BRAZIL’S EVOLVING SECURITY IDENTITY

8/10/2019 BRAZILS EVOLVING SECURITY IDENTITY

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BRAZILS EVOLVING SECURITY IDENTITY

Dr. Salvador Raza

The ideas presented in this paper do not represent the position of any institution or

government. This paper responds to the question formulated to the Seminar BrazilsEvolving Security Identity: egionalism and !lo"al #spirations$. The ans%ers address

issues and concerns "eyond the declaratory policy and pu"lished official positions and

guidance. It is rooted in the personal analysis and e&perience of the author' "ac(ed "y opensources documents and information. In this regard' it challenges the official %isdom and

defies the politically correct$ analytical neutrality of governmental forums not

representing' and in many points opposing' the security and defense sectors interpretation ofinformation and factual issues.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Brazils strategic security priorities under the presidency of Lula were defined by the NationalDefense Policys new decree on July, 200 as! "# the $%azonia, which includes drug traffic, i%pactof war in &olo%bia, guerrilla groups, etc'( 2# the )outh $tlantic, for its gas and petroleu% resources,and its role in trade( *# the establish%ent of +rapid deploy%ent forces and( -# a greater in.ol.e%entof Brazils forces in peace/eeping operations'

he regional security issues and architecture during Lulas ad%inistration were %ore focused onpolitical diplo%acy, i'e' policy nu%ber four of a greater in.ol.e%ent in peace/eeping operations' 1nthe other hand, the principal focus of President ouseffs policy is the de.elop%ent of criticalinfrastructure which is related to transportation and the distribution of energy at a national le.el'

$nother i%portant aspect of the ousseffs architecture is that her approach will be guided %ostlytowards the usage of pri.ate contractors in order to carry out certain tas/s that were carried out by the

state in the past' &ontrary to for%er President Lulas policies which were focused %ore on politicaldiplo%acy, President ousseffs policies are based on econo%ic diplo%acy, which ser.es as anotherfor% of soft power'

Brazils critical security interests are not structured in ter%s of regional or sub3regional, but inrelation to se.en security di%ensions, each one defining a set of the%es that dri.e its grand strategyand policies'

. E!"r#$ %"&'r()$4 the security interest of Brazil in this di%ension is to assure the feasibility of thenational energy %atri5 to pro.ide nationwide access to a %ini%u% "20 g67capita7year to supportecono%ic growth ranging fro% *' to '0 per year in the ne5t two decades 820"0320*0#' o supportthis econo%ic growth, Brazils energy a.ailability is e5pected to increase at a %ini%u% rate of about'9 percent through 20*0 8the desired le.el is :;7year#'

his is based on assu%ptions supporting pri.ate energy %ar/et supply and distribution strategies'here is a tension a%ongst the rebalance of the %atri5 towards clean and nuclear energy 8and large.ersus s%all nuclear reactors# and the e5ploration of the possibilities offered by the new deep wateroil fields identified in Brazils %ariti%e platfor%'

$ccording to the nfor%ation $d%inistration, Brazils consu%ption of energy in theglobal arena ta/es the ninth position and the third in the ?estern @e%isphere, falling right behind the


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n this relation, the gassupply fro% Boli.ia and oil supply fro% enezuela dri.e appeasing foreign policy decisions, under adeclaratory posture shaped by social 8and socialist under Lulas go.ern%ent# dri.en regionalcollaborati.e ob6ecti.es'

*. E!v(ro!+"!) %"&'r()$4 the security interest of Brazil is to protect %ini%u% natural resourcesreser.es as base for potential future e5ploitation needs in support of li.e 8food, water, and air#' hisob6ecti.e has led choices of en.iron%ent %anage%ent %odels which increase the le.el of ris/acceptance for %an3%ade natural disasters, whereas pro.iding leeway for econo%ic de.elop%entinitiati.es within the energy supply pro6ected possibilities'

,. T"&-!olo#$ %"&'r()$ Brazils technology security priorities ha.e three layered set of ob6ecti.es'he first layer enco%passes the efforts to assure the transfer of the production engineering /nown3how of defense high definition integrated optical and sound sensors, ndependent )tatistics and$nalysis! =>$, http!77www'eia'doe'go.7cabs7Brazil7Bac/ground'ht%l 8accessed ebruary 2", 20""#


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boundaries disputes in a stable political en.iron%ent in its area of strategic influence' $nd see/s touse the sa%e diplo%atic fra%ewor/, bac/ed by the capability to deploy and sustain peace forces, tounfreeze the world power structure, achie.ing a better share of the global wealth'

Based on these principles, Brazils defense and %ilitary strategy is centered in the $r%y capabilities,with the $ir orce in co%bat supporting defensi.e roles, and the Na.y pri%arily in a strategic%obility role' his logic %o.es the e%phasis of 6oint operation fro% co%bat to logistics effort' heNa.y resistance to this strategic concept finds its 6ustification in a se%i3independent Blue $%azon

&oncept, lodge in the =nergy and =n.iron%ental )ecurity Di%ensions, and the $ir orce in a se%i3independent )trategic >nterdiction aids aligned with the protection of the critical infrastructurenested in the political E econo%ic security Di%ension' o re%o.e the inconsistency in orce Designand Feostrategic )ecurity Priorities is the locus of the policy for%ulation in Brazils grand strategy'

5. 6'+a! S"&'r()$4 ousseffs go.ern%ent will ha.e to /eep the le.el of social tensions below theinternal crises threshold, pre.enting the spread of urban and possibility of rural .iolence, as well aspre.enting the disaggregation of the unions go.ern%ent support front, as critical progra%s slowlyde.elop effects to bring low inco%e population into the de.elop%ent %ainstrea%'

$rising tensions are inserted in the contradictions of a hu%an centered policy and a police centeredstrategy, and in the budget priority realign%ent fro% defense to security, to address the dyna%icrealign%ent of causes that produces and defined the co%posite significance of drugs, corruption,

illegal traffic/ing, urban gangs and organized cri%e, associated with the security and defenseredefinition of roles, responsibilities and strategies in borders area control and illegal i%%igrationpre.ention'

QUESTION 1: BRAZILS SECURITY IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAS

. WHAT ARE BRAZILS REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ANDDOES LEADERSHIP MATTER? WILL PRESIDENT ROUSSEFFS APPROACH TOREGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES AND ARCHITECTURE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THELULA ADMINISTRATION?

>n contrast to for%er President Lula, President ousseff has the profile of a progra% ad%inistrator')he thin/s hierarchically' )he is s/illed, co%petent, authoritarian, de%anding, and courageous' @er

political co%petence is based on rationality of public ad%inistration' @owe.er, she is not a higherstrategic thin/er, which %eans that Brazils grand strategy and force design will continue to befrag%ented and in a way obscure to e5ternal and international obser.ers which are sub6ect toperceptions and interpretations' 1n one hand, that is beneficial because it generates an uncertaintywhich fa.ors diplo%acy' Nonetheless, it also generates inefficiency and confusion in %any internalactors'

a. Wha !" h# $% %' U(!%( %' S%)h A*#$!+a( Na!%(" ,UNASUR a( h# S%)h A*#$!+a(D#'#("# C%)(+!& ,SADC !( B$a/!&" $#0!%(a& "#+)$! 2%&!+?

he


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countries, and how to balance Brazils persuasion capacity' n this role, it is an international%oney laundry depot, basing at least "9 international ban/s branches, and the basis for,pri%arily, the &hinese and the ussian Gafia' he regional inancial >ntelligence ta%araty# had his resourceso.erstretched to enlarge Brazils area of influence and participation in global issues, correlatedwith a loss of prestige, internal conflicts, and a procli.ity to ineffecti.eness' Ga6or diplo%atic%ista/es rebu/ed its pre.ious perfor%ance records'

he new >ta%aratys senior political appointees ha.e shown the intention to reestablish lin/s withretired diplo%ats 8that always ha.e had a strong influence as counselors, a practice that wasabandoned in the Lulas go.ern%ent#' he new ad%inistration should produce less ideologically


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oriented foreign policies, but should also produce %ore a%biguous, less asserti.e, and lessco%%ittal postures'

he restored >ta%araty will %o.e bac/ to the stronghold declarations of principles position,%a/ing %uch %ore co%plicated to %a/e the =stablish%ent produce co%prehensi.e diplo%aticpositions in issues that de%and the bac/ing logic of a strategy' ?e should ha.e a +play safe%ode at larger scale, transferring bac/ to the %ilitary the role in security and defenseparadiplo%acy' he new Ginister of Defense 4 Ginister Jobi%s substitute 4 will ha.e a large

influence in shaping the he%ispheric security trends and in the realign%ent of Brazils position inworld affairs'

*. WHAT ARE BRAZILS STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE 4BLUE AMAZON5? WHATDOES BRAZIL PERCEI9E AS THREATSCHALLENGES TO ITS STRATEGICINTERESTS THERE?

he +blue $%azon is a concept that 6ustifies a %ission for the Na.y' he design of the Na.y hasbeen oriented to the control of the sea, and li%ited power pro6ection capability' >t is based onapplied theory of na.al power rather than on sound strategic i%perati.es deri.ed fro% a netassess%ent of the role of the Na.y in actionable national security foresight' he concepts ha.ee5ternal consistency with a scenario of an ad.ersary e5peditionary force to the $%azonia area,led by a %iddle power =uropean country with e%bar/ed air stri/e power capability'

he Blue $%azon is internally consistent with the historically and culturally planted .ision of theNa.y of a self3sustained, independent power' he concepts disengage the Na.y fro% what occursin land, sol.ing the crucial issue of defining the hierarchy of %ission in a 6oint strategy that willine.itably subordinate the Na.y to a subsidiary position' ighting at sea to deny the access of ane5peditionary force is the core %ission of the Na.y that 6ustifies the nuclear sub%arines and thenew North leet'

Brazils %ilitary, to include the Na.ys analytical and foresight capabilities are li%ited andobsolete' ery few officers are Aualified for strategic thin/ing beyond the geostrategic paradig%'here is no Aualification in the sophisticated reAuire%ents of orce Design' urther%ore, thecapacity of the diplo%ats to create a chain of causality is too fragile' here is a need for a refor%in diplo%acy, as well as in defense' Ne.ertheless, these refor%s are bloc/ed by the obsolete logic

of reflection and the construction of rationality that find a cogniti.e and political co%fort zone inthe Blue $%azon'

Brazil would benefit fro% %ore ad.anced countries cooperation in! 8"# building the cogniti.eorce Design capabilities and its translation in integrated strategic plans and business orientedpolicy guidance to the co%ple5 industrial base, 82# creating co%petencies for the transfer andretention of technology, and 8*# %anaging co%ple5 defense progra%s'

H%7 $#a& a$# h$#a" 2%"# 3 !(#$(a!%(a& 2!$a+ #$$%$!"* % B$a/!&" *a$!!*#!(#$#""?

&urrent Brazils %erchant na.y is li%ited to a few tan/ers operating with ranspetro 8thetransport ar% of federal energy co%pany Petrobras 8NH)=! PB#' o re.ert this strategic fragilitywhich burdens Brazils trade balance, the %erchant fund 8GG# is tendering to build -2 ships' >n

this conte5t, prag%atically, global international piracy7terroris% at sea has significance as aprinciple' he Brazilian Na.y is not prepared, was not designed, and does not include in its corepriorities 8e5cept in a support role under a


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a. What are the interests o other regional or international maritime!owers in the S%)h A&a(!+? Wha a$# h# !*2&!+a!%(" '%$ B$a/!&!a( "$a#0!+!(#$#""?

he core interest in %ariti%e powers in the )outh $tlantic is to protect the ci.il and %ilitary sealines of co%%unications, with e%phasis on the oil flow, and oil fields platfor%s'

Brazil internal lines of co%%unication, the self3sufficiency in oil supply and logistics, and thepossibility of building a strategic air3bridge to refill core %ilitary supplies %a/es the protections

of these sea lines not rele.ant for self defense' he protection of international lines ofco%%unication beco%es rele.ant only of the conte5t of %utually supporting alliances capabilities4 which Brazil endorses with .ery li%ited enthusias%'

3. Wha a$# h# "$a#0!+ !*2&!+a!%(" %' B$a/!&" 2$#-"a& %!& '!#&"? H%7 7!&& %!& $#;#()#" 3#$#!(;#"# % ")22%$ "$a#0!+ #("?

Brazil was able to raise its reser.es and production le.els to achie.e self3sufficiency in oil in200C' Now Brazil is poised to beco%e a %a6or oil e5porter with the recently disco.ered pre3saltoil fields' >nitial trend analysis indicated the needs of %ore than n Gay 20"0 Petrobraz finalized the long ter% test refining the first

batch of pre3salt oil'Pre3salt in.est%ents will be addressed through the national industry, with technological bottle andproduction abo.e the installed capacity open to international co%petition' Petrobraz is %anagingits in.est%ent portfolio through the energy, technology and en.iron%ent policies' here is nointention to build a parallel structure to %anage the pre3salt re.enues' he pre3salt has beingdesigned as an in.est%ent pro6ect 8albeit a large one# inside the co%panys business %odel,logistics, and strategy'

Pres' ousseffs integrated the board that o.ersaw the de.elop%ent of Petrobraz strategyintegrated into the national de.elop%ent plan' Brazils Ginister of =nergy stated that the pre3saltsurplus of energy would pro%ote regional energy integration spilling o.er to a geostrategicintegration' Difficulties in the process are li/ely to e%erge in a scenario of ussia and )audi

$rabia %ar/et control alliance 8cartel#' &urrent ussias policy change to increase the e5port ofoil, threating the econo%ic .iability of pre3salt in.est%ent, is a glance of this scenario' Brazilneeds %ore power in shaping global issues to pre.ent such possibilities'

he GinDef 8Na.y# is re.iewing its force planning reAuire%ents to include %ore assets toenhance its capability in the protection of resources in the national sea platfor%' he Na.y isrebu/ing the need 8and e.en refusing to consider the possibility# of dis%e%bering a coast guardfro% the Na.y, which has today both %issions intertwined in its %ission portfolio' >ncreasing oilroyalties paid fro% Petrobraz to the Na.y will beco%e an issue in near future with the 20"0GinDef refor%s that centralized the budget process'

,. WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL DRI9ERS OF BRAZILS NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND WHATARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY?

Brazils nuclear policy is delineated in the National Defense )trategy and its initiati.es aredi.ided into four di%ensions!

"' &o%plete the full nationalization and the de.elop%ent 4 at industrial scale 4 of thefuel cycle 8including gasification and enrich%ent# and of the reactor constructiontechnology for e5clusi.e use of the Na.y nuclear3propelled sub%arine progra%'

2' )peed up the %apping, ore searching and utilization of uraniu% deposits'


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*' De.elop the potential of designing and building nuclear ther%o power plants withtechnology and capacities that %ay end up under the national do%ain, e.en if they arede.eloped by %eans of partnerships with foreign co%panies and )tates' ncreases in enrich%entcapacity 8which is perfectly feasible# would place Brazil in a s%all group of suppliers of thisproduct to the rest of the nuclear centers around the world' >ncreases in uraniu% enrich%ent willreduce Brazils strategic dependency 8and reduce costs of the nuclear progra%# fro% &anada'

President ousseff is loo/ing to i%pro.e relations with the ran'

3. "razil-#rgentina relations including "razilian-#rgentine #gency or

#ccounting and $ontrol o %uclear &aterials '#"#$$(he Brazilian3$rgentine $gency for $ccounting and &ontrol of Nuclear Gaterials 8$B3$&

was established in "KK"with the purpose of the de.elop%ent, ad%inistration and

2Brazil, National )ecurity )trategy' pg').https:**%%%.mar.mil."r*diversos*estrategia+defesa+nacional+portugues.pdf3>bid, ).4>bid, ).5>bid, ).


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application of the &o%%on )yste% of $ccounting and &ontrol 8)&&forpeaceful use ofnuclear energybetween $rgentina and Brazil' he )&&& is a safeguards syste% to .erify thatnuclear %aterials used in all nuclear acti.ities in both countries are not di.erted to purposesprohibited by the agree%ent, enforced independently both by the $B3$&& and the >nternational$to%ic =nergy $gency 8>$=$#'

he syste% is wor/ing properly with %ore than "00 hundred inspections carried out yearly inboth countries, reducing the ris/s of reacti.ating the $3B the co.ert nuclear ar%s race of the

"K:0s' his effort includes diplo%atic efforts to de.elop a .erification regi%e for the productionand utilization of low3enriched uraniu% for Brazils Na.y, the inspection protocols for thesafeguarded acti.ities at the $rgentinas gaseous diffusion uraniu% enrich%ent plant atPilcaniyeu, which was closed down in the "KKC and reopened in 1ctober 20"0'

Brazils concerns is with the ability to protect its indigenous technology for enriching uraniu%and /eeping effecti.e %echanis%s to apply na.al engineering technology into the de.eloping of anuclear propelled sub%arine that would e%power the country with strategy options in %issionsareas foresighted in the na.y plans'

+. %uclear trade and technology transers

Discussions on this issue %ust be grounded on a solid understanding of the intricacies of the

Brazilians decision process, otherwise it %ay beco%e a discussion on irreducible principles andnational interests, ta/ing to no prag%atic diplo%atic and technical agree%ent'

Brazil does not %a/e a policy distinction between +sensiti.e nuclear assistant, which includesnuclear weapons design, weapons3grade fissile %aterial, and sensiti.e nuclear fuel3cyclefacilities, and +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation, which is related to basic nuclear science andtechnology or the production of nuclear energy'

he Brazilian Na.y nuclear progra% was designed with the +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation stepsas interi% pro6ects in the goals of a +sensiti.e nuclear assistance co%prehensi.e progra%, with Cphases, the last one being the nuclear deterrence capability'

Pressed by political i%perati.es, the $r%ys nuclear progra% follows an alternati.e path based ondifferent technology' his rational for this approach is sound, although the decision process does

not follow a rational decision3process, but rather was propelled by internal ri.alries andco%petitions, i%posing %any difficulties in $r%y3Na.y collaboration, to the e5tent that aninternal nuclear race was o.ertly de.eloped between the $r%y and the Na.y'

Pressed by political i%perati.es deri.ed fro% the $rgentina3Brazil rapproche%ent, and thetransition out fro% the Gilitary Fo.ern%ents, the $r%y discontinued its progra%, /eepingcritical /now3how on the designing and on the technological bottle3nec/s of nuclear bo%bs storedin research and centers as acade%ic 8albeit classified# /nowledge, that could be e.entuallyretrie.ed and restored' he Na.y only dropped the thphase of its progra%' But pressed bybudgetary i%perati.es, it was only able to autono%ously 8there was not a GindDef ci.ilian3ledcentralized budget decision and o.ersight# fund the progra% at a .ery slow rate, with the practicalob6ecti.e of not losing the capability of de.elop his nuclear propelled sub%arines, which was an

i%perati.e under its strategic plan for control of the sea'>n ter%s of the transferring3in 8incorporation# of sensiti.e nuclear assistance, the Na.y needs/now3how transfer on a few design, engineering and control syste%s to e5pedite the industrialprocess in "27" years, or the eAui.alent of


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decision to beco%e a +capable supplier country does not preclude, howe.er, the alert for theconseAuences of the correlation of this type of decision with Brazils orce Design initiati.e'

. %uclear-wea!on-ree zone in La!( A*#$!+a a( Ca$!33#a(

he policy principles behind the nuclear3weapon3free zone in L$E& 3 he reaty of latelolco 3are sound, easily defended through e5plicit declaratory diplo%acy, and certainly +politicallycorrect'

Brazil signed the reaty in "KK:' >n 20"0, Lulas National )ecurity $d.isor 8)a%uel PinheiroFui%ares# said that it was a %ista/e to sign it, because Brazils constitution assigns the right forthe endogenous and autono%ous use of pacific use of nuclear energy, and that Brazilsparticipation in the ratelolco reat would be only 6ustified if the nuclear powers reduce theirnuclear arsenalsC'

he N)$ speech was pointed out as a foreign policy %ista/e, contrary to Lulas internationalposture and co%%it%ent to peace, since it would 6ustify a strong aug%entation of Brazils nuclearportfolio'

$gainst this position, there is the understanding that Brazils signature assures its co%pro%isewith international law, recognizing that the reaty, albeit i%perfect, has contributed to the globalreduction of nuclear ar%a%ents and the construction of peace in the region' @owe.er, this posture

reaffir%s the position of not signing the $dditional Protocol'

$nother stance defends Brazils right %aintain the capability to proceed fro% the "0; enrich%entle.el reAuired for energy production to the K0; that necessary for producing nuclear ar%a%ents'here is an o.ert %o.e%ent asserting the need for Brazil to de.elop its nuclear progra% in the)outh $frican or >sraeli fashion 4 %ilitary nuclear power pro6ection capability'

QUESTION =: BRAZILS APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ANDMULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE

D!"+)""!%( Q)#"!%(":

. Wha a$# h# $!;#$" %' B$a/!&" a22$%a+h % !(#$(a!%(a& ()+a$ ,a( (%(-()+a$(%(-2$%&!'#$a!%( a$+h!#+)$#?

D!"+)"" 7!h $#"2#+ %:

B$a/!&" a22$%a+h % *)&!&a#$a& a$*" +%($%& !(+&)!(0 IAEA A!!%(a& P$%%+%&6 N)+a$S)22&!#$" G$%)2 ,NSG6 B$a/!&" *#*3#$"h!2a#$"h!2 !( N%(-a&!0(# M%;#*#( ,NAM a(N#7 A0#(a C%a&!!%( ,NAC6 C%('#$#(+# %( D!"a$*a*#(6 NPT6 M!""! T#+h(%&%0 C%($%&R#0!*# ,MTCR a( a" a 2%#(!a& (#7 *#*3#$ %' h# G> G&%3a& Pa$(#$"h!2 P$%0$a*.

he Auestion %ista/enly assu%es a transiti.ity of assu%ptions, analysis and conclusions a%ongBrazils nuclear and non3nuclear non3proliferation'

he declaratory policy is co%prehensi.ely crafted in support of the international nuclear 8and non3nuclear# non3proliferation architecture' his posture was clearly stated by Brazil at the


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&onstitution prohibits nuclear acti.ities for non3peaceful purposes( an establish%ent of nuclear3weapons free zone can help peace and security( and nuclear weapons breed instability and insecurity'

his declaratory posture is consistent with Brazils position in the Non3aligned Go.e%ent and New$genda &oalition' Brazil pro%otes e%phatically the New $genda &oalition and the 22reco%%endations on nuclear disar%a%ent presented on the wor/ing paper'

Notwithstanding, Brazil has the potential to asse%bly the bo%b' >t will need the 6oint effort of thefissile %aterial, the $r%y bo%b design, and the $ir orce deli.ery .ehicle' =.en if there were the

political decision to produce it, the ser.ices collaboration and the technical interoperability of theser.ices effort ha.e practically i%possible short ter% challenges' he security issue is to builddeterrence capability based on potential capacity, but there is no strategy in place to articulate thisdeterrence potential into a grand strategy, because Brazils grand strategy design is by naturefrag%ented, e%bedded in sectorial policies and the national de.elop%ent progra%, designed andcontrolled by Pres' ousseffs during Lulas ad%inistration'

here is a large networ/ of docu%ents in the non3proliferation architecture' Brazil ratified in 200C theprotocol against the >llicit Ganufacturing of and raffic/ing in irear%s' Brazil also participates inthe Progra% of $ction to Pre.ent, &o%bat and =radicate the >llicit trade in )%all ar%s and Light?eapons in all its aspects' $nd ratified in "KKK the Gine Ban reaty 81ttawa &on.ention#'

But this architecture, differently fro% the nuclear one, does not wor/ for different reasons' >t is a

%ista/e to use the nuclear non3proliferation logic and political beha.ior to understand or, worse, totry to 6ustify why, or why it does not wor/s'

>t does not wor/ because there is a disconnection in the nature of Brazils public policy for%ulationand Brazils interagency operational strategy and tactical actions' here is little capillarity8correlation# effect a%ongst the rule of international law at political le.el and the law enforce%entactions at tactical actions'

his networ/ is part of the diplo%atic fra%ewor/' Brazil supports these treaties politically' he$r%ed orces abide by their ter%s, but they ha.e no institutional %ission clearly related to theenforce%ent of the ter%s of these treaties, and they are irrele.ant to police operations, %ostly becausethe incorporation in the co%%on law of international policy initiati.e is slow and cu%berso%e, e'g',the regulation of guns in Brazil is categorized as restricti.e and the guiding gun control legislation in

Brazil the )tatute of Disar%a%ent 8not a law#( guns in Brazil are regulated by the National $r%segistry' >n Brazil, the %a5i%u% penalty for illicit possession of firear%s is fro% one to three yearsprison and a fine( also, pri.ate guns are prohibited in sports arena, churches, go.ern%ent buildingsand schools'

*. Wha a$# h# !*2&!+a!%(" %' B$a/!&" ()+a$ 2%&!+ ,#.0.6 "a(+# %( "a'#0)a$"6 !")$a(!)* #($!+h*#( 2$%0$a*6 a( 2&a(" '%$ ()+a$-2%7#$# ")3*a$!(#" '%$ ()+a$(%(-2$%&!'#$a!%(?

here should be no +sensiti.e nuclear assistant to rogue countries as a conseAuence of the Na.ysnuclear3powered sub%arines progra% if the international organis%s, as a cautionary and intelligentlydiplo%atic beha.ior, /eep the Brazilian go.ern%ent under strictly nuclear control and o.ersight'hese initiati.es should also %otion a positi.e contribution to the +ci.ilian nuclear cooperation' he

1=$, through the Depart%ent of Gultidi%ensional )ecurity, will play a /ey role in this regard' >t has%uch %ore legiti%acy and is politically e%powered to de.elop strategic control %echanis%sco%ple%entary to the >$== technical %easuring procedures that ha.e produced difficult diplo%aticconundru%s and distrust'

he %oti.e behind the nuclear sub%arine is deter%ined by two reasons! 8"# control of the sea to denyaccess of a world power centered3e5peditionary force in the $%azon $rea, and 82# the establish%entof a persuasion shield based on retaliation' Both of the reasons behind the construction of the Brazilsnuclear progra% i%ply that the threats to which the progra% is directed are to co%bat and are not


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li%ited to the traditional regional antagonis%s, but rather are considering a %ultiple3front, alliance3based opposition, typical of threats historically faced by a great power'

hus, the rise of a nuclear progra% in the region has %ore i%plications on the role a state aspires toplay in the global arena and not the intentions it %ight ha.e for other neighboring states'8$s Brazil

%aintains the status Auo power in the region and there is only one other state, $rgentina, thatpossesses nuclear capabilities in the region which are %ostly directed to the production of electricity,there is no threatening i%plications for regional security'9 @owe.er, the e%ergence of &hile as a third

nuclear3capable country in the region adds e5ponential co%ple5ity to the issue'

8Garcos D' de $za%bu6a, Gata/e Ma%iya, and @enri J' Bar/ey'Brazil' 6apan' and Tur(ey,8?ashington, D&! he @enry L' )ti%son &enter, 200K#

9?orld Nuclear $ssociation, +Nuclear Power in the ?orld oday, 7orld 8uclear #ssociation'http!77www'world3nuclear'org7info7inf0"'ht%l 8accessed ebruary 2", 20""#'

BRAZIL’S EVOLVING SECURITY IDENTITY

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