Brest 43rd Infantry Division (May 18 Sep 44)

8/13/2019 Brest 43rd Infantry Division (May 18 Sep 44)

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ENGLISHBREST 3d INFANTRY DIVISION

MAY 18 SEP

HISTORICAL DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH

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4~i~r43J ~e~iLA di~~A~1;T4c~ JL Si LU May - 18 Sep 44

y

Rudolf Kogard berst i G a Do


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A [ O T E i:STALLAAianOUi THe ALA ikIX WALLJT0 HE BBGljiilrG vil TVH lhVATSiU

1 QOecumation^ ig enFr LIn the world there was talk of a strong German

Atlantic Wall already at the time when same did not yetexist. It is true the Atlantic Coast had constantlybeen occupied since the termination of the German Frenchwar in 194o but the fortifications were limited tomerely a few important points.

In Brittany the occupation forces were constantlychanged; units which were intact were at the middleof 1941 sent to the East and replaced by troops fromthere which were in need of freshening up. Their chiefaim was the restoration of their full fighting strengthbecause they expected to be committed again in the East.Therefore aside from training and recreation they wereas may be easily understood not very much interestedin the development of the Atlantic Wall especially sincethe majority of the troops did not expect an Alliedinvasion before the Fall of 1942

Since at that time the German rmy High Commandhad given up hope for a quick termination of the Russiancampaign and hence had to reckon with an Allied invasionin the West in due course orders were issued in 1942 ftrthe following essential changes in the defense system


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of the Atlantic Wall:a. A permanent occupation of the Atlantic Coast

by units which were especially organized for this purpose- so called garrison divisions

b. a systematic improvement of the coast carriedout by the garrisons,

c* increased effectiveness of operations on thepart of the garrisons, by means of allotting supplementaryweapons, according to the importance of the respectivesectors. These weapons were ma rled by permanentlystationed fortress cadre troops, who had to remain in thesame localities, even when the security divisions werechanged.

These measures brought it about that the garrisontroops gained a good knowledge of the surroundings andbecame convinced that each improvement of the fortifi-cations would result in a betterment of their own combatconditions.

When, at the end of 1942, the newly activated 45 Inf. Div. arrived at the northern coast of Brittany,in order to take over the sector of St. Brieuc up toPlouescat (west of Morlaix), it consisted of only twoinfantry regiments of three battalions each, fourbatteries, two engineer companies and one signal battalionsThe ammament and equipment was not complete; many troopsstill had no guns.


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When the formation and training for defense of theDivision had been completed and the Army High Commandhad realized that the occupation of the important harborBrest would also have to be assigned to a permant detach-ment of troops the 343 I.D. was during the middle of1943, transferred and stationed in the sector of Plouescatwest of Morlaix) up to and including the Crozon Peninsulaand reinforced by a third infantry regiment for thisimportant task. Prospects were held out of the arrivalof the third artillery battalion and the third engineercompany.

It was generally assumed that the Allies would invadewith the greatest commitment of men and material. Wetherefore had to prepare for this battle and were convincedthat our weakness in material could be balanced by pre-paratory measures. Our troops knew that every dig of thespade and any progress made in training improved theirchances for victory. The commands were issued and carriedout in consideration of these facts

2 Selection of the line of defense and technicalon truicton

e knew that the main body of the Allied invasionarmies could only be brought up by way of the ocean.The enemy would have to be angaged in combat at pointswhere his position was most disadvantageous i.e. before


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j B 4 7landing. Therefore wherever landing conditions werefavorable we set up battle positions and determined thestrengih of the occupation troops armament technicalconstruction and supply according to the importance ofthe respective locality. In view of the forces at ourdisposal and the frontage of the coast it was possibleonly to occupy isolated points and to merely observe theintermediate terrain.

The technical construction was supposed to serve thefollowing double purpose:

a Protecting our own occupation forces armamentand supplies against the effects of enemy fire

b impeding the progress of the enemy by meansof obstacles against landing craft as well as wireentanglements and mine fields against combat troops andsetting up of pole obstacles in areas which would besuitable for landing of parachute troops.

The change of occupation forces made it necessary toensure the durability of the technical construction.Therefore a construction officer acting as chief offortress staff was permanently assigned to each divisionsector. The supreme control of the coastal fortificationsremained in the hands of the permanent corps headquarters.

We assumed that landings would be made at high tidebecause this would enable the landing craft to bring the


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B 4 7combat troops under cover as closely as possible up toour combat positions. Therefore, the obstacles againstlanding craft were set up at the highest tidal line.When, after Iommxol s arrival in Brittany, it was pointedout that there was a possibility that the enemy mightprefer to face our defensive fire on the longer way, ratherth n encounter our high tide obstacles, we had to starterecting new obstacle lines for low tide landsings which,in view of the lack of time and materiel, was possible onlyat few points,

The most distressing problem of technical constructionwas the impossibility of appropriate camouflage, In spiteof our realization of its importance and greatest efforts,we did not succeed in sufficiently camouflaging the concreteshelter constructions and water obstacles against enemy

air reconnaissance. We therefore had to assume that theenemy was fully infirmed about our fortifications.

The great lack of materiel had detrimental effects onthe constructions. The most moderate monthly requirementsof the coast defense sector of the 343 I*D, called for otrainloads of concrete, of which not even half the quantitywas generally brought in, This was due not so much tothe lack of concrete as the difficulties of railroadtransportation, caused by Allied air force activity andacts of sabotage on the part of the French ResistanceMovement* Allotments of concrete were made in accordance


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with the importance of the respective fortifications.Until 1943, the three branches of the Wehrmacht wereoperating independently, so that these requirements werenot sufficiently taken into consideration and it wouldhappen that in naval constructions, latrines were fortifiedwith concrete, while at the same time, defensive weaponsat the coast could not yet be constructed with concreteAfter the end of 1943 this state of ff ires changed, whenthe corps general staff was placed in supreme control ofthe Wehrmacht branches.

The mine fields played an important role in thefortifications. They were supposed to be the chief meansof making the gaps in our fortifications impassable.@en. Pelam, Rommel ordered the mining of an 800 meter widecoastal strip on the average. As the available mines werenot sufficient for these wide areas, we established dummymine fields, i.e. we simply fenced in an area and put updanger notices. This was done with the plan of actuallylaying the mines subsequently. Of course, many unitinterpreted this method erroneously and goodn turedlywithout any thought of betrayal temporarily allowed thepopulation to lead their cows to pasture there. The dummymine fields also influenced the obtaining of seaweed to considerable degree. The German Army Command wasdepended on this material, but the extensive dummy minefields eliminated large areas which could have been u:sed


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or the production of seaweed.The coast defenses n technical construction w as

hindered by the sanding up, ;whic;h a:tected mLainly theweapons and water o s -tacless.3 mam nt

Already at the time when the field divis4ionswhich, in comparison wiith the garrison divisions, werebetter armed- were stationed at the coast, it waf obviousthat the au:,thorized armament was no1t sufficient for thecoast defense. Theref ore, the strong points and pocketsof resistance were in accordan ce with their respectiveimportance allotted supplementary local weapons antitankguns and machine guns), wtiich were manned by speciallytrained personnel- fortress cadre troops. These troopswere for tactical purposes- subordiinated to the garrisondivisions and rezaiined with thsir weapons even when theoccupation troops were changed. The 343. I.D. had in itssector one fortress cadre battalion w :ith seven companiesconsisting of roughly 2000 nen. Although the idea of thesupplementary local weapons was good, it entailed a greatdisadvantage inaslmuch as these weoapons due to thegenerally known materiel shortage could be allotted onlyby degress. In this manner, small caliber antitank guns,which were i ost easily 0ibtained, 1were first put at the bestlanding points and emplaced in concrete. . rlen, in the courseof time, it become possible to allot medium antita.nk guns

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and shortly before the invasion even large caliberantitank guns- to the sectors, it was longer possible tochange the small caliber antitank guns for these, becausethe concrete constructions were too small and the bestdefensive points were blocked up. Due to the shortageconcrete and the lack of time, it was not possible to razethe ooncrete bunkers, especially, since the enemy invasionhad to be expected at any moment. This resulted in apatchwork, which prevented the best possible effectivenessof our weapons,

4 oMunicatione.It was of the utmost importance fQr th ommand

to be correctly informed by quickest means regarding allenemy actions. Every soldier knew that this was the onlyway to achieve the right kind of command, which would thushelp him too. The first report about the enemy attack isthe most importantt This idea was hammered into all troops.Such reports had to be made by safe means, without weakeningthe occupation forces by sending out runners. We did notcount on tube connections (telephone) during combat;therefore, the construction of underground cables was alreadystarted early, These measured from 1/2 to 2 meters, accor-ding to the distance frmm the main line of resistance andthe importance of the locality. The cable constructionwas detrimental, inasmuch as the enemy through airreeonnaisance discovered the connections of our defensive


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system; camouflaging was impossible. The effects of theunderground cable network were also harmful due to th efrequent changes of the sector boundaries inasmuch s m nyoommand posts had to remain at unfavorable points.

Carrier pigeon service was established to the mostimportant strong points.

Since in case of combat we could not count on thebringing up of the necessary material even the smallestfortifications were furnished supplies sufficient for severaldays of combat.

Aamunition food cel d r wr lothingl d waer we allottedin accordance with the importance of the fortification andthe availability of material and for security reasons weretored -and protected as much as possible against shell

fragments at several points. The harmful dampness made itnecessary to constantly check and frequently shift thesesupplies.

6 g na nariPgi4ple or th congw 9t fb ttleMindful of the fact that the Wiected enemy superiority

in men and material would be felt especially during combat onthe mainland we knew that we had to do everything in ourpower to prevent an enemy landing Such io inv ionvescertain weak moments and during such times we had to engagethe enemy in combat.

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The Allies had the advantage of chosing the time andplace of landing, which gave them a powerful fire superiority.We had in our favor the improved positions and thoroughknowledge of the terrain Every soldier knew that his coastposition allowed for combat conditions which were morefavorable than oould be expected at any other point Therefore,the guiding principle was Fight to the finish in the coastpositions; there is no flexible conduct of battle, such sin the Bast *

Each unit which was committed at the coast for defenseoperations, required its own reserves for counterattacks,which - due to the enemy air superiority - had to be placedin readiness as closely as possible to the front line; however,not so near as to be caught, at the same time by enemy deetrc-tion fire. Therefore, the reserves were held in readiness nfortified switch and rear positions.

Should the enemy succeed in accomplishing landing, itwould be necessary to clear up the point of penetrationwithin 24 hours the latest a breakthrough had to be preven-ted at any o89a .

At the beginning of the livasion, we would have to resignourselves to the enemy superiority; after the third day, weexpected the arrival of a large number of our air force inthe endangered area*

Every unit and command headquarters placed in the rear

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had to entrench itself and prepare for all contingencies incombat in order to be able in case of breakthrough attempts to prolong their resistance until the reserves whichwould be brought up would be in a position to clear up theenemy breakthrough. This resulted in a checkerboardlikesystem of fortifications which was created to preventwidening of the enemy breakthroughs.

Every unit placed at the coast also had to be ready tosupport neighboring units which were threatened; bicyclesand motor vehicles were kept in readiness to enable theunits to render assistance more quickly.

Each unit and command headquarters had its own airobservers and improvised alarm detachments in preparationagainst enemy air landings. Reports on air landings couldthus be transmitted the quickest way possible. The alarmdetachments received constant training.

7 lX a invaBion exectedhaere When?We were certain than an enemy invasion would take

place in spite of the opinions to the contrary frequentlyexpressed to us by the French. These apparently originatedfrom enemy propaganda which vas supposed to make our troopscareless. Therefore already at the beginning of 1944 or e swere issued that ideas of this sort which lulled our troopsinto security were to be attacked most vigorously. Amongthe many incorrect reports the 4 I.D. a few days befoze


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the invasion received one which stated that the Alliedinvasion in Normandy would begin on 4 June. Already from thebeginning of 1944, the French resistance movement becameincreasingly discontent, because the Allies were procrastina-ting for such a long time, and among the polulation one couldhear th opinion that the resistance movement would dissolveif the Allies did not begin their operations soon.

During a conference of the General Staff held at Pontivyabout the end of April 1944, the following was announced:

An enemy invasion was definitely expected; the onlyquestion which remained was where and when. As regards theplace, the following possibilitesa were given:

a io rmandyb the Channelc ritt nyd south of Brittany

At that time, they also discussed the possibility thatthe invasion would take place at two of the above mentionedpoints simultaneously or successively . This idea must haveinfluenced the Higher Command continuously, because at theend of July and in August, the commands still called forseaward defense. Added to this was the fact that of theroughly 100 divisions which England had assembled at thebeginning of the invasion, the commitment of only about40 divisions was recognized at the end of July 1944.

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Hence the Higher Commaand st ll reckoned with a secondpossibly stronger invasion force while the lliesapparently planned for the employment n the directionof ermany of the divisions which were not yet oommitted


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8 Order of atiand combat ffiienc of ot teroos. tt the d j t _May 1944.

The 343. IT.D : Commander Gen. Lt. aauchI a OberstOberstMajor

The 951 Grenadier-Rgt.

i.G. Kogard,Baumann after 18 AugustHeitsch after 25 August)Oberst Baumann

The 952.The 998.

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Oberst PoersterOberstlt. Jaegerlater Oberstlt. Schwind

Three to four Ostbataillone,whose numbers I no longerremember*

FestungastammabteilungBrestThe 343. Artillery-igt.The 343. Pionier-Batl.The 343. MNaChrichten Abtlg.Supply ServicesAuxiliary Volunteers

Major SnizarewskiHauptmann FinkI can t remember anyother names*I do not recall the names

Oberst SermersheimIIauptmann v StraubMajor Roehsler

Major Aichseveral hundred Italiansand FrenchmenOberet v.d. MoselCommander of the Brest Fortress

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When the 343. I D was organized at the end of 1942,troops were used which were not fully fit for combat(g.v.H. garnisonsverwendungsfaehig Heimat- fit forgarrison duty in zone of interior)or belonged to older age classes; this was consideredsufficient security for the Atlantic Wall. The physicalcondition of the troops improved noticeably, which made itpossible during the course of 1943 to pick out troopswhich were sentt he Eastern theater of war. The firstto be considered were those troops whose health had improvedand the younger age classes; however, later on, those whoin 1942 had been considered fit only for use in garrisondivisions, were also included* In their stead, the Divisionreceived older troops and those who were less fit. Thisconstant change resulted in a continuous deterioration ofthe fighting power; when the invasion began, only about onethird of the troops assigned at the time of organizationwere still left in the Division. The heavy losses in theEast brought it about that the requirements for the Select-ion of officers were also lowered considerably; men who,in 1942, had been rejected as officer's canditates, had tobe trained as officer's candidates in 1944.

The Division was made up of South Germans- 2/3(including Austrians) and North Germans 1/3. The qualityof the men was good.


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The fortress cadre troops were older men or thoseclassified as less able; they were considered fit fordefensive combat.

The fighting power of the Ostbataillone battalionscomposed of men from East-European countries) was doubtful;and after their arrival at the end of 1943, they were rejecidby German troops* However, the higher commands - calling

attention to the scarcity of en -made great effortsbehalf of the military training of these battalions and theirrecognition by the German troops. Nevertheless, the Ost-batallione were employed only in emergencies an-d even thenkept under careful observation. Whenever the commitmentwas temporary and brief or German troops were close ibythese battalions made good.

The employment of the auxiliary volunteers for supplyservices without weapons, proved to be useful.

Service in the coast defense entailed the great dangerthat the troops would become unaccustomed to combat, andcareless, This drawback was obviated through special trainingand alternating em;-loyment, iurthermore, the troops, whichwere committed for coast defense, were alternately taken backinto the reserves for six weeks and trained or offensivecombat. However, due to the many types of eraployrent changes,the Division succeeded in giving this kind of training tonly six of the nine German battalions.


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Especially important was the ULivisions-Kam-pfsachuleBrignogan at the Goulvenbucht, to wvhich the troops were sentin rotation and in which tLey received the highest grade ofoffensive training. Although there were similar coursesof instruction at the Armee, the:l did not have sufficienttraining sites for the many divisions.

The troops were in general overloaded with these manyduties, so that their time for recreation was considerablylimited; this, consequently, affected the combat adversely.The construction of field fortifications especially occupied great deal of their time in addition, there was theconstant guard duty, continuous training and the manydetail duties.

We were convinced that we had taken all the necessarysteps to balance the expected enemy superiority. The moraleof the troops was good, even though certain war wearinesscaused mainly by letters from home became noticeable.The High Command tried to have the political leaders influencethe troops; they travelled, by rotation, even to thesmallest coast fortifications in order to speak to the men.

The arrival of Gene. ieldm. Rommel in the Spring of 1944was tremendous inspiration. Most of the troops began tobelieve that an enemy invasion could no longer succeed.However, their spirit was dampened when Rommel'e commandswere received after his visit, calling for extensive

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supplementary constructions, such as for instance, low tideobstacles, etc. The soldiers were of the opinion that itwould not be possible to make the necessary improvementsbefore the invasion began.

The morale of the troops was less favorably affected inthe Spring of 1944 by the arrival of the commission whichhad been sent by the High Command to investigate the defensepreparations. This commission consisted of high officers

of the three Wehrmacht branches, and it was their task toreveal in direct reports to the Fuehrer the weaknesses ofour defense and discover the means to overcome same. We allknew that this too would neither help us obtain the concretewhich was lacking and for which we had been fighting hard

for months, nor be able to prevent the railroad sabotageactivities of the French resistance movement, This beliefwas justfied for not the slightest change took place on thebasis of the visit of the commission.

9. nUrior~ gonds andnhboi__ng units-The 343. I.D. was - with the coast defense sector of

Brest subordinated to the XXV. Armeekorps, whose commandpost was at Pontivy later at Lorient). At the time ofoccupation of the Brest sector, the AOK 7 was deliberatingwhether it would not be better for the Division to remain -as had previously been the case - under the command of theLXXIY. Armeekorps, whose command post was at Guingamp.

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This seemed advisable because of the likelihood that an n yattack on Brest might be launched from the northern coast ofBrittany. On the other hand the decisive roason for subordination to the XXV. Arieekorps was first of all thene essity for dur bility of the fortifications. Since further-more the possibility existed that an enemy attack on Brestmight be launched from the southwesternx coast of Brittanythe coast defense sector remained unchanged under thecommand of the XXV. Armeekorps.

The commanding general of the XXV. Armeekorps was:Gen. d Art. Fahrmmbaoher

The chief of staff: Oberet i.G. Bader.


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Brest which was the second largestt rench harbor wasas submaarine base ust as important for the Geriaan strategyas it was or an Allied invasion, and it was, therefore,imperative that itt ehould remaiinin our hands. Theoccupation forces and the fortifications had t conformto this need.

The most important precautionary measures were aimedat the defense against esnemy raids, which were expectedchiefly from land air landings), but might also be launchedfrom the sea* Thie scarity occupation aesigned to reotconsisted of two infantry battalions, which had to bepermanently s-tatiorled within the fortress.

Oberst von der Mosel was the fortress aoamanderHe was responsible for the construaction of fortifications,the organization of the defense and the conduct of battle..

Major enemy attacks on rest were not expected to belaunched from the sea, but by way of land, i.e. chieflyfrom the northern ooast of Brittany, The landw ard frontof the fortress was set up accordingly, and this connection,the following was taken into consideration:

We were not certain as to the strenglth of theforces available for the battle at the fortress; we couldbe sure only of the permanent occupation forces and auxiliary

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formations e The deterioration of the situation at all frontsmade it impos.ieble for us to hope for airy substa.ntiaal increaein forces.

2. ^ tf e tinoe otU the ue eiy attack vwa.::.ot known, wehad .to be ready for diefene a ll ti me.

3 We had to reckon vwith materiel short;arjes and trans-portation difficulties.

hor thsee reasons we could o y decide on. a narrowcordbn of forts. Although the installations of the o d.re-noh for.tification inthe ctenter of the city were - fromnortheast to northvwest *- osaolete and a s ho;tt d.istanoee fromour submarine pen, this cznsctituted a ir begiunning. Thecourvse of this ring -of fr ts cane seen in. anneXoriginal fortified area)

see annmexzThe chief disadvanta:;cge of the narrow ring the pc0s1

ility of enemy artillery fire on objects of strategicimportance Fwas not decisive factorz because the enemy ir force wae able to attack these targets in full measure. n order to iake postsible an intellient utilization of theconstruction material, wh.ich vtas .arriving in barely sufficim-tquantities, and toproiperly comoit the occrpation .f;orcee atour disposal,- ordees were ijsued to the effaect that changesof the cordon of forts -were ,,subject to theFI approval of theAOX 7. In days to come, this comnand rejected requests for


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extention, referring to disadvantages vvh ich would1 risetherefrom for the adjacent fortifications of Lorien:t andSt. Nazaire.

he tip of the Bspagnol Peninsula whiich was locatedsouth of the city in conjunction with the original oldPrench fortifications formed the closig link in the cordonof forts of the Brest Harbor.

The narrow cordon of forts entailed the following iesadvantages, which could be eliminated only in August 1944,when the number of occupation forces was increased;

a It was not possible to set up thle many anti-aircraft gun emplacements within the fortifications, whichwould have ensured their best possible effectiveness, and

b the enemy was able to bring his observers byair and his artillery on land up to within six m of thesubmarine pen.

he fortress was divided by the Penfeld river courseinto two defensive sectors each of which had -one reserveoompany. In order to support the weak occupation forcesn o se of combat l rm detac2hments- composed of civiliansfrom the German administrative offices Labor Service etc.)were organized and trained.

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C 4AR BY^SNS kiSOM 2S B3GL Si-IJ^ Ubt h2EIUVASXMIi*0 TvE bBA i O HjBluA S FiibIIVACS

i e 6 JUki' g 5 AUS S3 1944. s annex

The distribution of troops in the coast defense sectorof Brest at the end of May has been indicated in nnex(marked in red). The sector was roughly 200 km long andoccupied by six German infantry battalions; they had toguard coast strips which were roughly 3 km long. Thedivision reserve consisted of one German battalion and threeOstbataillone. The companies were responsible for thesecuring of the coast; each of them had 6 -8 resistancepockets (smallest fQrtifications). Individual strong points(larger fortifications) were up to wo platoons strong.Even the smallest unit had ts own reserve.

Reserves of the higher comaand in the coast defensesector of Brest were;

The 353 I.D. and the 3. Fallschirm Jg. Div.The 343. I.D. was authorised - in case of direct danger

and disrupted communications to place portions of bothdivisions under its commzand subsequently inforiing thesuperior corps headquarters as thickly as possible. Beeides,artillery portions o: both divisions had been brought up tothe coast for strengthening and prompt defensive actions


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and- for t ctic l reasons- were subordinated to the3435 I.U

At midnight on June heavy bombardement was audibleat the division comiand post at Chateau Kerlezerien nearLanderneau, at a distance of 20 - 5 k and it waE assumedthat this was the beginnin g of the invasion. Upon inquiriest the coast defense groups and the Brest Fortress it wasascertained that it was a heavy air attack on the Brest-SuedAirdrome on the Crozon Peninsula and that no enemy forceswere to be seen at the coastline o f the 343 ID : Soonthereafter, corps headquarters announced; the beginning ogthe invasion in iormandy, with air landings and landingson the sea.

Prom that time on, we also expected enemy landings inBrittany, s the reserves of the highler command. had beenmarched off in the direotion of iXormandy the 343. I.D. w sleft to its own resources, .:e knew, however, that in caseof an enemy invasion in our sector, we would receivereinforcements from other sectors

see annex 2During the course of June and ;uly additional troops

were withdrawn from the division sector and sent to Normandyand besides the coastal sector w s extended to almi:st doubleits previous length 370 km s can be seen in annex 2hmarked in green . Our losees during the Normandy battles

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u S ,-427were by the end of July, so heavy tIhat the importantBreat sector was at that time without any coast defenseforces and only coast guards were left there. Moreover,the Ostbataillone were also coraiitted in the forward line,These drawbacks can be seen by glancing at annexY (comparered and green indications . iiowever we were all convincedthat the holding of our sector would be useless, in case theNormandy front were to collapse. Flor this reason, whenevertroops were detached for assistance only those with offen-sive training and best equipement ere chosen.

I tan no longer remember the sequence and the date ofthese troop movements, but I am able to set forth thefollowing in this connection:

Soon after the departure of the reserves of the highercommand the only German; reserve battalion of the ivi.sionand.one engineer company were started off in the directionof liormandy. Following this, the coast defense sector wasgradually extended and two additional Gerlman battalionswere given up to the neighlbor to the South the 265 IDo .The extension of the fr- nt of the 343. IoD and the 265.I.3Dhad become necessary due to the fact that the 275 I hadbeen pulled out of the coast defense formation of theXXVI Armeekoxrps; this Division was also sent to aormandy.

s result of these shifts the 453 ITD becamealmost completely non-mobile. Apart from this the rear

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columns of the garrison divisions had been apportionedto such a limite extent that they were sufficient onlyfor transportation of supplies. The bicycles which hadpreviously been allotted to the reserves were also sentalong with the troops to ~omaiandy.

A few weeks after the departure of the higher comuandreserves the 2 Fallschirm Jg. Div. which was in need ofreconditioning arrived in the division sector from theEast. The artillery of this Division ;as already at fullstrength and was committed for reinforcere.ent at the coastin the Goulven area. Other potions of this Division wereaccording to orders of the Supreme Co;;mand ot allowedto be committed, unless they were up to full strengthiHowever, already at the end of July additional reinforce-ments were required in .iormandy nd the 2 Pallschirm Jg.Div.,which had in the uLeantime been replenished to some degreewas detached thtere. However this movemIent due to Alliedair supremacy could lot be carried out, and the Divisionwas ordered to the Brest Fortress for reinforce:ment.

It was generally known that the Allied air force atthat time wade troop movements impossible during the day.Such movements could be carried out only at ni-ht off themain lines of communication and it took foot troops sevenfull days to get from Brittany to ormlandy. n thisconnection the following difficulties had to be facedt

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Scarcity of guides who knew the terrain, troubles whiletransferring the loads from broken down vehicles andcamouflaging against air observation during the day.Smaller groups and individual vehicles, which had strayed,became lost.

At the end of July, the 343. ID realized that, incase of a westward enemy advance, the troops stationed inwestern Brittany would have to withdraw to the BrestFortress, in order to escape capture. However, at thattime, the purport of the orders issued by the SupremeCommand was still the followings Every fortified positionis to-be held and any joining of forces for united combatis out of the question . The idea of combined operationsin the fortress was mentioned only a few days before5 August by the corps general staff of the XXV. Armeekorps.

The 2 Fallschitm Jg. Div. was subordinated to the343. I.D, and, after the breakthrough at Avranches,received orders to delay the westward advance of the enemyfrom the area of Landerneau- onts d'Arree in such a

manner as to make it possible to carry out the preparatorymeasures which had become necessary in Brest - especiallythe transfer of important defensive weapons from the coast.The Pallschirm Jgr.Div. was instructed, however, to evadeany major engagements, which would considerably lessenits striking power; in that way, a weakening of the

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fortress garrison wae to be avoided.The Fallschttm Jg. Rgt. which was under the coutand

of Oberst Pieczonka, occupied the area aroundHuelgoat,sodihe st of the Monte d Arree and daring the first days inAugust, reported that enemy forces were approaching fromthe East. Soon thereafter the 2 Fallschirm Jg. lDivproposed the withdrawal of the regiment, because otherwise,it might be encircled. The 543. I.D. rejected this proposal,

\

pointing out that the prepa-atpry mie sulres in Brest werestill in the process of formation. Twelve hours later,the complete encirclement of the regirment was reportet.Thereupon, the 3435 ID oommanded that the rzegiment -vasto fight its way through to Bre:t. However, already thenext day- about 4 August - it was reported that the enemyhad withdrawn from Huelgoat, and during the last 24 hours,the strong sound of motors e ld be heard almost continuously,It w s found ut the next day that the enemy armored grouphad undertaken the encirclem-ent of the Fallschirm Jg. Rgt.only in order to be able to reach the Brest Fortressquickly and without interference, in which it was completelysuccessful. The Fallschirm Jg. Di had not been able toul ill its mission; this could have been achieved onlythrough reconnaissance in force. The 343. I.D. also failedto receive the required reports on the strength of theenemy with epecifications as to dates and localities.

-28-


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On 5 August enemy armored forces reached the areaaround Lesneven where they overpowered our weak occupationforces. This was the warning sign for the 343. I.D. thatthe withdrawal to the fortress of the coast defense forcessehould begin.

The movements of the Allied armored forces throughBrittany proceeded unhindered and were aided by thefollowings

a Absolute air supremacy of the Allies therewas no sign of any German planes

b. the small number of German troops was stationedat the coast so that in the rear area there were onlysupply servioes and few command posts

c. the help of Frenchmen as reliable guideswho were not only acquainted with side roads but also thepositions of the German command headquarters which werebypassed

d. the absence of any kind of sabotage actiondue to the fact that this was a country friendly to theAllies.

then on 3 August the enemy armnored spearheadsapproached the city of Pontivy the corps general stafftransferred its com nd post from there to Lorient. Thishappened so suddenly that communications with the 543. I.D.and 266 I.D. were disrupted for quite a while. On the basis

29


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of numerous reportse the 343. I.D, concluded that thesituation at the division adjacedt to the right wasuntenable and advised same accordingly. However, sincecommunications to corps headquarters had not yet beenestablished it was not possible, for the tim e being, tomake any dispositions. When, later on, conmsunicatiops fromcorps headquarters were in order, the 343. I.D. reportedthe situation at the 266. I.1D and proposed its withdrawalto the Brest Fortresess. The corps general staff agreedthis and subordinated the 266. I.D. to the 343. I.D. The266. I DD was ordered by the 343. I.D. to start off inthe direction of Brest When after blasting of thepermanent weapons, fortifications and harbor installationsthe coast defense forces were set in motion, a message wasreceived from the AOK 7 which was a vehement protestagainst this withdrawal and referred to the FuehrerCommand which called fort Unconditional holding to thelast of even the smallest fortification . At the sametime, the AOK 7 reproached the 343. I.D.) for seeing ghostsand asserted that in all of Britanny there were few enemyforces. The AOK 7 promised that, in case of deteriorationof the situation, they would inform the divisions in timeandt issue the necessary commands* They insisted on animmediate re-establishment of the previous situation atthe ooast. The latter, however, was in view of thedemolitions no longer possible; the high command was


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especially horrified because of the blasting of the heavyrailwy artillery battery at Paimpolo

The 343. I.D. transmitted this order to the 266. I.D.whiose troops were ordered to return t tthe abandonedpositions. In this critical situation there was nobodyw o was willing to take the responsibility for the with-dr w l - which had become urgently necessary- of the266. I.D. which fact as will be schown later resultedin the capture of the largest portion of this Division.

The corps general staff of the XXV. Armeekorps had -already during the first days in August asked the 343I D. to consider the question how the defense of theBrest Fortress could be reinforced in the event of awithdrawal of the troops from the coast. In this connect-ion first of all the best weapons especially antitankguns with appropriate ammunition were to be immediatlysent off to the fortress. The disbanding of the coastdefense foroae was to be prepared in such manner thatit would be possible to set the troops going on shortnotice.

Because of the many transfers of troops to Normandyand the neighboring sectors the 543. I. D had only fewserviceable vehicles and the horses of two batteries someof which were afflicted with lung trouble. Therefore itwas no longer possible to count on being able to manage


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large-scale transportation.When, on 5 August, the enemy armored troops had reached

Brest a reinforcement of the Brest security occupationbecame an urgent necessity. Therefore, the 343. I.D. againapproached the corps general staff regarding the withdrawalof the 266. I.D., which proposal was approved. Since thismovement required protection, it was arranged that the;t roopsuse the road along the coast which was still occupied by the343 I.D. However, when, in the evening, enemy tanks

appeared at Lesneven and the withdrawal of the coast defenseforces of the 343* I.D. had to be ordered that same night,the 266. I.D. was warned against taking the coastal roadwhich had been agreed upon; instead, it was recommendedto use as march route the road eatending from Landivistuover Landerneau to Brest. The 2 Fallechirm Jg, Div. wasassigned to protect t4is movement in the area of LanderneauLandivisiau. Unfortunately, the 266. I.D. was no longer ableto comply with this warning allegedly because of the factthat orders had already been issued which led to thecapture of the largest portion of the Division north ofBrest. The division commander, General Spang, wa s alsocaptured on 6 August; only small units managed to getthrough to the Fortress, some arriving there on 7 Augustand some on 8 August.

In the preparatory orders of the 343* I*D. regarding


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the transfer of its coast defense forces to the BrestFortress, it had lre dy on 3 August been stipulatedthat the well fortified strong points of Aber-Wrach andAbet-Benoit would for the protection of the harborsthere have to remain occupied, even in the event of thewithdrawal of the coast defense forces. These combnandswere, at first, informative in character and in conformitywith the critical situation. In this connection, weassumed that the movements had to be ordered and carriedout speedily.

After 5 August, enemy pressure in the Northeast ofBrest increased noticeably, while in the area betweenLanderneau and Quimper, there was as yet no sign of anyenemy troops. As the danger existed that the eneray mightblock th road for the troops rmarching from the coast tthe fortress, the march was ordered to take place on thenight of 5 August. That same night, the Div. Stab 343arrived at Brest from Landerneau. The 2. Pallschirm Jg.Div.received orders to also move off after covering of the266. I. . in the direction of Brest and to use the lineof march south of the Blorn

The movements ordered for the disbanding of the coastdefense forces can be seen from annex 3. In thisconnection, the area around Plabenneo, north of Brest,was avoided because it was occupied by enemy armored forces.


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The order for this movement did not yet include anyinstructions with regard to the fortress because due tothe critical situation t was not possible to count on thearrival of all troops n Brest General Ramke was appointedcommander of the outpost troops. The garrisons for theArmorique Daoulas) Peninsula and Crozon were decided upon


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When the corps general taff of the XXV. Armeekorpsgave orders for the diabainlding of the coast defense forcesthey also issued instructions to keep open the nrarch routeof Quimperle uimper Chateaulin Brest which however,was no longer possible as far as the resistsanc.e movementwas concerned. The-refore, on 7 August the co.niand inggeneral had to abandon his plan to get from Jorient to Brest.Following this the commander of the 343 I.D. was grantedWehrmacht authority which lasted until ab:ut 13 August, onwhich day the comiander of the 2. Fallschizm Jg. Div. waspromoted and appointed comnmandant of the fortified of Brest.Oberet U8n der Mosel, the former comandant of the BrestFortress was assigned to be his chief of staff. Thischange had unfavorable effects on the defense because thenew ommafndant was not sufficiently acquainted with thefortifications.

As result of the substantial increase in occupationforces it was possible to ectend the cordon of fortsthat the drawbacks of the narrow cordon of .forts whichhate been described in chapter B were removed for themost part. Nevertheless, it was not possible to include ll battery positions and the Brest-Nord Airdrome, becausethis would have resulted in an unfavorable course of theline of battle. Several nti ircr ft batteries :erethereby, exposed to simple enemy attacks; the limite number


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of personnel made it impossible in spite of theirfortifications to off r any prolonged resistance.

Beginning August the n my adincing towardsBrest from the North ielt his way forward ald as heencountered resistance sent parlamentaires to the fortresscommandant with the request to surrender the fortress inorder to avoid futile battles. This request was rejected;however, for humane reasons, it was proposed tiat thecivilian population be evacuated and that only the Frenchmenworking in Wehrmacht factories and if necessary alsotheir families should remaiinn Brest. The evacuationwas arranged and proved to be a wise move, because most ofthe population would have been killed during the airbombardments which went on for weeks

After General amke had assumed command of the fortress,he ordered the transfer of the Div. Stab 343 from Brest tothe Orozon Peninsula, with command area extending southof the Blorn. On 15 August, the staff travelled on boatsto ie fret and on 18 August reached Morgat, where it remaineduntil the end of August.

On the Armorique Daoulas) Peninsula, the enemyfew days after encircling the fortress sa Veded in takingthe dominating Hill /154, thereby overwhelming someportions of our occupation forces. Because of thesesuccesses, the large Blorn Bridge w s threatened. Further


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enemy attacks in this area did not take place until thesecond half tof August. In order to clear up the situationon the Armorique Penisnula, the 543 I.D. little by littlecommitted almost all of the German infantry units stationedon the Crozon Peninsula, so that eastern troops were almostthe only remaining forces there. However, in spite ofthis commitment, it was impossible to hold the ArmoriquePeninsula; after its occupation, the enemy came up towithin 6 km of the Brest submarine pen. Before the lossof the peninsula, the fortress commander ordered theblasting of the two large bridges across the Blorn andthe Aulne Terenez Bridge).

Towards the end of August, the enemy also began hisattack on the Crozon Peninsula and since German forceswere lacking there gained ground rapidly. Position afterposition had to be given up; for the protection of theartillery, protraded resistance was to be offered alongthe line extending from Brest-Sued Airdrome to Tal argroas see annex covering position,/1). In addition,emergency formations were organized out of staffs and rearservices, ahd reinforced by antitank guns. These were soassigned antiaircraft guns, whose positions it had becomenecessary to give up, due to losses of terrain or enemyait attacks. Of course, supplying of the antiaircraft gunsremained in the planning stage, because it was no longerpossible to have the necessary concrete emplacements


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finished in time.In case of further enemy pressure on the Crozon

Peninsula orders called for occupation of the line ofresistance extending from Anse de Dinan up to east ofQuelern see annex covering position /2 .This would still have made it possible to protect theheavy batteries on the peninsula. The positions werereconnoitered and labor service forces began constructionof the line which was based on a system of strohpoints.On 1 September, the Div. Stab 343 moved from MSorgat tothe area north of Crozon; on 2 Septe.ber enemy bomberslaunched a heavy attack on /iMorgat which was presumablyaimed at the ivr Stab,

At the end of August, the forces of the far-off strongpoint of Audierne south of the Douarnenez Bay) were to bedisbanded and the occupation troops with armament w r tobe transported to Orozon. Although it was postsible withthe aid of the navy to establish contact this attractedthe attention of the French resista.ce forces, and thesubeequent relief attempt was prevented.

At the end of August, enemy artillery which wasdeployed for action on the Armorique Doulae) Peninsula,started systematic shelling of the Bspagnol Peninsula, onwhich movements were handicapped by the lively enemy aerialsurellaneo During the course of the first half of


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September, it was impossible for any movements to takeplace in this area during the day, because of the heavylosses in men and materiel. In the area of the BrestFortress, there was- since the encirclement no signof any German flier, in spite of previous promises, whichmade n especially unfortunate impression on the troops.

On 2 September, the enemy air force made a heavyattack on the old Prench Fort Quelern which had beencontemplated as the new post of the division staff - anddestroyed the installatihe taaionsthere almost as far as theboundary*

On the Crozon Peninsula, enemy pressure abated somewhatat the beginning of ie-eptember which made it possible forus to improve our rear positions. It had been planned totak ehe last stand north of rozonn the old Frenchfortification of Quelern, which protected the ?JspagnolPeninsula towards the South see annex coveringposition 5).* Of course, the heavy artillery of Camaretas well as the rest of the artillery belonging to theDivision was, thereby, given up, and only a few antitankguns remained for the antitank defense, These were of theutmost importance for the defense, because - judging fromprevious experiences it had never been possible to holdany positions without their protection. On the basis ofthis realizsat ion, the Division since weeks had aspeoial Panzer officer in the staff Ia/Pak), who w


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responsible to provide for replacements in case of breakdowns.This arrangement had the best results.

On 15 September, the comnander of the 3rcst FPortressarrived at the Crozon Peninsula and reported that supplieswere coming to an end in the fortress and that enemy flamethrowers had worked their way up to within 200 meters of thebunker containing serious casualties. le stated thatresistance in Brest was, therefore, becomilung useless andthat combat would cease in 2 3 days. Until that time,the 343. I.D. would have fulfilled its task of keeping theenemy as long as possible off the Crozon Peninsula in thedirection of Brest. At this point I imst not fail to mentionthat the 343. I.D. was, ttt tatime, omposed of only threeweakened Ostbataillone, two batteries and a few small staffs.

At the middle of September tihe enemy continrued hisattacks on the Crozon Peninsula. The fortress connmandanthad brought 1/2 companies from the fortr ess to theTspagnol Peninsula and had cotamitted same for the occupationof the oblique defense line at Quelern. In this way, theremnants of the 343 I.D. were pushed to the southern partof the peninsula in the direction of Cap de la Chevrea region which originally was supposed to tremain free fromcombat and had been assigned to evacuees from Brest.On 16 September enemy pressure on the weak eastern troopson rozon incre sed to suoh degree that the division


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M8 44 804 7commander oderered the withdrawal of the troops to the areasouth thereof, already for the night of 16 September.During the night of 17 September, the resistance pocketsin the new area were newly manned or reinforced, and thetroops were ordered to follow the principle of holdingout to the last man . In this conntstion, no considerationwas given to the grade of fitness, training and equipmentsThus it happened that in one resistance pocket, which was

manned by twenty officers, most of them were sick navalofficers who unarmed and in peace-time uniforms- hadbeen on their way to the convalescent home. In this pocketof resistance, there were two Belgian antitank guns whichin spite of the'immediately imminent enemy armored attackwere still stationed on the beach and could not be fired

in landward direction. All in all, confusion reignedduring this last useless effort.

On 17 September, enemy armored forces captured thelocalities of Orozon and Morgat and on 18 September,advanced southward. They systematically mopped up ourweakly occupied lines at the roads and the resistancepockets at the beach and towards evening, reached the lastbattery at the Cap de la Chevre, where the remnants of theDiv. Stab 343 were captured. Thus, resistance on theCrozon Peninsula was confined to the Espagnol Peninsula.On 18 September, in the afternoon, when was alreadyprisoner, observed the moving up to positions of strong


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enemy artillery forces in that direction and assume that thislast point of resistance was overcome on 19 September thelatest. The fortress cormxandant General :Ramke waspresumably also captured on that day at the battery ofPointe des Capucins. With that the battle oi -the restFortress was finished.

As far as the center of the Brest Fortress city area)is concerned m not in a position to give an estimateof the combat situation lor the period after 15 Augustbecause from that time on was on C0rozon

On the whole it is of importance to report that thesubmarine pen remained in use until the beginning of Septemberand the last submarines going northward left it about3 September. Of course we had lost our faith in theinvulnerability of this structure already three weeks beforewhen the Allied air force with eleven tons of bombs hadeasily pierced the 1/2 m thick reinforced concrete roof.Of course for the most part the roof of the pen was only3 1/2 m thick. The construction of the pen had deprivedimportant installations of a great deal of concrete so thatwe could not help but question whhether this considerableexpenditure of concrete had been worthwhile.

The ammunietion supply in the fortress was adequate;during the first nights after the encirclement supplementaryclose combat antitank weapons were dropped by planer


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There was a four weeks food supply for the garrison,The civilian population, with smaller rations, should havebeen supplied for the same length of time; however, inspite of greatest efforts, this could not be accomplishedup to the time of encirclement. Raghly estimated, therewere sufficient supplies for one week, whereby some articleswere lacking, while on the other hand, there wrias more amplesupply of others. The fortress held out from August until18 September, i.e. 1/2 weeks, which was nm de possibleonly through the evacuation of the civilian populationand seizure of all civilian supplies*

There was no scarcity as far as other supplies for thefortress were concerned*

Ive did not hear of any epidemics on Crozon.

signed) Dkfm . Rudolf ogard


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map scale 1 ; 100 0001 em = 1 km

Fortified Area of Brest2. Fallschjgr.Div E3M~

to Kogard Heport

LanderneauB e s ordAirdromeGuki.avjj.a

Obstlt.Fuerstt . athieu

Plougaatelga aul auObst. Poernster

Brest-Sued Airdromecov3r position 1Orozon Gen RauchTal j r r

Coxmandant of the fortified area of Brest

rigialortified: are. permanent fortificationsfor the security garrisonxtended :dfensive .area after the begiuming ofAugust 1944 on the Crozon Peninsula also coverpositions cover positions ;1 2, lad 3.Submarine:: e in Brest near the naval academy)

When the fortress became fully garrisoned, only the followingreinforced tron oint. were to remain ocupiad in the formerdefensive coastal sector of the 343. I.D.Aber Wrach, Aber Benoit, Audierne, Quessant Island.


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map scale

to ard Reportto Kogard Report1 s 250 0001 cm = 2.5 km

nZeratern Brittariu

Ile d Quessant

coast defense establishments at the enld of May 1944coast defense establishments at the eind of July 1944German infantry battalion in comparison with the situationOst-Btl. Russian volunteers in May

German infantry battalion )in comparison with the situationOst-Btl. Lussian vclunteers in July

ve oq the i ie r o and {in the sector of thein Mayt The 353 If Div. the 3. Fallschjgr, Div.In JulysThe 2 Pallsohjgr , Div.

GoulvenAber WrachLannilisAber BenoitPloudalxe zeau

343. I.D.)

266 I266. I.Do

aorlaix

Le Conquet

OrozonAber

Brest

iHopitall aou 343. I*.Dsix infantry battalionsand four Ost-Btl.

265. I D

DouarxienezQuimper265 I.D.Conoarneau

Daoulas


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map scale

Ainn X sto Kogard Report

1: 250 0001 cm = 2.5 km

Occupation of the Brzest Fortrmess nd is~nlof c st de ~en e for e

1 Aber ? rach2 Aber Benoit 266. I.DS

lie d Quess>.nt3Lncmd~ivi iaU

2 lallrchjgr. ivLanderneau

Le Conquet

Daoulas

CrozonDoarneneez

i lonts d Arree

lack Mountains

St. P Audierne4

Point of departure on 5 August 1944German Inf. Batl.Ost-Batl. (Russian volunteers)

Q4uimpoex265. I.IJ,Pont l Abbe Concarne au

Trooj moveYefntfi froi 5 Auloust AMindicated by arrows

At.. oatonly the following ; tro 3o intawere to remain occupied; Aber Wrach2 - Aber Benoit Xle uessant4 - Audierne

Morlaix


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Transcript of Brest 43rd Infantry Division (May 18 Sep 44)