Bristow, William F - Self-Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom

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Self-Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal FreedomWilliam F. Bristow aa University of California, Irvine, USA

Online Publication Date: 01 December 2006To cite this Article: Bristow, William F. (2006) 'Self-Consciousness, Normativity andAbysmal Freedom', Inquiry, 49:6, 498 - 523To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/00201740601016197URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740601016197

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Self-Consciousness, Normativity andAbysmal Freedom

WILLIAM F. BRISTOW

University of California, Irvine, USA

(Received 5 June 2006)

ABSTRACT This article critically examines Christine Korsgaards claim in her TannerLectures to find in self-consciousness itself the norms that would answer our need forpractical reasons, insofar as that need is constituted through our capacity for reflection.It shows that the way in which Korsgaard sees the need for a reason as arising out ofself-consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want as the ultimate sourceof our reasons an authority of which we cannot coherently demand legitimation in turn;on the other, our freedom demands that nothing count for us as a reason except insofaras it is in turn endorsed in reflection. Relying on resources drawn from the tradition ofreflection, this paper argues that Korsgaards attempt to resolve this tension isunsuccessful and appeals, in response to this failure, to faith in the authority of ourreasons in the absence of foundational justification of them.

Kant writes in his essay Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History

that when in the history of humanity man became conscious of his power of

choice, he suddenly found himself on the edge of an abyss.1 [W]hereas

instinct had hitherto directed him towards individual objects of his desire,

an infinite range of objects now opened up, and he did not yet know how to

choose between them. I elaborate Kants thought as follows. The practical

task this self-consciousness assigned us was perhaps initially limited to

determining the best means available for the achievement of ends still set by

nature. But, once having embarked on this path of reflection, we soon found

ourselves burdened with the further task of setting our own ends as well.

The ends nature set for us no longer had authority, since we now found our-

selves with the capacity to call them into question in turn and to set them

Correspondence Address: Bill Bristow, Department of Philosophy, University of California,

Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA. Email: [email protected]

Inquiry,

Vol. 49, No. 6, 498523, December 2006

0020-174X Print/1502-3923 Online/06/06049826 # 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00201740601016197

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aside in favor of others we set for ourselves. The abyss edged closer.

Because, of course, we had to ask: what is the importance of these further

ends? Reflection, once let loose, cannot be contained, and so we were

eventually burdened with the ultimate practical question or with questions

about the value of ultimate ends: what is the meaning of existence? Why

ought we live at all? As literatures paradigm of reflectiveness puts it: to be

or not to be, that is the question. Supposing we find ourselves with thequestion, but without the resources to answer it, where are we? If the

beginning of reflection puts us at the edge of an abyss, as Kant writes, the

end of reflection deposits us in the very pit of it, in despair.

Or do we find in the capacity for reflection itself the answer to the

practical problem that this capacity makes unavoidable for us? Do we find

in reflection the resources to to choose our own way of life, as Kant puts

itself-consciously choose itwithout thereby undermining our conviction

in the values which guide our choice? Different philosophers have argued indifferent ways that we do. Indeed, one might see this taskthe task, namely,

of showing that the answer to the practical question that reflection makes

unavoidable for us is contained in reflection itselfas one of the central

tasks of a tradition of philosophy extending from Rousseau (at least) to

Hegel (at least). Hegel expresses the solution to the practical problem and

its reflexivity in a slogan: the free will wills the free will.2 If the capacity to

determine ones actions reflectively poses the practical problem of how to

choose ones way of life, which amounts to being free in one sense, thenwilling in accord with the principles internal to the process of reflection itself

is the solution to that problem, a solution which amounts to being free in

another sense, in the sense of being autonomous. Self-determination is itself

the solution to the problem of self-determination. So argue Rousseau, Kant,

Fichte, and Hegel, each in his distinctive way. But the attempts of these

philosophers to show the ground of practical choice in reflection itself,

thereby bridging or averting the abyss, are shadowed by those of the

skeptics. In both the philosophy and the literature of the period, the so-called age of reflection, the tasks of reflection are freighted with the risks

of nihilism and despair.

Recently, Christine Korsgaard has explicitly revived the project of this

tradition. In her 1992 Tanner lectures, published as Sources of Normativity

(abbreviated SN), Korsgaard argues that the human problems of choice and

self-determination are set by our reflective nature.3 In accord with the

ambition of the tradition, she claims further that: If the problem springs

from reflection then the solution must do so as well (SN p. 93). She arguesthat the solution to the problem is autonomy, which consists, on her

distinctive interpretation, in conforming to practical principles that express

our practical identities. She argues, further, that this account of the source

of practical norms implies a justification of distinctively moral obligations,

practical obligations distinguished by their universality and necessity. Moral

Self-Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom 499

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obligations bind us inescapably because they express our inescapable nature

as self-conscious beings, as beings who must act for reasons.

In this paper, I inscribe Korsgaards project more explicitly and fully into

the tradition of reflection than she herself does and criticize her results in the

light of that tradition. More specifically, employing distinctions drawn from

the tradition, I object to her claim that practical principles expressing our

practical identities are unconditionally authoritative for us (Section II). Iargue further that her justification of moral obligations either begs the

question against her opponent or relies on a conception of how norms bind

that is incompatible with her account (Section III). By the end, it should be

clear that the way in which Korsgaard sees the need for a reason to arise

out of our self-consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want

as the ultimate source of our reasons an authority of which we cannot

coherently demand legitimation in turn; on the other, our freedom demands

that nothing count for us as a reason except insofar as it withstand the testof reflection. Korsgaards attempt to find in self-consciousness principles

that both express our freedom and yet have unconditional authority for us

(i.e., meet our need for a reason) is unsuccessful. In the last section, I

suggest a response to this failure, a response that also derives from the

tradition, which opposes faith to the despair that may seem the failures

inevitable consequence.

I. Self-consciousness and the normative question

In her first lecture, Korsgaard defines what she calls the normative ques-

tion. The normative question asks after the justification of the practical

obligations we stand under. Korsgaard insists that we ask and answer the

normative question from a particular standpoint, the standpoint, namely,

from which the obligations make their demands upon us. Korsgaard insists

upon this standpoint in order to distinguish the normative question from

others with which it is sometimes confused. In particular, an account of thesource of norms that explains why creatures such as us possess normative

concepts and act typically in accord with themfor instance, an evolution-

ary accountwill typically fail even to address an agents demand for the

justification of such obligations when they press upon her. Korsgaards

normative question is the question, Why must I A?, where A is some action

that is demanded of me; the answer must satisfy me in the standpoint from

which I am deciding what to do.4

There are two parts to Korsgaards response to the normative ques-tion. First, she offers an account of how practical obligations in general,

whether moral or not, are grounded in a persons practical identities,

whatever they are. Second, with the account of the source of the authority of

obligations in general as a background, she offers a justification of moral

obligations (obligations that are distinguished by their universality and

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necessity), thus refuting the moral skeptic in at least one of his harassing

appearances.

Before examining Korsgaards response to the normative question, I

examine in this section how the normative question is seen to arise out of

our capacity for self-consciousness. Korsgaard claims that our capacity for

self-reflection is the source of the need we humans have for norms or reasons

in the first place, of which the demand for justification expressed in thenormative question is a special case. She writes, a lower animals attention

is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will

(SN pp. 9293). But human beings, by virtue of their capacity to reflect on

their desires and perceptions, can distance themselves from them: our

capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a

capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question.

As Korsgaard explains in the following important passage, this reflective

distance implies the need for a reason.

I desire and find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up

and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance.

Now the impulse doesnt dominate me and now I have a problem.

Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind

cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a

reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself

and go forward. (SN p. 93)

The basic picture here is this: in becoming conscious of my psychological

impulse to perform some action, I am simultaneously conscious of my

freedom with respect to this action, which in turn implies my need for

authoritative norms (reasons) on the basis of which to determine myself.

Although Korsgaard does not call attention to the difference, the need for

reasons implied by reflection on ones desire is different on the face of it

from the need for a reason implied in the normative question above. There Iam faced in reflection with (apparent) obligation, with practical constraint,

requiring sacrifice of my desires perhaps, and what I need is justification of

the authority with which the obligatory action is demanded of me; here, in

contrast, I am faced in reflection with freedom of choice, and so what I need

is constraint or authority, something on the basis of which I can confidently

determine myself one way rather than the other. Both acts of self-reflection

imply needs for reasons, but there seem to be two distinct practical problems

here that pull in opposite directions and are beset by different risks. If Ishould be unable to gain insight by reflection into the authority by which

some action is demanded of me, then I have constraint without freedom;

whereas, if I should fail to discover reasons in reflection on the basis of

which to choose among the courses of action available to me, then I am

faced with the abysmal freedom to which Kant refers in the passage quoted.


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Our need for reasons seems to reflect both a need for authority (or

constraint), implied by consciousness of my freedom of choice, and a need

for justification, implied by consciousness of alleged constraint or authority.

This duality in the need for reasons suggests the dilemma: does not the

satisfaction of one need simply imply the other? How is it possible for both

needs to be fully and compatibly satisfied? Korsgaards account (following

Kants) means to meet this challenge.Korsgaard does not call attention to this duality in the need for reasons

because, I think, she operates with an underlying conception of free, rational

agency according to which my need for a reason expressed in the normative

question is the same as my need to have an authoritative norm by which to

determine my capacity of free choice.5 According to the underlying con-

ception, nothing determines my behaviorthat is, no values, principles,

desires, goals, or obligationsexcept insofar as it has my endorsement in

reflection. Behavior of mine counts as free action, of which I am regarded asthe author and for which I am responsible (subject to praise or blame), just

in case the considerations to which one would appeal in describing the

action as intentional (that is, the particular motivational desire or value or

goal or principle, or set of such, that determines the behavior as the

intentional action it is) do not determine the action immediately, but only as

mediated by what we might call a moment of endorsement. The moment

of endorsement consists in the agent counting or taking the practical

considerations on which she acts as sufficient reason to act as she does. Inthe case of desires, Korsgaard is explicit on this point. A desire-based action

only counts as free action insofar as the agent endorses the desire in

reflection. But, given that it is the reflective distance that poses the practical

problem (as she says in the passage above), the point is not unique to desire.

If the capacity to back up and bring a desire into view implies that I have a

certain distance, which implies in turn the need for a reason, then presum-

ably my capacity to back up from my values, principles and obligations

implies the same. I assume that Korsgaard does not note the duality in theneed for reasons remarked above because she takes the capacity to back

up from some apparent obligation to imply the same question (namely, the

question whether to endorse or not to endorse) that arises when one backs

up from ones desire.

With respect to this moment of endorsement, we must note another

important ambiguity in Korsgaards account. Korsgaards characterization

of the agents endorsement sometimes leaves open the possibility of inter-

preting it as a dateable psychological act. We all know what it is to backup from a desire and to subject it to critical scrutiny and then consciously

to affirm it before acting on it. Sometimes we do this, but most often we do

not. Interpreted as a dateable, psychological act, the moment of endo-

rsement does not have the normative significance Korsgaard would draw

from it. So interpreted, the moment of endorsement is not necessary. One

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may or may not endorse a desire in this sense, prior to acting on it.

Moreover, whether or not the act of endorsement in this sense occurs makes

no difference to the normative question.

Accordingly, I interpret the moment of endorsement as logical, not

psychological. I suggest that we interpret the moment of endorsement as a

necessary component of the representation of a behavior as free, authored

action. Then the claim is this: in representing a bit of behavior as authoredby the subject of the behavior, as that persons free action, for which she

bears responsibility, we implicitly regard the considerations on which she

acts as having her endorsement in reflection, in the sense that she takes the

practical considerations to be sufficient reason to act as she does. This

presupposition does not imply that, as a matter of the psychological facts,

she has backed up from the practical considerations on which she acts

and consciously endorsed them in reflection. Even if she is (as most of us are

most of the time, I assume) unreflective with respect to her practical reasons,we are taking itin regarding her as the responsible author of the action

that she is responding to reasons in the relevant stretch of behavior. This

usually implicit assumption becomes explicit on those relatively rare occa-

sions on which we call upon the person to justify her action. Whenever (and

insofar as) we regard a person as the responsible author of her action, we

implicitly take justification to be her task; we take justifying reasons to be

hers to provide, even if we demand them only rarely and under particular

circumstances. In taking the justification of an action to be the agents task,we take the considerations on which she acts to count for her as sufficient

reason to do as she does. Thus the moment of endorsement is not a

psychological act, the occurrence of which is contingent, but a necessary

component of the representation of an action as authored.6

In posing the normative question, the Korsgaardian practical agent

arrogates to herself a kind of practical authority. She arrogates to herself the

right to demand insight in reflection into the legitimacy (or rationality) of

any practical demand made upon her, as a condition of granting thatdemand authority in her deliberation about what to do. 7 On the face of it,

the authority she arrogates to herself conflicts with the authority by which

an obligation is commanded, insofar as obligations as such bind us uncon-

ditionally.8 But the authority the agent arrogates to herself is grounded in

the underlying conception of free, rational agency. Though most of us

accede to the obligations that daily constrain us without demanding insight

into the rationality of the authority by which they are commanded, insofar

as we are (regarded as) the responsible authors of our actions, endorsementis ours to give or to withhold. As such, each of us has the right to back up

from a supposed obligation and demand justification as a condition of

taking it as a sufficient reason to act. This authority is but the opposite face

of our responsibility, of our being on the hook for the provision of justifying

reasons, should they be demanded of us. To exercise this right, to press the


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demand for justification in reflection, just is to press Korsgaards normative

question. However, the above-mentioned tension between the authority the

agent arrogates to herself in pressing this question, as expressing her

freedom as a rational agent, and the nature of obligations as commanding

unconditionally, raises the disquieting possibility that nothing can satisfy us

in pursuit of the normative question.

Though Korsgaard insists that the normative question must be pursuedby taking up the stance of the practical agents deliberative reflection about

what to do, she perforce proposes her answers to the normative question

from the slightly shifted perspective of philosophical reflection. Again, the

answer she proposes to the normative question from this perspective has two

main parts: she attempts to provide both the general sort of answer that can

meet our need for justification with respect to practical obligations in

general (as they vary in their particular content from person to person) and

the particular answer that meets our demand for justification with respect tomoral obligations in particular, (which are distinguished as binding us

universally). In the following two sections, I examine these two parts of

Korsgaards response to the normative question in turn.

II. Self-consciousness, autonomy and practical identity

Korsgaard expresses the characteristic thought of the tradition of reflection

when she writes: If the problem springs from reflection then the solutionmust do so as well (SN p. 93). The proposal is that we find in the very

posing of the practical problem, insofar as that problem has its source in

self-consciousness, a procedure of practical reflection the internal princi-

ple(s) of which are the answer to the practical problem. In reflecting on ones

desire, one is conscious of freedom of choice with respect to the desired

action; as Ive interpreted it, the resulting need for a reason is a need for a

norm or principle on the basis of which to determine ones faculty of free

choice of which one is thereby conscious. Korsgaard suggests that reflectivescrutiny itself constitutes a kind of test or criterion on the basis of which one

determines oneself: We need reasons because our impulses must be able to

withstand reflective scrutiny. We have reasons if they do. The normative

word reason refers to a kind of reflective success (SN p. 93).

However, in the absence of a specification of the test of reflectionthat is,

in the absence of a specification of the norms or standards brought to bear

in reflective scrutiny, and of whence they in turn derive their authority for

usappeal to the test of reflection does not answer the normative question.According to Korsgaards account, the procedure of backing up from

practical considerations and subjecting them to critical scrutiny backs us up

to authoritative, grounding practical principles. The questions remains, How ?

As indicated above, if backing up from a desire implies the need for a

reason, then presumably backing up from other practical content (practical

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principles, values, goals, et cetera) implies the same need. For example,

if consciousness of my desire to drop off to sleep during a colloquium

implies the problem: shall I let myself? then consciousness of my practical

precept not to drowse off during colloquia implies in turn the need for

a justification or validation of this precept. Supposing the justification is

that such behavior is disrespectful to the speaker, I can back up from the

principle implied in this reason and ask for justification of its authorityfor me in turn. What then can the test of reflection consist in, if every

principle applied in reflection is one that itself requires legitimation through

a process of reflection, insofar as I can make it the object of a further

reflection?

What is needed, obviously, given the way the problem is posed, is a

practical principle from which one cannot back up again in turn. Korsgaard

conceives the problem in terms of what Kant called a search for the

unconditionedin this case, for something which will bring the reiterationof but why must I do that? to an end. The unconditional answer must be

one that makes it impossible, unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why again

(SN p. 33). Korsgaard finds the unconditional answerthough one in need

of modification, as we shall see belowin Kants derivation of the

categorical imperative as the principle of the free will in the opening

paragraphs of the Third Section of the Groundwork. A free will is as such,

according to its concept, determined by nothing alien or external to it. In

terms of the discussion above, whatever moves the free person to act isregarded as doing so only as mediated by the persons own endorsement of

that practical content. But again, our question is: what determines for the

person whether to endorse or not? The person needs a principle (or set of

such) internal to the will in terms of which she can determine whether to

endorse or identify with the particular practical consideration under

examination; but given that whatever principles she employs need to be

endorsed in turn, what can the test of reflection be, such that it constitutes a

genuine criterion of self-determination?The answer attributed to Kant is that the demand that a candidate

practical consideration be recognizable in reflection as a reason is itself

the sole criterion of self-determination. The need to act for reasons is itself

the single constraint internal to the will. Of course the difficulty is to see how

the need to act for reasons, which from one point of view simply poses

the problem, is supposed to be its solution, when looked at from another

point of view. How can this need, which we see to be internal to the will,

be understood itself to impose a constraint on, or a criterion for, choice?Our procedure makes clear that when searching for the ground of deter-

mination of a free will, we must abstract away from particular contentful

principles, because, as weve seen, such content can only be identified with

the free will through its endorsement and so cannot serve as the principle of

that endorsement. Abstracting from all particular, contentful principles


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leaves only the formal demand that one act on nothing that does not count

as a reason. But is this a criterion? By what mark(s) are practical reasons

recognized as such? For Kant, reasons or principles as such have the form

of universality. Hence, the practical demand that one act only on what

counts as a reason amounts to the demand expressed in the universal law

formulation of the categorical imperative: act only according to that

maxim that one can at the same time will as a universal law. Our pro-cedure reveals that this practical principle is internal to the process of

deliberative reflection about how to determine oneself. One cannot back

up from such a principle and subject it to critical scrutiny without

presupposing it.9

Korsgaard raises Hegels familiar objection that this formal constraint

internal to reflection exerts no genuine constraint at allit is an empty

formalism that can take any content whateverand modifies Kants posi-

tion accordingly (SN p. 99). She distinguishes, as Kant does not, betweenthe categorical imperative, which is the demand that one act only according

to principles that have the form of universality, and the moral law, which is

the principle that one act only according to principles that every rational

being could in principle consent to in a workable system of cooperation

(Kants kingdom of ends). The former is short of the latter since, though

every principle or law is as such universal, the domain of its legislation is

not specified by this constraint. The lack of specification of the domain of

legislation implies the emptiness of this constraint. If the law is the lawof acting on the desire of the moment, then the agent will treat each desire as

a reason, and her conduct will be that of the wanton. If the law ranges over

the agents whole life, then the agent will be some sort of egoist (SN p. 99).

If the law ranges over every rational being, then the law is the moral law.

How then does the constraint internal to practical deliberative reflection

have content, according to Korsgaards account? This content is provided

by the particular, contingent ways in which the individual conceives and

values herself within the stance of practical deliberation. In order to makethis point, Korsgaard introduces a second respect in which the reflective

structure of the mind is a source of self-consciousness as follows:10

The reflective structure of the mind is a source of self-consciousness

because it forces us to have a conception of ourselvesFrom a third-

person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may

look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the

strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But this isnt how it is for youwhen you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were

something over and above all your desires, something which is you,

and which chooses which desire to act on. This means that the

principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you

regard as expressive of yourself. (SN p. 100)

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This conception of yourselfor conceptions, since each of us typically has

severalis what Korsgaard calls your practical identity: a practical

identity is a description under which you find your life to be worth living

and your actions to be worth undertaking (SN p. 101). The specific ways in

which you conceive and value yourself (as teacher, mother, friend, et cetera)

specify the domain of your legislation and thus provide specific content to

your highest practical principles. When you back up from a practicalimpulse and ask whether it has practical authority for you, whether it

constitutes a reason for you, you answer by seeing whether the maxim of

acting on the desire could be willed as a law by you; the constraint here is

provided by your practical identity, by who you take yourself to be, as it

were (See SN p. 113).

Putting the basic elements together, Korsgaards account of the source

and nature of practical reasons and obligations is as follows. We begin from

ones capacity to back up from ones desire and make it an object ofreflection. This is the capacity for self-consciousness in the first sense. It

implies the agents consciousness of her freedom with respect to the desired

action, and hence the need for norms on the basis of which to determine

whether the desire constitutes sufficient reason to act as it impels her. But

whence such norms and their authority? Typically a person appeals in

reflection to other of her desires, her values, her practical principles, et

cetera. However, she can back up from these in turn, and hence their

authority is also conditional on endorsement. As Korsgaard puts it: afurther stretch of reflection requires a further stretch of endorsement (SN

p. 119). The need for a reason is the need for norms on the basis of which to

determine this endorsement. Because the original problem is posed by the

reflective distance opened between what I am conscious of as me in the

standpoint of deliberation and the grounds of choice on which I reflect (my

desire), whatever I can take a reflective distance on is something for which I

will in turn require a reason as mediating my endorsement of it as

authoritative for my choice and action. So our need for reasons can onlybe met, finally, by principles from which we cannot coherently back up

again in turn. The key claim is: the principles that express a persons

practical identities satisfy this condition. In the standpoint of agency, I am

conscious of myself not only in the sense of being conscious of my desire

for something, but also in the sense of being conscious of being something

over and above all my desires, something which is me and which chooses

which desire to act on, as Korsgaard says. Insofar as a practical principle

immediately expresses this self-conception, there is no reflective distancebetween what I am conscious of as me in the reflective stance and the

principle. Since my practical identity is an identity under which I value

myself and find my life to be worth living and my actions worth under-

taking, to back up from this self-conception is by definition to lose my

orientation in practical deliberation altogether. Thus I cannot intelligibly


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back up from such a self-conception and submit it to a further test of

reflection. In having backed up to explicit articulation of my practical

identity, Ive reached the normative foundation, the source of my reasons

and obligations. Thus, on Korsgaards account: Your reasons express your

identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what your identity

forbids (SN p. 101).11

In this way, then, Korsgaard finds in the capacity for self-reflectionitself the answer to the practical problem this capacity makes unavoidable

for us. Korsgaards account means to be Kantian insofar as it finds the

source of the authority of practical principles to be autonomy: the ulti-

mately authoritative principles are the principles of ones own will. Hence

Korsgaards account, like Kants, allegedly reconciles the tension between

our freedom and our standing under unconditional practical obligations:

since the unconditionally authoritative practical laws are self-legislated

(i.e., principles that express ones identity, as Korsgaard puts it), theirauthority does not oppose ones freedom, but rather expresses it. However,

Korsgaards departure from Kants position here is significant. For Kant

the supreme principle of the free will is the single, formal principle of the

categorical imperative, whereas for Korsgaard, the wills self-given princi-

ples are those that express her practical identities, whatever (and however

many) they are.

Whatever the prospects of Kants own account, Korsgaards Kantian

account does not succeed in reconciling our freedom and our standingunder unconditional obligations. Kants reasons for seeing the principle of

the free will as a formal principle retain their force. Recall the point

made above: behavior of mine counts as free action, of which I am the

author and for which I am responsible, just in case the considerations

on which I am acting, whatever they are, do not determine the action

immediately, but only as mediated by my endorsement of them; that is, only

insofar as I count them as sufficient reason to act as I do. This condition

applies as much to the principles expressing my contingent practicalidentities as to my desires. If it were the case that I could not back up from

a principle expressing my practical identity and subject it to rational

scrutiny as a condition of endorsing it, then the behavior determined by

that principle could not be seen as free, as authored by me, since this

would mean that I am not responsive to reasons with respect to that

behavior. To make this point vivid, suppose the case of someone who,

because of the circumstances of his upbringing, deeply conceives and values

himself as belonging to a pure race; suppose further that racist actionsfollow from this self-conception. Clearly, we would make the rational

demand (implicitly, at least) that such a person subject his principles to

rational scrutiny as a condition of acting on them; and in treating him as

responsible for his racist actions, we would regard his principles as counting

for him as sufficient reasons to act as he does. If we suppose that the person

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cannot subject the practical principles implicit in his self-conception to

rational scrutiny because the identity sticks too deep, then holding the

person responsible for actions deriving from the principles is at least

problematic, since, by that supposition, the principles amount to a kind of

fixation from which the person is powerless to release himself. Again, it is as

true of this practical content as of all other that it gives rise to action which

we regard as free, authored action just in case it has the agents endorsementin reflection. But this just implies that it cannot serve as the ultimate

normative basis of endorsement in reflection. As Kant argues, the principle

that can alone serve as the principle of the self-determining will is the purely

formal principle, the categorical imperative.12

The point can be made by drawing out the implications of the distinction

between the two sorts of self-consciousness indicated above. On the one

hand, self-consciousness is consciousness of a mental state (e.g., a desire)

as ones own: [W]e human animals [in contrast to other animals] turn ourattention on to our own perceptions and desires themselves, on to our

mental activities, and we are conscious of them (SN p. 93). This is object-

directed consciousness that has as its object some particular mental content

of the subject of consciousness. On the other hand, practical self-

consciousness is consciousness of that which is you, and which chooses

which desire to act on (SN p. 100). It is essential that this second sort of

self-consciousness not be understood on the model of the first, because,

whereas the first exactly implies the practical problem (the problem ofwhether this psychological content on which I reflect is a sufficient practical

reason), the second is supposed to provide the resources for solving the

practical problem. The first sort of self-consciousness implies a reflective

distance between the reflecting subject and the object of self-reflection (my

desire, say). The practical problem implied by this self-consciousness,

according to Korsgaard, is whether to identify oneself with the object of

reflection or not. The second sort of self-consciousness can be the ground

for self-determination, thus solving the problem, only if there is no reflectivedistance in this self-consciousness. Thus the self-consciousness the principle

of which serves as the ultimate norm cannot have the same structure as

other-directed consciousness; it cannot be consciousness of another, where

the other is oneself. It must be immediate, unreflective self-consciousness.

This implies that this self-consciousness must be pure or formal; whatever

content it has can have authority for the person only insofar as the person

takes it as authoritative for him, which just implies that it does not have that

authority immediately, as the principle expressing the self-consciousnessdoes. Apperception (to use Kants term for self-consciousness) can only be a

principle, normative for us in our activity, whether epistemic or practical, if

it has no content on its own, but merely expresses a relation in which the self

must stand to itself insofar as the self is the responsible agent of the norm-

governed activity. The normative demand or constraint implied in the stance


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of agency is just the formal demand that one act for reasons, that is, on the

basis of principles that have the form of universality. Either this can

function as a principle, or, if not, if it is an empty formalism, then the self-

consciousness that is internal to the stance of free, responsible agency

contains no normative constraint at all.13

Recall that Korsgaards aims are twofold in her Tanner lectures: 1) to

argue that the source of practical normativity in general is autonomy and 2)to justify moral obligations in particular, which are distinguished by their

universality and necessity. I will now go on to examine her argument for the

claim that the necessary condition of a persons contingent values, whatever

they are, is the value of her humanity. Does this argument do better in

finding in reflection itself the principle that answers the practical question

that our capacity for reflection makes inevitable for us?

III. Moral obligations and the universal identity as human

Given her view that the source of obligations in general is ones practical

identities, Korsgaards argument that we are all bound by moral obliga-

tions, whatever particular ways in which we happen to conceive and value

ourselves, takes the form of arguing that there is one practical identity that

each of us must have, namely, the practical identity simply as human being.

Korsgaard means by human being not a natural or biological category of

course, but rather what Kant means in some texts by humanity, namelythe capacity to set ends for ourselves, or, as Korsgaard construes it, the

capacity (or, indeed, the need) to act for reasons.14 Since she takes herself

already to have shown by this point in her lectures that acting for reasons is

acting from some self-conception or other, she defines human being as

an animal who needs a practical conception of her own identity, a con-

ception of who she is which is normative for her (SN p. 123). Korsgaard

argues that this meta-identity must stand behind ones other contingent,

practical identities, in the sense that valuing ones humanity is a condition ofones other contingent values. In a second part of her argument reserved for

the fourth lecture, Korsgaard argues that, in being committed to the value of

ones own humanity, one is bound by a principle requiring one to respect

always the humanity of each person. Thus, the authority of the moral

principle, as expressed in Kants Formula of Humanity, is implied in valuing

ourselves merely as human. I restrict my attention to Korsgaards argument

for the claim that we are committed to conceiving and valuing ourselves

simply as human. In evaluating Korsgaards argument, I press a questionconcerning the normative status of human identity. It is only if we endorse

the identity (that is, conceive and value ourselves under this description) that

it serves as a source of norms for us. But the argument that a person must

take this identity as normative for herself (as a matter of normative

requirement) begs the question at issue.

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Korsgaards argument proceeds according to the following steps.15

(1) The nature of the normative force of ones practical reasons andobligations in general is that ones practical identity is at stake in

conformity to them.

(2) Hence the following description holds of you, whoever you are (that is,

whatever your contingent practical identities): as a reflective being,

you have some practical conception(s) or other, from which you derive

reasons and obligations.

(3) It follows that you (again and throughout: whatever your contingent

practical identities) have a reason to have some practical identity orother, from which to derive reasons and obligations.

(4) This reason cannot derive from any of the identities you happen to

have, given the way your life has fallen out, since it is a reason you

have independent of these contingent identities and since its a reason

you have regardless of the contents of your particular identifications.

(5) Therefore, this reason derives from the universal self-description, from

the description that holds of you whoever you are.

Conclusion: This universal self-description (i.e., your humanity) must be

normative for you. Korsgaard puts the conclusion as follows: You must

value your own humanity if you are to act at all (SN p. 123). Or: all value

depends on the value of humanity; other forms of practical identity matter

in part because humanity requires them (SN p. 121). If valuing your ownhumanity commits you to respecting the humanity of each person, as

Korsgaard argues in the fourth lecture, then moral obligations follow, on

one recognizable characterization of them.

Korsgaard regards the first claim, that practical norms are expressions of

ones practical identities, as having been established already. The second

claim derives from this point a universal self-description, a description that

applies to each of us, whatever particular ways we happen as individuals to

conceive and value ourselves, given the way our lives have fallen out. Thetrick, however, is to see how this universal self-description is itself for each

of us a normative identity. A true self-description is not a source of norms for

a person unless the person conceives and values herself under that

description. The fact that Im a Hatfield, as a matter of blood relationship,

gives me no duties or reasons in the matter of the feud with the McCoys on

its own; this identity is a source of reasons and obligations only if the

conception of myself as a Hatfield is one under which I value myself and

find my life to be worth living and my actions worth undertaking. Hence,the rest of the argument aims to show that the universal self-description is

normative for you. The key to showing this is the third claim: it follows,

given (1), that without some practical identity or other, you will lose your

grip on yourself as having any reason to do one thing rather than another

and with it, your grip on yourself as having any reason to live and act at all


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(SN p. 121). So the force of the reason to have some practical identity or

other is what the force of a reason always is, according to the general

account of normativity: your practical identity is at stake in it. But which

practical identity is at stake here in particular? It could only be the universal

identity. Hence the conclusion: the addressee of the argument must

acknowledge the value of herself simply qua human.

On the most natural and immediate interpretation of the argument, itssuccess depends on getting its addressee to endorse her identity as human, to

value herself under that description.16 The argument depends on this,

because the human identity is a source of norms for a person only if that

person conceives and values herself under that description. But, so inter-

preted, the argument runs in a short circle. Obviously, unless I already have

reasons and obligations, independently of my endorsement of my identity as

human, I cannot be shown a reason why I must endorse this identity; and yet

the reason urged upon me by the argument for endorsing this identity isthat, if I do not, I lack any reasons and obligations at all. The role that the

argument itself assigns to this meta-identity, as standing behind my other

contingent practical identities (that is, as the highest source of reasons and

obligations), implies that no reason can be given for why I ought to endorse

it that does not presuppose that I already do. If the proponent of the

argument maintains that my actually valuing my humanityas opposed to

the value of humanity, whether or not I recognize itis the ultimate source

of my reasons and obligations, then the proponent of the argument can-not give me a reason to value humanity that does not presuppose that I

already do.

Accordingly, the argument must be interpreted differently. A different

interpretation seems required anyway by the aim of the argument. If the

argument aims to show the universality and necessity of moral obligations,

and if it is a contingent matter whether a given person conceives and values

himself under the universal self-description, then the proponent of the

argument cannot concede that its addressee has moral obligations only if hecomes to conceive and value himself under the universal self-description

through the argument itself.

In order to avoid the circle, we need an interpretation of the argument

according to which the force of the reason it gives us to recognize the value

of humanity does not depend on getting its addressee to endorse her identity

as human through the argument itself. This seems to point to a construal of

the argument according to which its work is to show that the value of

humanity is rationally implied by (presupposed by) the addressees affirma-tion of the particular values she holds, independently of the addressees

actual recognition of the value of humanity or of this rational implica-

tion. But on any such construal the argument faces the following problem:

the reason it would offer to compel recognition of the value of humanity

would have force independently of a threat to ones practical identities,

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contradicting the first premise of the argument. The first premise claims that

the normative force of reasons and obligations in general consists in ones

identity being at stake in conformity to them. This premise can rationally

imply the value of humanity only if the force of the reason implied by it also

consists in your identity, under some description, being at stake. But,

according to the argument itself, given that the argument means to regress

or ascend to the highest source of practical reasons and obligations, the onlyidentity that could be at stake in this reason is your identity as human. Thus

the force of the reason the argument provides for recognizing the value of

humanity must presuppose that you already value humanity, on pain of

contradicting its first premise. The force of the reason the argument

provides for you to recognize the value of humanity must either derive from

your valuing humanity already or compel recognition independently of your

identifications or endorsements.

The basic dilemma faced by the proponent of the argument is this: unlessthe reason the argument gives us to recognize the value of humanity compels

this recognition independently of our prior recognition of the value of

humanity, the argument is circular; but if it does, then, in this case at least,

our reasons have some other source than the value of humanity.

There may seem to be a third way of taking the argument, a way which

avoids the whirlpools of circularity on the one side and the shoals of

reversion to normative realism on the other. Clearly, from the perspective

of the proponent of the argument, what Ive pointed to and criticized as itscircularity is something like the crucial point of the argument. The crucial

point is: in acting at all, on whatever values we happen to have, we pre-

suppose the value of humanity. Perhaps, then, the proponent of the argu-

ment means to get us to see that we are, in all that we do, in fact, perforce,

already recognizing (or endorsing) the value of humanity. Perhaps the

argument is meant to show that ones actual valuing of oneself merely as

human is implicit in ones explicit, but contingent, values. Only on this

construal, it would seem, could the proponent both consistently maintainthat humanity is a source of norms for a person only if that person endo-

rses herself under that description (as required by the arguments starting

point) and still mean to conclude to the universality and necessity of moral

obligations.

The proponent of the argument, so taken, relies crucially on an obscure

distinction between valuing humanity implicitly (or endorsing oneself under

this description implicitly) and valuing humanity explicitly. Most of us some

of the time and some of us most of the time pursue deeply immoral projects,in more or less conscious defiance of universal values. In such pursuits, we

fail to recognize the value of humanity in some sense. The proponent of the

argument does not deny this undeniable empirical fact, presumably, but

accommodates it by insisting that, in such a pursuit, while one fails to

recognize (or even denies) the value of humanity explicitly, one nevertheless


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cannot fail to implicitly recognize the value of humanity. In order to do the

work that the proponent wants of it, implicitly valuing must be a form of

actually valuing, because it is only if one actually endorses the value of

humanity that one has the reasons and obligations that stem from such an

identity.

Whether the argument on this construal works depends on what content

can be given to the claim that someone implicitly values humanity, eventhough she may not know that she does and even though her actual actions

and statements would lead us to say of her that she does not. Though it is

not clear in advance that such a content cannot be specified, in the absence

of this specification, the argument itself is not specified. I suspect that we

cannot specify this content without generating a more complicated concep-

tion of the source and nature of norms than is available to us so far. Take

the most obvious beginning for specifying this content. The meaning of the

claim that a person implicitly values humanity, even in his deeply immoralaction and even while explicitly disavowing that value, is cashed out in a

conditional: if the person were to reflect, fully and correctly, on the con-

ditions of his explicitly recognized values, then he would recognize (expli-

citly) the value of humanity. But this conditional analysis just raises again

the original problem regarding the force of the reason that would compel

this explicit recognition in reflection. How is this conditional itself to be

spelled out? Presumably the conditional is not stating a prediction of what

will in fact happen if the person reflects. Rather the conditional rests on thefact that a reason to recognize the value of humanity is either revealed or

generated through reflection on ones values. The original problem is: what

is the source or nature of that reason? If we want to say at this juncture that

the persons reason to explicitly recognize the value of humanity in reflec-

tion is that he already does, then clearly we do not manage to explicate the

meaning of implicit recognition by appeal to this conditional, since, in

explaining the meaning of the conditional, we appeal again to implicit

recognition. We have not gotten any closer to understanding the necessity ofrecognizing this value.17

We find it difficult to hold to the conception of the force of norms as

consisting entirely in the strength of our actual commitments. Ordinarily, of

course, we take ourselves in our practical reasoning to be answerable to an

objective order of values, independent of our endorsements and self-

conceptions. Korsgaards argument begins from the denial of this assump-

tion; it begins from the claim that, as reflective beings, we project value onto

the world (SN p. 116). Ive argued in this section that the argument cannotgive us a reason to recognize the value of humanity compatibly with the

conception of the force of a reason with which it begins. The apparent force

of the argument relies, I believe, on the fact that we so easily lose our grip on

this conception of normativity and slide insensibly back into the ordinary,

realist point of view.18

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IV. Self-consciousness, the need for a reason and abysmal freedom

I conclude that Korsgaard does not succeed in showing us the answer in

reflection itself to the practical question constituted by our capacity for

practical reflection. In this last section, I want to question the moral of our

criticism.19 What follows? Prominent options are: skepticism (regarding the

justification of practical norms in general or only of moral norms in

particular); despair or nihilism (if that differs from skepticism); or con-

cluding that this way of posing the practical problem is misguided from the

beginning.

I want to suggest a moral different from these. In order to address this

question, we need to re-visit the need for a reason raised by reflection on

ones practical impulses and demands. What would meet this need? On the

one hand, the need seems very difficult to satisfy, since, insofar as it arises

through the capacity to back up from a practical impulse and subject it to

critical scrutiny before granting it authority, the reason needed must be one

in principle exempt from further reflective scrutiny. We need, not just a

practical reason, but a regress-stopping, foundational reason, a reason that

makes it impossible, unnecessary or incoherent to ask why again (SN

p. 33). Such reasons are notoriously hard to come by.

However, on the other hand, when Korsgaard gives her argument against

the moral skeptic, the demand for a reason (or on reason) seems to slacken.

Korsgaard admits that the reason she finds for endorsing the moral

principle is at best conditional: if you acknowledge the existence of any

practical reasons, then you must value your humanity as an end in itself.20

The reason Korsgaard offers for conforming to moral requirements pre-

supposes our commitment to the force of the non-moral practical reasons

that we recognize. If the skeptic calls these into question at the same time,

then, according to Korsgaards own admission, we are at a loss to answer

his challenges. Presumably Korsgaard is willing to make this concession

because it seems minimal: having pushed the skeptic to the extremity of

denying wholesale the force of all practical reasons, the skeptical hysteria is

revealed as such. The cost of following the skeptic in his all-consuming

doubt proves too high to pay. According to Korsgaards argument,

supposing that we are unwilling to pay that cost, we are constrained to

recognize the normativity of the moral principle.

However, this response misses the point, if the question is whether we find

in reflection the materials to satisfy the need for a reason constituted

through this reflection. The answer to the question of what satisfies this need

ought not depend on what the given reflecting individual, as a matter of

contingent, psychological fact, is or is not able to accept. Rather, the

standards of satisfaction of the need ought to be determined internally by

what motivates the reflection in the first place. Korsgaards justification

does not satisfy, according to those internal standards. The need for a


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reason arises from the fact that, when one reflects on ones practical

impulses, their authority for one is suspended, pending the provision of a

justification. The suspension of the authority of the practical reasons that

ordinarily move one in reflection is what motivates the need for a reason

in reflection, hence the search for the practical unconditioned, in the first

place. Clearly then, one cant rely on the authority of those practical reasons

in justifying the authority of the unconditional principle in reflection. The

consideration that, unless one recognizes the authority of the moral

principle, no practical reasons at all have authority may move a given

individual to endorse the moral principle, but the consideration does not

satisfy the need for a reason, insofar as that need is constituted through

practical reflection.

Our examination of Korsgaards arguments has suggested that nothing

satisfies the need for a reason insofar as that need is determined by the

distance opened in reflection between oneself as deliberator and the practical

grounds on which one chooses.21 One finds reasons in reflection, but not

foundational or unconditional reasons, not reasons that make it impossible

or incoherent or unnecessary to question in turn. Hence, the investigation

here suggests what I would like to call the truth of practical skepticism:

that we do not find internal to the stance of reflective scrutiny on the

grounds of our choices a reason that satisfies the demand for an uncon-

ditioned that is internal to such an inquiry.22

Humes discussion of epistemological skepticism in his Treatise, of which

we may be reminded by these considerations, teaches that such skepticism

has an ambiguous moral. Hume shows that, when we take what he calls the

intense view in reflection on the rational grounds of our beliefs, we end in

skepticism. Humes application of the standards internal to the intensely

critical standpoint of rational reflection undermines his natural convictions

and threatens to cast him into doubt and despair. But, as Hume goes on

famously to attest, when he leaves his study to dine or play, as he inevitably

does, the natural force of his ordinary beliefs overwhelms and conquers his

skeptical doubts.23 This calls into question the authority of the standards

internal to the standpoint of intense rational reflection, when it comes to the

daily business of forming and modifying beliefs in response to empirical

evidence. Humes response to skepticism in the epistemological context

poses the following question for our discussion: granted that nothing meets

the standards internal to the standpoint of critical reflection on our practical

impulses, is the appropriate response, perhaps, not despair or nihilism, but

the rejection of the authority of such standards when it comes to the

business of deciding how to act? Or, more generally: having come to doubt

that anything can satisfy our need for an unconditional reason, we may be

motivated to question the exact relation between the standards of satisfac-

tion that hold sway within the standpoint of critical scrutiny (in which

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nothing less than the unconditioned satisfies us) and the more relaxed

standards we employ in our practical reasoning outside the study.

Rather than attempting to tackle this large question that the inquiry has

led us to, I will end by merely pointing to a positive (and to me: attractive)

response to these skeptical considerations that one finds in the tradition. It is

easy to suspect at the root of the need for a reason a felt need to divest

oneself of ones abysmal freedom and responsibility. The critical reflectionon ones practical impulsesas both Korsgaard and Kant describe it

makes one aware of that freedom and responsibility. Simultaneously it

makes one aware of the need for a reason. The reason that answers the

need, could it be provided, would have the effect of divesting one of that

freedom and responsibility. The reason that would answer the need, again,

would be such that no reflective distance between oneself in the standpoint

of reflection and it could be opened again in turn. Hence the reason would

be such as to command independently of ones endorsement, that is,independently of ones taking it as authoritative in the stance of reflection.

This feature is what would mark it out as the desired unconditioned. So

what we want in wanting such a reason, it would seem, is a reason that

cancels our discretionary role in taking reasons as authoritative for us. We

want a reason in reflection recognition of the authority of which is literally

compelled. Our criticism of Korsgaards arguments suggests that no reasons

have that sort of authority.

If this diagnosis is correct, if at the bottom of the need for a reason asconstituted through critical reflection on the grounds of ones choice is a felt

need to be divested of ones role in freely accepting the practical reasons one

takes to be authoritative in ones practical reasoning, then the answer to the

threat of despair and nihilism contained in the procedure of intense

reflective scrutiny is not the vainly sought foundational reason, but faith in

the authority of ones reasons, in the absence of foundational justification of

them.

In the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, which are a late and ambiguousfruit of the tradition of reflection, one finds repeated an image that can be

read as an answer to Kants image for the beginning of practical reflection,

namely, that it places us on the edge of an abyss. Kierkegaard employs

frequently the image of the existing individual as suspended in his activity

over 70,000 fathoms deep.24 Kierkegaard can be taken to express by this

recurrent image that the human individual, who is as such wholly

accountable for how he conducts his life, cannot appeal in reflection to a

foundational justification of the norms which he takes to be authoritative inthought and action. What must suspend him over the abyss in the face of

this recognition, what must prevent his plunging into despair, is the strength

of his faith in the authority of the norms he recognizes, whatever they are. I

suggest that the skeptical considerations raised here imply, not that practical

reasons have no justified authority in our deliberations, but that practical


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reasoning never proceeds to an unconditioned in the sense that we feel in

need of it in that standpoint; that is, our practical reasoning in reflection

never makes unnecessary the leap of faith we are always making in taking

the reasons we recognize to be sufficient and authoritative. Accordingly, I

suggest that full reflection on the conditions of our agency need neither leave

us at the edge of an abyss nor deposit us in the pit of it, but rather may find

us suspended over it by faith in the authority of the reasons we recognize.25

Notes

1. Kant: Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1970) p. 224.

2. See G. W. F. Hegel Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Edited by Allen W. Wood

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Introduction pp. 2564, especially 127,

p. 57.

3. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996) The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora ONeill

(New York: Cambridge University Press). The volume contains, besides Korsgaards

Tanner Lectures, an introduction by ONeill, responses to the lectures by G. A. Cohen,

Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a set of replies by

Korsgaard. I will indicate page references to this volume (abbreviated SN) in the body of

the text.

4. Korsgaard claims that the normative question must be posed from the first-person

standpoint at SN pp. 1516.

5. I ascribe the following conception of rational agency to Korsgaard partly on the strength

of her discussion in a more recent article: Christine M. Korsgaard (1999) Self-

constitution in the ethics of Plato and Kant Journal of Ethics Vol. 3, pp. 129.

6. I proceed on the assumption of this interpretation of the moment of endorsement despite

passages that suggest the psychological construal, because endorsement construed

psychologically seems to me a non-starter for any account of the source or nature of

practical normativity. Given that the psychological act of endorsement is contingent,

how does the normative demand enter the account on the psychological construal?

Suppose the answer is: when (or if) one reflects, then one needs a reason, i.e., there must

be the dateable act of endorsement in order for action to occur, as a matter of the way

our reflective minds actually, contingently work. But this construal of Korsgaards point

implies too drastic a restriction on the norm-governed domain of human actions-for-

reasons and, what comes with this, an unacceptably revisionist account of that domain.

Speaking for myself, I do not very often back up from motives and endorse them in

reflection before proceeding to act on them. Moreover, it is clear that whether I do or

not makes no difference to whether I am the responsible author of the resulting action

nor to whether I am on the hook for the provision of justifying reasons, should their

provision be called for. Whereas the haphazard fact of psychological endorsement has

no promise or attraction as the beginning point of an account of practical normativity,

the moment of endorsement construed as an internal component of the representation

of an action as authored, as an action on the basis of reasons, is a promising beginning

for an account of the normative domain with significant antecedents in the tradition of

reflection. For a discussion of the relation of Korsgaards moment of endorsement

not so calledto Kants necessity of a possibility of attaching the I think to any

representation that counts as mine, see Mark Okrent (1999) Heidegger and Korsgaard

on human reflection Philosophical Topics Vol.27, pp. 4854. (I thank an anonymous

referee of the paper for prompting me to expand my discussion on this point. Also, I am

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indebted to Barbara Herman for a very thought-provoking discussion of an earlier

version of the paper that helped me in particular to improve this part of it.)

7. Hegel describes this as the right of the subjective will: The right of the subjective will

is that whatever it is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good, and that it

should be held responsible for an action as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or

illegal, according to its cognizance [Kenntnis] of the value which that action has in this

objectivity (Hegel Elements of the Philosophy of Right 1132, p. 158). Further, in the

Anmerkung: The right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is the

highest right of the subject

8. Korsgaard expresses the view that obligations are, as such, always unconditional at

SN p. 103.

9. Kant does not argue in this way from the idea of the free will to the categorical

imperative as its principle in the opening of the Third Section of his Groundwork of the

Metaphysics of Morals. Kant makes the transition from the negative definition of the

free will (the will not determined by anything external) to the positive (the will governed

by its own law, which is the categorical imperative) on the basis of the concept of

causality, which brings with it, he claims, that of laws. (See Immanuel Kant Groundwork

of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998) pp. 5253, (Akademie edition of Kants works, Volume 4,

pp. 446447).) Korsgaard does not suggest that Kants argument is that represented in

the paragraph above. However, I think it is helpful to see how Kant could arrive at his

unconditioned practical principle from within the standpoint of practical reflection on

grounds of choice that Korsgaard insists on, and which is, according to her, the

standpoint from within which the practical problem is discovered in the first place.

10. Korsgaard does not note that this is a distinct form of self-consciousness from that

discussed earlier. I comment on the distinction directly and draw out its implications

below.

11. According to my interpretation of Korsgaards position, the principles expressing a

persons practical identities have unconditional authority for that person just in virtue of

the fact that there is no reflective distance for that person between the I of which he is

conscious in the reflective stance and those principles. And that the principles express

practical identity implies this lack of reflective distance. However, others interpret

Korsgaard differently, and there are resources in her text for doing so. Her justification

of moral obligations implies that, if a persons practical identity is in and of itself

contradictory to the value of humanity, then its claims are not normative for him (SN

p. 126). Taking his cue both from Korsgaards recognition of a condition on the

normativity of the demands of a practical identity and from passages that suggest that in

deciding how to live we must choose between the conflicting practical identities that are

available to us, Christopher Gowans takes Korsgaards position to be that an act of will

is necessary in order to make a practical identity strongly normative for the person,

where a strongly normative practical identity is distinguished as a source of those

obligations the respect for which gives real worth to our lives. (See Christopher

Gowans (2002) Practical identities and autonomy: Korsgaards reformation of Kants

moral philosophy Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol.64, p.551).

According to Gowans, in order to answer her over-arching question, Korsgaard needs

to tell us how a contingent practical identity can be strongly normative for the person

whose identity it is (p. 551). But, supposing this challenge is motivated, the prospects

that Korsgaard will be able successfully to meet it are dim. Having backed up in

practical reflection to the articulation of practical identity, weve backed up to the edge

of the existential precipice, as it were. The only higher principle is the moral principle,

and it is useless as a criterion if our choice is between morally permissible, but

conflicting, practical identities. Also, the claim that we ought to prioritize that identity


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which in fact matters most to us obviously begs the question Gowans presses, which is

why one practical identity ought to matter more to us than another, granted that those

we choose among are all morally permissible.

On my reading, Korsgaards account does not have this problem, since, as I read her,

principles expressing a persons practical identity are unconditionally binding on the

person just by virtue of the fact that they express the persons practical identity. Gowans

reading ignores the normative significance of the fact that what is at stake in conforming

to obligations for Korsgaard is ones identity. How a person came to have the particular,

contingent practical identities she in fact has is not relevant to the normativity of their

demands; that the demands express the persons identity constitutes their special

normativity.

Of course, my interpretation of Korsgaards view avoids Gowans challenge only by

opening the view to other challenges. In particular, if principles expressing a persons

practical identities are simply as such unconditionally authoritative for her, then how can

we understand those demands as being conditioned by their conformity to moral

principles? In fact, Korsgaard maintains that, since obligations are always uncondi-

tional, moral obligations do not always trump other obligations: Conflicting

obligations can both be unconditional; thats just one of the ways in which human life

is hard (SN p. 126). Nevertheless, some of Korsgaards statements clearly conflict with

the view that the demands of a persons practical identity are simply as such

unconditionally binding on the person. Again, the conclusion of her argument justifying

moral obligations is that practical conceptions of your identity which are fundamen-

tally inconsistent with the value of humanity must be given up (SN p. 130). Further, she

claims: obligation is always unconditional, but it is only when it concerns really

important matters that it is deep (SN p. 103). An obligation is unconditional as

expressing ones identity. But Korsgaard also writes: some parts of our identity are

easily shed, and when they come into conflict with more fundamental parts of our

identity, they should be shed (SN p. 102, my emphasis). This certainly seems to express

the following condition on the authority of any principle that expresses ones practical

identity: the condition that there be no principle with which the given principle conflicts

which expresses a more fundamental part of ones identity.

In short, Korsgaards position in her Tanner lectures with respect to the question of

whether the demands of a practical identity are simply as such obligatory seems not to be

completely fixed. I pursue the reading I do here because of my interest in examining

Korsgaards view as re-animating a project of the tradition of reflection.

12. Korsgaard herself argues in the more recent publication referred to above (Self-

Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant) that the principle that expresses the self-

consciousness of the free or self-determining agent is solely the categorical imperative.

She expresses the conclusion of her argument as follows: To put the point in familiar

Kantian terms, we can only attach I will to our choices if we will our maxims as

universal laws. The categorical imperative is an internal standard for actions, because

conformity to it is constitutive of an exercise of the will, of an action of the person, as

opposed to an action of something within him (p. 27). According to Korsgaards

position in the Tanner Lectures, in contrast, the authority of a principle that expresses

some particular practical identity of yours is as such (that is, as expressing your practical

self-conception, whatever it is) beyond question. Further, you are autonomous in acting

from such a principle by virtue of the fact that it expresses your practical self-conception.

The argument Korsgaard runs in the Self-Constitution paper implies that no contingent

practical content is suited to express practical self-consciousness immediately, because

all such content is subject to the condition of being able to have the I will attached to

it (that is, of being willed as a universal law). If this constraint is an empty formalism,

then practical self-consciousness imposes no constraint. The principle that expresses

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practical self-consciousness must be a pure, or formal, principle; it cannot be infected

with contingent content.

13. The distinction between the two sorts of self-consciousness is roughly that which Sartre

famously draws between what he calls thetic (reflective) and what he calls non-thetic

(unreflective) self-consciousness. (See Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel

Barnes [New York: Washington Square Press, 1956] pp. 917.) But Sartre does not

claim, unlike others in the tradition, that a principle expressing non-thetic self-

consciousness is a highest principle for either theory or practice. The original source of

the distinction, presumably, is Kants discussion in his transcendental deduction of the

categories, where, in the context of arguing that a principle expressing self-consciousness

is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge, he distinguishes

between empirical self-consciousness and pure or original or transcendental self-

consciousness, which latter is alone suited to serve as a governing principle (see Critique

of Pure Reason. Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1998] B131-140).

14. See Korsgaards discussion in her essay Kants Formula of Humanity in Christine M.

Korsgaard (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press) pp. 110114.

15. See SN pp. 120125.

16. Thus Korsgaard writes, in the midst of the argument: It is because we are such animals

[that is, animals who need practical conceptions of their own identity, conceptions which

are normative for them] that our practical identities are normative for us, and, once you

see this, you must take this more fundamental identity, being such an animal, to be

normative as well (SN p. 123, my emphasis).

17. In addition to bringing with it the original problem, this conditional analysis suggests

another. The conditional suggests that the pressure on my identities will be felt only

insofar as I engage in the activity of reflection. This fact accounts for the much

chronicled human tendency to evade Socratic questioning of our values. The call to

justify our values in reflection rouses in us anxiety and resistance, even if we consider

ourselves relatively good persons, because we fear that the failure to justify will put

pressure upon us to change or will deprive us of the practical guidance and orientation in

our lives that we derive from reliance on our uncriticized values. Granted that the

activity of reflection itself threatens our identity, if we adopt Korsgaards claim that an

obligation consists in a threat to ones identity, must we not acknowledge, not merely a

temptation, but an obligation, to refrain from this activity?

18. We see Korsgaard trying to keep a firm grasp on this conception of normativity in her

response to one of Cohens objections at the end of her Repliesand failing, I think.

Gerald Cohen objects in his response to Korsgaards lectures that, if the force of a

practical obligation just consists in ones identity being at stake in the demanded action,

then a Mafioso who is motivated by his Mafioso identity to do some hideous thing

required by the Mafia code of hono

Bristow, William F - Self-Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom

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