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PROFILING AMMUNITION SEIZED AT BORDER CONTROLS AND RECOVERED FROM CRIME SCENES ACROSS LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Briefing Paper I: The Dominican Republic Case Study and Methodology

PROFILING AMMUNITION SEIZED AT BORDER CONTROLS AND RECOVERED FROM CRIME SCENES ACROSS LATIN

AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Developmentin Latin America and the Caribbean

Briefing Paper I: The Dominican Republic Case Study and Methodology

Table of ContentsAbout UNLIRECAcknowledgementsIntroduction to the Series: Profiling Ammunition Seized at Border Controls and Recovered from Crime Scenes across Latin America and the Caribbean

A. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIONB. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVESC. DEFINITIONSD. BACKGROUND LITERATURE

Briefing Paper I: The Dominican Republic Case Study and Methodology

Part I: Scope and methodology of the Dominican Republic case study.1. SCOPE2. METHODOLOGY3. RESEARCHERS’ NOTES AND STUDY LIMITATIONS

Part II: The Dominican Republic public security context and normative framework.1. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PUBLIC SECURITY CONTEXT2. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND IMPORTING REQUIREMENTS3. CASE STUDY: HOW DO WE FIND MEANING IN A FACT?4. QUALITATIVE OBSERVATIONS (A WINDOW INTO THE SOCIETY)5. KEY FINDINGS, TRENDS, AND ANALYSIS

Part III: Main conclusions and policy recommendations for improving public security.1. MAIN CONCLUSIONS + POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: WHICH COMPLEMENTARY INTERVENTIONS SEEM APPROPRIATE?2. MOVING FORWARD: A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES

ANNEXAnnex A: Map with location and time: where and when evidence was collected?

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COPYRIGHT NOTICE

This document is intellectual property protected by the UN. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, for any purpose, without prior permission in writing from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), acting as a representative body of the United Nations. This document is not for sale.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the CaribbeanComplejo Javier Pérez de CuéllarAv. Pérez Araníbar 750Magdalena del MarLima 17 Perú

Email: programme@unlirec.orgTelephone: (+51) (1) 625 9130©UNLIREC 2018 – All rights reserved

NOTICE

This is a working document and is subject to regular revisions, updates, corrections, and changes. Interested readers and users should consult the UNLIREC Public Security webpage (http://www.unlirec.org/) to check for regular updates.

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About UNLIREC AcknowledgementsThe United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), headquartered in Lima Peru, was created by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/41/60 J in 1986. It serves as the only UN regional entity specialized in disarmament and non-proliferation in Latin America and the Caribbean.

UNLIREC works to meet the needs of 33 States from Latin America and the Caribbean in the field of disarmament and arms control, in coordination with local, national, regional, and international partners. The UNLIREC instead of The Regional Centre contributes to improving public security, promoting confidence-building measures, assisting in the design of public policies, and supporting implementation of international instruments through the following initiatives:

• Builds the capacity of security sector personnel (law enforcement agencies and Armed Forces) and legal officers in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking.

• Provides technical assistance in the destruction of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and in managing stockpile facilities.

• Supports the integration of arms control measures and public security frameworks for the reduction of armed violence.

• Guides the creation of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms and national firearms policies.

• Provides legal assistance on normative frameworks related to firearms, ammunition and explosives.

UNLIREC seeks to advance the cause of practical disarmament the region as part of its commitment to support Member States in their implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN 2001 PoA).

This series of briefing papers will directly contribute to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 - to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. Target 16.4 seeks to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime. The achievement of this target would contribute to a reduction in all forms of violence and assist governments and communities to find lasting solutions to public insecurity. The strengthening of the justice sector and the rule of law are direct products of reinforcing the capacities of relevant professionals in the face of the challenges posed by armed violence and illicit trafficking in firearms and ammunition.

UNLIREC embarked upon the development of the present Series in response to requests from Latin American and Caribbean Member States to support national efforts in the fight against illicit trafficking of explosives. This effort was made possible thanks to the generous financial support from the Government of Germany.

The working version of the Series was spearheaded by Manuel Martinez and Alfredo Malaret. Important contributions were made by the following UNLIREC staff and consultants: Ignacio Bollier, Rodolfo Gamboa, Amanda Cowl, Ian Ruddock, Philip Boyce, Daniel Mack, Mark Mastaglio, and Arabeska Sanchez. Additionally, significant comments and contributions were provided by Axel Manthei, developer and owner of the CartWinPro Ammunition Database, Jonah Leff and James Bevan from Conflict Armament Research, and Luis Antonio Loayza from the Peruvian National Police.

UNLIREC owes particular appreciation to the Dominican Republic and their representatives. Their openness, transparency, support, and political will to explore untapped sources of information made this first Briefing Paper possible. In particular, we would like to express our gratitude to all the men and women who serve in the Dominican Republic National Police Ballistic Laboratory for their hospitality and relentless comittment.

Introduction to the Series: Profiling Ammunition Seized at Border Controls and Recovered from Crime Scenes across Latin America and the CaribbeanThis introduction presents The Series and outlines the motivation and objectives behind this effort, as well as offers some key definitions and highlights important takeaways from background literature.A. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

Armed violence in many Latin America and the Caribbean is too high and international attention too limited. Particularly troubling is that ammunition proliferation and use seem to have been generally relegated to the sidelines of policy-relevant debates. Considering that bullets are the ultimate accomplice in most armed violence lethal outcomes, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) has endeavoured to conduct a series of case studies aimed at sketching a profile of ammunition used in criminal activity across Latin America and the Caribbean, one country at a time.

Ammunition profiling is “the compilation of data on the various types of cartridges documented on site, with particular focus on calibre, production facility, and year of manufacture— [for] piecing together the sources and supply chain for ammunition

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circulating in conflict situations.”1 This series is an attempt to apply ammunition profiling methods, usually carried out in conflict settings, to diverse public security contexts. UNLIREC embarks in this endeavour with a view to shed light on the murky trail behind illicit ammunition proliferation, which is an enabling factor in armed violence. After all, the death toll from armed violence in public security contexts accounts for most global lethal outcomes due to violence. In fact, it dwarfs that of direct battlefield deaths, yet international attention to public security pales in comparison.2 This series is indeed, at its core, a pursuit to profile ammunition in illicit circulation; however, it is also an international call for urgent care. Ending criminal use of ammunition is owed to the millions of lives taken by bullets, and to those for whom bullets have taken a part of their life.

Latin America and the Caribbean represent only 9 percent of the world’s population, yet account for approximately 32 percent of all recorded homicides.3 The region has an average homicide rate of 24 per 100,000 people, which is about four times the world average.4 In many countries, homicides have reached, and maintained, epidemic proportions.5 National homicide rates, however, do not necessarily reflect the true extent of armed violence as experienced in the major cities of the Latin American and Caribbean. In 2017, for example, Latin America and the Caribbean, according to the Citizens’ Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice, was home to 10 of the top 10 – and 43 of the top 50 – world’s most violent cities.6 What is more, a different study by the Igarapé Institute, arrived at a similar conclusion: in 2016, 10 out of the top 10 - and 42 of the top 50 –most homicidal cities in the planet were located in the region.7 The methodologies, ranking, and cities differ in these studies, but the overall picture remains the same. Remarkably, within cities, most homicides occur in a handful of urban settings; particular locations, a proportion of blocks or street segments, reveal a higher predisposition for lethal violence than others. In other words, homicides around the region could be hyper-concentrating in so-called urban hotspots. A 2016 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) finds that, in a sample of five cities from the region, 50 percent of crimes are concentrated in 3 to

7.5 percent of street segments, and 25 percent of crimes are concentrated in 0.5 to 2.9 percent of street segments.8

Moreover, firearms are more frequently used in homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean than elsewhere in the world. According to the Igarapé Institute, in 2016, firearms were recorded to have been used in approximately 67 percent of homicides in Central America and Mexico, 53 percent in South America, and 51 percent in the Caribbean. In comparison, on average, firearms were used in 32 percent of homicides at the global level.9 Considering that most homicides in the region are perpetrated with firearms, it seems fair to conclude that societies awash in illicit firearms and ammunition are likely to generate detrimental conditions for public security and, consequently, for development.

The fundamental motivation behind this attempt to profile, and move a step closer to trace, small-calibre ammunition is best explained by the Small Arms Survey (SAS) in their 2008 Ammunition Tracing Kit, stating,

“Ammunition is a rapidly consumable good. During… high rates of crime, it is used up quickly and needs to be replenished often. In this context, controlling the supply of ammunition can have a more immediate impact on armed violence than can the control over weapons.”10

A different SAS research paper adds “Ammunition matters, because it is half the small arms equation. It is half of the problem, and precisely one half of that problem is currently being ignored.”11 Ammunition profiling could also help reduce armed, because it enables better understanding of the phenomenon and provides evidence for accurate controls and sensible policy-making. While tracing single rounds, tracking its lifespan to identify the exact diversion point of the ammunition used in criminal activity, is difficult, the more comprehensive the profile is, the closer are the interested parties to uncovering these diversion points and the responsibility borne by the actors participating in the illicit supply chain.12

Only once trafficking circuits are deciphered, can leakages be halted. It is hoped that the methodology tested, data generated, and resulting conclusions from this “Series”, will deepen the understanding of the issue and assist government officials, diplomats, activists, and researchers to tailor measures aimed at reducing the supply of ammunition reaching unauthorized end-users. It is also hoped that the series generates a debate and triggers recognition of the need for further research focusing on ammunition proliferation and use.

This series will pursue access to primary sources of information, which have often remained untapped and full of potential to generate strategic and tactical intelligence. To complete this series, UNLIREC researchers will partner with national authorities and analyse ballistics evidence recovered from crime scenes. In general, the data will be extracted from ballistics exhibits and will include, but not be limited to, calibre, manufacturer, headstamp markings (alphanumerical codes, year of manufacture, manufacturer, lot numbers, symbols, and colours), cartridge length, and physical

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composition. Information will be complemented by any available documents or reports from the crime scene. In some cases, when the sample has not been systematized, this means sorting through the individual pieces of physical evidence, within evidence storage facilities, and classifying it. In other cases, it will require examining police reports and internal documents from the forensic ballistics laboratories. In the best of cases, it will be a combination. UNLIREC researchers will also pursue to complete the profile by studying reports from seizures and confiscations carried out by customs authorities, intelligence services, law-enforcement, and the armed forces. Ideally, the compiled information will be cross-referenced with national import records, allocation of ammunition lots, official stockpiles, national procurement authorizations, commercial armoury availability, and other relevant and available contextual information. In all case studies that follow, the combination of information will vary, but the aim will remain the same: putting together the most comprehensive profile of ammunition used in criminal activity as possible, one case(ing) at a time.

B. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of this series are as follows:

• Raise international awareness on the resulting impact that ammunition proliferation has in undermining public security and, consequently, development efforts.

• Contribute to public security with evidence-based conclusions. - Broaden the understanding of illicit ammunition proliferation and use. - Make primary data accessible for other researchers to continue exploring the phenomenon. - Partner with national authorities to translate research conclusions into actionable policy recommendations.

• Develop a replicable methodology of data systematization that enables interested parties to establish trends, patterns, and probable diversion points of ammunition used in criminal activity.

• Test the data systematization methodology by examining real-case scenarios: - Sketch a profile of ammunition circulating in determined public security contexts, based on collected, seized, or recovered ammunition, spent cartridges cases and bullets from crime scenes. - Collect enough information information for a representative sample of the universe under scrutiny, departing from anecdotal evidence. - Tap into unexplored sources of information to produce original datasets. - Present the limitations of each case study so that future research efforts can improve upon this series.

• Position the methodology as a policy tool for national partners to generate big-picture intelligence in the fight against firearms-related crime.

- Generate a catalytic effect by jumpstarting a regional movement that replicates this examination.

C. DEFINITIONSFor this series UNLIREC has decided to adhere to the following definitions for key terms. Unless specified otherwise, these were taken verbatim from the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).13

UNLIREC embarks on this endeavour with a view to shed light on the murky trail behind illicit ammunition proliferation, which is an enabling factor in armed violence.

After all, the death toll from armed violence in public security contexts accounts for most global lethal outcomes due to violence. In fact, it dwarfs that of direct battlefield deaths, yet international attention to public security pales in comparison.

This series is indeed, at its core, pursuit to profile ammunition in illicit circulation; however, it is also an international call for urgent care.

Ending criminal use of ammunition is owed to the millions of lives taken by bullets, and to those for whom bullets have taken a part of their life.

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Ammunition: the complete round round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in a firearm, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorization in the respective State Party.14

Cartridge case: an item which is designed to hold an ammunition primer and propellant and to which a projectile may be affixed; its profile and size conform to the chamber of the weapon in which the round is fired. [In pursuit of simplicity, UNLIREC will only use the term cartridge case in this series when the projectile is no longer affixed to the casing].

Headstamp: A cartridge headstamp is the marking on the base of a cartridge casing that surrounds the primer cup. In the case of a rimfire cartridge, the headstamp covers the entire casing base.15 Commonly, numbers or letters [or symbols] are stamped into the base of a cartridge case by the manufacturer in order to identify the cartridge and its original loading.16

Marking: the application of marks – including colours, descriptive text and symbols – to munitions, parts and components thereof, and associated packaging, for the purposes of identifying, among other things, their role, operational features, age; and the potential hazards posed by those munitions.

Projectile: an object capable of being propelled by force normally from a gun, and continuing in motion by virtue of its kinetic energy. [Also referred to as a bullet within the context of firearms. See ammunition definition. This Series will privilege the use of the term bullet.]

Small arms ammunition (SAA) less than 20mm calibre: consists of cartridges used in rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, submachine guns, and machine guns and shells used in shotguns, which are less than 20mm calibre. [This study will also refer to small-calibre ammunition; as most existent literature uses the latter term to refer to ammunition smaller than 20mm calibre].

Small arm: any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive. NOTE 1: Includes, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition. NOTE 2: Excludes antique small arms and their replicas. [Small arms can also be referred to as firearms. This series will privilege the use of the firearm.]

Stockpile: a large, accumulated stock of explosive ordnance. Often used interchangeably the term ‘stock’ or to denote the ammunition retained in a specific ammunition storage facility or depot. (c.f. stock; c.f. national stockpile).

Tracing: the systematic tracking of illicit ammunition from the point of its manufacture or import, through the lines of supply, to the point at which it became illicit.

Figure 1

Small Arms Ammunition

Projectile/Bullet

Cartridgecase

Headstampand headstamp

markings

X X X

X X

X X X

X X

Co

mp

lete

sm

all-

calib

ream

mu

niti

on

Source: Small Arms Survey

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maintains that, “Examples of large-scale diversion include the former Soviet Union countries and more recently Iraq and Libya. Where accounting and accountability break down, diversion at grand scale may flourish.”25 These studies argue for proper and safe ammunition stockpile management, and evidence the need to minimize surplus stocks.

In another 2014 paper, SAS assessed the possible origins of small-calibre ammunition found in the Syrian conflict by examining the headstamps of recovered exhibits. That report pointed to state-to-state transfers as the probable origin for the bulk of the cartridges documented.26 Additionally, it found evidence of external supply of ammunition after the outbreak of hostilities.27 A similar effort by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 2017, entitled ‘Weapons of the Islamic State’, notes that ammunition dating from the 2010-2017 period accounted for more than 15 percent of the group’s documented ammunition.28 Both studies suggest similar broad patterns in the origins of ammunition manufacturers, and, importantly, note that - after the outbreak of violence - ammunition transfers continued to flow.

It becomes clear from previous efforts that, even if limited, baseline information can be used to identify the sources feeding criminal networks, whether that is from insufficiently regulated national production, complicit diversion from law enforcement, leakages from surplus stockpiles, or state-to-state transfers. Certainly, the information collected through these efforts has revealed diversion points and identified detrimental dynamics affecting human security in the different contexts; while its analysis yielded sensible prescriptive measures to control unauthorized ammunition proliferation and combat its criminal use.

D. BACKGROUND LITERATURE

A growing body of research has been devoted to tracing ammunition found in armed conflict to their origin. This series drew from past experience and and adapted to fit methodologies to fit a public security context.17

However, most efforts focussing on loose small-calibre ammunition tracing usually run into obstacles. That is to say, a situation that “imposes limitations on analysis, because loose small-calibre ammunition is rarely marked with lot numbers, which are required to identify specific ammunition consignments in production or export records. The required information is generally marked on ammunition boxes.”18

Furthermore, small-calibre ammunition is, more often than not, recovered from violent events without the factory boxes or packaging, which would have essential information to determine its origin.19 Nonetheless, despite the difficulties in tracing small-arms ammunition, several research efforts have created comprehensive ammunition datasets, in a myriad of settings, that revealed detrimental dynamics to human security.

The most relevant work for this series has been the ‘Analysis of Seized of Ammunitionin the State of Rio de Janeiro’ (2014-2017) carried out by the Brazilian Sou Da Paz Institute.20 One of the main findings of this study is that 42 percent of the illicit ammunition seized in 2014 had been manufactured domestically by the Companhia Brasilera de Cartuchos (CBC). Thus putting forward evidence on the need for better oversight of national production and trade, and arguing for enhanced marking practices. Another important finding is that 22 percent of the ammunition seized corresponded to rifle calibres. Noting the prevalence of the 7.62mm calibre which is, “used in AK and FN FAL rifles [the latter] utilized by the Brazilian Armed Forces.”21 This study offers the conclusion that to prevent armed violence, it is essential to stop the flows of ammunition reaching unauthorized hands and hold the supply chain that feeds the illicit trade accountable.

Other studies have gone further and exposed the role that state security forces play in feeding illicit markets. One 2008 SAS study reveals, based largely on ammunition profiles, a systematic operation from the Kenyan national police of supplying ammunition to the Turkana pastoralist communities.22 A similar 2007 SAS study in the region of northern Uganda found evidence of complicit transfers from security forces to the Karimojong warriors. Relatedly, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, this latter study found that criminal gangs had accessed assault rifle ammunition, in principle of restricted use and mostly held by the security forces. The evidence was insufficient to suggest complicit trade, however it pointed to the police as the most likely source of diversion.23

A 2014 SAS paper, examining active conflicts settings, found that “…more than half [of the ammunition samples collected] were produced during the cold war. This highlights the role old stockpiles of small-calibre ammunition continue to play in armed conflict and underlines the relevance of efforts to reduce aging surpluses.”24 Similarly, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, in a 2016 report,

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Briefing Paper I: The Dominican Republic Case Study and MethodologyPart I:Scope and methodology of the Dominican Republic case study.This section also includes important notes from the researchers and signals the limitations of this case studyThe Dominican Republic was chosen as the first public security context to carry out a case study in this series for two main reasons. First and foremost, the high level of openness, political will, and support for the ammunition profiling initiative. National authorities considered this initiative of paramount importance to complement their efforts aimed at combatting the scourge of armed violence. Second, national requirements pertaining to ammunition imports. According to national legislation, all ammunition legally imported into the country, for the civilian market, must be marked with a four-letter code. The first two letters being “RD” (country code), the third letter identifying the importer (each armoury authorized to import ammunition has been assigned a unique letter), and the fourth letter corresponds to the authorized ammunition lot. This presented a unique opportunity since the following hypothesis could be tested: if ammunition marking is required upon importation, and data from headstamps could be systematically collected, researchers would be able to track loose small-calibre ammunition and perhaps point to some diversion points. The combination of openness and demonstrable hypothesis presented the ideal scenario for the first step in the objectives of the series. The Dominican Republic case study follows.

1. SCOPE

The scope of the Dominican Republic case study consists, largely, of two different sets of primary data. The first is ammunition seized at border controls in 2017. The second is ammunition and its components recovered from crimes scenes in 2017. The earlier dataset sheds light on ammunition trafficking, while the latter on criminal end-use of ammunition. Considering that the data that could be extracted from each universe varied considerably, both datasets were compiled and analysed separately.

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The first dataset used for the Dominican Republic case study was put together from reports collected by the General Customs Agency (DGA in Spanish) on ammunition seized at border controls during 2017. The seizures took place in two main locations: airport controls and port controls. UNLIREC partnered with the DGA to access their files and then examined both the reports submitted after each detected trafficking incident, as well as the pictures of the seized ammunition. UNLIREC researchers were able to document and systematize 15,898 complete rounds of ammunition belonging to 48 separate trafficking cases in 2017. From the files of seized ammunition at border controls, UNLIREC researchers extracted and compiled, when available, the following information:

• date of interception,• flow (outflow or inflow), • exact country of origin and/or destination, • place of interception, • gender of trafficker(s), • concealment method, • exact amount in rounds of ammunition, • calibres trafficked, • brand of ammunition, • outcome of interception, and; • any available police-intelligence generated from the seizure.

The second dataset of information for this case study was constructed one case(ing) at a time.

The overwhelming majority of recovered ballistics evidence from firearms-related crimes committed in the Dominican Republic is submitted for analysis to the Ballistics Identification Unit of the Scientific Police. Hence, UNLIREC partnered with the Scientific Police and accessed all recovered ammunition and components from crimes perpetrated in 2017. This second dataset, as well as its processing methodology and subsequent analysis, will be far more in-depth than the previous one due to the fact that UNLIREC researchers had full access to the raw evidence rather than only reports on it.

The universe of information found in the storage facility was divided into two segments: physical evidence and accompanying documents. The physical evidence consisted of complete rounds of ammunition, spent cartridge cases, and bullets recovered from the either the scene under investigation or a person (wounded or deceased). It is important to note that most bullets were severely damaged or fragmented and thus offered limited data. The accompanying documents consisted of police records, notes from first responders, and/or forensic ballistics reports.

UNLIREC researchers were able to document and systematize 4,123 individual pieces of physical evidence (termed ‘exhibits’ for brevity) belonging to 1,061 separate crime scenes from 2017. From the physical evidence, in cases with complete rounds of

ammunition and spent cartridges, when available, UNLIREC researchers extracted and compiled the following information:

• any and all literal headstamp markings available, including: - import codes, year of manufacture, manufacturer and symbols.

• calibre,• colours,• length of case, and; case, and;• ferrous or non-ferrous.

Beyond the recovered ammunition, , it was possible to extract the following public security relevant data from the accompanying documentation, when available: • date of the crime,• location of the crime,• time of the crime,• perpetrator´s intention,• outcome of the crime (harm caused),• gender of victim,• gender of perpetrator and;• any available police-intelligence generated from the scene of the crime.

To complement and contextualize the primary data obtained from evaluating both datasets, UNLIREC was also able to access additional information from government documents. Researchers accessed tallies of ammunition seized in 2017 by the Division of Military Intelligence and the allocation of the four-letter import codes to the different commercial armouries, as well as some ammunition allocation lots by the Ministry of Interior and Police (MIP).

The data and analysis of these two universes of information will be presented in the next section, but first the methodology employed to systemize and extract the data will be discussed and some limitations will be put forward.

2. METHODOLOGY

In general, the methodology undertaken for this case study employed a Fact -> Meaning -> Action approach to the field of public security research. In a nutshell, the methodology entailed the following:

• How do we find a fact? By collecting primary data and systematising the information extracted from either recovered ammunition and its components or seized ammunitions, complemented by the accompanying documents. The primary data collected is then considered an undisputable fact, bearing in mind that it is a representative sample of the existing universe of information.

• How do we find meaning in a fact? By analysing the data collected to interpret

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what dynamics (i.e. trends, supply chain actors, origin, or patterns) may lie behind the systematised information. Thus reaching conclusions and sketching a profile of the context under examination.29

• With an interpretation at hand, which complementary interventions seem appropriate? Based on the interpretation of the primary data and in-house public security expertise, researchers developed a set of context-specific recommendations to counter some of the identified detrimental dynamics to public security.

2.1 Data Collection: How did we find a fact?In terms of methodology, UNLIREC researchers carried out a desk analysis of the DGA files, and systematically extrapolated relevant information from the official reports into a Workbook. The data points extracted from the DGA reports and systematised in the Workbook are the ones mentioned in the Scope segment, and together form the vis-a-vis ammunition seized at borders in 2017..

In addition, to find a fact regarding ammunition and its components recovered from crime scenes in 2017, the methodology required a field mission carried out by a task force commissioned to build the second dataset from scratch. Consequently, UNLIREC deployed three researches, for a two-week period, to the Dominican Republic to collect and systematise primary data from the evidence storage facility of the Scientific Police. UNLIREC researchers partnered with national authorities, and were granted full access to the storage facility to carry out the collection of primary data. The ballistics evidence in the storage facility was divided by national districts and year. UNLIREC researchers only considered evidence from crimes committed in 2017 and accepted, at face value, the geographical classification according to national districts employed by the Scientific Police. The evidence had a second key subdivision, between ‘solved’30 and open cases. UNLIREC researches examined both solved and open cases. A detailed explanation of how the second dataset was built follows:

To process and systematise such large amounts of raw data in only two weeks, UNLIREC designed a social science ‘production line’ where each researcher had an exclusive task, and all tasks were linked in a sequential circular order. That is, Researcher #1 would locate all evidence packages that fit under the scope of the study, district by district and would then hand over a determined evidence package to Researcher #2. Researcher #2 would then open the box or envelope and remove all evidential contents from the package, whether ballistics evidence or official documentation, or both. Researcher #2 would then proceed to examine the ballistics evidence and circulate the official documents to Researcher #3, who would examine, in parallel, any and all documentation available. To aid in the extraction of data from ballistics exhibits, Researcher #2 relied upon UNLIREC’s Ammunition Gauge31, magnifying glasses, a microscope, and a dirt-removing brush. After assessing both the physical evidence and the documents, Researcher #2 would read aloud the data extracted from each individual piece of physical evidence to Researcher #3, who would type the findings in an Excel Workbook. Researcher #3 would also type, in the same Excel Workbook, any public security-related a extracted from the documentation available. The data extracted from both the physical evidence and documents is the one mentioned in the above Scope segment, making up the second dataset.

Figure 2

Production Line. Profiling Ammuniton in the Dominican Republic

Select & OrganizeEvidence Packages

Register ProcessedEvidence Packages

Handover Evidence Packagesto National Authorities

Examine Documentation

Type Findings

Researcher #2

Researcher #3Researcher #1

Open Evidence Package

Examine Ballistics Evidence

Repackage, Reseal & StampEvidence Package

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Finally, to conclude, Researcher #3 reviewed systematized data from that particular evidence package, Researcher #2 would repackage, reseal, and re-stamp the evidence box or envelope. As soon as this process was completed, Researcher #3 would hand over the package to Researcher #1. To assure meticulous record-keeping and transparency, Researcher #1 would then note, in an internal document, the case number, date, district, as well as the number of physical pieces of evidence that came from that particular evidence package and the number of physical pieces of evidence that were put back in their original packaging. This document was reviewed and signed by a national representative from the Scientific Police and by the head of the UNLIREC task force. Original copies are kept at the storage facility in the Dominican Republic, as well as in UNLIREC’s internal filing system. Finally, Researcher #1 would store that particular evidence package where it was found in the storage facility, coming full cycle in the production line. Researcher #1 would then restart the cycle by handing over one new evidence package to researcher #2. This process was repeated with 1,061 evidence packages, equivalent to the 1,061-armed violence cases that form this second dataset. During this process, personnel from the Ballistics Identification unit of the Scientific Police monitored and supported the work of the researchers, providing valuable assistance when needed.

The box below describes some of the health and safety measures that UNLIREC adheres to in order to safeguard the physical integrity of those manipulating ballistics evidence. To replicate the ammunition profiling initiative in public security contexts, UNLIREC encourages all interested parties to consider and construct upon the health and safety measures, as well as the ‘production line’ methodology. This approach allowed for the safe documentation of 4,123 pieces of physical evidence in two weeks.

Generic health and safety measures for researchers collecting and examining small-calibre ammunition:

• In all cases, it should be determined whether the ammunition is in appropriate conditions for collection at the beginning of the cycle. If it appears to be defective, it is of vital importance to avoid picking it up or handling it until it is examined by a ballistics expert who determines how to proceed and collects it under appropriate conditions.

• Ammunition may be contaminated with various chemicals or biological traces; therefore, gloves (preferably nitrile) should be worn at all times, along with goggles, face mask, and a protective suit.

• In cases of chemical residue, care must be taken during the collection and handling processes, preferably notifying forensic chemistry experts to assess the risks and carry out a specialized collection.

• In cases of biological residue, care must be taken to avoid direct contact, thus diminishing the risk of personal biological contamination.

• Particular care must be taken with spent cartridges, fired projectiles, and projectile fragments as they may have sharp edges, representing a risk of injury, which, in addition, may be accompanied by a risk of biological contamination. All spent ammunition components should be collected and manipulated with tweezers, in addition to the gloves.

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3. RESEARCHERS’ NOTES AND STUDY LIMITATIONS

While the implementation of the methodology was successful, the collection of information had several limitations that will impose some restrictions upon the analysis that follows. The main limitations are presented and discussed with transparency and clarity so that future researches might improve upon this work.

• Headstamp photographs: In-house experience and background literature made clear the importance of photographing each individual piece of physical evidence. It is important to take meticulous photographs, because it aids rigorous classification of the exhibit in question, which in turn facilitates profiling and/or ensuing tracing. However, UNLIREC researchers only had two weeks to record as representative of a sample as possible from the vast universe of evidence that fell under the scope of the study; and consistent photographing was time consuming. Therefore, the conscious decision was made to transcribe the data read from the headstamp, rather than photographing it, because it allowed for quicker processing times. This results in a more representative sample at the expense of categorical documentation of the exhibits. UNLIREC researches did take some photos of the evidence, but in an illustrative rather than comprehensive manner.

• A representative sample, rather than the entire universe: The dataset of ammunition and its components recovered from crime scenes in 2017 is a representative sample. It is not, however, the entire universe of ammunition and its components recovered from crime scenes in the Dominican Republic during 2017. Similar to the previous limitations, due to time constraints, UNLIREC researchers were unable to document the entire existing universe of ballistics evidence stored at the Scientific Police. Nonetheless, UNLIREC researchers estimate that the sample accounts for more than 50 percent of the existent universe of ballistics data recovered in 2017. To ensure that an accurate time series analysis could be conducted, UNLIREC researchers processed the entire universe of 2017 evidence for certain districts. Additionally, at least one case from every month for every location was processed. See time and geographical distribution of samples in Annex A.

• Police ammunition: In some crime scenes examined, a police intervention had taken place. In such cases, investigators and first responders recovered all ammunition fired during the event as evidence. Consequently, some exhibit documents in the second dataset belong to law enforcement interventions. UNLIREC researchers were not able to differentiate precisely between ammunition used in criminal activity and ammunition used legitimately by law enforcement. In addition, UNLIREC researchers were not able to reliably identify a standard ammunition police marking or brand or access complete allotment files of ammunition consigned to law enforcement. Hence, the case study does not claim that all ammunition documented was used illicitly, only that the ammunition documented was recovered from crime scenes. UNLIREC researchers were able to document that in at least 88 of the scenes under investigation that make up this study, a law enforcement intervention had taken place. From these 88 scenes, 144 ammunition exhibits marked with the required import code were documented, and an inclusive grand total of 463 pieces of evidence were recovered.

• Firearms differentiation: The case study is an ammunition profiling study, of

both ammunition found at crime scenes and seized under trafficking charges, with snapshots of armed violence manifestations in the country. Considering that UNLIREC researchers were commissioned to focus on patterns of illicit ammunition proliferation and use, the data has that was classified into general calibre groups and notes regarding the precise firearm that fired (or can fire) the documented rounds have been disregarded. This means that the firearms differentiation that the analysis will present is of a general nature, only between rifle, shotgun, and handgun ammunition.

• Profiling, not tracing: One of the positions of this series is that ammunition tracing is a productive initiative that could help reduce armed violence, due to the fact that it sheds light on the illicit supply chain enabling armed violence. However, this case study will not reach the tracing stages of ammunition research. That is to say, UNLIREC researchers will not pinpoint the precise diversion point nor responsible actors involved in the ammunition recovered from criminal activity in the Dominican Republic. Hence, the case study will limit its analysis to ammunition profiling. However, it is also the position of this series that the more comprehensive the profile, the closer are the interested parties to tracing illicit ammunition. Only in some cases, when the ammunition observed had been marked with the import codes mandated by law in the Dominican Republic, can UNLIREC researchers cross-reference the dataset with official sources and identify the commercial entities that were assigned that particular ammunition code. Finally, only in a limited number of cases, headstamp markings from state-owned facilities manufactured for military supply structures were observed, suggesting plausible leakages from stockpiles.

• Interpretation and judgement calls: - To quantitatively measure certain behavioural dynamics involved in armed violence, which is a complex social phenomenon, some metrics have had to be simplified. True intentions behind acts of armed violence, for example, are virtually immeasurable. However, in an attempt to shed some measurable light on the phenomenon, UNLIREC researchers developed broad categories into which general intentions could be grouped and thus measured. The interpretation of perpetrators’ intentions was a judgement call made by researchers based upon reading all documents found in the evidence package. - In a similar way, some headstamp markings are not unequivocally identifiable and readily assignable to a determined ammunition manufacturer. For example, manufacturers markings are absent in ammunition marked with import codes. In other cases, when assigning a plausible manufacturer based on the markings, some judgement calls have been made in the analysis. The calls have been made based on commonality and general trade patterns, geography, plausibility and market availability, as well as other contextual information. Likewise, some ammunition manufacturers produce in different countries, assemble diverse brand names, and many produce as part of large global conglomerates. Hence, when determining the Most Likely Country of Origin for observed ammunition, the same guidance parameters were used to reach a conclusion. - Finally, written reports and files were not always necessarily clear. While UNLIREC researchers were privileged to access and read original documents, both from crime scenes and trafficking seizures, these written reports were not always prepared in a concise or precise manner, which might generate dissimilar

10 11

interpretations depending on the readers. Additionally, most of these documents were produced on the day of the event. Hence, in many cases these reports were put together under incomplete information and/or pressing circumstances. It is thus entirely possible that upon second examination, the readers’ interpretation would change. It is also entirely possible that as the investigation advances, the information in these reports would be updated. Similarly, it is entirely possible that reasonable researchers might read the same documents and reach different conclusions. UNLIREC researchers strived to be as faithful as possible to the written reports they accessed.

UNLIREC researchers hope that the approach, methodology, and limitations are discussed so future studies can find enhanced ways to maximize data collection under time-constraints.

Part II:The Dominican Republic public security context and normative framework. This background is followed by the analysis and breakdown of the main datasets in 2017 across the Dominican Republic:

• Ammunition Seized at Border Controls• Ammunition Recovered from Crime Scenes

This section concludes with an Interpretation of the findings i.e. (trends, patterns, plausible origin(s), national profile or dynamics identified).

1. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PUBLIC SECURITY CONTEXT

The Dominican Republic public security context presents a high perception of insecurity, with only 36 percent of the population reporting feeling safe.32 Additionally, almost a third of the population would consider “taking the law into their own hands.”33 In 2014, the level of victimization stood at 23 percent, as almost a quarter of the population revealed to have been victims of crime in the previous 12 months.34 By 2016, the level of victimization was at percent.35

Robberies, or at least the number of police-recorded offences, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), appear to have increased considerably in a two-year period, from 2,091 recorded offences in 2012 to 15,005 in 2014.36 Presently, the US Department of State notes that “the most common type of crime is drive-by robberies (1-2 (usually male) assailants on a motorcycle, scooter, or even a bicycle) …Often, they stop, one disembarks, and points a handgun at the victim, demanding valuables.”37 Furthermore, according to Ministry of Interior and Police (MIP) through their Dominican Republic Citizen Security Observatory (OSC-RD in Spanish) theft of motor vehicles increased nine percent in 2017 in relation to the previous year, and theft of firearms also increased, from 685 stolen firearms in 2016 to 723 in 2017.38 An overall increase in robberies might be fuelling the general perception of insecurity.

Nonetheless, in the last seven years of data made available by the OSC-RD, the homicide rate per 100,000 population appears to have maintained a decreasing tendency, from 26.3 (2011), 23.4 (2012), 20.3 (2013), 18.3 (2014), 16.8 (2015), 16.0 (2016), down to 15.4 (2017).39 The homicide rates from 2016 and 2017 account for, respectively, 1,616 and 1,561 lethal victims, the latter absolute number representing a reduction of more than

12 13

three percent in relation to the previous year.40 If the decreasing tendency holds, the Dominican Republic will have halved homicide rates in the near future.

Additionally, in the last six years of data made available by the OSC-RD, the homicide rate per 100,000 population perpetrated with firearms, also appears to have maintained a decreasing tendency, from 16.3 (2011), 14.9 (2012), 12.8 (2013), 11.5 (2014), 11.2 (2015), down to 9.7 (2016).41

From a different perspective, in 2012, according to UNODC, 64 percent of homicides were committed with firearms.42 In 2016, according to the National Police Department of Information and Statistics, 61 percent of homicides were committed with firearms.43 And, continuing with the decreasing tendency, in 2017, according to the OSC-RD, 59 percent of homicides were committed with firearms.44 The data presented here constitutes evidence that from 2011-onward, homicides have decreased as have lethal outcomes caused by firearms.

Still, a number of conflating variables could be driving numerous armed violence lethal outcomes in the Dominican Republic. For example, in 2017, 87 percent of homicide victims were male, and 49 percent of victims were between the ages of 20 and 34. Furthermore, weekends and evenings also revealed a disproportionate predisposition for violence. That is, 39 percent of homicides occurred only between Saturdays and Sundays, and 38 percent of all homicides occurred between the hours of 18:00 and 23:59.45 Additionally, social/interpersonal violence and common crime/criminal violence were to blame for most lethal outcomes, representing 51 and 35 percent of all homicides, respectively.46 It is likely that the outcomes of these conflating variables were made more lethal by the presence of firearms and ammunition. If so, controlling the supply of firearms and ammunition reaching unauthorized hands could be key to reducing armed violence lethal outcomes.

In effect, that is precisely the approach taken by government of the Dominican Republic, and the reduction in homicides rates and rates of homicides committed with firearms could be owed, even if partly, to these controls. For example, in 2006 Decree No. 309-06 temporally banned all imports of firearms, parts, and their respective ammunition for the private market47 A year later, Resolution 01-07, signed by the Minister of Interior, lifted that prohibition, but all legally imported ammunition to be marked by the manufacturer or importer.48 A comprehensive firearms legislation enacted in 2016, 631-16, would permit the importation of ammunition under the condition that only sanctioned commercial armories, strictly regulated, could introduce some calibers.49 These measures are explained in more detail in the following section, but they seem to demonstrate that having in place a complete and coherent regulatory framework for firearms and ammunition control is a crucial tool to prevent of illicit trafficking and its consequent impact on armed violence. Illicit trafficking certainly demands a response that cannot be dealt dealt with solely by using legal tools; rather, these tools must form part of a comprehensive context of people-centred public security measures. However, when it comes to imposing regulations that authorize or prohibit determined activities, the state must turn to the instrument of law. Only in this way can the state legitimately and effectively exercise the coercive powers inherent in

Figure 3

Homicide rate per 100,000 population30

20

10

02011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017**

26.323.4

20.318.3 16.8 16.0 15.9

Figure 4

Homicide rate per 100,000 population perpetrated with firearms20

15

10

5

02011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

16.314.9

12.811.5 11.2

9.7

Source: Dominican Republic Citizen Security Observatory

14 15

it. And the evidence seems to suggest that the regulatory framework of firearms and ammunition controls adopted by the Dominican Republic is working.

2. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND IMPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The National and international commerce of firearms and ammunitions in the Dominican Republic, as well as the possession and use of those elements, is scrupulously regulated by several legal provisions dictated both by Congress and the Executive Branch.

Law 631-16 on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials constitutes the cornerstone of the Dominican arms control legal system. As a general principle, Law 631-16 states that all activities related with commerce, possession and use of firearms and ammunitions are conditioned upon the issuance of a license.50 In that sense, article 14 tasks the Ministry of Interior and Police (MIP) with the responsibility of overseeing that petitioners fulfil the legal requirements prior to issuing those licenses.

Classification of firearms and ammunition within the Dominican Legal FrameworkAccording to law 631-16, firearms and ammunitions are divided into three categories): forbidden, restricted and fit for civilian use.

Forbidden51 elements are those, which cannot be legally sold or bought under any circumstance. On the other hand, the elements deemed fit for civilian use52 are those that citizens can legally purchase in gun shops, provided they have the adequate license. Finally, restricted53 elements are those than can only be purchased and used by the military or security forces. The MIP, with the assistance of the Ministry of Defense, is in charge of sorting the weapons and ammunitions into the aforementioned categories.54

Classification of the LicensesThere are three kinds of licenses: private, commercial and official. Private licenses55 authorizes the possession of those firearms and ammunitions that are fit for civilian use. Official licenses56 are only granted to a defined universe of high-ranking public officials and authorize the possession of both restricted and fit for civilian use elements. Commercial licenses57, in turn, are subdivided according to the purpose of the applicant: importing, intermediation, for the use of private security providers and for national retailers operating within the country. All of which are required to apply for a specific permit.

Commercial licenses can be granted both to individuals and companies. All licenses expire one year after the date of issuance and can be renewed as many times as possible, provided all legal requirements are duly fulfilled.

Eligibility CriteriaLaw 631-16 outlines a number of mandatory requirements for issuing a license. Some of the most relevant include58:

• Being at least 30 years old at the time of the application • Produce documents demonstrating the licit origin of the weapon• Produce a certificate of aptitude on the use of firearms• Produce a health certificate issued by a mental health professional• Absence of criminal records • Posess a civil liability insurance• In the case of companies, being legally incorporated and providing the name of its

legal representative.

Finally, before issuing any license, a ballistic fingerprint of the weapon must be made in the ballistic laboratories authorized by the MIP59.

Marking and Importing of Ammunition In July 2006, imports of weapons and ammunition into the Dominican Republic were forbidden by a presidential decree60. After a comprehensive census of Dominican gun-shops, the ban on ammunition imports was lifted in December 2007. However, all importers are required to mark the ammunition immediately after the elements arrive to the Dominican Republic.

According to article 5 of the MIP Resolution 01-07, marking must consist of a four-character alphanumeric code. The first two characters shall always be “RD”, that is to say, the initials of the country. The third character will identify the name of the importing gun-shop61, whereas the fourth designates the specific batch. By enacting this marking requirement, the Dominican authorities’ thus enhance the traceability of ammunition and prevented diversion and illegal trafficking.

Each and every import of ammunition to the country must be carried out through the gun-shops authorized by the MIP. Gun shops must posess a commercial and importing license, but they must also inform the IMP of every transaction and apply for a specific authorization when it comes to importing weapons and ammunitions.62 Furthermore, they must comply with able to comply with the requirements imposed by the Customs Office, among them, the possession of a low-risk importer certificate.

The transport and delivery of ammunition boxes to the armories is the responsibility of the Warfare Material Division, Dominican Armed Forces.

Commercialization of Ammunition In order to legally sell ammunition within the Dominican Republic, gun shops must obtain a commercial license. Additionally, they must keep a detailed inventory of its stocks and inform the MIP of all sales and acquisitions on a weekly and monthly basis.

Purchasing of Ammunition by Individuals According to Law 631-16 article 26, only those individuals possessing a firearm duly registered are legally able to purchase ammunition in those gun shops already authorized to commerce with guns by the MIP. Besides, it is mandatory to have a valid license, whether official or private.

16 17

Figure 5

Flow of seized ammunition

Inflow

11%Outflow

89%Figure 6

Country of Origin

Spain

3%Dominican Republic

12%USA

85%Figure 7

Inflow: Country of Origin

USA

3%Spain

97%

Ammunition rounds are for the exclusive use of the purchaser and cannot be re-sold. Authorized armories must keep a record of the amount of ammunition sold and the identity of the client.63

Operations in which the State is the Final UserIn cases whereby the ammunition is destined for use by the security forces, imports must be done exclusively through a public bidding process. Intermediaries are excluded from bidding and only manufacturers are allowed to submit an offer.64

3. CASE STUDY: HOW DO WE FIND MEANING IN A FACT?

3.1 Analysis of ammunition seized at border controls during 2017:According to the DGA files, in 2017, in the Dominican Republic, 15,898 complete rounds of ammunition belonging to 48 separate trafficking cases were seized at border controls. The analysis of ammunition seized at border controls during 2017 will be divided into two general sections: public security observations and ammunition-specific observations.

Public Security Observations:Out of the 48 trafficking cases, UNLIREC researchers determined that 89 percent of the 36 cases with relevant information available, had an inflow route; that is to say, had entered into the Dominican Republic. Out of the 33 cases whereby it was possible to determine the country of origin, considering both outflow and inflow cases, 85 percent of smuggling attempts originated in the USA.

Further disaggregating these 33 cases, UNLIREC researchers were able to categorise 29 cases with an inflow route and four with an outflow route. Out of the 29 cases whereby it was possible to determine both the flow and the country of origin, 97 percent of all inflow smuggling attempts originated in the USA. Similarly, albeit with a much smaller sample, out of the four cases whereby it was possible to determine both the flow and the country of destination, 100 percent of all outflow smuggling attempts had the USA as the intended destination. These findings suggest that the broad trend of illicit ammunition trafficking both into and out of the Dominican Republic is usually associated with an accomplice inside the USA, particularly Florida and New York.

From the 48 cases, only two modalities of entry points seemed to have reported seized ammunition: airport and port controls (including containers in warehouses, inland/dry ports, and entrepôts), representing, respectively, 40 and 60 percent. From the examined files, UNLIREC researchers did not find documented cases of ammunition seized at land checkpoints at the border with Haiti, nor at postal offices. Interestingly, from these seizures, four general concealment modalities were identified. Out of these concealment modalities, more than half of the cases were found in containers and more than a third in passengers’ luggage, representing 58 percent and 33 percent, respectively. In the two cases, representing 4 percent of the sample, when ammunition was exclusively concealed in a parcel, these were seized at airports rather than postal offices, because the consignments were sent via air cargo.65

18 19

In all cases, it was possible to identify the entry or exit district where the attempt to smuggle ammunition was intercepted. According to these files, the majority of cases were intercepted in Santiago (15 cases or 31 percent), followed by Haina (14 cases or 29 percent), and Santo Domingo (10 cases or 21 percent).

In 45 cases it was possible to identify the gender of the trafficker(s). Men were solely responsible for trafficking in 53 percent of cases, women were exclusively responsible in 18 percent of cases, and in 29 percent of cases both men and women acted in cahoots. Hence, in 82 percent of these cases, at least one man was involved, whereas in 47 percent of these cases at least one woman was involved.

Ammunition-specific observations:According to the DGA files, in 2017, in the Dominican Republic, 15,898 complete rounds of ammunition belonging to 48 separate trafficking cases were seized at border controls. These numbers offer a ratio of around 330 rounds of ammunition seized per interception. However, the ratio is skewed due to a few trafficking cases with outlying large quantities of ammunition. Hence, the median might be more representative by illustrating the amount in rounds of ammunition more frequently seized. The median of this sample is 100 units. Out of the 15,898 rounds of ammunition seized, in most cases, UNLIREC researchers were able to determine the calibre. The shotgun calibres accounted for the largest share followed by the 9mm calibre, representing, 47 percent of the seizures (7,505 rounds) and 28 percent (4,504 rounds), respectively. The distribution of seized calibres per rounds were as follows:

Figure 8

Border entry point

Airports

40%Maritime Ports

60%Figure 9

Concealment Method

Clothing

4%Parcels

4%Luggage

33%Containers

58%Figure 10

Entry / Exit District

Airports Containers in warehouses Ports

1614121086420

Santiago Haina SantoDomingo

Puerto Plata Caucedo PuntaCana

53%

47%90%

10%

100% 100%

100%

29%

71%

20 21

Figure 11

Gender of trafficker

Female

18%Both

29%Male

53%

Interestingly, 9mm calibre ammunition was seized in 27 independent cases, whereas the shotgun calibres were seized in only 14 cases. In other words, the DGA caught almost two times as many attempts to traffic 9mm than shotgun calibres. Nonetheless, the latter calibre accounted for more seized live rounds than the former. Hence, it might be that attempts to smuggle 9mm ammunition are carried out in smaller quantities than attempts to traffic shotgun calibres, yet attempts to smuggle 9mm ammunition are more recurrent. In addition, it is important to note that several trafficking attempts were not limited to one calibre. That is, in 15 out of the 48 interceptions (31 percent), documented by UNLIREC researchers, more than one calibre was seized.

One related observation was the large number of air-rifle pellets seized at border controls by national authorities. While it is not clear why these particular items are being trafficked into the country, numerous interceptions of this good are occurring. UNLIREC researchers did not compile exact data on air-rifle pellets, because they fell outside the scope of this study, but the number of pellets seized in 2017 at border control is well into the thousands.

From the DGA files, UNLIREC researchers were not able to reliably identify and assign a determined manufacturer to a determined amount of ammunition seized. However, from the manufacturers identified, Winchester ammunition was the most repeatedly intercepted brand followed by Remington, accounting for ten and seven independent cases, respectively.

Winchester 10 USA

Remington Arms Company 7 USA

Federal Premium Ammunition 5 USA

Aguila 2 Mexico

American Eagle 2 USA

Blazer 2 USA

Elite Performance Ammunition 1 USA

FIOCCHI 1 Italy

Hornady 1 USA

Magtech Ammunition Company/CBC 1 USA

Monarch 1 Serbia

Perfecta 1 Italy

PMC (Poongsan Metal Manufacturing Company) 1 South Korea

Speer 1 USA

TulAmmo 1 Russia

Brand and/or Manufacturer Number of Cases

Likely Country of Manufacture

Figure 12

Calibres per rounds

#rounds % of total

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

12GA+16GA

+20GA

9mm(9x19)

.380” .22” .38”(9x17)

.40” .45” N/A .25” 7.62mm

47%

28%

7% 6% 4% 4% 3% 1% 0.20% 0.06%

Figure 13

Calibres per cases9mm (9x19)

12GA+16GA+20GA.45”

.38”(9x17).22”

.380”.40”

7.62 mm.25”N/A

27%

14%

5%

5%

4%

4%

3%

1%

1%

2%

22 23

Contrary to the small-calibre ammunition recovered from crime scenes, in most cases, ammunition seized at border controls seems to have been intercepted in the factory boxes. According to the DGA files, it appears that in approximately 69 percent of the trafficking cases intercepted, the ammunition was seized in boxes, whereas only in 31 percent of cases did the ammunition appear in loose form. This finding opens the door for future research efforts. In other words, subsequent efforts must attempt to gain access to the actual physical evidence of border controls interceptions as it is likely that the majority will be found in their factory boxes; and, original boxes are usually marked or contain the required information to facilitate tracing and outline the supply lines feeding the illicit market. If this finding provides a pattern, then tracing small-calibre ammunition seized at border controls is entirely within reach.66

In addition to the DGA files, UNLIREC researchers were shown the tallies of seized ammunition by the Dominican Republic Division of Military Intelligence.67 According to this tally, 24,123 rounds of ammunition were seized in the national territory in 2017. The disaggregated data, however, was not available at the time of publication.

What this case study intends to show, beyond a description of the dynamics that are inherent to ammunition trafficking, is that there are, at least, 24,123 good reasons a year to enhance ammunition controls. If it were not for the efforts of the national authorities, at least, 24,123 rounds of ammunition would have entered the illicit supply chain in 2017. And, as will be become clear in the section that follows, it is exponentially better to intercept illicit ammunition than to recover it from a crime scene.

3.2 Analysis of ammunition recovered from crimes perpetrated during 2017:The analysis of ammunition recovered from crimes perpetrated in 2017 will be divided into two general sections: public security observations and ammunition-specific observations. The observations that follow are based on the analysis of 4,123 pieces of ballistics physical evidence (cartridge cases, bullets, and full ammunition rounds) from 1,061 separate crime scenes in the Dominican Republic in 2017, as well as the analysis of the accompanying documents.

Public security observations: UNLIREC researchers’ interpretation of the intentions per crime scene determined that 39 percent of the 1,061 cases were motivated by homicidal attempts, 25 percent due to theft or common crime, and 6 percent as impromptu run-ins or brawls that resulted in the abuse of a firearm.68 In two percent of cases, a suicide attempt was presumed to have taken place by the reporting official upon arrival at the scene. UNLIREC researchers were not able to establish a motivation in 20 percent of the cases evaluated.

The analysis of physical outcomes per case reveal that in 33 percent of the 1,061 cases studied, the crime resulted in at least one death. Additionally, in 50 percent of the cases, the crime resulted in at least one injured person. Considering that only initial reports were studied, it is entirely possible that an injured person would later die from the bullet wounds that were initially reported as injuries. In sum, it is striking that in at least 83 percent of cases, there was consequential bodily harm harm suffered

Figure 15

Outcomes per case

Material damage

2%N/A

15%Death

33%Injuries

50%

Figure 14

Intentions per case

Recovered +found

3%Firearms abuse

6%

Others (accidents +suicides + kidnapping)

7%N/A

20%Theft + common

crime

25%Homicides +

attemptedhomicides

39%

24 25

by at least one person. UNLIREC researchers also determined that in 2 percent of the cases there was meaningful material damage or loss. It is noteworthy that, in percent of cases, the outcome of the crime was unclear.

Out of the 618 cases whereby identification of the gender of the perpetrator was possible, in at least 98 percent of cases, men pulled the trigger, whereas women acted alone in only one percent of cases. Moreover, in the remaining one percent of cases both a man and woman had acted in tandum. Hence, in 99 percent of these crime scenes, at least one man was involved. This finding suggests that armed violence is closely connected to gender roles, pointing to a toxicity in masculinity.

Out of the 969 cases whereby identification of the gender of the victim was possible, in 87 percent of cases the direct victim was a man, in percent of cases. The direct victim was a woman. Moreover, in 5 percent of cases, both men and women were direct victims. Hence, in 92 percent of cases, at least one man was the direct victim of armed violence. This finding reiterates the prior observation and accentuates the association of men with armed violence as both the overwhelming majority of perpetrators and victims.

Out of the 732 cases whereby was possible to identify the time of the criminal act, 69 percent of cases occurred between sunset and sunrise (19:01-07:00), whereas 31 percent occurred between sunrise and sunset (07:01-19:00). This finding suggests that criminal activity occurs more frequently at night that during daylight hours.

For UNLIREC researchers, it was only possible to document and systematize all ballistics evidence from all crimes committed throughout 2017 in a few districts. In most districts, it was only possible to document and systematize a sample number of cases per month. Based on the data collected, only three districts presented conditions for a relevant temporal analysis: a threshold of more than ten crimes and complete documentation of the evidence recovered throughout the entire year. In two out of these three districts, the monthly distribution per cases reveal a higher number of crimes perpetrated with firearms during the first half of the year than in the second half. This finding is consistent with the OSC-RD report, which notes that the first half of 2017 was indeed more violent. Distrito Nacional reports a higher absolute number of crimes than Barahona/Neyba or La Altagracia/Higuey, likely because it is considerably more populated. Distrito Nacional is also a fully urban context and a major industrial centre, whereas the other two districts are less so. It is also noteworthy that the 318 cases documented in same comment represent approximately 30 percent of the total crime scenes documented for this case study.

Figure 16

Gender of perpetrator per case

Women

1%Both

1%Men

98%Figure 17

Gender of victim per case

Both

5%Women

8%Men

87%Figure 18

Time distribution per cases

Sunset-Sunrise(19:01-07:00)

69%Sunrise-Sunset(07:01-19:00)

31%

26 27

Figure 19

Cases per month - Distrito Nacional (2017)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

2129 29

37

24 28 28 3122 23 25

21

Figure 20

Cases per month - Barahona/Neyba (2017)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

0

2

4

1

4

12

10

1 10

Figure 21

Cases per month - La Altagracia/Higuey (2017)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

3

0

21

5

10

5

3

0

6

2

28 29

Ammunition-specific observations:Out of the 1,061 crime scenes studied, 4,123 pieces of ballistics physical evidence (exhibits) were recovered, presenting a ratio of around 3.89 exhibits per crime scene. Out of the total 4,123 pieces of physical evidence recovered, 84 percent were cartridge cases and three percent full rounds of ammunition, equivalent to 3,478 and 115 exhibits, respectively. The remaining 13 percent of ballistics evidence recovered were bullets, equivalent to 530 exhibits. For the purpose of this profiling case study, bullets offered limited relevant information as most were severely damaged or fragmented. Thus, most of the analysis that follows will focus exclusively on the 87 percent of the sample made up of recovered cartridge cases and full rounds of ammunition, which is equivalent to 3,593 exhibits.

Out of these 3,593 exhibits, approximately 97 percent of cartridge cases were made of non-ferrous alloys (mostly brass casings, and some aluminium), and the remaining three percent were ferrous alloys (mostly steel casings), representing 3,468 and 125 exhibits of physical evidence, respectively. This might suggest that only around three percent of ammunition recovered from crime scenes in 2017 was produced in former Eastern Bloc or Warsaw Pact countries, as the identified manufacturers of ferrous cartridge cases from the sample (TulAmmo and WOLF probably by Tula Cartridge Works, POBJEDA Technology, and Novosibirsk Low Voltage Equipment Plant) were likely manufactured in such countries.69

Production yearsOut of the 3,593 exhibits, only around 5 percent, equivalent to 179 exhibits, were marked with production years. Prominently, markings that identified the production year as 2005 were the more recurrent ones, followed by markings identifying production years of 2016 and 2014. In the table that follows, production years where no markings were found were omitted.

Figure 22

Distribution of ammunition samples

Full rounds

3%Bullets

13%Cartridge cases

84%

1978 5

1979 2

1981 2

1984 2

1985 7

1986 4

1991 3

1992 1

1994 4

1996 3

Year of Manufacture

#

1997 1

1998 1

2000 1

2001 6

2003 1

2004 10

2005 32

2006 2

2008 7

2009 3

Year of Manufacture

#

2010 3

2011 2

2012 8

2013 9

2014 20

2015 2

2016 23

2017 15

Year of Manufacture

#

TOTAL 179

Figure 23

Non-ferrous vs. ferrous

Ferrous

3%Non–ferrous

97%

30 31

Import codesMoreover, out of these 3,593, only 26 percent, equivalent to 944 exhibits, were marked with the mandated four-letter code upon import. These exhibits can be grouped according to the third letter in the headstamp code, which corresponds to the importing commercial armoury. This grouping shows where the ammunition - found at crime scenes and marked with the mandated country code - was imported through. The following table reveals that over a third of this subsample originated from a single armoury.

AArmería Peralta &

Compañía0

RDBA B Armería Metropolitana 39 4%

C Armería E.R.M 0

RDDM D Armería Impacto 2 0.21%

E Armería Carandaí 0

F Armería P.S & Asoc. 0

RDGC; RDGC; RDGE; RDGF

G Armería Dominicana 166 18%

RDHK; RDHL; RDHS; RDHO

HArmería Nicolás Yunes e

Hijos102 11%

IAlmacenes Riad & Nicolás

Yunes0

RDJB; RDJC; RDJF; RDJG

J Tejada Álvarez & Asoc. 325 34%

K Armería Heptágono, S.A. 0

RDLA LArmería Tu Close &

Diseño3 0.32%

M Armería Casa Nelson 0

N Armería Angleca 0

ÑArmería Montas &

Camasta0

RDOD; RDOE; RDOJ; RDOK; RDOL; RDOM; RDOT; RDOU; RDOV; RDOX

O Armería M&R, S.A. 75 8%

Complete import code

Third letter in

headstamp code

Importing armoury with the assigned letter

Number of

exhibits collected

Percentage of the

sample

P Macrotech 0

RDQC Q Armería Guinea S.A. 1 0.11%

R Inversiones Palium 0

RDSA; RDSD SArmería Defensa y

Tecnología164 17%

RDTA; RDTB; RDTC; RDTD; RDTE; RDTR

RDTT

T Armería Oliva 63 7%

RDUA U Armería La Mocana 4 0.42%

V Rio Tala 0

W Artiex 0

TOTAL 944 100%

Importercode

Calibre

Country code

32 33

B RD BA 39 4%

D RD DM 2 0%

G

RD GC 3 0%

RD GD 147 16%

RD GE 2 0%

RD GF 14 1%

H

RD HK 73 8%

RD HL 27 3%

RD HO 1 0%

RD HS 1 0%

J

RD JB 246 26%

RD JC 9 1%

RD JF 67 7%

RD JG 3 0%

L RD LA 3 0%

O

RD OD 10 1%

RD OE 2 0%

RD OJ 20 2%

RD OK 2 0%

RD OL 1 0%

RD OM 9 1%

RD OT 10 1%

RD OU 14 1%

RD OV 4 0%

RD OX 3 0%

Q RD QC 1 0%

Third letter in headstamp code

Complete import code

Number of exhibits per complete code

Percentage of the sample

SRD SA 161 17%

RD SD 3 0%

T

RD TA 25 3%

RD TB 3 0%

RD TC 1 0%

RD TD 2 0%

RD TE 9 1%

RD TR 19 2%

RD TT 4 0%

U RD UA 4 0%

TOTAL 944 100%

Further disaggregating this data, ammunition marked with the mandated four-letter code could also be grouped according to the fourth letter, which corresponds to the import lot brought into the country by the armoury assigned the preceding third letter. This grouping reveals that the lot marked ‘JB’ accounted for over a quarter of ammunition, marked with the mandated four-letter code, found at crime scenes in 2017. Furthermore, the lots marked ‘SA’ and ‘GD’ corresponded to 17 and 16 percent of this sample. In total, 59 percent of the sample corresponded to just three lots.

UNLIREC researchers were able to cross-reference three of these codes against official import records authorized by MIP. Thus, it was possible to identify the amount imported, calibre, exporter, importing armoury, and -in one case- exclusive authorized end-user.

• RD HL: Armoury ‘H’ imported 2,200 boxes of 12 gauge shot shells with 250 rounds in each box, for a total of 550,000 units. The permit was granted on 5/5/2016 and the ammunition was bought from Saga, S.A in Spain. UNLIREC researchers documented 13 exhibits recovered from crime scenes perpetrated in 2017 that corresponded to this lot. Moreover, an additional 14 exhibits were found with this four-letter code, but the latter were .38” ammunition. Overall, cartridges with this four-letter code were found at 19 separate crime scenes, while most of these crimes occurred around the capital area.

• RD SD: Armoury ‘S’ imported 500,000 rounds of 5.56 ammunition. The permit was granted on 7/6/2016, while the lot was consigned exclusively to the National Police. Out this lot, UNLIREC researchers documented three spent cartridge cases recovered from one scene under investigation in 2017.

• RD UA: Armoury ‘U’ imported 550,000 rounds of 12 gauge shot shells. The permit was granted on 31/1/2017, while the ammunition was bought from Saga, S.A in Spain. Out this lot, UNLIREC researchers documented four exhibits recovered from two separate crime scenes in 2017 around the capital area.

Marking codes in documented law enforcement interventionsNotably, in 88 scenes under investigation, out of the total 1,061 documented scenes, UNLIREC researchers were able to identify that a law enforcement intervention had taken place. From these 88 scenes, 463 individual pieces of ballistics exhibits were recovered. Cross-referencing the documented police interventions against exhibits with import codes yielded a subsample of 144. The analysis of this subsample reveals a fundamentally similar distribution to the above tables. This is important, because it suggests that commercial armouries with a larger presence in the subsample are likely providers to law enforcement. Certainly, with a distribution pattern that

34 35

incudes police forces, it is expected that these markings codes outnumber those that are destined exclusively to civilians. It is also important to note that in the general sample, there are likely more police interventions that UNLIREC researchers were unable to identify.

Groping by calibresRegardless of import codes, or lack of thereof, the entire documented sample can be grouped by calibres as follows. Out of the sample of 3,593 exhibits, composed of spent cartridge cases and complete rounds of ammunition, approximately 86 percent of physical evidence found at crime scenes corresponded to 9mm (9x19) ammunition. The second largest group was the revolver calibre .38”, corresponding, approximately, to four percent of the sample. Revolver ammunition might be considerably frequently present at crime scenes, because - once fired - the spent cartridge cases stay in their chamber, whereas in pistols (or submachine guns), the spent casings are ejected. However, it is remarkable that 96 percent of the exhibits recovered came from handguns (possibly some from submachine guns), and just about 2 percent, respectively, from shotgun calibres and the rifle calibre 5.56x45 (standard NATO cartridge). UNLIREC researchers did not encounter the 7.62mm calibre.

B RD BA 6 4% 4%

GRD GD 13 9%

10%RD GE 1 1%

HRD HK 10 7%

8%RD HL 2 1%

JRD JB 39 27%

37%RD JF 14 10%

O

RD OD 2 1%

9%RD OJ 5 3%

RD OK 1 1%

RD OT 5 3%

S RD SA 37 26% 26%

T

RD TA 7 5%

6%RD TC 1 1%

RD TR 1 1%

TOTAL 144 100% 100%

Third letter in the code

Four-letter code

Number of exhibits found

Percentage of code from this

sample

Percentage of third letter from

this sample

Marking codes in documented law enforcement interventions

Figure 24

Samples per calibre group

Number of cartridges % of cartridges

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

9mm(9x19)

.38” .380”(9x17)

12GA+16GA+20GA

5.56 mm Otherhandguncalibres

85.94%

4.45% 3.45% 1.86% 1.84% 2.45%

9mm(9x19)

.38” .380” (9x17) 32”

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

74%

8%14%

4%

Number of cartridges % of cartridges

Figure 25

Bullets identified per calibre group

36 37

Furthermore, from the 530 bullets recovered, the calibre of 74 well-preserved exhibits was identified by national firearms examiners in their forensic ballistics reports (around 14 percent). The calibre of a fired bullet recovered from a crime scene can be identified by competent firearms examiners when matched, under a comparison microscope, to the test fires from a specific firearm. Experts examine rifling: numbers of lands and grooves and the direction of the twist, firing pin impressions, and any and all individual characteristics of the specimens under comparison. The outstanding 456 bullets were not confidently identifiable due to the damage upon impact or to the fact that only fragments were recovered. The largest group was again the 9mm (9x19) ammunition, but, in comparison to spent cartridge cases and full rounds, bullets do show an increase in the presence of different handgun calibres. The distribution of identified bullets follows:

Top 11 manufacturersFrom the 3,593 exhibits (spent cartridge cases + full rounds of ammunition) recovered from crime scenes in the Dominican Republic, including all recorded calibres, the Aguila ammunition, manufactured in Mexico, accounts for the largest share, representing 17 percent of the sample. Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) ammunition, manufactured in Brazil, accounts for the second largest share of any one particular brand, representing 8 percent of the sample. This is important, because it suggests that the two most prominent brands of ammunition recovered from crime scenes were manufactured in Latin America and thus directs attention to the regional trade in ammunition. These two brands alone accounted for 25 percent, a fourth, of the entire sample.

The recurrent presence of US ammunition manufacturers is also noteworthy, with four brands at the top of the ranking. From the Top 11 Manufacturers table alone, it is clear that at least 25 percent of the ammunition recovered from crime scenes in 2017 was manufactured in the USA. This accounts for another fourth of the entire sample. In sum, ammunition manufactured in the Americas (Mexico + Brazil + USA) accounts for at least 50 percent of the entire sample, reinforcing the prior observation regarding regional ammunition trade.

928 DR Import Markings Not identifiable 26%

593 Aguila México 17%

284Companhia Brasileira de

Cartuchos (CBC)Brasil 8%

269 Winchester / Olin Corporation USA 7%

241Federal Premium Ammunition /

Vista Outdoor, IncUSA 7%

208 BLAZER / Vista Outdoor, Inc USA 6%

182 Sellier & Bellot / CBC Czech Republic 5%

178 Remington Arms Company, Inc. USA 5%

95 Prvi Partizan Serbia 3%

89Fiocchi Munizioni / Giulio

Fiocchi HoldingItaly 2%

526 Others (41 manufacturers) Multiple 15%

3,593 TOTAL 100%

Number of exhibits recovered

Likely brand/manufacturer Likely country of

manufacturePercentage

Top 11 Manufacturers

A dissagregated analysis of selected calibres and/or headstamp markings follows.

Cross analysis of ammunition found at crime scenes:

NATO ( )Just over one percent of cartridges recovered from crimes scenes seemed to have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cross head-stamped ( ). In other words, 47 exhibits out of 3,593 were likely originally manufactured for the NATO supply structure. Out of the exhibits with the NATO cross, 89 percent were 9mm (9x19) ammunition, and 11 percent 5.56x45mm. These exhibits also had the year of manufacture, and all identified exhibits were produced after 1996.

As presented in the analysis above regarding DR Import Codes, 26 percent of the sample was marked with the mandated four-letter code. Without access to all import records and allotment documents, it is not possible to determine the manufacturer and likely country of manufacture, which produced those exhibits as the four-letter import code trumps brand markings in the headstamp. The Top 11 Manufacturers table of spent cartridge cases and full rounds of ammunition recovered from crime scenes in 2017 follows:

38 39

Unidentifiable 1

1996 3

1997 1

2000 1

2001 5

2005 3

2008 1

2009 1

2010 2

2011 1

2012 2

2013 9

2014 7

2015 2

2016 8

Total 47

Manufacture year

Number of exhibits with NATO cross

( )

Manufacture year

Number of exhibits with NATO cross

( )

NATO-marked ammunition was found in 31 independent cases. Markedly, 65 percent of cases containing ammunition marked with the NATO cross occurred in the capital area (Distrito Nacional, Santo Domingo Este, Norte, and Oeste, and Boca Chica). However, the presence of the NATO cross does not necessarily suggest diversion from military stockpiles nor even that the original ammunition was used, since head-stamped NATO cartridges are often reloaded and sold, cartridges rejected by inspectors are sold as “seconds”, and/or surpluses could also be sold commercially.70

IMIFrom five different crime scenes, six 9mm (9x19) spent cartridge recovered were head-stamped ‘IMI’, which likely stands for Israel Military Industries.71 In a sixth crime scene, a single 5.56x45mm exhibit head-stamped with ‘IMI’ was recovered. This rifle cartridge was also marked with the NATO cross and a ‘01’, indicating a production year of 2001. This ‘IMI’ head-stamped rifle cartridge was recovered from the robbery of a person transporting a large sum of currency. This crime reported several injured persons and had, at least, 44 spent cartridges recovered from the crime scene, fired from no less than three different firearms. A total of seven IMI-marked exhibits were recovered from six different crime scenes.

In addition, five 9mm (9x19) spent cartridges with the headstamp marking ‘TZ’ were recovered from crime scenes. Those letters seem to indicate that the ammunition was manufactured exclusively for Israeli forces by the IMI.72 These five exhibits were also head-stamped ‘78’, which likely indicates a production year of 1978. Furthermore, two 5.56x45mm cartridge cases marked ‘TZZ’ were recovered from a crime scene, and that marking seems to indicate that the ammunition was manufactured for military customers outside of Israel.73 These two ‘TZZ’ head-stamped cartridges were also marked with the NATO symbol and ‘01’, indicating a production year of

2001. Additionally, these two ‘TZZ’ cartridges were also used in the above-mentioned robbery of a person transporting a large sum of currency.

I.M.G.In two separate crime scenes, a total of nine 5.56x45mm ammunition head-stamped ‘IMG’ were recovered, likely indicating manufacture by the Industria Militar de Guatemala.74 These nine exhibits were dominated by accompanying markings of ‘85’ and ‘91’, indicating production years of 1985 and 1991. Four of the ‘IMG’ head-stamped exhibits were also recovered in the above-mentioned robbery of a person transporting a large sum of currency. The other five exhibits were recovered from a neighbouring district, in a scene under investigation where a group fired at a person’s house at least 17 times with 5.56x45mm ammunition, and 12 times with 9mm (9x19) ammunition.

LCFrom five different crimes scenes, ten 5.56x45mm recovered exhibits were found to have ‘LC’ and the year of manufacture head-stamped, which might suggest production at the Lake City Ammunition Plant.75 This plant supplies ammunition to the US government and its allies.76 Two of these exhibits had the ‘86’ marking, indicating a production year of 1986, and were found in the above-mentioned robbery of a person transporting a large sum of currency. One other exhibit, also with the ‘86’ marking, was found in the neighbouring district where a group had fired at a person’s house at least 29 times. Altogether, the ten ‘LC’ head-stamped ammunition recovered had marking years of 1984 (2 exhibits), 1985 (1), 1986 (4), and 2005 (3).

5.56x45mm ammunition Overall, 5.56x45mm ammunition exhibits were documented 66 times in seven different crime scenes, representing 1.84 percent of the total cartridges and full rounds recovered. Out of the 5.56x45mm subsample, only three exhibits could be attributable to police forces, because the documented RD SD headstamp code was cross-referenced to allotment documents. Considering that this calibre is not available to the civilian market and is used by armed forces, their presence in public security contexts suggest that leakages from stockpiles have occurred in the past in either the Dominican Republic or overseas. In addition, the fact that two different crime scenes, in neighbouring districts, with more evidence than average, presented this calibre and the ammunition was head stamped with military-oriented production markings, might indicate that the perpetrators had a higher than average level of organization. A criminal group with a high level of organization might, in turn, further suggest a sophisticated illicit supply chain, one that could include accessing ammunition originally manufactured for military structures.

The analysis and notes presented here are insufficient to confidently point to diversion from military stockpiles. Nonetheless, the headstamp markings, while inconclusive, suggest that improved management of military stockpiles is desirable, and production years dating from 30 years ago could be evidence of the need to reduce old stocks.

40 41

9mm (9x19) ammunition Overall, 3,088 9mm (9x19) exhibits were documented in numerous crime scenes, representing almost 86 percent of the entire cartridges and full rounds recovered. From the 9mm ammunition subsample, the identified brand with the largest presence is Aguila, manufactured in Mexico, accounting for 18 percent of the subsample. Curiously, Aguila was also the most recurrent brand found in the 5.56x45mm ammunition subsample. Aguila 9mm (9x19) ammunition is followed by Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC), manufactured in Brazil, representing 8 percent. In addition, Sellier & Bellot ammunition, owned by, yet manufactured in the Czech Republic, accounted for 6 percent of the subsample. In sum, these three names account for almost a third of the 9mm subsample.

It is also worth noting that the sum of the brands which likely manufacture in the USA, account for 32 percent of the subsample, almost another third of the total 9mm ammunition recorded (USA-manufacturers accounting for one or less than one percent of the 9mm subsample have been included in Others the table above). Out of the US-manufactured ammunition, the most present brands, in order of recurrence, are Winchester, Blazer, and Federal Premium Ammunition. The latter two brands are likely part of the same conglomerate.

It is important to note that 27 percent of the 9mm sample was marked with the required four-letter import code and thus no brand or manufacturer markings could

8Federal Premium

Ammunition

USA 39%3 Remington Arms Company

4 Winchester

11 Lake City Ammunition Plant

13 Aguila Mexico 20%

9 Industria Militar de Guatemala Guatemala 14%

9 WOLF Russia 14%

3 Israel Military Industries Israel 5%

3 RD SD Import Markings77 Unidentified 5%

3 Unidentifiable Unidentified 5%

66 100%

Number of exhibits recovered

Likely manufacturer Likely country of

manufacture% of 5.56x45mm from subsample

5.56x45mm ammunition

827 DR Import Markings 27%

568 Aguila 18%

245 Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) 8%

233 Winchester / Olin Corporation 8%

194 BLAZER / Vista Outdoor, Inc 6%

184 Federal Premium Ammunition / Vista Outdoor, Inc 6%

172 Sellier & Bellot / CBC 6%

160 Remington Arms Company, Inc. 5%

68 Fiocchi Munizioni / Giulio Fiocchi Holding 2%

59 Prvi Partizan 2%

52 X-Treme 2%

326 Others (29 manufacturers) 11%

3,088 TOTAL 100%

Number of exhibits recovered

Likely brand/manufacturer Percentage

9mm (9x19)

42 43

be identified in those headstamps. It is presumed that, as implementation time regarding import marking requirements advances, the share of ammunition marked with the four-letter code will increase.

Finally, as with the 5.56x45 ammunition sample detailed above, Israeli Military Industries markings were also present in the 9mm ammunition subsample, albeit on a much smaller scale. A second military-oriented production marking identified was the Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM) on just one sample. The 9mm table organized by likely country of manufacture follows:

For a disaggregated look at the remaining calibres recovered from crime scenes perpetrated in the Dominican Republic in 2017, with assigned brands/manufacturers and likely country of manufacture, please refer to Annex B.

986 USA 32%

827 DR Import markings 27%

568 Mexico 18%

245 Brazil 8%

172 Czech Republic 6%

68 Italy 2%

68 Russia 2%

59 Serbia 2%

21 Unidentifiable 1%

18 Philippines 1%

16 South Korea 1%

12 Germany 0%

11 Israel 0%

6 Finland 0%

5 Hungary 0%

3 Bosnia 0%

2 Turkey 0%

1 Venezuela 0%

3,088 TOTAL 100%

Number of exhibits recovered

Likely country of manufacture Percentage

9mm (9x19)

4. QUALITATIVE OBSERVATIONS (A WINDOW INTO THE SOCIETY)

From the police reports and other documents accompanying the 1,061 cases of armed violence reviewed by researchers, several dynamics stood out, because of their recurrence. While UNLIREC did not compile quantitative data on these dynamics, it seems important to share some qualitative observations, even if only for anecdotal or background information. UNLIREC researchers consider that the following are marked characteristics of armed violence in the Dominican Republic in 2017 and deserve public attention:

• Many homicides were carried out with by an astonishing low level of organization, with impromptu violence continuously leading to the loss of life and injuries. These seemed to be committed in two main scenarios: brawls exacerbated by the presence of alcohol, and traffic disputes. In both scenarios, men were usually the perpetrators. The presence of firearms in such incidents increased the lethality of the outcome.

• The practice of two perpetrators on a single motorcycle (one driving and one armed on the passenger seat) to commit both robberies and homicide attempts seemed to be a practice by criminality. Motorcycles were also noted as a recurrent runaway vehicle.

• Stray bullets are a continuous threat to life, with children often as victims. Many stray bullets made their unwelcomed way into a house through fragile building materials, suggesting a higher impact in households with lower purchasing power. Additionally, stray bullets seemed to occur more frequently in densely populated sectors, reinforcing the prior observation.

• Some criminals deliberately pursued armed victims, or, put otherwise, carrying a firearm might be a liability for personal security. It seemed that killings motivated by the sole purpose of stealing the victim’s firearm is a common occurrence. This seemed true for private owners, police officers, and particularly for private security providers. It was the case that many private security guards, standing watch and even outside of working hours, were killed to be robbed of the assigned firearm. Similarly, some house robberies appeared to have been motivated by the presence of firearms in that household.

• There appeared to be high visibility of firearms in daily life. According to witnesses’declarations and police, it seemed clear that the presence of firearms in societal interactions has been normalized. Going further, for some men, firearms,

44 45

at times, seemed to reflect power and elevated social status. Such widespread presence of firearms in societal interactions might have increased the lethality of conflating variables and impromptu lethal outcomes. The conflating variables that might be coalescing and driving numerous lethal outcomes are usually a combination of one or more of the following: men, 20-34 age group, firearms, ammunition, alcohol, weekends, late hours, and impromptu social disputes.

• Police reports often seemed to be acquainted with the perpetrator. In many initial reports, the first responding police officer had already identified a suspect, often by a nickname. This may suggest that certain localities have been repeatedly victimized by a determined perpetrator, and this person is known to law enforcement authorities.

• There seems to be a thriving domestic market for firearms’ parts and components to modify and/or fix the ones in circulation, as well as the expertise to do so. Transfers in this market are not necessarily carried out in illegality given that many armouries are well equipped with spare parts and components.78 This might be an unforeseen and unfortunate consequence of the ban on new firearms imports.

• Many lethal outcomes or injuries were alleged to have been caused by accidental discharges, often from a firearm in the household.

• Firearms in the household seemed to have been frequently employed to commit acts of gender-based violence, as well as suicides.

• Several full rounds of ammunition found at crime scenes were struck by the firing pin, often more than one time, but the projectile had not been discharged. This was evident from the various marks left by the firing pin upon hitting the primer. This could mean that some firearms in circulation have a timeworn firing pin or that the ammunition was old or poorly stored. It could also mean that the cartridge had been reloaded. If true that the firearm had a timeworn firing pin or was poorly repaired, this observation reinforces the above-mentioned impression that there is a thriving domestic market for repairing older firearms. Or, if true that this ammunition had been reloaded, it could indicate that it was done with a low-quality primer. This could suggest a growing non-industrial market for reloading cartridge cases. Finally, if it is the case that the ammunition was old, it might suggest that there is a market for old ammunition to circumvent import marking requirements upon import.

• Firearms examiners from the Dominican Republic reported that certain manufacturers’ headstamp markings were obstructing adequate imaging acquisition and comparison in the Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS). In particular, examiners noted a headstamp mark by CBC, which the IBIS continuously tries to acquire as a firing pin impression or individual characteristic, when in fact it is not. UNLIREC researchers contacted the technology provider and learned that this particular mark misleads the IBIS acquisition algorithm. Currently, the way to overcome the obstruction is to use an ‘ignore sticker’ on top of the marking, but, together with the factory marking, all characteristics under the sticker will also be ignored during the information acquisition. As such, valuable individualizing characteristics are unavailable for the comparison. To facilitate the work of firearms examiners and the justice system, either the technology provider could consider enhanced corrective measures or the ammunition manufacturer could stop branding ammunition with such headstamp marking. For a picture of this headstamp markings in the IBIS, please see below:

It is the hope of researchers that future efforts aimed at disrupting armed violence can measure and describe these dynamics in greater depth to find effective ways to combat their negative impact on society.

5. KEY FINDINGS, TRENDS, AND ANALYSIS

• More than half of illicit ammunition trafficking cases were concealed inside containers. This should give port authorities further evidence to enhance container controls technical inspections and continue building upon their risk-assessment mechanisms.

• The majority of ammunition trafficking cases into the Dominican Republic seem to follow a pattern: ammunition is shipped from the USA, mostly New York and Florida, using commercial freight companies and declared as personal consignments. Considering that seized ammunition at border controls seems to be, more often than not, intercepted while still in the factory boxes, closer examination of these would enable accurate tracing and further disaggregated data concerning inflow trafficking patterns.

• Ammunition interceptions reported to the DGA seem to only be happening at airports and ports. Considering that it is unlikely that these are the only entry points

46 47

or modalities exploited by traffickers, other border control checkpoints should either increase vigilance or improve reporting to the DGA.

• In 33 percent of crime scenes studied, the crime resulted in at least one death. This finding suggests a high lethality in criminal incidents. A high lethality might be associated with the overwhelming prevalence of 9mm (9x19) ammunition. Further briefing papers and case studies in The Series will compare this hypothesis against public security contexts with reduced access to this calibre.

• 74 percent of the applicable sample of ammunition found at crime scenes was not marked. This finding might suggest that stocks from years before the law came into effect are still being sold and used, and there is ineffectual enforcement of marking requirements on new imports.

• Ammunition marked with the third letter “J” represents more than a third of the subsample of ammunition, marked with the mandated headstamp code, found at crime scenes. This finding suggests that either the JB lot in particular was disproportionately larger than other authorized lots, or that its distribution pattern is causing this code in particular to be found at crime scenes at a higher rate than other legally imported ammunition lots. Out of the two plausible options, the distribution pattern proposition is the most likely. This is because a comparison between ammunition found at crime scenes where police interventions were known to have taken place against import codes yielded an almost identical distribution to the general analysis of the subsample, where armoury J had the largest share and the code JB was the most recurrent. Therefore, it is possible that armoury J is a frequent provider to police forces.

• At least 96 percent of calibres found at crime scenes came from handguns (possibly some from sub-machine guns), with the 9mm (9x19) ammunition representing -alone- around 86 percent of the sample. It is thus, by overwhelming majority, the most common calibre found at crime scenes. As such, controls over this ammunition ought to be tightened. At the same time, this finding suggests that restrictions and/or controls over rifle ammunition are effectively supressing their presence at crime scenes.

• Production years marked into headstamps can be indicative of the role old stockpiles might have in enabling armed violence. If ammunition manufactured in 1978 is found at crime scenes today, it must be interpreted as evidence of the need to minimize surplus and old ammunition stocks. Furthermore, headstamp markings of military-oriented manufacture suggest that leakages from stockpiles have occurred in the past, either domestically or overseas. As such, this should be taken as further evidence of the need to reduce surplus and old military ammunition stockpiles.

• Ammunition manufactured in just three countries, USA, Mexico, and Brazil, accounted for at least 50 percent of the entire sample of spent cartridge cases and full rounds recovered from crime scenes in 2017 in the Dominican Republic.

• In both subsamples of 5.56x45mm and 9mm (9x19) ammunition, Aguila accounted for the largest share by any one particular ammunition brand or manufacturer. However, in both subsamples, the USA accounted for the largest share of the most likely country of manufacture. This is because different US-manufacturing brands were found and their addition resulted in the largest share for one single country, whereas Aguila was the only one manufacturer identified from Mexico.

Part III:Main conclusions and policy recommendations for improving public security.

This section concludes the paper giving consideration to Moving forward: a world of possibilities.

1. MAIN CONCLUSIONS + POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: WHICH COMPLEMENTARY INTERVENTIONS SEEM APPROPRIATE?

• Enforcing ammunition marking policy:National control authorities must ensure that every single cartridge sold at distributors and commercial armouries is marked as established by law. It seems that there is still a considerable amount of ammunition rounds available with no import marking codes, likely stocked by private users or commercial armouries from years before the law came into effect. This is evident from the 74 percent of the relevant sample found unmarked, as well as from UNLIREC visits to different commercial armouries. National authorities could consider imposing the marking requirement retroactively. As such, no law abiding distributor or commercial armoury would be able to introduce new unmarked ammunition to the market.

In addition, improving record-keeping will aid in providing crucial intelligence to facilitate cross-referencing and tracing once marked ammunition is found at a crime scene.

• Extending ammunition marking policy:Ammunition acquired by all law enforcement and military forces could also be marked with import codes. Ideally, with an alphanumerical combination to differentiate it from civilian ammunition. If this becomes the case, all ammunition legally imported into the country could be identifiable and traced back to the importing entity. Additionally, ammunition found at crime scenes with no import codes could be interpreted as an immediate red flag or indication of illicit trafficking.

This extension of the marking policy could be established by either modifying existent legal frameworks or enacting new regulations to make import marking compulsory for state security forces, as it is for the civilian market. To implement this policy, it is important to demand headstamp (or groove) markings, while defining technical specifications, during ammunition acquisition/procurement processes carried out by state security forces at no additional cost to the buyer. Important

48 49

to note that marking ammunition by lots entails no significant production cost to manufacturing companies.

• Strengthening legislation to limit ammunition rounds acquired by Private Security Companies (PSC) and private owners:Strengthening legislation to limit the amount of ammunition rounds that are acquired by PSCs and private owners seems like a critical follow-up step to the established marking practices. This measure could be accompanied by a reporting mechanism to monitor and enforce authorized users to not exceed, and to not access the number of rounds approved per individual and do not access calibres different than those permitted in the firearms license. Additionally, this reporting mechanism should ensure proper record-keeping of all ammunition rounds sold by commercial armouries, which could help supervise that no unmarked ammunition is sold. Limiting the the number of rounds sold to PSCs and private users, would require close coordination between government authorities responsible for overseeing PSCs and those regulating firearms and ammunition controls in a broader manner.

• Standardizing ammunition marking at the regional/sub-regional level: A consultative process or dialogue ought to be initiated to address standardized ammunition marking practices at the regional and/or sub-regional level. Agreeing upon a common framework for marking practices would be essential to further delineate illicit ammunition supply chains. Definition and acceptance of country codes in headstamps, as well as detailed alphanumerical codes, would help identify illicit ammunition flows and provide evidence or justification for appropriate policy responses.

The Dominican Republic - as a leader and pioneer of good ammunition marking practices in the region - could consider chairing this regional initiative and sharing its implementation experience and lessons learned, the technical expertise acquired, as well as the resulting impact in reducing armed violence, to generate a catalytic movement of good ammunition marking practices across Latin America and the Caribbean. UNLIREC stands ready to assist the government of the Dominican Republic in this effort. As a starting point, interested parties can consult directly with UNLIREC to access a copy of a technical proposal for ammunition marking practices developed in-house.79

• Enhancing security at entry points: - Approaching the UNODC-World Customs Organization (WCO) Container Control Programme (CCP): national customs authorities could consider assistance from the UNODC-WCO CCP. Collaborating with this joint initiative could further enhance national maritime ports control detection capabilities of illicit goods. This initiative seems particularly relevant as most ammunition as most ammunition being trafficked is likely concealed in containers. It would also send a strong dissuading message to potential traffickers. - Establishing special protocols and procedures for parcels and containers sent through shipping companies: Port authorities should continue to constantly

update their risk-profile of incoming shipments and ensure that protocols and procedures maximize their resources (both equipment and human capacities). The reports prepared by the DGA seem like an ideal starting point to collect big-picture data regarding seizures of illicit goods at border controls. Once data on trafficking modalities and patterns are identified and disaggregated, the information could be used to tailor intelligence-led inspections and aid in the maximization of resources. - Providing specialized equipment and training at entry points with a focus on x-ray identification of firearms, ammunition and parts and components. Increased national resources should be directed towards high-quality x-rays for inspecting containers and parcels at maritime entry ports, but also enhanced and recurrent training for both maritime ports and airport entry and exit control personnel and authorities (60 percent of cases documented by UNLIREC researchers were seized at ports, and 40 percent at airports). Usually, x-ray identification training has focused either on drugs or explosive devices and, often commonly, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have relied on “exporting” country authorities to stop the illicit flow of firearms, ammunition, and parts and components. To combat the influx of illicit firearms and ammunition, periodic specialized trainings focused on intercepting firearms, ammunition, and parts and components are needed at all entry points and addressed to personnel from all levels. Increased resources for technological equipment and human capabilities should be directed with particular urgency to districts suffering elevated rates of armed violence.

• Tracing factory boxes intercepted at border controls:It is possible that ammunition seized at border controls, if still in the original factory boxes, might have key information needed for tracing. It is of paramount importance to access the actual seized physical evidence to collect this sort of primary data. While there are no guarantees of success, if a data collection is attempted, a detailed profile of the illicit supply chain (Who sold it? Who bought it? Where was it made? To what lot does it belong? Was it assigned to security forces or sold commercially?) and responsibility borne by the actors involved might begin to form. Tracing small-calibre ammunition would constitute a giant step in the field of ammunition research, and could provide key intelligence for enhanced border control inspections, as well as evidence for sensible policy responses.

• Addressing the culture of toxic masculinity and conflating variables: Men represent the overwhelming majority of both perpetrators and victims of armed violence. National authorities could continue reducing armed violence with evidence-based education campaigns targeting men. These campaigns could start by pointing out that carrying a firearm will not necessary have favourable conditions for personal security and might even be detrimental. Additionally, reducing the presence of firearms in society could lessen the lethality of the conflating variables that seem to be driving numerous firearms-related lethal outcomes. To continue reducing the visibility and presence of firearms in society, gun-free zones should be expanded and enforced with zeal in localities that serve alcohol and remain open at night. In addition, restricting access to firearms where there is alcohol consumption ought to be a national priority.

50 51

• Understanding the 9mm as a weapon of mass destruction:The evidence is clear: 9mm (9x19) ammunition was found at the overwhelming majority of crime scenes in the Dominican Republic. The 9mm handgun should be considered, looking at the cumulative effect, a weapon of mass destruction. In any case, the 9mm is too readily available. National authorities could start by cracking down on the local market for repairing or modifying firearms in order to remove some from circulation. Detection and interception capabilities for firearms parts and components at border controls should be further enhanced as it is likely that the perceived thriving market for repairing and/or modifying older 9mm handguns is facilitated by an illicit influx of parts and components from abroad. Additionally, the ban on new imports should be maintained.

• Strengthening legislation for a better control of ammunition acquired by private security companies and the civilian market:Establish legislation to control ammunition acquired by PSCs and civilian owners and put in place mechanisms to monitor and enforce users to not exceed numbers of rounds approved per individual and to not access types of calibers different to those approved in their firearms licenses. Additionally, proper registration of rounds and calibre of ammunition sold by dealers should be carried out and adequate coordination should take place between government authorities responsible for PSCs and those responsible of ammunition control.

2. MOVING FORWARD: A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES

In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) most lethal outcomes are perpetrated with firearms and occur on an individual basis, but given the continuous recurrence, the cumulative effect is massive. Put otherwise, the effect of firearms-related violence is of mass destruction in slow-motion. Just like public insecurity, firearm and ammunition illicit proliferation and use have escaped the urgent care merited. But, if firearms-related violence in public security was taken with the same degree of seriousness and concern that weapons of mass destruction, it would make a world of difference. Likewise, it would open up a world of possibilities. A world of possibilities because it would save an ocean of unnecessary human suffering and would begin to pay the posthumous debt owed to those for whom bullets have stolen their lives.

The analysis and conclusions presented here are based on the premise that progress begets progress. One small step in the right direction creates the momentum for the next right step, and keeping this virtuous cycle moving forward strengthens the security sector ecosystem. This Briefing Paper aims to identify dynamics affecting public security to recommend complementary measures to assist in current national efforts. But it is just another small step to keep the momentum going in the reduction of armed violence in the Dominican Republic. This Briefing Paper must be construed upon two levels to keep the virtuous cycle turning. At the local level, this exercise must be expanded so that policymakers can further access disaggregated data, which will assist in directing policy prescriptions. At the regional level, the effort must be

replicated and kept alive in order to continue generating big-picture intelligence, which assist efforts across the region aimed at reducing armed violence.

Halving armed violence is well within our reach, but only a combination of disaggregated data, adequate analysis and willingness to address change will keep progress alive. Political will and contributions from all levels of society will be paramount in this effort. The UN system stands ready to provide support in promoting and maintaining peace and security to achieve this common goal. Because, as previously noted, ending criminal use of ammunition is owed to the millions of lives taken by bullets, and to those for whom bullets have taken a part of their life.

52 53

Gran Santo Domingo

Gran Santo Domingo

Distrito NacionalSanto Domingo NorthSanto Domingo WestSanto Domingo East

Santo Domingo East Boca Chica

North Region

SantiagoLa VegaSalcedoMontecristiDajabónSamaná/Las TerranasPuerto PlataMocaNaguaCotuíSan Francisco MacorísBonaoMonteplataPuerto Plata

South Region

Valverde MaoSan Cristobal HainaSan CristobalBarahona / NeybaAzuaBaníSan Juan de la MaguanaSan José de OcoaLa Altagracia o HigüeyVilla AltagraciaJimaníElías Piña

East Region

PedernalesLa RomanaHato MayorBávaroPunta CanaJuan DolioSan Pedro MacorísEl Seibo

ANNEX

Annex A

Map with location and time: where and when evidence was collected?UNRESOLVED CASES 2017

Gran Santo Domingo

Gran Santo Domingo

Distrito NacionalSanto Domingo NorthSanto Domingo WestSanto Domingo East

Santo Domingo East Boca Chica

North Region

SantiagoLa VegaSalcedoMontecristiDajabónSamaná/Las TerranasPuerto PlataMocaNaguaCotuíSan Francisco MacorísBonaoMonteplataValverde Mao

South Region

San CristobalSan Cristobal HainaBarahona / NeybaAzuaBaníSan Juan de la MaguanaSan José de OcoaLa Altagracia o HigüeyVilla AltagraciaJimaníElías PiñaPedernales

East Region

La RomanaHato MayorBávaroPunta CanaJuan DolioSan Pedro MacorísEl Seibo

Region Police District Municipality Dec

No

vO

ctSe

pA

ug

Jul

Jun

May

Ap

rM

arFe

bJa

n

All existingevidence processed

At least one evidence processed

Non existent All existingevidence processed

Non existent

SOLVED CASES 2017

Region Police District Municipality Dec

No

vO

ctSe

pA

ug

Jul

Jun

May

Ap

rM

arFe

bJa

n

54 55

NOTES1. Small Arms Survey, Global Focus: Ammunition Profiling, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlights-2014/

focus-ammo.html> Accessed on: 21/04/20182. According to the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 74 percent of all armed violence lethal outcomes occur

in public security contexts as intentional homicides -Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts, Chapter 2. Lethal Violence Update, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015, p. 51. <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GBAV3/GBAV3_Ch2_pp49-86.pdf>

3. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2013, March 2014, pp. 125-127. <https://www.unodc.org/gsh/>

4. The Economist, The Costs of Latin American Crime, February 25, 2017. <https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21717439-many-governments-are-failing-their-most-basic-task-costs-latin-american-crime>

5. The World Health Organization (WHO) considers a rate of 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants or higher to be characteristic of endemic violence.

6. Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal A.C., Metodología del ranking (2017) de las 50 ciudades más violentas del mundo, March 6, 2018, pp. 3-4. <http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/prensa/send/6-prensa/242-las-50-ciudades-mas-violentas-del-mundo-2017-metodologia>

7. Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, by Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, April 2018, p. 6. <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>. Important to note that Igarapé Institute seems to count Puerto Rico as Latin America, UNLIREC, in its geographical scope, for this study, does not. Thus, while the headline in the publication cited says 43 of the 50 most homicidal cities in the planet were in Latin America, UNLIREC only counts 42.

8. Laura Jaitman and Nicolas Ajzenman, Crime Concentration and Hot Spot Dynamics in Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank, IDB Working Paper Series, No. IDB-WP-699, June 2016. <https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7702/Crime-Concentration-and-Hot-Spot-Dynamics-in-Latin-America.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

9. Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, by Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, April 2018, p. 8. <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>

10. Small Arms Survey, Ammunition Tracing Kit: Protocols and procedures for recording small-calibre ammunition, June 2008, p. viii. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-06-ATK/SAS-Ammunition-Tracing-Kit.pdf>

11. James Bevan, Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Occasional Paper 22. Small Arms Survey. June, 2008, p. 77. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP22-Kenya.pdf>

12. Pierre Martinot and Ilhan Berkol, The Traceability of Ammunition, Groupe de Recherche et D’Information Sur la Paix et la Security, 2008/9, p. 13. <http://archive.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2008/2008-9_EN.pdf>

13. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), IATG 01.40:2015(E), UN SaferGuard IATG project, 2nd edition (2015-02-01). <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG01.40.pdf>

14. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, A/RES/55/255 (8 June 2001). <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf>

15. Robert E. Walker, Cartridges and Firearm Identification (Advances in Materials Science and Engineering), p. 115.16. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Definition of Headstamp. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/headstamp> 17. In this regard, a special mention must be made to James Bevan and Jonah Leff for their past and ongoing research efforts, and the

support, advise, and expertise lent to UNLIREC for this study. 18. Conflict Armament Research, Weapons of the Islamic State, Dec. 2017, p. 18. <http://www.conflictarm.com/publications/>19. Bearing in mind the roadblock, the case studies presented in this series explore different opportunities to bridge this gap in information.20. Instituto Sou da Paz, Arsenal Fluminense: análise das apreensões de munições no estado do Rio de Janeiro (2014-2017), Sep. 2017.

<http://www.soudapaz.org/upload/pdf/an_lise_das_muni_es_apreendidas_no_rio_de_janeiro_isdp.pdf>21. Ibid. p 6. 22. James Bevan, Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Occasional Paper 22. Small Arms Survey. June,

2008, p. 66. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP22-Kenya.pdf >23. James Bevan and Pablo Dreyfus, Chapter 9 ‘Enemy Within: Ammunition Diversion in Uganda and Brazil’ in Small Arms Survey,

Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 289–315 <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/full/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-09-EN.pdf>

24. Nicolas Florquin and Jonah Leff, Chapter 6 ‘Across Conflict Zones: Ammunition Profiling’, in Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 208. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2014/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2014-Chapter-6-EN.pdf>

25. Samuel Paunila and Andrew Hole, Ammunition Safety Management: preventing Loss of Life and Property, and Diversion from Stockpiles, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, COUNTER-IED REPORT, Jan. 2016, p. 89. <https://www.gichd.org/resources/publications/detail/publication/ammunition-safety-management-preventing-loss-of-life-and-property-and-diversion-from-stockpiles/#.WuS05tPwZAY>

26. N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Following the Headstamp Trail: An Assessment of Small-calibre Ammunition Documented in Syria, Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey Working Paper 18, April 2014, p.13. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP18-Syria-Headstamp-Trail.pdf>

27. Ibid. p. 14. 28. Conflict Armament Research, Weapons of the Islamic State, Dec. 2017, p. 6. <http://www.conflictarm.com/publications/>29. UNLIREC urges caution with the interpretations and conclusion put forward in this case study. While the information extracted from

the sample offers little potential to be misleading, the interpretation of it can be open to discussion and not all stakeholders might agree with UNIREC’s conclusions. Other researchers can look at the same data and reach completely different, yet absolutely valid, conclusions.

30. Solved meaning that all ballistics evidence from that case had been identified and matched to a firearm. In the context of the Ballistics Identification unit from the Scientific Police, solved does not necessary mean that perpetrators were brought to justice.

31. UNLIREC’s Ammunition Gauge assists in calculating the dimensions of the ballistics exhibit in question because it has several diameter measures to identify the calibre as well as a ruler to calculate the length of the cartridge under examination. This gauge also has a magnet which rapidly identified if a cartridge is ferrous or non-ferrous.

32. Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, by Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, April 2018, p. 10. <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>

33. Ibid. p. 38.34. Igarapé Institute, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, by Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguirre Tobón, April 2018, p.

31. <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Citizen-Security-in-Latin-America-Facts-and-Figures.pdf>35. Ibid. p. 10.36. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC Statistics Online Robbery at the national level, number of police-

recorded offences. Accessed on: 30/04/2018. <https://data.unodc.org/>

37. US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Dominican Republic 2017 Crime & Safety Report: Overall Crime and Safety Situation. Accessed on: 30/04/2018. <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=21470>

38. Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana República Dominicana, Informe Estadístico sobre Seguridad Ciudadana OSC-IE 026: Boletín Estadístico Enero-diciembre 2017, Feb. 2018, pp. 16-17. <http://mi.gob.do/observatoriodeseguridadciudadana/index.php>

39. Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana República Dominicana, Tasa de homicidios por cada 100 mil habitantes, Ministerio de Interior y Policía, nov. 2017. Accessed on: 2/05/2018. <http://mi.gob.do/observatoriodeseguridadciudadana/index.php/publicaciones/indicadores?showall=> ** Rate for 2017 on graph was a projection based on data from the first semester, published in November of 2017. The study cited below, published in February 2018 (p.5), confirms that the rate for 2017 was 15.4, less than the projection.

40. Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana República Dominicana, Informe Estadístico sobre Seguridad Ciudadana OSC-IE 026: Boletín Estadístico Enero-diciembre 2017, Feb. 2018, pp. 2-5. <http://mi.gob.do/observatoriodeseguridadciudadana/index.php>

41. Ibid. Tasa de homicidios con armas de fuego por cada 100 mil habitantes. 42. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC Statistics Online: Percentage of homicides by mechanism (2000-

2015). Accessed on: 30/04/2018. <https://data.unodc.org/>43. Policía Nacional, Departamento de Información y Estadísticas, Homicidios según el tipo de arma utilizada, 2016.44. Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana República Dominicana, Informe Estadístico sobre Seguridad Ciudadana OSC-IE 026: Boletín

Estadístico Enero-diciembre 2017, Feb. 2018, p. 6. <http://mi.gob.do/observatoriodeseguridadciudadana/index.php>45. Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana República Dominicana, Informe Estadístico sobre Seguridad Ciudadana OSC-IE 026: Boletín

Estadístico Enero-diciembre 2017, Feb. 2018, p. 5. <http://mi.gob.do/observatoriodeseguridadciudadana/index.php>46. Ibid. p. 6. 47. República Dominicana, Decreto No. 309-06. 48. República Dominicana, Ley 631-16.49. República Dominicana, Resolución 01-0750. Law 631-16, art 13, Spanish text available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/361824815/Ley-631-16-de-Armas 51. Law 631-16, art 3, num 1452. Law 631-16, art 3, num 1153. Law 631-16, art 3, num 1554. Law 631-16, art 855. Law 631-16, art 16, num 156. Law 631-16, art 16, num 9. 57. Law 631-16, art 16, num 258. Law 631-16, art 1459. Law 631-16, art 21, Parr. III60. Decree 309-0661. For a list of the codes assigned to every gun-shops authorized to import please see section 2.3.2. 62. Law 631-16, art 3363. Law 631-16, art 3164. Law 631-16, art 3265. It seems important to note that other trafficking cases attempted smuggling via parcels, but when these where seized at containers,

researchers noted containers as the concealment modality rather than parcels.66. Conflict Armament Research, Weapons of the Islamic State, Dec. 2017, p. 18. <http://www.conflictarm.com/publications/>67. Exchanges between UNLIREC researchers and national authorities. 68. UNLIREC researchers classified a case as ‘homicide + attempted homicide’ when the documentation suggested that the primary

motivation of the perpetrator was to inflict bodily harm to the victim and activated the firearm expressly and purposefully towards that end, whereas in ‘theft + common crime’, the primary motivation was to commit a robbery and the perpetrator activated the firearm in support of the primary criminal intention. This ‘primary motivation’ criterion was also used to classify ‘kidnappings’, of which only one case was documented. Moreover, UNLIREC researchers decided to classify a case as ‘firearms abuse’ when there was no premeditated criminal intention of any sort, yet the perpetrator activated the firearm in a social interaction and harmed a victim. UNLIREC researchers created the category of ‘Recovered + seized’ to group those scenes under investigation where first responders were called in but events that unfolded were not immediately clear, and the ammunition exhibits were recovered from the area or from a person involved or somehow related to the event. The category ‘N/A’ denotes the cases with absolutely no contextual or supplementary information. The categories ‘Accident’ and ‘Suicide’ were used to denote scenes under investigation when, upon arrival, the first responding officer presumed or was told that an accident or suicide had occurred. UNLIREC researchers are aware that the difference between categories is nuanced and most cases would legally constitute homicide or attempted homicide, yet still thought that adding a grading scale, as subjective as this may be, to the intentions behind criminal violence would contribute, even if slightly, to the field of public security research. UNLIREC is aware that other stakeholders can look at the same information and reach completely different, yet completely valid, conclusions.

69. Exchanges between UNLIREC researchers and technical experts. Also, see Robert E. Walker, Cartridges and Firearm Identification (Advances in Materials Science and Engineering), p. 54. And, N.R. Jenzen-Jones, Following the Headstamp Trail: An Assessment of Small-calibre Ammunition Documented in Syria, Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey Working Paper 18, April 2014, p. 24. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP18-Syria-Headstamp-Trail.pdf>

70. Robert E. Walker, Cartridges and Firearm Identification (Advances in Materials Science and Engineering), p. 118. 71. Robert E. Walker, Cartridges and Firearm Identification (Advances in Materials Science and Engineering), p. 137. Important to note, in

2005, Israel Military Industries changed name to Israel Weapon Industries.72. Ibid. 73. Ibid.74. Ibid. p. 136.75. Orbital ATK, Product Specification Sheet, M855 Ball fact sheet, <https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/small-caliber-

systems/5-56mm/docs/PS001810%20(M855).pdf>. Accessed on: 10/05/2018.76. Orbital ATK, Defense Systems - Small Caliber Systems, <https://www.orbitalatk.com/defense-systems/small-caliber-systems/>.

Accessed on: 10/05/2018.77. In most cases, if not all, when the ammunition headstamp has been marked with the mandated four-letter code, there are no

manufacturers branding nor production year marked. 78. UNLIREC researchers visited several armories and took notes of present market availability. 79. UNLIREC, Propuesta Técnica para la Marcación de Municiones Argentina, (2013), p. 13. Full text available from UNLIREC upon request.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Developmentin Latin America and the Caribbean

Lima, Peru.programme@unlirec.org

With the support of the governments of Germany and the Dominican Republic