Brady appeal decision

7/26/2019 Brady appeal decision

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152801(L),152805(CON)NationalFootballLeagueManagementCounciletal.v.NationalFootballLeaguePlayersAssociationetal.

In the1

United States Court of Appeals2

for the Second Circuit3________4

AugustTerm,20155

No.152801(L),No.152805(CON)6

NATIONALFOOTBALLLEAGUEMANAGEMENTCOUNCIL,7

PlaintiffCounterDefendantAppellant,8

and9

NATIONALFOOTBALLLEAGUE,10

DefendantAppellant,11

v.12

NATIONAL

FOOTBALL

LEAGUE

PLAYERS

ASSOCIATION,

on

its

own13behalfandonbehalfofTomBrady,14

DefendantCounterClaimantAppellee,15

and16

TOMBRADY,17

CounterClaimantAppellee.*18

________19

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt20

fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.21

Nos.155916,151982(RMB) RichardM.Berman,Judge.22

________23

*TheClerkofCourtisdirectedtoamendthecaptionassetforthabove.

Case 15-2801, Document 236-1, 04/25/2016, 1757310, Page1 of 33


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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

Argued:March3,20161

Decided:April25,20162

________3

Before:KATZMANN,ChiefJudge,PARKERandCHIN,CircuitJudges.4

________5

AppealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor6

the Southern District of New York (Richard M. Berman, Judge).7

Followinganinvestigation,theNationalFootballLeagueimposeda8

fourgame suspension onNew England Patriots quarterback Tom9

Brady. Thesuspensionwasbasedonafindingthatheparticipated10

in a scheme to deflate footballs used during the 2015 American11

FootballConferenceChampionshipGame to apressurebelow the12

permissible range. Brady requested arbitration and League13

Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an14

awardconfirmingthediscipline. Thepartiessoughtjudicialreview15

and thedistrict courtvacated theawardbasedupon its findingof16

fundamental unfairness and lack of notice. The League has17

appealed.18Wehold that theCommissionerproperlyexercisedhisbroad19

discretion under the collectivebargaining agreement and that his20

procedural rulingswereproperlygrounded in thatagreementand21

did not deprive Brady of fundamental fairness. Accordingly,we22

REVERSE thejudgment of the district court and REMANDwith23

instructionstoconfirmtheaward.24

ChiefJudgeKatzmanndissentsinaseparateopinion.25

________26

PAULD. CLEMENT (Erin E.Murphy,MichaelH.27

McGinley, on the brief), Bancroft PLLC,28

Washington,D.C.;DanielL.Nash,PratikA.Shah,29

2



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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

StaceyR.Eisenstein,GregoryW.Knopp&James1

E.Tysse,AkinGumpStraussHauer&FeldLLP,2

Washington,D.C.,onthebrief,forPlaintiffCounter3

DefendantAppellant

and

Defendant

Appellant.4

JEFFREY L. KESSLER (David L. Greenspan, on the5

brief),Winston & Strawn LLP, New York, NY;6

Steffen N. Johnson, Winston & Strawn LLP,7

Washington, D.C., on the brief; Andrew S.8

Tulumello, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,9

Washington, D.C., on the brief, for Defendant10

CounterClaimantAppellee and CounterClaimant11

Appellee.12

________13

BARRINGTOND.PARKER,CircuitJudge:14

This case involves an arbitration arising fromNewEngland15

Patriots quarterback Tom Bradys involvement in a scheme to16

deflatefootballsusedduringthe2015AmericanFootballConference17

Championship Game to a pressure below the permissible range.18

Followingan

investigation,

the

NFL

suspended

Brady

for

four19

games. Brady requested arbitration and League Commissioner20

RogerGoodell, serving as arbitrator, entered an award confirming21

the discipline. The parties soughtjudicial review and the district22

courtvacatedtheaward,reasoningthatBradylackednoticethathis23

conductwasprohibitedandpunishablebysuspension,andthatthe24

manner inwhich theproceedingswereconducteddeprivedhimof25

fundamental fairness. The League has appealed and we now26

reverse.27

Thebasic

principle

driving

both

our

analysis

and

our28

conclusion is well established: a federal courts review of labor29

arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly30

deferentialindeed, among themost deferential in the law. Our31

3



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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

roleisnottodetermineforourselveswhetherBradyparticipatedin1

aschemetodeflatefootballsorwhetherthesuspensionimposedby2

theCommissionershouldhavebeen for threegamesor fivegames3

ornone

atall.

Nor

isitour

role

tosecond

guess

the

arbitrators4

procedural rulings. Our obligation is limited to determining5

whether the arbitrationproceedings and awardmet theminimum6

legalstandardsestablishedbytheLaborManagementRelationsAct,7

29U.S.C.141etseq. (theLMRA). Wemustsimplyensure that8

the arbitrator was even arguably construing or applying the9

contractandactingwithin the scopeofhisauthorityanddidnot10

ignore theplain languageof thecontract. UnitedPaperworks Intl11

Unionv.Misco, Inc.,484U.S.29,38 (1987). Thesestandardsdonot12

require perfection in arbitration awards. Rather, they dictate that13

even if an arbitratormakesmistakes of fact or law,wemay not14

disturb an award so long as he acted within the bounds of his15

bargainedforauthority.16

Here,thatauthoritywasespeciallybroad. TheCommissioner17

was authorized to impose discipline for, among other things,18

conductdetrimentaltotheintegrityof,orpublicconfidence,inthe19

game of professional football. In their collective bargaining20

agreement,the

players

and

the

League

mutually

decided

many21

years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule22

violations,shouldimposeappropriatesanctions,andmaypresideat23

arbitrations challenging his discipline. Although this tripartite24

regime may appear somewhat unorthodox, it is the regime25

bargained forandagreeduponby theparties,whichwe canonly26

presumetheydeterminedwasmutuallysatisfactory.27

Giventhissubstantialdeference,weconcludethatthiscaseis28

not

an

exceptional

one

that

warrants

vacatur.

Our

review

of

the29record yields the firm conclusion that theCommissioner properly30

exercisedhisbroaddiscretion to resolvean intramuralcontroversy31

between theLeague and aplayer. Accordingly,weREVERSE the32

4



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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

judgment of the district court andREMANDwith instructions to1

confirmtheaward.12

BACKGROUND3

On January 18, 2015, the New England Patriots and the4

Indianapolis Colts played in the American Football Conference5

ChampionshipGameatthePatriotshomestadium inFoxborough,6

Massachusetts to determinewhich teamwould advance to Super7

BowlXLIX. During the second quarter,Colts linebackerDQwell8

JacksoninterceptedapassthrownbyBradyandtooktheballtothe9

sideline,suspectingitmightbeinflatedbelowtheallowedminimum10

pressureof12.5poundspersquare inch. Afterconfirmingthatthe11

ballwas

underinflated,

Colts

personnel

informed

League

officials,12

whodecided to testallof thegameballsathalftime. Elevenother13

PatriotsballsandfourColtsballsweretestedusingtwoairgauges,14

oneofwhichhadbeenusedbeforethegametoensurethattheballs15

wereinflatedwithinthepermissiblerangeof12.5to13.5psi. While16

eachofthefourColtsballstestedwithinthepermissiblerangeonat17

least one of the gauges, all eleven of the Patriotsballsmeasured18

below12.5psionboth.19

On

January

23,

the

National

Football

League

announced

that

it20hadretainedTheodoreV.Wells,Jr.,Esq.,andthe lawfirmofPaul,21

Weiss, Rifkind,Wharton & Garrison to conduct an independent22

investigation intowhether therehadbeen improperball tampering23

beforeorduringthegame. That investigationculminated ina13924

pagereportreleasedonMay6,whichconcludedthat itwasmore25

probable than not that two Patriots equipment officialsJim26

McNally and John Jastremskihad participated in a deliberate27

1WeaffirmthedistrictcourtsdenialofMichelleMcGuirksmotiontointervene,No.

1:15cv05916RMBJCF,ECFNo.90,inasummaryorderfiledsimultaneouslywiththis

Opinion. Belowandonappeal,McGuirkoffersnoexplanationofherrightorneedto

intervene,beyondadesiretopreventfraudonthecourt. TherelevantFederalRules

ofCivilandAppellateProceduredonotpermitpartieswithamereacademicinterest

inalitigationtoinsertthemselvesintothedispute.

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

effort to release air from Patriots gameballs after theballswere1

examinedbythereferee. JointApp.at97.2 Specifically,theReport2

found thatMcNallyhadremovedthegameballs from theOfficials3

LockerRoom

shortly

before

the

game,

inviolation

ofstandard4

protocol, and taken them to a singletoilet bathroom, where he5

locked thedoor andusedaneedle todeflate thePatriots footballs6

beforebringingthemtotheplayingfield.7

Inadditiontovideotapeevidenceandwitnessinterviews,the8

investigation team examined text messages exchanged between9

McNally and Jastremski in the months leading up to the AFC10

ChampionshipGame. In themessages, the twodiscussedBradys11

statedpreference

for

less

inflated

footballs.

McNally

also

referred

to12

himself as the deflator and quipped that hewas not going to13

espn . . . yet, andJastremski agreed to provideMcNallywith a14

needle in exchange for cash, newkicks, and memorabilia15

autographedbyBrady. JointApp.at99102. TheReportalsorelied16

on a scientific study conductedby Exponent, an engineering and17

scientificconsultingfirm,whichfoundthattheunderinflationcould18

notbeexplainedcompletelybybasic scientificprinciples, suchas19

the IdealGasLaw,particularly since the averagepressure of the20

Patriotsballs

was

significantly

lower

than

that

ofthe

Colts

balls.

21

JointApp.at10408. Exponentfurtherconcludedthatareasonably22

experienced individual could deflate thirteen footballs using a23

needle inwellunder the amountof time thatMcNallywas in the24

bathroom.325

The investigationalsoexaminedBradyspotentialrole in the26

deflation scheme. Although the evidence of his involvementwas27

lessdirectthanthatofMcNallysorJastremskis,theWellsReport28

concluded

that

it

was

more

probable

than

not

that

Brady

had

been29

2TheReportassessedtheevidenceunderthemoreprobablethannotstandard,

whichappliestoviolationsofthiskind.3TheWellsReportconcludedthattheevidencedidnotestablishthatanyotherPatriots

personnelparticipatedinorhadknowledgeoftheseactions.

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

atleastgenerallyawareofMcNallyandJastremskisactions,and1

thatitwasunlikelythatanequipmentassistantandalockerroom2

attendantwoulddeflategameballswithoutBradysknowledge,3

approval,awareness,

and

consent.

Joint

App.

at112,

114.

4

Among other things, the Report cited a text message exchange5

between McNally and Jastremski in which McNally complained6

about Brady and threatened to overinflate the game balls, and7

Jastremski replied that he had [t]alked to [Tom] last night and8

[Tom] actuallybrought you up and said youmust have a lot of9

stresstryingtogetthemdone. JointApp.at112. Theinvestigators10

also observed that Brady was a constant reference point in11

McNallyandJastremskisdiscussionsabout thescheme,JointApp.12

at112,hadpubliclystatedhispreferenceforlessinflatedfootballsin13

thepast,andhadbeenpersonallyinvolvedin[a]2006rulechange14

thatallowedvisitingteamstopreparegameballsinaccordancewith15

thepreferencesoftheirquarterbacks,JointApp.at114.16

Significantly, theReportalso found that,aftermore than six17

months of not communicating by phone or message, Brady and18

Jastremski spoke on the phone for approximately 25minutes on19

January19,thedaytheinvestigationwasannounced. Thisunusual20

patternofcommunication

continued

over

the

next

two

days.

Brady21

hadalso taken theunprecedentedsteponJanuary19of inviting22

Jastremskitothequarterbackroom,andhadsentJastremskiseveral23

textmessages thatday thatwereapparentlydesigned tocalmhim.24

The Report added that the investigation had been impaired by25

Bradys refusal to make available any documents or electronic26

information(includingtextmessagesandemails),notwithstanding27

anofferby the investigators toallowBradyscounsel toscreen the28

production.JointApp.at116.29

Ina letterdatedMay11,2015,NFLExecutiveVicePresident30

TroyVincent,Sr.,notifiedBradythatGoodellhadauthorizedafour31

game suspension of him pursuant to Article 46 of the Collective32

Bargaining Agreement between the League and the NFL Players33

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

Association (the Association or the NFLPA) for engaging in1

conductdetrimentaltotheintegrityofandpublicconfidenceinthe2

gameofprofessionalfootball. JointApp.at329.4 Thedisciplinary3

lettercited

the

Wells

Reports

conclusions

regarding

Bradys4

awarenessandknowledgeof thescheme,aswellashisfailure to5

cooperate fully and candidlywith the investigation, includingby6

refusing toproduceany relevantelectronicevidence (emails, texts,7

etc.) despite being offered extraordinary safeguards by the8

investigatorstoprotectunrelatedpersonalinformation. JointApp.9

at329.10

Brady, through theAssociation, filed a timely appeal of the11

suspension,and

the

Commissioner

exercised

his

discretion

under12

theCBA toserveas thehearingofficer. TheAssociationsought to13

challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report, and also14

argued that the Commissioner had improperly delegated his15

authority to discipline players pursuant to theCBA. Prior to the16

hearing,theAssociationfiledseveralmotions,includingamotionto17

recuse theCommissioner,amotion to compelNFLExecutiveVice18

President and General Counsel Jeff Pash to testify regarding his19

involvementinthepreparationoftheWellsReport,andamotionto20

compelthe

production

ofPaul,

Weisss

internal

investigation

notes.

21

4Article46,Section1(a),reads,infull:

Alldisputes involving a fine or suspension imposedupon a

player for conduct on the playing field (other than as described in

Subsection(b)below)orinvolvingactiontakenagainstaplayerbythe

Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public

confidence in, the game of professional football, will be processed

exclusivelyas follows: theCommissionerwillpromptly sendwritten

noticeofhisactiontotheplayer,withacopytotheNFLPA.Withinthree

(3)business

days

following

such

written

notification,

the

player

affected

thereby,ortheNFLPAwiththeplayersapproval,mayappealinwriting

totheCommissioner.

JointApp.at345. Article46furtherprovidesthattheCommissionermayserveas

hearingofficerinanyappealunderSection1(a)ofthisArticleathisdiscretion. Joint

App.at346.

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

TheCommissionerdeniedthemotionsindecisionsissuedon1

June 2 andJune 22, 2015. He reasoned that his recusalwas not2

warrantedbecausehedidnotdelegate [his]disciplinaryauthority3

toMr.

Vincent

and

did

not

have

any

first

hand

knowledge

ofany4

of theeventsat issue. SpecialApp.at6768. TheCommissioner5

alsodeclined tocompelPashs testimony,saying thatPashdidnot6

play a substantive role in the investigation, and that theWells7

Reportmadeclearthat itwaspreparedentirelybythePaulWeiss8

investigativeteam. SpecialApp.at63. TheCommissioneroffered9

to revisit his ruling should thepartiespresent evidence showing10

that the testimony of [Pash] . . . is necessary for a full and fair11

hearing,SpecialApp.at64,buttheAssociationneveraskedhimto12

reconsider. As to the Paul, Weiss investigation notes, the13

Commissioner ruled that theCBAdidnotrequire theirproduction14

and, in any event, the notes played no role in his disciplinary15

decision.16

OnJune23,theCommissionerheldahearinginvolvingnearly17

tenhoursofsworntestimonyandargumentandapproximately30018

exhibits. Shortlybefore thehearing, itwasrevealed thatonMarch19

6the same day that he was to be interviewed by the Wells20

investigativeteamBrady

had

instructed

his

assistant

todestroy21

thecellphone thathehadbeenusingsinceearlyNovember2014,a22

period that included theAFCChampionshipGame and the initial23

weeks of the subsequent investigation, despite knowing that the24

investigators had requested information from the phone several25

weeksbefore. SpecialApp.at42. AlthoughBradytestifiedthathe26

was followinghisordinarypracticeofdisposingofoldcellphones27

inordertoprotecthispersonalprivacy,hehadnonethelessretained28

phonesthathehadusedbeforeandaftertherelevanttimeframe.29

OnJuly28,theCommissionerissuedafinaldecisionaffirming30

thefourgamesuspension. Baseduponthenewlyrevealedevidence31

regardingthedestructionofthecellphone,theCommissionerfound32

thatBradyhadnotonly failed to cooperatewith the investigation,33

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

but made a deliberate effort to ensure that investigators would1

never have access to information that he had been asked to2

produce. Special App. at 54. The Commissioner consequently3

drewan

adverse

inference

that

the

cell

phone

would

have

contained4

inculpatoryevidence,andconcluded:5

(1)Mr.Bradyparticipated ina scheme to tamperwith6

the game balls after they had been approved by the7

gameofficialsforuse intheAFCChampionshipGame8

and(2)Mr.Bradywillfullyobstructedtheinvestigation9

by, among other things, affirmatively arranging for10

destructionofhis cellphoneknowing that it contained11

potentiallyrelevant

information

that

had

been12

requestedbytheinvestigators.13

SpecialApp. at 54. Finally, theCommissioner analogizedBradys14

conduct to that of steroidusers,whomhebelieved seek togain a15

similar systematic competitive advantage, and consequently16

affirmed that, in his view, the fourgame suspension typically17

imposedon firsttimesteroiduserswasequallyappropriate in this18

context.19

The

League

commenced

an

action

the

same

day

in

the

United20StatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Berman,21

J.), seeking confirmation of the award under the LMRA. The22

Associationbrought an action to vacate the award in theUnited23

States District Court for the District of Minnesota, which was24

subsequentlytransferredtotheSouthernDistrict.25

OnSeptember3,thedistrictcourtissuedadecisionandorder26

grantingtheAssociationsmotiontovacatetheawardanddenying27

theLeaguesmotiontoconfirm. NatlFootballLeagueMgmt.Council28

v.Natl

Football

League

Players

Assn,

125

F.Supp.

3d

449

(S.D.N.Y.29

2015). ThecourtreasonedthatBradylackednoticethathecouldbe30

suspended for fourgamesbecause theprovisionsapplicable tohis31

conductprovidedthatonlyfinescouldbeimposed. Thecourtalso32

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

held that the award was defective because the Commissioner1

deprived Brady of fundamental fairness by denying the2

Associations motions to compel the production of Paul,Weisss3

internalnotes

and

Pashs

testimony

regarding

his

involvement

with4

theWellsReport. TheLeaguetimelyappealed,andwenowreverse.5

STANDARDOFREVIEW6

We reviewadistrictcourtsdecision toconfirmorvacatean7

arbitrationawarddenovoonquestionsoflawandforclearerroron8

findingsoffact. WackenhutCorp.v.AmalgamatedLocal515,126F.3d9

29,31(2dCir.1997). Becausethisdispute involvestheassertionof10

rights under a collective bargaining agreement, our analysis is11

governedby

section

301

ofthe

LMRA.

Major

League

Baseball

Players12

Assnv.Garvey,532U.S.504,509(2001).13

The LMRA establishes a federal policy of promoting14

industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining15

agreement, with particular emphasis on private arbitration of16

grievances. UnitedSteelworkersv.Warrior&GulfNavigationCo.,36317

U.S.574,578 (1960). TheActembodiesaclearpreference for the18

private resolution of labor disputes without government19

intervention.

Intl

Bhd.

of

Elec.

Workers

v.

Niagara

Mohawk

Power20Corp.,143F.3d704,714(2dCir.1998).21

Under this framework of selfgovernment, the collective22

bargainingagreementisnotjustacontract,butageneralizedcode23

to govern amyriad of caseswhich the draftsmen cannotwholly24

anticipate. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578. Collective bargaining25

agreementsarenotimposedbylegislaturesorgovernmentagencies.26

Rather, they are negotiated and refined over timeby the parties27

themselves so as tobest reflect their priorities, expectations, and28

experience.Similarly,

the

arbitrators

are

chosen

by

the

parties29

becauseoftheirexpertiseintheparticularbusinessandtheirtrusted30

judgment to interpret and apply [the] agreement in accordance31

withtheindustrialcommonlawoftheshopandthevariousneeds32

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

anddesiresoftheparties. Alexanderv.GardnerDenverCo.,415U.S.1

36,53(1974). Thearbitrationprocessisthuspartandparcelofthe2

ongoingprocessofcollectivebargaining.Misco,484U.S.at38.3

Our review of an arbitration award under the LMRA is,4

accordingly, very limited. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509. We are5

therefore not authorized to review the arbitratorsdecision on the6

meritsdespiteallegationsthatthedecisionrestsonfactualerrorsor7

misinterpretsthepartiesagreement,butinquireonlyastowhether8

thearbitratoractedwithin thescopeofhisauthorityasdefinedby9

the collectivebargaining agreement. Because it is the arbitrators10

view of the facts and themeaning of the contract forwhich the11

partiesbargained,

courts

are

not

permitted

tosubstitute

their

own.

12Misco, 484U.S. at 3738. It is the arbitrators construction of the13

contractandassessmentof the facts thataredispositive,however14

good,bad, or ugly. OxfordHealth Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct.15

2064,2071 (2013). Contrary toourdissentingcolleague,wedonot16

consider whether the punishment imposed was the most17

appropriate, or whether we are persuaded by the arbitrators18

reasoning. Inshort,itisnotourtasktodecidehowwewouldhave19

conducted the arbitration proceedings, or how we would have20

resolvedthe

dispute.

21

Instead, our task is simply to ensure that the arbitratorwas22

even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting23

within the scope of his authority and did not ignore the plain24

language of the contract. Misco, 484U.S. at 38. Even failure to25

follow arbitral precedent is no reason to vacate an award.26

Wackenhut,126F.3dat32. Aslongastheawarddrawsitsessence27

from the collective bargaining agreement and is not merely the28

arbitrators

own

brand

of

industrial

justice,

it

must

be

confirmed.

29NiagaraMohawk,143F.3dat714(quotingUnitedSteelworkersv.Enter.30

Wheel&CarCorp.,363U.S.593,597(1960));seealsoGarvey,532U.S.31

at 509; 187ConcourseAssocs. v.Fishman, 399F.3d 524, 527 (2dCir.32

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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

2005).5 If thearbitratoractswithin the scopeof thisauthority, the1

remedyforadissatisfiedpartyisnotjudicialintervention,butfor2

thepartiestodrafttheiragreementtoreflectthescopeofpowerthey3

wouldlike

their

arbitrator

toexercise.

United

Bhd.

of

Carpenters

v.4

TappanZeeConstr., LLC, 804 F.3d 270, 275 (2dCir. 2015) (internal5

quotationmarksomitted)(quotingT.CoMetals,LLCv.DempseyPipe6

&Supply, Inc.,592F.3d329,345 (2dCir.2010)). Against this legal7

backdrop, we turn to the decision below and the arguments8

advancedonappeal.9

DISCUSSION10

Article 46 of the CBA empowers the Commissioner to take11

disciplinaryaction

against

aplayer

whom

he

reasonably

judge[s]12

to have engaged in conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or13

publicconfidencein,thegameofprofessionalfootball. JointApp.14

at 345, 353.6 A disciplined player is entitled to appeal to the15

Commissioner and seek an arbitration hearing, and the16

Commissionermayappointeitherhimselforsomeoneelsetoserve17

asarbitrator. Article46doesnotarticulate rulesofprocedure for18

thehearing,excepttoprovidethatthepartiesshallexchangecopies19

ofanyexhibitsuponwhichtheyintendtorelynolaterthanthree(3)20

calendardayspriortothehearing.JointApp.at346.21

On this appeal, theAssociation does not contest the factual22

findings of theCommissioner. Nor does theAssociation dispute23

that theCommissionerwasentitled,underArticle46, todetermine24

thatBradysparticipat[ion]inaschemetotamperwithgameballs25

5Thisdeferentialstandardisnolessapplicablewheretheindustryisasports

association.Wedonotsitasrefereesoffootballanymorethanwesitastheumpires

ofbaseballorthesuperscorerforstockcarracing. Otherwise,wewouldbecome

mireddownintheareasofagroupsactivityconcerningwhichonlythegroupcan

speakcompetently. SeeCrouchv.NatlAssnforStockCarAutoRacing,Inc.,845F.2d397,

403(2dCir.1988);CharlesO.Finley&Co.,Inc.v.Kuhn,569F.2d527,53638(7thCir.

1978).6PlayersareputonnoticeoftheCommissionersArticle46authoritybywayofthe

LeaguePoliciesforPlayersandtheNFLPlayerContract.

13



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Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

wasconductdetrimentalworthyofafourgamesuspension. The1

partiesdisagree,however, as towhetherother aspectsof theCBA2

andtherelevantcaselawrequirevacaturoftheaward.3

The district court identified three bases for overturning4

Bradyssuspension:(1)the lackofadequatenoticethatdeflationof5

footballscould lead toa fourgamesuspension, (2) theexclusionof6

testimonyfromPash,and(3)thedenialofaccesstotheinvestigative7

notes of the attorneys from Paul,Weisswho prepared theWells8

Report. We conclude that each of thesegrounds is insufficient to9

warrant vacatur and that none of the Associations remaining10

argumentshavemerit.11

I. Lackof

Adequate

Notice12

The parties agree that the law of the shop requires the13

League to provide players with advance notice of prohibited14

conduct and potential discipline. The district court identified15

severalgroundsforconcludingthatBradyhadnonoticethateither16

his conductwasprohibited or that it could serve as a ground for17

suspension.18

A. ThePlayerPolicies19

TheAssociationschiefgroundforvacatur,relieduponbythe20

districtcourt,isthattheCommissionerimproperlysuspendedBrady21

pursuant to theconductdetrimental clauseofArticle46because22

Bradywasonlyonnoticethathisconductcouldleadtoafineunder23

themorespecificDisciplineforGameRelatedMisconductsection24

of the League Policies for Players (the Player Policies). These25

Policies,which are collected in ahandbookdistributed to allNFL26

players at thebeginning of each season, include a section entitled27

Other

Uniform/Equipment

Violations.7

287TheOtherUniform/Equipment Violationssectionreads,infull:

The2014UniformPolicy,the2014OnFieldPolicy,andtheenforcement

proceduresforthesepoliciesareattachedattheendofthissection.

ALeaguerepresentativewillconductathoroughreviewofallplayersin

14



15/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

The Association argues that the Commissioner was not1

permitted to impose a fourgame suspension under Article 462

because the Player Policies mandated only a fine for equipment3

infractions.The

Association

further

contends

that

the

award

is4

additionally defective because the Commissioner failed to make5

findings as to the applicability or interpretation of the Player6

Policies. SeeClinchfieldCoalCo.v.Dist.28,UnitedMineWorkers,7207

F.2d 1365, 1369 (4thCir. 1983) (Where . . . the arbitrator fails to8

discuss critical contract terminology, which terminology might9

reasonably require an opposite result, the award cannot be10

consideredtodrawitsessencefromthecontract.).11

Thisargument

by

the

Association

has

atortured

procedural12

history. During arbitration, the Association disclaimed the13

applicability of the Player Policies, saying we dontbelieve this14

policyapplieseither,becausethereisnothinghereabouttheballs.15

Joint App. at 956. This change of position is itself grounds for16

uniformduringpregamewarmups.

AlluniformandOnFieldviolationsdetectedduringtheroutinepregame

checkmustbecorrectedpriortokickoff,ortheoffendingplayer(s)will

notbeallowed toenter thegame. Aviolation thatoccursduring the

gamewillresult intheplayerbeingremovedfromthegameuntilthe

violationiscorrected.

Leaguedisciplinemayalsobe imposedonplayerswhoseequipment,

uniform,orOnFieldviolationsaredetectedduringpostgamereviewof

video,whorepeatviolationsonthesamegamedayafterhavingbeen

corrected earlier, orwhoparticipate in the gamedespite nothaving

correctedaviolationwheninstructedtodoso.Firstoffenseswillresult

in

fines.

In addition, in accordancewithArticle 51, Section 13(c) of theNFL

NFLPACollectiveBargainingAgreement,allplayerswillberequiredto

wearanon

obtrusive

sensor

orGPS

tracking

device

during

NFL

games.

Leaguedisciplinewillbe imposedonanyplayerwhorefusestowear

suchadevice,orafterhavingsuchadeviceaffixedtohisequipment,

removesthedevicepriortoorduringagame.Firstoffenseswillresult

infines.

JointApp.at384.

15



16/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

rejecting the Associations argument. See York Research Corp. v.1

Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1991) ([A] party cannot2

remain silent, raising no objection during the course of the3

arbitrationproceeding,

and

when

an

award

adverse

tohim

has

been4

handeddown complainofa situationofwhichhehadknowledge5

fromthefirst.(quotingCookIndus.,Inc.v.C.Itoh&Co.(Am.)Inc.,6

449F.2d106,10708 (2dCir.1971))). Wenonetheless exerciseour7

discretiontoaddressit. Weconcludethattheequipmentprovision8

does not apply and, in any event, the punishments listed for9

equipment violations are minimum ones that do not foreclose10

suspensions.11

1. Applicabilityof

the

Player

Policies12

TheAssociationprimarilyreliesonastatementintheOther13

Uniform/EquipmentViolationssection,whichprovides thatFirst14

offenseswill result in fines. It argues that equipment violations15

includeballorequipment tamperingandequipment tampering16

such asballdeflation. But theAssociation finds language in the17

Other Uniform/Equipment Violations provision that we cannot18

locate. The provision says nothing about tamperingwith, or the19

preparation of, footballs and, indeed,doesnotmention thewords20

tampering, ball, or deflation at all. Moreover, there is no21

otherprovisionofthePlayerPoliciesthatreferstoballorequipment22

tampering, despite an extensive list of uniform and equipment23

violationsrangingfromthelengthofaplayersstockingstothecolor24

ofhiswristbands.25

On theotherhand,Article46gives theCommissionerbroad26

authority to dealwith conduct hebelievesmight undermine the27

integrityofthegame. TheCommissionerproperlyunderstoodthat28

aseries

ofrules

relating

touniforms

and

equipment

does

not

repeal29

hisauthorityvestedinhimbytheAssociationtoprotectprofessional30

football from detrimental conduct. We have little difficulty in31

concluding that the Commissioners decision to discipline Brady32

pursuant to Article 46 was plausibly grounded in the parties33

16



17/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

agreement,whichisallthelawrequires. SeeWackenhut,126F.3dat1

32.2

2. 2014ScheduleofFines3

Evenwere thedistrictcourtand theAssociationcorrect,and4

they are not, that Brady couldbe punished only pursuant to the5

Player Policies and its Other Uniform/Equipment Violations6

provision, itwouldnot follow that the only availablepunishment7

wouldhavebeena fine. While thePlayerPoliciesdospecify that,8

with regard to Other Uniform/Equipment Violations, [f]irst9

offenses will result in fines, the 2014 Schedule of Fines, which10

appears five pages later and details the fines for these violations,11

makesclear

that

the

[f]ines

listed

below

are

minimums.

Joint

App.12

at384,389. TheScheduleofFinesgoeson tospecify that[o]ther13

formsofdiscipline,includinghigherfinesandsuspensionmayalso14

beimposed,basedonthecircumstancesoftheparticularviolation.15

JointApp.at389. Readinconjunction,theseprovisionsmakeclear16

that even first offenders are not exempt from punishment, and17

serious violations may result in suspension. But even if other18

readingswere plausible, theCommissioners interpretation of this19

provision as allowing for a suspension would easily withstand20

judicialscrutinybecausehisinterpretationwouldbeatleastbarely21

colorable,which,again,isallthatthelawrequires. SeeInreAndros22

CompaniaMaritima,S.A.,579F.2d691,704(2dCir.1978).23

B. SteroidComparison24

Thedistrictcourtalsotook issuewith thecomparisondrawn25

by theCommissionerbetweenBradys conductand thatof steroid26

users. In his arbitration award, theCommissioner noted that the27

fourgamesuspension typically imposedon firsttimesteroidusers28

wasahelpful

point

ofcomparison

because,

like

Bradys

conduct,29

steroid use reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive30

advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game. Special31

17



18/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

App. at 57. Finding such a comparison inappropriate, thedistrict1

courtheld:2

[N]o player alleged or found to have had a general3

awarenessof the inappropriateballdeflation activities4

ofothersorwhoallegedlyschemedwithotherstoletair5

outof footballs ina championshipgameandalsohad6

notcooperated inanensuing investigation, reasonably7

could be on notice that their discipline would (or8

should)bethesameasappliedtoaplayerwhoviolated9

the NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroids and Related10

Substances.11

NatlFootball

League,

125

F.Supp.

3d

at465.

The

Association12

approaches this comparison somewhatdifferently, contending that13

theCommissioners failure topunishBradypursuant to thePlayer14

PoliciesisonlyunderscoredbyhisrelianceontheSteroidPolicy.15

AppelleesBr.45.16

We are not troubled by the Commissioners analogy. If17

deferencemeansanything,itmeansthatthearbitrator isentitledto18

generous latitude in phrasing his conclusions. We have little19

difficulty

concluding

that

the

comparison

to

steroid

users

neither20violatedarighttowhichBradywasentitlednordeprivedhimof21

notice. Whilehemayhavebeen entitled tonoticeofhis rangeof22

punishment,itdoesnotfollowthathewasentitledtoadvancenotice23

of theanalogies the arbitratormight findpersuasive in selecting a24

punishmentwithinthatrange.25

Thedissentcontendsthatwemustvacatetheawardbecause26

theCommissioner failed to discuss a policy regarding stickum,27

which the dissent views as a natural starting point for assessing28

Bradyspenalty.

Dissenting

Op.

at7.We

do

not

believe

this29

contention is consistent with our obligation to afford arbitrators30

substantialdeference,andby suggesting that the stickumpolicy is31

themoreappropriateanalogy,thedissentimproperlyweighsinona32

18



19/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

pure sports questionwhether using stickum by one player is1

similartotamperingwithfootballsusedoneveryplay. Andevenif2

thefine forstickumuse is themostappropriateanalogy toBradys3

conduct,nothing

inthe

CBA

orour

case

law

demands

that

the4

arbitratordiscusscomparableconductmerelybecausewe find that5

analogy more persuasive than others, or because we think the6

analogythearbitratorchosetodrawwasflawedorinapt.8 Nor7

doestheCBArequirethearbitratortofullyexplainhisreasoning,8

Dissenting Op. at 6; it merely mandates that the hearing officer9

renderawrittendecision,JointApp.at346. TheCommissioner10

not only did just that, but he also explained why he found the11

analogy to steroidusepersuasive. Not even theAssociation finds12

defect in theawardon thispointthisargumentwasnever raised13

bytheAssociation,eitherbeloworonappeal. Whileweappreciate14

thatourdissenting colleaguemightview thepenaltymetedout to15

Brady as harsh,we do notbelieve that view supplies a sufficient16

basistowarrantvacatur.17

Accordingly, we believe the Commissioner was within his18

discretionindrawingahelpful,ifsomewhatimperfect,comparison19

to steroidusers. In any event,webelieve this issue ismuch ado20

aboutvery

little

because

the

Commissioner

could

have

imposed

the21

samesuspensionwithoutreferencetotheLeaguessteroidpolicy.22

C. GeneralAwareness23

Thedistrictcourtalso concluded that theawardwas invalid24

because[n]oNFLpolicyorprecedentprovidednoticethataplayer25

could be subject to discipline for general awareness of another26

personsallegedmisconduct. NatlFootballLeague,125F.Supp.3d27

at 466. This conclusionmisapprehends the record. The award is28

clearthat

itconfirmed

Bradys

discipline

not

because

ofageneral29

awarenessofmisconducton thepartofothers,butbecauseBrady30

8Thisisespeciallytrueheregiventhat,despiteknowingthatBradyhadbeen

suspendedfourgames,theAssociationneverattemptedtodrawananalogytothe

punishmentforstickumusers.

19



20/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

both participated in a scheme to tamper with game balls and1

willfully obstructed the investigation by . . . arranging for2

destructionofhiscellphone. SpecialApp.at54.3

TheAssociation takes a somewhatdifferent tack and argues4

that the Commissioner was bound to theWells Reports limited5

conclusion that Brady was at least generally aware of the6

inappropriate activities of Patriots equipment staff. But the7

Associationoffersnopersuasivesupport for itscontention that the8

universe of facts the Commissioner could properly consider was9

limited by the Wells Report. Nothing in Article 46 limits the10

authorityofthearbitratortoexamineorreassessthefactualbasisfor11

asuspension.

Infact,

inproviding

for

ahearing,

Article

46strongly12

suggests otherwise. Because the point of a hearing in any13

proceeding is to establish a complete factual record, itwouldbe14

incoherent tobothauthorizeahearingandat the same time insist15

that no new findings or conclusions couldbebased on a record16

expandedasaconsequenceofahearing.17

Additionally,itwascleartoallpartiesthatanimportantgoal18

of the hearing was to afford the Association the opportunity to19

examine the findings of the Wells Report, and the Association20

availed itselfof thatopportunity. SeeJointApp.at952 ([W]eare21

abouttotellyouwhywething[sic]theWellsreportiswrong....;22

[W]ebelieve you are going to concludewhen you hear [Bradys23

testimony] that he is not somebody who was responsible for24

anything . . . .), 953 (What it turns out is there are so many25

unknownswhichareintheWellsreport.). InlightofBradyseffort26

to challenge the factual conclusions of the Wells Report by27

presentingexculpatoryevidence,itwouldmakelittlesensetoaccept28

the

Associations

contention

that

the

introduction

and

consideration29ofinculpatoryevidenceviolatestheCommissionersbroadauthority30

tomanagethehearing.31

TheissuebeforetheCommissionerwaswhetherthediscipline32

imposedonBradywaswarrantedunderArticle46,andthatwasthe33

20



21/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

issuehedecided. TheCommissionerdidnotdevelopanewbasis1

for the suspension,nordidhedepriveBradyofanopportunity to2

confront the case against him. We see nothing in the CBA that3

suggeststhat

the

Commissioner

was

barred

from

concluding,

based4

on informationgeneratedduring thehearing, thatBradysconduct5

wasmoreseriousthanwasinitiallybelieved.6

Moreover,theWellsReportdidnotlimititselftoafindingof7

generalawareness. Italsofoundthatitisunlikelythat[McNally8

and Jastremski] would deflate game balls without Bradys9

knowledge and approval or that they would personally and10

unilaterally engage in such conduct in the absence of Bradys11

awarenessand

consent.

Joint

App.

at114.

The

Commissioners12

shiftfromknowledgeandapprovaltoparticipationwasnot,as13

the Association argues, a quantum leap, but was instead a14

reasonablereassessmentofthefactsthatgaverisetoBradys initial15

discipline,supplementedbyinformationdevelopedatthehearing.16

Unprompted by the Association, our dissenting colleague17

contendsthatbecausetheWellsReportneverconcludedthatitwas18

more probable than not that the gifts Brady provided were19

intendedasrewardsoradvancepaymentsfordeflatingfootballs in20

violationofLeagueRules,DissentingOp.at3, theCommissioner21

deprived Brady of notice by concluding that he provided22

inducementsandrewardsinsupportof[the]scheme,SpecialApp.23

at51.24

But the Wells Report was clear that its conclusion was25

significantly influenced by the substantial number of26

communicationsand events consistentwith [its] finding, including27

that [McNally] . . . received valuable items autographedby Tom28

Bradythe

week

before

the

AFC

Championship

Game.

Joint

App.

at29

108. WithspecificregardtoBradysinvolvement,theWellsReport30

notedthatBrady[was]aconstantreferencepointinthediscussions31

betweenMcNallyandJastremskiabout . . . items tobereceivedby32

McNally. JointApp. at 11213. And as the dissent admits, the33

21



22/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

AssociationquestionedBradyatthehearingonthisverypoint,and1

the Commissioner determined that Bradys testimony was not2

credible. Therecordestablishes thatBradywasonnotice from the3

outsetthat

the

Wells

Reports

conclusions

were

significantly4

influenced by his providing McNally9 with autographed5

memorabilia, the Association confronted this allegation at the6

hearing,andtheCommissionerrejectedBradysexplanation. Brady7

knewthatthefactualpredicatesofhisdiscipline(thetextmessages,8

the phone calls, the autographed memorabilia, etc.) would be at9

issue inthearbitration. Thathechose tofocusonsomemore than10

otherssimplyreflectshisowntacticaldecisionastohowtopresent11

hiscase. Andagain,theAssociationneverputforththiscontention,12

eitherbeforeusorinthedistrictcourtbelow.13

We therefore find that the Commissioner was within his14

discretion toconclude thatBradyhadparticipated inascheme to15

tamper with game balls. Because the parties agree that such16

conduct is conduct detrimental, the district court erred in17

concluding that the Commissioners deviation from the Wells18

Reportsfindingofgeneralawarenesswasagroundforvacatur.19

D. DisciplineforNoncooperation20

The district court held and the Association contends that21

Bradys suspension cannot be sustained on the grounds that he22

obstructed the Commissioners investigation. The court reasoned23

that[n]oplayersuspension inNFLhistoryhasbeensustained for24

an alleged failure to cooperate withor even allegedly25

obstructingan NFL investigation. Natl Football League, 125 F.26

Supp.3dat465(internalquotationmarksomitted). TheLeague,on27

theotherhand,arguesthatnotonlyisthedeliberateobstructionofa28

leagueinvestigation

conduct

detrimental

within

the

meaning

of29

Article46,butalso thedestructionof the cellphonepermitted the30

9TheCommissionerneverreferencedthegiftsJastremskireceivedfromBrady.

22



23/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

Commissioner to draw an adverse inference against Brady that1

supportedthefindingthatheparticipatedinthedeflationscheme.2

The Associations argument is essentially procedural. The3

Associationdoesnotdispute that theCommissionerproperlyused4

the destruction of the cell phone to draw an adverse inference5

againstBrady. Inthefaceofthisconcession,theAssociationinsists6

thatbecause the award is invalid in light of the Commissioners7

failure to discipline Brady under the Player Policies, the award8

cannotbesalvagedonthealternativetheorythatBradycouldhave9

beensuspendedforhisobstructionoftheinvestigation. Specifically,10

theAssociation contends that once itbecomes clear that Bradys11

noncooperation

led

tothe

adverse

inference

about

ball

tampering,12

itsbacktosquareone:TheonlypenaltyofwhichBradyhadnotice13

was the collectively bargained fine for equipment violations.14

AppelleesBr.51. Thisargumentfailsforthesimplereasonthat,as15

wehaveexplained, thePlayerPoliciesare inapplicableand, inany16

event, suspensionsmaybe imposed forviolations of theLeagues17

equipmentpolicies.18

At oral argument, the Association contended, for the first19

time,thatBradyhadnonoticethatthedestructionofthecellphone20

wouldevenbeat issue in thearbitrationproceeding.10 Ordinarily,21

anargument suchas this that isnot raised in thebriefs iswaived22

and thusnotappropriate for considerationonappeal. Littlejohnv.23

City ofNewYork, 795F.3d 297, 313n.12 (2dCir. 2015). However,24

because the parties discussed this issue at length during oral25

argument,weexerciseourdiscretiontoaddressit.26

For a number of reasons, the Associations assertion that27

Bradylackednoticethatthedestructionofthecellphonewouldbe28

10Bycontrast,initsbrief,theAssociationarguedonlythatBradyhadnonoticethathe

couldbesuspendedfordecliningtoproducehisprivatecommunications. Appellees

Br.51. BecausethepartiesagreethattheCommissionerproperlydrewanadverse

inferencebasedonthedestructionofthecellphone,weneednotconfrontthis

argument.

23



24/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

an issue in the arbitration has no support in the record. The1

Leagues letter toBradynotifyinghimofhissuspensionpointed to2

Bradys failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the3

investigation,including

by

refusing

toproduce

any

relevant4

electronicevidence(emails,texts,etc.). JointApp.at329. Having5

beengiven clearnotice thathis cooperationwith the investigation6

wasasubjectofsignificantinterest,wehavedifficultybelievingthat7

eitherBradyortheAssociationwouldhavebeensurprisedthatthe8

destruction of the cell phone was of importance to the9

Commissioner. Thenotion thatBradywasunfairlyblindsidedby10

the Commissioners adverse inference is further belied by the11

opening statement of the Associations counsel at the arbitration,12

whodefendedBradyshandlingofelectronicevidence:13

We are also going to put in a14

declaration from a forensic person who15

dealt with the issue of email and texts.16

And you know from your decision that17

[this]wasanaspectofthediscipline....18

....19

[T]here

were

no

incriminating

texts20beingwithheldoremails,and therenever21

have been any incriminating texts or e22

mails. Andnowhehasgone throughand23

producesexactlywhatTedWellshadasked24

forat the time thatexistedat the timeand25

existstoday.26

. . .Hewas following the advice of27

hislawyersandagentsatthetime.28

JointApp. at 953. Counsel for theAssociation laterwent further,29

directly acknowledging the destruction of the cell phone and30

referencing an expert declaration submitted in support of Brady.31

Whateveritmaysaynowaboutitsexpectationsforthehearing,the32

24



25/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

Associationhadatleastenoughnoticeofthepotentialconsequences1

of the cellphonedestruction to retainan expert inadvanceof the2

arbitrationtoassistcounsel inexplainingwhyanadverse inference3

shouldnot

be

drawn.4

Atoralargument, theAssociation furthercontended that the5

Commissionerwas improperlypunishingBrady fordestroyinghis6

cellphonebecausehewas required to instituteanewdisciplinary7

action (so thatBrady could thenappealanydetermination thathe8

haddestroyedhis cellphone). Thisargument failsbecause,as set9

forth in the original disciplinary letter, Brady was punished for10

failingtocooperate,anditisclearfromtheCommissionersdecision11

thatBradys

cell

phone

destruction

was

part

and

parcel

ofthe12

broaderclaimthathehadfailedtocooperate. Further,aswestated13

with regard to general awareness, nothing inArticle 46 limits the14

arbitratorsauthoritytoreexaminethefactualbasisforasuspension15

by conductingahearing. Additionally, theCommissionerdidnot16

increase thepunishmentasaconsequenceof thedestructionof the17

cellphonethe fourgame suspensionwasnot increased. Rather,18

thecellphonedestructionmerelyprovided furthersupport for the19

Commissioners determination that Brady had failed to cooperate,20

andserved

asthe

basis

for

an

adverse

inference

astohis21

participationintheschemetodeflatefootballs.22

Finally, any reasonable litigant would understand that the23

destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the start of24

arbitration proceedings,wouldbe an important issue. It iswell25

established that the lawpermitsa trierof fact to infer thataparty26

who deliberately destroys relevant evidence the party had an27

obligation to produce did so in order to conceal damaging28

information

from

the

adjudicator.

See,

e.g.,

Residential

Funding

Corp.29v.DeGeorgeFin.Corp.,306F.3d99,10607 (2dCir.2002);Byrniev.30

Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 10712 (2d Cir. 2001); Kronisch v.31

UnitedStates,150F.3d112,126 (2dCir.1998). Theseprinciplesare32

sufficientlysettled that there isnoneed foranyspecificmentionof33

25



26/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

them in a collective agreement, and we are confident that their1

applicationcameasnosurprisetoBradyortheAssociation.2

E. CompetitiveIntegrityPolicy3

The final ground for vacatur due to inadequate notice4

identifiedbythedistrictcourtwasBradyspurportedlackofnotice5

of the Competitive Integrity Policy, which authorized the initial6

investigation. The district court reasoned that Brady was7

improperlysuspendedpursuanttotheCompetitiveIntegrityPolicy,8

which is distributed only to teams, and not to players. This9

conclusionisincorrectbecause,aswehaveseen,Article46properly10

suppliedthebasisforthesuspension.11

Tellingly, theAssociationdoesnotdefend thedistrictcourts12

analysis on appeal. The League in its initial punishment and the13

Commissioner inhis arbitration awardwereboth clear thatBrady14

wasbeingdisciplined pursuant toArticle 46, not theCompetitive15

Integrity Policy.11 The Competitive Integrity Policy, which says16

nothing about disciplining players, merely supplied the17

Commissionerwiththeauthoritytoconductaninvestigationandto18

requirethePatriotscooperation. Theoperativequestionfornotice,19

as

the

parties

agree,

is

whether

Brady

was

aware

that

his

conduct20couldgiverisetoasuspension. Article46puthimonnoticepriorto21

the AFC Championship Game that any action deemed by the22

Commissioner to be conduct detrimental could lead to his23

suspension.1224

11SeeJointApp.at32930(explainingtwicethatthesourceofthedisciplinewasthe

CommissionersauthorityunderArticle46oftheCBA);SpecialApp.at5859n.19

(Asthedisciplinelettermakesclear,Mr.Bradywassuspendedforconduct

detrimentaltotheintegrityofandpublicconfidenceinthegameofprofessional

football,notforaviolationofthe[CompetitiveIntegrityPolicy].).12ThedissentemphasizesatvariouspointsthatBradysfourgamesuspensionwas

unprecedented. E.g.,DissentingOp.at1,6,9. Butdeterminingtheseverityofa

penaltyisanarchetypalexampleofajudgmentcommittedtoanarbitratorsdiscretion.

Theseverityofapenaltywilldependonanynumberofconsiderations,includingthe

culpabilityoftheindividual,thecircumstancesofthemisconduct,andthebalancingof

interestsinherentlyuniqueineveryworkenvironment.Weighingandapplyingthese

26



27/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

II. ExclusionofTestimonyfromNFLGeneralCounsel1

Prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings, the2

CommissionerdeniedtheAssociationsmotiontocallNFLGeneral3

CounselJeffPash to testifyat thearbitrationconcerninghisrole in4

thepreparationof theWellsReport. TheCommissionerdid soon5

the grounds that Pash did not play a substantive role in the6

investigation and the Wells Report made clear that it was7

prepared entirelyby thePaulWeiss investigative team. Special8

App.at63. Asanindependentgroundforvacatur,thedistrictcourt9

held that it was fundamentally unfair to exclude Pash from10

testifyingbecauseit is logical thathewouldhavevaluable insight11

intothe

course

and

outcome

ofthe

Investigation

and

into

the12

draftingandcontentoftheWellsReport. NatlFootballLeague,12513

F.Supp.3dat471. Again,wecannotagreewiththisconclusion.14

It iswell settled thatprocedural questions that arise during15

arbitration,suchaswhichwitnesses tohearandwhichevidence to16

receiveorexclude,are left to thesounddiscretionof thearbitrator17

andshouldnotbesecondguessedbythecourts. Misco,484U.S.at18

40. Arbitrators do not need to comply with strict evidentiary19

rules,andtheypossesssubstantialdiscretiontoadmitorexclude20

evidence. LJL33rdSt.Assocs.,LLCv.PitcairnProps. Inc.,725F.3d21

184,19495(2dCir.2013);seealsoVoltInfo.Scis.,Inc.v.Bd.ofTrs.of22

LelandStanfordJuniorUniv.,489U.S.468,476(1989).23

However, a narrow exception exists under the Federal24

Arbitration Act (FAA), which provides that an award may be25

vacatedwhere the arbitratorswere guilty ofmisconduct . . . in26

refusingtohearevidencepertinentandmaterialtothecontroversy.27

9U.S.C.10(a)(3).Wehaveheldthatvacaturiswarrantedinsucha28

circumstanceonly

iffundamental

fairness

isviolated.

Tempo

Shain29

Corp. v.Bertek, Inc., 120F.3d 16,20 (2dCir. 1997).13 There is little30

factorsisleftnottothecourts,buttothesounddiscretionofthearbitrator.13TheFAAdoesnotapplytoarbitrations,likethisone,conductedpursuanttothe

LMRA,butthefederalcourtshaveoftenlookedtothe[FAA]forguidanceinlabor

27



28/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

questionthattheexclusionofthetestimonywasconsistentwiththe1

Commissionersbroadauthoritytoregulateproceduralmattersand2

comportedwith theCBA. Thus, theCommissionersrulingcanbe3

revisitedincourt

only

ifitviolated

fundamental

fairness,

and

we

see4

nosuchviolation.5

The central issue in the arbitrationwaswhether Brady had6

engagedinconductdetrimentaltotheLeague. TheinsightsPash7

might have had and the role he might have played in the8

preparationoftheWellsReportwereconcernsthatwerecollateralto9

theissuesatarbitration. TheCBAdoesnotrequireanindependent10

investigation,andnothingwouldhaveprohibitedtheCommissioner11

fromusing

an

inhouse

team

toconduct

the

investigation.

The12

AssociationandtheLeaguebargainedforandagreedintheCBAon13

a structure that lodged responsibility for both investigation and14

adjudicationwiththeLeagueandtheCommissioner. Moreover,the15

CommissionermadeclearthattheindependenceoftheWellsReport16

wasnotmaterial tohisdecision, thus limitinganyprobativevalue17

thePashtestimonymayhavehad.18

arbitrationcases.

Misco,

484

U.S.

at40n.9.

However,

we

have

never

held

that

the

requirementoffundamentalfairnessappliestoarbitrationawardsundertheLMRA,

cf.BellAerospaceCo.Div.ofTextron,Inc.v.Local516IntlUnion,500F.2d921,923(2dCir.

1974)(applying,withoutexplanation,9U.S.C.10(a)(3)(formerly10(c))toan

arbitrationundertheLMRA),andwenotethatthecircuitsaredividedonthisquestion,

compareLippertTileCo.,Inc.v.IntlUnionofBricklayers,724F.3d939,948(7thCir.2013)

([LMRA]reviewsimplydoesnotincludeafreefloatingproceduralfairnessstandard

absentashowingthatsomeprovisionoftheCBAwasviolated.),withCarpenters46N.

Cal.Ctys.ConferenceBd.v.ZconBuilders,96F.3d410,413(9thCir.1996)(Although

deferencemustbegiventoanarbitratorsdecisionsconcerningproceduralissues,itis

generallyrecognizedthatthecourtsmayconsideraclaimthatapartytoanarbitration

hasbeendeniedafundamentallyfairhearing.).WhiletheLeaguedoesnotexplicitly

disputetheapplicabilityofthefundamentalfairnessstandardhere,italsodoesnot

contesttheAssociationsargumentsregardingfundamentalunfairness,andinstead

onlyarguesthattheCommissionersproceduralrulingsdidnotviolatethetermsofthe

CBA. Regardlessofwhichpositionweadopt,ourresultisthesame,andthusweneed

notdecidewhetherthefreefloatingproceduralfairnessstandardoftheFAAought

tobeimportedtoourreviewofarbitrationsconductedpursuanttotheLMRA.

28



29/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

In any event, the Commissioner did receive extensive1

testimony from Troy Vincent regarding the initiation of the2

investigation and its initial stages, and from Theodore Wells3

regardingthe

investigation

itself

and

the

preparation

ofthe

report.

4

Allofthisiscompoundedbythefactthatwheninitiallydenyingthe5

Associations request to call Pash, the Commissioner noted that6

shouldthepartiespresentevidenceshowingthatthetestimonyofa7

witness . . . isnecessary for a full and fairhearing,hewouldbe8

willing torevisit theNFLPAsmotion tocompel [the] testimony.9

SpecialApp.at64. TheAssociationneverrenewed itsobjectionor10

further pursued the issue. We thus conclude that the11

Commissionersdecision to exclude the testimony fits comfortably12

withinhisbroaddiscretiontoadmitorexcludeevidenceandraises13

noquestionsoffundamentalfairness.14

III. DenialofAccesstoInvestigativeFiles15

Thedistrictcourts thirdand finalground forvacatur is that16

Brady was entitled under the CBA to the interview notes and17

memorandageneratedby the investigative team fromPaul,Weiss,18

and that the denial of those notes amounted to fundamental19

unfairness. TheLeaguearguesthatthisisnotagroundforvacatur20

becausetheCBAdoesnotrequiretheexchangeofsuchnotes.21

Weagree. Article46specifiesthat[i]nappealsunderSection22

1(a), theparties shall exchange copiesof any exhibitsuponwhich23

they intend to rely. Joint App. at 346. The Commissioner24

reasonably interpreted thisprovision tonotrequiremoreextensive25

discovery. Significantly, the parties agreed in theCBA to permit26

morecomprehensivediscovery inotherproceedings,suchas those27

underArticle15,Section3,whichallowsreasonableandexpedited28

discoveryupon

the

application

ofany

party.

Special

App.

at65.29

The Commissioner further concluded that Brady was not30

deprived of fundamental fairnessbecause theCommissioner did31

notreviewanyofPaul,Weissinternalinterviewnotesoranyother32

29



30/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

documentsgeneratedbyPaul,Weissother than their final report,1

and theLeaguehad already produced all of theNFLdocuments2

considered by the investigators. Special App. at 65. The3

Commissionerpointed

out

that

the

Association

had

not

even4

identified anymaterial factual dispute that Paul,Weiss internal5

workproductwouldhelptoresolve. SpecialApp.at66.6

Inmaking these findings, theCommissionerwas,at thevery7

least,arguablyconstruingorapplyingthecontract,Misco,484U.S.8

at 38, andhe reasonably concluded thathewouldnot require the9

productionofattorneyworkproducthehadnotreliedon,oreven10

seen. Hadthepartieswishedtoallowformoreexpansivediscovery,11

theycould

have

bargained

for

that

right.

They

did

not,

and

there

is12

simplynofundamentalunfairnessinaffordingthepartiesprecisely13

whattheyagreedon.14

IV. AdditionalIssues15

Because the district court held that Bradywas deprived of16

adequatenoticeandfundamentalfairness,itdeclinedtoaddressthe17

Associations alternative grounds for vacatur. Although it is our18

usualpracticetoallowthedistrictcourttoaddressargumentsinthe19

first

instance,

we

choose

to

address

the

Associations

arguments

here20because theywere fullybriefedbelow andon appeal andbecause21

theyaremeritless. WesterbekeCorp.v.DaihatsuMotorCo.,304F.3d22

200,218(2dCir.2002). Accordingly,weturntothetworemaining23

argumentsadvancedonappealthat(1)theCommissionerdeprived24

Brady of fundamental fairness when he denied an evidentiary25

hearing on the claim that he delegated his authority to discipline26

Brady to Vincent in violation of the CBAs grant of exclusive27

disciplinary authority to the Commissioner, and (2) the28

Commissionerwas

evidently

partial

because

he,

rather

than

some29

neutralthirdparty,decidedthedelegationissue.1430

14Inafootnoteonthelastpageofitsbrief,theAssociationfaultstheLeagueforits

failuretoemploytestingprotocolstoensurefairandconsistentdiscipline.

AppelleesBr.62n.13. Weordinarilydeemanargumenttobeforfeited...whenitis

30



31/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

A. RefusaltoHearEvidenceonDelegation1

The Association contends that Brady was deprived of2

fundamental fairness when the Commissioner chose not to hear3

evidence on whether he improperly delegated his disciplinary4

authority to Vincent in violation of Article 46. The Association5

offered only twomeager pieces of evidence in support. First, it6

pointed to a press release inwhich theCommissioner noted that7

TroyVincentandhisteamwillconsiderwhatstepstotakeinlight8

of the [Wells] report. Joint App. at 1207. Second, it cited the9

disciplinary letter from the League announcing the fourgame10

suspension, which was sent and signed by Vincent instead of11

Goodell.

12

The Commissioner adequately explained that he did not13

delegate [his] authority as Commissioner to determine conduct14

detrimentalortoimposeappropriatediscipline. SpecialApp.at59.15

Rather, he concurred in [Vincents] recommendation and16

authorized him to communicate to . . .Mr. Brady the discipline17

imposedunder[theCommissioners]authority. SpecialApp.at59.18

Tellingly,theCommissionerwentontoremindtheAssociationthat19

this procedure ha[d] been employed in numerous disciplinary20

hearings over the past two decades and ha[d] neverbeforebeen21

assertedasabasisforcompellingtheCommissioneroranyoneelse22

totestify inanArticle46disciplinaryproceeding. SpecialApp.at23

62.24

We see no impropriety and certainly no fundamental25

unfairnessbecause theresolutionof thismatter fellwellwithin the26

broaddiscretionaffordedarbitrators. Andtheallegationlacksmerit,27

as the record is clear that the discipline imposed on Brady was28

pursuanttothe

Commissioners

authority,

which

iswhat

Article29

46 contemplates. Where a claim is faciallydeficient, an arbitrator30

onlyaddressedinafootnote,CityofNewYorkv.MickalisPawnShop,LLC,645F.3d114,

137(2dCir.2011),andholdlikewisehere.

31



32/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

maysummarilydismiss it,so longasdoingsodoesnotcontravene1

thecollectiveagreement. SeeSheldonv.Vermonty,269F.3d1202,12072

(10thCir. 2001).15 If it is seriouslybelieved that theseprocedures3

weredeficient

orprejudicial,

the

remedy

was

toaddress

them4

during collectivebargaining. Had thepartieswished tootherwise5

limit thearbitratorsauthority, theycouldhavenegotiated terms to6

doso.7

B. EvidentPartiality8

TheAssociations final contention is that theCommissioner9

wasevidentlypartialwithregardtothedelegationissueandshould10

have recused himself from hearing at least that portion of the11

arbitrationbecause

itwas

improper

for

him

toadjudicate

the12

proprietyofhisownconduct. Thisargumenthasnomerit.13

Wemayvacateanarbitrationawardwheretherewasevident14

partiality . . . in the arbitrator[]. 9U.S.C. 10(a)(2).16 Evident15

partiality may be found only where a reasonable person would16

have to conclude thatanarbitratorwaspartial tooneparty to the17

arbitration. ScandinavianReins.Co.v.SaintPaulFire&MarineIns.18

Co.,668F.3d60,64 (2dCir. 2012) (quotingApplied Indus.Materials19

Corp.

v.

Ovalar

Makine

Ticaret

Ve

Sanayi,

A.S.,

492

F.3d

132,

137

(2d20Cir.2007)). Thepartyseekingvacaturmustproveevidentpartiality21

by clear and convincing evidence. Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of22

Tartikov, Inc. v.YLL IrrevocableTr., 729F.3d 99, 106 (2dCir. 2013).23

However,arbitration isamatterof contract,andconsequently, the24

15Therecordstronglysuggeststhatthedelegationargumentwasraisedbythe

Associationinordertoprocureamorefavorablearbitrator. SeeJointApp.at1120(In

lightoftheabove,theNFLPAbelievesthatneitherCommissionerGoodellnoranyone

withclosetiestotheNFLcanserveasarbitratorinMr.Bradysappeal.). Partiesto

arbitrationhavenomorerightthanlitigantsincourttoforcerecusalsbyleveling

meritlessaccusationsagainstthedecisionmaker.16Asabove,wedonotpassonwhethertheFAAsevidentpartialitystandardapplies

toarbitrationsundertheLMRA. Becausethepartiesdidnotbriefthisissueand

becausetheresolutionofthiscaseisunaffected,weassumethatitdoes. Seesupranote

13.

32



33/36

Nos.152801(L),152805(CON)

parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than1

inheres in themethod theyhave chosen. Williams v.NatlFootball2

League,582F.3d863,885 (8thCir.2009);Winfreyv.SimmonsFoods,3

Inc.,495

F.3d

549,

551

(8th

Cir.

2007).4

Here, theparties contracted in theCBA to specificallyallow5

the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all disputesbrought6

pursuanttoArticle46,Section1(a). Theydidsoknowingfullwell7

that the Commissioner had the sole power of determining what8

constitutes conduct detrimental, and thus knowing that the9

Commissionerwouldhaveastakebothintheunderlyingdiscipline10

and ineveryarbitrationbroughtpursuant toSection1(a). Had the11

partieswished

torestrict

the

Commissioners

authority,

they

could12

havefashionedadifferentagreement.13

CONCLUSION14

For the foregoing reasons,weREVERSE thejudgmentof the15

districtcourtandREMANDwithinstructionsforthedistrictcourtto16

confirmthearbitrationaward.17

33



34/36

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square

New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE

CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: April 25, 2016

Docket #: 15-2801cvShort Title: National Football League Manag v. National

Football League Playe

DC Docket #: 15-cv-5916

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORKCITY)DC Docket #: 15-cv-5982

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK

CITY)

DC Judge: FrancisDC Judge: Berman

BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS

The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill ofcosts is on the Court's website.

The bill of costs must:* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;

* be verified;

* be served on all adversaries;* not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;

* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a

cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;

* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New

York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.



35/36

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square

New York, NY 10007

ROBERT A. KATZMANNCHIEF JUDGE

CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFECLERK OF COURT

Date: April 25, 2016

Docket #: 15-2801cvShort Title: National Football League Manag v. National

Football League Playe

DC Docket #: 15-cv-5916

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORKCITY)DC Docket #: 15-cv-5982

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK

CITY)

DC Judge: FrancisDC Judge: Berman

VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS

Counsel for_________________________________________________________________________

respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk toprepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the

________________________________________________________________

and in favor of

_________________________________________________________________________

for insertion in the mandate.

Docketing Fee _____________________

Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

Costs of printing brief (necessary copies ______________ ____) _____________________

Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies ______________ ) _____________________

(VERIFICATION HERE)



36/36

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Signature


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