswereunderconstructionandbeingcompletedforserviceasquicklyaspossible:HermeswasinhandatDevonport,theconvertedEagleatPortsmouthandFuriousatRosyth.It was brought to the attention of the DNC that except forHermes all the

otherswere conversions and the present value of their tonnage did not reflecttheir value as aircraft carriers. If proper new aircraft carrier designs wereallocatedtotheseshipsasavingof4,000tonsforFuriousand8,000forEaglecouldbeachieved.Furious–30knots,22,000tons,anewdesign–18,000tons;Eagle 24 knots – 23,000 tons, new design – 15,000 tons. It was also beingdebatedwhetherornotArkRoyalandPegasuscouldreallybeclassedasaircraftcarriers, and be included in the aggregate tonnage for aircraft carriers in theRoyal Navy. At that time there was a Board policy that Glorious andCourageous should be converted to aircraft carriers, which, when completed,wouldgiveGreatBritainthefinestfleetofaircraftcarriersintheworld.ItwasconsideredthatifthelattertwoshipswerenotconvertedtheRoyalNavywouldfinditselfsaddledwithdistinctlyinferiorcarriersasregardsspeedandnumbersofaircraftthatcouldbecarried,apartfromFurious.Itwasunderstood that as soon asFuriouswas completed thedata fromher

trialswould influence anydecision fully to convertGlorious andCourageous.Facedwiththeever-growingneedoffastcarriers,andthefactthattheUSNavywasconvertingthelarge,fastSaratogaandLexington tofullyfledgedcarriers,theAdmiraltyissuedthefollowingstatementon27July1921:‘TheirLordshipshavedecidedthatHMSGloriousistobetakeninhandforreconstructionasan

aircraftcarrierduringthefinancialyearof1922–3.’AlthoughthegrosstonnageforaircraftcarriersintheRoyalNavywas80,580

tons–somewhatinexcessofthelimitforaircraftcarriersasreportedtobelaiddown by the Washington Conference – it was pointed out that all wereconversions(exceptHermes)andthereforeinefficientfortheirdisplacementandthis was accepted. Eager to convertGlorious andCourageous because of thegreat saving in expenditure (about £3 million – to build a new carrier £6million),theDNCwasorderedtopreparesuitablesketches.FollowingthelinesofFurious,theoriginalsketchesshowsuperstructureandafunnel(completedassuch) on the starboard side of the flight deck instead of the internal ducts forsmoke.ThiswasacceptedbecauseofthefactthatFurioushadtobecompletelyre-routed internally all for the sake of the funnel trunking. The placing ofuptakesontheupperflightdeckallowedthehangars tobe increasedinsize tocarry extra aircraft and thiswas considered a vast improvement overFurious.(SeenotesonfunneldischargeforArgus.)InOctober1923theControllergaveverbalinstructionstogoaheadwiththe

complete reconstruction of Glorious and Courageous. Outline sketches wereforwardedshowingtheamountofcuttingawayofthemainstructureandarmourrequired,andthesewouldbeeasytofollowifFuriouswereanythingtogoby.SketchesandgeneraldescriptionsweresenttothedockyardsatDevonportandRosyth, but therewasmuchdiscussionof the issue in an endeavour to ensurethattheworkthatwasabouttobeundertakenwasfullyunderstood.As Furious neared completion she was transferred to Devonport for

completing.Theportionsof thestructureand fittings thatwerealteredandcutawaytorebuildthetwovesselswere:

1. Structure above forecastle deck removed generally including: allbulkheads; shelter deck; conning tower; director towers; masts; mainderrick; bridges; funnel, uptakes andboiler roomvents down to themaindeck;allgunsandboats.

Courageousin1923,shortlybeforebeingearmarkedforconversion.Notehowmuchupperworkandarmamentneededtoberemovedfortheconversion.

COURAGEOUSGeneralArrangementsasconverted1928

2. ForecastleDeck: breakwater (39–44½ stations) port and starboard andPUhouse(37–39stations);coalingwinches;communicationtubesforwardand aft. Sketches were prepared and submitted for approval showing thefilling–inplatinginwayoftheboilerroomventsandthefunnelhatchesinthe forecastle deck, this plating being of the same scantlings as theforecastledeckinthisarea.3.UpperDeck:longitudinalfunnelcasingbulkhead11feetfromthemiddleline, 81–109 stations port and starboard; bulkhead at 15 feet from themiddle line to remain;abovewater torpedo tubes, ship’ssidepocketsandstructure in connectionwith these torpedo tubes; screen bulkhead 129½–142stationsportandstarboard;bollardsat135stationsportandstarboardand fairleads at 142 station port and starboard (thesewere fitted again inotherpositions);40lbdoublingplates134–156½stationsand20lbdoublingplates156½to162½stations.

4.Sectionsofarmourwereremoved:allholesinthevariousdecksinwayof‘A’and‘Y’ turretswerefilled inwithplatingof thesamethicknessasthe decks in the area; ‘A’ turret barbette and guns, ring bulkhead, etc.,removed; ring of armour from upper deck upwards and the horseshoearmourbetweenthemainandupperdeckwereremoved;the240lbarmourmaintoupperdeckremoved;60bulkheadontheupperdeckwascompletedto form a protective bulkhead of the same thickness as the parts nowoutsidetheringandthebulkhead;‘Y’turret:thebulkheadat154stationonthelowerdeckremained;theringarmouronthelowerdeckwastakenoutandthelongitudinalprotectivebulkheadswereextendedaftto154station;onthemaindecktheringwasremovedand150stationbulkheadsfilledin;the barbette, guns, ring bulkhead, etc., and the ring armour on the upperdeckswereremoved.5. Work below the upper deck: 15in shell rooms and magazines werecleared of all bins, dunnage, etc.; 4in shell rooms andmagazines, small-arms blank and gunners’ stores were dismantled and a savingwasmadeherebyusingexisting fittings; capstanengine, anchorandcablegearandhawsepipesforwardweretakenout–thestempipesremained;submergedtorpedo room was dismantled and the compartment cleared; 15intransmittingstationwasdismantled; lowerconning towerwasdismantled;thearmouredcommunicationtubetothelowerconningtowerwasremovedbutwasutilizedinthereconstruction;aftercapstangearwasremovedandrepositioned; boat hoistingwinches and gear were removed; kite balloonwinchesonmaindeckabaft139stationwereremoved.

General:Beforedismantlingtheshipsthedraughtswerecarefullynotedandallremovedweightswererecorded.

During the summer of 1922 there was some discussion as to what suitablearmament could be given toCourageous. It had already been decided to giveGlorious ten 5.5in, six 4in and four pompoms which corresponded with thearmament in Furious and Hermes. The requisite number of 5.5in guns andmountings were readily available for Courageous, but it was argued that astronger, 6in batterymight be a better prospect. Therewas a glut of 6in gunsreturning tostoragefromscrappedcruisers,but itwasseen thatmanyof thesewerewornout(thosefromRoyalisthadfiredmorethan1,300roundsandfromCarolinemorethan900rounds).Theywouldrequireconsiderableservicingandin some cases re–lining before re-issue, and in view of this the 5.5in gunsseemedtobethemostsuitable,andasimilarcalibretothatofFuriousseemedadvantageous.

LimitationsimposedbytheWashingtonTreatywere:

1.Aircraftcarrierswerenotallowedtocarryagunlargerthan8in.2.Notmorethantengunsabove6incalibrewereallowed.3.Anynumberofgunsof6inorlesscalibrecouldbecarried.4.Anynumberofhigh-anglegunscouldbecarried.

TheNavalAirSectionpointedoutthataircraftcarrierswouldbespecialtargetsand there were two forms of attack to which they would be subjected: 1. airattack;2.attackbycruisers.

AirAttackItwasnecessarytobepreparedforairattackstobeginlongbeforethemain fleetswere incontact, i.e.,while theywerestill70,80oreven100milesapart.Beingthefirsttomaterializetheseattacksareperhapsthemostimportant.Ingeneralitcouldbesaidthatthecarriersrequireconsiderable sea room to exercise their functions which means thatthey would be in a comparatively isolated position and would beforced to rely largelyon themselves fordefenceagainstattacks fromhostileaircraft.Assumingthatthehigh-anglearmamentwouldengagetheaircraftitisverydesirablethatthemainarmamentshouldbeabletoassistinbreakingupthemorepersistentformations.Ahigh-angleofelevation for themain armament is therefore considered amatter ofextremeimportance.AttackbylightcruisersIt is thought quite possible that an enemy light cruiser might breakthroughthedefenceandattackthecarriers.Alsoduringanactionthecarriersmight lose their position (due to flying-off and flying-on) tosuchanextent that theywouldbe liable toattack fromsingleenemylight cruisers without being supported quickly by their own supportships. Under these circumstances it seems essential that a carriershould be able to render a good account of herself against acontemporary light cruiserwhileworking-up her speed to rejoin herown forces.Alternatively,anyCommander-in-Chiefwouldbe forcedto detach a defensive escort for the carriers to the detriment of hisoffensivepowers.Considerationoftheseformsofattackpointstothedesirabilityofan8inarmamentforGloriousandCourageous.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSAsAircraftCarriers:GunLayoutscomparedtoFurious

Thepossibilityofacarrierbeingabletodefendherselfagainstalightcruiserbymeans of her own aircraft was thoroughly investigated during February andMarch1922andtheconclusionsreachedbytheCinC,AtlanticFleet,were:

InthreecasesoutoffouritisprobablethattheAircraftCarrierwouldhavebeensunkbytheLightCruiserthoughintwotheLightCruiserswould also have been damaged or sunk by the torpedo planes.Thusthe conclusion is that Aircraft Carriers cannot rely on protectingthemselvesatpresentfromtheattackofevenasingleLightCruiserbymeansof torpedoplanesandneedeitheraveryhighspeed toescapeattackoranadequateescort.

Fromthegunnerypointofviewitwasconsideredthattheidealmainarmamentfor the two carriers should consist of 8in guns capable of high angles of

elevation. It was realized that the proposal would be more costly than thealternatives, but itwas submitted that the extreme importance of these vesselsjustifieditsconsideration.Astrongbodyofopinion,however,consideredthatthecarriersshouldnever

be exposed in the ordinary course of tactical manoeuvring to attack by lightcruisers since the relative importance of recovering aircraft intact would beinsufficienttojustifysucharisk.Ifthecarrierwerebroughttoaction,evenifherarmamentweresuperiortothatoftheenemyshipengaged,itwasprobablethatthedeck,hangarlifts,etc.,wouldsuffersuchdamagethatshewouldbeunableto continue to work her aircraft. Only in exceptional circumstances of coursewouldcarriersbecompelledtoacceptactionandthereforetheheavierarmamentwasdesirable.Whengenerallyconsideringbothairandsurfaceattackitwasappreciatedthat

undernormalconditionsitwasbettertoincreasetheelevationofthesecondaryarmament rather than increase the calibre because thiswould enable themainarmamenttoengageapproachingaircraft.Itwasalsopointedoutthatthedutiesofacarrierweretofly–offheraircraftandavoidgettingwithinrangeofenemysurfaceships.Withoutenteringintoanyargumentsthemostimportantitemseenat that time was speed, which was considered to be the main essential of anaircraft carrier; it was also considered that if action could not be avoided byspeed alone, then outranging the enemy was of the greatest importance. Toachievethisanycarrierwouldhavetobeprovidedwiththelongest-rangegunspossibleprovidedthatherspeedwerenotimpaired.GreatdifficultyhadalreadybeenwitnessedwitharmamentinHermesandEagle,especiallyhigh-angleguns.TestsforwardedbyExcellentshowedthatinterferencebyblastfromthe4ingunsin theseships reduced theeffectivearmamentvirtually to twoguns inHermesandfourinEagle.Ascanbeseenfromtheaboveitwasfoundtobeextremelydifficulttoconvertthesetwoshipsandgivethemalltheessentialqualitiesofanaircraftcarrier:1.Suitablearmament;2.Highspeed;3.Agoodaircraft-carryingcapacity.Theconclusionoftheselong-windeddebateswasthatneither8innor6in guns with high elevation could be fitted without interfering with thefunctionsoftheshipasanaircraftcarrier.FacedwiththeseproblemstheDNCinvestigatedseveralalternativesingreat

detail.Oftheninealternativessubmitted(seedrawings),‘Hand‘J’layoutswerethemostfavoured.Thearrangementsin‘H’and‘J’weremodificationsofdesign‘C’,thatis,theyweregenerallysimilarto‘C’asfollows:

Design‘H’

Thesix4inhigh-anglegunsin‘C’werereplacedbysix4.7inhigh-angleguns.Inadditionfour4.7inwerearrangedonthelowerhangardeck,twoontheportside and two on the starboard side. These guns on the lower deck had amaximum elevation of about 63°. In order to mount the two additional 4.7ingunstheywererelativelycloselyspacedandthisimposedsomerestrictionintheangleoftraining.The four after 6in guns were moved aft relative to the ‘C’ design which

caused the lower hangar in way of the after pair of guns to be restricted ascomparedwith‘C’.Inviewofthedifficultyofmaintainingadirectsupplyofammunitiontothe

4.7ingunsonthelowerhangardeckwithoutinterferingwiththeworkingofthe6in guns, ready-use magazines were indicated which would take up a certainamountofhangarspace.

Design‘J’The armament in this arrangement comprised 4.7in guns entirely, eighteen ofthem being indicated on the upper hangar deck forward, twelve on the lowerdeckandtwoontheupperdeckaft.Thetwelvegunsonthelowerhangardeckshowed high angles of elevation.As in design ‘H’ these broadside gunsweresponsonedouttwofeet.ThefollowingtablegivestheapproximatehangarstowageofDesigns‘H’and

‘J’comparedwith‘C’.

Design No.oflarge No.of aircraft Flycatchers‘C’ 51 67‘H’ 51 63‘J’ 52 65TheprosandconsofDesigns‘H’and‘J’weresetoutinalettersenttotheDNCbyJ.C.W.Henley,DNO,pointingoutthesalientfeatures:

Design‘J’(a)Auniformarmament; (b)Agreatly superior anti-aircraft fire; (c)QF cartridges alone required, vessel so vulnerable and from petrol,aircraft,etc.The4.7ingunsonthebroadsidewillhaveamaximumelevationup

to60°onagoodarcoftraining,andthemaximumrangeofthegunas

a low-angleweapon on these bearingswill be 17,000 yards.On theother hand a 4.7in broadside is considered little use outside about12,000 yards in stopping TBDs, as the difficulties of spotting thesesmallshipsatgreaterrangeareinsuperable.Againstthismustbeplacedthefactthatenemyaircraftatseaorin

harbour will undoubtedly be the principal factor against which acarriermustbecapableofdefendingherself.Whatever guns she may carry, to defend herself against surface

attack, they will not deter a determined enemy making an effectiveattack against such a prize.No consideration of gunfire deterred ourdestroyersinpressinghomeattacksontheHighSeasFleetatJutland.Thecomplete4.7inarmamentinDesign‘J’hasafurtheradvantage

in that,with control arrangements fitted at each corner of the flyingdeckboth forward and aft, attackson4 separate bearingsby aircraftcouldbedealtwithsimultaneously.Design‘H’The proposal for two 4.7in guns on the broadside is not liked, as itmixesthe6inand4.7inarmament.Thealternativeoffive6ingunsonthe broadside is an improvement on Design ‘C’ and provides a fairTBDarmamentwith4.7ingunsasHAarmament.

SKETCHDESIGNSShowingdifferentarrangementsforfunnel,islandandgunpositions

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUS:PARTICULARS,ON

COMPLETIONASBATTLECRUISERSConstruction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedGlorious: arland&Wolff 20.4.1915 20.4.1916 14.10.1916.Courageous: Armstrong 26.3.1915 5.2.1916 28.10.1916.Displacement(tons):Glorious19,180(load),22,360(deep);Courageous19,180(load),22,560(deep).Dimensions:Length:735ft1½in(pp),786ft9in(oa).Beam:81ft(deck).Draught:22ft8in–25ft10in.Armament:4×15in42cal18×4inMkIX2×3pdr2×21insubmergedTTArmour:Mainbelt3in(2inplus1in);Bulkheads3–2in;barbettes7–6–3in;turrets11–9–7–4¼in;Decks:forecastle1in;upper1in;main1¾–1in;lower3–1in;CT10–6–3in;Funneluptakes1½in.MachineryParsonsgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.DesignedSHP:90,000for32knots.Boilers:18Yarrowsmalltubed,235psi.Fuel:750/3,160tonsoil.Radiusofaction:6,000nmat20knots(designed).Costs:Glorious£1,967,223;Courageous£2,038,225.

GloriousinJanuary1930,thefirstappearanceofthenewlyfittedaircraftcarrieratDevonportWithallheralterationsandtopweightshestillmade29.466knotsontrials.

Anangleoffireof1degreeacrossthesternishopedforfortheafter6inguns.For the reasons given under Design ‘J’ and those in ACNS’s minute of

13.2.24,itisconsideredthat‘J’isdecidedlypreferableandisrecommendedforapproval.

[Signed]J.C.W.Henley

AscompletedtheshipswerethelastBritishfleetcarriersnotoriginallydesignedandbuiltassuch,andweremoreorlesssimilartoFuriouswiththeexceptionofthe funnel discharge arrangements.Courageous was the first to be completed(May1928)withGloriouscommissioninginFebruary1939.Theyprovedverysuccessful in their redesignedroleandmore thanfulfilled

the Navy’s demand for aircraft at sea at that time. As with Furious, manyexperiments were carried out in them and the results all went towards thesuccessfuldesignsofArkRoyal(1937)andthelaterIllustriousclass(1940).

ArmourWith only 2in high-tensile steel covered with 1in mild steel, Glorious andCourageouswere poorly protected indeed. In fact, the scale of protectionwasbarely proof against even the smallest shell. As large light cruisers whencompletedtheywereaterriblerisk,butascarrierstheprotectiondidnotseemtomattersomuchbecausetheywouldnotbecalledupontofaceothershipsintheline of battle. As reconstructed into aircraft carriers they were not given anyadditionalprotectionovertheirvitalsexceptanextra⅝inontheflightdeckovertheentirelength.Itwasarguedthat,aswiththeirsidearmour,thisthicknessofflightdeckprotectionwastotallyinadequateagainstevensmallbombs–infactit was little more than bulletproof. But there was no question of their beingclassedasarmouredshipsandtheywerethoughtveryhighlyofintheirnewrole

asfloatingairfields.

Mainbelt:2inHTplus1inMS.Bulkheads:3–2inHT.Protectivedeckwasretained:1–¾inHT.Uptakes:1½–1inMS.4.7inguns:½inMS.

MachineryAsinFurious.

SeaTrialsofGlorious,27January1930Theshipputtoseaon27Januarywiththeintentionofcarryingouther4–hourfull–powertrials,butbecauseoftroublewiththeaircondenserpumpsthiscouldnotbedone.ShereturnedtoPlymouthforrepairsanddidnotattempttrialsagainuntil 30 January, although no actual trials were carried out (or certainlyrecorded) until 1 February. The 4–hour full-power trials were successfulalthough theweather was foul and shewas recorded as rolling to 15 degreesmaximumwithapitchof2degreeseachway.SummaryoftrialcomparedwithCourageous(sametrial)

Meandisplacement Glorious Courageous(tons) 24,750 23,460Meanrevolutions 316 318.5ofallshaftsAverageSHP 92,270 92,065

On the measured mile Courageous made 30.507 knots with 90,618shp and317.75revolutions.On3February1930GloriouscarriedoutherturningtrialsoffPlymouth.Comparison:Fullspeed: Advancetactical Glorious Courageous diameter(yds) 1,200 1,07014knots tacticaldiameter 1,080 1,090 (yds)Aircraftlifts:trialscarriedoutandweremostsuccessful.

Hangardoors: Windspeed,40knots. Openbypower,22seconds.

Byhand;(close)18menontackle,38seconds.

Windscreens: upin8seconds(downinsametime).Wirelessmasts: upin32seconds,downin28seconds.

StowageofFAAFlightsinGloriousInNovember1931itwassuggestedbytheCinCthatGloriouscouldnotoperate52 aircraftwith any efficiency It was remarked thatmaintenancewas the all-importantfeatureandthattoflymoreaircraftthancouldbemaintainedproperlywasoutofthequestion.AnofficerinGloriouspointedoutthatthestowagewasfor48aircraft,butthat52wasdefinitelynotoutofthequestion.The52aircraftcould be operated (somewhat inefficiently perhaps if nine includes sixteenFlycatcherswithsmallendurance)morefreelyiffighters(NimrodsandOspreys)wereused.Itwasnotedthatsincecompletionasacarriershehadnevercarriedmore than 46 aircraft whereas Courageous had (and operated efficiently) 52aircraft forsome timesincehercompletion in1928.A totalof52aircraftwasundesirable from the training point of view, but when necessary to carry fullcomplement ofmachines itwas thought that this could be accomplished. TheCaptain ofGlorious sent a letter to the CinC,Mediterranean Station, dated 8November1931:

1.Theproblemofoperatingaircraft fromacarrier involvesnotonlytherangingup,flying-off,landing-onandsoon,butalsotheefficientupkeepof the aircraft in the hangars. It is even possible to flymoreaircraftthancanbemaintainedinefficientconditionsonboard.2.Thelimitingcondition, therefore, ishowmanyaircraftofdifferenttypescanbestowedsothattheworknecessaryforpropermaintenancecanbecarriedoutonthem?3.Theattachedlisthasbeenworkedoutandthevariouscombinationsactuallytried.Themostsuitableforordinarypeacetimecruisingworkseems to be No. 1. This allows of all aircraft belonging to the shipbeingcarried,exceptonecompleteflightofFlycatchers.4.Fromsea training inpeacepointofview the single seater fighterscanbestbesparedasthebulkoftheirtrainingandexercisecanwellbecarriedoutashore.

AlternativestowagesofGloriouswhichshouldmakeitpossibletooperate

themefficiently.

1.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – upperhangar6T/B – upperhangar12T/B – lowerhangar4oldSSFTotal46 – lowerhangar2.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18T/B – upperhangar10oldSSF – onesideoflowerhangar8IIIF – onesideoflowerhangarTotal42

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUS:PARTICULARS,ONCOMPLETIONASAIRCRAFTCARRIERS

Displacement(tons):Glorious(July1935)24,970(load),27,419(deep),27,95I(extra deep); Courageous 23,550 (legend), 24,210 (as inclined 13 July 1928),26,990(deep),27,400(extradeep).Length:unchanged.Beam:90ft6inwaterlineoverbulges,104ftflightdeckatbridgesection.Armour:(seenotes).Machinery:unchanged(3,800tonsmax.oil).Armament:16×4.7indual-purposeHA/LA,fittedinsingleopenmountings;eightoneachbeam,twoatendofafterflying-off platform forward, twelve spaced along the sides of upper deckamidships,tworightaftonquarterdeck.4×3pdr(saluting)24 × 2pdr (3 × 8 barrels) added in Glorious (1935), 12 × 2pdr added inCourageous(1936)(3x4barrelsex-battleshipRoyalSovereign).Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedtoboth.Searchlights:5×36in:Ioverbridge,3insponsonsonportsideofflightdeck,Iinsponsononstarboardsideofflightdeckrightaft.Aircraft:seelists.Complement:Glorious(193I)793plus490FAA;Courageous(1938)814plus

531FAA,(1939)807plus403FAA.Boats(1936):2×36ftmotorpinnaces2×35ftmotorboats1×35ftbarge(Courageousonly)2×35ftcrashboats(IinCourageous)1×32ftmotorcutter2×32ftpullingcutters1×30ftcutter2×30ftgigs2×27ftwhalers2×16skiffdinghies

GLORIOUS:STEAMTRIALSASAIRCRAFTCARRIER,20MARCH1930Displacement(tons) Revs: SHP Speed(knots)24,165 104 3,466 10.14424,540 152 9,508 14.68524,160 208 25,637 19.91524,435 270 52,948 25.5624,360 296 72,572 28.10424,260 318 91,063 29.466

AerialviewofCourageousabout1932/3whileservingtheAtlanticFleet.AsCourageouswascompletedtwoyearsbeforeGlorious(1928)herfirecontrolandrelatedequipmentwasnotasgoodasthatoftheGlorious.

GloriousanchoringinGrandHarbour,Malta,June1930.Notetheextraordinaryheightoftheflightdeckfromtheoriginalhull,whichgivesanimpressionoftop-heaviness.

3.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – ‘F’upperhangar6oldSSF – ‘A’upperhangar12T/B – ‘F’lowerhangar4oldSSF – lowerhangarTotal464.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – ‘F’upperhangar6T/B – ‘A’upperhangar10oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangar8T/B – ‘A’lowerhangarTotal42

5.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar6oldSSF – onesideofupperhangar6T/B – onesideofupperhangar6T/B – ‘A’hangar(upper)4oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangar12IIIF – ‘A’lowerhangarTotal406.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar12IIIF – ‘A’lowerhangar18T/B – upperhangar6oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangarTotal42[SignedCaptain]GloriousatMalta,8November1931

FLIGHTSCARRIED

1928:CourageousIF/F.2S/R.2T/B.1930:Courageous 3 F/F. 4 S/R. 2 TIB.Glorious 3 F/F (Flycatchers). 2 S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T/B(Ripon).1931;Bothships.2F/F(Flycatchers).2S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T(Dart).1932:2F/F(FlycatchersorNimrods).3S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T(DartorRipon).1933–4:Courageous I F/F (Nimrod or Osprey). I S/R (9 Fairey IIIF). I T/B(Ripon).GloriousIF/F(NimrodorOsprey).IS/R(FaireyIIIF).IT/B(Ripon).1935;Courageous I F/F& F/R (9 Nimrod and 3Osprey). I SIR (12 Seal). IT/S/R(12Shark).1T/B(12Baffin).1936:Both ships. IF/F (9Nimrodand3Osprey). 2T/S/R (24Shark). IT/B.1937:Bothships:36T/S/R.12F.D.B.April 1940: Glorious carried I Squadron T/B (Skuas) and I Squadron F/F(Gladiators).

AppearanceChanges1928–30Appearance (as in Furious) particularly unattractive because of abruptterminationofflightdeckwellshortofbows,withseparateflying-offplatformlower down forward. Leading edge of flight deck rounded steeply down indome-shaped curve, the effect being especially distinctive seen bows on.Superstructure very short and high. Funnel: flat-sided, very large, occupyingabout two-thirds the length of superstructure. Bulges: very prominent abovewaterline amidships. Light pole mast stepped through bridge. Short inCourageous as completed (1928), taller in Glorious as completed (1930).Collapsible lattice poles (3 port and starboard) forW/T along sides of flightdeck. Note that in both ships themast actually comprised two poles set veryclose together abreast in Courageous and fore and aft in Glorious. InCourageousseenfromabeamandGloriousseenendon,themastappearedasasinglepole.Theshipswereeasilyidentifiedbyasingleverylargefunnel,lightpole mast, flight deck not continuous to stern and a low, sloping flying-offplatform over the forecastle. The superstructure and funnel separate fromFurioustowhichtheywouldotherwisehavebeenverysimilar.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSasconvertedtoaircraftcarriers(portandstarboard)

IndividualdifferencesCourageous: Short mast with no forward strut. Inconspicuous directors (pre-August 1930 only). Rounded extremity to flying-off platform. Signallingsearchlightsonportsidebeforefunnel.Lowerdown,smallsearchlightstarboardafter corner superstructure.Short searchlightplatformbefore funnel.Glorious:Taller mast with prominent forward strut. Conspicuous directors. Pointedextremity to flying-off platform. Signalling searchlight platform. Side beforefunnelcarriedhigher,tallersearchlightplatformbeforefunnel.1928–39LightAAadded.Aircraftcatapultsinstalledandflightdeckmodified.1930CourageousasrefittedJune–August1930.LAdirectorsfor4.7inreplacedbyHA/LA(asGlorious).Arrangementsofdirectorsandsearchlight sponsonsatafterendof flyingdeck

were reversed, i.e., SL sponsons relocated before instead of abaft directors.Tail of flying deck lengthened and slightly modified. Extra plating addedbeforeflyingdeckforward.

Rigmodified as inGlorious, i.e., highermastwithwider yard and prominentstrutsprotrudingfromthis.

Glorious

Extraplatingaddedbelowflyingdeckforward(aftertrials).1933CourageousHighcharthouseaddedonbridgeand36insearchlightsremoved(May1933).

DIMENSIONSCOMPAREDWITHFURIOUSANDEAGLE Courageous

GloriousFurious Eagle

Lengthofarrestinggearforflying-on(ft):Spaceforflying-off(ftapprox.)

300 300 320

(i)afterendofflightdeck: 300 300 280(ii)forwardendofflightdeck: 165 160 185(iii)forwardendofupperhangardeck: 156 156 Cleardistancebetweenlifts(ft): 342 344 326Totalbreadthflightdeck(ft): 100 91 100Clearbreadthinsideisland(ft): 84½ 78Lengthofisland(ft): 73½ 163

COURAGEOUS:GMANDSTABILITY,ASINCLINED28FEBRUARY1928‘A’condition(load) Draught GM MaxStability(1,000tonsoil) 25ft10in 3.3ft 300‘B’condition 28ft 4.4ft 31°(3,665tonsoil)Stabilityvanishesintheaboveconditionsat:‘A’:49°,‘B’:55°.

1933–4CourageousTwin catapults fitted in forward flyingdeck trained fore and aft beforeMarch

1934).1935GloriousAsrefittedMay1934toAugust1935.Threemultiple 2pdr (8 barrels) added.One port and starboard on flying deck

forwardandoneonsuperstructureabaftfunnel.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)

addedinsponsonportsideflyingdeckrightaft.CatapultsfittedasinCourageous.Tailofflightdeckextendedaftindownwardcurve.Midships36insearchlightsonflyingdeckremoved.Quarterdecktoforecastledecklevel.1936CourageousasrefittedOctober1935toJune1936.LAAaddedasinGloriousexceptthatmultiple0.5inwereonthestarboardside

insteadofportside.2pdrsadded(4insteadof8barrels).Polemastreplacedbylighttripodwithaircrafthomingbeaconaerialatthehead.1939:ApartfromtripodmastinCourageousandraisedquarterdeckinGlorious,

their original appearance as completed aircraft carriers remained generallyunchanged (Glorious had ‘GL’ painted up on flight deck in May 1937,Courageousmayhavebeensimilar).

GLORIOUSProposedconversionto‘single’hangarship,15November1938

IndividualdifferencesCourageous:Tripodmastwithextraplatformandaircrafthomingbeaconaerial

head. Tall charthouse on bridge and large deckhouse abaft funnel. Lowquarterdeck. Short tail to flying deck, rounded extremity to flying-offplatformforward.

Glorious: Pole mast. No charthouse. No deckhouse abaft funnel, highquarterdeck, long tail to flying deck and pointed extremity to flying-offplatformforward.

1939–40:Nooutwardappearancechanges.

ExtensiontoFlightDeckAftinGlorious,1936Afterherafterportionofflightdeckhadbeenlengthenedin1936,itwasfoundto be a great improvement when landing the aircraft. Tests were made onpassagetoSudaBayinOctober1936andthefollowingreportensued:

Extension to flying deck is a great improvement. The more gradual andextended slope has produced a surface which gives an uninterrupted airflow enabling pilots to land further aftwithout having to fly through theturbulence set up by the steeper and shorter round-down ofCourageoustype.Thereisnoquestionofanydownwhencomingintoland.

AerialviewofCourageousabout1932/3whileservingtheAtlanticFleet.

AIRCRAFTCARRIERANDBATTLECRUISERDATACOMPARED Carrier BattlecruiserArmour 3–2inmain 3–2in

beltProtectivedeck 1inand¾in 1inand¾inFlightdeckprotection(‘D1’quality)Weights(tons)

⅝in

Generalequipment 870 650Armament 760 2,250Machinery 3,130 2,350Armourandprotectiveplating 16,680 8,500BoardMargin 100 100Totaldisplacement 23,250 17,400

Itwas noticeable thatwhenwewere in companywithCourageous, aircrafttoucheddownfurtherforwardthanuswhichindicatedahigherapproachtakenby the pilots in order to avoid the eddies caused by the abrupt round-down.Althoughtotalextensionamountsto41ft,only3ft6inofthisisleveldecksothatverylittlerangingareaisgained.Mostaircrafttouchdownwiththeirhookontheforwardendoftheafterlift

andwheelsalittleahead.Maximumnumberofourstrikingforceis24,i.e.,18ranged on deck, 1 behind each accelerator and 2 ready each side to take ontotrolley.

Although such a success, andplanned forCourageous duringhernext refit, itwasneverimplemented,eveninherrefitof1939.

ProposedConversiontoSingle-HangarShips,1938Towardstheendof1938thequestionwasraisedastowhethertoconvertbothGloriousandCourageoustosingle-hangarships.The apparent advantages – itwould be easier to handle the aircraft, protect

themwitharmourplatingandperhaps increasecapacity– seemedattractiveatthetime.Thereweretwoessentialsforsingle-hangarships:thehangarhadtobeatleast62ftwidesothataircraftcouldbestowedthreeabreast;heighthadtobesufficient to allow of three gallery decks of reasonable width foraccommodation.Toachievethesedimensionsbeamwouldhavetobeincreasedby about 14 feet. To support such an extension of the entire hull, however,would require a great deal of reconstructionwhichwould put the ships out ofservice for a considerable time (see drawing).As newer aircraft carrierswereunder construction (ArkRoyal) and the cost of conversionwould be high, the

projectwasshelvedandthendiscarded.

History:GloriousCommissioned for trials as a battlecruiser on 14October 1916, she joined the

2ndLCSinOctoberofthatyear.ReducedtoReserveatRosython1February1919andbecametendertoHMSHercules.

Turret Drill Ship at Devonport, attached to Vivid Training Establishment,December1920.

1921–22:FlagshipofRear-AdmiralCommandertheReserveFleetatDevonport.September1923:ParentShipinPortsmouthReserve.14February1924:Paidofftoprepareforcompletereconstructiontoanaircraft

carrier at Rosyth. Conversion began at Rosyth but later transferred toDevonporttocomplete.

BegantrialsasacarrierJanuary1930.Commissioned at Devonport 24 February 1930 to relieve Courageous in

MediterraneanFleet,butactuallyattachedtoAtlanticFleetforthreemonths,March1930toJune1930.

MediterraneanFleet:June1930toOctober1939.In collisionwith French linerFlorida nearMalaga 1April 1931 (see report).

RepairedatGibraltarandMaltauntilSeptember1931.ExtensiverefitDevonport,July1934toJuly1935.PresentattheCoronationFleetReviewMay1937.BecameunitofForce J (Glorious andMalaya)organized inOctober1939 for

operations against the German pocket battleship Graf Spee in the IndianOcean.

LeftAden14October1939.ForceJ:OctobertoDecember1939.ForceJbrokenup6December1939,MalayatoHalifaxescortduties,Glorious

senttoColombo.MediterraneanFleet:December1939toApril1940.Transferred to Home Fleet April 1940 for Norwegian Campaign, arrived off

Norwegiancoast,flew-offsquadronofGladiatorsforlanduse24April1940.HomeFleet:ApriltoJune1940.Employed in providing air cover for convoys and troops, landing places, etc.,

andtoattackairfieldsinNorway.

GLORIOUS1932

Flew-off RAF fighters (Gladiators and Hurricanes) for operations againstNarvik,26May1940.

AttackedandsunkbyGermanbattlecruisersScharnhorstandGneisenau8June1940 (see report).When shewas attacked shewas largely ineffective becauseher own aircraft complement had been reduced to make way for the RAFfighters that had been flown off at Narvik. Shewas also low on fuel, havingexpendedmuchof it during theoperations fromwhich shewas just returning,whichmeantthatshewasunabletoreachthehighspeedsrequiredforflying-offaircraft.

History:CourageousCommissioned for trials as a battlecruiser on 28October 1916 and joined the

2ndLCSinOctober1917.June1919.TendertoHMSHerculesinReserve.March1920.FlagshipofRear-AdmiralCommandingReservesandattached to

PortsmouthGunnerySchool.

TwoviewsdepictingGloriousaftercollisionwithSSFloridaonIApril1931:thesmashedbowhead-onand(bottom)thebowfromtheportside.

GloriousentersMaltaaftertemporaryrepairstothebow.CompleterepairstookuntilSeptember1931.

August1923.Hoisted theFlagofRear-AdmiralCommandingReserveFleetatPortsmouth.

27 June 1924. Taken in hand at Devonport for complete reconstruction toaircraftcarrier.

Conversion commenced at Devonport DY June 1924 and commissioned as acarrier21February1928.

CommissionedforservicewithMediterraneanFleetMay1928toJune1930.RelievedbyGloriousJune1930.RefitJunetoAugust1930.Recommissioned12August1930forAtlanticFleet,replacingArgus.AtlanticFleet:August1930toMarch1932.HomeFleet:March1932toDecember1938.PaidoffatPortsmouthforrefit1October1935.PresentatCoronationFleetReviewMay1937.TemporarilyattachedtoMediterraneanFleet1936.Relieved by Ark Royal December 1938 and reduced to Reserve as training

carrierDecember1938toAugust1939.RelievedasdecktrainingcarrierbyFuriousatRosythMay1939.

PresentatPortlandFleetReviewbyHMKingGeorgeVI9August1939.ChannelForce(DevonportandPortland)August1939.SunkbyU2917September1939(seereport).

CollisionofGloriousandSSFloridaExtractfromletterwrittenbyMr.Newnham(AssistantConstructor)toDNC,5April1931:

At1630on1/4/31Gloriouswassteamingatabout16knotsinafog.ShecameintocollisionwithSSFlorida,thebowsofGloriousstrikingSS Florida nearly normally between nos. 1 and 2 holds andpenetrating to just beyond the centre line of the ship. The resultingholewas36ftwideandapparentlyextendedforthewholedepthofSSFlorida.DamagetoGloriouswasfoundtobeasfollows:(Thisisapartofa

report sent into to the Captain before we arrived at Gibraltar. Theunderwaterdamagebeingunknown.)ThelowerFlying-OffDeckisbuckledforabout60ftfromthefore

end.TheCableDeckiscompletelysmashedto10station,the2BowerHawsepipes being wrenched up with the structure being completelyentangled in the wreckage. The port bower pipe is cracked beyondrepair.Thesheethawsepiperemainsinplace,butallitsholdingdownrivets have sheared, and theweight of a long length of cablewouldprobablytearitfromthestructure.Thesheetanchorhaslostoneflukeand the starboardbower anchor shank isbent.The fashionplate andadjoiningplatinghasbeentornawayandbentroundtoport.BetweenCable Deck and Upper Deck everything is smashed as far as andincluding10bulkhead.Seamen’s urinals are damaged.BelowUpperDecknoexaminationhasbeenmadeontheforesideof10bulkheadasmanhole was covered with debris. An examination of the after sideshowed the following state of 10 Bulkhead: Upper – Main Deck –Buckled with some plating torn. Main – Lower Deck – Bulkheadintact. Lower – Platform – A few weeping rivets. Platform Keel –Intact. The bulkhead was shored up and on arriving at Gibraltarconditionswerethesame.

Gloriousc.1930/32.MatelotsandMarinesgatheredontheflightdeck.Notetheheightoffunnelandthecamberinthedeck.Duringtheearlyyears,GloriousandCourageouswerepracticallyidentical.

PlentyofroomforSundayservice.

CourageousinJuly1934whileservingwiththeHomeFleet.

TheCommander suggests that thiswould be a good opportunity for givingGloriousanarrowerlowerFlying-OffDeckfrombeforetheforemostgunstotheforeend.Aircraftflyingoffdonotrequiresowideaplatformasformedbytheafterpartofthisdeck.Therewouldbelesslikelihoodofitsbeingliftedbyheavyseas.Cableworkshouldbefacilitated;andincidentallyweightshouldbesaved.

CourageousunderrefitatPortsmouthin1936,duringwhichshereceivedatripodforemast.

CourageousinJuly1937.Notetheshortextensiontotheflightdeckaft,unlikethatofGloriousduringthisperiod.

CourageousinMay1937,showingmodifications.Notethebridgeworkandnewtripod.

CourageousinJuly1937.Agoodbowview,thisshowstheextraordinaryheightoftheflightdeck,bridgeandfunnelsfromthewaterline.Thephotographalsohighlightsthemassiveanti-torpedobulges.

GloriousattheCoronationFleetReview,18May1937.

GloriousinMay1937,showingtheextensiontotheflightdeckaft.Thisrefit,whichtookfromJuly1934toJuly1935,wasnevercarriedoutinCourageous.

BattleDamageSinkingofCourageousbyU29On 16 September 1939Courageous sailed from Plymouth for the Atlantic tocarry out offensive air operations against enemy submarines off the southwestcoastofIrelandescortedbyfourdestroyers.On17SeptemberCourageoushadbeen steaming to the westward at high speed. This course and speed wereassumedinorder todecrease thedistancefor thehomingofastrikingforceof

four aircraftwhichhad left at 1615hours for an attackon a submarinewhichwas shelling SS Kafiristan. At the same time as the striking force left, thedestroyersInglefieldandIntrepidweredetachedtofollowthemupforhuntingthe submarine.At about 1920 hoursCourageous turned to the south-eastwardintothewindandreducedspeedtofly-onthestrikingforceagain.AtthattimetheshipwasscreenedbythedestroyerIvanhoeontheportbowandImpulsiveonthestarboardbow.ShiphitbytorpedoAt about 1955 there were two heavy explosions in rapid succession. All thelightsintheshipwentoutatonceandtheshipalmostimmediatelytookaheavylist to port. The ship had already been darkened although the sun had not yetquite setwhen thiswas done and all deadlights andmost of the screen doorswerethereforeclosed.Itwasestimatedthattheshipfinallysankabout2015onlytwenty minutes after being hit. No torpedo tracks had been seen nor had thepresenceofasubmarinebeendetectedbythescreenwhichwasregainingstationafterstartingaturnbyRedPendant.PositionofTorpedoHitsFromstatementsmadebyofficerandratingsurvivors itwouldappear thatonetorpedo hit the port side approximately abreast the Petty Officers’ Flat. Thesecond hit appears to have been at about the after end of ‘B’ boiler room.Officersandratingswhowereonthebridgecouldgivelittleinformationinthisrespect as the bridge being on the starboard side, any view to port is muchrestricted by the flight deck. All electric power went off at once after thetorpedoeshitandtheTyfonsirenstartedandcouldnotbestopped.ImmediatelyaftertheexplosionstheQuartermasterreportedthattheshipwouldnotsteer.TheCaptain then ordered the ship’s position to be given to the W/T Office.Meanwhile the signal books had been collected on the signal bridge and theunweightedonesplacedinaweightedcanvasbag.Theywerethentakendowntothecompassplatformreadyfordestruction.Abouttenminutesafterbeinghitsomebulkheadswereheardtocollapseandthelistincreasedtoabout35°.AtthesametimetheCaptainorderedtheinternationalcodesignal‘Standbyme’tobehoisted.Thiswasdone.Hethensaidthatanyonewhowishedtoleavetheshipwasatlibertytodoso.LieutenantE.Shentonwasonwatch in the forwardcentreengine roomand

immediatelyafterthedoubleexplosionalllightsintheengineroomwentout.TheshiptookaheavylisttoportimmediatelyandLieutenantShentonordered

the starboard engines to be stopped. He then ordered the engine room to beevacuated.Inthemeantimethesteampressurewasfallingrapidlyandtherewas

a considerable steam leak on the port side. Lieutenant Shenton thereforeoperated the emergency bulkhead valve closing lever, and rang the sprayertelegraphstozero.Ashewasleavingtheengineroomtherevolutiontelegraphfromthebridgewasrungdown.Astokercomingupfromtheboilerroomwithhis overalls on fire could give no information. Other men came up from theboilerroomslaterbutnostatementsweretakenfromthem.ActionbetweendecksThis amounted to very little. All the important watertight doors were alreadyclosedandduetotheheavylistoftheshipandthefactthattherewerenolightsorbroadcasterworkingtheremaindercouldnotbeclosed.Shortly after the explosion the Captain had given the order to flood the

starboard bulges. Although the order did not get through, Lieutenant E.SedgwickandastokerPettyOfficerfromthedouble-bottomparty,withthehelpofaSub-Lieutenantcarryinga torch,hadproceeded to ‘Z’seacock inorder toattempttofloodthestarboardbulge.Thecotterpinwasremovedbutinspiteofawheelspannerthevalvecouldnotbeturned.Itwasassumedthattherodgearingwasdistortedandjammedbytheexplosion.ActiontakenonupperdeckAllboats except seaboatswere turned in and secured.Owing to theheavy listwhichtheshiptooktoportatonceandwhichfinallyreachedabout35°to40°itwasnotpossible to loweranyboatsexcept thestarboardseaboat (cutter).Thisboat apparently suffered some damage on being lowered and subsequentlybecamecompletelywaterlogged.Thefourthmotorboatontheportsiderightaftwas,however, traversedoutandsomeratingswereable tounhook the fallsassoonasshebecamewaterborneowingtothelistoftheship.ItwasonlyfoundpossibletocastlooseaboutthreeoftheCarleyfloatsonthestarboardside,andthesewere lowered.Gratings and loosewoodworkwere also thrown over thesidetohelpmeninthewater.HangarsBothhangarswereevacuatedbythefewofficersandratingswhowerethereatthetimeofthetorpedoes’hit.Personnelinthelowerhangarappeartohavehadsomedifficulty in forcingaway through the fire curtainswhichwere jammeddownaftertheexplosions.Immediatelyafterthetorpedoeshit,HMSIvanhoeontheportbowturnedand

attackedthesubmarine.Itisunderstoodthattwopatternsofdepth-chargesweredropped.HMSImpulsiveonthestarboardbowdroppedasternandcommencedpickingupsurvivorswhohadabandonedship.

Several officers aft on the Quarter Deck said that they saw a submarineperiscopefineon theportquartershowingupagainst thereflectedglowin thewater from thewestern sky. Some of the officers loaded S.8 – 4.7in gun butowing to the list of the ship it could not be trained. They stated that HMSIvanhoe thenarrivedatthepositionwheretheperiscopewasseenanddroppeddepth-charges. Several officers and ratings stated afterwards that they saw thesternofthesubmarinecomeupoutofthewaterafterthedepth-chargeattack.Itisconsideredthatthiswasquiteprobablythepositionofthesubmarineafterherattack, as HMSCourageous was still carrying a good deal of way for someminutesafterthetorpedoesstruck.CaptainW.T.Makeig-Jones and 518 of her crewwere lost. The destroyers

pickedupthesurvivorsandU29wasvigorouslyhunteduntilmidnight.Furtherattempts to locate the submarinecontinued for twodaysafterwardsbut theU-boatescapedandreturnedsafelytohomebase.

TheLossofGloriousOn the morning of 8 June 1940 Glorious, escorted by the destroyers HMSAcasta and HMS Ardent, left the Narvik area bound for Scapa Flow, afterparticipatingintheevacuationofBritishforcesfromNorway;thecarrierhadonboardsomeRAFfightersandafewSwordfish.At1600onthesameday,whileoffNarvik,twoenemywarshipsweresightedtothenorth-westward.ArdentwasorderedtoinvestigatethecontactswhichprovedtobetheGermanbattlecruisersScharnhorst and Gneisenau, while Glorious turned to the southward,unsuccessfullyattemptingtoflyoffherSwordfishaircraft.At1631Scharnhorstopened fire at a range of 27,800 yards, closely followed byGneisenau. BothBritish destroyers made for the enemy at high speed, laying a smokescreen,whichprovedmost effective, silencing thebattlecruisers’guns for a time.Theoutcome,however,wasalreadyaforegoneconclusion.Gloriouswascompletelyoutranged,her4.7ingunsprovingoflittleuse,andshortlyaftertheactionbeganshe receivedahit in the forwardupperhangarwhich starteda fire,destroyingthe RAF Hurricane fighters stored there, as well as preventing access to theaircrafttorpedoeswhichwerealsokeptthere.At1700asalvohitthebridgeandat1715shereceivedaheavyshellhitaft.Fiveminuteslatertheorderwasgivento abandon ship and she sank at 1740, leaving only 43 survivors.MeanwhileArdent hadbeen sunkat1728after firingall eight torpedoes,without success.Acastasteeredtothesouth-east,concealedbysmoke,andthenfiredasalvooffour torpedoes, ofwhichonehitScharnhorst abreast the after 11ingun turret,causingseveredamageandreducingherspeed.At1808afinalsalvodevastated

Acasta and the orderwas given to abandon, the ship sinking soon afterwards.Casualties from the three ships were heavy: a total of 1,515 Naval and RAFpersonnellosttheirlives.Amost interesting account of the incident is given in the reportwritten by

Germanstaff.A reporton theaction foughtby theScharnhorst andGneisenauwithHMS

GloriousandherdestroyerescortonJune8th,1940,writtenbyKonte-admiralSchubert frommemoryon19thJuly,1945,andsubmitted to theFlagOfficersSchleswig-Holstein.

IwasExecutiveOfficerofthebattleshipScharnhorst,whichtogetherwith thebattleshipGneisenau sank theAircraftCarrierGlorious andthe two destroyersArdent andAcasta in theNorth Sea on June 8th,1940.MyactionstationasExecutiveOfficerwasintheship’scontrolroom.ButIwasonthebridgeatvarioustimestogetapictureofhowthe battle situation was developing. The following statements arethereforebasedonnotonlymyownobservation,butonreportswhichIreceivedduringthecourseofthebattle,orwhichweresubsequentlygiventomebyotherofficersof theship. Ino longerpossesswrittendocumentsforthisreport.Itiswrittendownfrommemory.AfterabriefactionoffNarvik,involvingthetwobattleshipsandthe

lightnavalforcesattachedtotheunit,thebattleshipsailednorthwardsonJune8th,1940withoutanyescortingvessels,becauseofnews,asfarasIcanremember,ofthepresenceofanAircraftCarrierformationin theareaofJan-Mayen.In theafternoon,atabout1700,acloudofsmokeat adistanceofabout25miles to starboardwas sighted fromthe foretop of theScharnhorst through the good lenses of the targetindicator.TheforceoftwobattleshipsunderthecommandoftheCinCaboard theGneisenau,proceededathighspeed towards thiscloudofsmoke.TheScharnhorstwas at this timeon the starboardquarter ofthe Gneisenau. On drawing closer, first of all a trellis mast wasrecognized,latertwofurthermasts.Atfirsttheimpressionwasgainedthat therewereonebattleshipandtwocruisers.Finally,however, theaircraft carrier Glorious was recognized in company with twodestroyers.Oneofthetwodestroyersdetacheditselffromtheforce,andfiring

recognition signals, approached the two battleships. The recognitionsignals were not answered. The battleships opened fire with theirfor’ardheavygunsontheaircraftcarrierfromadistanceofabout13

miles.Thereupononeoftheescortingdestroyerstookupapositiononthe port side of the battleships and from there carried out a torpedoattack,whilethesecondescortingdestroyerremainedwiththecarrier.It couldbeobserved that in theaircraft carrier theyhad immediatelybeguntobringtheaircraftondeck.Thebattleships’firstorsecondsalvohadalreadyscoredahitonthe

aircraftcarrier.Atthattimeshewasproceedingataspeedof30knots.The escorting destroyer in the company of the aircraft carrier laid asmokescreen between the retreating carrier and the battleships, andthuseffectivelywithdrewthecarrieroutofsightofthebattleships.Incarrying out this manoeuvre the destroyer steamed at high speedthrough the heavy fire of the two battleships. After laying thesmokescreenshetookuppositionontheleftedgeofthesmokescreen(asseenfromthebattleships),andfromthereopenedfireon the twobattleships.Thesalvosfellveryshort,astherangewasmuchtoogreatfor the destroyer’s guns. The salvos from the carrier also fell veryshort.Thedestroyerontheportsideofthebattleshipforceagainattacked

with torpedoes, and endeavoured in an extremely skillful manner toescape the effective defensive fire of the medium guns of thebattleshipsbyconstantalterationsofcourse.Finallythisdestroyeralsoopened fire on the battleships. She fought with a dash which wasoutstanding inahopeless situation.Thedestroyer receivednumeroushits and finallywent down, steaming at high speedwithher enginesapparentlyundamagedandfiringherfor’ardguns(bowchaser)tothelast. The last fighting range was about 5 miles. After the battleshipforcehadpenetratedthesmokescreen,theGloriouswasagainsightedat a great distance. The heavy guns opened fire from the bows andvery quickly the aircraft carrier received further hits. The fightingrange quickly narrowed, but still remained comparatively great. Thecarriersustainedalisttoportandwasonfireuntilitfinallycapsized.Thedestroyerwith thecarrierclosed toattack thebattleshipforce,

andataverycloserangefiredtorpedoesatthebattleshipswhichtookevasive action. At this stage of the battle, at about the time of thecarrier capsizingScharnhorst received a torpedohit on the starboardsidebytheheavyfor’ardturret.Aswasrevealedlatertheholetornintheship’ssidewasofconsiderableextent.Themagazinesoftheheavyturretwere directly penetrated and caught fire. The starboard engine

wasputoutofaction,andthestarboardshaftwiththeshaftmountingswastornawayfromthehull.Alargeamountofwaterenteredtheship;the ship’s situation was becoming difficult, and in particular themiddle engine room was gradually filled with water. The ship stillcontinued the action with the destroyer which was not very heavilydamaged.Thedestroyer,withhergreatlyinferiorarmament,foughtahopeless fight against the battleships.As far as I can remember, shescored aminorhitwithher gunson themiddleof the secondheavyturret.Thecarrierhadmeanwhilecapsizedandsunkfarasternoftheship.

When the destroyer with her guns out of action ceased fire, thebattleshipsdidthesame.ThesituationcausedbytheseveredamagetotheScharnhorstmade itnecessaryaboveall for thedamagedship toreturn to the nearest Norwegian harbour and for this the necessarysteps had to be taken at once. The Narvik area was still in Britishhands, and the nearest harbour was Trondheim. As far as I canremember, the action took place at about 70 degrees north.The twobattleships, leaving thedestroyerwhichwasdamagedbutstillafloat,proceededsouthwardsatagreatlyreducedspeed.Itwas not clear as towhether the torpedohit onScharnhorstwas

really scoredby thedestroyer inher advancedpositionorwhether itwashitbyasubmarine.At first the latterseemedmoreprobable.Toremainlongeratthesceneoftheactionwas,therefore,notjustified.Not only the tactical handling, but the audacity and pluck of the

destroyers were outstanding. Every officer taking part in the actionwasofthesameopinion.Thedestroyersputtheirutmostintothetask,although in their hopeless position success was impossible from thestart.

Hood

DesignThebasicconceptofHood’sdesignbeganon8November1915whentheDNCwas asked to prepare a new battleship design along the lines of an improvedQueen Elizabeth. To this end Tennyson d’Eyncourt forwarded the followingdata:

Length:760ft.Beam:104ft.Draught:23/25ft.Displacement:31,000tons.ShaftHorsePower:75,000.Speed:26/27½knots.Fuel:1,000tonsofoil,3,500tonsmax.Armament:8×15in,12×5in,2×3in,4TT.Armour:mainbelt10in,upperandlower6½–3inends5–3½in,barbettes10in,

turrets 11–9in, CT 11in, uptakes 1½in, upper deck 1in, main deck 1½in,middledeck2–1in,lower3–2½in.

Generalequipment:750tons,armament:4,750tons,armourandbacking:9,150tons,machinery:3,550tons,hull:11,650tons,BM:150tons.

Theinitialdesign,asusual,wasmodifiedslightly togivedifferentversionsonthe same theme, but at this time the primary ideawas still to build a superiorbattleship.ThemodifiedfiguresofJanuary1916show:

750ft×90ft×25ft3in.Displacement29,500tonsShaftHorsePower60,000Speed25kts.Otherwisesameasbefore.

DESIGN‘3’:LEGEND,27MARCH1916

Displacement(tons):36,250–36,300Length:810ft(pp),860ft(oa).Beam:104ft.Draught:26/29½ftArmament8×15in12×5.5in.Armour8–5–3inamidships.5–4inforward,4inaft,bulkhead4–3in,barbettes9in,turrets11–10in,CT10in,DirectorTube6in,funneluptakes1½in,forecastledeck1½in,upper1in,main1½,lower2–1in.Weights(tons)Hull,etc.14,070Armour10,100Machinery5,200Generalequipment4,750Fuel1,200BM180

After some discussion twomoremodified versionswere adoptedwhen itwashoped that the best of both worlds would be highly advantageous in perhapshavingaveryfastbattleshipratherthanaslowbattleshipandafastbattlecruiser.By 24 January 1916 there were now four designs to discuss, ‘A’ and ‘B’, asalreadymentioned, the other two being designated ‘C’ and ‘C2’. ‘C’ 660ft ×104ft×23–24ft.Displacement27,600tons.ShaftHorsePower40,000.Speed22knots. ‘C’2 610ft × 100ft × 24/25ft. Displacement 26,250 tons. Shaft HorsePower40,000.Speed22knots.Otherwiseallspecificationsthesame.Aconferencewasheldon26January1916todiscusslayouts.TheSecondSea

Lord pointed out that, ‘…we are not building battlecruisers in the absence ofinformationonthenewGermanconstructionandwemustactontheassumptionthattheyarekeepinguptheirapprovedprogramme’.GreatattentionwaspaidtoaseriesoflettersfromtheCommander–in–Chief,

Admiral Jellicoe, who had the advantage of the latest war experience. Hisguidelinesassetoutinaletterdated8February1916reflectedthefollowing:

1.Wedonotrequiretobuildbattleshipsatthemoment.2.Our superiority isverygreat andgivesnocause foruneasiness inregardtothistypeofship.

3.Weaknessinfuturewilllieinthebattlecruisertypeespeciallythosepossessing high speed. Germany is building at least three very fastbattlecruisers, theHindenburg,VictoriaLouiseandFreya inadditionto Lützow and almost certain to approach 30kts, which will be inexcessofourbattlecruisers.4.Almostcertainthatthelastthreewillhave15.2inguns.5. Any armoured vessel which we are building should be of thebattlecruisertypeandtheneedisgreat.6. Glorious is unable to compete with the German ships owing toinadequateprotectionandthesameappliestotheRepulse.7. In somebattleship designs forwarded the speed varies from25 to27kts.Thisintermediatespeedistomymindoflittleuse.Eithertheyshouldbebattlecruisersof30ktsorbattleshipsof22kts.8.IamattemptingtousetheQueenElizabethclassasafastwingbuttheirexcessinspeedisofverylittleuseanditisquestionablewhethertheycangettoheadofthelineofdeploymentwithoutblanketingthebattleline.9.Requirementsarebattlecruisersat30kts.Notlessthan8guns.10.Noneofourarmoureddecksinbattlecruisersaresufficient.Lowerdecksshouldbenotlessthan2½inthickandthefunnelcasingrequiresbetterprotection.

Furnishedwith suchadvice theFirstSeaLordasked theDNC topreparenewdesignsforamuchlargertypeofbattlecruiser.TheBoardgenerallyfavoureddesignNo.3andwithsomemodificationitwas

workedoutindetail.Thelegendappearedon27March1916showingthesamespeed asNo. 3 for less SHP (144,000) but an armoured belt of only 8 inchesmaximum.InApriltheBoardapprovedthedesignandorderedfourofthetypewhichweretobeknownasthe‘Admiral’class.

Work onHood commenced in May 1916, but as a result of experience atJutland it was decided tomodify the design to secure increased protection, ithaving been found possible substantially to improve this by accepting deeper

draught and slightly reduced speed but without any radical alteration in thedesignasawhole.Improvementsingunneryandtorpedoequipment,bridgeandconningtowerdesign,etc.,wereincorporatedatthesametime,thedetailsbeingworkedoutincollaborationwiththeCinCGrandFleet.Themodifiedprotectionplan was complete by September 1916 and four ships were laid down in theautumn of 1916 although the revised plans were not finally completed andapprovedinalldetailsuntil1917(seefinallegend).Principalmodificationsontheoriginaldesignwere:

1.Nominal draught and displacement increased by 3 feet and 4,900 tonsrespectively.2. Elevation of 15in guns increased from 20 to 30 degrees withcorrespondingincreaseinrange.3. Fire control and rangefinding equipment formain and secondary gunsimproved.4. Four above-water torpedo tubes added with improved torpedo controlequipment.5.Armouronbelt,decks(overmagazines)andbarbettesincreased.6.Hullsidesslopedinboardtowaterline,offeringabnormalangleofimpacttoprojectilesandincreasingeffectivearmourthickness.7.Specialanti-flashprotectionfittedtomagazinesandammunitionhoists.8.Estimatedspeedreducedby1knotalthoughontrialstheoriginaldesignspeedwasexceededbyafractionofaknot.9.Conningtowerandbridgedesignimproved.

Thereviseddesign,whichrepresentedamergingofbattleshipandbattlecruisercharacteristics, constituted what was then a unique combination of offensivepower, protection and speed and amounted to a battlecruiser edition of theQueenElizabeth class, themarked rise indisplacement (13,700 tons) resultingmainlyfromthematerialincreaseinhorsepower(69,000)requiredtoraisespeedfrom25to31knots.It also marked the final abandonment in the British Navy of the original

battlecruiserconcept,embodiedtovaryingdegrees inall theprecedingclasses,in which protection was sacrificed to an extent which rendered them unfit toengage other capital ships and resulted in the loss of three ships at Jutland.AlthoughbenefitingconsiderablyfromthelessonslearnedatJutland,thedesigndid not fully embody all 1914–18 war experience and was never officiallyrecognizedas representing the idealpost-Jutland type.Principalpointsopen to

criticismwere:1.Lowratioofoffensivepowertodisplacementwithonlyeightguns on 41,200 tons. 2. Retention of relatively light armour on upper sidesinsteadofconcentratingprotectiononbelt,deckandgunpositions,andabsenceofanyarmouredprotectiontosecondaryguns.Earlyin1917theGermansceasedworkedonthethreeGrafSpeeclass,and

construction onAnson, Howe andRodney was suspended inMarch 1917, thecontractsbeingfinallycancelledinOctober1918after£860,000hadbeenspentonthem.Thehullsweredismantledtocleartheslipsafterthearmistice.Withaviewtobringingherdefensivequalitiesasfaraspossibleintolinewith

modern requirements, Hood was earmarked early in 1939 for majorreconstruction along similar lines toRenown, although the outbreak ofwar inSeptember 1939prevented this frombeing carriedout and the shipwasnevermodernizedtoanysufficientextent.Modificationsweretohaveincluded:

FINALLEGEND,20AUGUST1917

Displacement:41,200tons.Length:810ft(pp),860ft(oa).Beam:104ft.Draught:28/29ft.Freeboard:29ftforward,21ft11inamidships,18ft9inaft.Armament8×15in80rpg12×5.5in150rpg4×4in200rpg2×21insubmergedTT,8×21inabovewater(changedto4atalaterdate).SHP:144,000for31knots.Fuel:1,200–4,000tonsoil.Armour21ft6inabovewaterlineatnormalload,3ft3inbelow.Mainbelt 12–7–5in,6–5in forward,5–4in aft, bulkheads5–4in aft, 5–4in foreandaft,barbettes12inmax,turrets15–12–11in,TCT9–7in,Funneluptakes2–1½in,Decks:Forecastle2–1½in,Upper2–l–¾in,Main3–2–1½–1in,Lower1½–1inforward,3–1½–1inaft.Weight(tons)Hull,etc.14,950Armour13,550

Machinery5,300Armament5,200Generalequipment800BM145

LAUNCH,22AUGUST1918Length: 810ft 5in (pp) Beam: 104ft 2in. Beam: 103ft 11Min (as moulded).Depthofkeelfromforecastle:50ft6in.Breakage:Longitudinallyinadistanceof610ft=2 thsinhog.Transverseinadistanceof88ft= thshog.Displacement:21,720tons.Armament:74tons.Machinery:1,620tons.Armament:1,184tons.Menandequipmentonboard,etc:310tons.3,188tonstotal.

1.Newdual-purpose(HA/LA)secondaryarmament.2.Removaloftorpedoarmament.3.Additionofaircrafthangarsandcatapult.4.Increasedprotection,especiallyhorizontal.5. New machinery and new high-pressure boilers (see notes onreconstruction).

Hoodin1922.Shewasoneofthemostinterestingwarshipsduringtheinterwaryearsinthefactthatshewasahybrid.Shewasafast,well-protectedshipbutwitharelativelyweakdeckby1921standards.Sheis

seenhererunningtrialsfortheNavy.

Hood served in theHome Fleet 1939–40; ForceH (Gibraltar) 1940–1; HomeFleet1941,lostMay1941.

HullTheoriginaldesign,towhichworkcommencedon27March1916,calledforanominal load displacement of 36,300 tonswith the same length andbeambutwith3feetlessdraught.AdditionalprotectionworkedintothedesignasrevisedonthebasisofJutlandexperienceincreasednominaldraughtanddisplacementby 3 feet. The revised design was nominally 12,700 tons heavier than Tiger,previouslytheheaviest(althoughnotthelongest)shipbuiltfortheRoyalNavy,withan increaseof156 feet length (oa) and14ft9inbeam,butwith the samedesigned mean draught. Compared with the Renown class displacementincreasedby14,700tonswithanincreaseof66½ftinlength(oa),15ft4inbeamand 3ft draught. This substantial rise in displacement over earlier ships wasnecessitated in order to combine all requirements of armament, protection andspeed,andformorethantwentyyearsHoodretainedthedistinctionofbeingthelargest warship afloat. The hull lines were perfectly proportioned andexceptionallygraceful,carefulattentionbeinggiven toherunderwater formsoas to avoid any sacrifice in speed because of the provision of anti-torpedobulges.Heroutstandingfeatureswere:

1. Strong upward sheer forward and aft, offsetting to some extent thereducedfreeboardofthereviseddesign,althoughthequarterdeckwasstillverylowandliabletobefloodedinaseaway.2.Continuousflarefromstemtostern,introducedinthereviseddesign,andintended to augment protection by offering abnormal angles of impact toprojectiles.Thiswasconsideredespeciallyeffectiveagainstplunging fire.Intransversesectionthehullsidesslopedinwardsfromweatherdecklevelsrighttothekeel,wheretheymettheloweredgeofthebulge,theflarebeingsuch that theouteredgeof thebulgewasperpendicular to the topsideofthehull.Thelongforecastlecarriedrightthroughto‘X’turret.Clipperstemwithout the strong reverse curve of the Renowns. Bow flare wasconsiderablebutlessmarkedthaninthoseships.

Thefittingofadditionalarmourinthereviseddesignposedspeciallongitudinalstrength problems as a consequence of the very considerable bendingmomentinducedby the increasedweightof eachpairofbarbettes,whichwere located

very far apart. Constructionwas especially stiffened tomeet this demand andwasexceptionallystrong,largeareasbeingcoveredbythickplating,andheavyframing being an outstanding feature. Shell plating behind all armour wasespeciallyheavy,rangingfrom2inHToverthegreaterportionto1½inandlinelsewhere. This materially increased the strength of the entire structure andserved as additional armoured protection. The double-bottom was not carriedabovetheturnofthebilge.Sheprovedherselfagoodseaboatandasteadygunplatform.Atfullspeedorinaseaway,however,thedeepflareandupwardsheerforwardkepttheforecastledryalthoughfreeboardaftwasinsufficienttopreventthequarterdeckfrombeingfloodedundertheseconditions.

ArmamentTheeight15in42calMk1gunswere in four twin turrets allon thecentreline,two on the forecastle and two on the quarterdeck, second and third turretssuperfiring over first and fourth. Twelve 5.5in 50cal Mk 1 guns for thesecondaryarmamentwereinsinglemountingsbehindopenshields,ten(5P&S)well spaced along the forecastle deck amidships, two (P&S) on shelter deckabeamforefunnel;four4inanti-aircraftgunsinsingleopenmountingsatafterendofforecastledeck,twooncentrelineabaftmainmast,two(P&S)abeamthis.The 15in guns were the same model as those in theQueen Elizabeth, RoyalSovereign andRenown classes.Directorcontrolwas fitted:director towerwith15ft rangefinder over the control top, 30ft rangefinder in revolving armouredhoodovertheconningtowerandinrearofeachturret.Thearmouredcasesforthe turret rangefinderswere slightlywider than the rangefinder itself to allowthese to be traversed for fine adjustment. Range clocks on foremast, belowcontroltop,andatrearofaftercontrolplatform.

AnaerialviewofHoodduringtheWorldCruise1923,showingheroveralllayoutandappearanceasFlagshipoftheSpecialServicesSquadron.

OnthequarterdeckofHoodduringtheWorldCruiseandshownhereanchoredinGovernmentDock,Victoria.BC.Repulseisinthebackground.June1924.

Themainarmamentwasequaltothatof thelatestcontemporarybattleships,buttheratioofoffensivepowertodisplacementwasrelativelylowasaresultofthe urgent demands for protection and speed, this factor being one of the fewpoints subjected to criticism in the design as a whole. The original design

provided20°elevation for the15ingunsas inQueenElizabeth. In the revisedplan, however, this was raised to 30° which increased range by about 7,900yards. Improved loading gear increased rate of fire from one round in twominutes to one round in about 1 minute 35 seconds. The turrets were a newdesign (weighing about 900 tons apiece) with flat crowns and small squaresighting ports cut low in the turret face for laying over open sights. Thisprovisionofsightingportsintheturretfaceinsteadofinhoodsonthecrown,asinalltheearlierclasses,alloweddirectend-onfirebythesuperfiringturretsforthefirsttimeintheRoyalNavy.Thishadpreviouslybeenimpracticablebecauseofblasteffectsonpersonnelat thehoods in the lower turrets.Firecontrolandrangefindingequipment,whichreceivedspecialattentionin thereviseddesign,wasunusuallyelaborate,detailsbeingworkedoutincollaborationwiththeCinCGrand Fleet. The 30ft rangefinders over the conning tower and in the turretswere the largest afloat to that date. She was the last British capital shipcompletedwithmast location for control and/or director positions. In the laterships thesewere carried on a large tower structurewhich replaced the normalbridgework.Gastight arrangementswere fitted in thecontrolpositions,but thetransmittingstationwasfoundtobecomeintolerablyhotwhensealedagainsttheoutsideair.The 5.5in secondary armament was a new calibre introduced in the light

cruisersBirkenheadandChesterwhichwerebuildinginEnglandforGreecein1914andtakenoveraftertheoutbreakofwar,thesparegunsandmountingsforthese ships being utilized for Hood. The shelter deck and first two pairs offorecastle deck guns bore directly ahead towell abaft their beam.Others hadwide arcs on their own bow and quarter. They had no direct astern fire.Originallyithadbeenintendedtocarryfouradditionalguns(makingsixteeninall)mountedat theafterendof theforecastledeckandbearingdirectlyastern,but these were suppressed while building as being unnecessary and entailingextra weight and personnel. Director control was fitted, with director towers(P&S)onthelowerbridge.Therewerecontrolpositionseachsideof themaincontroltop.Officialplansshowa9ftrangefinderoneachposition,butthesedonot seem to havebeen fitted until 1924–5 (according to photographs).Batterysightinghoods(P&S)weresituatedontheshelterdeckbetweenthesecondandthirdgunsandabaftthefifth.Thedistributionofsecondarygunswaswellplannedandtheirhighcommand

enabledthemtobefoughtinheavyweatheralthoughtheabsenceofanyformofprotectionotherthantheopensplintershieldsleft thecrewsveryexposed.Shewas the last British capital ship to have an open secondary battery. The firecontrol and rangefinding equipment in the revised design received similar

attention to that given to themain armament.A torpedo-spotting positionwasfitted below the main control top. Antiaircraft armament as completed wasdouble thatpreviously carried in anyBritish capital ship.Thedesignprovidedfora6in‘travelling’HARFmountedonathwartshipsrailsontheaftercontrolposition,butthiswasnotactuallyfitteduntilafter1926–7.Specialarrangementsfortorpedocontrolwereprovidedinthereviseddesign,these,asinthecaseofthegunnerycontrol,beingworkedoutinconjunctionwiththeCinCGrandFleet.Therewere three torpedocontrol towerswitha15ft rangefinder ina revolvinghood on each (after hood was armoured): two (P&S) abeam the amidshipscontrol tower before the second funnel, one on the centreline abaft the aftercontrolposition.Directionalwirelesswasfitted,theaerialslungbetweenmastswellbelowthemainWTaerials,DFofficeinthemidshipscontroltowerbeforethe second funnel. She was the first British warship to complete with D/Fequipment.

ArmourThearmouringintheoriginaldesignwasverysimilartothatofTigerwith8inbeltand9inbarbettes,butasaresultofthelossofInvincible,IndefatigableandQueen Mary at Jutland because of inadequate armouring, it was decidedimmediately after this engagement to modify the design to secure increasedprotection, it having been found possible substantially to improve this byacceptingdeeper draught and slightly reducednominal speed, butwithout anyradical alteration in the design as a whole. The revised protection plan wascompleted by September 1916, the principal modifications involving about5,000tonsadditionalarmourcomprising:

1.Increaseinmaximumthicknessofbeltarmourfrom8into12in.2.Materially increasedarmouringondecksovermagazines (extraarmouradded to crowns of ‘X’ and ‘Y’ magazines from 40lb to 80lb). Deckprotectionincreasedtoatotalof6½inoverforwardmagazinesand7inoveraftermagazines.3.Increaseinmaximumthicknessofbarbettearmourfrom9into12in.4.Provisionof specialanti-flashprotection tomagazinesandammunitionhoistsandimprovedarrangementsforisolationandfloodingofmagazines.

Thebeltandsidearmourwasbackedbyspecial2in–1½in–1inHTshellplatingover the greatest portion,which in effect increased themaximum thickness ofbelt, loweranduppersideto13½in–9in–7inrespectively.One-inchHTplatingwascarriedcompetetothestembeyondtheendsofthe6inbeltarmourandover

thesameheightasthis.Effectivethicknessofbeltandsidearmourwasfurtherincreasedbyastronginboardslopeofthehullsidetothewaterline,introducedinthereviseddesign,continuousoverthewholelengthoftheshipandofferingabnormal angles of impact to projectiles. This feature was of special valueagainstplungingfire.Theturretswereanewimproveddesignwithflatcrownstendingtodeflectshellsfallingatasteepangleandsmallsquaresightingportscutlowintheface.Roofplatesinthereviseddesignwereconsiderablythickerthan inanyof theprecedingclasses.Theabsenceofanythingbetter thanopensplintershieldsfor thesecondarygunswasaweakpointand theentirebatterywasliabletosimultaneousdisablementbyasinglehit.

HoodatanchorinToulonin1923.Noteher30ftrangefinderontopofthemassiveconningtowerrangeclocks,improvedshapeof15inturrets,bridgelayoutandhulllines.

The conning tower, to which particular attention was given in the reviseddesign, was located unusually far ahead of the bridge, affording anunprecedentedlywide range of vision andwas the largest, best devised,mostelaborateandheaviestever fitted inanywarship to thatdate.Thebasecarrieddowntothemaindeck.Theupperstagescomprisedtwoshells,11inouterand9ininner,withanarrowpassagebetweenthem.Inthemiddleandlowerstagestheinnershell(3in)wasfittedontheforesideonly.Theconningtowerarmourweighedmorethan600tons,thewholestructureweighingalmost900tons.Provisionwasmadeforsealingoffthe15ingunturrets,controlpositionsand

bridge against gas attack, but during exercises in 1923 conditions in thetransmitting station were found to become intolerable when entirely shut offfromtheoutsideair.

Theanti-torpedobulgeswereofan improvedtypedevelopedbySirEustaceTennysond’Eyncourt(DNC)andProfessorB.Hopkinson,fromtheearlypatternfitted in monitors and old cruisers of the Edgar class in 1915 as a result ofexperimentscarriedoutinobsoletebattleshipsshortlybeforethewar(seeRoyalSovereign class, notes onbulges).The structure comprised anouter sectionofwatertight compartments separated by a ½in HT bulkhead from the innerbuoyancyspace,alsosubdividedandboundedbya1½inHTlongitudinalanti-torpedobulkhead,slopinginwardstothekeelandformingacontinuationofthetopsideplatingandinnerboundaryofthebulgeproper.Theinternalsectionofthe anti-torpedo space behind this bulkhead, instead of comprising part of thebulgeasintheRenownclass,waspartofthehullproperandwascomposedofoil fuel compartments which were separated from working spaces by an airspace and an inner ¾in HT anti-torpedo bulkhead about 16ft inboard at thewaterline risingvertically fromkeel tomaindeck.Within thebulgewere fiverows of crushing tubes over thewhole length of the citadel. Thewidth of thebulge forHood had been determined by the weight of the explosive chargecarriedintorpedoesatthatdate.Theouteredgeofthebulgeintheperpendiculartotopsideofhull,themarkedflareofthehullsideallowingwiderbulgesthanintheRenowns.Thebulgesranfrom‘A’and‘Y’barbettesonly,hullsidesbeingmoulded to flush with these, causing no loss of speed. Complete end to endprotection was considered unnecessary because the effect of flooding at theextremitieswasregardedasbeingnegligible.

Hoodin1924duringtheWorldCruise.EveryonewantedtoseetheHood,andtheladieswerenoexception.Notethefashion.

Hoodundergoingtrialsofspeedandturningcapabilitiesetc.Notethetremendouswashoverthebows.1926.

As completed it was estimated thatHood was capable of withstanding theexplosionoffourorfivetorpedoes(1915–18model)withoutanymateriallossofspeed or fighting efficiency. Internally she had more than 500 watertightcompartments.Theindependentventilationinallmaintransversecompartmentseliminatedtheriskofwaterpassingbetweenthemintheeventofdamage,andthere were very elaborate pumping and flooding arrangements. The pumpingequipmentwascapableofdischargingabout20,000tonsofwaterperhour.The general scheme of protection in the revised design was most

comprehensiveandsimilar to thatof the latestGermanbattlecruisers, the largeareas covered by heavy armour, strong framing and plating, etc., being anoutstandingfeature.Horizontalandunderwaterprotectionwasespeciallystrongandoncompletion (1920)Hoodwasgenerallyconceded tobeamong thebestprotectedwarships afloat, all-round armouring being rather superior to that oftheQueenElizabethclassandunderwaterprotectiondistinctlystronger than inthoseshipsascompleted.Percentageofarmourweighttodisplacement33.5percent against 31 per cent in theQueen Elizabeths. Total weight of protection13,550tons,whichexcludedespeciallyheavyHTshellplating.Atthesametimeprotection to the main armament, magazines and machinery fell short of the

standardsaffordedby the ‘allornothing’planadoptedby theUSNavy in theOklahomaclassof1916,butnotacceptedbytheBritishAdmiraltyuntilafterthewarwhenitbecameuniversallyadopted.Asaresult lightarmourwasretainedovertheuppersideinHoodwhenitwouldhavebeenmoreusefullyappliedtofurtherstrengtheningthebelt,decks,turretsandbarbettes.During the late 1920s and 1930s it was more than apparent that Hood’s

protectionwasvulnerabletomodernheavycalibreprojectiles,especiallyatlongrangewhen thesewould fall at steep angles, although the shipwould becomeprogressively less liable tovitaldamageas the rangeapproached12,000yardsandtrajectoriesflattened.Protectionascompletedwas:

Mainbelt: 12in amidships, 562ft long×9ft 6inwide, extending almost to theouterfacesof‘A’and‘Y’barbettes.Theupperedgeatmaindecklevelwas5½ftabovethewaterline,theloweredgealongthelowerdeckwas4ftbelowthewaterline;6in-5inforwardextendingtowithin75feetofthestemoverthesameheightasthemidshipssection,6infor50feetbeyond‘A’barbette,5inoutside this; 6in aft extending towithin 80 feet of the stern over the sameheightasthemidshipssection,3inlowerstripfittedbelow12insection.

Middle side:7in–5inextending from forwardextremityof6inbelt armour,50feetbefore‘A’barbettetoabeamcentre‘Y’barbettebetweenmainandupperdecks;7inbetweenouterfacesof‘A’and‘Y’barbettes,5inforwardof‘A’.

Upperside:5infromouterfaceof‘A’barbetteto65feetshortof‘X’betweenforecastleandupperdecks.

Bulkheads: 5in closing forward extremities of 5in belt armour between lowerandmain decks. Closing forward extremities of 12in belt armourwith ‘A’barbette between lower and main decks. Closing forward extremities ofmiddlesidearmourbetweenmainandupperdecks.Closingafterextremitiesof 12in belt armour with ‘Y’ barbette between lower and main decks.Oblique,closingafterextremitiesof7inmiddlesidearmourwith‘Y’barbettebetweenmainand‘Y’–12in–9in–6in–5in–2in.Outerface12inaboveupperdeck,12inand9inupper tomain,5inmain to lower. Innerface12inaboveupperdeck,6inuppertomain,2inmaintolower.

Turrets:15infaces,12in–11insides,11inrearsand5incrowns.Secondarygunshields:lin.Ammunition(5.5inhoists):¾in.Ammunition passages: l½in–lin port and starboard between upper and main

decksoutsideengineroomcasingbelow5.5inbattery.Conning tower:11in–9in–7in–6in–3insides.Outershell11inupperstages,7in

middle, 6in and 3in lower (forecastle to upper deck). Inner shell 9in upperstages,3inmiddleandlower(onforesideonly),5inroof,2in–¾infloor;2inbelowuppersection,¾inatbaseonupperdeck.

Sightinghood:10inface,6inrearoverconningtower,5incrown.Revolvinghood:6insides,3incrownoversightinghood,2infloor.Torpedocontroltower:4infaceandsides,1½inrear,3inroof,2infloor.Revolvinghood:4insides,3inroofovertorpedocontroltower.Uptakes:1¼in(ship’scoverstates1½in–2½inbutsomeplateswereremovedin

revisedplan)betweenshelterandupperdecks.Anti-torpedobulkheads:1½inouter,¾ininner.Longitudinalportandstarboard

overallmagazine,machineryandboilerspacesfromkeeltomaindeck.Outerbulkheads sloped inboard to keel conforming to angle of hull side. Innerbulkheadsvertical.Forwardandafter extremitiesclosedby1½in transversebulkheads.

Anti-torpedobulges:About7½feetwideextendingovermagazine,machineryandboilerspaces.

MachineryBrownCurtisgearedturbinesdrivingfourscrews.Fourseparatesetsofturbineseachcomprising:1.Compoundaheadturbines.2.Cruisingturbines inseparatecasing.ConnectedwithmainHPshaftasrequiredandoperatedinserieswithHPand LP turbines at cruising speed. 3. Astern turbine fitted in LP casing androtatinginvacuumwhensteamingahead.Eachsetwascompleteinitselfwithitsown condensers and auxiliaries and could be operated independently. 210revolutions per minutes at full speed. The turbines were arranged in threecompartments:twosetsinforwardcompartmentdrivingwingshafts;onesetinmidships compartment driving port inner shaft; one set in after compartmentdrivingstarboard innershaft.Reduction inshaft revolutions,ascomparedwithprevious ships with direct drive turbines, permitted the adoption of higherefficiencypropellers.Thedesignedhorsepowerof36,000oneachshaftwasthehighestpowerever

putthroughgearingtothatdate,andthetotalhorsepowerwashigherthaninanyother ship extant: twenty-four Yarrow small-tube boilers arranged in fourcompartments (six in each) with an average working pressure of 210psi.Excepting the Courageous group as being large cruisers,Hood was the firstBritishcapitalshiptohavegearedturbinesandsmall-tubeboilers.Adoptionofsmall-tubeboilers,whichhadlongbeenadvocatedbytheDNC(d’Eyncourt)andwhich afforded 30 per cent greater power than the large tube without

correspondingincreaseinweightandspace,materiallyinfluencedthedesignasawhole.Onareductionofapproximately185tonsinweightofmachineryandboilers, a 30 per cent increase in horsepower was obtained over the Renownclass,andmorethandoubledtheLions’horsepoweronapproximatelythesameweight; the gain, in this case, being obtained on the same total floor spacealthoughsubstitutionofoilfuelforcoalwasanimportantcontributoryfactorinthis respect. Eight widely separated dynamos provided electric power: twodrivenbyturbines,fourbyreciprocatingenginesandtwobydiesel.

Hood,Melbourne,Australia,March1924.Oneofherfirstmajortaskswasto‘showtheflag’.WithRepulse,cruisersanddestroyers,theSquadronwentonaWorldTourfromNovember1923toSeptember1924andcausedmayhemwherevertheywentbecauseofthepublic’swantingtoviewthelargestwarshipintheworld.

HOODAsFitted,1924.AsseenonWorldCruise

HOODBRIDGEWORK

Theoriginaldesignprovidedfor32knotsatthenormalload,rathersimilartotheRenownclass.Nominalhorsepowerwasunchangedinthereviseddesign,theestimatedspeedbeingreducedby1knotasaresultoftheincreaseddraughtanddisplacement. As completed, however, she proved capable of exceeding theoriginaldesignednormalloadfigure.Carefulattentiontothehullformmeantthatthespeedwasnotaffectedbythe

bulges,andoncompletionshewasoneof the three fastestcapital ships in theworld(theothertwobeingRenownandRepulse).

BridgeworkAlthough the form ofHood’s bridge represented the final development of theolder style superstructure, which had been in use since 1912, it was not toeveryone’sliking,adversecriticismsbeing:

1.Standardcompassplatformtoosmall.2.Impossibletolookaftfromthisposition.3.Necessarycommunicationsfromthispositionnon-existent.

Duringpreliminarytrialsthebridgewasfoundratheropenanddraughtyandthefollowingalterationsweredemanded:

1.Wingsfittedatthesideofthebridge.2.Canopyextendedtopelorusplatform.3. Canopy given a lip around the opening to deflect air current fromopening near the standard compass as far as possiblewithout obstructingviewoftheinstruments.

Evenwith thesemodifications and other alterations that took place during thefollowingyears,furthermildcriticismwasvoicedin1936.

PortbowofHoodmooredalongsideandflyingtheflagofRearAdmiralSirRogerKeyesc.1920/21.

ReportofCaptain’sBridge:There is no all-round view. The aft view can only be obtained by going outthrough the doors to platforms on the wings. When coming alongside theCaptain would be on one of these wing platforms which are cut off from

essentialcontrols,etc.Ifbridgeiswinddownanddoorsatthebackofcompassplatform are shut conditions are not bad. When doors at the back are openconditionsatthecompassaredifficult.Admiral’sBridge:FromenclosedpositioninfrontofcharthousetheAdmiralcannotseeaheadastheviewiscompletelyblankedbythearmouredhoodandrangefinderovertheconningtower.Frompositionsinthebridgefromwhichhecouldseeaheadandoneside,hisviewoftheothersideisblanked.Togetagoodviewafthehastouse the5.5indirectorplatformonone sideandagain is cutoff from theotherside.

TheseandothercriticismsfromofficersaboardHisMajesty’scapitalshipsledtoacompletelynewtypeofenclosedstructurebeingdevelopedandthisfeaturedforthefirsttimeintheNelsonpairof1925.

GeneralNotesThe bridge structure, which was a development of the type introduced in theKingGeorgeVclassbattleshipsandLionclassbattlecruisers,comprisedaheavysquarecut central towerwith twowingsat each side.Thenavigatingplatformwascompletelyenclosedandnotprojectedforwardasintheearlierclasses.Thebridgewassetwellabafttheconningtower.Fourseparatesteeringpositionswerefitted:(a)inconningtower;(b)inlower

conningtower;(c)inafterengineroom;(d)insteeringcompartment(auxiliaryonly).Nohand steeringgearwasprovided, experiencehaving failed to justifyretentionofthisinlarge,high-speedships.Heavy boats were stowed on the shelter deck between second funnel and

mainmast and handled by main derrick slung from mainmast. Seaboats werecarriedintwopairsoffixeddavits(portandstarboard)onshelterdeckbetweenfunnels.Anextrapairofdavitswasaddedfurtheraft,1926–7.Accommodation,whichembodiedrecommendationsofthespecialcommittee

appointedshortlybeforethewar,wasmateriallyimprovedinsomerespectsoverthat in the earlier ships. Berthing and sanitary arrangements were reported asbeingnotinferiortothoseincontemporaryUSships.Officers’accommodationwasreportedasbeingexcellent,butcrew’squarters,locatedoverboilerrooms,not altogether satisfactory. Messes had good headroom but where otherwisecramped and inferior to the preceding classes. Oil-fired cooking appliances,marking a considerable advance over all previous arrangements,were adoptedfor the first time in theRoyalNavy.Special attentionwas paid to ventilation.

Supplyandexhaustfansprovidedfreshair,warmedifnecessary,atlowvelocityto all living spaces, with full natural supply to engine and boiler rooms, aseparate supply being provided to eachmain transverse compartment to avoidopeningsinbulkheads.Theshipwasfittedasaflagshipbutwithnosternwalk.

ConveyedbytenspecialtrainsfromCoventry7,000schoolchildreninvadedPortsmouthon2September1933tovisittheFleet.ThephotoshowsapartyofschoolchildrenwaitingtoboardHood.

RigTripod fore andmainmasts.Stump topmast to fore and short topmast tomain.Topgallantmast tomaininearlyperiod,whenrequiredtoincreaseW/Trange,butusuallycarriedhouseddownabafttopmast;carriedthroughoutworldcruise1923–4butremovedaltogetherafterthis.Widesignalstruts,rakedstronglyaft,from lower starfish on foremast. Combined signal andW/T yard at head foretopmast.Main derrick on mainmast. Light derricks port and starboard abeamsecondfunnelandateachsidemidshipscontroltowerbeforethis.Accordingtophotographsoftheofficialmodel,theshipwasoriginallydesignedwithoutmaintopmast,afterendsofW/Taerialsbeingcarriedtoupward-rakingstrutsatmainstarfish,andwouldprobablyhavebeenriggedthusifcompletedpriortotheendofthewar.

AppearanceChangesandRefitsShewasmuch longer and less ‘piledup’ than theRenowns andwasgenerallyconcededtohavebeenoneofthefinest-lookingwarshipseverbuilt.No previous ship had presented such an embodiment of power and speed

combinedwithbeautyandproportion,andhersizewasnotapparentunlessshewas seen in company with other ships. Principal characteristics: (a) Clipperstem,(b)Markedupwardsheerforwardandaftandinboardslopeofhullsidetowaterline,continuousoverwholelength,(c)Exceptionallylargeconningtower,well clear ahead of bridge,with prominentRF over this, (d) Solid, square-cutbridgework.(e)Largecontroltoponforemastwithheavydirectortoweronroof,(f) Large SL and control tower before second funnel, (g) Large, flat-sidedfunnels,(h)Secondarygunsinshieldsalongforecastledeckamidships.

STEAMTRIALS:HELDONTHECLYDE(Preliminarytrialsforacceptance)18March1920.Displacement(tons) Revolutions SHP Speed(knots)42,090 inner66.5 inner655 11.84 outer93 outer3,901 41,700 inner61 inner– 15.17 outer112 outer7,480 41,600 inner125 inner7,232 20.37 outer123 outer7,307 42,190 inner173 inner21,229 27.46 outer174 outer22,071 42,200 inner203 inner35,246 31.58 outer203½ outer37,543 44,600 inner204.7 inner40,000 31.88 outer204.3 outer40,900 Maximumspeedattainedonthisdaywas32knotswith151,600shp.ThefollowingdayHood’scalculationswere:5,000milesat18knotsand4,500milesat20knotsbasedonconsumptionduringtrials.SteamTrials:MeasuredMile,April1920Displacement(tons) Speed(knots) SHP RPM42,090 13.53 9,110 80

41,700 15.60 14,630 9341,700 17.20 20,050 10341,600 20.37 29,080 12441,850 25.24 58,020 15442,100 27.77 89,010 17642,150 27.71 116,151 19142,200 32.07 151,280 20745,000 13.17 8,735 8145,000 15.78 14,020 9645,000 19.11 24,720 11644,600 22.00 40,780 13644,600 25.73 69,010 16144,600 28.37 112,480 18544,600 31.89 150,220 204

METACENTRICHEIGHTANDSTABILITY

(Asinclined,21February1920)Displacement(tons):41,125(light).Draught:28ft3in.GM:4.2ft.42,670(legend).Draught:29ft3in.GM:3.25ft.46,680(deep).Draught:32ft.GM:3.2ft.Asinclined,14March1931Displacement: 41,125 tons (light). Draught: 28ft 3⅜in forward, 28ft 5⅛inamidships,29ft5¼inaft.Asinclined,15July1932Displacement:45,450tons(legend).Draught:30ft4inforward,32ftaft

1920–391921:Rangeclocksremovedfromsidesofaftercontrolposition;onerelocatedatrearofthis,othersuppressed.

1922–3:LowerpairofSLremovedfrommidshipscontroltower.Smalltoweronlight lattice support temporarilymounted over after control position (removedJuly1923).

1924–5:Rangeclockbelowforecontroltopremoved.SecondaryarmamentRF(9ft) in shield fitted at each side of main control top. These RF included inoriginal design (vide official plans) but not fitted as completed.ModificationseffectedbyMay1925.

HOOD:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETEDConstructionJohn Brown; laid down 1.9.1916; launched 22.8.1918; completed 7.1.1920(commissionedfortrials).Displacement(tons):41,125(light),42,670(load),46,680(deep).DimensionsLength:810ft5in(pp),860ft(oa).Beam:104ft2in(105ft3inmax.).Draught:28ft3inlight,29ft3inload,32ftdeep.Armament8×15in42calMk1

12×5.5in50calMk14×4inAA4×3pdr(saluting)5MG10Lewis6×21inTT(4abovewaten2submerged).Armour:(seealsoarmournotes)Mainbelt 12in amidships, 6–5in forward,6in aft, 3in lower strip;Middle sidebelt7–5in,Upperside5in,Bulkheads:5in,Decks:Forecastle2–1½–1¼–¾–½in,Upper2–1–¾in,Main3–2–1½in,Lower2–1½–1inforward,3–2–1½–1 in aft; Barbettes 12–10–9–6–5–2½in, Turrets 15–12= 11–5in,Secondarygunshields1in,Ammunitionhoists(5.5in)¾in,CT11–9–6–3in,TCT4–1½in,Anti-torpedobulkhead1½/¾in.Directorcontrol:fittedintoweraloftandalsoin‘B’and‘X’turrets.MachineryBrownCurtisgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.Boilers:24Yarrowsmall-tubein4compartments.Workingpressure:210psi.Designedshp:144,000for31knots.Fuel(tons):1,200oilnormal,4,000max.Radiusofaction:6,400nmat12knots.Searchlights:8×36in:2onplatformlowonforetripod,4onmidshipscontroltowerbetweenfunnels;4x24insignalling:2onaftercontrolpositionabaftmainmast.RangefindersFive30ft:1ineach15inturretand1indirectorcontroltowerforward.Ship’sboats(see1939).Anchors:3×192cwtstockless1×61cwtstern.Wireless:Types1–16,Types1–34,Type31(2officesascompleted).Complement:1,475(average).Cost:publishedfigure:£6,025,000.

HoodsleavesPortsmouthc.1926flyingtheflagofRearAdmiralCyrilT.M.Fuller.Notetheaircrafton‘B’turretandrunwayfullywooded;alsothesmallrangefinderatrearofthespottingtop.

1925–6:Aftercontrolpositionenlarged.SLonaftercontrolpositionremountedabreastwithremotecontrolpositionbeloweach.

1926–7: 6ft traversingHARFmounted on athwartships rails on after controlposition.Thiswasincludedinoriginaldesign(seeofficialplan)butnotfittedascompleted.

1931:AsrefittedMay1929toMarch1931:Multiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedportandstarboardonshelterdeckamidships.HARFonaftercontrolpositionreplaced by RA director. One pair 24in signalling SL remounted onsuperstructure below bridge.Aircraft catapult (McTaggart training type) fittedonquarterdeckrightaftwithcraneforhandlingaircraftabaftit.OneFaireyIIIFreconnaissance seaplane carried. Flying-off platform removed from ‘X’ turret.Short wings fitted to upper bridge. Forward pair seaboat davits removed toaccommodatemultiple2pdrs.

1932: Range clock removed from after control position. Secondary armamentRFat each sideof control top removed.Aircraft spottingposition added (portandstarboard)onafterpointsofstarfishbelowcontrol top.Catapultandcraneremoved (location reported to have been found inconvenient). ModificationseffectedMay1932.

Portquarterandfull-lengthviewsofHoodasshepreparesfortheCoronationFleetReviewinSpitheadRoads,May1937.Repulseisbehind.

SternofHoodduringtheWorldCruise1924andcoveredwithvisitorswhohavearrivedonsmallboats.Notethefreshairventsprotrudingfromtheportholes.

1933–4: Multiple 0.5in AA (4 barrels) added port and starboard onsuperstructure abeam conning tower. Flying-off platform removed from ‘B’turret.ModificationseffectedbyJuly1934.

1934–5: Secondary armament RF remounted port and starboard on forwardsuperstructureabeambridge.AAspottingpositionsonstarfishbelowcontroltopenlargedandbroughtinagainstrearoftop.ModificationseffectedbyJuly1935.

1936: As refitted June to September 1936: After control position rebuilt andenlarged.AAspottingpositionsonforemastremoved.SLandplatformremovedfrom foremast. Remaining 36in SL replaced by 44in. Upper bridge built up.Middlebridgewingsextendedaftaroundtripodlegs.

1937–8:Red,white and blue identifications bands painted up on ‘B’ turret inMediterraneanduringSpanishCivilWar.Refit,February toJune1939:Shelterdeckpairof5.5in removed.Four twin

4inAAinlargeshieldsadded,2P&Sonshelterdeckabaftsecondfunnel,closeto mainmast. After pair of 4in AA remounted in place of shelter deck 5.5in.Multiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedonlargeplatformoncentrelineabaftcontrolposition (replacing torpedo control tower). HA directors added (P&S) on

forward superstructureabaftbridge.Submerged torpedo tube roomutilized forotherpurposes(TTinthispositionremovedin1937).AdditionalDFequipmentadded.Two44in lampsaddedonplatformP&Scloseabaft second funnelandsetwelloutfromthis.Bridgefaceslightlymodified.

HOOD:PARTICULARS,1939Displacement (tons): 42,672 (load), 48,650 (deep) (48,360 after removal of5.5inguns).Dimensions:unchanged.Draughtgreatlyincreasedowingtoadditions:33ft2inforward,34ft0¼inaft.ArmamentMaingunsasoriginalSecondarygunsasoriginal8×4in(twins)24×2pdrAA(3×8barrels)8×0.5in(2×quads)Originalfieldandsalutingguns4×21inTT(abovewater).Radar:ImprovedMF/DF(1939).Searchlights:6×44in.Aircraft:nil.Protection:asoriginal.Machineryandboilers:unchanged.Speed:Reportedashavingdroppedconsiderably,28–29knotsmaximum.Rig: Original plus DF aerial at head of main topmast. D/F cabinet on mainstarfish.Complement:1,341–1,418.

AppearanceOriginal appearance not materially altered by 1920/39 modifications.Bridgeworkonlyslightlymodified.Largecontroltowerbeforesecondfunnelwasreplacedbysmalldeckhousewellclearoffunnel.Twin 4in AA amidships and prominent 2pdr gun mountings. After controlpositionconsiderablyenlarged.

Refit extension, June to August 1939: All single 4in AA removed. Shelter

deck5.5in replaced.Control towerbeforesecond funnel removed;originalDFposition in this was relocated in small deckhouse farther away from funnel.Extensiontoadmiral’sbridge.HACSimproved.Refit,MarchtoJune1940:Shelterdeck5.5inremoved.All5.5inequipment

removed.Threetwin4inAA(HA/LAMkXIX)addedinlargeshields.Forward5.5in openings plated up. Low shields fitted around 2pdr guns. Five UPmountings fitted, one on ‘B’ 15in turret, four on shelter deck amidships.Degaussingcablefittedoutsidehull.5.5inspottingtopsconvertedto4incontrolpositions.Refit, January toMarch 1941 (lastmodifications received): Type 284 radar

fittedformaingunnery.Type279AWradarfitted.HF/DFofficeremovedfrommainmast.Torpedolookoutsremovedfromforemast.Foretopmastremoved.

History:HoodOrderedApril1916underEmergencyWarProgrammefromJohnBrown&Co.,

Ltd.,Clydebank.Work commenced 31 May 1916 but suspended after Battle of Jutland for

modification in design (see General Summary of Design). Laid down toreviseddesign1September1916.Launched22August1918.CommissionedatClydebankfortrials7JanuarytoMarch1920.

AchanceforsomeofthecrewtorelaxasHoodpassesthroughthePanamaCanalon23July1924duringtheWorldCruise.

Lookingovertheforecastlefromtheconningtowerin1926.

Completed full crew at Rosyth 29 March 1920 to relieve Tiger as flagBattlecruiserSquadron,AtlanticFleet.

CarriedoutfurthertrialsfromDevonportMarchtoMay1920.Officiallycompleted15May1920.JoinedBCSatPortlandMay1920.FlagtransferredfromTiger17May.ATLANTICFLEET(flagBCS)May1920toNovember1923.Ordered to RevalMay 1920, withTiger and nine destroyers, to reinforce the

British Baltic Squadron for proposed summer operations against theBolsheviks. Squadron left Portland 30May and proceeded via Sweden andDenmark.

RecalledfromCopenhageninJuneowingtochangeinpolicytowardstheRedregime,andvisitedOsloenroutehome.

ArrivedScapa3July.ReceivedsurrenderofGermanbattleshipsHelgolandandWestfalenandtwelve

destroyersinForth4August1920.Detached August 1922, with Repulse, to represent Royal Navy at Brazilian

Independence Centenary Celebrations at Rio de Janeiro and subsequentlycarriedoutflag-showingcruiseintheWestIndies.

MASTS:AUGUST1931Foremast: length(ft) diameter(in)Lowermast steel 87 36Struts steel 100 33Flagpole wood 19 6–1Topmast wood 30ft5in 14–6Signalyards wood 30ft6in 8½–5Outriggers wood 9–10 Mainmast: Lowermast steel 92 36Struts steel 72ft9in Topmast wood 59 Flagpole wood 26ft10in Gaff wood 32ft10in Topgallantyard forW/T 30 Derrick steel 65 Jackstaff wood 50 Ensignstaff wood 21ft6in

PROPOSEDMODERNIZATION:12DECEMBER19381.Newmachinery.2.8×5.25ingunsinpairs.3.ShortrangeHAAAincreasedto6MkVIpompoms,0.5ingunsremoved.4.FittingD111HCatapultandaircrafthangarasinKGVclass.5.Removalofallabove-waterTT6.Removalofconningtowerandreconstructionofbridgework.7. Modification of underwater protection, removal of crushing tubes andreplacementwithoilfuelcompartments.8.Increasedeckprotection(5inovermagazines,4inovermachinery).9.Removalofupperbelts(7inand5in)andreplacewith12inplates.

Estimatedcosts: Machinery £1,625,000Armourprotection 750,000

Underwaterprotection 300,000Rearmament 1,000,000CTandbridgework 150,000Extensionofforecastle 30,000Includingothersmalladditiorandalterations,thetotalestimatedcostwas£4,035,000.Afterthisrefittheshipwasestimatedtobegoodforanotherfifteenyears.

HOODJuly1931PlusModifications

Port-sideamidshipssuperstructure.

LeftDevonport14August1922,returned3December.WithRepulseandSnapdragon,visitedNorwayandDenmarkJunetoJuly1923.

HoistedflagKingofNorwayasHonoraryAdmiralinRoyalNavyduringthiscruise.

DetachedNovember 1923 as flag Special Service Squadron comprisingHood(flagVA),Repulseand1stLCSDelhi(flag),Danae,DauntlessandDragon,forEmpireandworldcruise.

FLAGSPECIALSERVICESQUADRON(WorldCruise)November1923toSeptember1924.Squadron left from rendezvous off Plymouth 27 November, proceedingoutwardsviaCapeandIndianOceanandreturningacrossthePacific.Itineraryofbattlecruisersandlightcruisersvariedinsomeinstancesandfinallyseparatedon leaving San Francisco 11 July 1924 on the return leg, the former passingthrough the Panama Canal while the latter proceeded around South America.Squadron reformed again off the Lizard 28 September, ships arriving back attheir home ports on 28th and 29th.Hood and Repulse visited: Sierra Leone,Capetown, Zanzibar, Trincomalee, Port Swettenham, Singapore, Fremantle,

Albany, Adelaide, Melbourne, Hobart, Jervis Bay, Sydney, Wellington,Auckland,Fiji,Honolulu,Vancouver,Victoria,SanFrancisco,Panama,Colon,Kingston(Jamaica),Halifax,QuebecandSt.John’s(Newfoundland).HoodarrivedDevonport29SeptemberandrejoinedAtlanticFleet.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1924toMay1929(flagtoApril1929).RefitRosythandDevonportSeptember1924toJanuary1925.WithRepulse,representedRoyalNavyatVascodaGamacelebrationsatLisbon

February1925.FlagtransferredtoRepulseApril1929andHoodpaidofftoDockyardControlat

Portsmouth17May1929forextensiverefit,May1929toMarch1931.RecommissionedPortsmouthforBCS17May1931.ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)May1931toMarch1932(flagfromJuly1931).FlagtransferredfromRepulse11July1931.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(flagBCS)March1932toSeptember1936.RefitPortsmouthMarchtoMay1932.CollisionwithRenown during exercises off Spanish coast 23 January 1935.

HoodrammedbyRenownonstarboardquarter,damagetosternandpropellers.TemporarilyrepairedatGibraltar.RepairscompletedatPortsmouthFebruarytoMay1935.InMarch1935, itwasdecided, in the interestsofhomogeneity,gradually to

separatetheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,stationingtheformerin theMediterranean and the latter in the Home Fleet. Because of the heavyreconstruction programme in the Queen Elizabeth class, the Mediterraneanwouldloseonebattleshipbythechange,andtheBattlecruiserSquadronwastobe transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet to offset this. Squadron initiallydividedbetweentheHomeandMediterraneanFleetsApril toSeptember1936.Not finally transferred toMediterraneanuntil 1936,Repulse inApril,Hood inSeptember.Renownreconstructing1936–9.HoodpresentatJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

BecauseoftheItalo-Abyssiniancrisis,BattlecruiserSquadron,comprisingHoodand Renown (Repulse reconstructing), sent Gibraltar September 1935 toreinforcetheMediterraneanFleetalthoughremainingasaHomeFleetunit.RenowntransferredtoAlexandriainJanuary1936andattachedto1stBSuntil

May1936whensherejoinedBCSathome.

HoodreturnedhomeatPortsmouthuntilSeptember1936.Recommissioned at Portsmouth 8 September 1936 for BCS Mediterranean

Fleet under the 1935 Fleet Reorganization plan. Joined at Malta 20 October1936.MEDITERRANEANFLEET(BCS)September1936toFebruary1939(flagVABCSand2ndfleetflagfromNovember1936).FlagVAand2ndfleetflaghoistedatMalta30November1936.Flag1stBS(Barham)previously2ndfleetflag.Employed 1937–8 mainly in protecting British interests (anti-piracy patrols)

duringSpanishCivilWar.InApril 1937 stood by,with Shropshire, off Bilbao following interception of

British steamer Thorpehall by Franco cruiser Almirante Cervera outsideterritorialwaters.ThorpehallsubsequentlyreleasedfollowingarrivalofthreeBritish destroyers. Later same month escorted British steamersHamsterly,MacGregorandStanbrookcarryingrelieffoodsuppliesfromSt-JeandeLuztoBilbaoandpreventedinterferencebySpanishwarships.

PresentatCoronationReview,Spithead20May1937.Stationed in western Mediterranean January to November 1938 (Marseilles-

Barcelona-Palmaarea),Vice-AdmiralBCSbeingappointedSeniorOfficer.Western Basin Mediterranean from January 1938 in connection with Spanish

Waroperations.BattlecruiserSquadronrevertedtoHomeFleetFebruary1939.HOMEFLEET(BCS)February1939toMay1940(flagBCStoMarch1940and2ndfleetflagfromJune1939).RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoJune1939.

Foremastandfunnel;notethe5.5ingun.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth1June1939,flagVABCSbecoming2ndfleetflagfromthatdate.

With Renown, two cruisers and four destroyers, carried out patrol betweenIceland and the Faroes 7–12 September 1939 to intercept enemymerchantshippingandenforceBritishblockade.Attackedbyenemyaircraft inNorthSea 26 September 1939 while covering rescue operations for submarineSpearfish,damagedoffHornsReefon25thandunabletodive.Hitglancingblowonquarterbyheavybomb.Nodamage.

WithRepulse,Aurora,Sheffieldandfourdestroyers,searchedforGermanforcecomprisingGneisenau,KölnandfourdestroyersoffStadlandet8–10October1939followingsortiebythisgroup.Nocontactestablished.

WithNelson,Rodneyandfourdestroyers,coveredironoreconvoyfromNarviktoUK22–31October1939.

Commenced refit at Devonport November 1939 for machinery defects whichhadreducedspeedto25knots.RefitinterruptedtosearchforScharnhorstandGneisenaufollowingsinkingofRawalpindi23November.

Left Devonport 25 November and joined French battleship Dunkerque andcruiserGeorges Leygues andMontcalm, with British and French destroyer

screen, for search inarea southof Iceland.Thiswas the firstAnglo-FrenchnavaloperationofthewarandwasundertheoverallcommandoftheFrenchadmiralinDunkerquewhowasseniortothevice-admiralinHood.

WithBarhamandWarspite,covered thefirstCanadian troopconvoytoUKinDecember1939.LeftClydeforthisoperation12December.

ResumedrefitatDevonportMarch1940,flagBCSbeingtransferredtoRenown.LeftDevonport26MayforLiverpool tocompleterefit,completed12June.While ship under refit, 250 crew, mainly Marines, joined AlliedExpeditionaryForcetoNorway.

Escorted first New Zealand troop convoy from Finisterre area to Clydeimmediatelyaftercompletionofrefit.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)onitsformationJune1940.LeftClydeforGibraltar18June,arrived23rd.TooffsetthelossoftheFrenchFleetintheMediterranean,followingthefallof

France in June 1940, it was decided to base a powerful force, designatedForce H, at Gibraltar, independent of the existing Gibraltar command, toworkintheWesternBasinoftheMediterraneanandcovertheconvoyroutesfromSierraLeoneandGibraltar.

AsorganizedatGibraltaron28June1940,ForceHcomprisedHood(flagVA),Resolution, Valiant, Ark Royal, Arethusa, Enterprise and four destroyers.FlagVice-AdmiralSomervillehoistedinHoodon30June.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoAugust1940(flag).Took part in attack by Force H (plus seven destroyers from the Gibraltar

command)ontheFrenchfleetatOran3July1940.SlightlydamagedbyshellsplintersfromfireofDunkerque.W/Taerialscarriedaway.Oneofficerandoneratingwounded.

Force attacked by Italian high-level bombers in centralMediterranean 8 June1940 while en route to carry out air attack on Cagliari as a diversionaryoperation to coincide with passage of convoy from Malta to Alexandria.Operationlaterabandonedbecauseofriskoffurtherheavyairattack.

On 31 July 1940, ForceH leftGibraltar escortingArguswith the first fighteraircraftreinforcementsforMalta,thesebeingflown-offfromapositionsouthof Sardinia.Before returning, aircraft fromArkRoyal carried out attack onCagliari airfield. Force later attacked by Italian high-level bombers but nodamagesustained.

HoodrejoinedHomeFleetinAugust1940,relievingRenownasflagBCS.FlagForceHtransferredtoRenownatScapa10August1940.

HOMEFLEET(flagVABCSand2ndfleetflag)August1940toMay1941.WithRepulse, three shipsof1stCSand sixdestroyers, coveredapproaches to

BrestandLorientduringsearchforScheerfollowingsinkingofJervisBay5November1940.

RefitRosythFebruarytoMarch1941.Took part in search for Scharnhorst andGneisenau in North Atlantic March

1941.Based on Hvalfiord (Iceland) with four destroyers early May 1941 to cover

convoys passing south of Iceland against possible attack by enemy heavyships.

Left Scapa 22May 1941, withPrince of Wales and destroyers Icarus,Echo,Electra,Achates,Antelope andAnthony, to cover area southwestof IcelandandsupportNorfolkandSuffolkinDenmarkStraitfollowingreportofsortiebyBismarckandPrinzEugen.

Theforwardsuperstructureasseenfromtheforecastlec.1931/32.

Hood,WeymouthBay,July1935.Oneofthemostgraceful-lookingwarshipseverbuilt,the‘Mighty‘Ood’showsherfinelines.

Germanshipssightedearlyon24MayoffthewesternendoftheDenmarkStraitandactionopenedat0552atabout25,000yardsrange.Enemyfire initiallyconcentratedonHood although, through to anerror in identification, she atfirstengagedPrinzEugeninsteadofBismarck.

LossofHoodBismarckhadopenedfireatabout thesametimeasPrinceofWales.Atabout0555HoodandPrinceofWalesexecutedaturntogetherof20°toportinordertobringtheiraftergunsintoplayasonlytheforwardturretswouldbearat theangleofearlyengagement.ThethirdsalvofromBismarckhadhitHood’sboatdeck near the mainmast and started a fierce fire in the area. The masses ofevidenceshowthatHoodwashitagainbythefifthsalvofromBismarckandthatoneortwoshellsfellintheareaoftheboatdeckandpossiblynearorbelowthewaterline.ThiswasatthesametimeasHoodandPrinceofWaleswereputtingover another 20° (range about 16,300 yards). Thismove, however,was neverexecutedbecauseat0600hoursHoodexplodedinamassofflamesandsmoke,andsankinapproximatelythreeminutes.ThereissomeevidencethatHood’safter15ingunsactuallyfiredasalvojust

beforesheexplodedoratleastsimultaneouslywiththehit.Asmightbeexpectedin connectionwith such a sudden, unexpected and stupendous happening, andthe lapse of time from the occurrence to recalling the incident, the actualevidencewasconfusedandcontradictory.

ABoardofEnquirywassetupbutitwasacceptedthatnowitnesstothescenecouldbe100percentcertainofwhatreallyhappened.Theonlycertainfactwasthatthemajorexplosionwasintheareaofthemainmast.Totry–asmanyhave– to determine exactly how and whyHood exploded as she did is fruitless;unlessanduntilherremainsareinspected,⋆whichmightthrowsomelightonthematter,anyconclusionismerespeculation.Nevertheless,wecanbesureaboutmuch that happened on that fateful day and, following official documentsclosely, the evidence of observers is presented below. In the vicinity, HMSSuffolk(cruiser),28milesfromHood:

HoodatInvergordon,11August1940.UpuntilherlossinMay1941,thegreatshipwaskeptextremelybusyandcertainlyhadnotimeforanyimprovementsduringhertwoyearsbeforedestruction.

Theplot(ExhibitA)showsthatthisshipwas28to30milesfromHoodduringtheactionanditisobviousthatlittlecouldbeseen,althoughamirageeffectwasnoticeable(seeCaptainR.M.Ellis’sevidence(SeriesA.26)).WeconsiderthatCommanderL.E.Porter’sdescription(A.15)givesanaccurateideaofthemostthatwasvisiblefromSuffolk.BrieflyallhesawwasgunflashesfromHoodandthenaverythinparallel-sidedpillaroforangeflamewhichwenttoabout800to1,000feet.Thiswasfollowedbyacloudofverydarksmokewhichdevelopedfromthebottomoftheflame.Norfolk’sevidence:TheplotgivesNorfolk’sdistancefromHoodas15miles.Amirageeffectwasalsonoticeablefromherbutitisnotconsideredlikelythatmorethanageneral

effect could be observed. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker’s evidence (A.l) isconfidentandclear.Thegeneralimpressionfromthesetwoshipswasasfollows:

A fire in the after part of the ship burnt with a clear, reddish flame, and itappeared to die down and then increase. This was followed shortly by a bigexplosion which took the form of a high sheet of flame shaped like a fan orinverted cone. Clouds of dark smoke surmounted this flame, and the shipdisappeared.One or twowitnesses, however, e.g., Captain Phillips (D.6.) andMids. Summers (C.39) and Buckley (C.40) mentioned a ball or balls of fireshowingclearlyintheflameoftheexplosion.Twowitnesses stated theyhad seen (throughglasses) a completemainmast,

and two otherswhatmight have beenmast or derrick.Although debris couldprobablybeseen, toomuchreliancecannotbeplacedontheevidenceas to itsnature.

DESTRUCTIONOFHOOD,24MAY1941Eyewitnesses’sketches

PrinceofWoles’sevidence:TheverycloseproximityofPrinceofWalesandthefactthatshewasinactionatthetimepreventedmanyoftheobserversfromgettingaclear-cutimpressionof the occurrence and it was fairly certain that no one observer could recordeverydetailofwhathappened.ItwasclearthatafirehadstartedontheportsideoftheboatdeckofHoodby

the third or fourth salvo from Bismarck, but the opinion was divided as towhether itoriginatedbeforeorabaft themainmast (evidenceshows that itwasabaft) but it evidently spreadwith very great rapidity covering a considerablesectionof theboatdeck.This fact and the inclinationofHood fromPrinceofWales would account for the difference of positions given. Themost reliableevidenceshowsthatthecolourofthefirewasareddish,orangecolourwithverylittlesmoke– the latterbeingabrownorblackcolourbutcolours frombrightyellow todull redandevenblueare shown in theevidence.Severalwitnesseswhoalreadyhadexperienceof cordite firesdefinitely specified the fireon theboat deck as such and Lieutenant Commander Rowell described it as beingsimilartoapetrolfire.Evidenceabouttheexplosionshowsthat itwasdividedbetween before and abaft the mainmast and there was some divergence ofopiniononthispoint.Otherwitnessesonlyrecordedaflashoftheexplosionbutothers,whoshowedakeenerappreciationoftherapidevents,saidthattheflameof the explosion had definite duration. One of the most reliable witnesses ofcoursewasCaptainLeachwhowasimpressedbytheeffectwhichhedescribedas like a vast blowlampwhile Chief PettyOfficer French stated that the boatdeckappeared to raise in themiddlebefore themainmast.Ascanbeexpectedthecolouroftheexplosionunderthoseconditionswasdifficulttorecordbutitwas probably a reddish-orange colour. The smoke ranged from dense whitethrough to having an appearance of rising steam. Other witnesses talked ofyellow,brown,white, light-greyandblacksmoke.Sub-LieutenantWomersley,whowasachemistinprivatelife,hadtheimpressionthatthecolossalvolumeofbrown smoke had a red glow all the way along the base of it. The SecondGunneryOfficer said that itwas thickdarkyellowsmokewhichheassociatedwithcordite.Theparadoxofthewholeordealwasthatveryfewwitnessesheardany noise from the explosion, only a rumbling and a few muffled noises –perhapsadullthudoraroarbutnottheusualnoiseassociatedwithsuchahugeexplosion.Partof themainmastormainderrickwasstatedtohavebeenobservedbya

fewwitnesses.Onewitnesswaspositivethathesawacomplete15inturretwithtwogunsandasinglegunintheairandfiveotherwitnessesclaimtohaveeither

seensingle15ingunsorpartofthegunhouseofaturret.The shipwas obviously so enveloped in smoke and disappeared so quickly

thatitseemsthatnoonewitnessgotacompletelyclearpictureofHoodaftertheexplosion.Lieutenant-CommanderRowellstatedthathesawherforetopfallingbackwardsandthesternslippingforwards.HesaidthatasPrinceofWalesdrewabreast ofHood all that could be seen was what appeared to be three largesectionsofthehullwhichwereunrecognizableandsinkingfast.Otherwitnesseswerecertainthattheysawtheforepartoftheshipwhichwasnotdamagedandseveralofthemsawherforepartstickingoutofthewaterataverysteepangleslipping backwards under water and turning over as it did so. Able SeamanPaton said that he saw her turn to port, roll over and that two funnels werevisible lying on the water, he could also see a jagged part of the stern. Allevidenceagreedthatshesankinaboutthreeminutes.TheevidencegenerallyindicatedthatthefirstsalvofromBismarckfellahead

ofHood and the second salvo astern. It was the third that hit, the fourthwascloseandthefifthhitheragain.Therewerealsothe8insalvosfromPrinzEugenwhichmadeitdifficultwhenrecordingthefallofshotinthearea.TocompoundtheconfusionwasthefactthatwitnessesstatethatHoodhadjustfired‘A’,‘B’andpossibly‘X’and‘Y’15inturretswhichalsocausedfierceflameandheavysmoke.

HoodduringtheFleetReview,July1935.AnaerialviewonthedaybeforetheKing’sinspection.

There were only three survivors and their evidence was all-important.MidshipmanW. J.Dundaswas not available for interrogation at theBoard ofEnquiry,buthehadgivenevidenceshortlyafterthetimeofhisrescue.Hehadbeen employed as Midshipman of theWatch on the upper bridge during the

action.Theupperbridgewasclosedinandhehadnoviewaft.Hispositionwasamidshipsatthecharttableandhesawverylittle,buthisevidencesuggeststhatthe first salvo fromBismarck fellonHood’s starboardbow, thesecondon theport bow.After the third salvo theTorpedoOfficer,whowas at the starboardafterendof thebridge,reportedacorditefireonthestarboardsideof theboatdeck.Hoodfiredatleastonesalvoafterthisreportandwasstillsteamingfast.OnaboutthefourthorfifthsalvofromBismarckeveryoneonHood’sbridgewasthrownofftheirfeet,wreckagestartedtocomedownandongettingtohisfeetDundassawamassofbrownsmokedriftingtoleeward(theportside),theshipwas listing heavily to port and he had an uphill scramble to reach one of thewindows. He noticed the Officer of the Watch climbing through anotherwindow.When Dundas was halfway through the window the water came upbeneathhimandthenextthingheknewhewasswimming.HesawHood’sbowsat an angle of about 45° with the forefoot, just clear of the water, slidingbackwards on an even keel. He was quite sure that the ship received no hitsforward and his recollection was that there was complete silence everywhereafter the shockand that the shiphad stoppedandwasheelingquickly toport.Therewasnoblastbiggerthanthatoftheship’sowngunsfiring.

HoodduringtheFleetReview,July1935.FullydressedandmannedonthedayoftheKing’sinspection,depictingthefinesttraditionsoftheRoyalNavy.

ThesecondsurvivorwasR.E.Tilburn,AB.HeimpressedtheBoardasbeingavery intelligentmanalthough inexperienced,andat the timeof theBoardofEnquiry was still obviously shaken by his ordeal. His was the only firsthandevidenceofwhathappenedonboardfromanobserverwhocouldseeaft,butfor

mostofthetimehewaslyingdownontheboatdeckbeforetheportforwardUPmountingsohisviewwaspartiallyrestricted.HestatedthatHoodwashitneartheportmidshipUPmountingwhichcausedafiercefire.Thefiredidnotseemtospread,buthethoughtthattheRUammunitionwasaffectedbecauseheheardnoises like ‘explosions of a big Chinese cracker’. He thought it was too farforward for a petrol fire – his evidence as regards the petrol stowage was,however,rathershaky.Hestatedthatthe4inammunitionhatchontheboatdeck(port side)withwhichhewas familiarwasdefinitelyclosedduring theaction.Withregardtotheexplosion,hestatedthattremendousvibrationresultedfromanother hit, but he did not seemuch except a lot of grey smoke.Therewas anoise as if the guns had fired, then dead silence. One flash of flame camebetweenthecontroltowerand‘B’turretabovetheforecastledeckjustashewasgoing into thewater.A lot of debris and bodies fell over the decks, but apartfromthefactthatsomeofthosebodieswerethoseofofficers,hecouldidentifynothing.Oneparticularly interestingpointhestatedwas thathesawlongsteeltubes,approximately15feet longand1foot indiameter,floatingin thewater,and these were thought to be the crushing tubes from the bulges whichconfirmed themagnitudeof thedamagedone to theship. In factherbackhadbeenbroken.The third survivorwasA.E.Briggs,OrdinarySignalman,whom theBoard

alsosawasanotherquite intelligentwitness.Hewasonthecompassplatform,however,andagaindidnotseemuch,buthewas inaposition tooverhear theconversationofsomeofficers.Importantpointswere:

1.TheSGOsaid,‘…shehasbeenhitontheboatdeckandthereisafireintheRUlockers’.2.TheVice-Admiralsaid‘…leaveit‘tiltheammunitionhasgone’.3.ImmediatelyaftertheexplosiontheOOWstated,‘thecompasshasgone’–thiswouldbethegyrorepeateronthecompassplatform.4.Briggsstatedthattherewasnotaterrificexplosionatallasregardsnoise,andhesawnodebriscomingdown.5.HetestifiedtothegreatrapidityofHood’ssinking.

Becauseofthemish-mashofevidencecominginduringtheBoardofEnquiry,the cause ofHood’s destruction could nor be determined, so to clarify certainissuessomeoutstandingpointersintheevidencewereemphasizedbytechnicalwitnesses. It was obvious that she had been sunk by Bismarck’s 15in shellswhichhadstruckherinoraroundtheareaofthemainmast,butwhatitwasthatcausedthetremendousexplosionwasuncertain.Whetherthe15inshellpierced

herupperarmourbelt,orenteredthroughthedecks,andinwhatareaitlandedarequestionsthatmayneverbefullyanswered.Intheafterareaoftheshiptherewerenotonly15inand4inmagazines,buttorpedowarheadswhichcouldhaveexploded, starting a chain reaction in other ammunition compartments.Technical evidence,however ruledout the torpedowarheaddetonation theory,theirevidencebeingasfollows:

1.Awarheadwouldnotbedetonatedbya shellunless itburst inside themantlet.2. One warhead detonating inHood would detonate the next one in thehorizontalplane.Warheads inoneplanewouldnotdetonateothers in theplane higher or lower owing to the horizontalmantlet.Warheads on onesideoftheshipwouldnotdetonatewarheadsontheotherside.Tosumup,oneshellwouldnotcausemorethantwowarheadstodetonate.

Hoodrollsatsea,exposingherunderwaterbulge,February1937.

3. If the warheads detonated they would not explode the 4in or 15inmagazines.4.Theeffectoffireroundawarheadwouldpossiblyleadtoanexplosion,but it would have to be a fire of fierceness and duration and the resultwouldprobablybecomparativelymild.5.Ifanyoftheafter4inmagazines,excepttheforwardupperone,explodeditwouldexplodetheafter15inmagazines.6.Theauralandvisualeffectofwarheadsgoingoffwouldbeanoiseofasharp loud crack and a bright flash, which would be instantaneous, andlikelytobedull-red,dark-red,reddish-brownorbright-yellow(lighterthancordite).

7.Therewasnounanimityofopinion about the effect on the ship if twowarheads detonated. DTM,DNO and CSRD’s representatives consideredthatalthoughthestructureintheimmediatevicinitywouldbeshatteredandsomeofthe5inand7inbeltblownaway,itwouldnotcauseaseriousrentin the ship’s side below the waterline, and theywere convinced that theeffect would not be disastrous. DNC’s representative on the other handconsidered that the strength deck would be destroyed for a considerablewidth and the main deck ruptured. There would be a sufficient rupturebelowthewaterlinetocausethewatertobescoopedinandbreakdowntheafterbulkheadsasfaras259andpossibly280whichwouldcausetheshiptosinkveryrapidly.

HoodentersMalta,February1938.NotetheMediterraneanlight-greypaintworkandSpanishCivilWarrecognitionbandson‘B’turret(red,whiteandblue).

AlovelyaerialviewofHoodenrouteforMalta,February1937

8.Theauralandvisualeffectsofa15inmagazineblowingupwouldbearumbling noise (unless it detonated, in which case it would be a sharpexplosion)accompaniedbyaspurtofbright-yellowflameofsomeduration(asopposed toa flashandsmoke).Thesmokewasdescribedvariouslybytheexpertsas:(a)darkandsomewhitelikesteam;(b)denseanddirty;(c)black,perhapsgreyand;(d)reddish.Thefirstkickoftheexplosionwouldtaketheeasiestpath,buttheremightbeothereffectsinotherplaces.9.The‘ballsoffire’seenintheexplosioncouldnotbeexplained,buttheymight have been partly ignited cordite charges taking fire in the air, orignitionofprojectedoilfuel.10.Therewasgeneralagreementthat:(a)Thedescriptionsoftheexplosiongiven by Admiral Wake-Walker (A.1), Captain Leach (B.1) and Sub-LieutenantWormsley(B.8)pointedtoalargecorditeexplosion.Corditeontheupper deckwouldnot cause themain effect seen, (b)The fire on theboatdeckhadnothingtodowiththeexplosion,butwasprobablycausedby4in ready-use or UP ammunition. Ignition of either of these would notproduce disastrous effects, (c) It would be impossible for an untrainedwitnesstodifferentiatebetweena4inandaUPammunitionfire.11.Bismarck’s shells probably had amuzzle velocity between 2,721 fpsand3,150fps.

12. Ifas lowas2,721,although itcouldnotpenetrate the12inbelt, therewasastripontheship’ssideabouteighteeninchesdeepand42feet longwheretheshellcouldenterandpassoverthetopofthe12inbeltandyetgetinundertheflatportionoftheprotectivemaindeck.Withafuzedelayofabout55feetitcouldexplodeinavitalpart.13. Therewas a zone a few feet wide the length of themagazine groupwhere a shell could fall short of the ship and enter the ship below thearmouredbelt.Assumingafuzedelayofabout75feet,thisshellcouldgettoa15inmagazineandwithadelayof55feetgettoa4inmagazine.Abouthalfthetravelwouldbeunderwater.14. German shells probably have longer fuze delays than ours andexperienceshowsthattheirfuzesarefairlyerratic.IntheactionoftheRiverPlatetwoGermanshellsburstat65and70feetrespectively.15. Little is known of underwater trajectory but the general opinionwasthatifashellhitbelowthewaterlineitwouldbeslowedupsomuchthatafuzedelayof75feetunderthesecircumstanceswouldbeunlikely.

CauseoftheShip’sDestructionThe very sudden and total disappearance of the ship clearly showed that theexplosionwhichsankherwasofgreatmagnitudeand,asnotedbefore,muchoftheevidencewascontradictoryandinconclusive,andmanypointsinconnectionwith the loss of the Hood can never be proved definitely. The first visibleevidenceofdamagewhichmightpossiblyhaveledtothedestructionoftheshipwasafireontheboatdeck.TherecanbenobetterconclusionthantheBoardofEnquiry’swrittenreport:

1.Itisestablishedthatthisfollowedimmediatelyonahitontheboatdeck,probablyfromBismarck’sthirdsalvo.2.PositionandExtent.Theexactpositionofthehitand/orthestartofthefire is in doubt, but the bulk of the evidence shows that the fire firstappearedontheportsideandabaftthemainmast.Itiscertainthatitspreadveryrapidlyuntilitcoveredalargepartoftheportsideoftheboatdeck.Itis not certainwhether itwas confined to the boat deck, but there is verylittleevidence that itextendedbelow.TherewasnosignofHood’sspeeddecreasing before the explosion and itmight be inferred that the fire hadnot,therefore,affectedtheenginerooms.3. Appearance. Evidence as to colour of flames, smoke and otherphenomenaobserved in this firediffersveryconsiderably,butanalysisof

the most reliable evidence indicates that it burned with a reddish-orangeflameandcomparativelylittlesmoke.Distantobserversemphasizethered.4.Cause.1. There are three possible causes of such an immediate and rapidlyspreadingfire:(a)Petrol,(b)ReadyUseammunition,(c)UPammunition.2.The exact amount of petrolwhichwas on board at the time cannot bedefinitelystated,butiftheordersknowntobeinforceinHoodashorttimepreviouslywerecarriedout–andthereisnoreasontosupposeotherwise–itisunlikelythattherewasmorethan2gallons.Thiswouldhavebeenonthe boat deck abreast the mainmast. There is reason to believe that thepetrol stowage inHoodwas carefully supervised andnotwithstanding theopinion formed by Bismarck’s officers which was based on a falseassumption theBoard consider it unlikely that petrolwas the cause or atanyratethesolecauseofthisfire.3.Eightyroundspergunof4inRUammunitionwerestowedinlighttypelockersontheboatdeck.UPammunitionwasstowedinlockersontheboatdeckandforecastledeck.It isquitepossible thateither4inorUPorbothcouldbeignitedastheresultofashellburstingintheirvicinityandthereisdefiniteevidencefromthesurvivorsthatammunitionwasinfactexplodingin the fire.One survivor (Briggs) gave evidence that the SGO reported afire in the RU lockers and Mid. Dundas is stated to have informed thepreviousBoardthattheTorpedoOfficerhadreportedacorditefireonthestarboardsideoftheboatdeck.ThenoiseslikebigChinesecrackersheardbyABTilburnmayhavebeenUPammunitionexploding.EvidenceastoorderswhichwereknowntobeinforceinHoodashort

time previous to the date in question, regarding the supply of 4inammunition,makesitpracticallycertainthatallthehatchesinthetrainofsupplywouldbedefinitelyclosed.The evidence of expert witnesses also shows that the results of a fire

amongstthe4inRUandUPammunitionshouldnotbefataltotheship.5. Conclusion. We have made a careful study of the plans showing thestowageof4inandUPammunition;theevidenceclearlyshowsthatsomeof this caught fire.After consideration of all the evidence and bearing inmindthatHoodwascertainlyhitagainafterthefirehadstarted,andalmostimmediatelybeforetheexplosion,wehavecometotheconclusionthatthefire was not in itself the cause of, and was distinct from, the explosionwhichdestroyedtheship.6. Some cause other than the fire must therefore be sought for the

explosions, and the three potential dangers are obviously as follows: (1)TorpedoWarheads,(2)4inMagazines,(3)15inMagazines.7. As regards the Torpedo Warheads we put ourselves the followingquestions:(a)Couldoneormorehavebeencausedtoexplodeduringtheaction?(b)Doestheevidenceofeyewitnessescorrespondtowhatonemightexpecttoseeorhearifoneormorewarheadshaddetonatedorexploded?(c) Would the explosion or detonation of one or more warheads havecausedtheshiptosinksorapidly?Toobtainanswers to thesequestionsweconsulted theexpertwitnesses

availableanddrawthefollowingconclusions:8.Withreferenceto(a).Evidenceofeyewitnesses,Repulseandanofficerwho had recently served in Hood leaves little room for doubt that themantlet doors were closed. A warhead could still, however, have beendetonated or exploded by a direct hit fromBismarck’s shell. There is nodirectevidencethatsuchahitoccurred,butitmayhavedonesooneithersideoftheship.Ifasinglewarheadhadgoneoff,oneother,butprobablynotmorethanone,warheadwouldalsohavegoneoff.Withreferenceto(b).Expertopinionsuggestedthattheexplosionoftwo

warheadswouldproduceanall-roundalmostinstantaneousflash.Itwouldnothaveproducedtheveryhighcolumnofflameofappreciableduration,whichwasseenbysomanywitnesses.Norwasthenoise,reportedasbeingheard,compatiblewiththatofTNTdetonationorexplosion.TheconsensusofexpertopinionwasdefinitelyagainstthecharacteristicsoftheexplosionasgiveninevidencebyeyewitnessesbeingthatofTNTWithreferenceto(c).Mr.Offord,ouradviserinconstruction,wasofthe

opinion that thiscouldbe thecase.Otherwitnesses,experts inexplosionsbut not in construction, were of the opposite view and the Board is notconvinced that such a very rapid sinking could follow from the damagewhich Mr. Offord considered would result from the explosion of twowarheads. Further, there is strong evidence that the widespread andimmediate damage actually caused to the after part of the ship wasconsiderably greater than that whichMr. Offord considered would resultfromtwowarheadsexploding.Wehavethereforecometotheconclusionthat,althoughtheexplosionor

detonationof twowarheads cannot be entirely excluded, thiswas not thedirectcauseofthesinkingoftheship.Asregardsthe4inand15inMagazinesthefollowingquestionsarise:

(1)Isitlikelythatenemygunfireduringthisactionwould‘blowup’anyorallofthemagazines?(2)Wouldtheblowingupofmagazinesproducetheeffectsseenandheardbywitnesses?(3)Would theblowingupof anyor all of themagazines cause the rapiddestructionoftheship?

Here again expert advisers were consulted, and lead us to the followingconclusion:

OneofthelastphotographsofHood,takenon23May1941.

As regards (1). Expert evidence shows that this is quite possible if themuzzle velocity of Bismarck’s shell was between 2,721 and 3,050fps(actually2,790fps).As regards (2). We consider that what was seen and heard was in

accordancewithwhatmight be expected if the after group of 4in and/or15inmagazinesofHoodhadblownup.There is one important point which needed careful consideration and

whichwasremarkedonbyDNCinhisminuteonN.L.9821/41(Reportofprevious Board of Enquiry) and by CinC, Home Fleet, namely that theposition of the explosion as observed by some competent witnesses wasmuchfurtherforwardthanwould,atfirstthought,havebeenexpectedhadthe 4in or 15in magazines blown up. This is where we reached theconclusion that not only was a tremendous pillar of flame observed justbeforethemainmast,butthatinadditionaveryheavyexplosionwasseenpracticallysimultaneouslyfurtheraft.Commander Maton and Commander Knight agreed that if the 4in

magazineswentofffirst, followedalmost instantaneouslybythe15in, thefirstvisiblesignmightwellbealargesheetofflamedirectlyaboveorjust

beforethe4inmagazines.Finally it must be remembered that our peacetime knowledge and

practicalexperienceoftheresultsofcorditeexplosionshasbeenbasedonexperimentswithamaximumofabouthalf a tonof cordite.Hood’s aftermagazines contained about 112 tons – over two hundred times asmuch.Thecourseoftheexplosionfollowingontheterrificpressureslikelytobeproduced in thiscasemustbedifficult topredict.From the lastwar thereare three examplesof the effectsonbattlecruisersof cordite explosions–explosionswhichbothinappearanceandeffectgiveverysimilarresultstothoseexperiencedinthelossofHood.As regards (3). There is little room for doubt that the immediate

destructionoftheafterendoftheshipfollowedbytherapidsinkingoftheremainderwouldresultfromtheblowingupofthe4inor15inmagazines–inthecaseoftheformerbecausetheirexplosionwouldcausethe15inalsotoblowup.Conclusions–10October1941:(1)ThatthesinkingofHoodwasduetoahitfromBismarck’s15inshellinoradjacent toHood’s4inor15inmagazines,causing themall toexplodeand wreck the after part of the ship. The probability is that the 4inmagazinesexplodedfirst.(2) There is no conclusive evidence that one or two torpedo warheadsdetonatedorexplodedsimultaneouslywith themagazines,oratanyothertime, but the possibility cannot be entirely excluded.We consider that iftheyhaddonesotheireffectwouldnothavebeensodisastrousastocausethe immediate destruction of the ship, and on the whole we are of theopinionthattheydidnot.(3)That the firewhichwas seen onHood’s boat deck, and inwhichUPand/or 4in ammunition was certainly involved, was not the cause of herloss.

ThedisasterwasbroadcastontheBBCat9p.m.on24May1941:

British naval forces intercepted early this morning off the coast ofGreenlandGermannavalforcesincludingthebattleshipBismarck.Theenemy were attacked and during the ensuing action HMS Hood,wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral L. E. Holland, C. B., received anunlikelyhitinthemagazineandblewup.TheBismarckhasreceiveddamageandthepursuitoftheenemycontinues.Itisfearedtherewill

befewsurvivorsfromHMSHood.

Afurtherofficialstatementwasdrawnup,butitwasthoughtthatthepublicwerenotreadytobetoldtherawtruthofthematter.TheDNC(S.V.Goodall)said:

This statement gives the bald facts. If presented to the public as itstandsitwillbeperturbingandalthoughsomepeoplemaythenrealizethe load of anxiety which has rested upon successive Boards ofAdmiraltyowingtoourcapitalshipsbeingoutofdate,itappearssuchastatementwoulddepressour friendsandhearten theenemy,givingthelatterinformationwhichitishopedtheydonotatpresentpossess,e.g.,wehavebeenbluffingthemwiththeRoyalSovereignsfornearlytwoyears.It isforconsiderationtowhatextentthisstatementshouldbemodifiedongroundsofpolicyifsomepublicationisessential.

HoodpayingoffatPortsmouthon16January1936,returningfromtheMediterraneanaftertheItalo-AbyssinianwarNotethegreatheightbetweendecks.

⋆ThewreckofHoodwaslocatedandinspectedin2001butdidnotprovideconcreteevidenceastoexactlywhere Bismarck’s 15in shells pierced the armour. For further information see HMSHood Associationwebsite.

NelsonandRodney

Thursday 17 December 1925 dawned cold and damp, one of those greymornings when even the most robust and sturdy shipyard worker seemeddejectedandmiserable.But therewasagoodreasonforhighspiritsbecauseitwas a very special day for the Birkenhead shipyard and a huge crowd hadwrappedthemselvesupintheirwarmestclothingandgatheredinandaroundtheyard to await the arrival of HRH Princess Mary and her husband ViscountLascelles to perform the naming ceremony of one of the most powerfulbattleships ever constructed in aBritish yard. Indeed, the people of LiverpoolandthelittletownofBirkenhead,andMessrsCammellLairdShipbuildingandEngineeringWorkswerejustlyproudoftheoccasion.Notonlyhadtheybroughtanewconceptinwarshipdesigntothelaunchingstage,buttheywerewitnessingtheconstructionofoneofthefewBritishbattleshipstobelaiddownduringtheinterwar years.The very existence of such a vessel during the depressionwassomethingof amiracle; shewasbeingbuiltunder the shadowof severenavalrestrictionswhichgoverneddisplacementsandgunsizes.Thegeneralpublicsawtheshipassomethingofacompromiseandhardlyknewwhattoexpectbecauseof the continuous agitation in the Press during the last few years since theWashingtonNavalTreatyof1921,wherebyBritainhadagreedtoreducethesizeof her fleet, abandoning the ‘two power standard’ and aligning herselfnumericallywiththeUSA.In1921Britainhadlaiddownfourgiant48,000-tonbattlecruisersofwhichthisshipshouldhavebeenone,butlengthynegotiationshad reduced their sizebymore than15,000 tons, andonly two instead if fourwereallowedtocompensatefor thelatestbattleshipsbuildinginJapanandtheUSAatthattime.Atapproximately10.15a.m.onthatDecembermorningHRHPrincessMary

andherhusbandenteredtheshipyardtobemetbyTheRightHonEarlofDerby,KG, GCB, GCVO, and a very vociferous crowd. The Royal party wereintroduced toMrW.L.Hichens (Chairman)andMrR.S. Johnson(ManagingDirector)beforemakingtheirwaytothefirm’smainoffices.Atprecisely10.40a.m.HerRoyalHighnesslefttheofficesandmadeherway

to the launching platform where the religious ceremony was then held. Atexactly11.15a.m.,inamomentofhush,aquietvoicecalled,‘InamethisshipRodney,andGodblessallwhosail inher’,andtheleverwaspulledtoreleasethe christening fluidover thebowsof thegreat ship.Thus themightyRodneyslidcalmlyandmajesticallydowntheslipwayforaboutfiftyfeetbeforeenteringthecoldwateroftheRiverMersey.Inthecomingmonths,sheandhersister(Nelson,whichhadbeenlauncheda

fewmonthsearlierinSeptember)wouldbefittingoutandtakingshape,andthemediawouldgettheirfirstlookatwhathadbeenoneofthemostcontroversialdesignsoftheinterwaryears.Indeed,theyweretowonderwhetherthetwoshipswouldbeworth£7,000,000each,whenthelatest,andlarger,Hoodhadonlysetthembackalittleover£6,000,000.Withhindsight,however,itcanbesaidthatNelson and Rodney proved to be two of the most powerful 16in-gunnedbattleships ever built, and the sterlingwork theywere about to do during thecoming war (1939–45) would more than justify their building; in fact, at theoutbreakofwar,theywerethelatestbattleshipsthattheRoyalNavypossessed.

RodneyislaunchedatLiverpool,17December1925.Thecrowdlookonandwonderwhathercompletedappearancewillbe.Notethatpartofthetowerisalreadyinplace.

DesignDuring the period 1919 to 1921, a considerable number of alternative capitalshipdesigns,embodying1914–18experience,especially the lessonsofJutlandandtherecommendationsofthePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,werepreparedand considered by the Admiralty, and in 1921, when the large programme inhand in the USA and Japan necessitated a resumption of British capital shipconstruction,abattlecruiser typeof47,540 tonswaschosen.The latest ship tocomplement the Royal Navy’s fleet at that time (1920) was the largebattlecruiserHood,andalthoughshehadbeenconstructedwithoutregardtothemany lessons learnt at Jutland, her general design and layout was naturallyfollowed(‘K’,‘K2’and‘K3’).Following these sketch designs, there was a serious investigation into the

construction of one of the largest andmost powerful battleships built to date(‘13’),butalthoughitreachedsketchstageandgainedsomeBoardapproval,theConstructor’sdepartmentsawitasfartoolargeandradicalatthattime.In1920,however,theNIDinformedtheirLordshipsthatbothJapanandtheUSAwouldprobablyconstructvesselsofabout48,000tonsarmedwith18ingunsinthenearfuture,anditwasreluctantlyagreedthattheRoyalNavywouldhavetofollowsuittomeetanythreat.Itwasrealized,however,thatshipsofsuchasizewouldintroducesevereproblemsnotonlyfordesigners,butindockingaccommodationaswell.Duringthenextfewmonthsvariousdesignswereprepared(seepage337)for

both battleships and battlecruisers, but unfortunately most of the information(ship’scovers)concerningthebattleshipshasbeenmislaid,onlythebattlecruiserlayouts being available (variations of ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’ and ‘N’ Designs wereshown). In December 1920 it was decided that the sketches ‘G3’ and ‘H3’(battlecruisers)shouldbeinvestigatedfurther,butwithmodificationson‘G3’soas to include extra armour protection to the deck area. After viewing themodified ‘G3’ layout, theBoardaccepted it inprinciple and inFebruary1921asked for confirmationand furtherpreparationon four shipsof suchacalibre.TheDNC(d’Eyncourt)particularlyapprovedof themodifiedG3andwrote totheFirstSeaLordon23March1921pointingoutthesalientfeatures:

Themainarmamentconsistsofnine16ingunsinthreeturretswith40degrees elevation. Two pairs forward and one amidships. The lattercannotfirerightastern.War experience, and our recently acquired knowledge of German

andUnitedStatesturretshavebeencarefullyconsideredinconnection

with the main armament; the protection and flashtightness is verycomplete.Secondary armament consists of sixteen 6in in eight turrets,

arrangedsothatsupplyfrommagazinesandshellroomsisverydirect,but is provided with breaks and other safeguards to prevent flashpassing down into magazines. AA consists of six 4.7in high-angleguns, and mountings embody the latest high-angle ideas asrecommencedbyNavalHighAngleGunneryCommittee.Armament controls are a special feature. An erection forward

supportsthemaindirectorcontroltower,twosecondarydirectorsandthe high-angle directors, and calculating positions are free from anysmoke interference. Aeroplane hangars may be considered as apermanentfeaturebutadecisionispending.Main armament has been concentrated in the centre of the ship in

orderthattheheavyhorizontalandverticalarmourrequiredtoprotectitmaybeaminimum,andalso that themagazinesmaybeplaced inthewidestpartof theship,and theunderwaterprotectionbe thebestthatcanbeafforded.Overthiscentralcitadela14inbelt isarranged,andrestingonthebeltisadeckof8inontheflatand9inontheslopes.These thicknesses and angles have been carefully calculated afterconsideration to oblique attack results with the latest type of shell.Abaftthecentralcitadelasloping12inbeltand4indeckareprovidedovermachineryspaces.The belt extends over the aft 6in magazine, and here the deck is

increasedto7in.Abaftthecitadelathickdeckof5inisprovidedoverthesteeringgear.Barbettesare14inandturretsand17inonthefacewith8inroofs.Underwater experience is based on Chatham Float tests and

embodies the principle of the bulge as fitted to theHood. The sideunderwater protection is designed towithstand a charge of 750lb ofexplosive.

SOUTHDAKOTAANDLEXINGTON,1921Battleshipandbattlecruiser

Protectionagainstminesisaffordedbyadouble-bottomof7ftdeep.Byslopingthemainbeltoutwards,notonlyisthevirtualthickness

increased, but protection is provided against attack by distant-controlledboatscontaininglargeexplosives.Inorderthatthestabilityof thevesselmaybeadequate, the triangularspacebetweensideandarmourwillbefilledwithlighttubes.Calculationsshowthatthewholeof thisstructurewouldhave tobecompletelyblownawaybefore theshipwouldlosestability.

Althoughneverwantingshipswithsuchmastodonproportions,onacceptingthe‘G3’designandthebattleshipversion‘N3’,theRoyalNavyhadaccomplishedwhatitsetouttodo,andthatwascompletelytooutclassanyforeignoppositionforat least fiveyearsahead.Thedesignwas faraheadof its timeandshowedfeatureswhichevenmatchedtheJapanesegiantsoftheYamatoclassconstructedin1941.Indeed,itmaybethatthe‘G3’planswerecarefullyconsideredbytheJapanesewhen their two shipswere under construction because they certainlyreflectedmanyqualitiesoftheearly1921Britishdesign.Withallmajormaritimepowersbuildingalongthesamelinesitwasonlytoo

obvious that it would be but a matter of time before the design wasovershadowed by a vessel grossly out of proportion to requirements, witheveryone else being forced to follow. The political implications were toocomplextobediscussedhere,buttheresultendedinaNavaltreatycalledforbythe USA and it would include Great Britain, Japan, Italy and France. Anagreementwasreachedwherebytherewouldbeabattleshipholidayforthenexttenyears.Newshipscouldonlybeconstructedafterexistingshipshadreachedtheageof20years,andnewconstructionwaslimitedto35,000tonsandcalibres

reducedto16ingunsratherthanthe18inbeingpreparedatthattime.Dozensofolder(inBritain’scasenotsoold)battleshipswenttothescrapyard.ContractsfortheBritish‘G3’class(four)hadbeenunderwayforsometime

andwheninFebruary1922lettershadtobesentouttothefouryardsinvolved,stating that the ships were cancelled, it came as a bitter blow to an alreadyflaggingindustryduringthedepression.

ARMOURPROTECTIONCOMPARISONS

TooffsettheretentionoftheWestVirginiaandNagatoclassesbytheUnitedStatesandJapanrespectively,whichhadbeentoofaradvancedtoscrap,GreatBritainauthorizedundertheTreatytwonewdesignstocomplywiththeseverelimitationsthathadbeenimposedonconstruction.As early as November 1921, when it became probable that the four ‘G3’

groupvesselswere tobescrapped, theConstructor’sDepartmentwasasked topreparefreshlayoutswithinthelimitsofthetreaty,butwasaskedtoincludeanyof theG3’s features where possible.The first three sketches (‘F1’, ‘F2’, ‘F3’)featured15ingunsbecausethedepartmentthoughtthatnosuitable16in-gunneddesign could be acquired on such a limited displacement, but itwould appearthat the designs received little consideration because both theUSA and Japannowhad16in-gunnedbattleships(seetables).InJanuary1922furtherproposalswereforwardedshowingareducededitionofthe‘G3’butretainingmanyofitsqualities(‘O3’,‘P3’and‘Q3’)withaspeedof23knots.

NELSONCLASSEarly‘G3’Battlecruiser,17December1920

⋆18ingunswereproposedfortheseandsomeoftheotherdesignsbutwerereferredtointheShips’Coversandvariousofficialdocumentsas16ingunsforsecuritypurposes.

The Controller asked for the designs to be fully worked out, and it wasproposed to Constructor E. L. Attwood that dimensions be 710ft by 102ft(waterline) by 30ft, and that SHP sufficient to reach 23/24 knots would beneeded. The main armament would be the same as in the ‘G3’s (16in), butarmourplatingwouldbeseverelythinneddownfromthatdesign.Inorder thatthelegendweight,asdefinedbytheWashingtonTreaty,shouldcomewithinthe35,000tonslimit,theutmosteconomywascalledfor,andnoBoardmarginwaspossibleforanyweightsaddedduringconstruction.InSeptember1922thefinaldesignwas accepted (modified ‘03’) and it embodied all the essential featuresdemanded:

1.High freeboard and good seakeepingqualities, these being regarded asessential.2.Armamentasinthecancelledbattlecruisers(‘G3’).3. Armouring generally similar to that of the battlecruisers, andconcentrated overmagazines,machinery and gun positions on the ‘all ornothing’principle.4.Speedequaltoorhigherthancontemporaryforeignbattleships.

Although having the same main armament and turret arrangement as thecancelled battlecruisers (whose guns and mounts were utilized to a certainextent) and resembling them in certain outward characteristics, Nelson andRodneywereinnosensemerelyareducededitionofthoseships,butconstitutedanentirelydistinct‘battleship’type,representingthenearestapproachthatcould

beobtained,within the limits, to the48,000-tonplanpreviouslyproposed.Thebattlecruiser design was stated to have constituted a reply to Naval StaffRequirementsforan‘idealbattlecruiser’;NelsonandRodney,ontheotherhand,represented the best that could be done, within treaty limitations, towardsmeetingthedemandforan‘idealbattleship’.

‘G3’:FINALLEGEND,12AUGUST1921Displacement(tons):48,000.Length:820ft(pp),856ft(oa).Beam:106ft.Draught:32ftforward,33ftaft.Freeboard:28ftforward,21ftamidships,25ftaft.SHP:160,000=31/32knots.Fuel:1,200tonsoilmin,5,000tonsmax.Complement:1,716.Armament9×16inMk1(80rpg)16×6in(150rpg)6×4.7in(200rpg)40×2pdr2×24.5inTTArmour14in at 72° incline (overmagazines), 12in at 72° incline (overmachinery andboilers).Bulkheadsforward12-5in,aft10–4in,barbettes14inmax.,turrets17–13–8in, CT 12–6in, tube 8in, DT 5–3in, funnel protection 12–9-5in, decks:forecastle1in,upper8in,4inovermachinery,lowerdeckforward8–7in,aft5–3in.Weights(tons) Hull 17,860Armour 14,700Armament 7,030Machinery 6,000Generalequipment 1,000BM 200

TheinfluenceoftheTreatyrestrictionsonthenewshipswasconsiderable,as

it was necessary, for the first time, towork to an absolute displacement limitwhich could not be exceeded, but which had to be approached as closely aspossibleinordertosecuremaximumvalue.Thehistoryofthesetwoships,then,isacomplexone,butwhenlaidoutintabularformitseemsstraightforward:

1. At the conclusion of the 1914–18 war, investigations were conductedinto capital ship design to incorporate the lessons learnt at Jutland inparticular.2. Battlecruiser design with legend displacement of 48,000 tons wasapprovedbytheBoardofAdmiraltyon12August1921.

‘F2’AND‘F3’:PARTICULARS,30NOVEMBER1921‘F2’Displacement(tons):35,000.Length:720ft(pp),760ft(oa).Beam:106ft.Draught:28ft6in(mean).SHP:112,000.Speed:30knots.Armament:6×15in,12×6in.Armour: 13in over magazines, etc., 12in over machinery and boilers, turrets16–12–9in,barbettes13in,CT12–6in,7inupperdeck,3¼inovermachinery,5–3inaft.‘F3’Displacement(tons):35,000.Length:700ft(pp),740ft(oa).Beam:106ft.Draught:28ft6inmean.SHP:96,000.Speed:28½knots.Armament:9×15in,8×6in.Armour:mainbelt12in,barbettes12in,CT9–5in,otherwisesameas‘F2’.

3.Orderswereplacedforfourshipson26October1921,butcancelledon13February1922underWashingtonNavalTreaty’sdirectivenottoexceed35,000tons.4.Investigationsintodesignsfora35,000-tonbattleshipresultedinsketch

‘03’ (modified) being accepted by the Board, and became Nelson andRodney.5.TheWashingtonTreaty’s35,000-ton limit led todevelopmentofbetterqualitysteel.

PARTICULARSOF‘P3’AND‘Q3’‘P3’,Displacement(tons):48,000.Length:717ft(oa).Beam:104ftDraught:30ftmean.Armour: 11 in upper belt, amidships 14in, decks 8–7½in, 5–3½in overmachinery.Armament:9×15in(newtype),16×6in,6×4.7in,2aircraft.‘Q3’sameasaboveexceptfortwomaintripleturretsforwardofbridgeinsteadofallforwardofbridge(seedrawings).

6. No further capital ships to be built from 12 November 1921 exceptNelsonandRodney.7. General armour and protection affected (reduction from ‘G3’) to saveweight.8.Thearmourcitadelwas384ftby14inabreast16inmagazines,slopedat70°andwassoarrangedinsidethehullthattheslopeproduceddownwardsdid not meet protection bulkheads. Each belt of armour was keyed, andindividual plates were made as large as possible with heavy bars fittedbehind the butts. Chock castings housing the lower edge of armour alsodirectedfragmentsofburstingshellsawayfromthebelt.9:Nonewconstructiontobecommenceduntil:UnitedStates1931;GreatBritain1931;France1927;Japan1931;Italy1927.

ConstructionThe outstanding features, which in respect of the arrangement of armament,werepeculiarinbeingapparentlygovernedmorebyconstructionalthantacticalprinciples,included:

NELSONCLASSDesigns‘O3’,‘P3’and‘Q3’withvariants

1.Exceptionallyhighfreeboardwithaflushdeckhull.2. Concentration of entire main armament forward, allowing maximumprotection to gun positions and magazines, and grouping of anti-torpedoarmamentintwinturretswellaftoneachquarterforsimilarconsiderations,andalsotominimizeblastinterferencefromthe16inguns.3.Excellentprotectionfromallformsofattackwithmainstrengthformedoverthemagazines,machinery,boilersandmainarmament.4.Designedspeedabout2knotsaboveexistingbattleshipaverage.5.Innovatoryhighstructurereplacingnormalbridgeworkandtripod.

Both shipswerebuilt ingreat secrecyand itwasnotuntil official notificationwasgiventhat thegeneralpublicknewanythingabouttheRoyalNavy’slatestacquisition.DespiteitssomewhatexperimentalnatureandthehamperingTreatyrestrictions, the design proved generally satisfactory so far as the Board ofAdmiralty and Constructor’s Department were concerned. The ships were,however,subjecttosomecriticism:

1.Absenceofanydirectasternfirefromthemainarmament.2.Insufficientdepthofarmourbeltbelowthewaterline.

TheWashingtonTreaty’sdictatesmeantthateconomywasmoreimportantthan

ever before, and the general design was so disposed as to give maximumeffectiveness to armament and protection within the smallest possibledimensions, while special measures were taken to eliminate all non-essentialitems and to utilize the lightest practicable materials and methods ofconstruction.Theseincluded:

1. The use of special ‘D’ steel in place of normal high-tensile steel, thesuperior quality of this enabling higher stresses to be accepted with aconsequentsubstantialreductioninweightofscantlings.2. Special investigations were made into the strength of the plating andframing of the double-bottom so as to reduce weight to aminimum (7ftdouble-bottomof‘G3’reducedto5ftinthisclass).3. Modified form of construction for the principal decks, comprising asystem of longitudinal girders with widely spaced beams in conjunctionwith web frames to utilize the maximum amount of material forlongitudinal stresses and so reduce thickness of deck plating required forstrengthpurposes,whichaffordedaconsiderablesavinginweight.4.TheuseofDouglasfirinsteadofthecustomaryteakfortheupperdeck,thereductioninwearingqualitiesandappearancebeingacceptedinfavourofthereducedweight.5.Extensiveuseofaluminiumalloysforminorinteriorfittings(kitlockers,store cupboards, mess racks, etc.) with some plywood for the dwarf anddivisionalbulkheadsthatdidnotrequirestructuralstrength.

The hull construction was very strong throughout, the unusually concentratedand very heavy weights of armaments necessitating a special provision foradequate longitudinal strengthwhen docking, including the new form of deckconstruction.

RigTherewasa thickrectangularstumpforemastforwardat therearof thebridgetower with an open, diamond-shaped platform carrying the high-anglerangefinderatthehead.Notopmastandnoyardsorsignalstruts.ForwardendsoftheW/Taerialswerecarriedtoprominentstrutsonrangefinderplatformandbridge tower. They were given a tripod mainmast with a tall topmast andtopgallant.Themainyardwaswellbelowthestarfish,withanothersmalleroneabovetheheadofthetopmast.TherewasaverywideW/Tyardattheheadofthetopgallantmast.

LEGEND:(FINAL)‘03’FINALLEGEND,SEPTEMBER1922(NELSONANDRODNEY)Displacement(tons):35,000.Length:660ft(pp),710ft(oa).Beam:106ft.30ftmeandraught.Freeboard:29ftforward,25ft6inamidships,27ftaft.SHP:45,000–23knotsFuel:4,000tonsoilmaximum.Armament9×16inMk112×6in6×4.7in4pompoms.TT:2×24.5inTT(10torpedoes).Armour14ininclinedat72°10feetabovelowerwaterline,13inovermachineryspaces.Bulkhead forward 12–8in, aft 10–4in, barbettes 15inmax., turrets 16–11–9in,CT14–6½in,DCT2–1in,NConbridge1in,boileruptakes9in,deck6¾inovermagazines,4¾inaft.Weights(tons) Hull 14,250Armour/protectiveplating 10,250Armament 6,900Machinery 1,924Generalequipment 1,050NoBM.

LAUNCHFIGURES

Nelson,3September1925Length:660ft0⅞in(pp),709ft9⅞in(oa).Beam:106ft.Depthfromkeeltoupperdeck:55ft6in.Draughtatlaunch:8ft5⅜inforward(10ftabaftpp),24ft10¾inaft(42ftabaftAP).Breakage:Longitudinallyinadistanceof512ft3in=⅛inhog.Transverseinadistanceof99ft9½in–0.Displacementatlaunch:19,454tons.Equipmentonboardattimeoflaunch:94.3tonsarmament1,511.5tonsmachinery6,081.9tonsarmour773.5tonsballast,men,gear,etc.8,461.2tonsRecordedweightofhull:11,102tons.Rodney,17December1925Length:660ft0⅛in(pp),710ft2½in(oa).Beam:106ft in.Depthofkeelfromupperdeckamidships:55ft in.Draughtatlaunch:9ft7¾inforward(8ft10inabaftFP),25ft2¼inaft(42ft2inforwardofAP).Breakage:Longitudinalinadistanceof438ft=¼inhog.Transverseinadistanceof85ft=0.Displacementatlaunch:20,200tons.Equipmentonboardatlaunch:157tonsarmament1,483tonsmachinery6,107tonsarmour636tonsmen,ballast,gear;etc.Recordedweightofhullatlaunch:11,905tons.

NelsonfittingoutattheArmstrongconstructionyardduringJuly1926.

ArmamentWiththeexceptionofthe16.25ingunmountedintheBenbowandSansPareilclasses,completed1888and1891respectively,NelsonandRodneywerethefirstand only British battleships to have 16in BL guns in triple-mounted turrets,whichmadethemthemostpowerfullyarmedbattleshipsafloat.Anexperimentalmounting had been produced by Messrs Armstrong and Co. and fitted andsatisfactorilytestedinthemonitorLordCliveinFebruary1921inanticipationoftheir being fitted in the ‘G3’ group. When the ‘G3’s were cancelled some£500,000had been spent on themand itwas only natural that themoney andresults of the tests should be used in the new ships of the Nelson class.Concentrationof the entiremain armament forwardwas unique at the timeoftheir building, and allowed a minimum length of armoured citadel withmaximumprotection togunpositionsandmagazines,while theclosegroupingof the turrets incidentally facilitated fire control. These advantages wereconsidered tooutweigh the lossof tacticalefficiencycausedby theabsenceofdirectasternfirewhichatfirstwasamuchcriticizedfeature;thedesign,inthisrespect, subordinating tactical principles to severe pressures in constructionalrequirements and weight saving. The arrangement was not repeated after theNelsonpair,althoughitwaslateradoptedbytheFrenchNavyintheDunkerqueandRichelieuclasses(laiddown1932–7respectively).Althoughnodirectasternfirewasprovided,thesuperstructurewascutawayandsoarrangedastoallow‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets rather large nominal arcs of fire, bearing respectively to

within31°and15°oftheaxiallineastern.The 16in gun was a high-velocity/lighter shell weapon, but tests after

completion showed that it was much inferior to the low-velocity/heavy shell15in gun which had proved itself an excellent piece during the Great War.Nevertheless, the heavier weight of broadside did have its compensations(6,790lbheavierthaninQueenElizabeth)andwasnotequalleduntil1941whentheUSNorthCarolinaenteredservicewithasimilararmament.Magazines and shell rooms were grouped together around the revolving

hoists,andtheboilerswerelocatedabaftinsteadofbeforetheengineroomssothattheuptakesandfunnelarrangementcouldbeplacedfurtheraft,withaviewtominimizing smoke interference to the controlpositionson topof thebridgestructure.Shewasanimprovementoverpreviousdesigns,but,ascompleted,thefunnelproved tobe tooshort,beingappreciably lower than themassive towerand its controls, especially steaming head to wind when the tower producedconsiderablebackdraughtandthefunnelgasescausedseverediscomfort.Ontrials,andduringgunnerytests,itwasfoundthatwhenthegunswerefired

atconsiderableanglesabaftthebeam,thestructureandpersonnelwereaffectedbyblast.Inparticular,‘C’turret,whenfiredabaftthebeamatfullelevationwastocausesevereproblems,andspecialmeasureswouldbeneededwhenfiringatthese angles (see Captain’s report, elsewhere).Many officers thought that theblastwas too severe, and that the designwas a bad one, butwhen testswerecarriedoutbyHMSExcellentduringtheearlyguntrials,therewasadivergenceofopinion.Gunpressures on thebridgewindowswere recorded and showed figures of

8½psiwhenbearing120degreesgreenorred,anditwassuggestedthatbridgepersonnelmight possibly bemoved to the conning towerwhen the gunswerefiring at these angles. Constructor H. S. Pengelly was aboard Rodney on 16September1927andhadthistosaywhenmakinghisreportfortheirLordships:

Lookingafttowardthemassive16inturretsandbridgeofRodneyc.1929.

Rodneybeingtowed,oncompletion,downtheRiverMersey.Port-bowviewshowingherleavingthefitting-outberth.

Duringthefiringof‘X’and‘B’abaftthebeam,Iremainedonthemiddlelineatthe after end of the Admiral’s platform. The firing from ‘B’ was notuncomfortable,buttherewasconsiderableshockwhen‘X’firedat130degreesorslightlyless,butat40degreesofelevation.Theshockwasaggravatedbyone

notknowingwhentoexpectfire,butapartfromthispoint,itisunderstoodthattheblastrecordedattheslotsontheAdmiral’splatformwereabout9lbpsiandon the Captain’s platform about 11lb psi. It was noted that 10 degrees morebearingaftmadeallthedifferencetotheeffectexperiencedonthebridge.Thebridgestructurewas,initself,entirelysatisfactory,andIwasinformedby

theofficersoccupyingthemainDCTforward, that thispositionwasextremelysatisfactory,andtheywouldhavebeenready,throughoutthewholeofthefiring,tofireagainin8to10seconds.

Theonlydamagewasonthesignalplatform–1×18inprojectorattheforeend–glasssmashed,andshutterofanotherbroken.On theCaptain’s bridge, fourwindows broken, a few voice pipes

loose.OnAdmiral’sbridge,fourwindowsbroken.Numberofelectriclights put out of action. General damage was little, and the extrastiffening inboardafterNelson’sgun trialsappear tohave functionedwell.

TheywerethefirstBritishbattleshipstocarryanti-torpedogunsinturrets,whichafforded, in addition to the better protective area for gun crews, substantiallywiderhorizontalandverticalarcsoffirethanthebatterysystemoftheprecedingclasses. On the protection side, however, the secondary armament failedmiserablybecauseoftherestrictedweightsallowedintheships,andthewholeof the secondary armament – turrets and barbettes – were practicallyunarmoured,withnothingmorethan1inhigh-tensilesteelalloverasaformofsplintershield.

Rodneybeingtowed,oncompletion,downtheRiverMersey.GettingupsteamandmakingherwaydownriverSeptember1927.

Nelsonin1931ThesetwosistershipswerethefirstBritishbattleshipstobeconstructedaftertheGreatWarandwerethelastforfourteenyears.Theyweredescribedastheoutcomeofthegunneryofficers’lessonsatJutlandregardingprotection.

The turrets were arranged in two compact groups, governed by the sameconsiderations of concentration to allow magazine grouping, as had been thecasewith themainarmament.Therewas somecriticismof theclosegrouping

becauseasinglehitmightput theentirebatteryoutofactiononanyoneside.Theywerelocatedasfaraftaspracticablesoastominimizeblasteffectfromtheafter16ingunswhenfiringabaft thebeam.Theirhighercommand(about23ftagainst 19ft) meant that the fighting efficiency of these guns in moderate orroughweatherwasmateriallybetterthanthatoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,anadvantagethatwasdemonstratedduringfleetmanoeuvresinMarch1934whenunitsofall threeclassesoperatedtogetherinsomeoftheworstweathereverexperiencedduringpracticalbattletests(thesecondarygunsoftheQEandRSclasseswereseentobecompletelywaterloggedandwereofnousewhatsoever).The 24.5in torpedo armament was introduced in this class (21in was the

largest previously carried) even though there was a body of opinion thatexpressedawish todiscontinue torpedo tubes incapital ships.The tubeswerenot trained abeam,but angled forward towithin about 10degrees of the axialline. To eliminate risk of serious flooding, the torpedo compartments werelocatedinaseparateflatratherthanasingleflatasinprecedingclasses,whichwas seen a serious fault in those early classes. The torpedo control positionswerelocatedonthesuperstructureclosebeforethefunnel.Given that the design had been restricted in displacement, the armament in

generalwasmore thanadequate,but the triplemountingof the16ingunswasnot viewed favourably in the Constructor’s Department, which preferred twinmountings as in preceding classes – awell-tried andproven set of equipment.Thetroubleseemstohavebeentheextremeweightoftheentiretriplemounting(1,500 tons approx.)whichbore down tooheavily on the flanges of the rollerpath when the turret was being trained. As a result of this and other smallteethingproblems thegunsor turretsneverachieved thereputationof the twinmounted15ingunwhich,inhindsight,hasbeenconsideredthebestcombinationthateverwent tosea inabattleship.Afternewvertical rollershadbeenfitted,andmuchexperimentationonthe16inmountings,thingsdidimprove,buttheywerenevertrouble-freeduringprolongedfiring.

ArmourThearrangementof armouring in the ‘G3’s andNelson andRodney embodiedthe‘allornothing’principle,introducedforthefirsttimeintheDreadnoughteraintheUSshipsNevadaandOklahoma(laiddown1912).Protection was concentrated over gun positions, magazines, machinery and

boiler spaces, with the entire hull before and after this being completelyunarmoured. To allow minimum length of the citadel, and maximum armour

thickness, main armament was located forward, the after turret being locatedexactly amidships. The adoption of this method of application was a radicaldeparture fromBritish practice, but had been grudgingly accepted in order tosecurethegreatfreeboardrequired,goodseakeepingqualities,extremelyheavyarmament and above-average speed on the 35,000-ton Washington TreatydisplacementlimitwhileatthesametimemeetingstrictAdmiraltyrequirementsforaverythickbelt(14in)toprotectthemainarmamentforward.Extremely valuable information about armour protectionwas gleanedwhen

the ex-German battleshipBaden was used as a target for heavy shells on 29September1921.Rounds3,8and14wereofparticularinterestastheyshowedwhatmodernAP shells could do, and the vulnerability of turrets protected byonlymedium armour thickness. The 7in side armour protecting the secondaryarmament,andthatforthemainbelt loweredge(6¾in)proved,infact,almostvalueless.These roundsalso showedwhatAPshells coulddoagainstmediumarmour struck at largeoroblique angles andprovedhow relatively ineffectualthe armour was. It had long been recognized that armour plate was of thegreatest value when worked in large thick masses. Distribution of mediumthicknesses over large areas gave a general impression of protection, but thiswas, in fact, illusory.Thiswas impressively illustrated by rounds 3, 8 and 14whenfiredat the7inplatesofBaden,whichwereallpiercedby15inshellsofarmour-piercingquality,atavelocityof1,380fps.Notonlywasthe7inbatteryarmourpierced,butthe7⅞inarmouronthebarbettesbelowtheupperdecklevelwasnearlyperforated.Thiswouldhavebeenaccomplishedhadtherangebeengreater and the shell diving at a steeper angle.The same shells attacking14inarmour under the same conditions would have broken up after considerabledamagetotheplate,butthatthicknesswouldhavekepttheblastoutside.The policy of the day was to protect any new ship with maximum

concentration around vitals and at the maximum thickness that displacementwouldallow.Horizontalprotectionrequirementswereindicatedbyrounds2,4and 10 which were fired at the unarmoured ends of Baden and resulted inexplosionsbetweenthedecks.Inround10(CPC)theupperdeckwaslifted4ft6in and 43 feet of itwas torn away from the side of the ship. The shell thenpiercedthemaindeckandproducedahole16ftwideby4ft6inlongandblewthat deck 7ft downwards. It was considered that such severe damage in astrengthdeckwouldjeopardizethelongitudinalstrengthofavessel,especiallyifthevesselreceivedmorethanonehitinthesamearea.Round6wasfiredtotestthetongue-typejointsadoptedbytheGermansfor

their barbettes. The velocity and angle of attack was so arranged that the

attacking shell would just fail to perforate and putmaximum pressure on thejoint.Theresultwasthatthestrapbehindthearmouredjointgavewayandthejointsplit;thiswasexacerbatedbythenumberofboltholesinthearea.To complete the tests againstmodern armour, further firingwas conducted

against the old battleship Superb (Bellerophon class, 1907) on 2 May 1922.Plates were taken from Baden and positioned in Superb to take the blast. Anumberof15inshellswerethenfiredatthedecks(290lbplates)andsidearmour(560lbplates)fromHMSTerrorfromadistanceof500yards.Theresultswere:

1.Thearmourqualityof theplates fromBaden stoodup to the testsverywell.2.Anyelectricweldingincorporatedinthestructurebrokeaway.3.Heavydeckthicknessesofthisnaturecouldbesupportedifnecessary.4.Theangleofthe560lbarmourwasenoughtocausetheshelltobreakuponimpact,butitwasseenthatthebeltwouldhavetobe‘keyed’inproperlysoastoavoidanydamagetothehullproper,ordisplacementofthearmourstrakesinquestion.

Thegeneral schemeofarmouring inNelsonandRodneyalsoembodiedall thelessonslearnedduringtheGreatWar,especiallyatJutland.Newimproved‘D’type steelwith a tensile strengthof37 to43psiwasused for the first time, inplace of normal high-tensile steel, on decks and anti-torpedo bulkheads. ThemainbeltwasfittedinternallyforthefirsttimeinaBritishbattleship–tosecuremaximumsupporttothearmouragainstbeingdriveninbodilybyadirecthit,ashadoccurredinDerfflingerandLionatJutland,anditwasfittedatanangleof72 degrees, running away from the waterline at its bottom edge to increaseeffectiveness against plunging shell fire. The belt was not deep enough,however,andcausedgreatconcernamongtheconstructionstaff.Theupperedgeofthemainstrakewassupportedbyathickarmoureddeck,buttheloweredgerested on an inclined shelf with individual plates ‘keyed in’ and heavy barsplaced behind this. These chock castingswhich housed the lower edgewouldalso help to direct fragments of a bursting shell upwards and take them awayfromthelowerpartsoftheship.Thearrangementofinternalarmouringreducedthearmouredwaterplane,butsufficientresourcesofbuoyancywereavailabletoensure that the ship would be safe even if the outer hull were opened up bygunfire. The horizontal protection against plunging fire and bombing aircraftwas developed to a very high degree, and was considered at the time to beadequateagainstanythingthatcouldbeusedagainstthenewships.

NELSONArmourLayout

Theslopingarmoureddeckbehindthemainbelt,whichhadbeenafeatureinallBritishbattleshipssincetheMajesticclass(1893),wasabandonedinNelsoninfavourofaflatheavydeckacrossthetopofthemainstrakeandcoveringthemagazines, boiler spaces andmachinery.An extension aft, at a slightly lowerlevel, ran across to protect the steering gear. The horizontal armouring wasconcentratedentirely in these two levels,and theywere the thickest individualarmoureddeckseverfittedinabattleshiptothatdate.Theirdesignalsoreceivedspecialattentioninviewofprobabledevelopmentsinaircraftattack.All openings for ventilation were reduced to a minimum while special

hatches, with operating gear under protection below, were fitted to provide aready means of escape. Protection to the main armament and magazines wasvery thorough, special attention having been given to this in viewof the highpercentage of hits on and around turrets during the war, and the usuallydisastrous effects of these. Maximum armour thicknesses on barbettes andturrets were respectively 5in and 3in more than in theQueen Elizabeth andRoyalSovereignclasses.Theturretswereanew,lowdesignwithaflatcrowntodeflect projectiles falling at a steep angle, and reportedly they afforded a highdegree of protection. Anti-flash protection to magazines was materiallyimproved as a result of post-war experiments. They were the first Britishbattleshipstocarrytheanti-torpedoarmamentinclosedturrets,theseproviding,inadditiontootheradvantages,morecompleteprotectiontotheguncrewsthanthe battery system. They were the last British battleships to have a separateheavilyarmouredconning tower, thisbeingabandoned in the succeedingKingGeorge IV class andVanguard in which only a light splinterproof navigatingpositionhighupinthefaceofthebridgetowerwasprovided.QueenElizabeth,ValiantandWarspiteweresimilarlymodifiedduringtheirfinalreconstructions.Underwater protection was very complete particularly in the machinery andboiler spaces, where it reached a degree not previously attained in any other

British capital ship.The usual external bulgeswere replaced by an alternativeandveryefficientsystemofinternalsubdivisiondevelopedafteralongseriesofexperiments and it is reported that this was designed to be capable ofwithstanding the simultaneous explosion of four torpedoes. A longitudinalbulkheadwasfittedthroughoutthemachineryandboilerspaces.The DNC (Sir William Berry) had favoured inward sloping sides with

externalbulgesasinHood,butthiswasfoundtobeimpracticablebecauseof:1.Inabilityofexistingdockingaccommodationtotaketheincreasedbeamcausedby the considerably wider bulges required to resist modern torpedoes. 2.Necessityformaximumarmouredbeamatwaterlinetoensurestabilityineventofheavyflooding.Pumpingand floodingarrangementswereveryextensiveandweredesigned

to deal rapidlywith the correction of heel and/or trim resulting from damage.Eleven electrically driven pumpswith individual outputs of 350 tons per hourwereprovidedforcompartmentsoutsidethemachineryandboilerspaces.Themainarmourprotectionwasasfollows:

MainBelt:was14inthickamidshipsandranfor384feet.Angledat72°,itwasfittedinternallyandextendedfromtheouterfaceoftheforward16inbarbette(about100feetfromthebow)totheinnerfaceoftheafter6inbarbette(about70feet fromthestern)andsloped inwards to thewaterline.The14inplatesreducedto13inabreastmachineryandaftermagazines.Bulkheadswere12inand8in forwardclosing forwardextremitiesofbelt armourbetweenmiddleandlowerdecks,10inand4inaftclosingafterextremitiesofbelt.

Decks:6¼inarmourplatesplus1½inplating laidover the top (6¾in) laid flatover the length of the 14in belt armour onmiddle deck level. Lower deck4¼inarmourplatesplus½inplatinglaidoverthetop(4¾in)flat,fromafterextremityof14inbelttowithinabout25feetofthestern.

Barbettes:15incarrieddowntomiddledeck(seeplanforvariousthicknesses).Turrets:16infaces,7¼incrownsandrear.Secondarybarbettes:1in.Conningtower:14insides,12infront,10inbackand6½inroof.Tube:6in.Conningtowerhood:5in–3in.Funneluptakes:8in–7in.Anti-torpedobulkheads:1½in,longitudinalportandstarboard,setwellinboard,

extending completely between forward and after magazines from keel tomiddledeckandslopinginwardsfromtoptobottom.

Oncompletiontheywereprobablythebestarmouredbattleshipsafloatalthoughthe shallow 14in belt led to much criticism after completion. During firingexperimentsin1931onMarlboroughandEmperorofIndiaoneshell(hitno.4)burstunderthearmouredbelt,apparentlyjustwhereitwasincontactwithskinplating,andcausedconsiderabledamage.Thishitemphasizedthedesirabilityofa deep belt and it was proposed thatNelson andRodney be improved in thisrespectwhen theycame inhand for refitting,but theextensionof sidearmourwas never effected and their armour protection remained the same throughouttheir lives.The only additionwas toNelson,whichwas fittedwith 100lb and120lbNCarmouronthelowerdeckforwardbetween80and84stations,‘160lbarmour bulkhead at 80 station from hold to platform deck. Rodney was notcompletely fittedwith additional armour forward, but it is understood that shedid receive something along these lines although the official records are notclear. Later proposals tomodernize the armour protection (1938)were finallyabandoned(seenotesonreconstruction).

NELSONANDRODNEY:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETEDConstruction Dockyard Laid

DownLaunched Completed

Nelson: Armstrong 28.12.1922 3.9.1925 April1927(begantrials).

Rodney: CammellLaird

28.12.1922 17.12.1925 August1927(begantrials).

Displacement (tons): Nelson (as inclined 19.3.1927) 31,800 (light), 33,300(standard),37,780(deep).Rodney:33,730(standard),37,430(deep).DimensionsLength:Nelson660ft(pp),709ft9⅞in(oa);Rodney710ft2½in(oa).Beam:106ft.DraughtNelson:28ft1in(light),30ft4in(meanstandard);Rodney:30ft2in(standard),31ft8indeep.Armament9×16inMk1(100rpg)12×6inMkXII(150rpg)6×4.7inHAMkVIII(175rpg)4×3pdrHotchkiss

8×2pdrSingleQF9×6pdr5×MG18Lewis2×24.5inTTsubmerged.ArmourMainbelt:14in(KC)thinningto13inatmachineryspacesandaftermagazines.Barbettes:15–12inBulkheads:12–8–10–4inTurrets:16–11–9inConningtower:14–12–10–6inDecks:Protectivedeck:6¼inplus½inplatingoverwhole lengthof14inbelt,lowerdeck4¼inplus½inplating.Secondarybarbettes:1in(special‘D’steel)Secondaryturrets1½–1in(special‘D’steel).MachineryBrown Curtis geared reduction turbines driving 2 propellers. Designed SHP:45,000for23knots.8Admiralty3-drumsmall-tubedboilers,250psi.Lengthofenginerooms:29ft11⅛inforward,23ft11¾inaft.Lengthofboilerrooms:41ft11¼inforward,42ftaft.Fuel:3,800tonsoilmax.Radius of action: 14,500rpm at 10 knots, 5,500 at full speed (see also 1939figures).Ship’sboats:2×50ftmotorpinnaces,1×35ftmotorpinnace,2×45ftmotorlaunches,2×32ftsailingcutters,2×27ftwhalers,1×30ftgig,2×16ftskiffdinghies.Forprivateshipadd:1×30ftgig,1×50ftadmiral’sbarge,1×13ft6inbalsaraft.Searchlights4×36in:2onplatformeachsideoffunnel,2onplatformonmaintripodlegs,6×24insignallinglamps.Complement:1,361asflagship,1,314asprivateship.Costs:Nelson£7,504,055,Rodney:£7,617,799.

MachineryThearrangementofboilersandmachinerywascontrarytonormalpractice,the

enginesbeingforwardoftheboilerrooms.Thislayoutwasadoptedbecause:1.Engine room required more width than the boiler room and in reversing theorder of normal practice this was obtained and it was consequently betterprotected.2.Largeopeningsforuptakesandboilerroomfanswerefurtherfromthemainmagazines. 3.Great space formain armament and controls could beprovidedwithoutsmokeinterferencefromthecloseproximityofthefunnels.They were the first British battleships to have all geared turbines although

these had been fitted in the battlecruiser Hood, the large cruisers of theCourageous class and some smaller cruisers and destroyers. Subdivision inmachinery and boiler spaces was developed to a higher degree than in anyprevious British capital ship. Arrangement of the boilers abaft machinery,contrary to normal practice, brought the engine rooms immediately below thebridgetoweranditwasadoptedtoenablethefunneltobeplacedwellabaftthetower with a view to reducing smoke interference to the bridge and controlpositions.The funnelwas locatedabout40 feet abaft the tower,but in servicethisdistancewasfoundtobestillinsufficient,especiallywhensteamingheadtowind,when the towercreatedaconsiderablebackdraught to the inconvenienceofthebridgeandcontrolpersonnel.Onvariousoccasionsafunnelextensionandcowlwererecommended,butthiswasneverfitted.TheNelsonarrangementwasnotrepeated,althoughthepracticeofdisposing

engineandboilerroomsalternatelyforgreatersecuritywaslateradoptedintheKingGeorgeV class andVanguard and in somecruisers anddestroyers, eachgroup of boilers being placed before the engine room it served. The mainmachinery was Brown-Curtis single reduction geared turbines driving twinscrews, one HP ahead and one LP ahead and astern turbine on each shaft.Cruising stages were fitted to HP turbines for economy at low powers. Themachinerywas in four compartments forwardof theboiler rooms, arranged inpairsabreast,separatedbyacentrelinebulkhead.The turbineswere in the twoforward compartments, reduction gear, etc., in the two after compartments.Therewasacompletesetofmachineryforeachshaft,entirelyisolatedfromandindependent of the other. Auxiliary machinery was situated in wingcompartments farther aft. Boilers were eight Admiralty, 3-drum, small-tubeboilerswithsuperheatersandforceddraught,sixboilersof5,600hpandtwoof5,100hp.Workingpressurewasapproximately250psireducingto200psiattheturbines, and superheated to 150° Fahrenheit. The boilers were in fourcompartments, two in each, arranged in pairs abreast on each side of thecentreline bulkhead abaft themachinery space, with central stokehold spaces.The port and starboard boiler rooms were completely isolated from andindependentofoneanother.

Theauxiliarymachineryconsistedofdistillingmachinery–fourevaporatorsand two distillery condensers – capable of 320 tons output per 24 hours,arrangedintwocompletesets,oneineachauxiliarycompartment(locatedportand starboard abreast boiler rooms with the turbines in well-separatedcompartments forwardof theengine rooms).Thiswidedistributionminimizedtheriskofallelectricpowerbeinglostintheeventofdamageinanyonearea.Anewtypeofelectro-hydraulicsteeringgearwasintroducedintheseships.Ramswereoperatedbyoilunderpressurefromthreevariable-speedpumpsdrivenbyelectricmotors.Eachpumpwith itsmotorwasplaced in a separatewatertightcompartment.Alternativesteam-drivenpumpswereprovidedintheafterengineroom for use in event of complete electric power failure. This gear, whichprovedverysatisfactoryinservice,wascapableofputtingtherudderhardoverfromporttostarboardorviceversainaboutthirtyseconds.Oilfuelwas3,967tonsandwascarriedinwingtanksanddouble-bottomsandincluded162tonsofdieseloil.

NELSON:GMANDSTABILITY,BASEDONINCLININGEXPERIMENTS19MARCH1927

‘A’ condition: Ship fully equipped with 1,000 tons oil in bottom tanks, and1,000tonsinwingtanks.Draught:30ft4inmean.GM:9.3ft‘B’condition:Shipfullyequippedwith95%fueloilonboard(3,900tonsoil).Draught:31ft8inmean.GM:10.2ftAnglesof stability: ‘A’ condition:30°max. ‘B’ condition:40°max.Stabilityvanishesat‘A’condition:73°,‘B’condition:77°

Twosetsoftrialswerecarriedoutineachship,oneatstandarddisplacementand one at deep load. Nelson, without forcing, exceeded nominal speed atstandarddisplacementanddidverywellatdeepload,theseresultsrepresentingameanofeighthours’trialineachcase(seesteamtrialtables).Bothshipsprovedtobeexcellentsteamersinserviceanditissaidthatwhile

chasingBismarck inMay1941Rodneyattainedaspeed inexcessofwhathadbeenthoughtpossibleinviewofpreviousmachineryandboilerbreakdownsandthe long time that had elapsed since her last refit. In relation to displacementNelsonandRodneywere,oncompletion,probablythemosteconomicalsteamersintheRoyalNavy

GeneralNotes

Acompletebreakawayfromthenormalbridgeworkandheavytripodforemast,whichwas replaced by a high tower structure, was considered to be the onlysatisfactory means of obtaining adequate support and clear vision for theextensive modern fire control equipment, as well as providing the necessaryaccommodationforthenavigatingandsignallingpositionsandextracabins,etc.Thecontrolsforthemainandsecondaryarmamentwerelocatedatthetopofthetower, and the Admiral’s bridge, navigating and lookout platforms werearranged around the upper sides and face of the tower, with signallingsearchlights in ports inside and lower down. The sea cabins, plotting offices,etc.,werepositionedatthebaseofthetower.Allflagsignallingwascarriedoutfromtheforemast(seeCaptainsreport).Themassive towerbridgework, introduced in this class,was retained in the

succeedingKingGeorgeVandVanguardclasses,and(inmodifiedform)inthereconstructedWarspite,Valiant,QueenElizabethandRenown.Theheavyboatswere all stowedabaft the funnel, andhandledby themain

derrickwhichwasworkedfromthemainmastbase.Accommodation greatly embodied the recommendations of the

Accommodation Committee, which had been appointed by the Admiralty in1923,andinthesetwoshipsitwasespeciallygoodbothforofficersandratings–thespaceavailablebeingmuchgreaterthanusualasaconsequenceofthehighfreeboardoverthewholelengthoftheship,whichalsoofferedampleheadroombetween the decks. Natural light was provided in most living spaces, andventilation was greatly improved over preceding classes. The ships were alsoprovidedwithsuchitemsasreadingandrecreationrooms,dryingroomsforwetclothing,bakery,oil-firedgalley,laundryandelectricovensforthefirsttime.Ventilationreceivedspecialattentionandprovedtobegenerallysatisfactory

in service. In the crew’s galley, however, exhaust fumes were stated to beintolerableduringthewarwhentheskylightswereoftenclosedtodarkenship.Thepairwereknownaffectionatelyas ‘TheQueen’sMansions’ (becauseof

themassivetower)andby1930hadbecomepartoftheBritishconstitution–thegeneralpublic lovedthemandtheywerealwayscrowdedouton‘NavyDays’,but amore relevant opinion came fromCaptainT.H.BinneyofNelsonwhenfinishinghistermofserviceinher:

BeforerelinquishingcommandofHMSNelson, Ihave thehonour tosubmitthefollowingremarksorpointsofinterestrelatingtothisclassof ship. I have been fortunate in that I have joined the ship at thatmomentwhen shemay be said to have got over her initial troubles,

andmyperiodofcommandhasincludedthelasttwelvemonthsofthefirst commandwith awell-trained ship’s company, and the first fivemonthsofthesecondcommandwithanewship’scompany.

NELSON:STEAMTRIALS,DISPLACEMENT:33,636/33,913TONSDate Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)21.5.1927 1.East 6,318 84.7 85 13.01 2.West 6,224 82 82.25 12.34 3.East 6,329 83.5 85 12.84 4.West 6,393 83 82.75 12.29 1.East 9,463 97.2 96.5 14.89 2.West 9,332 94.4 96 14.13 3.East 9,193 96.4 95.6 14.75 4.West 8,707 91 93.5 13.76 1.East 14,574 112.2 110.3 17.34 2.West 14,594 110.6 110 16.38 3.East 14,633 112.2 111.2 17.211 4.West 14,583 110.2 110.2 16.47 1.East 18,331 117.5 120.25 17.9 2.West 18,777 122.7 121.7 18.85 3.East 18,624 121.2 120.2 17.70 4.West 18,763 122 121.3 18.8523.5.1927 1.West 27,186 136.6 137.3 20.76 2.East 27,531 137 136.3 20.22 3.West 27,612 138 137 20.67 4.East 27,380 136.7 136 20.1124.5.1927 1.East 37,008 150.6 152 22.53 2.West 36,992 150.3 151.3 22.19 3.East 36,936 150.3 151.7 22.67 4.West 36,569 150.3 147 22.0926.5.1927 1.East 45,805 161 161 23.14 2.West 45,878 162 162 23.9

3.East 45,890 161.5 160.3 23.23 4.West 45,174 162 162.6 23.84 5.East 46,212 161.3 161.3 23.32 6.West 46,089 162 162 23.68

NELSON:STEAMTRIALS,DISPLACEMENT:33,636/33,913TONS(DEEPLOAD)Date Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)28May1927 1st 6,342 80 79 12.33 2nd 6,046 81.2 82.9 12.30 1st 15,238 113.25 113.75 17.48 2nd 15,218 111.25 111.25 16.42 3rd 15,189 113 113.25 17.66 4th 15,115 111.8 112.27 16.36 1st 19,030 121.7 122 19 2nd 18,790 120 120.6 17.31 3rd 18,636 120 120.7 18.33 4th 18,626 119.5 120 17.11 1st 37,027 150.3 150 22.36 2nd 36,554 149 148.3 21.10 3rd 36,920 150 149.3 22.14 4th 36,312 148.6 148.3 21.25 1st 45,876 161.5 161 23.20 2nd 45,685 160 159.7 22.90 3rd 45,844 160.6 161 23.05 4th 45,840 160 160 23.14 5th 45,795 160 161 23.96 6th 45,771 160 160.3 23.35

RODNEY:STEAMTRIALSCourse throughout the trials was about 2 miles from shore at a depth of 25fathoms.Sea:Smooth.Displacement:33,785/33,660tons.Date Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)

30.8.1927 1.East 18,162 122 122 18.672 2.West 18,236 124 123 18.710 3.East 18,307 124 122 18.367 4.West 18,399 124 123 18.828 I.West 14,859 114 114 17.892 2.East 15,022 116 115 16.901 3.West 14,803 114 114 18.072 4.East 14,875 114 115 16.697 1.West 10,237 101 101 16.514 2.East 9,623 98 98 14.331 3.West 9,627 98 97 15,481 4.East 8,919 97 95 14.074 1.West 5,760 86 86 13.897 2.East 6,633 89 89 12.894 3.West 6,752 87 88 13.667 4.East 6,809 87 88 12.8111.8.1927 1.East 27,809 140 140 20.571 2.West 28.069 140 140 21.277 3.East 28,167 141 140 20.809 4.West 27,727 140 139 21.3532.9.1927 1.East 36,442 154 154 22.670 2.West 36,626 154 153 22.670 3.East 37,052 154 153 22.613 4.West 36,651 153 152 22.7857.9.1927 1.West 46,477 164 163 23.08 2.East 45,427 165 163 3.West 45,591 163 162 4.East 45,365 163 163 5.West 46,030 165 161 6.East 46,317 165 163

1.Manoeuvringpowers.In the early stages of the ship’s first commission, there was a general

misconceptionintheservicethattheNelsonclasswereunhandyanddifficulttomanoeuvre.Thiswasprobablydue to theunaccustomedpositionof thebridgeand the initial inexperience of the personnel ofwhat the shipmight do undervarious conditions. Both my predecessor and myself, however, very soondiscoveredthatthisopinionwasentirelyfallacious.Incalmweather,theship’smanoeuvringcapabilitiesare innoway inferior,and inmanywayssuperior tothoseofQueenElizabethorRevenge.TheasternpowerismuchbetterthanthatofQueenElizabeth,theysteermuchbetterwiththeenginesstopped,andatresttheyturnveryeasilybyworkingtheengines.Owingtothehighsuperstructureaft,however,theycarryagooddealofweatherhelm,andforthesamereason,theirturningcirclewhenturningawayfromthewindisgreatlyincreased,whilewhenturningintothewind,itiscorrespondinglydecreased.Asanexampleoftheeffectofthewind,ononeoccasionwhengettingunder

waywithawindofabout5–6ktsonthestarboardbeam,theshipswung4pointstostarboardagainstfullstarboardhelm,anditwasnotuntiltheshipwasmovingthroughthewaterat9ktsthatshestartedtoanswerherhelm.On another occasion,when anchoredwith the fleet,with awindof about 5

knotsontheportbeam,theship’sheadcouldnotbekeptsteadywithfullporthelm,andswungtoportinspiteofstarboardscrewsbeingreversed.OnenteringaharbourthroughalongnarrowchannelsuchasGibraltarastrongheadwindisthecauseofsomeanxiety;buttheeffectseemstobegreatlyreducedifthewindisafewpointsabaftthebeamoronthebow.Whenpointingtheshipusingtheengines,thewindhaslittleeffect,exceptto

stoptheswingatonce.Generally,thesuperstructurehastheeffectofamizzensailcontinuouslyset,

and if this is kept in mind, no real difficulties should be encountered in anycircumstances.ArmamentIholdtheopinionthatthelow-anglegunequipmentasawhole,andparticularlythe16inmainarmament,isaverymarkedadvanceonanypreviouscapitalship,andshouldresultinimprovedrateofhittingatallranges.Onaccountofvariousimprovements(rangefinders,controlapparatus,etc.)as

wellas theincreasedsizeofsplashes, long-rangefiringfromNelsonshouldbemoreeffectiveinthe25/28,000ydslong-rangefiringthaninQueenElizabethat21/25,000yds.Inthecaseofsecondaryarmament,althoughtherateoffireisratherlow,the

increasedrangeatwhichfirecanbeopened,and theabsenceof lossofoutputdue to fatigue,combinedwithexcellentammunitionsupplyarrangements,will

beaveryprominentfactorinwar.In view of themodem tendency of construction for ‘all or nothing’ armour

protection leaving controls and secondary batteries unprotected, the possibilityforusingthesecondarybatteryfor‘harassingfire’at themainarmouredtargetwhen the rangehasbeen foundassumesgreater importance,and inNelson thesecondary armament can do this efficiently without loss of anti-torpedo boatefficiency.16inmountingsThe16intriplemountinghasbeensubjectedtoconsiderablecriticismfromtimeto time, and there is little doubt, that in somequarters the view is held that atriplemountingforheavygunsisnotagoodinvestment.Thegreatadvantageofthetriplemountingsystemfromconstructionpointof

view(whichisthatthearmamentcanbeconcentratedinamuchsmallerspace,and will require less area of armoured protection) has not, perhaps beensufficientlyemphasized.The main disadvantage of Nelson’s triple mounting is loss of output on

accountofthefactthatthethreegunscannotbefiredtogetherowingtoballisticdifficulties,whereastheymustbeloadedtogether.This,however,isnotinitselfareasonforcondemningthetriplemountingingeneral.Themountingmaybesaidtohaveproveditself,wheninOctober1929,one

turret crew with two years’ experience, loaded and fired 33 rounds withoutmishap.Themaindefectsappeartobetherollerpathsandtherollers.FirecontrolThemainarmament firecontrol isverysatisfactory,andamarkedadvanceonthatofearlierbattleships.Theefficiencyof therangefinder installationandtheAdmiralty fire control table are of a high order, and it has been found acomparatively simple matter to train the personnel in their use. In secondaryarmament apparatus no great advance can be recorded as the installation isessentially the same as in older ships though more automatic in action. Theinstallation,however,fulfilstherequiredconditionofsimplicity.

Rodneyleavingportc.1934.

RODNEYAsFitted,1928

RODNEY1928InboardProfile,UpperDeckPlan,Rig

AmidshipsviewofNelsonin1932.Notethestairwaysattherearofthesuperstructure.

TheCaptains bridge is generally satisfactory and a great improvement overpreviousclasses.Onesmalldifficultyoccurshowever,asaFlagship,inthattheCaptainandofficerson thebridgecannotseesignalshoistedon themainmast,and are entirely dependant on the reporting of them by a signalman. TheAdmiral’sbridge is inferior to theCaptain’sbridge in that theAdmiralhasnoall-round view from any one spot, the bridge itself is unduly crowded withpersonnel.Ibelievethatwarrequirementswouldverysoonleadtoademandtoimprove

thebridgeinthisrespect,andifexpensewerenoobject,itcouldeasilybedonebyextendingtheforeendofthisstructureoverthecompassplatform.AccommodationThe accommodation for officers and men is excellent, the men’s particularlybeing in conformity with the spirit of the times and without any kind ofpamperingandisagreatimprovementonanythingthathasgonebefore.

In conclusion, it may be worth emphasizing the obvious fact of the goodmoral effect on officers andmen of serving in such a ship completewith themostup-to-datematerial.Servinginsuchashipinducedasenseofresponsibilityandconsequentthoroughnessinquiteanexceptionaldegree.Men take pride in their ship because she is up to date, and take pride in

showingher to their friendsbecause they feel that theyhave somethingworthshowing.Thisconnectionbetweenmoralandmaterialfactorsisnotofcourseinitself a reason for building new ships, but in the post-war navy it is a fact ofsomeimportancethatshouldnotbeneglected.

BridgeworkAfter a long succession of single and tripod foremasts to house the ‘eyes andbrains’ofthebattleship,anentirelynewconceptinbridgeworkarrivedin1925withthemassivefullyenclosedstructurefittedtoNelsonandRodney.Thistypeofstructurehadneverbeenseeninacapitalshipbefore;gonewerethesteppedlevelsofbridgeworkthathadalwaysbeenopentoallweathersandinitsplacewasonelargetowerwithdirectorcontrolequipmentlocatedonthetop.Withinthetowerwerehousedalltheessentialstoruntheship:Captain’s,Admiral’sandofficer’s levels, searchlight platforms, lookout and navigating bridge. Thestructurewassomethingofagambletofitina£7,000,000battleshipwithoutanyproperpracticaltests,butonethatthankfullypaidoff.The tower itself, which dominated the appearance of the ship, had some

disadvantages, including lack of all-round vision, but its good points, such asbeing fully enclosed, which offered some degree of protection to everyoneserving in there, and all instruments being close to hand, outweighed thedisadvantages.Amajordisadvantagewasthefactthatthelargeflatsidesofthestructure caught the wind at all angles. Tests had shown that the wind whenhead-on would flow quickly up over the face of the bridge and then quicklymovearoundtothebackofthestructure.Whenthewindowswereopeninthebridgeandnavigatingpositionstherewouldbeaterrificbackdraught,whichinsevereweatherwouldcausediscomfortnotunlikethatexperiencedintheolder,more open bridgework.With all doors andwindows closed, the back draughtpracticallyceased.Throughouttheyearsthestructurewassubjecttocriticism,especiallyin1934

whenNelsonranagroundatPortsmouth.(Itwasarguedthatthewindcaughtthestructure and pushed the ship off course. See Nelson aground notes.) Thecriticism, however, was certainly less than that levelled at older bridgework.Moreover thedesignwasmuch favouredabroadandbecamewidelycopied in

newshipsandoldervesselsbeingreconstructed.ThistypeofstructurecontinuedintheRNinvariousshapesuntilthedemiseofthebattleshipwithVanguardin1946,soitmusthavebeenreasonablysuccessful.

NELSON:MASTS,MARCH1930Forwardsteelspursonfrontofbridge:7ft6inlong,3–3½indiameter.Jackstaff:22ft6inlong,3–4indiameter.Ensignstaff:27ft3inlong,3–5indiameter.Twosoundingbooms:30ftlong,6–4indiameterEightgeneral-purposederricks(Oregonpine)40ftlong,11½–14indiameter.Mainmast(Oregonpine) length(ft/in) diameter(in) weight(tons)Lowermast 90 34 16.89Struts: 77ft6in 30 16.28(two)Topmast: 60 16–10¼ 1.18Topgallantmast: 49 12¾–5 .77Lowersignalyard 19ft6in 6–4½ .09Topgallantyard: 50 9–4¼ .56Mainboatderrick: 59ft4in 21–16¾ .31(mildsteel) 5.36Highestfixedpoint: 113ft5¼in.Heightoftopgallantmastfromwaterline: 190ft9in.High-anglecontroltower: 116ft7in.High-anglecontrolplatform: 108ft.Mainarmamentcontrol: 82ft7in.Floorofsearchlightplatform: 61ft1in.Pom-pomcontrolplatform: 68ft.

DuringtheSecondWorldWartestswerecarriedout(1943–4)bytheNationalPhysicalLaboratorytoascertainadegreeofhabitabilityforthoseservingintheuppermostlevelsofthebridgework.AmodelwasmadeofNelson’sbridgeworkat½fullsize,includingpartoftheupperdeckand‘X’and‘B’16inturretsandthefunnel.Various screens were fitted to the original bridge and navigating positions,

first12ininheightandthen18into24in.Itwasfoundthatwindpressuresand

backdraughtcouldbeeliminatedsufficientlybyfittingscreensandbaffles;thesmallledgethathadbeenfittedinRodneyinthe1930s(belowbridgewindows)had in factbeena success.Nelson, however,wasnotgiven thisuntil the testshadbeencompleted.Itwasprobablyfittedinlate1943orearly1944andcanbeseenasasmallledgewithairflowbafflesbeneathitfittedjustbelowthelowerbridgeworkwindows.

NelsonAground,January1934Bigshipswouldoftenbumpintooneanotherduringdockinganditwasnoeasytask toensure thesafetyofabout35,000 tonsat lowspeeds inconfinedareas.Anotherregularmishap toshipswith largedraughtswasrunningaground,andwhenNelsonranagroundinJanuary1934abigissuewasmadeoftheincidentbecauseithappenedclosetoSouthseabeachandinfullview.On12Januaryshewasproceedingoutofharbourathightideassistedbythreetugs.AttheSouthRailway Jetty the orderwas given to increase speed to 15½knots and fixingswere taken from the land to attain the correct speed.OnpassingMarlboroughPierandapproachingHamiltonBanktheorderwasgiventoreduceto12knots.The ship turnedagainst the rudder to starboardandafterproceedingabout2½lengths grounded fast on the Hamilton Bank at a bearing of 10½ degreesstarboard.Earlyeffortstorefloattheshipprovedunsuccessfulandsomeofthestoresandequipmenthadtoberemoved.Diversweresentoverthesidetoseewhatdamagehadbeencaused(actuallyverylittle)andaninquirywasorderedalmost at once to determine whether the grounding had occurred through anerrorbytheofficersinchargeorhadsimplybeenanaccident.Wasitbecauseofthe close proximity of the land, or had the rudder been put over too hard?Abnormalsteeringwasalsosuggested.Theshipwasrefloatedonthenexthightide,butbythenthePresshadmorephotographsthantheyneeded.Amodeloftheshipwasmadeandtestswerecarriedoutusingasimulationof

the scene in a test tank. The path of themodel was carefully recorded, windspeeds, weather and officers’ orders were all taken into consideration. ThefindingsoftheCourtwerevariable,butnoneofthestaffinNelsonwasblamed:

1.Windeffectonsuchalargestructureascarriedbytheclass.2.Rudderdraginsuchshallowwater.3.Tugmismanagement.4.Screwtypesandsizes.5.Correctdisplacementwhenleavingharbour.6.Nelsonclasshandlebadlyatslowspeeds.

Withregardtonumberoneitwasconcludedthatalthoughthestructureforwardcaughtthewindthisdidnotinfacthaveabadeffectonthehandlingoftheshipatsea,butinsomecasesdidaffectthevesselatslowspeeds.Number two was dismissed because the rudder did not contribute to the

grounding. Number three. Although one tug had parted the tow duringpreliminarysailing,theothertwoperformedverywellexceptthatatthetimeitwasthoughtthatagreaterspeedfortugswouldhavebeenanadvantage.NumberfourwasdealtwithlaterbyStanleyGoodall(AssistantConstructor)

whowrote:

The absenceof complaints is the highest reward that theDirector ofNaval Construction expects, but in this particular case a report wasreceivedfromacaptainrelinquishingcommand(seereportelsewherein chapter) in which it was stated that the ship’s manoeuvringcapabilitiesareinnowayinferiortothoseoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses.IthinkthisistobeattributedtosomeextentthatNelson andRodneyhave twinscrewsof largediameter,whereastheotherclassesmentionedhavefourscrewsofsmallerdiameter.

Number five was proved to be correct; the ship was not over weight for hervoyage.Numbersix,statingthatNelsonhandledbadlyatslowspeeds,didhavesome

foundation (see Captain Binney’s report), and when first completed theconstructorsnotedthefollowing:

W.J.Berry,13December1927:InabeamwindofForce6theestimatedwindpressureontheship

amounts tomore than38 tons.Ataspeedof7knots the thrust fromeachscrewamountstoabout7tonsandthepressureontherudderat20degreesisabout8½tons.Itwill thusbeseenthatatlowspeedsastrongwind produces the greater force acting on the ship and couldaffectherbehaviourrenderingherlessresponsivetotheactionoftherudder.

All these possibilities were examined, but the conclusion was that the ship’scoursewas too fareastof thecentreof thechannel throughwhichships leavePortsmouth,probablybecausetheshipwasnothandlingtoowellatalowspeed.Althoughitwasoftenstatedthatthepairdidhandlewellatsea,manyreports

from1945onwardsstatedthattheydidnotperformatallwellatslowspeedsas

aresultofthewindcatchingthemassivesuperstructure.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsTheuniqueappearanceofNelsonandRodneywasneverequalled inanyothercontemporary capital ship – British or foreign.Many thought them extremelyugly, and they received derisory nicknames: ‘Rodol’ and ‘Nelsol’ (after oiltankers); ‘the pair of boots’ – the right and left boots of the Second BattleSquadron–‘theuglysisters’or‘theCherryTreeclass’(i.e.,cut-downversionsfromWashington Naval Treaty). Yet they were generally conceded to be themost impressive-looking British battleships of their day, with a menacingappearance of fighting efficiency seldom, if ever, equalled in any otherbattleship.Oneofherofficers saidofher, ‘Ichallengeanyone to standonherfo’c’s’le and not feel a definite tingle of pride and fear’ – certainly a generalfeelingthatwaspromulgatedbythemedia.

NelsonagroundatHamiltonBankinJanuary1934.Thetugsareattemptingtopullhercleanbuttonoavail.

AnaerialviewofNelsonatthe1935FleetReview.

The abnormally long forecastle, with its massive bridge structure locatedabout 60 feet abaft amidships and standing approximately 116 feet above sealevel,andtheveryshortquarterdeckmadeforanextremelyunattractiveprofileand, incidentally, made a true appreciation of their worth somewhat difficultfrom certain angles. It is often said that theywere seen to their best from thequarter,buttheauthorbelievesthatbyfartheirmostimpressiveappearancewasbow-on.Theirprincipalcharacteristicswere:

1.Highfreeboard,flushdeckhullwithstraightcutawaysteminsteadoftheusualramorplough-shapedbow.2. Three triple 16in turrets, all forward with the after turret placedapproximatelyamidships.3.Threetwin6inturretscloselyspacedoneachquarter.4. High massive bridge tower with rangefinders and directors on top,slightlyabaftamidships.5.Rectangularstumpforemastatrearoftower.6.Asinglerathersmallfunnelsetwellabafttower.

As completed they were extremely alike, and from a distance it was almostimpossible to distinguish one from the other. Individual differences: Nelson,flagpole tomain. Second yard onmainmast carried low;Rodney, no flagpole.Second yard on main carried higher. Also there were slight variations in thescuttlesnearanchorsandunder6inarmament.Pendantnumbers(neverpaintedup):Rodney29;Nelson28.1929–30:High-angle rangefinderon foretop replacedbyhigh-angledirector

(byMarch 1930 inRodney,May to June 1930 inNelson). Original diamond-shapedtopreplacedbycircularpattern.

NELSONCLASSRe-armouring,21May1936

AnaerialviewofNelsonduringthespringcruise,March1937.Notetheidentificationletterson‘C’turretroof.

RODNEYANDNELSONBridgeModifications

1931–2:Rodney by July 1932,multiple 2pdrAA (8 barrels) added in largesponsonsonstarboardsideofsuperstructureabeamfunnel.Originalsingle2pdrAAremoved.StarboardtorpedoRFremoved.1933–4:Nelson,multiple 2pdrAA (8 barrels) added, asRodney, and single

2pdr AA removed (by March 1934). MF DF equipment added May to June1934.Aerialatheadofmainmast.Remotecontrolofficefittedatrearofbridgetower.1934–5:Nelson,multiple 0.5inAA (4 barrels) added P&S on platform low

downattherearofbridgetower.Straight-armedcraneforhandlingaircraftfittedonportsideontheupperdeckabeamthetower.OneSeagullamphibianfitted,mainlyforexperimentationinconnectionwiththesubstitutionofamphibiansforseaplanes incapitalshipsandcruisers,andforobtaininginformationregardingtheir performance in reconnaissance and roughweather operations. The cranewas retained forotherpurposesafter theconclusionof trials.NootheraircraftequipmenteverfittedinNelson.Rodney,multiple2pdrAAaddedonportsideofsuperstructureabeamfunnel.Multiple0.5inAAaddedasinNelson.PorttorpedoRFremoved.1935–6:36inSLreplacedby44ininbothships.1936–7:Nelson,multiple2pdr(8barrels)addedonportsideofsuperstructure

abeamthefunnel.Shieldwastemporarilyfittedtoforward4.7inAA(removedbyMarch1938).1937:Red,whiteandblueidentificationbandspaintedupon‘B’turretinboth

shipsinSpanishwatersduringSpanishCivilWar.Aircraftidentificationletterspaintedoncrownof‘C’turretinNelson(NE)(paintedoutbySeptember1939).1937–8:Nelson as refitted June 1937 to January 1938. SecondHAdirector

added on foretop close before the other, and raisedwell clear of this. Foretopwasconsiderablyenlarged.Additionalhorizontalarmouraddedinforwardpartof the ship (see armour drawing). Thicker foremast fitted to support extraweights of second HA director and generally improved stable foundation.Rodney,noextraarmour fitted,but therewere some improvements forwardofthe main belt internally. Refit September to November 1938, multiple 2pdradded on quarterdeck, right aft. Air warning radar Type 79Y added on eachmasthead. (First capital ship to have operational radar.) Aircraft catapult(McTaggart)addedoncrownof‘C’turret.Bent-armcranefittedonportsideofconning tower. Topmast fitted to foremast for RDF (79Y). Maintopgallantremoved.1940–1: UP AA rocket-projectors fitted on ‘B’ and ‘C’ turrets (1940). Air

warningradarType279fittedinNelson(modified79Y).Type79YreplacedinRodneybyType279.DFaerialremovedfromheadofmainmastinNelson,withamodified type fitted lowon fore topmast.Shields fitted to4.7inAAguns inNelson.Foretopmastadded,andmaintopgallantremovedinNelson.1941–2:RadarType284fittedformainarmament.Multiple2pdrs(8barrels)

added P&S on superstructure and ‘B’ turret, and on quarterdeck, right aft inNelson(RodneyalreadyfittedonQD).Seventonine20mmAAaddedinvariouslocations, port and starboard superstructure around and abaft bridge tower inbothships,on‘C’turretinNelsonandon‘B’turretandconningtowerhoodinRodney(removedfrom‘B’turretinRodneylater).0.5inAAremovedfrombothships.Radar fitted for controlof4.7in and2pdrs (Type285 for4.7in;283 for2pdrs). AA director platform at head of foremast was considerably enlarged.LAAdirectors fittedon former0.5inAAplatformsat rearofbridge tower,onupperpairofmaintripodplatforms,andbeforeandabaftafter16indirector.UPAA rocket-projectors removed from ‘B’ and ‘C’ turret in Rodney, but stillevident in Nelson until September 1941. All modifications effected by May1942.Type279radarremovedinRodneyandreplacedbyType281.Aerialsonboth mastheads. Surface warning radar Type 271 added in both ships (aerialinsidelanternonmainmast).GeneralwarningradarType291fittedinRodney,aerialatheadofforetopmastaboveType281.D/FaerialremovedfromforetopinNelson, and amodified type fitted to the face of the bridge tower.MF/DFfitted inRodneywith aerials same as inNelson.Heavier foretopmast fitted inRodneytoaccommodateadditionalradar.Camouflagepaintedupinbothships.

NELSONWindEffectonBridgework

Nelsonin1937.Lookingupatthemassivesuperstructure,itisobviouswhythisclassweredubbed‘TheQueen’sMansions’.

NELSONANDRODNEY:PROPOSEDRECONSTRUCTION,1938

Scheme1.Removeall4.7ingunsandreplacewithtwotwin5.25inturrets.Add

deck armour over magazines andmachinery. Displacement: 39,470 tons deepload;draught:32ft7½in.Scheme2.Removeall6ingunsandreplacewith4.5inturrets.Amendarmourasabove,plusmodifysidearmourDisplacement:40,830tonsScheme3.Fitonly3×5.25inturrets.Nosplinterprotectionaddedbutmodifyarmourbelt.Costs:6×5.25in: £30,000 each

(mountings)Twelveguns: 3,500 eachSightingandcontrolgear: 20,000 Dockyardwork: 60,000 Miscstructuralwork: 30,000 Sidearmour: 400,000 Removalofoldbridgeplusnewonefitted: 13,500 Machineryrenewalormodification: 440,000 Chainhoistsfor5.25inguns: 60,000 Newpompoms(AA): 13,500 Otherworkrequired:Removalofoldfunneluptakes.Fitaircrafthangarorpositionaircraftbysideof‘C’16inturret(2innumber)(catapulton‘C’turret).Totalcostincludingallworkinvolved: £2,234,500.Alldetailswereagreedinprinciplebeforethewanbutallworkceasedaswarapproachedin1939.

1942–3: 13 × 20mmAA singles added (Nelson), three P&S on platform atrearanglesofbridgetower,replacingformerLAAdirectorplatform.Rodney,35×20mmAAsinglesadded(byAugust1943)‘B’and‘C’turret,quarterdeck,etc.Type271 replacedbyType273.ExtraLAAdirectoraddedonconning tower.Catapult removed but crane was retained. Shields fitted to 4.7in AA.Modificationstodirectorcontrolplatform.1944:Rodney,extra20mmAAadded.Type650anti-missileequipmentfitted.

Nelson,28×20mmAAsinglesadded.1944–5:Nelson, as refitted for Eastern service, July 1944 to January 1945,

mainarmamentdirectorpositionover conning tower removed.LightAAgunsincreased by 4 quad mountings 40mm AA, some 2pdr directors removed to

makespaceforextra20mmAA.LAAdirectors(283RDF)wereaboveandabaftforward pair of 40mm AA mountings, port and starboard on superstructureabeam and abaftmainmast and on platform onmain tripod legs. SL removedfrommain tripod legs tomakeway for LAA directors. Internal arrangementsmodifiedfortropicalservice.StandardAdmiraltycamouflageschemepaintedupinNelsononly.Type650anti-missileequipmentfitted(late1944),aerialonfaceofbridge.1946:Some20mmAAremovedfrombothships.Repaintedallgrey(Nelson

only),Rodneyretainedoriginalcamouflagetothescrapyard.1947–8:Strippedofallsmallguns,aerialsandgeneralsmallfittings,etc.

BattleDamageNelson,mined4December1939At0755hoursasNelsonwasenteringporton4December1939ataspeedof9–10knots, she ranoveraminewhichexploded in thearea forwardof ‘A’16inturret. The forward part of the shipwas pushed up andwhipped two or threetimesbeforecomingtorest.Menontheupperdeckforwardwerethrowndownin a forward direction and a splash of about 6 feet above the upper deckwaswitnessed alongwith bluish-grey smoke.Nelson took a slight list to starboard(about2°)andtrimmedbythebow.Herdraughtwascheckedandread39ft2in,forward,31ft2inaft.Theshipwasquicklyputintoportanddiverswentoverthesidetoexaminethedamage.From43to74stationsthesideplatingwasslightlybuckledandshowedanumberofcracks,andtherewasaholejustabaftstation60.Abaftstation60theplatingwasdishedoveralengthofabout14feet.Theholeatstation60wasabout10ft×6ft.Theedgesoftheplatingwerebentinandout.

AwalkaroundNelsonin1937.Lookingaftonthesuperstructureand‘A’and‘B’16inturrets.

Lookingforwardovertheforecastleand16inturrets.

TherearofNelson’sfunnel,showingthesearchlightplatforms.

Nelson,lookingaftfromtherearofthetoweroverfunnelandmainmast.

LookingupatthestaircaseattherearofNelson’stower,showingtheheightoftheDCT.

FloodingAbaft80,D.B. tanksunder ‘A’corditehangingroomwereunderpressureandoilwasleakingslowlyintothesumpunderthefalsefloorinthehandingroom,andthencethroughrivetholesintheboundarybaratthebottomof88transverse

bulkhead into the hold space 84–88. The transverse oil-fuel tank 80–84 wasunderpressure.80–86.No.3 central storeholdwas floodedatonce.CO2 roomSandE.A.

roomPwerefloodedslowlytoabout6ftand3ftrespectivelyabovetheplatformdeck.Coldandcoolroomsonplatformdeckmiddle-lineremainedfairlydry,butwatersquirtedintothelobbyfrombuoyancyspace80–84.60–43torpedobodyroomplatformdeckmiddle-linesoonflooded,andwater

rose in the escape trunk towaterlineoutside.Thecell flat andmusic roomonlower deck flooded slowly. The fresh-water tank 43–50 lower deck had saltwaterinitandhadtobepumpedout.43–28torpedo-tubecompartmentplatformdecksoonflooded.Compartments

aboveremaineddry,exceptforasmallleak.28–23 ‘A’ pump-room platform deck flooded, and cable-locker flat filled

slowly.23–16 inflammable store platform deck flooded to about 3 feet through a

loose rivet; the tatterwas stopped and the compartment cleared ofwater. Thepetrol-tank belowwas intact, but therewas a littlewater at the bottom of thecompartment.Pumping.Therewerethree350-tonpumpsandtwo50-tonpumpsforwardof

the citadel.The two50-tonpumpswere out of action, that in ‘A’ pump-roombeingfloodedandthatintheCO2roombeingdamaged.No.1350-tonpumpin‘A’room,workedonthetorpedodraintank,lowered

thewater in the torpedo-tube compartment fromwaterline level to a few feetbelowthelowerdeck;thepumpthengaveout(anelectricleadwaslaterfoundtobeparted),andthecompartmentfloodedagain.ThestarterofNo.2350-tonpumpwasflooded,andthepumpcouldnotbeused.No.3350-tonpumpinthelobbyabaftthecoldroomdealtwiththewaterin

theCO2roomandintheE.A.room,atfirstbydrainingthewaterintothelobby,andlaterbywanderingsuctions.Twooftheship’s100-tonportablesubmersiblepumpswereused in clearingwater from ‘A’pump room,etc. In addition, theEnglishman had been alongside, using a 250-ton pump, but the latter did notpumpmore than100 tonsper hour.Waterwas cleared from theCO2 room toplatform-deck level, theE.A. room toouter bottom, the lobbyof the cold andcool rooms, ‘A’ pump room, and all spaces above the lower deck. It waspossiblewiththepumpsavailabletolowerthewaterinthetorpedobodyroomand in the torpedo-tube compartment to below the lower deck, but thesecompartmentswerestillfloodedandremainedsountildamagetotheship’sside

wasmadegood.InternalstructuraldamageSofarascouldbeexamined(i.e.,wherenotflooded)internalstructuraldamagewas slight andmuch less thanwouldbeexpectedafter the forwardendof theship hadwhipped as described by officers andmen.Local damage to fittings,etc.,occurredinvariousplaces;evidencethattheshipwasthoroughlyshakenisgivenbyminordamageasfollows:

(1) Cases in the provision room 60–80 lower deck rose about 2ft andflattenedaventilationtrunk.(2)Storerooms,sickbay,etc.,overtheneighbourhoodoftheexplosionhadstores, fittings,cots,etc., thrownoutofplace.Thesurroundingbulkheadsofthesickbayareundamaged,thepaintbeinguncracked.(3)AtablecollapsedintheAdmiral’sdiningcabin.(4)Afewminorbulkheadswerebuckled,butnothingmorethanwouldbeexpected if the main armament were fired over the deck at moderateelevation.(5)Thefire-mainunderupperdeckfracturedata joint just forwardof43andstoppedsupplytotheheads.(6)Thewoodliningtothecoldandcoolroomswaspracticallyundamaged,althoughabovethecentreofthemainexternaldamage.

Inallcasesdamagetostructureappearedtobelocal,andsofarascouldbeseentherewasnosuspicionofstructuralbreakage,either longitudinalor transverse.Theupperdeckwas sighted as carefully aspossible, and, on leaving, the shipwassightedfromabout50yardsforwardofthebowandappearedtobenormal.Theupperdeckplankingwasintactandbuttsandedgesofcaulkingsound.MachineryThemainmachinerysufferednoimportantdamage.Allbedplates,glands,etc.,were examined and appeared sound. Starboard auxiliary condenser dischargeoverboardwasfracturedclosetotheoutboardflange;therewasslightbucklingoftheinnerfunnel.Auxiliarymachinerysufferedasfollows

(1)Capstanmachinery.Control shaftingand tiltplateactuatingspindle tocentreline capstan bent and distorted. Pressure joints leaked on all units.Themachineryneededre-alignment.(2)TheCO2machinerywasunderwaterandcertainCO2bottlescracked.

(3)TheE.A.plantwasunderwater.(4)Hydraulicmachinery.OneinnumbersuctionpipesplitineachofNos.1and2pumps;theoutboardendofthecrankshaftofNo.3pumpdistorted.Pressureandexhaustmainswereleaking.

Armament(a)Torpedo.Thiswasallflooded.(b) Gunnery. The secondary, H.A. and D.C.T.s were unaffected. Certaindamagewas sustained to themain armament, but not serious.All turretswere somewhat affected, but principally ‘A’. Items examined were asfollows:(1)CorditeHandingRoom.Oil fuelwas leakingfromD.B. tanks into thesump below the false floor. The floor of the revolving structurewas notconcentricwiththefalsefloorofthefixedstructure,norquitelevelwiththesame.With the turret foreandaft therewasagapbetween the twofloorsabout 1¼inwide at 0 degrees, and at this position the revolving positionwaslinbelowthefixed.Thegapreducedtozeroandthefloorsarelevelat120°R&G;thegaprevolveswiththeturret.Whentraining,theangle-barstiffener under the edge of the revolving platform rubbed on bracketssupportingthefalsefloor.

NELSON1934

OnthequarterdeckofNelson(Rodneyfollowing)KingGeorgeVI(seatedatrear)takestimetotalktotheofficers,Weymouth,1938.

Rodney,amidshipsin1937showingtheaircraftcatapulton‘C’turret.

NELSONMineDamage,4December1939

(2)All16inshellhoistswerefullyloadedatthetimeoftheexplosion,buttherewasnopressureontheturrets.Thehoistsdroppedabout½in,shearing2 bolts in small brackets connecting the hoists to the main revolvingstructure.Triangular brackets connecting the hoists to the platformof thetrainingenginecompartmentdepressedtheplatformslightly.

CasualtiesTherewere74injured,about45seriousorfairlyserious, theremainderminor.The more serious cases comprised three fractured thighbones, two compoundfracturesofthelowerlegs,2or3forearmfractures,kneecapfractures,fracturedjaws(onelower),oneshoulder-blade,backinjuries,andcutstoupperinsideleg.Thelast-mentionedinjurieswerecausedbyratingsusingtheheadsfallingbackonbrokenpans;onesuchcasewasserious.Therewerealsoheadinjurieswhereheadsstruckdecks.Alltheinjuredwereintheforepartoftheshipatthetimeoftheexplosion,eitherontheupperdeck,intheheadsorinthecable-lockers.ConditionofshipDivers attempted to close the various cracks in the ship’s side by soft woodwedges,etc.,buttheholejustabaft60couldnotbeclosedbeforedockingexceptby means of a large ship’s side patch. It was considered that the ship couldproceedtoseainsafetywithoutthispatchbeingfitted.

Shewasoutofserviceforatotalofsevenmonths.

DamagesustainedbyRodneyduringtheBismarckaction,27May1941During theactionRodney sustainedvery littledamage fromreturn fire– threeminorshrapnelholesinthesideandanothersmallholewhichcutthesearchlightcontrol leads on the conning tower level. The high-angle director trainertelescopewasdistortedandputoutofaction.Muchmoredamagewascausedbythefiringofherown16ingunsandwasasfollows:

External.Upperdeckwasdepressed tovaryingdegrees inwakeof the turrets.Wood decking was lifted, split and blown out of place. Deck fittingsincludingstowagehuts,mushroomheads,skylights,breakwaterandberthingrail stanchionswerebrokenanddistorted.Watertighthatches to thesickbayflatwereblownopen.

Internal.Deckpillarsundergirdersweredistortedandshaken, the foreandaftgirders themselves being fractured in several places. In the torpedo bodyroom thedepressionwas transmitted to the lowerdeck andput the torpedotransversingtrolleyoutofaction.Partitionbulkheadsweredistortedandsplitbetweenupperandmaindecks.Considerable lengthsofventilationtrunkingwere split open and in some cases blown out of place. All the stanchionssupportingthesickbaycotscameawayfromthedeckfastenings.

Damagebyblast.HACSrollcorrectorglassfractured.Theanglesupporton16inguns around inside of armoured ring bulkhead for supporting leather apronwasdamaged.Brassboltswithintheturretbrokelooseleavingsomehangingoutofplace.Periscopesin‘A’turretwerepulledfromsecuringboltsbyblastfrom‘B’turret.Variousperiscopesinboth16inand6inturretshadhoodssodistortedthattheywererenderedpracticallyuseless.Thesuperstructurestoodup quitewell to the blast of the 16in guns, but the upper deck and fittingsprovedtobeaproblemandtherewasaneedofextrasupportandadditionalstiffeningwhichwascarriedoutduringrefitasopportunityarose.

Nelson,torpedoed27September1941Operatingwith ForceH in theMediterranean,Nelson was attacked by Italianaircraft and hit by one torpedo on the port sidewhile underway at about 16knots. Fortunately the torpedo’s TNTwarhead onlyweighed about 375lb, butthe damage was still extensive. The hit made a hole in the bottom platingapproximately30feetlong×15feetdeepextendingfromthelowerdeckedgetojustbelow theplatformdeckbetweenstations50and65andcausedextensiveflooding to compartments in the area.When flooding had been brought undercontrol therewas about3,700 tonsofwater insideherhull.Before thehit herdraughtwas35ft3inforwardand34ft6inaft,butaftertheexplosionitincreasedto44ftforwardand38ftaftandtherewasaheelofabout1½°.AcoursewassetforGibraltaratahighspeedof10to17knotsandshearrivedat1045hourson30 September. Pumping operations were put into effect immediately after theexplosionandcontinuedthroughoutthepassagesothatonapproachingGibraltarthe draught had been reduced to 39ft 6in forward and 32ft 3in aft. She wasdockedon2Octoberandafullsurveyofherdamagewascarriedout.

StructuralDamageOuterBottom.On the port side, themain hole extended from the edge of thelowerdecktohalfwayacross‘H’strakeandbetween50–65stations,about15ftinwidthand30ftinlength.Long,jagged,fractureshadoccurredupwardsacrossthemainstrakesbetween52and54stations;across‘N’strakebetween58and60stationsandacross‘N’,and12ininto‘P’strakebetween64and66stations.Fractures occurred diagonally forward across ‘H’ strake between 50 and 58stations and to the lower edge of ‘C’ strake between 60 and 62 stations. Thejagged edges of plating were turned in sharply at the forward and after endsalong the bottomof the hole and considerable distortionof plating around theholewascausedoveranareaextendingfromthemiddledecktothebottomofthe strakeand fromabout48–70stations, approximately40ft×40ft.Allouterbottom plating was 20lb ‘D’ except ‘M’ strake immediately below the lowerdeck,whichwas20lb‘D’beforeand25lb‘D’abaft61station.Onthestarboardside the outer bottom was pierced by three splinters in ‘M’ and ‘L’ strakesbetween56and60stations.

NELSONTorpedoDamage,27September1941

Framing.Themainframes(6in×3in×3in×14lbchannelbar)werecompletelydestroyed inway of the hole andwere severely distorted and torn frombeamarmbracketsinwayofthedamagedbottomplating.

MiddleDeck.Ahole, approximately3ft×2ft situatedabout2ft6inbefore60bulkheadand20ft toportofmiddle line,wascausedbyanarmouredmanholecover blown up from the lower deck. The deck plating (12lb ‘D’ with 14lbstringer)wasbulgedupwards,maximum9inoveranareaextendingfrom48–60stationsinaforeandaftdirection,andfromtheship’ssidetowithin4feetofthemiddle line athwartships, i.e., approximately 23ft in length by 21ft in width.Abaft 60 bulkhead the deck was bulged upward, slightly between 60½–69stations and from17ft to 29ft to port of themiddle line, i.e., about 17 feet inlengthby12ftinwidth.Exceptfortheholereferredtoabovetherewerenoholes

orfracturesinthisdeck.Slightleaksoccurredalongplateedges,boundaryangleat side, and through screw-holes to corticene stripswhichwere broken by thebulgedplating.

LowerDeck.Thedeckplating(10lb,14lbstringer,100–120lbNCarmour)wasforcedupwardsoveranareaextendingfromtheship’ssidetowithin6ftofthemiddle line between 50–60 stations and to about 20ft from the middle linebetween 60–70 stations. The 10lb and 14lb plating was severely distorted,perforatedbysplinters,andtorn.The100lbarmourplateadjacent totheship’sside,48–52stations,was forcedupwards,maximum4½inalong thebuttat52station.Thisplatewasnotdistorted.The120lbarmourplate,52–60,wasforcedupward9inattheforwardbuttand19inattheafterbutt.Theplatewasdistortedbutnot fractured.The adjacent armourplate (120lb) abaft 60 station, and alsonexttowardthemiddleline,52–60,weredisturbedupwardmaximum3½in.Nodistortionoccurred.Thedeckbeams(7in×3in×14.6lbbulbangle)ontheportside inwayof theexplosionweredestroyedand thedeepgirderat52stations(14lb×24inplate,with9in×3½in×3½in×25lbchannelbartodeckand3½in×3in×8lbdoubleanglestiffenersontheloweredge)wasseverelydistorted.

PlatformDeck.IntheTorpedoBodyRoom,43–60,thedeckplating(14lb)wasdistortedoveranareaextending12infromship’ssideat43stationtowithin6ftof the middle line at 60 station. The plating adjacent to the ship’s side wasdestroyedbetween57–62stationsandthejaggededgeswereturneddownoverthe bottom platingwhich had been blown inwards. The hatch between 62–63stationsleadingtotheAirCompressorRoom(under)wasdestroyed.

Hold. The plating in theAirCompressorRoom andAirBottleCompartment,52–70,wasslightlydistorted.

Bulkheads.No.43bulkheadwasslightlydistortedneartheship’ssidebetweenLower andPlatformDecks.No. 60Bulkhead.The scantlings of this bulkheadwere–12lb‘D’platingbetweenMainandPlatformDecks,14lb‘D’belowthePlatformDeck.Stiffeners4in×2½in×6.5lb ‘D’bulbanglesbetweenMiddleand Lower decks; 6in × 3in × 3in × 14lb ‘D’ channels (continuous) betweenLower Deck and Inner Bottom. Below the lower deck the bulkhead wasdestroyedfromship’ssidetothelongitudinalbulkheadoftheColdRoom,i.e.,adistanceof9ft6infromtheship’ssideatPlatformDecklevel.Theremainderofthebulkheadwasdistortedtowithin4ftofthemiddleline.BetweentheLowerandMiddleDecks thebulkheadwasdistortedoveranareaextendingfromthe

ship’sside to theport longitudinalbulkheadof theProvisionRoom, i.e.,about13ftfromtheship’sside.BelowthePlatformDecktoportlongitudinalbulkheadtoCentralStore60–80M.L.wasdistortedbetween60–70stationsandtornfromtheboundaryangleat60transversebulkhead.Theverticalstiffeners8in×3½in×3½in×20lb channels at 62–65 and67 stationsweredistorted and fracturedacrossthestandingflanges.Thedivisionalwatertightbulkheadat70stationwasbulgedaft,maximum12 inches.Thedoor at themiddle lineof this bulkhead,hinged on the fore side, remainedwatertight. Slight distortion occurred to theinner bottom in the vicinity of 60 bulkhead. On the Platform Deck, the portlongitudinal bulkhead of the Torpedo Body Room, 43–60 was torn from 60bulkheadand from itsdeckconnections.Thebulkheadwasholedbysplinters,about 20 No. maximum size 8in × 6in between 50–60 stations. Three of thesplintersperforatedtheouterbottomonthestarboardsidein‘M’and‘L’strakes,between50–60stations.Asplinterperforated thecoverof thehatch leading tothelobbyunder.TheouterlongitudinalbulkheadoftheColdRoom,60–80Portwasseverelydistortedbetween60–72stations;stiffenersandbracketsweretornfrom the bulkhead anddecks.The lower forward portion of the bulkheadwascrushed and a hole about 2ft 6in square led directly into theColdRoom.Theafterbulkheadat76stationwasdemolishedandblowninto the lobbybetween76–80stations.OntheLowerDecktheminorbulkheadstoLobbyandPrisons,50–60 stations, and to Canvas Room, 60–70 stations, were buckled anddistorted.

DamagetoNelsonfromtheItaliantorpedo.WhenlookingatthedamagefromonetorpedoitisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyRoyalOak,Barham,PrinceofWalesandRepulsesuccumbedtothisweapon.

MachineryMain.Nodamagewascausedtomainmachinery.Thewaterlevelintheboilerswasnotaffected.ArmamentGunnery:Nodamagewascausedtogunarmament.Torpedo:Thetorpedoroomwaswrecked.FloodingAsaresultoftheexplosionallcompartmentsontheLowerDeckbetween53–85bulkheads;on thePlatformDeckbetween43–84andbelowthePlatformDeckbetween43–80,wereflooded.TheportTorpedoTubeRoomwasfloodedfromthe Torpedo Body Room through a multiple electric cable gland in No. 43

bulkhead.Thedrainvalves to theDrainTank from theTubeRoomshadbeenleft open and resulted in the Drain Tank and Starboard Torpedo Tube Roombeingflooded.Thisfloodingmayhavebeenaccentuatedbyleakagepastthereardoorofthestarboardtube,whichwasfoundtohavebeendamaged.Bothtubeswereloaded,withbowandreardoorsclosedanddrainvalvesopen.TheMiddle Deck was flooded to a depth of 2ft between 43–60 bulkheads

through the hole caused by the armoured manhole cover blown up from theLowerDeckandthroughtheventilationsupplytrunktothePrisonFlatbelow.The compartments affected were: Lower Deck: Prisons, Lobby and Music

Room;CanvasRoom;AwningRoom;ProvisionRooms;CanteenStore; FlourStores; Lobby. Platform Deck: Torpedo Tube Rooms; W.T.Compartment;Torpedo Body Room; W.T. Compartment; RefrigeratingMachineryRoom;ColdRoomandLobby;E.A.PlantRoom.Hold: ‘A’PumpRoom Drain Tank; Torpedo Tube Drain Tank; Warhead Magazine; TorpedoGunner’s Store; Warhead Magazine; Air Bottle Compartment; No. 3 CentralStores (Forward); No. 3 Central Stores (Aft). Double Bottoms: W.T.Compartments.DamagecontrolShoring: Some time elapsed before the forward boundary of the flooded areawas established, due to the flooding of the Middle Deck, but it was quicklyascertained thatnofloodinghadoccurredforwardof23bulkhead.At theafterboundaryof the floodedarea, theWatchkeeperescaped from theRefrigeratingMachineryRoomandclosedthewatertightdoor,butonlyclippeditonthesidenearestthehinge(thisdooropensintothecompartmentandishingedontheforeside).TheholeintheMiddleDeckwaspluggedbyhammocksshoredfromthedeck over. Shores, closely spaced, were erected between Main and MiddleDecksthroughoutthefloodedarea,theworkbeingcontinuedincessantlyfor48hours.Morethan24hoursaftertheexplosion,whentheshiphadbeenlightenedsufficiently to partially empty the Lower Deck compartments (43–60) whichwere open to the sea, the surge of water caused the Middle Deck to bulgeupwardsabout9ininthevicinityoftheholeandfurthershoringwascarriedoutoverheadbetweenMain andUpperDecks.Shoreswere erectedbetweenMainandMiddleDecksinwayofthebulgedplatingontheMiddleDeck,portside,60–70stations.Smallleakswerepluggedandshoredandleaksintheboundaryanglewerestoppedwithcement.

Nelsonlimpsbacktobase,downbythebowsafterbeingtorpedoedbyItalianaircraftinSeptember1941.

Effect on Fighting Efficiency: Torpedo tubes were out of action and of 12torpedoescarried10weredestroyedorrenderedunfitforservice.Speedofshipwasreducedonaccountoftheamountofwaterinthefloodedcompartmentsandtheriskofunduestrainonstructureintheimmediatevicinityofcompartmentsopentothesea.Exceptforthepossibilitythatfiringthe16ingunswouldhavedisturbed the shoring of the Middle Deck, the fighting equipment was notaffected.ShewasoutofactionuntilApril1942.

Operation‘Bronte’,BombingTrialsinNefsonNelson showed resilient qualities when used as a target ship for 1,000 and2,000lbbombs.The trialswerecarriedout in theFirthofForthnear InchkeithIslandfrom4Juneto23September1948.Thetrialsweredividedintostagesandtheobjectiveswerenotonlytotestherarmoureddecks,buttotesttheefficiencyofthearmour-piercingbombsused.Onetrialshowedthatalthoughher6inarmourcouldbepiercedbya2,000lb

bomb, it would have to be dropped frommore than 4,000 feet to obtain thispenetration.Nelsonwasmoored foreandaft tobuoys laidaboutposition260°InchkeithLight1.14miles,lyingalongaline045°/225°,bowstothenortheast.SixBarracudaIIInavalaircraftwereused,andtherewerefourpilots,i.e.,two

aircraftwerealwaysinreserve.TheaircraftwerebasedontheRoyalNavalAirStation, Arbroath, and were controlled when over the target by R/T fromInchkeithIsland.Bombswerereleasedindivingattacksat55°tothehorizontal,divingto thepointofreleasefromaheightof4,000feetat280knots.Attackswere made either along the middle line of the ship from astern or from thestarboardquarterdiagonallyacrosstheshiptowardstheportbow.Twocameras

torecordthepathof thebombsprior tostriking,strikingvelocityandangleofstrike,werepositionedatPettycurBattery,KinghornNess,onthenorthshoreoftheFirthofForthandonInchkeithIsland.TheoriginalorderforStageIVwas:‘Bomb,A.P.,2,000lb,MkIV,filledinert

and exploding charge 23¼lb T.N.T., fitted pistol and detonator delay, divedroppedfrom8,000ft.’The pistol used was No. 65Mk IX. The stage commenced with detonator

delayNo.60MkII (0.07seconds)andwas tohavecontinuedwithdetonatorsNo.56Mk11(0.05seconds)orNo.50Mk11(0.14seconds)ifthedelayprovedtoolongortooshortrespectively.After39bombshadmissedfrom8,000feetthedroppingheightforStageIV

wasamendedto6,500feettogiveareasonablechanceofhitting,sinceonly60ofthespeciallyexplodingbombshadbeensuppliedforthewholetrial.HitJ,thefirst in the stage, was scored with the 42nd bomb. The stage was thendiscontinuedastheexplodingchargeappearedtobetoopowerful.Thesystemofnumberingofhitsgivesthestageno.,theserialno.ofthedropinthatstageandtheletterofthehit.ResultsHitIV/42/JDate:15thSeptember,1948Time:1715.TypeofBomb:2000lbA.P.explosive,0.07secondsdelaydetonator.ForceandDirectionofSurfaceWind:NorthWest,5knots.WeatherandVisibility:3/10thscumulus,extremevisibility.ConditionsofRelease: Ordered ActualHeightofRelease 6,500ft 5,900ftTrueAirSpeed 285kts 280ktsStrikingVelocity 807fps 780fpsStrikingAngle 20° 28°(tovertical) TimeofFlight 11.3secsAngleofAttacktoship’shead. Green124°

PARTICULARSOFSHIPS,1944–5Displacement (tons): (1942) Nelson 34,955 (light), 40,628 (average action),42,740(deep);(1945)Nelson44,054(deep);Rodney43,100(deep).Draught; (1942) 34ft forward, 35ft 4½in, 34ft 8¼in (mean); (1945) 34ft 7in

forward,35ft3inaft(Rodney).Armament:Mainandsecondaryasoriginal.AAguns:6×4.7in48×2pdr16×40mm(Nelson)32×20mm(Nelson)13×20mm(Rodney)Originalsaluting,boatandfieldgunsOriginalTTAllgunsexcept20mmwereradar-controlled.Radar: Type 284 formain guns,Type 285 for 4.7in,Type 283 for lightAA,AW Type 279 (Nelson), Type 281 (Rodney), SW Type 271, GW Type 291(Rodney),MF/DF.Searchlights:Nelson2×44in,Rodney4×44in,6×24insignallinginboth.Aircraft:none,butaircraftcraneretainedinboth.Complement:1,631–1,650Speed: Stated to have been reduced to about 22 knots owing to additionalweightsaddedsince1939.

OPERATION‘BRONTE’BombingTests,1948

Pathofbomb:The bomb struck the starboard side of ‘B’ Barbette on the armoured ringbulkheadat station126about6ft6inabove theUpperDeck, andexplodedonimpact.The angleof strikewas70° to thenormal to the armoured ring at thepointofimpact.Themarksonthearmourindicatedthatthecentreofexplosionwasveryclosetothepointofimpact.Sincethecentreofthebursterchargewassituatedataboutone-fifththelengthofthebombfromthebaseend,itfollows

thatthenoseofthebombhadsliddownthearmourtowardsthedeck,bringingthe tail nearer to the armour, when the explosion occurred. There was noevidenceeitherwayastowhethertheexplosionhadoccurredbeforeorafterthetailactuallystruckthearmour.Alargenumberoffragmentswasproducedbytheexplosion,varyinginsize

fromafewpoundstomorethan100poundsinweight.Someofthesefragmentswere seen to hit thewater some distance ahead of the ship (estimated at 300yardsmaximum).AnIngersoll-Randaircompressor,standingclosetothepointofburst,wasdamagedbeyondrepairbyfragmentsandblast.

‘B’BarbetteArmour:Thicknessofarmour600lb.Theplatewasscoopedatthepointofimpacttoadepthof inonanareaof6in×2in.Theplateasawholewasdished¾inona4ftdatumandloosenedslightlyatthebutts.Therewereafew small cracks on the cemented face.Therewasno apparent damage to theturretrollerpath.

UpperDeck:ThereweresixmainholesintheUpperDeck,thelargestofwhichwasdirectlybeneaththeexplosionandappearedtohavebeencausedmainlybythe air blast of the explosion.Thedeckplating in the areawas30lbS.Q.Themainholeswere:

1.4ftwideby8ftlongfromaboutstation124to127justbesidethebarbettearmour.

NELSONInboardProfile,1945

2.4ft2inlongby1ft8inwideat120stationat20ft6intostarboardofthemiddleline.3.12inlongby6inwideat119station,23ft9intostarboardofthemiddleline.

4.2ft8in longby6inwideat121station,25ft tostarboardof themiddleline.5.6in×3inat123station,24fttostarboardofthemiddleline.6.3ftlongby1ftwidefrom127to128½stations,20fttostarboardofthemiddleline.

No.1holehadalargepetalofplatinghangingdownwardsattheforwardedgeof the hole.All the other holes had little or no petalling and showed signs ofbrittlefracture.Thedeckgirder,8in×6in×6in×35lbS.Q.Ibar,inwayofholeNo.1wascarriedawaycompletelyfromstations124to127.Atstation128,thisgirderwasdistortedandsplitwhereafragmenthadstrucktheupperdeck.HoleNo.6wasjustinboardofthisgirder.Main Deck. This deck was perforated in several places both by bomb

fragmentsandpiecesoftheUpperDeckcarriedawaybythesefragmentsorbytheblastoftheexplosion.TheW.T.doorinbulkhead127wasperforatedbyafragment which carried on through the Main Deck abaft 127 station. TheprincipalholesintheMainDeckwereheldbelowNo.1intheUpperDeck.Oneorbothmayhavebeencausedby thenoseof thebombwhichmayhavebeenbroken by the explosion. The base-plug of the bomb was found on the maindeck.MiddleDeck.Thedeckarmour,of250lbwith30lbS.Q.backingplate,was

struck at 122 station, 21ft to starboardof themiddle line close to thebarbettearmour ring, presumably by the nose of the bomb or part of the nose. Thearmour plate struck was one cut diagonally at the after end to fit the castingsupporting‘B’barbette.Theplatewas15ft longonthe inboardside,21ft longontheoutboardsideand6ft6inwide.Theinboardseamwas14fttostarboardofthemiddleline.Theseamsweretonguedandgroovedandthebuttsplainfaced.Thehitoccurredonthepointoftheplatewhereitwascutdiagonallyattheafterbutt.Thispointwassetdown,withsomeremovalofmetalfromthefaceoftheplate,toamaximumof4¾in,thetonguesandgroovesbeingopenedupinway.Therewasascoopinboththeadjacentcastingandthenextplateoutboardwithnodepressionineither.Piecesofthenoseofthebombwerefoundscatteredonthe armour in the Mess space between bulkheads 95 and 127. The fragmentwhich caused hole No. 2 in the Upper Deck passed through theMain Deck,travelled forward through a vent trunk, struck a ladder removing the bottomrungs and was deflected upwards to strike and force open the W.T. door atbulkhead 95. Somedistance forward of this door, a jagged fragment of ship’sstructurewasfoundembeddedinthesideofakitlockeratstation82.Thismayhave been a piece of the main deck carried away by the fragment described

above or it may even have come from the upper deck and been itself thefragmentwhichdamagedtheladderanddoor.Thetotaldistanceofthisfragmentfromthepointofexplosionalongitspathwasabout90ft.Underside of Middle Deck. The backing to the deck armour was smooth

bulgedtoadepthof5inona4ftdatuminawayoftheimpactofthebombnose.The9in×7in×7in×53lbS.Q.Ibarundertheoutboardseamofthedamagedarmourplatehad its top flange andupperpart of theweb split at thepoint ofimpact.Detailsofbomb:2000lb,A.P.,MkIV.Makers:ThomasFirth&JohnBrownLtd.BombNo.P.4110.FilledHES/RD1057.Pistol:65Mk.IX.Detonator(delay):60MkII0.07secondsdelay.Tube:T.N.T.Exploder,23½lbandC.E.Pellet–12oz3drachms.Tailunit:No.47MkIThebombexplodedinstantaneously,thecentreofburstbeingveryclosetothepointofimpactofthenose.Itbrokeupintoalargenumberoffragmentsvaryingin size from a fewpounds tomore than 100 pounds inweight. The nosewasfoundinthreepiecesonthearmourdeckanditcouldnotbeascertainedwhetherithadbeenbrokenupby theexplosionorby impactwith thedeck.Thebase-plugwasfoundonthemaindeckandnoexplanationcouldbefoundastowhyithadbeenprojecteddownwards.Noconclusiveevidencecouldbeobtainedastowhether thedelayhadbeenshortenedbyablowtransverselyon the tailof thebomborwhetherithadsimplynotfunctionedcorrectly.Floodingcaused:Nil.Damage toMachinery,etc.:Firemainsupply tomainandmiddledecks,95–

127starboard,fracturedonmaindeck.Damage toElectricalLeads:Lighting andpower leads, both permanent and

temporary, were severed on main and middle decks between 95 and 127starboard,These included thedegaussingcircuitand telephoneandfirecontrolcircuitsoftheship’spermanentsystem.Inthelasttriala2,000lbAPMkIVbombhitthedeckat232station,22ft6in

to port of middle line just abreast the funnel. It perforated all decks andtransversebulkheaddowntothemiddledeck,whereitpenetratedandreboundedwholeon topof thedeck.Anothersimilarbomb,droppedin thesamefashion,alsopiercedthearmourdeck,at219/220station.Theplatingwasheavilydishedoverawideareaandsomeholding-downboltsblewdownandpiercedthelower

deck.Theconclusionsdrawnfromthesetestswere:

1.Allbombsneededtobedroppedfromatleast5,000feettobeeffective.

Rodney’sbiggunsopenfire.Whenthemainarmamentfireditcausedhavoconboardbecauseofthetremendousblast;everyonetookcoverandheldontightwhenthefiringbellsounded.

2.Droppedfrom3,000to4,000feet,inpracticethebombsonlypenetrated2.95into4.75in.3.Itwasnoteasytohittheshipfromtheseheightsandcertainlynotfrom5,000feet.4.Itwasnotedthattheshipwasastationarytarget.5. Ithadnotbeenaneasy task topierceNelson’s6inarmoureddeck,butthefactremainedthatithadbeenpiercedandthisprovedonceandforallthatbattleshipswereveryvulnerabletothiskindofattack.Infactthetestsprovedthatthedaysofheavilyarmouredshipswereover.

History:Nelson1922 Programme. Laid down by ArmstrongWhitworth & Co., Newcastle on

Tyne28December1922.Launched3September1925.BegantrialsApril1927.CompletedtrialsJune1927.CommissionedatPortsmouth15August1927torelieveRevengeasflagAtlantic

Fleet.CarriedoutfurtherextendedtrialsAugusttoOctober1927anddidnothoistflaguntil21October1927.

ATLANTICFLEET(Flag)October1927toMarch1932.CollisionwithSSWestWalesspring1931.Slightdamage.Embarked King Amanullah of Afghanistan for exercises off Portland April

1928.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEETMarch1932toJuly1941(fleetflagtoDecember1939andfromAugust1940toApril1941).Grounded inPortsmouthharbourJanuary1934when leavingforspringcruise.

Nodamage.JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.ExtensiverefitPortsmouth1937toJanuary1938.WithRodney,paidofficialvisittoLisbonFebruary1938.Took part in operations against Scharnhorst andGneisenau 23–30 November

1939followingsinkingofRawalpindibyScharnhorston23rd.ConsiderablydamagedbymagneticmineinLochEwe4December1939.RefittedatPortsmouthJanuarytoAugust1940.Temporarily replacedas fleet flagbyWarspitepending returnofRodney from

refitJanuary1940.RejoinedfleetAugust1940.NorwegiancoastoperationsSeptember1940.Took part in operations against Scheer following sinking of Jervis Bay 5

November1940.OperationsagainstScharnhorstandGneisenauJanuarytoMarch1941.RelievedasfleetflagbyKingGeorgeV1April1941.DetachedApril1941toescortMiddleEasttroopconvoyviaCape.RejoinedHomeFleetJune1941.TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)July1941forMaltaconvoy;leftClydewith

convoy11July.FORCEH(Gibraltar)JulytoSeptember1941(flagfrom8August).Maltaconvoy21–27July1941.RelievedRenownasflag8August.Selected(withRodney)inAugust1941fortransfertoEasternFleetinDecember

1941orJanuary1942(seeRamillies).Latercancelled.Malta convoy 24–30 September 1941; damaged forward by aerial torpedo 27

September,duringthisoperation.Shipbrought10ftdownbyhead,reducingspeed to 15 knots and later to 12 knots. Refitted at Malta and RosythSeptember1941toApril1942.

RejoinedHomeFleetoncompletionofrefit.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoNovember1941.TransfertoEasternFleetagainproposedApril1942.LeftClyde 31May 1942,with convoy for Freetown, en route to join Eastern

Fleet,viaCape,butrecalledfromFreetowninJulyforMaltaconvoy.RejoinedHomeFleetatScapa26July.Flag(VA)convoyescortforcehoistedatScapa27July.LeftClydewithconvoy

4August.Maltaconvoy10–15August(flagVAEscortForce).RejoinedHomeFleetlaterinAugust.TransferredtoForceHOctober1942forNorthAfricainvasion.LeftScapa30OctoberandjoinedatGibraltar6November.FORCEH(Gibraltar)November1942toOctober1943(flagfrom15November1942toMay1943andfromJune1943on).TookpartinNorthAfricainvasionNovember1942.RelievedDukeofYorkasflag15November.Temporarily relieved as flag byKingGeorgeVMay 1943 and camehome to

workupatScapaforSicilyinvasion.RejoinedForceHJune1943.LeftScapa17th.ArrivedGibraltar23rd.TookpartininvasionSicilyJuly1943andItalySeptember1943.With Rodney, bombarded defences at Reggio 31 August, prior to Italian

landings.SupportedlandingsatSalerno9September.ItalianarmisticesignedonboardatMalta29September1943.LeftGibraltartorejoinHomeFleet31October.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1943toJune1944.UnitofbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasionJune1944.Carriedout twentybombardmentsofbatteries, includingHoulgatebattery,and

troopconcentrations11–18June.Damagedbymine18June.LeftPortsmouth22JunetorefitintheUSAforservicewithEasternFleet.RefitPhiladelphiaNavyYard1944toJanuary1945.RejoinedHomeFleetJanuary1945forworking-up.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoApril1945.LefthomeApril1945tojoinEastIndiesFleet(ex-EasternFleet)viaSuezCanal.Continued work-up in Mediterranean en route and arrived Colombo 9 July,

relievingQueenElizabethon12Julyasflag3rdBSandfleetflag.EASTINDIESFLEETJulytoOctober1945(flag3rdBSandfleetflagto

September1945).SurrenderofJapaneseforcesinSingaporeareanegotiatedonboardatPenang2

September1945.Present at surrender all Japanese forces in South-East Asia at Singapore 12

September1945.RelievedasflagbyHowe20Septemberandleftforhome13October.ArrivedPortsmouth17November1945.RecommissionedatPortsmouth24NovembertorelieveRodneyasflag2ndBS

andfleetflagHomeFleet.HOMEFLEETNovember1945toOctober1947(flag2ndBSandfleetflagtoApril1946.SeagoingTrainingShipfromApril1946.FlagHomeFleetTrainingSquadronAugusttoOctober1946).Relieved as fleet flag byKing George V 9 April 1946 and became Seagoing

TrainingShipinHomeFleet.Hoisted flag (RA) Training Battleships Home Fleet 14 August 1946 on

formation of special Training Squadron, to comprise Nelson, Anson andHowe.

RelievedasflagbyAnsonOctober1946andbecameprivateshipinsquadron.CollisionwithsubmarineSceptreatPortland15April1947.Slightdamage.ReplacedbyVictoriousandreducedtoreserveatRosyth20October1947.RESERVE(Rosyth)October1947toMay1948.PaidofftoDisposalList,Rosyth19May1948.Usedasbombingtarget1948(seeOperation‘Bronte’).SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCorporation5January1949andallocatedtoT.W.

Ward&Co.forscrapping.ArrivedInverkeithing15March1949.HullarrivedTroonforfinaldemolitionDecember1949.

History:Rodney1922 Programme. Laid down by Cammell Laird, Birkenhead 28 December

1922.LaunchedbyPrincessMary17December1925.BegantrialsAugust1927.CommissionedatDevonport7December1927for2ndBattleSquadron,Atlantic

Fleet.Becauseof further extended trials, didnot actually join fleetuntil 28March1928.

ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)March1928toMarch1932(temporaryfleetflagApriltoMay1930andJuly1931).

TemporarilyreplacedNelsonasfleetflagApriltoMay1930.Conveyed British Parliamentary Delegation to Iceland June 1930 for 1000th

AnniversaryCelebrationsofIcelandicParliament.Again temporary fleet flag July 1931 while Nelson refitting after collision

damage.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toSeptember1941(FleetflagJanuary1934.Flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagJanuarytoMay1936.FleetflagJune1937toFebruary1938andJanuarytoAugust1940).BecametemporaryfleetflagJanuary1934afterNelsongroundedinPortsmouth

harbouratcommencementofspringcruise.Flagre-transferredduringcruise.JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.AgainfleetflagJune1937toFebruary1938,replacingNelsonforrefit.WithNelson,paidofficialvisittoLisbonFebruary1938.RefitPortsmouthSeptembertoNovember1938.Took part in operations against Scharnhorst andGneisenau 23–29 November

1939 following sinking of Rawalpindi by Scharnhorst 23 November.Developedseriousrudderdefectsduringtheseandforcedtobreakoffsearchon29thandreturnforrepairs.

RefittedatLiverpoolDecember1939(completed31st).Rejoinedfleet1January1940andbecamefleet flag, relievingWarspitewhich

hadtemporarilyreplacedNelsonafterlattermined4December.NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.Hit aft by bomb off Bergen 9 April 1940. No material damage. Fifteen

casualties.Detachedtoescorthomeward-boundHalifaxconvoysaftersinkingofJervisBay

byScheer5November1940.Took part in operations against Scharnhorst andGneisenau in North Atlantic

JanuarytoMarch1941.Brieflysightedthem16Marchbutunabletomaintaincontact.

Detached24May1941 fromescortingSSBritannic to takepart inoperationsagainstBismarck.JoinedKingGeorgeVon26thandassistedindestructionofBismarck on 27th. Third salvo scored first registered hit on theGermanship.SustainedonlysplinterdamagetooneHAdirectorduringtheaction.

RefitBostonNavyYardtoAugust1941.Selected(withNelson)inAugust1941fortransfertoEasternFleetinDecember

1941 or January 1942 (see Ramillies). Later cancelled. Worked-up atBermuda after refit and then joined ForceH (Gibraltar) late September forMaltaconvoy.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)SeptembertoNovember1941(flagfrom30thSeptember).Maltaconvoy24–30September.

NelsonentersPortsmouthafteramostimpressivewarcareen1945.SheisseenhereafterherservicewiththePacificFleet.NoteAAadditions,camouflageandRDFinstallations.

ReplacedNelson as flag ForceH 30September after latter damaged by aerialtorpedoon27thduringconvoyoperation.

RelievedasflagbyMalayaandrejoinedHomeFleetNovember1941.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1941toNovember1942.BasedatHvalfiord,IcelandNovember1941toFebruary1942tomeetthreatof

attackonNorthAtlanticconvoysbyenemyheavyships.RefitLiverpoolFebruarytoMay1942.TransfertoEasternFleetagainproposedApril1942.LeftClyde31May1942,

with convoy for Freetown, en route to join Eastern Fleet, via Cape, butrecalledfromFreetowninJulyforMaltaconvoy.

RejoinedHomeFleetatScapa26July.LeftClyde4AugustwithconvoyforMalta.Maltaconvoy10–15August.RejoinedHomeFleetlaterinthemonth.TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)October1942forNorthAfricainvasion.LeftScapaforGibraltar23October.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1942toOctober1943.TookpartinNorthAfricalandingsNovember1942.InactionwithbatteriesatOran8–10November.EngagedfortDjbelSantononthe9thuntilitcapitulated.CamehomeMay1943towork-upatScapaforSicilyinvasion.RejoinedForceHJune1943.LeftScapa17June.ArrivedGibraltar23rd.TookpartininvasionofSicilyJuly1943andItalySeptember1943.WithNelson,bombardeddefencesatReggio31AugustpriortoItalianlandings.

SupportedlandingsatSalerno9September.RejoinedHomeFleetOctober1943.

Rodneyopensfirewithher4.7ingunsduringbattlepractice,1939.

HOMEFLEETOctober1943toNovember1945(2ndBStoSeptember1944.Fleetflaglater).Unit of bombardment force for Normandy invasion June to September 1944.

Attackedbyshorebatteries,bombsandhuman torpedoesduring thisperiodbutnotdamaged.BombardedHoulgateandBenervillebatteriesonD-Day(6June).

On 30 June, heavily hit concentrations of armoured vehicles seventeen milesbehind‘Gold’beach.

Bombardedenemytroopconcentrationsatextremerangeon2July.BombardeddefencesatCaen8July,priortoassault.Knockedoutshorebatteries

onAlderney(ChannelIslands)12August.UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysSeptembertoNovember1944.RelievedDukeofYorkasflagHomeFleetSeptember1944.RelievedbyNelsonNovember1945andreducedtoreserveatRosyth.RESERVE(Rosyth)November1945toMarch1948.ReducedtoCare&MaintenancestatusAugust1946.PlacedonDisposalList1948.SoldtoT.W.Ward&Co.,March1948.ArrivedInverkeithingforscrapping26March1948.

Rodney’screwloading16inshellsduringtheearlymonthsofthewar(1940).

Rodneyinherwarpaint,1942.

StarboardquarterviewofRodneypreparingforcoastalbombardmentduties,26May1944.

RodneypulledintopositionbytheworkersofThomasWardscrapyard.Shortlyafterthisphotographwastaken,alldrawings(hull,electrical,gunneryandtorpedo)weretakenofftheshipbyRoyalNavalofficersanddestroyedbyfire.March1948.

KingGeorgeVClass

DesignAswithNelsonandRodney,theKingGeorgeVdesignwasnotsettledwithoutagreat deal of deliberation, and was carried through against a background ofrestrictionsanddifficulties.TheAdmiraltyhadplannedfortheshipsasfarbackas1933althoughtheirideaofasuitableshiptoenhancethebattlefleetwasnotpopular with Britain’s allies or indeed among some departments of theAdmiraltyitself.Inallessentialstheclasswasbuiltundertherestrictionsofthe1921 Washington Treaty which was extended by the 1930 and 1935 navalagreements between Britain, USA, France and Russia and severely limiteddisplacements,theentirescopeofthedesignsufferingaccordingly.During the great lull in construction from 1925 to 1935 there had been an

enormous amount of experimentation regarding the entire infrastructure ofBritishcapitalshipdesign,andthiswasfastidiouslyexaminedbythePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,which in turnsent itsdeliberations to theirLordships. Itwasnotedthattherehadbeenmuchactivityinthewayofforeigndevelopment;shipssuchastheGermanDeutschland(1931)andtheFrenchDunkerque(1935)weretwoofthemostformidableto

ORIGINALPROPOSALFORBATTLECRUISER,8AUGUST1935Equipment 1,200 tonsMachinery 3,350 Armament 6,850 Armour 10,550 Hull 13,050 Totaldisplacementofshiptobe35,000tons.Design‘14P’FinalLegendDisplacement:35,000tonsLength:700ft(pp),740ft(w2).

Beam:103ft.Draught:28ftmean.Freeboard:22ft9in.SHP:110,000for28½–29knots.Fuel;4,000tonsoil.Armament10×14in(80rpg)16×5.25in(200rpg)2pompomsMkVI(500rpg)4×0.5inMGCatapultandaircraft(4aircrafttobecarried).ArmourMainbelt15in,15–7inbelowwaterTurrets13–9–7in,deck:6inovermagazines,5inovermachinery.Weights(tons)Generalequipment 1,050Machinery 2,635Armament 5,880Armour 12,845Hull 13,040Designs ‘15C’ ‘14H’ ‘14G’ ‘14J’ ‘14K’9×15in 9×14in 12×14in 12×14in 12×14in29½knots 30 27 28 29108,000shp 112,000 80,000 90,000 100,00014inarmour 14in 14in 13in 12½in6¼indeck 6¼in 6¼in 6in 6in740ftlong 750 750 740 75035,000tons 34,545 35,345 35,300 35,200

The conclusion of many years of careful study culminated in a summarydeliveredtotheBoardshowingjustwhattheRoyalNavywouldrequireinanyfreshbattleshipconstruction:

1.DispositionofMainArmament

Notlessthanfourtwinturrets,placedasinQueenElizabethclass.2.CalibreandDispositionofSecondaryArmamentTwelve6ingunsinbatterymountings,capableof30°elevation.3.Anti-AircraftArmamentSix guns each side, or two twin mountings each side and one on centreline.Designofshiptobesuchthat4.7inor4incanbemounted(decisionastowhichcalibretobegivenlater)inbetween-decktwins.FourMkMpompomsandeight0.5inmultiplemachine-gunsifpossible;aminimumoftwopompomsandfourmultipleMGifitisnecessarytoreducenumbers.4.TorpedoArmamentTorpedoestobecarriedinabove-watertubes,quintuplemountings.5.ArmourProtection

(a) If displacement is not reduced, 1928 proposals to be accepted, i.e.,against 16in shell and 2,000lb bombs; but protection to be given tomachineryspacesagainst1,000lb‘terminalvelocitydive’bombattack.(b)Ifdisplacementisreduced,standardofprotectiontobeagainst14infire;anti-bombprotectionasbefore.

6.UnderwaterProtection(a)Anti-Torpedo:Against1,000pb.chargeincontactwiththeship’sside,(b) Anti-mine – (‘B’ Bomb, etc.). Best protection possible; Nelson’sstandardbeingaminimum.Closesubdivisionofcompartments.(c)Near-Miss(byaheavybomb).Areasoutsideanti-torpedoprotectiontobeconsidered.

7.Speed.Amaximumof23knots.(Endurancerequiredatvariousspeedsisdetailed.)8.Endurance14,000milesat10knots.

On this foundation theDNCDepartmentwasasked in1935 tosubmitsuitablesketches.Thistheydid,butbecauseofthelargenumberofdesignsproposed,allstill being restricted to about 35,000 tons, the concept gave the department analmost impossible task. More than twenty designs were forwarded from July1935toApril1936andadesignprefixed‘14.0’wasconsideredthebestpossibleall-roundlayout.TheDNCsaid:

Inviewoftheverygreatimportanceofgettingthebestdesignofshipspossible,adesignwhichmustbeabletowithstandthedevelopmentofdesignofthenexttwentyyears,thenavalstaffhavebeenatgreatpains

to examine ‘14.0’ design in every aspect. The staff memo has theappearanceofbeingwrittenbyanadvocatusdiaboli pointingout alltheweakspotsofanadmittedlyfinedesign.Butthisisalltothegoodasitbringsoutthesepointswhichrequiremodification.Theraisingofthe armoured deck is of great importance and definitely should beadopted.’ With slight modification of armouring and armament theprefixwaschangedtobecomedesign‘14.P’andwasapprovedon28May 1936.The design can be best understood by referring to theofficialAdmiraltyHistoryofDesign,KingGeorgeVclass:

The last capital ships completed for the Royal Navy prior to KingGeorgeVwereNelsonandRodneywhichweredesigned tomeet therequirementsoftheWashingtonTreaty.AttheGenevaConferencein1927theBritishcontingentwerepreparedtoacceptareducedstandarddisplacementandsmallercalibreofgunforcapitalships,huttheUSAwasnotpreparedtodiscusssizeofcapitalships.AttheLondonConferencein1930themajorpowersagreednotto

exercisetherightprovidedintheWashingtonTreatytolaydownthekeels of capital ships replacement tonnage during 1931–6 inclusive.Thus the earliest date for laying down keels of replacement tonnagebecame 1.1.1937. The London Treaty of 1936 between the USA,FranceandBritainwasarrangedbecauseoftheforthcomingexpirationoftheWashingtonTreaty(1921)andLondonTreaty(1930).An importantclauseaffectingcapital shipdesignwas to theeffect

that no capital ship should carry a gun over 14in calibre providedhowever that if any of the parties of the 1921 Washington Treatyshouldfailtoenterintoanagreementtoconformtothisprovisionnotlater than1stApril1937thenmaximumcalibreshallbe16in.(Japandidnotenterintotheagreement.)KingGeorgeVclassweredesignedtoTreatylimitationsof35,000

tons and 14in guns. Great Britain decided to lay down two capitalshipsat theearliestdatepermittedby theTreaty,namely1stJanuary1937.GreatBritain then became committed to the 14in gun although in

theeventofJapanrefusingtoacceptthissizeconsiderationwasgiventodesigningtheshipssothatthe14ingunscouldbechangedoverto16in guns at a later date. This, however, would have involved anappreciableincreaseincitadellengthandarmourweightanddelayandit was therefore decided to design the ships with 14in guns. Many

sketch designs were prepared before approval. The earliest sketchdesign included 12 × 14in guns in three quadruple turrets and 20 ×4.5ingunsintentwinturrets.Themiddledeckwasthearmoureddeck.Inlatersketchesthesecondaryarmamentbecame16×5.25ingunsineight twin turrets and the armoured deck was raised to main decklevel,increasingthedepthofsidearmourbyabout8feet.Tomeetthisincreaseadheringto35,000tonsitwasfoundnecessarytoreducethemainarmamenttoten14inbymaking‘B’turretatwinmounting.Everyeffortwasmadetoeconomizeinweight.On28thMay1936approvalwasgiventodesign14.P.On 29th July 1936 two ships were ordered (King George V and

PrinceofWales).TheBoarddrawingswerecompleted,approvedanddeliveredtothe

shipbuilderson30thSeptember1936.

Thedesignascompletedwasprobablythebest35,000-tonlimiteddisplacementbattleship ever produced. True, themain armamentwas not powerful enough,butthe14inwasagoodgun,andinallotheraspectstheywereexcellentships;the armour protection was in fact second to none. Lessons embodied in thedesign had all been learnt during the Great War and augmented by theexperimentswithEmperorofIndiaandMarlboroughin1931.Theyincluded:

1.Magazinesbelowshellrooms.2. Main machinery rearranged and subdivided to reduce possibility ofcompletedisablement.

PrinceofWalesfittingoutatCammellLairdsearlyin1941.

ThefirstvieweverpublishedofKingGeorgeVin1941.(Jane’sFightingShips)

3.Sidearmoursubstantiallylengthenedandthickened.4.Thickarmourattopendofsidearmourandsplinterprotectioncoveringallmagazines.5.Anti-flasharrangementsinallturrets.6.Ventilationarrangementstohandingrooms.7.Importantunderwaterprotection.8.Closewatertightsubdivisionandpumpingfacilityextensions.9. Technical improvements, particularly in propulsive machinery andstructuralapplicationofarmour.

Featuresofthedesignwere:

1.TheonlyBritishbattleshipstohave14inguns(apartfromtheex-ChileanCanadatakenoverin1914)andquadrupleturrets.2.Firstdesignsince1877withadual-purposeHA-LAsecondaryarmamentandthefirstcompletedwithoutanytorpedoarmament.

KINGGEORGEV:LAUNCHFIGURES,21JANUARY1939Length:700ft(pp),700ft0¼inasmeasured,745ft0⅛in(oa).Beam:103ft in.Depthofkeeltoupperdeck:51ft in.Breakage:Longitudinallyinadistanceof688ft:1inhog.Transverseinadistanceof98ft:nil.Draught:13ft2⅛inforward,15ft10¼inamidships,18ft6⅞inaft.Hull:11,790tons.Displacementatlaunch:18,120tons.Displacement(tons)atlaunchforothersPrinceofWales: 18,578.DukeofYork: 18,852.

DUKEOFYORK:GMANDSTABILITY,19AUGUST1941Shipin‘A’condition:Draught:32ft5½in,55tonswaterprotection,2,530tonsoilfuel.GM:7.36ft.Ship in ‘B’condition:Draught:33ft3in,55 tonswaterprotection,3,270 tonsoilfuel.GM:8.14ft.Stability.Maximumin‘A’condition:34°‘B’condition:35°Stabilityvanishesat:‘A’condition:67°‘B’condition:70°Displacement:38,126tonsloadcondition.

3.Thefirstcompletedwithradar.4.Thefirstdesignedtocarryaircraft.5. The first since 1877 completed without a heavily armoured conningtower.

Theshipshadaflushdeckhullandaveryslightsheerforward,thishavingbeencurtailed to an undesirable extent tomeet anAdmiralty requirement (in forceprior to 1941) that all turrets be able to fire at 30 depression over their entiresafetyarcs.Thesheerforwardwasinadequate,however,andwasaggravatedbya reduction of about three feet in the original design freeboard due to theadditionofextraweightsduringconstruction.Thiscausedtheshipstobewetathigh speed and inclined to bury in head seas, the class suffering appreciablyfrom this defect. During the action withBismarck inMay 1941 ‘A’ and ‘B’turret rangefinders inPrinceofWaleswereblankedbyheavyspraycoming inoverthelowforecastleand,asthemainarmamentradarwasnotfunctioning,thefightingefficiencyofthegunswasseriouslyimpaired.SuchwasnotthecaseinKingGeorgeVhowever.Onherpreliminarytrials(2

December1940),ConstructorH.S.Pengellysaidofhergeneralseaworthiness:

Duringfullpowertrialstheshipwasdryexceptforbrokenwateroverthebowwhichwaswellclearedbythebreakwaters.Thefairingatthefore end of the side armour and the streamlined refuse chute wereeffectiveinreducingspray.Theflying-offspaceandquarterdeckweredry,thelatterevenwhengoingasternat10knots.Themovementoftheshipwasgenerallyeasy,periodsmeasuredon

manyoccasionsbeingabout7½seconds’pitchand14 seconds’ roll.The ship was remarkably free of vibration at all speeds and I wasinformed that the rangefinders could be usedwithout difficulty. TheCaptain and officers have all expressed themselves as being pleasedwiththeshipandherperformance.

TheywerethelastBritishbattleshipstohavetheconventional(cruiser)stern,anew square-cut type being adopted in the later Vanguard. The tight, almostsquarebilgeofferedgreaterresistancetorolling.Themetacentricheightwas6.1feetintheaverageloadand8.1feetdeep,thisbeinggreaterthaninanypreviousBritisharmouredshipsinceInflexible (1874).Electricweldingwasextensivelyusedintheconstructionbutwaslimitedtocertainareas.

PARTICULARSOFSHIPS,ASCOMPLETEDConstruction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedKingGeorgeV: Vickers 1.1.1937 21.2.1939 11.12.1940.PrinceofWales: CammellLaird 1.1.1937 3.5.1939 31.3.1941.

DukeofYork: JohnBrown 5.5.1937 28.2.1940 4.11.1941;Anson: Swan,Hunter 22.7.1937 24.2.1940 22.6.1942.Howe: Fairfield 1.6.1937 9.4.1940 29.8.1942.Displacement(tons):Duke of York: 37,754 (light), 41,858 (average action), 42,046 (deep); KGV:38,151(load),42,245(deep);Howe:39,138(load),42,630(deep).DimensionsLength:KingGeorgeV 700ft0¼in(pp) 745ft0⅛in(oa)PrinceofWales 700ft1in 745ft1⅝in(oa)DukeofYork 699ft11⅝in 745ft0¼in(oa)Anson 700ft0¼in 745ft0¼in(oa)Howe 699ft11½in 744ft11½in(oa)Beam: KingGeorgeV 103ft in PrinceofWales 103ft in DukeofYork 103ft1¾in Anson 103ft0¼in Howe 103ft0⅜in Draught:Rangingfrom28ft6inthroughto33ft7½independingoncondition.Armament10×14in45calMkVII(80rpg)16×5.25in50calMkIHA/LAdual-purpose(200rpg)32–482pdrAA1×40mmAA(PrinceofWales)11–15×20mmAA(AnsonandHowe)4×3pdrsaluting3to420-tubeAArocket-projectors(KingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales).Freeboard:(asdesigned)30ft10inforward,26ft10inaft.ArmourMainbelt15–14inBulkheads12–I0inBarbettes14–13–12–11inTurrets13–9–7inSecondaryturrets1in–1/½–1in

Splinterprotectiontosecondarymagazines1½in‘D’steelUnderwaterprotection1¾–½inDeck:6inovermagazines,5inovermachineryLowerdeckforwardofcitadel5–2½in,aftofcitadel5–4½inConningtower(andbridge)4insides,3infaceMachineryParsonssinglereductiongearedturbinesdriving4propellers.Separatecruisingturbines.Turbinesarrangedinfourcompartments.Boilers:8Admiralty3-drumboilersin4compartments.DesignedSHP:110,000for28.5/29knotsWorkingpressure:380/410psiSteamtemperature:750degrees.Lengthofenginerooms:‘A’and‘B’43ft11¼in.‘X’‘Y’43ft11¼in.Lengthofboilerrooms:43ft11⅝inFuel:3,770tonsoil(average).Radiusofaction:KingGeorgeV,PrinceofWales,DukeofYork,15,600nmat10knots;Anson16,700nmat10knots;Howe15,400nmat10knots.Weights(tons) Generalequipment 1,150Machinery 2,770Armament 6,570Armour 12,460Hull 13,780Costs Hull £2,578,034Armour 1,140,000Machinery 1,116,153Armament 2,243,162Storesandequipment 315,785Storesandequipment 315,785Totalofeachshiponaverage: £7,393,134.Ship’sboats3×25ftmotorboats3×45ftmotorpickets

1×45ftmotorlaunch2×32ftcutters2×27whalers2×14ftdinghies1×16ftdinghy1×13ft6inbalsaraft47lifefloats.Searchlights6×44in:2onlowerbridge,2onplatformabaftforefunnel,2onplatformonsecondfunnel;2×24insignallingonlowerbridge.Upperdecktoforetruck121ft6in.Topofforefunnelfromupperdeck63ft9in.Upperdecktoaftertruck103ft.Upperbridgetoupperdeck59ft6½in.ComplementKingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales:average1,400(1941);PoW110officers,1,502men(December1941);DukeofYorkassquadronflagship84officers,1,530men,asfleetflagship104officers,1,578men.

ArmamentIn1931staffrequirementscalledforamainarmamentmountedinnotlessthanfour twin turrets placed as in theQueenElizabeth class.Aftermany tests thismethodofdisposingthearmamentwasstronglyadvocated.Itwasthoughtthatifforreasonsconnectedwithadequateprotectionandlimitedtonnageitwasfoundimpossibletomountthearmamentinthisway,themethodshouldfollowthatasfitted in Nelson and Rodney (triple turrets).The calibre of gun as proposedranged from 14in to 16in and in all forms of disposition.That the 14in wasfinally adopted came about as a direct result of the 1936 London NavalConference, which suggested a reduction in maximum permitted gun calibrefrom16into14in,andthedesignof theKingGeorgeVclasswaspreparedonthisbasis.Theotherpowersconcernedfailedtoratifytheagreement,butasthedelayofoneyearrequiredforthepreparationofnewdesignswasunacceptablethe 14in armament was retained. Designs for 15in guns were available at thetime, but the 14in was considered to offer a better-balanced design on adisplacementlimitof35,000tons.Numerous alternative plans were considered with a view to mounting the

maximum number of guns, and both twin, triple and quadruple turrets werediscussed.Threequadrupleswereeventuallyapprovedalthoughitlaterbecamenecessary to reduce this to twoquadrupleandone twin tooffset theweightofextra magazine protection which trials with new projectiles had shown to bedesirable.TheNelson-classarrangementfortheoriginalthreequadrupleturretswasconsidered,butrejectedbecauseofsevereblasteffectswhentheafterturrettrainedabaft thebeam,andbecauseofdifficulty inaccommodating the longermachinery space required in the fine stern section. The arrangement of twoturrets forward and one aft was finally adopted, the second (superfiring)quadruplebeinglaterreplacedbyatwin.TheyweretheonlyBritishbattleshipstohave14inguns (apart from theex-ChileanCanada takenover in1914)andquadrupleturrets.Theywerealsothefirsttocompletewithradarcontrol.Because of the complexity of the quadruple turrets the crews had problems

thatwere noticeable during the action againstBismarck in 1941, for example,whenmainarmamentsinPrinceofWalesandKingGeorgeVwereattimesonly20–50 per cent effective.Prince ofWales had one gun in ‘A’ turret defectivethroughout,and‘Y’wastemporarilyoutofactionthroughmechanicalfailure.InKing George V one turret was inoperative for nearly twenty minutes. Theseproblemswere later overcome and at the sinking ofScharnhorst inDecember1943Duke of York fired 52 broadsides ofwhich 31 straddled and sixteen fellwithin200yardsofthetarget,aremarkableperformanceeveniftheefficiencyoftheradarcontrolistakenintoconsideration.The secondary armament for the King George V group was extremely

problematical although it had been under development since the time of theoriginalproposalin1928,whichcalledfortwelve5ingunsmountedsixoneachside.ThecontentiousissuewaswhethertoincludeagunthatcouldcoverbothLA and HA fire. The low-angle gun needed to be powerful enough to stopattackingdestroyersandyethavesufficientelevationtocounterdivingaircraft,and there was no such dual-purpose weapon in production at that time. Thequestions of armament allocation and weight distribution were hotly arguedthroughout the early 1930s, but on 1 January 1936 it was finally decided toreplacethe4.5ingunbythenew5.25inwhichwasabouttogointoproduction.At a DNO’s meeting on 1May 1936 the positioning of the 5.25in guns wasdebated:

Position ‘A’:Eightgunsoneachside in twogroups.Theentire5.25inbatterybeing fed from common groups of magazines and situated just before theforemostboilerroom.

Position ‘B’:To separate thegunson each side into twogroups, the foremost

groupeachsidetobefedfrommagazinespositionedforward,andaftergroupfrommagazinespositionedaft.

DisadvantagesofPosition’A’:1. The two after mounts required long-distance transportation ofammunitionbetweendecks.2.Asall5.25inmagazineandshellroomscametogetherseriousdislocationwouldresultfromanunderwaterhit.3.Couldbeputoutofactioncompletelybyshellorbombhit.4.Close-rangeAAdifficulttopositionawayfromblastof5.25inguns.

DisadvantagesofPosition‘B’:

1.Arrangementrequiredtwoseparatefunnelsandforefunnelwouldhavetobeclosertothebridgework.

Advantagesof‘B’:1.Magazineswidelyseparated.2.Lessvulnerabletoallbeingknockedoutbysingleblow.3.Betterinternalarrangements.4.Betterarcsoffireandnointerferencetobridge.

Although Nelson and Rodney’s secondary guns were fitted in turrets, therecommendationsofthe1928committeedidnotfavourareturnofthismountingand strongly advocated the battery system of theQueen Elizabeth andRoyalSovereignclasses.

AnoverallviewofKingGeorgeVin1941.

DukeofYorkrunningspeedtrialsinNovember1941.

Twoclose-upsofDukeofYork’ssuperstructurewhilefittingoutatJohnBrownshipyardinNovember1941.Notethestrangecamouflage.

Theadvantagesofthebroadsidebatteryasopposedtotheturretsystemwere:

1. More reliable due to absence of machinery and probable effect ofsplinters.2.Crewsfairlywellprotected.3.Abetterchanceofafairproportionofthearmamentbeingfitforserviceafteraday’saction.4.Localcontrolofwholebatteryeasy.5.Upkeepeasyandcheap.6.Costofmountingtwelvegunsaboutone-thirdthatofmountingthesamenumberinturrets.

Disadvantages:

1.Arcsoffirenotasgoodasthoseofturrets.2.Rateoffirefallsoffaspersonnelbecometired.3.Adequatesupplyarrangementsmoredifficulttoarrange.

4.DifficulttoprotectfromweatherunlessmountedhigherthaninQEandRSclasses.

Thefinalrecommendationwasfortwelvegunsinabatteryofhighcommand.ThebackupHAarmamentwastoconsistofeight4.7intwinmountingsashad

been discussed in the 1928 proposals. At a later date, however, weightrestrictions imposedon thedesign forceda reduction incalibre to4.5in.Morediscussionsledtothefavouringofadual-purposebattery(bothLAandHA)andforthistheturretsystemseemedbest,althoughatthesametimeitwasseenasaflawintheprotectionbecausesecondaryturretscouldnotbeheavilyarmouredbecauseofdisplacementrestrictions.Thefinalrecommendationswerefor5.25ingunsseparatedintofourgroupsoffourguns(i.e.,twotwinmountings)situatedin thecornersof thecitadel, themagazinesandshell rooms tobedivided intogroupsbeforeandabaftmachineryspaces.Both the 1928 and 1931 Battleship Committees had problems in deciding

whethertofitanytorpedoarmament.The1928Boardshowedacertaindislikefortheidea,butthreeyearslaterfavouredtheaddition.The1931proposalwasfor above-water tubeswhichwould be advantageous for night fighting. Later,however, the whole question of torpedo armament was dropped because ofweightproblems.Theywere the firstBritish battleships to be designedwith the dual-purpose

(LA/HA)secondaryarmament,butinservicethe5.25ingunwasfoundtobetooheavyforrapidfire,particularlysustainedAAfireatcloseranges.LightAAarmamentwasvariableintheearlierandlatershipsoftheclass,as

completed.The original design had provided for thirty-two 2pdrs in four multiple (8

barrels)mountings, twoP&S on the superstructure before and abeam the forefunnel. The first two ships (KGVand PoW) completed thus (1940–1) plus asingle40mminbreastworkrightaftonthequarterdeckinPrinceofWalesonly.KingGeorgeVcarriedfourandPrinceofWalesthree20-tuberocketprojectors,one each on ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets in both ships.KingGeorgeV also carried anadditional rocket launcheronherquarterdeck.DukeofYork,Anson andHowecompletedwithanextrapairofmultiple2pdrmountings,oneon‘B’turretandoneon‘Y’insteadoftherocketlaunchers.Therewerealsosome20mmAAinAnsonandHowemountedontheforecastleandquarterdeckinboth,andontheforwardsuperstructureaswellinAnson.Rocket-projectors inKingGeorge V andPrince ofWaleswere replaced by

multiple 2pdrs (8 barrels) and four 20mm AA added in place of the rocket

projectoronthequarterdeckinKingGeorgeV.Therewasradarcontrolforthesecondaryarmamentandthe2pdrs;fourdirectors inKingGeorgeV,PrinceofWalesandDukeofYorkascompleted,butsixinthelasttwooftheclass.

These ships were the first British battleships to be completed without anyformoftorpedoarmament.

ArmourTheoriginaldesiredscaleofprotectionwasthatfirstenvisagedduringtheearly1930swhenproposalsweremadetoprotectnewbattleshipsagainst16inshellsat ranges between 12,000 and 30,000 yards. In foreign navies, however, therewere only five 16in-gunned ships (1935, USA three, Japan two) and it wasthoughthighly improbable thatanynewshipwouldhave to faceoneof these.Most heavy gunswere 14in, however, and itwas thought that this sizemightwellbecomethe‘standard’soprotectionwouldonlyneedtobeeffectiveagainstthiscalibre,especiallywhendisplacementlimitationswouldplaysuchabigpartinconstructionofanynewships.

Amoredauntingaspectwhenconsideringadequateprotectionwas theever-increasing danger from aerial bomb attack, the efficiency of which wasimprovingsteadily.In1930theweightofthehigh-explosivebombwaslimitedto2,000pounds, but it couldnot be ruledout that before longmorepowerfulbombswouldbeavailable.IthadbeenestimatedthatthefollowingthicknessesofNCsteelcouldbepenetratedbythe1,000lbbomb:Aircraftspeedatendofdive: Heightofrelease: NCsteel:320mph 1,200ft 3.43in400mph 1,200ft 4.20in

Protectionwouldneedtobe:Magazines:Againstpenetrationby14inshellsbetween12,000and30,000yards.Against2,000lbbombsAPdroppedfrom10,000ftandlower.Engineandboilerrooms:

1.Against14inplungingshellfireupto26,000yards;thesidearmournotbeingpenetrableoutside12,000yardsat70°inclination.2.Against2,000lbbombswhendroppedfrom4,000ftandbelow.3.Against1,000lbbombsof‘terminalvelocitydive’type.Mainarmament:

Ammunition supply arrangements and gunhouses to be protected from 14inshellsbetween12,000and26,000yards.

Sameprotectionagainstbombsasforengineroomsandboilerhouses.Secondaryarmament:Against splinters and blast of 14in shells or 2,000lb bombs bursting in the

vicinity plus weather, blast from own guns and machine-gun fire fromattackingaircraft.

Steeringgear:Theneedforprotectionagainstallbutdirecthits.Itwasfoundpracticabletoincludeprotectionagainstgunsofgreatercalibrethantheirown, thescale in factbeingsecond tononecompared toanycapital shipafloat(1937)orindeedanyproposeddesignsofthetime(withtheexceptionofthe Japanese Yamato class). As built, they were protected against 16in shellsbetween12,000and30,000yardsandagainst2,000lbbombsfrom10,000ft(sidearmouranddecks).Themainarmamentwasproofagainst16inshellsatrangesbetween12,000and26,000yards, themachineryspacesagainst16inplungingfire up to 26,000 yards, and the side armourwas impenetrable outside 12,000yardsduringnormalbattleconditions.Extraconsiderationwasgiventounderwaterprotectionanditwasconcluded

thatthefollowingwasneeded:

Anti-torpedo:Toprovideagainst750lbchargeincontactwithship’sside.Anti-mine:Toprovideatleast5feetbetweenbottomsofinnerandouterhulls.

Anti-torpedoprotectionwasbuilt inandfittedinternallyforasfarforwardandaft as possible on the given weight restrictions, and during constructionconsideration was given to protection against 1,000lb torpedo charges ratherthan750lbafterreviewingthescaleofprotectioninNelson.As with the battleships that had been ‘modernized’ during the 1930s

(Warspite,Renownetc.),therewasnoprovisionforaheavilyprotectedconningtower as had been normal to that date (1933), all control positions beingadequatelyprotectedbeneaththedeck,andbulletproofprotectionbeingprovidedfor bridges, etc. In any case officers were reluctant to use a conning towerbecauseof thepoorviewfromthepositionandthefact thatadirecthitwouldprobably put the personnel out of action – and this saw the demise of theconningtowerwithintheRoyalNavy’sdesigns.Theentirephilosophyunderlying theprotectiongiven to theKingGeorgeV

classwasadirect resultof full-scale testscarriedoutduring the1930sagainststructuresbuiltonto‘Job74’whichweretestedagainstheavycontactcharges.Thetwomostimportanttestsinvolved1,000lbTNTchargesexplodedagainstaheavy two-ply rivetedprotectivebulkheadof ‘D1’material,andshowed thatariveted bulkhead resisted explosive charges much better than a welded one.ManyexperimentswerecarriedoutwithmodelsandagainstoldershipssuchasEmperor of India, Marlborough, Centurion and the monitor Roberts. Thedrawingsshowsomeofthetests.ConclusionsoftheExcellent testswerehighlightedinthereportmadetothe

Admiralty:

1.Both systems of defencewere heavily defeated and, had either systembeen incorporated in a ship, sea water would have entered two, possiblythree,maincompartmentsbehindtheholdingbulkhead.

KINGGEORGEV,1936ARMOURJob74

KINGGEORGEVAsFitted,1940

DUKEOFYORKFebruary1942

2. The principal cause of the extensive damagewas brittle failure whichwasassociatedwithweldedjoints.3.Steelranginginthicknessfrom1½into inwasusedintheconstructionofthetargetandthickmetalwasthemostsusceptibletobrittlefracture;infact,examplesofductilebreaks in1½inmetalwere rare,whereas, in insteeltheywerenumerous.4.TheevidenceofthetestsandJob74trialsindicatesthatrivetedjointsinthick protective bulkheads are superior to welded joints for resistanceagainstexplosiveloading.5.Valuable informationwas obtained on the efficiency of various designfeaturesofthedefencesystem.6.Thedamageobtainedwasfarmoreextensiveanddifferentintypewhenfull-scaletrialsratherthan¼-scalemodelswereused.7. The trials emphasize the importance of metallurgical research onstructuralsteels.8. The trials emphasize the importance, in the building of large warshipstructures,ofthehighestqualityofworkmanship.

Ascompleted,theKingGeorgeVclasshadanexternalarmouredbeltinsteadofthe internal arrangement adopted in theNelson class and the armour beltwascarried lowerbeneath thewaterline than inanypreviousbattleships, thisbeingdemonstrated during firing tests against the German battleshipBaden (1921),Superb (1922), Monarch (1924) and Emperor of India (1931). Despite this

increase in depth of armour, however, Prince of Wales was hit beneath thearmourbeltduringtheBismarckactioninMay1941.ThebeltarmourwascarriedonedeckhigherthaninNelsonwithamaximum

increaseof1inoverthatclass.Theflatarmoureddeck,adoptedinNelson,wasretained but placed one deck higher. Thickness was reduced by ¼in overmagazines, but increased 2in over machinery and boiler spaces. The 6inmaximumdeckthicknesswasbasedontheextensivetrialssince1922whichallindicated that this thickness was adequate against any bombs then consideredlikelytobedeveloped.Ontheotherhand,onlytheJapanesehadestimatedthata6inthicknesswasnotenoughtokeepoutreallyheavybombs,andduringtestscarriedoutfrom1934hadconcludedthatatleast7into9inwasneededtoresistAPbombsdroppedfromagreatheight.AsinNelson,theexternalbulgesystemwasnotusedandanewarrangementofbulkheadingwasadoptedwithincreasedpumpingfacilities.The loss of Prince of Wales, which capsized after being hit by many

torpedoes,showedupawholeseriesofminordefects,however,oneofthemostimportant being the lack ofwatertight integrity in the ventilating system. Theship settled rapidly before capsizing.The torpedoes causedmore damage thantheyshouldhavedone,butitisbelievedthattheshipcouldhavebeensavedhaditnotbeenforabombwhichpiercedthecatapultdeck,burstinthecinemaspacebelow and blew out the side of the hull, causing rapid flooding. The cinemaspaceextendedrightacross theshipand thefreefloodingcollected in thisandwasmainly responsible forher capsizing.With the abandonmentof aircraft inbattleships after 1942, this hazard was reduced by relocating the cinema andvariousofficesonthecatapultdeckintheformerhangarspaceandeliminatingthefreefloodingareabelow.AdditionaltanksforwatertightintegritywerealsofittedfollowingthelossofPrinceofWales.Withaviewtoincreasingwaterlineprotection,arrangementsweremade,for

thefirsttime,forfloodingthefueltanksoutsidetheanti-torpedobulkheadsasoilwasexpendedsothatthesewouldneverbeempty.Later,however,itwasfoundthatthisofferednoadvantageoveremptyspacesinabsorbingshock.Themainarmouredbelt ascompletedwas15inabreast themagazines,14in

abreast machinery and boiler spaces with a lower edge of 5½in and 4½inrespectively. The total armoured side was 414ft long by 23ft 6in wide andextendedtojustbeyondtheouterfacesof‘A’and‘Y’barbettes.Theupperedgeofthebeltwasatmaindecklevelsome14ft9inabovethewaterline(atnormalload), the lower edge being approximately 8ft 6in below. The entire sideprotection of the citadel reached 40ft before and 36ft abaft. Bulkheads were

12in–11in–10in closing forward and after extremities of belt armour betweenmainand lowerdecks.Themaindeckwas6in–5in thickand laid flatover thelengthofthebelt;6inovermagazinesand5inovermachineryandboilers(also5in–2½in and 5in–4½in on lower deck outside citadel). Barbettes were 13in–12in and12in–11in according to position (‘A’ and ‘B’3in–12in–11in and ‘Y’13in–12in). Turrets had 13in faces, 9in sides, 7in rears and 6in crowns.Secondary turrets (5.25in) were given only 1½–1in bulletproof plating.Splinterproof protection for secondary magazines was 1½in ‘D’ steel. Anti-torpedobulkheadswere1¾inrunningthewholelengthofthearmouredbeltandfinishingina1½inbulkhead.Theconningpositioninthebridgefacewasgiven4inarmourplatesonthesides,3inonthefront.Therewasalsoextraarmourinthewayofcircularbulkheadsunderthebarbettes;2insplinterproofscreensformainmagazines (‘D’ steel) and a small 4in bulkhead on the after end of thesteeringcompartment.Theshipshadadouble-bottom4feetdeep.

HoweontrialsinAugust1942.Judgingbytheamountofphotographs,thetrialswerewellrecorded,althoughheavilycensored.

MachineryIn 1928 the Post-War Questions Committee examined the requirements for a

superior battleship and its conclusion was: ‘A slight superiority in battlefleetspeedoneither side isof little account.’With this inmindand the fact that itwould still be to some advantage to have at least equality with most of theforeignbattleships at sea, the terms for theRoyalNavy’snew shipswere laiddown.At first thesuggestedspeedwasonly21knotswhichwasmuchslowerthan the Nelson and Queen Elizabeth classes. In October 1928 the Boardconsidered the following alternatives: ‘Either design for 21 knots with thepurposeofmaintainingthatspeedthroughout thelifeof theship,ordesignfor23knots,whichwouldbeobtainedbyforcing theboilersandwhichwouldbesubjecttoreductionwithage.’

PRELIMINARYSTEAMTRIALS

KingGeorgeV: Displacement41,700tons. 108,290shp = 28.4kts.PrinceofWales: Displacement42,650tons. 111,900shp = 27.5kts.DukeofYork: Displacement42,550tons. 111,30shp = 28.6kts.Anson: Displacement42,600tons. 111,850shp = 27.62kts.Howe: Displacement42,630tons. 112,105shp = 27.5kts.

DUKEOFYORK:TRIALS,INOVEMBER1941Shipcompletewithammunitionplus35tonstrialammunition.Displacement:42,970tons.Underway08.30hours.FirthofForth.Fullpowertrialscommenced12.00hours.Sea:slight.Wind:moderate.MeanSHP:28,720.RPM:153.Speed:20.6knots.MeanSHP:111,200.RPM:232.Speed:28.6knots.ConstructorandDNCaboard.

Theconclusionreachedwasthatthebestpolicywastoaimforaspeedof23knotsinthestandardconditionandthatagreaterforcingoftheboilersthanhadpreviously been allowed should become common practice. The figures werebasedonashipof35,000tonsandcarrying16inguns.In1929,whenthematterofasmallerbattleshipwasbeinginvestigated,thequestionofspeedwasaired:‘Thestaffwereunabletorecommendapolicyofincreasingspeedattheexpenseofmain battleship requirements’.At thismeeting the notion of ‘a balance’ inspeedfromthetacticalpointofviewwasputforwardanditwaspointedoutthatifbattle fleet speeds increased, so toowould the speedsofothernew typesofvesselswhichwouldhavetokeepupwiththem.TheDNCDepartmentdidnotlikeoraccept thisviewand,evenat theexpenseofanother1,000 tons, itwasthoughtnecessary to raise the speedof thenewbattleship toat least25knots.

Theargumentabouthighspeedswasbasedonthesuppositionthatspeedswouldriseinthefutureinalltypesofshipsandthathighspeedswereessentialtodealwiththeattackof‘extraneousweapons’.

TheillfatedPrinceofWalesinfullfightingshapeAugust1941.Notethecamouflage–fivecolours–whichmadeheroneofthemostcolourfulbattleshipsinthefleet.

Itbecameextremelydifficulttoworkoutthepropulsivepowerthatcouldbeworked into the new ships. Moreover, there were many reports reaching theAdmiraltyregardingspeedsof themodernizedJapanesebattlefleet,anditwasknown that the French fleet and reconstructed Italian ships were all showinggreaterspeeds thanbefore. In the lightof this itwasalmost impossiblefor theCommitteeandtheDNCnottogivethenewshipsaspeedofatleast26knots,andwhenthefinallegendwasdrawnupthespeedhadrisento27knots–whichwasstillconsideredbymanytobetooslow.Asbuilt themachineryconsistedofParsonssingle-gearedreductionturbines

driving four screws. There were separate cruising turbines and they werearranged infourseparateenginerooms infourcompartments.EightAdmiralty3-drum boilers in four compartments with a working pressure of 380–410psi.Steamtemperaturewas750°.Machineryandboilerswerearrangedalternatelytoreduce the risk of complete disablement. It was reported that the cruisingturbineswereseldomusedduringthewarasthefleetspeedwassetataknotortwoabovetheircapabilityandsotheycouldnotbeemployed.

BridgeworkThebridgeworkofKingGeorgeVwasbasicallyadevelopmentofthatinNelson

andRodneybutwasamoresquare-shapedconstructionwithalesspointedfront.Over the years itwas found that althoughNelsonwasmuchbetter bridgewisethanpreviousclassesofbattleshipswiththeiropentripodfittings,therewasstilla considerable back draught throughout the bridge and compass platform,especiallyifthedoorswereleftopen.In an endeavour to alleviate this problem a slightly lower andmore square

flat-facedsuperstructurewaschosenaftermanytestsofamodifiedNelson-typestructurehadbeencarriedoutattheNationalPhysicalLaboratoryfrom1934to1936.Ascompleted,however,itwasfoundinpracticethatalthoughlessdraughtwas evident as compared toNelson, therewere still cross-flowsof draught upandoverthevariouslevelsatkneeheight.Further tests were carried out from 1940 to 1943 in the interests of future

battleshipconstruction,butitseemsthatthesituationwasneverrectified–evenforVanguard (1944), the last British battleship.Although it had probably thebest-designed and constructed forward superstructure fitted in a British ship,KGVwasneverdraught-free, justmore tolerable thanmost of theolder ships.The problem was that the more closed-in and draught-free a bridge structurewas,thelessvisionthestaffhad.Amoreopenstructureobviouslymeantstrongor severe draughts and the answer had to be a compromise to attain anacceptablelevel.Throughout thehistoryofBritishbattleship construction from1906 to1944

(Dreadnought toVanguard),many testswere undertaken (as seen in previouschapters), all leading to the final conclusion that a sharp-faced or round frontwasfarworseregardingdraughtandup-windsthanalessstreamlined,flat-facedtypeofstructure.Itwasprovedthatthewindhittingtheflatfacewoulddispersearoundthesidesratherthancarryonacrossasitdidwithrounded-offedgesorsmooth,streamlinedfittings.Theopenbridgeworkof theQueenElizabeth,RoyalSovereign,Renownand

Hood types were at best practicable; at worst they proved downrightuncomfortable, but it was claimed that from the point of view of fightingefficiency they were much easier to man and were more favoured by thepersonnel than the closed-in efforts that became normal in all new battleshipsandreconstructionsthroughoutthe1930s.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsTheshipswereverydistinctive,withalong,lowflushdeckhullwithveryslightsheer forward. They had very large superstructures that were separatedamidshipsbycatapult space.The forwardsuperstructureandbridge towerwas

especiallymassive. Large quadruple turret forward and aftwith twin turret insuperfiringpositionforward.Secondary turretsportandstarboardamidships intwo groups. Large, flat-sided strongly ribbed funnels spaced well apart.Searchlight platform on second funnel. Prominent aircraft crane port andstarboardovercatapultspaceamidships.RocketprojectorsorlightAAgunson‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets. Very light rig: light tripodmasts.Main tripod legs rakedforward.Shorttopmasttoeachmast,notopgallants.Radaraerialatheadofeachtopmast. Prominent radar aerial screen (lantern type) on foretop inAnson andHowe.

AerialviewsofKingGeorgeVarrivingbackinBritishwatersfromtheUSAfromwhereshehadjustconveyedLordHalifaxasBritishAmbassador.

Individualdifferences:

KingGeorgeV:1. Rocket projectors on ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets and right aft on quarterdeck(removed1941–2andreplacedonturretsbymultiple2pdrs).2.LanternradarscreenonbridgetowerbetweenHAdirectors(relocatedonforetop1941–2).3.Type279radaraerialateachmasthead.4.Externaldegaussingcable(relocatedinternallylater).5.Squareportsrightaft.

Others:1.Multiple2pdrson‘B’and‘Y’turrets(Anson,DukeofYorkandHowe).Rocketprojectors(PrinceofWales)replacedby2pdrs1941.2. Lantern screen on bridge tower (Prince of Wales), foretop (others).AddedinDukeofYork1941.3.Type279 radaraerials atmastheads (Howe).ReplacedbyType281 in1943.4.Internaldegaussingcables.5.Roundportsrightaft.

PrinceofWales:1.Single40mminbreastworkrightaft(onlyshipthus).

1941–21.Radar control (Type285) fitted for 5.25inguns inKingGeorgeV andPrinceofWales,asothers(byJune1941inPrinceofWales).Multiple2pdrmounting (8 barrels) addedon ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets inKingGeorgeV andPrinceofWales(June1941inPrinceofWales).Rocketprojectorsremovedfrom both ships. Nine 20mm AA (singles) added in Duke of York(May/June1942):fiveonforecastleabaftbreakwater,fouronquarterdeck.Four 20mm (singles) added on quarterdeck inKing George V, replacingrocketprojector.2. Surface warning radar (Type 271) added in Duke of York. Aerial inlanternscreenonforetop.3.ProtectiontomagazinesandmachineryfurtherimprovedinKingGeorgeV andPrinceofWales in1941 following lossofHood.Other three shipssimilarlymodifiedwhilebuilding.4.CamouflagepaintedupinKingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales.

1943Howe:

AirwarningradarType279replacedbyType281(March1943).1944–5:

1.Type284radaronforward14indirectorreplacedbyType274.Type274fittedtoafterdirectoraswellinallexceptKingGeorgeV(Type285).NewMk6directorswithType275radarfittedforsecondaryarmamentinAnsononly. Quadruple 40mm AA mounting added port and starboard on aftersuperstructure abeam mainmast. Eight 40mm (singles) added in Howe(1945): two port and starboard on lower bridge, two in place of SL onsecondfunnel, twoportandstarboardonforecastleandquarterdeck.Two40mm (singles) added port and starboard on superstructure abaft secondfunnel inKingGeorgeV.Fourmultiple2pdrAA(8barrels)added inall.Two port and starboard on superstructure abaft second funnel and onquarterdeck(notcertainthatHoweandKingGeorgeVhadafterpair).Fourmultiple2pdrAA(4barrels)added inAnson andDukeofYork: twoportandstarboardonlowerbridgeandonupperdeckabeamrearof‘B’turret.Someorall20mmAAremoved.KingGeorgeVcarriedtwoinplaceoftheSLabaft forefunnel.Additional lightAAdirectors (Type283radar) fittedportandstarboardonsuperstructureabeamandabaftsecondfunnelinall,inplaceofSLabaftforefunnelinAnsonandDukeofYorkandoncentrelineabaft mainmast inDuke of York and King George V (Anson andHowecompleted thus). Type 282 radar control to LAA directors where fittedreplacedbyType283.

PARTICULARSOFSHIPSIN1945OriginallengthandbeamDisplacement (tons):KingGeorgeV 44,460 tons:DukeofYork 44,790 tons;Anson45,360tons;Howe45,400tons.Alldeepload.Draught had risen about 1½ftwith an average addition of 1,500 tons per shipsince1941.Averagedraught:35ft10into38ft3indeepload.ArmamentOriginalmainandsecondary.LightAAgunswerevariablethroughouttheclass.8×16×40mmAA.Twoquadruplesinallplus8singlesinHoweand2inKingGeorgeV.80–96×2pdr10×8barrelsinallplusfourquadruplesinAnsonandDukeofYork.Nil to4×20mmAA.Allgunsexcept single40mmand20mmwereradarcontrolled.RDF:Type274formainarmament.275forsecondaryinAnson,285inothers.Type 283 for lightAA.Airwarning Type 279 inKingGeorge V and 281 in

others.SurfacewarningType277.Air/surface warning Type 277. IFF Type 242. HF/DF and MF/DF.VHFcommunicationinAnson.Searchlights:4×44inKingGeorgeV;others2×44in;2×24insignallinginall.Aircraft:Allremovedincludingmostoftheequipment.Armour: as original with some minor modifications to the magazines andmachineryareas.Machinery:asoriginal.Speed: slight reduction owing to additional weights added during the warAdmiralVianreportedthatKingGeorgeVcouldnotmanagemorethan26knotsby1945.Aircrafthangarsutilizedforofficesandcinemaspace.Boatsstowedoncatapultdeck.Rig:Originalexceptforheavierforetopmast.Appearance: Very cluttered with AA guns, radar aerials, etc., but no majorchanges.Individualdifferences(1945)Anson: Wery large secondary directors (only ship thus). Multiple 2pdrmountingsP&Sonlowerbridgeandupperdeckabeam‘B’turret.ProminentDFaerialsonmaintripodlegs.DukeofYork:SLplatformonsecond tunnelextendedwell forward.Multiple2pdrsasinAnson.Howe:ForwardsectionofSLplatformaroundsecondfunnelwasenlargedandenclosed.AAgunsinplaceofSLonthisplatform.KingGeorgeV:20mmgunsinplaceofSLabaftforefunnel.279RDFaerialatheadofmainmast(281inothers).

Ansonin1942.Ascompleted,AnsonandHowewereextremelydifficulttotellapart.

2. Surface warning radar Type 271 replaced by Type 277. Air surfacewarning radarType 293 added.Aerial at head of foretopmast in place offorwardType281aerial.Identification(IFF)radarType242fittedhighonforetopmast andatheadofmaintopmast.HF/DFaerial added right aft onquarterdeck in all. VHF radio communication equipment fitted inAnson,aerialsonmaintripodlegs.3. Searchlights removed from bridge and abaft forefunnel in Anson andDukeofYorkandfrombridgeandsecondfunnel inHoweandfromabaftforefunnelinKingGeorgeV.4. Aircraft and catapult removed (1944), cranes retained for boats.KingGeorgeVreportedtohavebeenthelastBritishbattleshiptofly-offitsownaircraft.5. Superstructure built up between second funnel andmainmast and boatstowageshiftedtocatapultdeck.6.Heavierforetopmastfittedtocarrytheadditionalradaraerials.7.Pacificcamouflagepaintedup(1945).

Appearancewas very clutteredwithmany lightAA guns and numerous radaraerials, etc., but no major changes. Any type of camouflage deleted by later1945.Individualdifferences:Anson 1. Very large secondary directors (only ship thus). 2. Multiple 2pdr

mounting port and starboard on lower bridge and upper deck abeam ‘B’turret.3.ProminentDFaerialsonmaintripodlegs.

Duke of York 1. SL platform on second funnel extended well forward. 2.Multiple2pdrsasAnson.

Howe1.ForwardofSLplatformaroundsecondfunnelenlargedandenclosed.2.AAgunsinplaceofSLonthisplatform.

KingGeorgeV1.20mmgunsinplaceofSLabaftforefunnel.2.Type279radaraerialatheadofmainmast(Type281inothers).

19451.DFaerialonquarterdeckremoved.

1946–81.All2pdrsand20mmAA(withexceptionoftwo20mminKingGeorgeV) removed; 2pdrmountings retainedon turrets and superstructure. 2pdrsremovedfromHoweandKingGeorgeVinearly1946.Quarterdeck2pdrsremovedfromAnsonandDukeofYorkin1946,others1947–8.Quadruple40mmAAretainedinallplusfoursinglesinAnson(onbridgeandsecondfunnelplatform)andtwoinKingGeorgeV(abaftsecondfunnel).2.VHFequipmentremovedfromAnson(1946–7).

Alllaid-upfrom1950–1.

BattleDamagePrinceofWalesBombDamage,31August1940While fitting-out atCammellLairds,Prince ofWaleswas subjected to a low-level bombing attackduringwhich shewas struckby a 250lbbomb.The raidtook place at about 2030 andPrince of Wales, whilst lying in the fitting-outbasin,washitat2040.Thebombactuallyexplodedbetweenthebasinwallandthehullof theship,causingdamage to thehullplating.Therewas flooding totheportlongitudinalprotectivebulkheadandtheshipheeledtoabout8degrees.Waterroseinthelowerdeckcompartments(184–228)toabout18inchesbelowthemiddledeck.Thelowerdeckwasfloodedthroughholeswhichhadrecentlybeenmadefortheinternaldegaussingcable.Theshiphadtobedry-dockedoncemoreandthedamagewasrepairedwithoutanyseriousdelaytohercompletion.

DAMAGETODUKEOFYORKBYSCHARNHORST26December1943

AerialviewofDukeofYorkin1943,showingadditionalAAgunsmountedontheforecastlenearthebreakwater.

DukeofYorkactionagainstScharnhorst,26December1943AlthoughDuke of York’s action against the German battlecruiser Scharnhorstwas an overwhelming success, she received some damage. The battle damage

reportisgivenbelow:

Duke of York sustained no serious structural damage due to enemyactionwith theexceptionofonehit froman11inshellwhichpassedthrough the port strut of themainmast and themainmast itself. Theshelldidnotexplodebutcarriedawayabouttwo-thirdsofthestructureofbothmastandstrutinthetrackoftheshell.1.ExtremelyhastyrepairswerecarriedoutatKolaInletbywelding

onsteel strapsand the ship’s staffperformedwell inmakingstagingforandcarryingouttheserepairsindistinctlydifficultconditions.2. The repairs, although of some help, could certainly not be

consideredeffectiveand,sincetheshipexperiencedfairlybadweatheron the passage back to Scapa, the fact that the mainmast stood isregardedasadefinitetributetothetripodsystemofconstruction.3.ThedamageinDukeofYorktoweatherdeckfittings,particularly

mushroom heads and covers to ventilation openings and lengths ofventilation trunkingbelow theupperdeck,wassevereandextensive.Thisdamagewasmainlyduetoblastfromthe14inbroadsidesbutwasaccentuated somewhat by the trunking systems filling with heavyquantities of water due to continuous hard driving in bad weatherbefore,duringandaftertheactionwithScharnhorst.4.Thepotentialweaknessesoftheventilationsystemwerealready

wellknown,asampleexperiencehadbeengained inall shipsof theKing George V class. The present action experience, with theventilationsystemextensivelydamagedbyblast,stronglyemphasizedtheurgentneedforfittingthestrongertypesteelormetalweatherdeckventilation valves instead of the existing aluminium type. Most ofthesestrongervalveswereorderedmonthsago forall fourshipsandeveryopportunity takentofit thenewtypeofvalve toallventilationopenings in theweather deck including thoseopeningsnot yet fittedwithavalve.5. In addition, the trunking below the weather deck developed

numerous gaping cracks throughwhichwater poured into the livingspaces.Asrenewalbystrongertrunkingoftheroundsectionishardlypracticable inwartime, it is necessary for the corners of all trunkingliabletoexposuretogunblasttobereinforcedbyextensivestrapping.6.Weatherdeck leakagealsodeveloped throughbolt fasteningsof

Oerlikon screens and ammunition lockers and rivet fastenings of

breakwaters, skylightsandgirdersunder theupperdeck.These leakswere numerous and mainly due to the whip of the forecastle deckunderblastfromforwardarcsoffire;thebreakwaterdefectsweredueto heavy seas. Pillars under the upper deck suffered from blast anddishedwashersbetweentheheelofthepillarandthemaindeckappeartoassistthetaprivetssecuringtheheelsofthesepillars.Itisclearthatthe weather deck fittings should be secured in general by weldinginsteadofthroughfastenings.Manyofthefittingscausingleakagehadbeensecuredbyboltingwhenlittletimeandlabourwereavailableforusingalternativemethods.7.Severeleakageoccurredpast‘A’barbetteonthemaindeckand

weathershieldsaroundthesebarbettes,particularly‘A’,areanecessityforbadweather.8. Some leakage occurred into the fire control rooms, 14in

magazines,actionmachinery roomsandpowercontrol room throughtheventilationsystemandthismighteasilyhaveprovedserioussincesomefanswentoutofactionfromthiscause.9.Altogether the largeamountofwaterwhichaccumulatedbelow

presented a serious and continuous problem which was dealt withlater.10.Aninterestingcaseofblastdamageoccurredin‘Y’boilerroom

wherethedivisionalplatesabovetheeyesoftheboilerroomfansweresplitopenatmiddledecklevel.

AnexcellentviewofHowein1944,showinghercamouflageandextensiveradaraerials.

11. As will be seen from the above the damage was confined tosubsidiaryequipmentwitheffectswhich,althoughhighlyinconvenientandinsomecasestemporarilyserious,didnotaffectthemainstructureof theship. It is satisfactory tonote that, inspiteof themoreor lesscontinuousharddrivingtowhichtheshipwassubjectedinthecourseoftheseoperations,nostructuralfailureoccurred.12.RadarType281,F.V.I,91and251M,W/TType75Dwereput

outofactionbywiringbeingsevered.13.Gunarmament–Nodamagewascausedbyenemyactiontothe

main armament. Five Oerlikon shields and the supports on theforecastlewereextensivelydamagedbyweatherandblastandhadtobe scrapped before the homeward passage. P2 andS2 theGRUwasblown from its supports, all by blast from ‘Y’ turret. Repairs weremadeafterarrivalinharbourthefollowingday.

History:KingGeorgeVThe ship would normally have been named after the reigningmonarch, KingGeorgeVI,butwasnamedKingGeorgeVatthespecialrequestoftheKingtocommemoratehisfather.1936Programme

Laid down by Vickers-Armstrongs, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 1 January 1937.Launched21February1939.

Commissioned at Newcastle 1 October 1940 for 2nd Battle Squadron, HomeFleet.JoinedFleetatScapa2December1940.

HOMEFLEETDecember1940toMay1943(2ndBStoApril1941,fleetflaglater).Conveyed Lord Halifax to the United States as British Ambassador, January

1941.LeftScapa15JanuaryandarrivedatAnnapolisonthe24th.Leftforhomeonthe25th,escortingaspecialconvoy,andrejoinedHomeFleet

atScapalateFebruary.UnitofcoveringforceforLofotenIslandsRaid4March1941.Temporarily attached to the Battlecruiser Squadron, Home Fleet, earlyMarch

1941.Took part March to May 1941 in covering Halifax convoys against possible

attackbyenemyheavyships,specificallyScharnhorst,Scheer,andHipper.RelievedNelsonasfleetflag,HomeFleet1April1941.TookpartinoperationsagainstBismarckandPrinzEugen22–27May1941and

with Rodney in destruction of Bismarck on 27th, experiencing difficultieswithmainarmamentduringthisaction.

Took part in search for Scheer and Prinz Eugen off Norwegian coast 20–23February1942.

FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysMarchtoMay1942.From 6 to 10March a force comprisingKingGeorge V (flag),Renown (flag

VA), Duke of York, Victorious, Berwick and twelve destroyers providedspecialcoverforanoutwardandhomewardconvoyduringasortiebyTirpitz.

Contact with Tirpitz established off the Lofoten Islands by aircraft fromVictoriousbutatorpedoattackbythesefailedandtheGermanshipwasabletoreturntobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

RammedandsankPunjabi,oneofherscreeningdestroyers,inlowvisibilityon1 May 1942 during Russian convoy operation. Sustained considerabledamagetobowsandalsodamagedbyexplosionofPunjabi’sdepthcharges.

Refitted by Cammell Laird, Birkenhead, May to July 1942, flag behindtransferredtoDukeofYorkon6May.

RejoinedfleetatScapaandrevertedtoflagCinC11July.UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyJanuary1943.TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)withHowe,May1943forSicilyinvasion.

KingGeorgeVon4February1943.

LeftScapaforGibraltar21May.FORCEH(Gibraltar)MaytoOctober1943(flagMaytoJune).Temporary flag of Force HMay to June, relievingNelson for working-up at

Scapa.FlagrevertedtoNelson23June.TookpartininvasionofSicilyinJulyandItalyinSeptember.WithHowe intended to serve as a reserve for Force H in these operations to

carryoutdiversionarybombardments,assaultconvoysandreplaceanyotherForceHbattleshipsthatmightbedisabled.

On night of 10/11 July both ships carried out bombardment of Marsala andTrapanionwestcoastofSicilytosimulateanotherintendedlandingandpindownenemytroops.

Stationed at Augusta 7 September with Howe as reserve force for Salernolandings but detached on the 8th, following the signing of the Italianarmistice,asunitofspecialsquadron(undercommandVice-AdmiralMalta)comprisingHowe(flag),KingGeorgeV,fourcruisersofthe12thCSandthe

minelayerAbdielsenttoTarantotooccupyandholdtheport.ForceenteredTaranto10September.

WithHoweescortedthelargerofthesurrenderedItalianwarshipsfromMaltatoAlexandria14–16September.

LeftAlexandria1OctobertorejoinHomeFleet.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)October1943toFebruary1944.Detached December 1943 to bring Prime Minister home from the Cairo

Conference. Withdrawn from Home Fleet February 1944 to refit prior totransfertoEasternFleet.

RefitbyCammellLaird,BirkenheadFebruarytoJuly1944.Worked-upatScapaandleftforCeylon28October1944.ProceededviaSuezCanalandbombardedLakidaBatteryonenemy-heldisland

of Milos in the Aegean 15 November 1944 while en route through theMediterranean.

LeftAlexandria1December,arrivedTrincomalee15DecemberandtransferredtothePacificFleetthenbeingformedthere(seeHowe).

ANSONProfile,March1945

AnaerialviewofKingGeorgeVreturningfromtheUSA,1941.

KingGeorgeVleavingSydneywiththeDukeandDuchessofGloucesterforTasmaniaandtheUK,January1946.

PACIFICFLEET2BSDecember1944toJanuary1946(FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruarytoOctober1945).LeftTrincomaleeforPacificFleetbaseatSydney,Australiaon19January1945

together with Indomitable (flag RA carriers), Illustrious, Victorious,Indefatigable,Argonaut,BlackPrince,Euryalusandtendestroyers,theforcecarryingoutairattacksonoilrefineriesatPalembang,Sumatra,on24and29Januarywhileenroute.

Arrived Fremantle 4 February where flag Vice-Admiral second in commandPacificFleethoistedinKingGeorgeV.ArrivedSydney10February.

At Sydney flag CinC Pacific Fleet transferred ashore from Howe, the Vice-AdmiralinKingGeorgeVassumingseagoingcommand.

FleetleftSydneyforoperationalarea28February1945.JoinedUS5thFleetandcommencedoperationsagainsttheJapanese26March

1945,beingdesignatedTaskForce57.Carried out bombardments of Japanese airfields on Formosa and Sakashima

GuntoIslandsMarchtoMay1945aspartoftheOkinawacampaign.On4MaywithHoweandcruisersbombardedairfieldsonMikayoShimainthe

SakishimaGuntogroupofislands.On 27 May the US 5th Fleet became the 3rd Fleet, following a change in

command,andtheBritishPacificFleetwasrenumberedTaskForce37.

On 17 and 29 July King George V took part with US fleet ships inbombardmentsofindustrialareasonJapanesecoastnorthofTokyo,beingtheonlyBritishbattleshipintheoperationalarea,HowehavingbeenwithdrawnearlierinJulyforrefit.

Flag of British Force, comprising King George V, Indefatigable, Gambia,Newfoundlandandtendestroyers,selectedon12August1945toremainwiththeUSFleetoffJapanfollowingnewsoftheimpendingJapanesesurrender,theremainderoftheBritishPacificFleetreturningtoAustralia.

PresentatthesigningoftheJapanesesurrenderaboardUSSMissouriinTokyoBay2September1945.

Relieved as flag 1st BS by Anson October 1945 at which time flag VA 1stCarrierSquadronreplacedflagVA1stBattleSquadronas2ndfleetflag.

RefitSydneyOctobertoDecember1945.ConveyedDukeandDuchessofGloucesterfromSydneytoHobart,Tasmania,December1945.ReturnedhomeMarch1946.ArrivedPortsmouthonthe1st.RelievedNelsonasflagHomeFleet9April1946.HOMEFLEETApril1946toSeptember1949(flagtoDecember1946.TrainingSquadronPortlandfromMay1948).RelievedasflagbyDukeofYorkDecember1946.RefitDevonportDecember1946toNovember1947.JoinedHomeFleetTrainingSquadron,Portland,May1948,replacingHowe.Reducedtoreserve,Portsmouth,September1949untilApril1957(Portsmouth

toJune1950.C.CategoryClydelater).LaidupinClydeinextendedreserve(CCategory)June1950.PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.SoldtoArnottYoung,Dalmuir,January1958.ArrivedDalmuirforscrapping20January1958.HulkarrivedTroonforfinaldemolitionDecember1958.

History:PrinceofWales1937Programme.LaiddownbyCammellLaird1January1937.Launched3May1939.CommissionedatBirkenhead18January1941for2ndBattleSquadron,Home

Fleet. Joined Fleet at Scapa 25 March 1941 in incomplete state withcontractors’men still on board. Two turrets not finally handed over to theAdmiraltyuntil27April1941.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoSeptember1941(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagfromJuly).Left Scapa 22 May 1941 with Hood and destroyers Icarus, Echo, Electra,Achates, Antelope and Anthony to cover area southwest of Iceland andsupport cruisersNorfolk and Suffolk in Denmark Strait following report ofsortiebyBismarckandPrinzEugen.

German ships sighted on 24 May and action opened at about 25,000 yards.Scored two hits on Bismarck, flooding one boiler room, reducing speed,causingoilleakandputtingshiponetotwodegreesdownbyhead.Receivedfivehitsby15inshellsand threeby8in.One15inhitoncompassplatformandkilledorwoundednearlyallbridgepersonnelalthoughCOunhurt.Brokeoffactionowingtoturretfailures,seriousdamagetobridgeandfourhundredtonsofwatershipped.

RefittedatRosythMaytoJuly.RejoinedFleet16JulyasflagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag.Detached4August

1941totakePrimeMinistertoandfromtheAtlanticCharterConferencewiththe President of the United States, held on board at Placentia Bay,Newfoundland,on10th.

RejoinedFleetatScapa18August.FlagtemporarilytransferredtodepotshipatScapaduringthisperiod.

TemporarilyattachedtoForceH(Gibraltar)September1941forMaltaconvoybutcontinuedtowearflagVA2ndBS.

LeftClydewithconvoy17September.ForceH(Gibraltar)SeptembertoOctober1941.Maltaconvoy24–30September.RejoinedHomeFleetearlyOctober.ReachedCapeTownon16NovemberandColomboonthe28thwhereRepulse

joinedandtheForcewasgiventhecode-nameForce‘Z’.ArrivedSingapore2December.EASTERNFLEET(Force‘Z’Singapore)NovembertoDecember1941.Force ‘Z’, comprisingPrinceofWales (flag) andRepulse,with thedestroyersElectra,Express,VampireandTenedos, leftSingaporeon8December1941toattacksupply lines fora Japanese invasion forcewhichhad landedon theeastcoastofMalayaduringthenightof7/8th.The original plan for the formation of the Eastern Fleetwas to concentrate

Nelson,Rodney,RepulseandfourRClassbattleshipswithappropriatenumberofcruisersanddestroyersandforthemtoproceedincompanytoSingapore,but

itwasnotthoughtthatsuchafleetcouldarriveatSingaporebeforethespringof1942forthefollowingreasons:1. The necessity for refitting ships before leavingUK, and equipping them

withthemostmodernRDFavailable.2.LightcraftcouldnotbemadeavailablewithoutreducingtheHomeFleet,MediterraneanFleetandtheshipsrequiredfortheBattleof theAtlantic.Nomodernaircraftcarrierwasavailableat that timebecause: 1. Illustrious andFormidablewerenot ready to leave theUKbeforeFebruary1942.2.Victorioushadtoremainathome,beingtheonlyoperationalcarrier with the Home Fleet. 3. There were urgent demands for two moderncarriersintheeasternMediterraneanandonemoderncarrierwithForceH.It had been hoped to sendArkRoyal to theEastern Fleetwhen her refit in

AmericawascompleteinaboutApril1942.Revenge arrived at Durban on 28 September,Repulse on 3 November and

Royal Sovereign on 17 December.Ramillies left the UK on 8 December andResolutionwasduetoleaveon7JanuaryTheplantosendNelsonandRodneyprovedabortivewhenNelsonwastorpedoedanditbecamenecessarytochangeRodneysguns.By21OctoberthesituationintheFarEasthaddeterioratedanditwasdecidedtosendPrinceofWalesinsteadofRodney.ShearrivedatColomboon 28 November and reached Singapore in company with Repulse on 2December.ToprovidethenecessaryscreenforPrinceofWalestwoHomeFleetdestroyers and twoMediterraneanFleet destroyers (bothofwhich couldbe illafforded)plus fourAustraliandestroyers (which ithadbeenplannedwouldbeaddedatalaterdate)weresentalong.InadditiontheUSNavypromisedeightdestroyers tobridgethegapuntilsufficientdestroyerscouldbemadeavailable(fourof thesearrivedatSingapore shortlyafterAdmiralPhillipshad lefton8December).ThereasonforsendingPrinceofWalesandRepulsetoSingaporepriortothe

concentrationoftheEasternFleetwasthatitwashopedthattheywouldactasadeterrenttotheJapanesethreat.If,however,Japandecidedtotaketheplungeitwashopedthattheseshipsmightpreventthemsendingtheirexpeditionaryforceinto the Gulf of Siam. It was realized that it was within the ability of theJapanese to bring down amuch superior force, but it was felt that the strongAmericanFleetatHawaiiwoulddeterthemfromdoingso.On 1December theAdmiralty suggested thatPrince ofWales andRepulse

disappear into the blue, and that the uncertainty of their whereabouts woulddisconcert theJapanese,but theappearanceofJapanesesubmarinesoffSaigonmeantthattoputtoseawithoutadequatebackupforceswouldbeunwise.In judging the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, one must

strikeabalancebetweenwhatisknownnowandwhatwethinkheknewwhenhetookhisdecisiontoput tosea.HehadnodefiniteknowledgethatJapaneseaircraftcarrierswereintheGulfofSiam.Warexperiencehadshownthathigh-speedwarshipswith full freedomofmanoeuvrewouldhave agoodchanceofavoiding torpedo aircraft attack, earlier torpedo attacks on the enemy havingborne this out. It must be remembered that it was only the third attack onBismarckthatdidvitaldamage.NeitherhenortheAdmiraltyhadanyreasontosuppose that the Japanese torpedo aircraft were in fact of a higher degree ofefficiencythantheBritish.Theweatherwassuchthatdetectionandattacksbyaircraft would be very difficult to execute (a northeastern monsoon wasblowing).Thefactthattheweatherclearednotonlyontheeveningofthe9thbutalso in themorningof10Decemberwas seen tobeunusual.AdmiralPhillipswasoperatingatsuchadistancefromenemyshore-basedaircraftinIndo-Chinathat the chance of a torpedo attack from them could with all fairness beconsidered minimal. He probably reckoned that the destruction of the largeJapaneseconvoy(knowntobeintheGulfofSiamon7December)mightwellturnthescaleofmilitaryoperationsintheMalayPeninsuladecisivelyinfavourof theAllies. Itwouldbe idle tosaythat theAdmiraltywasnotanxiousaboutthese ships. They considered that the submarine riskwas themost potent andthatAdmiralPhillipswouldhavetorelyonthehighspeedofhisshipstoavoiddanger. The air threat was appreciated, but with the incomplete informationavailabletotheAdmiraltyatthattimeitwasfeltthatAdmiralPhillipswasinthebestpositiontoassessthethreat.AdmiralPhillips realized the danger of sailing into this areawithout fighter

protection,hencehisrequestfor it.Thefacts thathecouldnothaveitandthattheweatherhadclearedwereprobablythefactorsthatinducedhimtoreturntoSingaporeonthenightofthe9th.

LossofPrinceofWales1.PrinceofWales,Repulse and fourdestroyers leftSingaporeafterdarkon8December.BeforesailingtheCommander-in-Chiefaskedfor:(a)reconnaissance100miles to thenorthof force at daylighton9December; (b) 100milesmidpoint Singgora, 10miles from coast leaving first light on the 19th; (c) fighterprotection off Singgora daylight 10 December. After sailing the CinC wasinformedthatitwashopedtoprovide(a)and(b)butnot(c).

KingGeorgeVreturnstoPortsmouthafterthewaronIMarch1946havingservedwiththePacificFleet.

2. At 1700 on 9 December the weather cleared and Prince of Wales wassightedbyJapaneseaircraft.PhillipsdecidedtoreturntoSingaporeatfullspeed.3.Atmidnighton9/10Decemberhewasinformedthatalandingwastaking

place at Kuantan and he decided to investigate. At about 1000 shadowingaircraft were again observed and at 1115 air attacks onPrince of Wales andRepulsebegan.The attack developed in several waves (seeRepulse), being carried out by

high-level bombers and torpedo-bombers. Prince of Wales was hit by sixtorpedoesandonebomb(nohitinfirstattackwithbombs).Inthesecondattack(torpedo) Prince of Wales was hit aft by two torpedoes which crippled herrudderandbothportpropellers.⋆Oneshaftwastornoff,rippingalargeholeinthehullandcausingtheportturbinestoracetodestruction.Theshiplisted13°outofcontrolandspeedreducedtolessthan15knots.Shewasalsoincapableofmanoeuvring.ThethirdattackwasdirectedentirelyatRepulse.The fourth attack saw Prince of Wales being hit by four more torpedoes,

forward,midshipsandaftonthestarboardside,andinthefinalattackonebombpenetratedthecatapultdeckandblewoutthesideoftheship.Followingthistheship settled rapidly and capsized twohours after the first hit.Electra,ExpressandVampirepickedup90officersand1,195ratings.Twentyofficers,includingtheAdmiralandCaptain,and307ratingswere lost.Onhearingof thedisaster

thePresshadafieldday,levellingseverecriticismatthegovernmentandthoseresponsiblewithintheAdmiraltystaffHeadlinesweredisplayedeverywhere.1.SundayExpresscriticizedthe traditionbywhichtheAdmiralandCaptain

onboardPrinceofWaleswentdownwiththeirship.2.DailyHerald(1)allegeddelayofCinCEasternFleetinaskingforfighter

support;(2)allegeddelayintheirarrivalwhenaskedforand(3)askedwhywasthere a change of course to the northward after being sighted by Japanesereconnaissanceaircraft.3.EveningStandardaskedwhethertherewereenoughaircraftinMalayafor

bothmilitaryandnavalneeds.4.DailyExpress andNewsChronicle:Gravityof initial lossofairfieldsnot

appreciated;follyofdividedresponsibilityforairfields’defence.

KingGeorgeVindrydockunderpreparationtobemothballed,1951.

5. Daily Herald: Unpreparedness in Far East especially in mechanizedequipment.6.DailyMirror:ThehigherCommandshouldbesackedfornotappreciating

theimportanceofairprotectionforshipsatsea.AlsoquotedasimilardemandmadebySydneyDailyTelegraph.

7. Daily Mail (Sydney Correspondent): Revelation in Australia by theMinister forExternalAffairs that theAustralianGovernmenthadsuggestedanagreement with Russia that either nation would make war on Japan if Japanattackedtheother,butthatthesuggestionhadbeenturneddown.8. News Chronicle: Naval losses were due to failure of inter-service

cooperation.Navymainlytoblame(noreasongiven,thearticlewentontoshowthatthechiefomissionwasproperdefenceoftheaerodromeatKotaBharu).Thesamewassaidbyseveralotherpapers.9.LetterfromAdmiralBacontoTheTimes:

Battleshipsshouldnotbeusedtorepelinvasion.ItismostdisquietingtofindtheFirstLordtobestilloftheopinionthatbattleshipscanbeusedforinshoreoperations.

As can be seen the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse caused dismay andmisgivings throughout thecountry,coming,as itdid,withina fewdaysof thePrimeMinister’sannouncementoftheopportunearrivalofthesetwofineshipsat Singapore. To thosewhowere aware of the superiority and strength of theJapanese fleetand itsnavalair service itwasobvious that this small squadronwouldnotbeabletooperatefarfromtheprotectionofSingaporeandthefightercover of the RAF. Sir Roger Keyes, writing in the News Chronicle on 18December1941,summeditup:

Untilallthefactsareknownitwouldbefruitlesstospeculate.Butitisquitecertain that theAdmiraltyutterlyunderrated thestrengthof theJapaneseNavalAir Service and that Sir TomPhillips, his Squadronand some hundreds of seamenwere the victims of the failure of theAdmiraltyand theGovernment toprovide the fightingNavywithanefficientNavalAirServiceunderthedirectcontroloftheAdmiral,andmustbearalltheresponsibility.

HMSPrinceofWalesCompassPlatformNarrative:Thisrecordwas takenbyPaymaster-LieutenantW.T.Blunt,RN,whohadhisaction recorder with him, andwrote out a fair copy as soon as possible afterbeingpickedupbyElectra.

1113.Openedfireoneighthigh-levelbomberswhichattackedRepulse.Repulsewasstraddledbybombsandreportedsomedamageandsmallfirefromtwonearmisses.

1141½Openedfireonninetorpedo-bomberscomingintoattackfromportside.1144.Torpedohitonportsideaftofthebridge(exactpositionnotknown).1144½.Oneaircraftshotdown,fallinginseacloseonthestarboardside.1145.Closemisspastthestarboardquarterbytorpedopassingfromforwardaft.1149½.Repulseattackedbyoneaircraftwhichdroppedonetorpedo.1150½.Reported:Oneaircraftcrashedinsea,Green140.Atthisstageaheavy

listtoporthaddeveloped.1157½.Openedfireonsixaircraftonthestarboardside,thoughttobeattackingRepulse.

1158.Ceasefire.1159. Aircraft seen to have turned away. 1205. Man overboard, port side.

1206½.Vampireorderedtopickhimup.

KingGeorgeVhavingrunagroundonherwaytobelaidupintheGairloch,August1955.Theanchorsarebeingremovedtolightentheloadatthebow.

1210.Hoisted‘Notundercontrol’.1213.out of touchwith ‘X’ engine room. (Noted that bridgewas out of touch

withDamageControlHeadquarterssinceshortlyafterhit.)1220.Sevenaircraftonstarboardbow.1221½.Openedfire.1223.Twohitsby torpedoeson starboard side, a fewsecondsapart.Onevery

nearthestem,theotherintheafterpartoftheship.1224½.Onehitstarboardsideundercompassplatform,bytorpedo.

1226½.Repulseshotdowntwoaircraft.1227.Repulseobservedtobelistingtoport.?hitbytwotorpedoes.1228.DestroyersorderedtocloseRepulse.1230. Nine high-level bombers on port bow. 1230. ‘X’ engine room only

working.1232.Repulsesinking.1233.Repulsesunk.1241.Opened fireoneighthigh-levelbombersonportbow.1244.Hitbyone

bomb(reportedasbeingstarboardsidecatapultdeck).1250.AskedSingaporefortugs.1310(approx).Ordertoinflatelifebelts.1315(approx).Listtoportbegantoincreaserapidly.1320(approx).Shipsank,capsizingtoportExtractfromreportofFlight-LieutenantT.A.VigorstoC.inC.,FarEasternFleet;datedIIDecember1941,fromRAAFStation,Sembawang:

I had the privilege to be the first aircraft to reach the crews of thePrinceofWales and theRepulse after theyhadbeen sunk. I say theprivilege for, during the next hour while I flew low over them, IwitnessedashowofthatindomitablespiritforwhichtheRoyalNavyis so famous. I have seen show of spirit in this war over Dunkirk,duringthe‘BattleofBritain’,andintheLondonnightraids,butneverbeforehaveIseenanythingcomparablewithwhatIsawyesterday.Ipassedover thousandswhohadbeen throughanordeal thegreatnessofwhichtheyalonecanunderstand,foritisimpossibletopassone’sfeelingsindisastertoothers.Even to an eye so inexperienced asmine, itwas obvious that the

threedestroyersweregoingtotakehourstopickupthosehundredsofmen clinging to bits of wreckage and swimming round in the filthyoilywater.Aboveallthisthethreatofanotherbombingandmachine-gunattackwasimminent.Everyoneofthosemenmusthaverealizedthat.Yet,asIflewround,everymanwavedandputhisthumbupasIflewoverhim.Afteranhourlackofpetrolforcedmetoleave,butduringthathour

Ihadseenmanymenindiredangerwaving,cheeringandjokingasiftheywereholidaymakersatBrightonwavingatalow-flyingaircraft.It

shookme,forherewassomethingabovehumannature.Itakeoffmyhattothem,forinthemIsawthespiritwhichwinswars.I apologise for taking up your valuable time, but I thought you

shouldknowoftheincredibleconductofyourmen.

History:DukeofYork1937Programme.LaiddownbyJ.Brown&Co.,Clydebank,5May1937asAnson.RenamedDuke of York 12 July 1938 in honour of King George V who had

servedintheRoyalNavyasDukeofYork.Launched26February1940.BegantrialsJune1941CompletionforservicedelayedbyimprovementstoprotectionfollowinglossofHood.

Completed4November1941HoistedflagVA2ndBSand2ndflagHomeFleetatScapa6November1941,

replacingPrinceofWales.HOMEFLEETNovember1941toOctober1942(FlagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagNovembertoDecember1941andApriltoMay1942.FleetflagMaytoJuly1942.Privateshipin2ndBSlater).Flag transferred toRenown9December1941andship leftScapa forClyde to

embarkPrimeMinisterandpartyfortheUnitedStates.LeftClydeforUSADecemberandarrivedatAnnapolisonthe22nd.PrimeMinister returnedhomebyairandDukeofYorkworked-upatBermuda

5–17January.Left Bermuda for home on 17 January and rejoined Home Fleet at Scapa on

30th.Unit of covering force forRussia convoysMarch toMay1942.From6 to 10

March,a forcecomprisingKingGeorgeV (flag),DukeofYork,Victorious,Berwick, and twelve destroyers provided special cover to an outward andhomewardconvoyduringsortiebyTirpitz.

Contact with Tirpitz established off the Lofoten Islands by aircraft fromVictorious,butatorpedoattackbythesefailedandtheGermanshipwasabletoreturntobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

FlagVA2ndBStransferredfromRenown3April1942.TemporaryfleetflagMaytoJuly1942,replacingKingGeorgeVforrefitafter

rammingPunjabion1May.

FlaghoistedatScapa6May.On 6 June 1942, King George VI visited Home Fleet at Scapa and was

accommodatedonboard.Flagofdistantcoveringforce(DukeofYork,USSWashington, Victorious, Nigeria, Cumberland and fourteen destroyers) forRussiaconvey(PQ17)from27Juneto8July1942.

Fleet flag reverted to King George V at Scapa 8 July on return from thisoperationandDukeofYorkbecameprivateship.

UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoySeptember1942.TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)asflag(VA)October1942forNorthAfrica

invasion.HoistedflagatScapa30OctoberandleftsamedayforGibraltar.FORCE‘H’(Gibraltar)OctobertoNovember1942(flag).TookpartinNorthAfricalandingsNovember1942.ForceHemployedincoveringboththeinitialBritishtaskforcesandfollow-up

convoysagainstattackbyItalianorVichyFrenchforces.RelievedbyNelson15NovemberandleftGibraltarforhomeonthe18th.RejoinedHomeFleetatScapaon26th.HOMEFLEETNovember1942toSeptember1944(2ndBStoMay1943.FleetflagfromMay1943).RefitRosythDecember1942toMarch1943.BecameflagCinCHomeFleetMay1943ontransferofKingGeorgeVtoForce

H.Flaghoisted8May.FlagofcoveringforceforattackonenemyshippingoffNorwaybyaircraftfrom

USSRanger4October1943.FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyNovembertoDecember1943.SankScharnhorstoffNorthCape26Decemberduringthisoperation,puttingup

aremarkableshootingperformancewiththirty-onestraddlesoutoffifty-twobroadsidesandplacingsixteenwithin200yardsofthetarget.

Sustainedminor damage to bothmasts thatwere hit by shellswhich failed toexplode.Thiswasthelastoccasiononwhichbattleshipswereinactionwithone another. Proceeded right through to Kola Inlet with convoy after theaction,beingthefirstHomeFleetcapitalshiptoenterRussianwatersduringthewar.

ReturnedtoScapa1January1944.FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyMarch1944.Flag of force supporting attacks on Tirpitz in Altenfiord by aircraft fromFormidable, Indefatigable andFurious on17 July, 22 and24August 1944

andfromFormidableandIndefatigableon29August1944.WithdrawnfromHomeFleetSeptember1944torefitforPacificservice.RefittedforPacificatLiverpoolSeptember1944toMarch1945.Worked-upatScapaand left forPacificFleetbaseatSydney,Australiaon25

April. Proceeded via Mediterranean with further work-up period at Malta,Suez Canal, Colombo, Fremantle and Albany. Joined fleet at Sydney July1945.

PACIFICFLEETJuly1945toJuly1946(fleetflagtoJune1946).Hoisted flagAdmiral SirBruce Fraser,CinCPacific Fleet, at Sydney 31 July

1945.ArrivedtoolatetotakepartinoffensiveoperationsagainsttheJapanese,which

were terminated on 15 August 1945, and employed mainly on occupationduties.

HadbeenintendedtobeunitofsecondBritishTaskForce(TF38.5)comprisingAnson, Duke of York, Colossus, Venerable and Vengeance (11th CarrierSquadron), to work with the main body of the British Pacific Fleet (TaskForce 37) in the US Third Fleet for the proposed invasion of Kyushu(Operation‘Olympic’).FollowingendofhostilitiesconveyedAdmiralFrasertoTokyoBay for signingof Japanese surrender aboardUSSMissouri on2September1945.

RelievedAnsonasbaseshipatHongKongDecember1945.LeftHongKongforhome6June1946.FlagCinCtransferredtoAdmiralBoydatSingapore11Juneenroute.ArrivedDevonport11July1946andflagAdmiralFraserstruckonthe12th.RefitDevonportJulytoNovember1946.JoinedHomeFleetNovember1946.HOMEFLEETNovember1946toApril1949(flagfromDecember1946).RelievedKingGeorgeVasfleetflagDecember1946.FlagHomeFleetforClydeReview22–23July1947.RefitPortsmouthDecember1947toFebruary1948.Flagof division ofHomeFleet comprisingDukeofYork,Cleopatra,Diadem,Sirius and six destroyers, visitingWest Indies andBermudaduring autumncruise,SeptembertoNovember1948.

RelievedasflagbyImplacableandreducedtoreserveatPortsmouthApril1949.RESERVEApril1949toApril1957(PortsmouthtoSeptember1951.FlagReserveFleetfromJuly1949.ClydeCCategoryfromNovember1951).RefitPortsmouthApriltoJuly1949.

BecameflagReserveFleet,PortsmouthJuly1949.RelievedbyDido2September1951.RefitCammellLaird,Birkenhead,SeptembertoNovember1951.ReducedtoCCategoryReserveandlaidupinClydeoncompletionofthis.LeftBirkenheadintowforGareloch6November1951.

DukeofYorknearGuaminAugust1945whilstservingwiththePacificFleet.

DukeofYorkafterthewaratPortsmouthin1947.

DukeofYorkinPortsmouthDockyard,1949–HMSVictoryinthebackground.

LookingovertotheDukeofYorkfromunderneaththelong,silentgunsofKingGeorgeVanchoredinGairlochshortlybeforescrappingcommenced,27September1957.

PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.SoldtoShipbreakingIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,18February1958.ArrivedFaslaneforscrapping.

History:Howe1937Programme.LaiddownbyFairfield,Govan,1June1937asBeatty.RenamedHoweFebruary1940ongroundsthatthenameBeattycommemorated

atoorecentAdmiral.Launched9April1940.CommissionedatGovan1June1942for2ndBattleSquadron,HomeFleet.JoinedFleetatScapa29August1942.HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)August1942toMay1943.UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysDecember1942andFebruary1943.Based on Hvalfiord, Iceland, March to April 1943 to cover North Atlantic

convoysagainstpossibleattackbyenemyheavyships.Transferred to Force H (Gibraltar) with King George V, May 1943, Sicily

invasion.LeftScapaforGibraltar21May.FORCEHGibraltarMaytoOctober1943(2ndflagfromSeptember).TookpartininvasionofSicilyinJuneandItalyinSeptember1943.With King George V, intended to serve as a reserve for Force H in these

operations, to carry out diversionary bombardments, cover assault convoysandreplaceanyotherForceHbattleshipsthatmightbedisabled.

On night of 10/11 July, both ships carried out bombardment of Marsala andTrapanionwestcoastofSicilytosimulateanotherintendedlandingandpindownenemytroops.

Stationed at Augusta 7 September, withKing George V, as reserve force forSalernolandingsbutdetachedonthe8thfollowingthesigningoftheItalianarmistice as flag special squadron (under command Vice-Admiral Malta),comprisingHowe, KingGeorge Fand four cruisers of the 12thCS and theminelayerAbdiel,senttoTarantotooccupyandholdtheport.ForceenteredTaranto10September.

FlagRA2ndincommandForceHtransferredtoAnsonfromWarspiteatMalta12September.

WithKingGeorgeVescortedthelargerofthesurrenderedItalianwarshipsfromMaltatoAlexandria14–16September.

LeftAlexandria1OctoberforhometorejoinHomeFleet.HOMEFLEET2ndBSOctober1943toJanuary1944.WithdrawnfromHomeFleetJanuary1944forrefitprior to transfer toEastern

Fleet.RefitDevonportJanuarytoApril1944.Worked-upatScapaandleftforCeylon1July1944viaMediterraneanandSuez

Canal.JoinedEasternFleetatTrincomalee3August1944.EASTERNFLEET1stBSAugusttoDecember1944.

On 22 November 1944, formation of a Pacific Fleet to be based on Sydney,Australia commencedwith the appointment ofAdmiralSirBruceFraser asCinCandtheEasternFleetredesignatedEastIndiesFleet.

Howe transferred to Pacific Fleet as flag 2 December, Admiral Fraser’s flagbeinghoistedatTrincomaleeonthatdate.

ByendofDecember1944followingshipsallocatedtothePacificFleetalthoughsome had not actually joined: Howe (flag), King George V, Formidable,IllustriousIndefatigable,Indomitable,Victorious,Swiftsure,Ceylon,Gambia(NZ), Newfoundland, Achilles (NZ), Argonaut, Black Prince and 22destroyers.

Pacific Fleet Battle Squadron became the 1st BS and the East Indies FleetSquadronthe3rdBS.

PACIFICFLEETDecember1944toSeptember1945(fleetflagtoFebruary1945.IBSlater).ArrivedSydneylateDecember1944beingthefirstofthePacificFleetshipsto

reachthere.ConveyedAdmiralFrasertoNewZealandJanuary1945forconferencewiththe

NewZealandgovernment.FleetfinallyassembledatSydney10–11February1945atwhichtimeAdmiral

Frasertransferredhisflagashore,Vice-AdmiralRawlingsassumingseagoingcommandwithhisflaginKingGeorgeVwhileHowebecameprivateshipin1stBS.

FleetleftSydneyforoperationalarea28February1945.JoinedUnitedStates5thFleetandcommencedoperations26March1945,being

designatedTaskForce57.Carried out bombardments of Japanese airfields on Formosa and Sakashima

Gunto Islands March to May 1945 in support of the American operationsagainstOkinawa.

On4MayHowe,KingGeorgeV andcruisersbombardedairfieldsonMiyakoShima in theSakashimaGuntogroup.HowenarrowlymissedbyKamikazeaircraftoffSakashimaGuntoIslands9May.AircraftheavilyhitbyAAfireanddeflectedincourse,passingcloseoverquarterdeckandcrashingintothesea.

On27May1945theUS5thFleetbecamethe3rdFleetaftercommandchangeandtheBritishPacificFleetwasrenumberedTaskForce37.

HowewithdrawninJuneforrefit.RefitDurbanJunetoSeptember1945.

Transferred toEastIndiesFleetoncompletionandrelievedNelsonasflag lateSeptember.

EASTINDIESFLEETTrincomaleeSeptember1945toJanuary1946(flag).ReturnedhomeJanuary1946arrivingatPortsmouthonthe9th.TransferredtoHomeFleetFebruary1946relievingQueenElizabeth.HOMEFLEET2ndBSFebruary1946toApril1949(Flag2ndBStoAugust1946.TrainingSquadronlater).Attached to new Home Fleet Training Squadron, Portland, August 1946 (seeAnson).

ClydeReviewofHomeFleet22–23July1947.RefitDevonportMay1948toApril1949.Transferred to Reserve, Devonport (as Senior Officer) 21 April 1949 on

completionofrefit.

Howe‘makingashow’assheleavesFairfieldsconstructionyardoncompletion,November1942.

RESERVEDevonportApril1949toMay1957(50toJuly1950.CCategoryfromFebruary1950).ReducedtoCCategoryReserveFebruary1950.PlacedonDisposalListDevonportApril1957.SoldtoT.W.Ward&Co.,Inverkeithing2June1958.ArrivedInverkeithingforscrapping4June1958.

History:Anson

1937Programme.Laid down by SwanHunterWighamRichardson, Newcastle-on-Tyne 20 July

1937asJellicoe.RenamedAnsonFebruary1940,prior to launch,ongroundsthatnameJellicoe

commemoratedatoorecentAdmiral.Launched24February1940.CommissionedatNewcastle22June1942asflagVA2ndBattleSquadronand

2ndfleetflag,HomeFleet.HOMEFLEET(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagJune1942toJune1944).UnitofcoveringforceforfollowingoperationsSeptember1942toApril1944:RussiaconvoysSeptember1942andJanuary1943.Attack on enemy shipping at Bodø, Norway by aircraft from USS Ranger 4

October1943.RussiaconvoyNovember1943andMarch1944.AttackonTirpitz inAltenfiordbyaircraftfromFuriousandVictorious3April

1944.Attack on enemy shipping at Bodø and in the leads to the south of Bodø by

aircraftfromFuriousandVictorious26April1944.WithdrawnJune1944torefitforPacificservice.RefitDevonportJune1944toMarch1945.CommissionedatDevonport7March1945forPacificFleet.Worked-upatScapaMarchtoAprilandleftforfleetbaseatSydney,Australia,

withDukeofYork,25April.Proceeded via Mediterranean, with further work-up periods at Malta, Suez

Canal,Colombo,FremantleandAlbany.JoinedfleetatSydneyJuly1945.PACIFICFLEETJuly1945toJuly1946(2ndflagRA1stBSAugusttoOctober1945.FlagRAlaterVAOctober1945toJanuary1946).Joined too late to takepart inoffensiveoperationsagainst theJapanese,which

wereterminatedon15August,andemployedmainlyonoccupationduties.WithDukeofYork,Colossus,VenerableandVengeance(11thCarrierSquadron)

intendedtoformasecondBritishTaskForce(TF38.5)toworkwiththemainbodyofBritishPacificFleet (TaskForce37) in theUSThirdFleet for theproposedinvasionofKyushu(Operation‘Olympic’).

Following theendofhostilitieson15August selectedas flag (RA)SingaporeOccupationForce,comprisingAnson(flag),Vengeanceandfourdestroyers.

Singapore Force later cancelled because of logistic problems and this group

added to Hong Kong Force, comprising Indomitable (flag RA Harcourt),Venerable,Swiftsure,Euryalus,RCNPrinceRobertandtendestroyers.

Entire force (less Vengeance, detached to Rabaul en route) arrived off HongKongon29August andon the 30thRear-AdmiralHarcourt transferredhisflag to Swiftsure and entered the port accompanied by Euryalus, PrinceRobertandthedestroyers,theheavyshipsremainingoutsidebecauseofriskofmines.

Rear-Admiral Harcourt appointed Governor-General immediately afterwardsandRear-AdmiralDanielinAnsonassumedcommandoftheforce.

Anson subsequently served as base ship at HongKong until December 1945,landing400ratingsand230marinesforgarrisonandpoliceduties,etc.

JapanesesurrenderofHongKongsignedonboard,16September1945.RelievedKingGeorgeVasflag1stBSinOctober1945andalsobecameFlag

OfficerWestern Pacific Area. At the same time, 2nd fleet flag transferredfrom1stBSto1stCarrierSquadron.

DetachedtoTokyoasguardshipinNovemberandreturnedtoHongKongearlyDecember.

Relieved as base ship byDuke of York inDecember and left HongKong forSydneyon26th.

FlagVAtransferredtoBelfast(2ndCS)January1946.RefitSydneyJanuarytoFebruary1946.ConveyedDukeandDuchessofGloucester fromHobart,Tasmania toSydney

February1946.Returned to forwardarea inMarch,visitingYokohama,KobeandKure.Later

againstationedatHongKong.Flag RA 5th CS temporarily flown from May to June 1946 while Bermuda

refitting.LeftHongKongforhome21June1946fortransfertoHomeFleet.FlagVAshifted toBelfast inJanuary1946, rehoistedatSingaporeforpassage

home.ArrivedPortsmouth29July1946.RefitPortsmouthJulytoOctober1946.Selected inAugust forHome Fleet Training Squadron, formed in thatmonth,

comprisingNelson(flag),AnsonandHoweandbasedonPortland.Joinedsquadron19October1946,relievingNelsonasflag.HOMEFLEET(FlagRATrainingSquadron,Portland)October1946toNovember1949.

PresentatClydeReviewofHomeFleet22–23July1947.RefitDevonport1947.TookpartinNATOnavalexercisesummer1949.Withdrawn from Training Squadron November 1949 for refit prior to being

placedinreserve.RefitDevonportNovember1949toAugust1950.Reduced to extended reserve (CCategory)August 1950 and laid up inClyde

August1950toApril1957.PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.SoldtoShipbreakingIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,17December1957.ArrivedFaslaneforscrapping.

Ansonshortlyaftercompletionin1942.From1942to1944shewastheflagshipofViceAdmiralSirBruceRFrasenandduringthistimeshewasmainlyoccupiedinshadowingforcesinsupportofRussianconvoys.AsthiswasapressphotographsomeoftheRDFaerialsandcamouflageshapeswereremovedpriortopublication.

⋆ Following fresh evidence from a complete underwater survey of the wrecks of Prince of Wales andRepulse duringMay 2007 it shows that the first torpedo hit onPrince ofWales in the area of the portpropellershaftcausedcatastrophicdamagetotheship’swatertightintegrity(tearingthehullopenaroundtheshaft).Inthefinalattackshewashitbythreetorpedoesonthestarboardside(actualholesinthehull)whichsealedherfate.Itseemsthatotherclaimedhitsarenotshowing…Thehullof theRepulse (some9milesaway) showsonly two torpedoholes

(onetoportandonetostarboard)buttheothertwohitstoportasclaimedwerenot found. However, the area of hull on the port side has sunk deep into theseabed and cannot be seen. Some distortion of the hull is evident amidshipswhere theclaimed torpedohitswere supposed tobe.CaptainTennantclaimed

threehitsontheportside(seehisreport)afterwhichhestartedhisabandonshipprocedureandgiventherapidityofRepulsesinkingitismorethanprobablethatthesetorpedohitsarethereburiedinthesilt.ForafullreportonthissurveyseePacificwrecks.comExpeditionJob74

Conclusion

Whenhostilitiesbeganin1939noonecouldhaveforeseenthemanychangesthattheRoyalNavywouldbeforcedtomakeasthewarprogressed.Thepanic-strickenrushtobuildbig-gunnedshipsduringthe1930s,althoughnotexactlyinvain,hadinallessentialsbeenamistake.EventhoughtheAdmiraltyknewthattheGermanNavyhadonlysevenlargesurfaceshipsthatconstitutedathreat,itwasnotobvious to them that the fightingwasgoing tobeverydifferent fromthat of the Great War. In fact the Germans concentrated their efforts oncommerce raiding by surface and underwater craft. Nevertheless, at thebeginningbattleshipswerestillconsideredtobeprimefactors,andevenmoresoby1941whenJapanenteredthewar.Itwouldnotbefair tosaythatmoneyspentonbattleshipswouldhavebeen

better directed towards other types of vessels because nearly all the leadingmaritimepowersstillbelievedthattherewouldstillbetheclassicsurfaceactionduringanyhostilities.Solongasanynationhadthetypewithintheirfleet, theotherswereobligedtoconform.During the early years of the Second World War, except at Taranto, the

aircraftcarrierdidnotfulfilitspromiseastheweaponoftomorrow,assooftenforecast during the 1930s.Most of the existing carriers had no experience ofconducting successful airborne to surface attacks – especially at sea. WhenPrinceofWalesandRepulseweresunk in1941 itwas land-basedaircraft thatdidthejob;theaircraftprovedtheirworth,notthecarrier.It is true that the attack onPearlHarbor showed the value of the carrier in

conveyingaircraftforanattackonafleetinharbour–anemulationofTarantoin1940,anditwasthenthatallthepowersbecamereallyawareofthecarrier’spotential.Butthisdidnotmakethebattleshipobsolete;itstillhadanimportantrole to playwithin the infrastructure of any surface action. Itwas still a verycapableweaponofwar,butitwasclearthatitwasvulnerabletoairattackandneededsupportfromAAshipsanditsownprotectivecarriers,inthesamewayasthoseshipsneededbiggunprotection.Theroleofthebattleshipfrom1942turnedtowardsprotectionforotherships

andtheirbiggunsalsoplayedasuperbpartinbombardingbeachesinsupportoflandingtroops.Therewerelimitationsofcourse,ascanbeseeninthispassageof a report made by the Commanding Officer aboardWarspite in November1944whilebombardinglandpositions:

BackfromRussiaatlastasRoyalSovereign(Archangelsk)passesundertheForthBridgeonherwaytoRosythfortheofficialhandovertotheRoyalNavyon4February1949.StillingoodfightingorderatthisdatewhilsthersistershipsRomillies,RevengeandResolutionhadlongbeenunderthecutter’storch,shewouldhavebeenidealshipforpreservationasanhistoricBritishbattleship.

AuniqueviewofRodneyassheentersherfinalberthwhereshewouldfacethescrapper’scuttingtorch,26March1948.

ThelastappearanceofQueenElizabeth,offtheIsleofWight(Motherbank)–‘notwantedanymore’–autumn1946.

ThemajesticNelsonsitsbehindRevengenowinasorrystate.Note‘B’turret’s16ingunshavebeencutoff.Inverkeithing,15March1948.

Thereareboundtobelimitationsastowhatthebombardmentcanandcannoteffectand it is thoughtproper that these shouldbe setoutbythe Commanding Officer verbally to the Officer planning and/orconductingtheoperation,orthatparticularpartofit.TheCaptainofaheavy draft bombarding ship has his hands very full when he mustmaintainhis ship ina strong tideway,withina spaceof,perhaps,nomorethantwicethelengthofhisship.Ifheiscontinuouslyassailedbydoubtsastodetailsoftheundertaking,itcanbutreducetheefficiencyof the hammering, which the enormous hitting power of a 15inbattleship should make possible AND IS KNOWN TO BEPARTICULARLYDISLIKEDBYTHEGERMANS.

Inmanypreviouspublications thecomparativeworthofBritishbattleshipshasbeenmuchdebated.Theanswerisverysimple;theywereasgoodasanybuiltfor any other nation within the limitations of displacement and size, and anystatementsfrom1919tothepresentsuggestingthatBritishbattleshipswerenotonaparwiththoseofforeignpowersarenonsense.Letuslookatsomeoftheargumentsthathavebeenrepeatedforsolong:

1.TheRoyalSovereignclassweretooslowandwereweaklyprotectedoverthedecks.2.KingGeorgeV class (1936)wereundergunnedandhadpoor radiusofaction.3.Britishbattlecruiserswerepoorlyprotected.4.Britishunderwaterdefencewaspoor.

Inansweritwouldhavetobesaidthat,yes,ofcourse,theRoyalSovereignclasswereslowby1939standards,andshortofbeinggivennewenginesandboilerequipmenthowcouldtheyfailtobeanythingelse–afteralltheywerenearly25yearsold.Thedeckarmour,althoughpoorby1939standards,wasallthatcouldbeapplied(seeclassnotes)becauseofstabilityproblemswithintheirdesign,butthey were still a match for any contemporary foreign battleship, surviving asthey did until the Second World War. When the Rs were sent to the IndianOceanin1942,withthelikelihoodofhavingtofacetheJapaneseKongo-classbattlecruisers, itwas seenasadisastrousmove,but theBritish shipswould infact havegiven a remarkablygood account of themselves against ships armedwith14ingunsandprotectedbyarelativelythin9inbelt.HadtheybeencaughtbytheJapaneseaircraftcarriersitwouldhavebeenadifferentstory,butthenitwouldhavebeenthesameforanymodernbattleship.

Aclose-upofRevengeon4September1948,nowaworn-outrelicofthepast.Notetheadditionstothebridgeworkandtheextradecklevelattherearofthefunnel.

ThesecondgenerationofBritishbattleships, theKingGeorgeV class,wereundergunned, etc! Maybe, but the Admiralty knew that before continuingconstruction.Butundergunnedagainstwhat?Theywouldnothave to faceUS16in-gunned ships, and it was highly unlikely that they would ever face theJapaneseNagatoandMutsu(16in).ThatlefttheGermanandItalianshipswiththeir15inguns.Against thesethe14ingunhadalowerratingonpaper,but inpracticeatseathe14ingunproveditselfanexcellentweaponalthoughlackingtheextrapunchoftheheavier15in.The14ingunmadebigholesintheGermanbattlecruiserScharnhorston26

December 1943, and she had 14in KC belts. The gun wrecked the so-calledsuperior battleship Bismarck in 1941, against 12in KC armoured strakes. Itseems that the14ingunacquired itspoor reputationearly in its lifebefore theminorfaults in itsmountinghadbeenrectified,and the troublesomequadrupleturret inPrinceofWalesandKingGeorgeVduring theBismarckepisode lentstrengthtoitscritics.Butapartfromthat,whenandwheredidthegunandturreteverfailtoperformadmirably?Poorradius.Well,thiswastrue,butbecauseoftherestrictiontoabout35,000

tons,theweightwasdirectedelsewhereinsteadofbeingusedforlargetanksformuch-needed fuel supplies.ManyBritishbattleships faredbadly in this regardwhenservinginthePacific,whereasinhomewatersreplenishmentwasclosetohand.Britishbattlecruiserswerepoorlyprotected.Again,onemustagree,but they

werebuilt forspeed.All thebattlecruisers thatsurvivedtoservein theSecondWorldWarwereoldshipsby1939.They had been designed to outrun rather than outfight the enemy. Even in

modernized ships this poor protection was never rectified. Hood’s armoureddeckwasweakand theAdmiraltyknew it before shewas completed in1920.Renown remained theweakestunit in thebattle fleet,but shewascertainlynoweaker than the JapaneseKongo-class ships and there never seem to be anyderogatorycommentsmadeaboutthem.PoorunderwaterprotectioninBritishships?Notexcessively,whencompared

toshipsofthesameage.TheRoyalSovereignandQueenElizabethclasseshadold systems of underwater protection which could not in all cases cope withsevere damage. Royal Oak and Barham were most effectively sunk bysubmarineattack;hitbyatleastthreetorpedoesinquicksuccession,theycouldnotfailtosink.Butwouldnotsimilarforeignbattleshipshavesunkinthesamecircumstances?Ofcoursetheywould,anditwouldbefoolishtodenyit.PrinceofWaleswaseffectivelysunkbytorpedoesandbombs,butinviewof

the damage she received it is not surprising.Her own turbines opened up herbottomaftwhenshewashitinthatarea.Noothership,neworold,couldhavesustainedthatpunishmentandlivedtotellthetale(withtheexceptionsperhapsofthegiantYamatoandMusashi).TheunderwatersystemoftheKingGeorgeVclasswasasgoodasanythingfittedtoanyforeignbattleshipofthe1930s,infactitoutclassedsomerivalsinthatitwasamorecompletesystem.These reflections onBritish designsmay seemvery chauvinistic, of course,

but that is exactly what they are. They do not seek to denigrate the foreignopposition,norskateoverthefactthatthereweremanyfaults,butwhenalltherelative factors have been carefully considered, the conclusion is that Britishbattleshipsstoodwell the testof timeanddonotdeserve theadversecriticismthathasbeenlevelledatthem.

‘Let’sgodownandseethe“oldlady”!’wasthecrywhenWarspiteranagroundin1947.Shecheatedthescrapyardbutsadlydidnotescapethescrapper’storchandwascutupwhereshelay.

Bibliography

The hundreds of documents consulted during thewriting of this book are toonumeroustolistbutbelowaresomeofthemoreimportantones.NationalMaritimeMuseum:ShipsCovers:KingGeorgeV1911IronDukeClass1912QueenElizabethClassRoyalSovereignClass1913RenownClass1915GloriousandCourageous1916Furious1916Hood1916NelsonClass1925KingGeorgeVClass1936ForeignBattleships(general)Manuscripts:SirTennysond’Eyncourt.DNC.SirWilliamMay.AdmiralR.E.E.Drax.AdmiralWilliamTennant.AdmiralAlfredChatfield.AdmiralSirCyprianBridge.AdmiralSirB.E.Domville.PublicRecordsOffice:ADMpapers.NavalPolicy.1936.Aircraftversusbattleships.1937.Firingtests.(Job74etc)

Usesforcapitalships.1943.Bombardmentetc.1943.Degaussingexperiments.Shellandbombdamage.1939/45.WashingtonNavalTreaty.1921.LondonNavalTreaty.1930.Capitalshippolicy.1921.Bridgeconstructionincapitalships.Battleshipsdesign.1919,1921,1928,1934.Battlecruiserdesign.1921.Aircraftinbattleships.1937.Armourincapitalships.Enduranceincapitalships.Replacement.1933/4.DesignKingGeorgeV.1936.ReconstructionofRenown.1923.ReconstructionofRoyalOak.1924.ReconstructionofGloriousandCourageous.1923.Camouflageinwarships.Radarinstallations.LossofPrinceofWales.LossofRoyalOak.LossofBarham.LossofHood.LossofGlorious.LossofCourageous.Proceedings: Ramillies, Furious, Revenge, Renown, Queen Elizabeth andWarspite.

ShipsBooks:KingGeorgeV;Hood;AnsonandHowe.Ships Logs: Queen Elizabeth; Warspite; Barham; Valiant; Royal Sovereign,Revenge, Royal Oak; Resolution; Repulse; Renown; Glorious; Nelson;Rodney,Hood;KingGeorgeV.

Vulnerabilityofbattleships.1933.Modelsofcapitalships.1940.Paintingofships.1939.Usesforoldbattleships1944.Gasandchemicalattacks.1923.

Publishedbooksconsulted:Raven,AlanandJohnRoberts.BritishBattleshipsofWorldWarTwo.Armsand

ArmourPressandNavalInstitutePress,1976Parkes,DrOscar.BritishBattleships.SeeleyService,London,1957.Roberts, John. Hood. Anatomy of the Ship Series. Conway Maritime Press,

London1982.TransactionsoftheInstituteofNavalArchitects.Allvolumesfrom1911to1948Brassey’sNavalAnnual.1916throughto1950.Jane’sFightingShipsforrecognitionandphotographidentification(notfordata

however).1919to1945.PeriodicalsandNewspapers:TheSphere.TheIllustratedLondonNews.NavyLeague.Mariner’sMirror.TheTimes.TheDailyMail.TheEveningStandard.TheDailyGraphic.TheDailyTelegraph.

Large drawings are based on Admiralty ‘As Fitted’ plans now held in theNational Maritime Museum; small drawings on official drawings andphotographicevidence;isometricdrawingsonphotographicevidence.Photographsarefromauthor’scollection.

Index

A

Aircraft31–4,250,252,270–4,284Aircraftcarriers,developmentof250–62Ajax43,44,69Anson

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars389,402,405design386–9history423machinery402–3

Argus252–4aircraftequipment252

ArkRoyal(1914)250,254aircraftequipment252

ArkRoyal(1937)258–62Arkangelsk,seeRoyalSovereign

B

Barhamappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage108–12datatablesandparticulars75,76,89design71–3history134–5lossof117–20machinery74reconstruction85

Ben-My-Chree251aircraftequipment252

Benbow20,44,48,61–2,68,69Bridgework

inHood310–12inKingGeorgeVclass403inNelsonandRodney357inQueenElizabethclass78–80inRepulseandRenown211–14inRoyalSovereignclass151–4

BulginginRoyalSovereignclass148–51,173–80

C

Camouflage34–40Campania251

aircraftequipment252Centurion30,43,44,48–55Chemicalwarfare27–9Courageous

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits284–6,287armament279–82armour282datatablesandparticulars282,283,285,286designandconversion278–82flightscarried284history289–90lossof297–8machinery282

D

Dreadnought,evolutionofthe10–17DukeofYork

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402battledamage408–9datatablesandparticulars388,389,402,405design386–9history418–21machinery402–3

E

Eagle252,257,278,280,285EmperorofIndia20,22,30,44,48,58,61Empress251Engadine251,254

aircraftequipment252

F

Furiousaircraftcarried273–4appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits274–6armament267–9armour267datatablesandparticulars265,266,270,273designandconversion263–7flying-offtrialsin266,270–3history276–7machinery269–70

G

Gloriousaircraftstowagein283–4appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits284–7armour282datatablesandparticulars282,283,285,286designandconversion278–82flightscarried282history287–9lossof298–9machinery282

H

HandlingandmanoeuvrabilityinRoyalSovereignclass154–6Hermes(1924)257–8Hood

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits313–18armament302–4armour304–7datatablesandparticulars300,301,313,318,319design300–2history318–25lossof325–32machinery307rig313

Howeappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars389,402,405design386–9history421–3machinery402–3

I

Illustriousclass262IronDuke

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits61–9battledamage70datatablesandparticulars57,61,68design57history69–70rig58–61

K

KingGeorgeV(1912)16KingGeorgeV(1940)

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars388,389,402,405design386–9history409–12machinery402–3

L

LossesBarham117–20Courageous297–8Glorious298–9Hood325–32PrinceofWales413–18Repulse238–40RoyalOak180–3

M

Malayaappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage112–13datatablesandparticulars75,76,89,96,104design71–3history138–42machinery74reconstruction85–8,89–96

Manxman251aircraftequipment252

Marlborough20,30,44,48,61–8

N

Nairana251Nelson

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits358–66armament342–5armour345–8battledamage366–74,374–7bombingtrialsin377–81datatablesandparticulars339,348,349,357,366,377design335–9history381–2machinery348–9rig339

P

Pegasus,seeArkRoyal(1914)PrinceofWales

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402battledamage406datatablesandparticulars389,402design386–9history412–18inBismarckaction325–30lossof413–18machinery402–3

Q

QueenElizabethappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage120–2datatablesandparticulars75,76,85,89,104design71–3history127–32machinery74reconstruction85–8,107

R

Radar40–3Ramillies

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour147–51battledamage188–91datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history200–6machinery151

ReconstructionsBarham85QueenElizabeth85–8,107Renown228–33Valiant85–8,100–7Warspite85–8,96–100

Renownappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits214–34armament208–9armour209–10datatablesandparticulars207,210,212,214,233,234design207–8history240–8machinery210–11

Repulseappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits214–34armament208–9armour209–10datatablesandparticulars207,210,212,214,228design207–8history234–8lossof238–40machinery210–11

Resolutionappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51battledamage183–8datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history196–200machinery151

Revengeappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history194–6machinery151

Riveria251aircraftequipment252

Rodneyappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits358–66armament342–5armour345–8battledamage374datatablesandparticulars339,348,350,366design335–9history382–3machinery348–9rig339

RoyalOakappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170design143–7history200lossof180–3

machinery151RoyalSovereign

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51asArkangelsk193–4datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history191–3machinery151

T

Thunderer44,55Tiger20,44,47,55

V

Valiantappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage113–17,121–2datatablesandparticulars75,76,89,104design71–3history135–8machinery74reconstruction85–8,100–7

Vindictive252,257

W

Warspiteappearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage113–17datatablesandparticulars75,76,85,89,97,104design71–3history132–4machinery74reconstruction85–8,96–100