BPC# 09-0008

OIG’s 2007 Annual Report Regarding Categorical Uses of Force

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December 23, 2008 BPC# 09-0008 1.0

TO: Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General, Police Commission

SUBJECT: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANNUAL CATEGORICAL USE OF FORCE REPORT

The attached is submitted for Board information. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has prepared this annual report detailing the findings of the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) relative to Categorical Uses of Force (CUOF) incidents reviewed during 2007, pursuant to paragraph 142 of the Consent Decree. This paragraph requires the BOPC to annually issue a public report detailing its findings regarding CUOF incidents. If you have any questions regarding this report, please feel free to contact me at (213) 202-5866. E-copy - Original Signature on File with the Police Commission ANDRÉ BIROTTE, JR. Inspector General Police Commission Attachment

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE


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INTRODUCTION

Consent Decree paragraph 142 requires the Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) to annually issue a public report detailing its findings regarding Categorical Use of Force (CUOF) incidents. Pursuant to this requirement, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has prepared this annual report (Report) detailing the findings of the BOPC relative to CUOF incidents reviewed during 2007.

STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CATEGORICAL USES OF

FORCE THAT OCCURRED IN 2007

The primary focus of this report is on incidents involving Categorical Uses of Force reviewed by the BOPC during 2007. However, the following data provide an overview of incidents involving Categorical Uses of Force that occurred during 2007. Similar data for the previous four years is included for comparison.1 The yearly total number of incidents involving Categorical Uses of Force remained relatively consistent, with 112 in 2003, 132 in 2004, 100 in 2005, 103 in 2006, and 106 in 2007. The following chart includes Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings in the total number of Categorical Uses of Force for comparison purposes.2

Categorical Use of Force Incidents, 2003-2007

1 Special Order No. 34, issued on October 12, 2005, deactivated the use of the term Law Enforcement Activity Related Death (LEARD) and provided for all incidents resulting in the death of an individual during an incident involving LAPD officers to be referred to as an In-Custody Death (ICD). Thus, for purposes of this report, all incidents previously referred to as a LEARD are included in the totals for ICD incidents. 2 On June 2, 2005, the United States District Court approved amendments to Consent Decree paragraph 13, which excluded Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings from the definition of Categorical Uses of Force. The definition of the term “Categorical Use of Force” currently means “all incidents involving the use of deadly force by an LAPD officer, except for non-tactical accidental discharges and animal shootings.” However, for comparison purposes, Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings are included in this chart.

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

2007 ANNUAL REPORT REGARDING

CATEGORICAL USES OF FORCE


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The following graph compares Officer Involved Shootings (OIS) with other types of Categorical Uses of Force. Other types of Categorical Uses of Force include law enforcement related injuries (LERI); in-custody deaths (ICD); carotid restraint control holds (CRCH)3; head strikes with an impact weapon (HS); and police canine contacts resulting in hospitalization (K9). The graph includes Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings in the total number of OIS incidents for comparison purposes. As depicted in the graph:

• Of the 112 CUOF incidents that occurred in 2003, 66 (59%) involved an OIS. • Of the 132 CUOF incidents that occurred in 2004, 82 (62%) involved an OIS. • Of the 100 CUOF incidents that occurred in 2005, 66 (66%) involved an OIS. • Of the 103 CUOF incidents that occurred in 2006, 64 (62%) involved an OIS.

In 2007, there were 106 incidents involving a CUOF. Excluding Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings, there were 83 incidents involving a CUOF. Of these 83 incidents, 54 (65%) involved an OIS where an officer intentionally discharged a firearm at a person. In addition, there were five incidents of Negligent Discharges and 18 Animal Shootings, for a total of 77 shooting incidents.

OIS Compared to Other Categorical Uses of Force, 2003-2007

3 Formerly referred to as “upper body control hold,” or UBCH.


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The following table illustrates the number of Categorical Use of Force incidents that occurred in 2007 by Bureau and Division.

OIS LERI ICD CRCH HS K9 Central Bureau:

Central 1 2 1

Hollenbeck 3 1 2

Rampart 2 2 1 1

Newton 4

Northeast 5 1 1

South Bureau:

77th Street 5 2 2 1

Harbor 1

Southeast 6 1 1 1

Southwest 3 1

West Bureau:

Hollywood 1 1

Pacific 3 1

West Los Angeles 1

Wilshire 2 1

Valley Bureau:

Devonshire 1

Foothill 1 1

Mission 6 1 1 North Hollywood 2

Van Nuys 3 2

West Valley 2

Outside the City 2

[THIS PORTION OF THE PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]


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OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS

In 2007, officers were involved in 54 shooting incidents, all of which occurred while the involved officers were on-duty. This figure of 54 does not include five Negligent Discharges and 18 Animal Shootings. By comparison, in 2003, officers were involved in 66 shooting incidents total, 59 of which occurred while the involved officers were on-duty and seven of which occurred while the involved officers were off-duty. This total includes eight Negligent Discharges and 14 Animal Shootings. In 2004, there were 82 shooting incidents, 76 of which occurred while the involved officers were on-duty and six of which occurred while the involved officers were off-duty. Six of the 82 shooting incidents were Negligent Discharges and 20 were Animal Shootings. In 2005, there were 66 shooting incidents, including six Negligent Discharges and 16 Animal Shootings, 42 of which occurred while the involved officers were on-duty and two of which occurred while the involved officers were off-duty. In 2006, there were 464 shooting incidents, 41 of which occurred while the involved officers were on-duty, and five of which occurred while the involved officers were off-duty. Suspects were shot in 27 incidents in 2003; 43 incidents in 2004; 29 incidents in 2005; 27 incidents in 2006; and 24 incidents in 2007. Of these, there were 14 suspect fatalities in 2003; 17 suspect fatalities in 2004; 11 suspect fatalities in 2005; 5 12 suspect fatalities in 2006; and 15 suspect fatalities in 2007. Officers were shot in two incidents involving an OIS in 2003; five incidents in 2004; two incidents in 2005; three incidents in 2006; and 2 incidents in 2007.6 No officers were killed in OIS incidents in 2003, 2005, 2006, or 2007. One officer was killed in an OIS incident in 2004. Also in 2004, there were a total of four bystanders hit by gunfire during three OIS incidents. In 2005, there was one bystander/hostage who was shot and killed in the course of an OIS incident.


4 This figure of 46 does not include eight Negligent Discharges and ten Animal Shootings. 5 In 2005, there were five incidents during which officers fired at suspects, but the suspects escaped. For these five incidents, it is unknown whether the suspects sustained any type of injury as a result of the officers’ gunfire. 6 This figure does not include officer injuries sustained in the course of Negligent Discharges or Animal Shootings.


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The following chart does not include Negligent Discharges or Animal Shootings in the total number of OIS incidents.

Officer Involved Shooting Incidents, 2003-2007

OTHER CATEGORICAL USES OF FORCE

Other (non-OIS) Categorical Uses of Force include ICDs, CRCHs, K9s, LERIs and HSs. Of the Categorical Uses of Force that occurred in 2003, 41% were non-OIS Categorical Uses of Force. These consisted of 14 ICDs, two CRCHs, six K9s, 11 LERIs and 13 HSs. Of the Categorical Uses of Force that occurred in 2004, 38% were non-OIS Categorical Uses of Force. These consisted of 14 ICDs, three CRCHs, one K9, 17 LERIs, and 15 HSs. Of the Categorical Uses of Force that occurred in 2005, 44% were non-OIS Categorical Uses of Force. These consisted of six ICDs, two CRCHs, 10 LERIs, 12 HSs, one incident involving both a HS and an ICD, two incidents involving both a HS and a LERI, and one incident involving both a HS and a CRCH. Of the 85 Categorical Uses of Force that occurred in 2006, not including Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings, 46% (39 incidents) were non-OIS Categorical Uses of Force. These consisted of 16 ICDs, four CRCHs, two K9s, and 13 LERIs, and four HSs. Of the 83 Categorical Uses of Force that occurred in 2007, not including Negligent Discharges and Animal Shootings, 35% (29 incidents) were non-OIS Categorical Uses of Force. These consisted of eight ICDs, one CRCH, one K9, 12 LERIs, and seven HSs.



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Other Categorical Uses of Force, 2003-2007



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CATEGORICAL USES OF FORCE REVIEWED BY THE

BOPC DURING 2007 During 2007, the BOPC reviewed 115 CUOF incidents.7 These consisted of 76 OISs (including 56 incidents where an officer intentionally discharged a firearm at a person, nine Negligent Discharges and 11 Animal Shootings); ten LERIs; five HSs; 19 ICDs; one K9; and four CRCHs.

Categorical Uses of Force Reviewed by the Commission in 2007

49%

9%

16%

1%

3%

4%

8%

10%

OIS - Person

LERI

ICD

Canine Contact

CRCH

Head Strike

Negligent Discharge

On-Duty Animal OIS

The BOPC reviews CUOF incidents for a) tactics, b) drawing, exhibition and holstering a firearm, and c) all involved uses of force. No “in policy” or “out of policy” finding is made in relation to tactics. However, a determination is made regarding the action warranted in relation to officers’ tactical performance. Officers’ tactics can be deemed to warrant “no action,” “divisional training,” “formal training” or “administrative disapproval.” For drawing/exhibition/ holstering, the BOPC determines whether the involved officers’ actions conformed to Departmental policy and issues a finding of “in policy” “in policy, divisional training,” “in policy, formal training” or “out of policy, administrative disapproval,” accordingly. For uses of force, the BOPC issues a finding of “in policy,” “in policy, divisional training,” “in policy, formal training,” “negligent,8 administrative disapproval” or “out of policy, administrative 7 Absent justification for tolling the statute of limitations for a particular incident, the BOPC has up to one year from the date of an incident to adopt findings regarding the appropriateness of the actions of the involved officer(s). The statute of limitations for an incident may be tolled for a limited number of reasons, including pending criminal investigation/prosecution and pending civil litigation. 8 On July 12, 2005, the Board of Police Commissioners accepted and filed the Department’s Report dated June 28, 2005, regarding the terminology for non-tactical discharges of firearms. This Report provided that a “discharge resulting from a violation of the (firearms) safety rules” shall be referred to as a “negligent discharge,” and “an unintentional discharge when all safety rules are followed, e.g., a mechanical breakdown of a weapon” shall be referred to as an “accidental discharge.”


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disapproval.” If a weapon was not drawn or no force was used, a finding of “does not apply” is made. Findings relative to canine contacts requiring hospitalization are either deemed “consistent with established criteria” or “not consistent with established criteria.” 9

TACTICS

Of the 115 CUOF incidents reviewed by the BOPC in 2007, 21% (26) resulted in a finding of no action for tactics for all officers involved; 46% (57) resulted in a finding of divisional training for tactics for at least one of the involved officers; 20% (24) resulted in a finding of formal training for tactics for at least one of the involved officers; and 13% (16) resulted in a finding of administrative disapproval for tactics for at least one of the involved officers. The 16 incidents that resulted in a finding of administrative disapproval for tactics involved the tactics of a total of 61 officers, 28 of whom received a finding of administrative disapproval. Those cases in which there was a finding of “administrative disapproval” for tactics are summarized below. Some of these cases may have also warranted a finding of administrative disapproval for drawing, exhibition and holstering a firearm and/or for use(s) of force, and, as such, will also be referenced in subsequent sections of this report.

OIS 010-06

On the morning of February 6, 2006, Police Officers A and B were conducting a stolen vehicle investigation, when Victim A approached them and informed Officer B that he had just been the victim of an attempted carjacking involving a male who had displayed a firearm.

Note: Officers A and B did not broadcast to Communications Division (CD) that they were investigating Victim A’s report of a man with a gun.

Officers A and B began to search the area for Subject 1. Approximately one to two blocks from their original location, the officers observed a male whom they believed matched the description of Subject 1. Officers A and B approached this person (Witness A), and received some identifying information from him. Victim A then approached Officers A and B and advised them that they had the wrong person.

Note: Officers A and B did not broadcast their location to CD when they encountered Witness A.

Officers A and B continued to search for Subject 1. As they did so, they noticed a man, later identified as Subject 1. This man matched the description of Subject 1 the officers had been provided with. Officer B remained seated in the driver’s seat of the police vehicle and used the door frame as

9 On August 5, 2008, the Board of Police Commissioners approved a policy revising the system by which categorical use of force incidents are adjudicated.


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cover. Officer A exited the police vehicle and took a position outside of the passenger door of the police vehicle. Both officers drew their service pistols, based upon the fact that they were contacting a possible man with a gun. Officer A ordered Subject 1 to face the wall of a building. Officer B also ordered Subject 1 to move up against the wall, face away from the officers, spread his legs, put his hands up above his head, and not move. Officer A then moved to a standing position behind the right front tire of the police vehicle. Officer B noted that Subject 1 continued to turn his head toward the officers in what Officer B believed was an attempt by Subject 1 to locate them. Officer B responded by issuing additional commands. Officer B then exited the police vehicle, and Officers A and B then began to approach Subject 1 on foot. Subject 1 then began to run on the sidewalk. Officer A chased Subject 1 by running parallel to him in a traffic lane. As Subject 1 was running, he removed a blue steel handgun from his waistband with his right hand and then turned toward Officer A. Officer A was fearful that Subject 1 was about to shoot him. Officer A slowed down, began to crouch and took aim at Subject 1. Officer A then fired two shots at Subject 1.

Note: Officer A indicated Subject 1 did not appear to be affected by the first round which struck a building. The second round struck Subject 1 in the left leg.

Officer A heard Subject 1 scream. However, Subject 1 continued to run away from the officers. Officer A continued to run parallel to Subject 1 on the street, using parked vehicles as cover. Officer A de-cocked his pistol and re-holstered it as Officer A ran. Subject 1 then turned and ran down a driveway. Officer A followed Subject 1 down the driveway. Meanwhile, Officer B parked the police vehicle in the roadway near the driveway, exited, re-drew Officer B’s service pistol, and followed behind Officer A.

Note: As Officer B ran down the driveway, he broadcast his location to CD. This was the first broadcast made by the officers regarding their investigation into the incident.

Subject 1 ran into in a confined area between a fence and a carport. Subject 1 then jumped over two large trashcans blocking his path. At that time, Officer A drew Officer his service pistol a second time, concerned that Subject 1 was still armed with a gun. As Officer A was chasing Subject 1, Officer A ordered Subject 1 to drop the gun and to stop. According to Officer A, as Subject 1 began climbing the fence, Subject 1’s head and gun turned toward him. Officer A once again believed that Subject 1 was about to fire at Officer A and in response, Officer A fired one round at Subject 1, missing Subject 1. Subject 1 scaled a fence and ran through the back yard of a residence. Officer A looked over the fence, saw Subject 1 running through the back yard, re-holstered his pistol, and followed Subject 1 over the fence. Officer B also re-holstered his pistol and climbed over the fence. However, the


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officers lost sight of Subject 1. Subject 1 was taken into custody following a search of the area by assisting officers.

The BOPC noted that Victim A advised Officers A and B that he was seated in his vehicle when Subject 1 approached and pointed a handgun at him. Although the officers were contacted by Victim A and provided with a detailed description of Subject 1, the BOPC noted that Officers A and B did not advise CD of their location or broadcast Subject 1’s description to units that were in the area who could assist in the search for him. The BOPC would have preferred that they had done so. Additionally, the BOPC noted that Officers A and B did not use sufficient resources before initiating their search to locate and confront a potentially armed subject. Officers A and B should have requested an additional patrol unit and air unit to assist with locating Subject 1 and provided CD with a description of Subject 1.

The BOPC further noted that in an effort to locate Subject 1, Officers A and B drove around and located a possible suspect. The officers exited their police vehicle, but did not advise CD of their location and status with the possible suspect. The BOPC would have preferred that they had done so. Although the circumstances of the detention warranted the use of the customary practice of searching/detaining an armed suspect (high-risk prone search) which is universally-recognized, Officers A and B approached Witness A with a conversational demeanor and conducted their questioning of Witness A without taking the desired tactical measures to enhance officer safety. The BOPC noted that as the officers were conducting their investigation, Victim A drove up to the officers and advised them that the individual they had detained was not the perpetrator. The officers drove on another street and observed Subject 1 walking on the sidewalk. Officers A and B once again failed to advise CD of their location and status with Subject 1. The BOPC would have preferred that they had done so. The BOPC also noted that Officers A and B both proceeded to issue verbal commands to Subject 1. Officers are trained that when multiple officers give commands, it may create confusion in the mind of a subject.

The BOPC noted that Subject 1 initially complied with the officers’ directive to turn and face his body away from them and place his hands above his head; however, they again did not use the customary practice of the high-risk prone search. Additionally, the BOPC noted that Officer B holstered his weapon and left cover to handcuff Subject 1, even after noting that Subject 1 was continuously looking around as if he was considering an escape route or an assault on the officers. The officers should have maintained their positions of cover and ordered Subject 1 into a high-risk prone position as warranted by the circumstances of the incident and considered waiting for sufficient backup to arrive before initiating contact.

The BOPC noted that as Officers A and B made their approach, Subject 1 ran down a street. Officers A and B initiated the foot pursuit without broadcasting their location, direction of travel, Subject 1’s description, or type of crime. The BOPC would have preferred that they had done


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so. The BOPC noted that as the officers ran after Subject 1, he turned his head, extended his right arm, and pointed a handgun toward Officer A. In immediate defense of Officer’s A life, Officer A fired two rounds at Subject 1. Subject 1 appeared to be unaffected by the rounds and continued to run eastbound on a street. The BOPC then noted that Officer A de-cocked and holstered his service pistol, and while using the parked vehicles as cover, pursued Subject 1 on foot. Simultaneously, Officer B returned to the police vehicle and followed Subject 1 and Officer A. The BOPC noted that Officer B, regardless of his proximity to the police vehicle, should have remained on foot with Officer A.

The BOPC noted that Officer B intended to use the vehicle to drive past Subject 1 and cut him off. This is a highly discouraged tactic because it inherently places the officers at a significant disadvantage by increasing the likelihood of a cross-fire situation, and it restricts the movement of the officer in the event the subject deliberately converges on the officer while still seated in the police vehicle.

The BOPC further noted that Subject 1 ran down a residential driveway. Officer A placed himself at a tactical disadvantage, as Officer A had neither cover nor concealment as Officer A closed the distance between Subject 1 and Officer A.

The BOPC noted that Officer A clearly initiated the foot pursuit with the intent to apprehend Subject 1. Once a reasonable amount of cover became unavailable, Officers A and B should have established a perimeter by directing responding units to specific perimeter positions to contain Subject 1.

The BOPC is critical of the tactics utilized by Officers A and B. The cumulative tactical errors and decisions by Officers A and B compounded to make their performance seriously deficient. The BOPC found Officer A and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval. The BOPC found Officers A, B, and C’s drawing of their firearms and Officer A’s use of lethal force to be in policy.

OIS 014-06

Officers A and B received a radio call of a domestic violence incident. Officers A and B were directed to meet Victim 1 at a public telephone. Officers A and B met Victim 1, who was speaking loudly in both English and Spanish. Officers A and B, who possess limited Spanish skills, determined that she had been Victim 1 of an assault by Subject 1.

Officer B asked Victim 1 for the exact location of the incident, and without warning she began walking on the sidewalk at a fast pace. Officers A and B, believing Victim 1 was leading them to a nearby area, followed her in their police vehicle. Officer B asked Victim 1 to specify the location, but she only pointed while continuing to walk at a fast pace.


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At one point, Officers A and B lost sight of Victim 1. Officers A and B made a U-turn, and, shortly thereafter, observed Victim 1. Victim 1 stopped in front of a yard surrounded by a metal fence, then dragged a plastic traffic barricade and placed it adjacent to the fence. Victim 1 climbed over the barricade and fence.

Officers A and B, stopped, exited their police vehicle, and immediately heard Victim 1 and Subject 1 yelling. Officer A stepped up on the barricade, looked over a fence and observed Victim 1 and Subject 1. Subject 1 had one arm around Victim 1’s neck while striking her in the head. Victim 1 was struggling with Subject 1 but unable to overcome his resistance. Officer A ordered Subject 1 to release his hold of Victim 1. Subject 1 refused and began dragging Victim 1 towards the rear of the yard.

Officer A, believing that Subject 1 was going to choke Victim 1, decided to climb over the fence. Officer B followed behind.

Officer B drew his service pistol in anticipation of an armed confrontation and used a flashlight to illuminate the yard. Subject 1 dragged Victim 1 to the open door of a residence within the yard and lifted Victim 1 off the ground by Victim 1’s underpants and pulled her inside. Subject 1 then turned off the lights inside the residence. Victim 1, while struggling to get away from Subject 1, was able to hit the light switch and turn the lights back on; but Subject 1 again turned them off. Subject 1 said in Spanish, “I am not going to let them take me” and armed himself with a knife.

As both officers approached the residence, they heard yelling coming from inside. Using the flashlight, both officers saw Subject 1 holding Victim 1 by the throat with one hand and punching her in the face with his other hand while yelling, “Shut up!” Victim 1 fought with Subject 1 while screaming, “Help me, help me.”

Officer A grabbed the door handle of the residence and discovered it was locked. Officer A drew his baton and wedged it behind the door handle in an attempt to pry it open. Officer B used his baton to break out the window on the door. Subject 1 ran over towards the door as Officer B reached inside to unlock the door. Seeing this, Officer B removed Officer B’s hand at which time Subject 1 turned and ran away out of sight. Officer B again reached inside the window and unlocked and opened the door.

Officer A entered the residence and observed Subject 1 running full-speed from the back of the residence towards Officer A. Subject 1 had his arms spread-apart wide and attempted to tackle Officer A. Subject 1 placed both of his arms around Officer A’s waist.

The officers began punching Subject 1 to free Officer A from the hold. Subject 1 appeared unaffected by the punches and became more violent as he yelled profanities while holding on to Officer A. Officers A and B decided to take Subject 1 to the floor in an attempt to place him in handcuffs.

While on the ground, Subject 1 bit Officer A’s left forearm. Officer A attempted to break free of the bite but was unable to do so. Subject 1 then began to pull on Officer A’s holstered service


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pistol. Officer B struck Subject 1 in the back of the head approximately five times with a closed fist. The strikes did not appear to affect Subject 1. Officer B considered shooting Subject 1 to prevent him from removing the pistol from its holster, but was unable to shoot Subject 1 without risking the safety of Officer A and Victim 1.

Officer A pushed Subject 1 away, who then began fighting with Officer B. Officer A sprayed oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray in Subject 1’s face. Subject 1 screamed loudly and continued fighting with Officer B.

Officer B, somewhat affected by the OC spray, was able to push the emergency/help button on his radio while attempting to pull Subject 1 towards the door. Subject 1 then bit Officer B on his left forearm. Officer B was able to pull his arm away as both officers continued to pull Subject 1 towards the doorway, causing the three of them to fall onto the dirt. Officer A broadcast a help call.

While on the ground, Subject 1 bit down on Officer B’s right pinky finger. At the same time, both officers were able to stand. Officer B continued to struggle and was subsequently able to free his finger.

Using both hands, Subject 1 then grabbed Officer B’s holstered service pistol in what appeared to be an attempt to disarm Officer B. Officer B yelled to Officer A, “[Subject 1’s] got my gun! […] Shoot him!”

Officer A drew his service pistol, pointed it at Subject 1, and fired one round, striking Subject 1 in the upper body. Subject 1 released his hold of Officer B’s pistol/holster, clutched his chest and collapsed. Officer B then handcuffed Subject 1, broadcast “Shots fired,” and requested a rescue ambulance.

The BOPC noted that upon contacting Victim 1, Officers A and B immediately recognized a language barrier existed. Officers A and B should have requested a Spanish-speaking officer to respond to their location and obtain the pertinent information related to the incident.

Officers A and B did not take control of the situation and instead allowed Victim 1 to dictate their response to this incident. Officers A and B followed Victim 1 as she walked approximately one-half mile from their location without knowing where she was actually going, which limited the ability to prepare tactically and ensure the appropriate response to the incident.

As a result, Officers A and B allowed Victim 1 to come close to Subject 1, at which time Subject 1 immediately assaulted her and dragged her into a locked residence. Without providing an updated location to CD and requesting assistance, Officers A and B placed themselves in a situation where a violent and life-threatening physical altercation occurred in an isolated location unknown to CD or other on-duty personnel.

Officers A and B placed a premium on their need to respond to the assault on Victim 1 rather than their sense of safety and therefore severely limited their tactical advantage over Subject 1 and access to additional Department resources.


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The BOPC found Officer A and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval.

The BOPC found Officer A’s drawing to be in policy. The BOPC noted that, immediately upon Officer A entering the residence, Subject 1 attempted to tackle Officer A. Subject 1 was unsuccessful in knocking Officer A down and became involved in a fistfight and violent struggle with both officers. At one point, Subject 1 turned his aggression away from Officer A and began attacking Officer B. Officers A and B successfully forced Subject 1 to the ground in an attempt to handcuff him. This resulted in Subject 1 biting the forearm of Officer A.

Subject 1 attempted to disarm Officer A by removing Officer A’s service pistol from its holster. Officers A and B successfully prevented the disarmament by delivering a series of punches and strikes to the head and body of Subject 1. Officer A removed Officer A’s canister of OC and sprayed Subject 1 in the face. The use of OC appeared to have an adverse impact on Officers A and B rather than on Subject 1.

During a subsequent struggle, Subject 1 violently bit the pinky finger of Officer B, which resulted in it being fractured.

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s non-lethal use of force to be in policy, warranting formal training. Finally, the BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to be in policy.

OIS 030-06

Detective A and Officer A were conducting a narcotics investigation. The detective and officer, who were wearing plain clothes, established an observation post to observe a location where narcotics dealing was suspected – a motor home parked in the street. From the OP they observed an apparent narcotics transaction occur. Detective A and Officer A followed, contacted, and arrested the buyer for possession of rock cocaine. Detective A and Officer A then transported the buyer to jail. Detective A and Officer A later returned to the area of the motor home and parked their plain police vehicle directly in front of it. Detective A and Officer A used their vehicle’s mirrors to observe the motor home directly behind them. Detective A and Officer A did not broadcast to CD that they were at the location. Detective A and Officer A then observed Subject 1 arrive at the motor home in a truck. Officer A exited the passenger side of the police vehicle and exposed his police badge hanging from a chain around his neck. Detective A exited the driver’s side of the vehicle. As he approached Subject 1, Officer A identified himself as an LAPD officer and instructed Subject 1 to show his hands. Subject 1 then began to put his hands out to the side. Officer A attempted to grab Subject 1’s hand when Subject 1 punched Officer A on the right side of his head. Subject 1 punched Officer A again on the back of his head, although Officer A attempted


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to duck the punch. Subject 1 then turned and ran from Officer A. Meanwhile, Detective A observed a second occupant in the truck that Subject 1 had arrived in. Detective A ordered that person out of the truck, but then joined Officer A in a foot pursuit of Subject 1. Officer A requested that Detective A broadcast that the officers were in foot pursuit. As they chased Subject 1, the officers left the person in the truck behind them. As the foot pursuit continued, Officer A repeatedly yelled commands at Subject 1 to stop. Subject 1 failed to adhere to these commands. At one point, Officer A could not see Subject 1’s hands. Officer A drew his service pistol and commanded Subject 1 to lay on the ground. Subject 1 continued to run, and Officer A re-holstered his pistol. Detective A caught up to Subject 1 and, with his radio in hand, attempted to tackle Subject 1. However, Detective A’s attempt failed and he, Officer A, and Subject 1 became involved in a struggle. During the struggle, Subject 1 bit Officer A and hit Officer A in the head an additional two times. In response, Officer A delivered a punch to Subject 1’s head. Officer A removed the radio from Detective A’s hand and retreated a short distance away from the struggle. Officer A realized the radio was programmed to the wrong frequency. Officer A re-programmed the radio to the correct frequency and broadcast a help call. Following the broadcast, Officer A re-engaged in the struggle. Officer A attempted to gain control of Subject 1’s arms by utilizing a twist lock or joint lock. As they moved, Officer A again attempted to broadcast two additional help calls. Subject 1 punched Officer A in the back of the head again. Officer A took a position behind Subject 1 in an attempt to wrap his arms around Subject 1. Due to the subject’s size, Officer A had a difficult time wrapping his arms around Subject 1. Subject 1 then backed along the sidewalk with Officer A behind him, causing Officer A to collide with a gate. Subject 1 stepped forward and back again, ramming Officer A into the gate at least three times. Detective A grabbed Subject 1’s legs to pull Subject 1 to the ground. The officers and Subject 1 then went down to the pavement. Officer A fell on top of Subject 1 and Detective A fell slightly offset from Officer A. Once on the ground, Officer A felt a hand going towards his gun. Detective A then noticed that Subject 1 was holding his pistol. Detective A stated, “He has my gun.” Subject 1 then pointed the gun at Officer A’s neck. Officer A grabbed the top frame of the pistol in Subject 1’s hand with his right hand. Detective A grabbed the slide/barrel area of the pistol. Officer A and Detective A were able to move the barrel of the gun away from Officer A’s head. However, during the continued struggle, Subject 1 kept trying to point the gun toward Officer A. Officers B and C heard the help call and responded. Officers B and C observed the struggle on the sidewalk and recognized the two officers struggling with Subject 1 on the ground. Officer B realized that Subject 1 had a pistol in his right hand. Officer B ran towards the struggle.


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Officer B noticed that the gun being held by Subject 1 was pointed in his direction and Subject 1 had his finger on the trigger. Officer B drew his pistol because he felt that Subject 1 was going to shoot him. Officer B ordered Subject 1 to drop the gun, but Subject 1 did not comply. Fearing that he, Detective A, Officer A, Officer C, and/or members of the public were going to be shot by Subject 1, Officer B fired one round at Subject 1’s face, striking him. Meanwhile, Officer C ran towards the struggle. Officer C noticed that Officer A appeared to be dazed. As Officer C was about to join the struggle, he heard someone say, “gun, gun, gun.” Officer C began to look for a gun. He saw a hand holding a gun and other hands trying to point the gun towards the ground. At the time, the gun was parallel to the ground with the muzzle pointed towards Officer C and his partner. Officer C drew his pistol. The only target Officer C believed he had available without risking injury to the other officers was Subject 1’s head. As such, he fired one shot at Subject 1’s head. Officer C then noticed that Subject 1 stopped moving and he re-holstered his pistol. Officer A and Detective A were able to take control and remove the pistol from Subject 1’s hand. Officers G and H heard the gunshots, but did not see who fired. Officer H drew his service pistol and held it at a low ready position toward the crowd that had formed in the area. Officer H ordered the crowd back. Detective A instructed Officer G to handcuff Subject 1. Detective A and Officers C and H assisted. Officer A realized that he was missing his pistol. Later, Officer A noticed his pistol on the ground. The BOPC noted that Detective A and Officer A opted to conduct a narcotics investigation without the assistance of additional officers, while not knowing if there were additional suspects inside of the motor home. While operating with only two officers proved to be accomplished safely during the initial arrest, their subsequent contact with Subject 1 presented a situation that could not be safely carried out with only two officers. The BOPC noted that it would have been tactically advantageous for Detective A and Officer A to request at least two additional officers to assist with the narcotics investigation.

Detective A and Officer A did not advise CD of their location and status, or advise CD of their surveillance activities while conducting their investigation at the initial location. It would have been tactically safer for Detective A and Officer A to advise CD of their status and to initiate a formal narcotics complaint investigation prior to conducting their investigation. The BOPC was also concerned that Detective A and Officer A’s initial broadcasts did not indicate that they were in plainclothes.

The investigation revealed that Detective A and Officer A parked their vehicle directly in front of the motor home while observing activity directly behind them. While this rear observing


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tactic is commonly utilized during surveillance operations, maintaining distance between the observation post and the motor home would have been tactically safer.

Officer A did not carry a radio with him as he exited from their vehicle to confront Subject 1. It would have been tactically safer for both Detective A and Officer A to maintain a radio, allowing more immediate and effective communications. In addition, the BOPC was concerned that Detective A’s radio was programmed to a frequency that was not monitored by CD at the time of the incident.

Officer A and Detective A approached Subject 1 from opposite sides. This approach created a potential crossfire. This also created a barrier, resulting in Detective A not being able to see Officer A as Subject 1 physically assaulted him and began running away. It would have been tactically safer for the officers to maintain better tactical positioning with one another and primarily focus their attention on Subject 1. The BOPC would have also preferred that Detective A and Officer A had worn raid jackets in order to ensure their identification as police officers.

Officer A decided to draw his service pistol while in foot pursuit of Subject 1, given that he was unable to see Subject 1’s hands as he fled. Although it appears that Officer A reholstered his pistol shortly after drawing it, the BOPC was concerned that Officer A was running with his pistol in his hand for some period of time.

As Subject 1 ran, Detective A tried to tackle him. A preferred tactic in this scenario would have been for Detective A to attempt to push Subject 1 from the rear, placing him off balance in order to avoid injury from going to the ground during a tackling motion. It would have been preferable for Detective A to have had both hands free when he engaged Subject 1.

Both Detective A and Officer A lost their weapons during the altercation. Weapon awareness and retention is a critical officer safety concern.

The BOPC was critical of Detective A and Officer A’s lack of planning and poor decision making during this incident. Detective A and Officer A failed to identify the need for and request additional resources throughout this incident. After having made the initial arrest at the location, Detective A and Officer A returned to effect another arrest on a previously-observed male suspect of substantial size, without first requesting additional officers to assist.

The BOPC found Detective A and Officer A’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval and formal training. The BOPC found Officers B and C’s tactics to be appropriate.

The BOPC noted that Officer A believed that Subject 1 was arming himself with a handgun and drew his service pistol. Once Subject 1 faced forward again and continued running, Officer A holstered his service pistol and continued pursuing him.


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Upon Officers B and C’s arrival at the help call, they observed Detective A and Officer A fighting with Subject 1 on the sidewalk. Officers B and C observed Subject 1 holding a pistol in his hand while pointing it at Detective A and Officer A. Officers B and C approached the struggle and drew their service pistols, believing that the situation had risen to the level where deadly force was necessary.

Officer H arrived as the shots were being fired. Officer H was initially unsure of the origin of the gunshots and drew his service pistol, believing that deadly force may become necessary. After observing that Subject 1 was no longer a threat, Officer H holstered his service pistol.

The BOPC determined that Officers A, B, C and H had sufficient information to believe that the situation may necessitate the use of deadly force and found Officers A, B, C and H’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that Detective A unsuccessfully attempted to tackle Subject 1 from behind. Officer A then joined the altercation and grabbed Subject 1’s arms and torso. As Subject 1 continued to struggle to get away from Detective A and Officer A, he swung his fists, striking Officer A on his head. Subject 1 also bit Officer A on both arms. Officer A again grabbed Subject 1’s upper body with both hands to control his arms. Subject 1 rammed Officer A against a gate. Simultaneously, Detective A grabbed Subject 1’s legs. Ultimately, Detective A and Officer A were able to bring Subject 1 to the ground in a continued effort to detain him.

Subject 1 fell to the sidewalk on his back. Detective A and Officer A observed Subject 1 holding Detective A’s service pistol. Both Detective A and Officer A were able to grab Subject 1’s hand and push the pistol downward several times. Subject 1 continued to overpower Detective A and Officer A and pointed the pistol directly at Officer A’s neck and face.

The BOPC determined that Detective A and Officer A were initially attempting to effect an arrest on Subject 1 for assaulting Officer A. Subject 1 fled from Detective A and Officer A, and continuously used force against them to prevent them from detaining him. Detective A and Officer A reasonably believed that Subject 1 presented an immediate threat of bodily injury.

The BOPC found Detective A and Officer A’s use of non-lethal force to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that, upon Officers B and C’s arrival, they observed Detective A and Officer A struggling with Subject 1 on the sidewalk. Officers B and C feared for their and the other officers’ lives, as Subject 1 pointed the pistol at them. Officers B and C had no other portion of Subject 1’s body to fire upon to stop his actions due to Detective A and Officer A lying on top of him in an effort to control him and prevent the gun from being pointed at them.

There were various witness accounts regarding the time frame from the firing of the first gunshot to the second. The BOPC noted that the preponderance of the evidence supported the determination that both rounds were fired very close in time to one another. Given that four


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officers indicated that Subject 1 was holding a gun in his hand and that this account was supported by at least three independent witnesses, the BOPC believes that the totality of the available evidence supports the officers’ actions. The BOPC determined that Officers B and C reasonably believed that Subject 1 presented an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death and found Officers B and C’s use of lethal force to be in policy.

OIS 032-06

On the evening of May 13, 2006, Officers A and B responded to a call reporting the presence of armed gang members near an intersection. Officers A and B did not find any evidence of the gang members near that intersection, however, and they left. In the meantime, Police Officers C and D also decided to respond to the broadcast. Officers C and D observed approximately eight to ten individuals standing, drinking, and listening to music in front of a residence. The officers communicated their observations to one another and decided to contact the group.

Officer D angled his police vehicle toward the group and began to come to a stop. Just before Officer D stopped the vehicle, Officer C slightly opened the passenger’s side door in preparation to quickly exit the vehicle. As he did so, he observed two males (Subject 1 and Subject 2) start to back away and separate themselves from the group. Holding his flashlight in his left hand, Officer C exited the vehicle as Officer D brought the vehicle to a stop. Meanwhile, Subject 1 and Subject 2 both backed up, away from the street, and moved along the driveway next to the residence. The subjects faced Officer C as they moved away from him. Officer C pursued Subjects 1 and 2 on foot. As he did so, Officer C saw Subject 1 remove a handgun from his waistband. He also noticed Subject 2 reaching toward his waistband. Officer C then drew his weapon in response as he continued the pursuit. Officer C then yelled to Officer D, “Partner, gun.” and he yelled to Subjects 1 and 2, “Stop. Put your hands up.” Subjects 1 and 2 then both turned around, facing away from Officer C, and ran further along the driveway. Officer D turned off the engine of his police vehicle and exited the vehicle. He then began to run after the subjects and his partner. As he continued his pursuit, Officer C noticed that Subject 2 was still moving his right arm as if he was attempting to retrieve an object from his waistband. Subject 1 then began turning toward Officer C. While aiming his pistol at Subject 1, Officer C observed Subject 2 turning toward him as well. Officer C also observed that Subject 2 had drawn a handgun and was pointing it in his direction. Officer C fired one round at Subject 2. Subject 2 screamed and threw his handgun away.


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Subjects 1 and 2 then fell to the ground. Officer C commanded Subject 2 to stop moving and to show his hands. Subject 1 then rose to his feet and ran away. Meanwhile, Officer D caught up to Officer C’s location. Officer C informed Officer D that Subject 1 had fled the area. Officer C then holstered his weapon and placed Subject 2 into handcuffs. Officer D broadcast a help call using his radio. Prior to doing so, Officer D ran to the front of the residence in order to verify the address where he and Officer C were located. In response to these requests, a perimeter was established and officers from the Department’s K-9 unit arrived at the scene to search for Subject 1. Operations South Bureau Gang Unit Officers E and F arrived at the scene around this time. Officer C directed Officers E and F to follow him back into the rear yard in order to locate the weapon that Subject 2 had thrown away. Upon seeing a handgun in the alley behind the residence, Officer C asked Officers E and F to stand guard over it. Additional officers responded to the scene. Subject 1 was located and taken into custody without further incident.

The BOPC noted that Officers C and D did not sufficiently discuss or prepare for potential tactical eventualities associated with their specific assignment. Officers C and D were not regularly assigned partners and needed to discuss applicable tactical considerations before engaging in field activities. This practice elevates performance and enhances the likelihood of making sound tactical decisions.

Officers C and D responded to a radio call of a gang group. The initial call stated that there were 40 gang members congregated with handguns in their waistbands. This type of call warrants consideration into requesting an air unit to assist in locating the group and providing a situation report to the officers. This information would have assisted Officers C and D in formulating an appropriate tactical plan. Additionally, consideration should have been given to advising CD of their status in the area. This would have made nearby units aware of their location and created the circumstance wherein they could more rapidly respond if needed.

When driving to the scene, Officers C and D observed a group in front of a residence. Officer D positioned the police vehicle directly in front of the potentially armed group. It would have been tactically safer for the officers to stop prior to the group and deploy on foot after broadcasting their location and requesting an additional unit to respond.

The BOPC noted that it appears that Officer C acted independently when he immediately exited the police vehicle and pursued Subjects 1 and 2. Officer C did not communicate his intentions to Officer D. Additionally, Officers C and D ran past the remaining members of the group, who were also potentially armed and posed a viable threat to the officers. There was no tactical communication between Officers C and D to coordinate their actions to address the fleeing suspects and those that remained in the group.

After Officer C saw that the two suspects were armed with handguns, he continued to engage in the foot pursuit. Officers are not to engage in a foot pursuit of an armed suspect. Officer C


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should have moved with adequate cover and established a perimeter by directing responding units to specific perimeter positions. Additionally, Officer C ran with his service pistol in his hand, increasing the likelihood of a negligent discharge.

After the shooting occurred, Officer C approached Subject 2, de-cocked and holstered his service pistol and handcuffed Subject 2. It would have been tactically safer for Officer C to maintain the role of cover officer while Officer D approached and handcuffed Subject 2. The BOPC also noted that Officer D was not sure if he had his service pistol drawn at the time Officer C approached Subject 2, essentially creating a circumstance in which no weapon was drawn to provide Officer C cover.

Officer D then ran to the front of the residence to confirm their location in order to broadcast a “help” call. The BOPC is concerned that the officers were unaware of their specific location and unable to provide responding units with an accurate location, potentially delaying a response in the event the circumstances did not provide the opportunity to confirm their location.

Officers E and F arrived in response to the “help” call. Officer C led Officers E and F to the alley behind the garage, where he observed Subject 2 throw his gun. Once the pistol was located in the alley, Officers E and F stood guard near the gun. Officers E and F remained until Sergeant A provided them with further direction to photograph the firearm and properly secure it in a police vehicle.

A tactically safer action would have been to continue perimeter integrity, keeping personnel out of the area that had not yet been cleared. Upon the arrival of the K-9 officers, they could more effectively conduct a search of the perimeter with a properly configured and equipped search team.

Finally, the BOPC noted that Officers C and D did not carry their batons on their equipment belt during the incident. The officers are reminded that batons are a significant equipment item to be carried at all times when conducting police activities.

The BOPC found Officers C and D’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval, and Officers E and F's tactics to warrant divisional training.

The BOPC found Officers C and D’s drawing of a firearm and Officer C’s use of lethal force to be in policy.

OIS 033-06

In the early morning hours of May 15, 2006, off-duty Officer A was wearing plainclothes and was sitting inside his personal vehicle parked in front of his residence. Officer A noticed a Lexus motor vehicle with its headlights off pass by him twice, and then saw the Lexus parked at the corner of two neighborhood streets, close to his residence. Officer A then saw Subject 1 on the passenger side of his (Officer A’s) vehicle, shaking the handle of the right front passenger door. Officer A also heard metal clicking sounds against the door window. Officer A noticed that Subject 1 had what appeared to be gloves and a metal


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object in his hands. Officer A believed that Subject 1 was attempting to burglarize his vehicle. Officer A drew his service pistol and exited the vehicle. Officer A identified himself as a police officer and told Subject 1 to get down on the ground. As Subject 1 moved toward Officer A with a metal object in his hand, Officer A fired one warning shot into a dirt embankment behind Subject 1 in order to stop Subject 1 from advancing. After that, Subject 1 complied and lay down on the ground. Officer A noticed Subject 1 moving his hands in and out from underneath his body. Officer A instructed his son, who came out onto the balcony of their home, to call the police and to come down and assist. Officer A’s son did as Officer A had instructed him. Meanwhile, the Lexus passed Officer A once again. This time, the Lexus stopped in the middle of the roadway, close to Officer A's position. Subject 2 exited the Lexus and approached Subject 1. There, Subject 2 attempted to convince Subject 1 to get up and leave. Subject 2 also argued with Officer A, questioning Officer A’s status as a police officer. Officer A believed that both subjects were trying to distract Officer A by being verbally aggressive toward him. Officer A instructed his son to retrieve his LAPD identification from inside his vehicle. Officer A then passed the identification card to Subject 2. Subject 2 said she did not believe that Officer A was a police officer. Officer A then retrieved his ID card from Subject 2. Meanwhile, three additional subjects walked toward Officer A’s position and formed a semi-circle around Officer A and Subject 1. The subjects were verbally aggressive with Officer A and demanded that Officer A allow Subject 1 to leave. At one point, Subject 2 approached Subject 1, took a screwdriver from his hands, and walked back toward the Lexus. While waiting for the police to arrive, Officer A instructed his son to retrieve a set of handcuffs and a tape recorder from his vehicle. Officer A’s son did so and handed the items to Officer A. Police officers arrived a short time later and all five subjects were arrested for attempted burglary. The BOPC noted Officer A’s observation of the Lexus’ actions substantiated reasonable suspicion and warranted the response of the local law enforcement agency to conduct an investigation. However, Officer A delayed informing the local law enforcement agency about his observation. Officer A was seated inside a vehicle with a pistol on his lap. Officer A should be reminded that while off-duty, all weapons should be concealed out of public view and carried in a secured manner. Officer A left a position of advantage behind his vehicle and closed the distance between himself and Subject 1. Officer A’s actions left him vulnerable to an attack. Following the officer-involved shooting, Subject 1 complied with Officer A's verbal commands to lie on the ground. Officer A asked his son to assist him in his detention of Subject 1. The BOPC was concerned with Officer A's decision to involve his son in a potentially volatile situation. This caused Officer A to split his attention between Subject 1 and the safety of his son.


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The group of Subject 1’s accomplices formed a semi-circle and yelled at Officer A, who attempted to engage them in conversation as a distraction technique. It is apparent that Officer A’s technique was ineffective and Officer A should have reverted to his training and displayed command presence to control the approaching group. Officer A also approached Subject 1 and used his body weight to control him while his weapon was drawn. The BOPC is concerned about this decision, as it potentially created a situation where Subject 1 could have engaged Officer A in a struggle over his weapon. Finally, the BOPC noted during Officer A's attempt to identify himself, Officer A allowed Subject 2 to come within arm's reach, placing himself at a tactical disadvantage. The BOPC found Officer A’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval. The BOPC found Officer A’s drawing of a firearm, use of non-lethal force, and use of lethal force to be in policy.

OIS 034-06

On the evening of May 15, 2006, a male called CD from a public telephone to report that a group of males was loitering and selling narcotics in an alley. The male further indicated that a member of the group, who he described, had a gun in his waistband. CD assigned the call to Officers A and B. Officers A and B responded to the call location. Officer A, who was driving the police vehicle, then turned off the vehicle’s headlights before turning into an alley. Officer A stopped the police vehicle at a T-intersection where the group was reportedly located. Officer B informed CD that his unit was at the call location. Officer A used the police vehicle’s spot lamp to illuminate the alley. When he did so, the officers saw a group of three to five people in the alley. A member of the group (Subject 1), whom the officers observed to match the description of the armed suspect provided by the caller, ran away, jumping over a wall into a residential yard. Officer A told his partner that they needed to get to the front of the residence in question. Leaving the spot lamp shining down the alley, Officers A and B left their vehicle and ran along the street, toward the residence. Officer A ran ahead of Officer B. As Officer A approached, he encountered Subject 1 at the front of the residence. According to Officer A, when he encountered Subject 1, Subject 1 was sitting in a chair on the driveway of the residence. Officer A described Subject 1 as breathing heavily. According to Officer A, as he approached Subject 1, he could see a pistol protruding from Subject 1’s waistband. According to Officer A, Officer A drew his service pistol and instructed Subject 1 to stand up, put his hands on his head and get down on his knees. Subject 1 stood up and raised his hands, but then ran back toward the alley. Officer A then broadcast a request for “back-up,” providing his location.


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Officer A told Officer B that Subject 1 was running towards the alley, and to “contain the other side of the alley.” As Officer B went back toward the entrance to the alley, Officer A began to move through the driveway and yard of the residence where Subject 1 had fled. Subject 1 scaled a wall at the rear of the residence and ran into the alley. Officer A, who could hear Subject 1 running, looked over the wall and saw Subject 1 fleeing. Officer A heard Officer B coming around the corner, had Officer B in his line of sight, and yelled to him that Subject 1 had a gun. Officer A holstered his service pistol and scaled the wall. Once in the alley, Officer A re-drew his service pistol and began to chase Subject 1. Officer A then reached for his radio, intending to broadcast Subject 1’s direction of travel, but found that the radio was no longer in its holster. Officer A then drew his flashlight. As Officer A continued to follow Subject 1 in the alley, he saw Subject 1 grasping the pistol in his waistband, turn and look in Officer A’s direction several times, then draw the pistol from his waistband. As Officer A ran, he saw Subject 1 point the weapon towards him. Officer A responded by firing two rounds in rapid succession at Subject 1. Officer A observed no effect from these rounds, and, seeing that Subject 1 was still pointing his pistol in his direction, came to a halt and fired a third round. When the third round was fired, Officer A saw Subject 1 throw his pistol over a gate, into a residential yard. Having thrown the gun, Subject 1 continued to flee. Officer A lost sight of Subject 1 for a couple of seconds, maneuvered around the corner, and saw Subject 1 running across the street. Officer A gave verbal commands to Subject 1 to stop and raise his hands, and Subject 1 began to slow down and raise his hands. Officer A heard and observed the lights from the responding police vehicles, re-holstered his service pistol and tackled Subject 1 from behind, taking him to the ground. Officer A then handcuffed Subject 1 without further incident. Meanwhile, moments after he heard Officer A say, “He has a gun,” Officer B heard two gunshots. Upon hearing the shots, Officer B turned back to see where Officer A was, but found that Officer A was no longer in sight. Realizing that Officer A needed help, Officer B toward Officer A’s direction. Subject 1 was handed off to a responding unit by Officer A. The BOPC noted that Officer A and Officer B deployed in the alley from a tactically advantageous position, illuminated the potential suspects with their vehicle's spotlight, and, anticipating that Subject 1 would emerge on the street, left the vehicle's spotlight on before running to the street. This tactic created the illusion that additional police personnel were present, reducing the likelihood that Subject 1 would double back. The BOPC further noted that, although the decision to effectively contain Subject 1 was appropriate, neither officer broadcast a request for an air unit or additional units to respond. It would have been tactically prudent to broadcast a request for a perimeter and to direct responding units to specific perimeter locations. The broadcast should also have included the officers' location, the subject's description, and direction of travel, and the type of crime.


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When Officer A encountered Subject 1 and observed that Subject 1 had a gun, it would have been preferable for Officer A to advise Officer B that Subject 1 was in possession of a handgun and that it was concealed in his waistband. Officer A broadcast a back-up request. The broadcast should have included a request for an Air Unit; should have provided responding units with information regarding the suspect's description and direction of travel; and should have indicated the type of crime involved, that Subject 1 was armed with a handgun, and specific perimeter locations for units to respond to. Officer A then instructed Officer B to return to the police vehicle and occupy that position on the perimeter. After having instructed Officer B to return to the police vehicle, Officer A should have returned to the mouth of the alley and directed the first responding unit to the side of the perimeter. From these positions and behind sufficient cover, Officer A and Officer B would have been in line of sight and in a position to render immediate aid. That this tactic would have provided the officers with coverage of three of the four sides of the perimeter and would have required Subject 1 to travel the distance of the long block before the arrival of the first unit to defeat the containment efforts. Based on the need for a balance between those tactics that provide a sufficient likelihood that a suspect will be apprehended and those that afford an officer an appropriate level of safety, the BOPC was critical of Officer A's decision to follow an armed subject through unfamiliar territory. Officers are not to engage in a foot pursuit of an armed subject unless there is adequate cover to continue the pursuit with the intent of monitoring the subject's progress to better establish a perimeter. The BOPC also noted that officers should not split-up during a foot pursuit and are strongly discouraged from doing so. As Officer A pursued Subject 1 in the alley, Officer A reached for his radio, only to discover his radio holder was empty. At this point, Officer A should not have remained in foot pursuit. Officer A was unaware of Officer B's location and was knowingly without radio communication, which minimized the ability of Officer B and responding units to readily assist Officer A. According to Officer B, at the time of the officer-involved shooting, Officer B was running back to the police vehicle and that, upon hearing shots fired, turned to visually locate Officer A, last observed standing on the sidewalk. When Officer B observed that Officer A was no longer there, Officer B ran back to locate Officer A. The BOPC was critical of Officer B's decision to not immediately broadcast a "Help" call. After the officer-involved shooting, Officer A continued after Subject 1 with his service pistol in one hand and his flashlight in the other. Running with a firearm in hand can increase the chance of having an unintentional discharge, and that officers should have their firearms holstered when involved in a foot pursuit. At no time between the officers’ initial separation and Subject 1 being taken into custody was either officer in a position to render immediate aid to the other. The BOPC was particularly concerned that the officers separated when they knew that multiple subjects were in the vicinity, including at least one who was seen to be armed.


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There were inconsistencies between the accounts of the involved officers, and an apparent inconsistency between Officer B’s account and broadcasts made during this incident. As a result of these inconsistencies, some of the details of the officers’ performance cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, the available evidence shows that the officers separated, that they did not make appropriate broadcasts, and that they did not meaningfully attempt to orchestrate a perimeter. Finally, Officer A did not take his baton with him when he left the police vehicle, and his pistol was not loaded to capacity. The BOPC found Officers A and B's tactics to warrant administrative disapproval. However, the BOPC found Officer A's drawing, non-lethal use of force, and lethal use of force to be in policy.

OIS 039-06

While driving to a radio call, Officers A and B heard gunshots. Officer B drew his service pistol and held it at a low ready position as they drove in the direction of the gunshots. An oncoming vehicle, driven by Subject 1, approached the officers from the opposite side of the street at a high rate of speed. Attempting to stop the vehicle, Officer A activated the police vehicle’s forward facing red light and steered into the oncoming vehicle’s path. The vehicle drove around the police vehicle. Meanwhile, Officer B broadcast to Communications Division (CD) that the officers needed back up. Officer A turned to follow the speeding vehicle. A short vehicle pursuit ensued. The vehicle eventually slowed and Subject 1 exited and fled on foot along an alley. Subject 2, the passenger, attempted to exit the vehicle but became entangled in the seatbelt.

Note: According to Officer A, during the pursuit he told Officer B to broadcast that they were in pursuit of “a shooting vehicle, ADW [Assault with a Deadly Weapon] suspects.”

Officer A ran after Subject 1, who attempted to climb a fence. Officer A drew his service pistol and ordered Subject 1 to stop. Subject 1 stepped back from the fence and pointed a handgun towards Officer A. Officer A responded by firing two rounds at Subject 1. Officer A had slowed from a run to a walk by the time he fired the rounds. Officer A took cover behind a telephone pole. Officer A peeked around the pole and saw Subject 1 running. Officer A re-holstered his service pistol and continued to follow Subject 1. Meanwhile, Officer B exited the police vehicle. Officer B observed Subject 2 exit the vehicle and run. Officer B re-holstered his service pistol and initiated a foot pursuit of Subject 2. Officer B heard gunshots from the alley, which caused Officer B to abandon the foot pursuit, redraw his service pistol, and proceed in the direction of the gunshots. As Officer B entered the alley, Officer B saw Officer A running. Officer A instructed Officer B to return to the police vehicle as the keys were still in the ignition and the windows were open.


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Shortly thereafter, an Air Unit arrived over the scene. Responding units established a perimeter of the area; however, Subjects 1 and 2 were not apprehended. The BOPC noted that, after hearing numerous gunshots, Officer A drove the police vehicle in the direction of the gunshots. The BOPC noted that Officers A and B observed a vehicle accelerate to a high rate of speed away from the gunshots. Officer A believed that the vehicle was associated with the gunshots and drove into the opposing lanes to force the vehicle to stop. The BOPC noted that, although this is generally not a recommended tactic, the alternative, passing the vehicle, created a circumstance where the officers would have been more significantly exposed to potential gunfire from the fleeing vehicle.

When Officer B broadcast that back-up was needed, it would have benefited the responding units had the broadcast included the fact that shots had been heard, a description of Subject 1’s vehicle, and the desired direction of travel for the responding units.

The vehicle sped past the officers and that Officer A initiated a vehicle pursuit. Officer B’s broadcast to Communications Division omitted pertinent information regarding the vehicle pursuit, such as a description of the subject’s vehicle, the reason for the initiation of the pursuit and a request for a back-up or air unit.

Subjects 1 and 2 exited the still-moving vehicle and fled in different directions. Officers A and B went in different directions to pursue the subjects and lost sight of one another, which created a situation where they were unable to render immediate aid to one another and were unaware of each other’s location at the time of the officer-involved shooting. Poor communication between the involved officers resulted in substantially compromised tactics. It was incumbent upon Officer A, who was functioning as a Field Training Officer, to effectively coordinate the tactical response.

Officers are taught that a vehicle remains a viable threat and should be cleared before the initiation of a foot pursuit of a fleeing subject. However, Officer A initiated a foot pursuit of Subject 1 without first clearing the vehicle. It would have been tactically advantageous to clear the vehicle to ensure that there were no additional subjects inside, and to direct responding units to establish a perimeter.

Subject 1 continued to run after the officer-involved shooting occurred and Officer A, with the knowledge that Subject 1 was armed, left cover and continued to pursue Subject 1. Officers should not attempt to follow a subject who is reasonably believed to possess a firearm unless the surroundings provide a reasonable amount of cover to allow the officers to move from one position to another. Officer A should have established a perimeter with the intent of apprehending Subject 1 with a coordinated and systematic search of the area.

Officers A and B both engaged in foot pursuits of Subjects 1 and 2, but that neither officer broadcast that they were in foot pursuit, the location of the foot pursuit, nor the subjects’ descriptions.


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Officer A did not remove the keys from the police vehicle prior to engaging in the foot pursuit, resulting in the police vehicle being left unattended in the roadway with the windows down and the keys in the ignition, vulnerable to theft. Officer A left his baton in the police vehicle and did not carry a collapsible baton.

The BOPC found Officer A’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval and Officer B’s tactics to warrant formal training. The BOPC noted that Officer B, believing that an armed confrontation was imminent and that the situation could escalate to necessitate the use of deadly force, drew the service pistol while seated in the police vehicle. Officer B held the service pistol in a one-handed low ready position along the outside of Officer B’s right leg and holstered it once the pursuit was initiated.

When Subject 1’s vehicle stopped, Subject 2 exited. In anticipation of confronting armed subjects, Officer B drew the service pistol a second time. After Subject 1’s vehicle drove away, Officer B drew the service pistol a third time and holstered it as he engaged in a foot pursuit of the passenger.

Upon observing a possible shooting suspect flee from the subject’s vehicle, run down an alley, and attempt to climb over a fence, Officer A, in fear of an armed confrontation with the subject, drew his service pistol.

The BOPC determined that Officers A and B had sufficient information to believe their incidents could escalate to the point where deadly force may become necessary. The BOPC found Officers A and B’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that that Officer A ordered Subject 1 down off of the fence and that Subject 1 initially complied, but then pointed a handgun at Officer A. In immediate defense of Officer A life, Officer A fired two rounds in rapid succession from the service pistol at Subject 1 from a distance of approximately 83 feet. The BOPC determined that Officer A reasonably believed that Subject 1 presented an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of lethal force to be in policy.

OIS 097-06

Officers A and B and Detective A were driving in an unmarked police vehicle, fitted with emergency lights and sirens. Officer A was driving, Officer B was in the front passenger seat, and Detective A was in the rear passenger seat. The officers and detective were wearing raid jackets and had their Department badges displayed on their belts. The officers observed a group of males crossing the roadway outside of any designated crosswalks. Officers A and B noticed that the group of males forced traffic on the roadway to


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brake in order to avoid running into them. Officer A recognized one of the individuals, Subject 1, as a possible suspect in a homicide investigation. Officer A also knew that Subject 1 was a member of a local street gang. The group of males reached the opposite side of the roadway and continued to walk in the roadway. Officer A decided to initiate contact with the group and “chirped” the police vehicle’s siren to get their attention. He also put his hand out and made a “stop” motion toward the group. Officer A observed Subject 1 stop walking at this point. Officer A stopped the police vehicle near a limousine that was parked along the curb. Officer B then directed Subject 1 and the other three individuals with him to move onto the sidewalk and face away from the officers. The three individuals who were with Subject 1 complied with Officer B’s commands. Meanwhile, Officer B observed Subject 1 duck down behind the parked limousine. Detective A and Officers A and B then exited their police vehicle. Officer B walked toward the rear of the parked limousine while Officer A moved toward the front of the limousine. Officer B then observed that Subject 1 had repositioned himself by placing his back up against the wall of a store, still facing the officers. Officer B also observed Subject 1 angle his body slightly away from the officers, raise his hands above his shoulders, and then drop his hands to his waistband. Officer B told Subject 1 not to place his hands near his waist, but Subject 1 continued to raise and drop his hands and lift his shirt up. When he noticed that Subject 1 was not obeying his commands and reaching toward his waist, Officer B drew his service pistol. At this time, Detective A and Officers A and B observed Subject 1 begin to run along the sidewalk. Officers A and B ran after Subject 1 while Detective A stayed with the other three subjects. Detective A lost sight of Subject 1 and Officers A and B remained on the sidewalk in order to guard the remaining subjects.

As he pursued Subject 1, Officer A ordered Subject 1 to stop and to put his hands up. Subject 1 moved his hands toward his hip area and Officer A drew his service pistol. Meanwhile, Subject 1 ran into a lot and through an open bay door into a building situated on that lot. As Subject 1 ran, he removed his jacket and dropped it to the ground. Officer A entered the lot and took cover behind some vehicles that were parked outside of an open bay door. Officer B also entered the lot and ran past Officer A, toward the open bay door. As Officer B was just about to enter the building, he saw Subject 1 reaching toward the side of his body and grabbing hold of a handgun that was tucked into his waistband. Subject 1 then pulled out the handgun and angled himself so that he was facing toward Officer B. In response, Officer B fired four rounds at Subject 1. Subject 1 then turned and continued running through a short hallway into another room within the building. Officer B ran after Subject 1, stopping at the edge of the short hallway. Officer B then carefully maneuvered around the corner of the hallway in order to relocate Subject 1. Officer B observed Subject 1 near a doorway along the side of the building. The doorway led


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into a rear yard behind the business where a number of vehicles were parked. Officer B then saw Subject 1 turn, bringing his arm across the front of his body and his shoulder back toward Officer B. Officer B fired one more round at Subject 1. Around this time, Officer A joined Officer B at the edge of the small hallway inside the building. Officers A and B then saw Subject 1 run into the rear yard, and they followed behind him. Meanwhile, from the sidewalk, Detective A heard shots being fired. Detective A told the three subjects to get down on the ground. She then returned to the police vehicle and retrieved a radio from the backseat. One of the three subjects then fled the location. Detective A broadcast a help call, indicating that shots had been fired and identifying the officers’ location. Detective A then went into the building through the bay doors, drawing a service pistol before entering. As Officers A and B neared the exit of the business, Officer A observed a loaded revolver lying on the ground. In the rear yard, Officer B saw Subject 1 standing on the far side of one of the vehicles parked in the yard, and then he saw Subject 1 going down to the ground at that location. Officer B heard Subject 1 screaming, “You shot me. I’m shot.” Officers A and B approached Subject 1. Officer B observed that Subject 1 no longer had a gun in his hands. Officer A then used his radio to broadcast his location, and to request backup and a supervisor. Officer B then went to handcuff Subject 1, but then realized that he did not have his handcuffs with him. Officer B asked Officer A for his handcuffs, then re-holstered his weapon and handcuffed and searched Subject 1. Officer A broadcast a request for a rescue ambulance (RA).

The BOPC noted that observed four males slowly walking across the roadway, causing vehicles to brake in order to avoid colliding with them. As their police vehicle neared the pedestrians, Officers A and B recognized one of the pedestrians as Subject 1, a documented gang member that had been implicated in a homicide that was still under investigation. However, Officers A and B did not disseminate the above crucial information to Detective A before they initiated their pedestrian stop, thereby placing the detective at a tactical disadvantage.

Detective A and Officers A and B also detained Subject 1 and his three companions without appropriately notifying CD of their status and location. Officer A used the siren to gain the attention and compliance of the suspects in the roadway, which demonstrated that there was time to make the appropriate notification to CD.

The BOPC determined that Officer A’s failure to notify CD of the officers’ status and location was most appropriately viewed as administrative disapproval because Officer A has previously been directed to training regarding this issue.

The pedestrians were ordered to face the wall and all complied except Subject 1, who clutched his waistband as he ran. Officers A and B immediately pursued Subject 1. Detective A repositioned on the sidewalk to simultaneously monitor the actions of Officers A and B and the remaining three subjects.


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Officers A and B initiated a foot pursuit without either of them or Detective A broadcasting their location, direction of travel, the subject’s description or the type of crime suspected.

The BOPC noted that Officers A and B initiated a foot pursuit of Subject 1, who they reasonably believed to be armed, leaving Detective A with the three subjects that were neither searched nor handcuffed. Officers A and B’s decision to initiate a foot pursuit resulted in a situation where Detective A was tactically compromised and where Officers A and B would have been unable to render assistance if this had become necessary. In applying the Department’s standard on separation, officers are considered split up when either their distance is so great from one another, or barriers exist that would unreasonably delay the ability to assist a partner officer. In the event that partners become separated, they must be able to maintain voice or radio contact. The BOPC noted that Detective A attempted to maintain a line of sight with Officers A and B, but the foot pursuit created a circumstance where Detective A was unable to see Officers A and B, or to verbally communicate with them. Detective A’s radio was in the police vehicle, further limiting Detective A’s ability to communicate with Officers A and B.

The BOPC considered the fact that officers are trained, when working three to a car, that the responsibility of the third officer is to not engage in the foot pursuit but to assist by establishing containment. In this instance, the tactic was inappropriately applied because Detective A was left alone with three subjects. The BOPC recognized the inadvertent application of the containment tactic and determined that the separation concerns would best be addressed through additional training.

Officers A and B made sound decisions during the foot pursuit. As Subject 1 ran into the open business, Officer A followed while using parked vehicles as cover. Upon making entry to the building, Officer B observed Subject 1 running toward an open doorway. Subject 1 proceeded to remove a handgun from his waistband and turned his body toward Officer B. Officer B fired four rounds at Subject 1. Subject 1 continued running through the doorway and out of the officers’ sight.

After the first sequence of fire, Officer B carefully maneuvered around the corner of the doorway and observed Subject 1 running toward an open bay door leading to a rear yard. Subject 1 then turned his torso and pointed his handgun at Officer B. Officer B fired one round.

Meanwhile, back on the sidewalk, Detective A maintained control of the three additional subjects and ensured they did not follow the path of the foot pursuit. After the first sequence of fire, Detective A appropriately ordered the three subjects to the ground. One of the subjects failed to comply with her commands and fled.

The BOPC found Officer A’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval, and Detective A and Officer B’s tactics to warrant formal training.

The BOPC found Detective A and Officers A and B’s drawing and Officer B’s use of force to be in policy.


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OIS 111-06

Detective A was driving home in his privately owned vehicle, dressed in sweatpants, a tee shirt and a sweatshirt. He was not wearing or displaying any items that would have made him readily recognizable as a police officer. As he attempted to make a turn at an intersection, Detective A was cut-off by a vehicle that failed to stop for a red tri-light traffic signal. Detective A had to abruptly apply his vehicle’s brakes in order to avoid a collision. As he applied his brakes, Detective A also honked his vehicle’s horn.

The vehicle in question had four to six occupants. Several of the occupants responded to the honk by yelling expletives and making obscene finger gestures and what Detective A believed to be gang signs. Detective A formed the opinion he was dealing with a group of gang members and responded by yelling an obscene remark through the open window of his vehicle.

Detective A sped up to get away from the vehicle and its occupants. He looked over his shoulder as he was pulling away and observed one of the occupants throw what appeared to be a full can of beer at his vehicle. The can did not strike his vehicle. At that point, Detective A reached down and started looking for his cellular telephone in order to call for assistance.

As Detective A prepared to use his telephone, the vehicle pulled up alongside his vehicle. In order to protect himself, Detective A removed his service pistol from a holster that was under a bag on his front passenger seat. Because of a slow moving vehicle to his front, Detective A had no readily available avenue of escape. The occupants of the vehicle were still yelling expletives at Detective A. Detective A pointed his pistol toward the passenger door just below the window jam. Apparently having observed the detective’s pistol, the occupants of the vehicle ducked and the vehicle swerved and accelerated away.

Detective A called the Area Detective Desk and reached Police Service Representative (PSR) A. Detective A informed PSR A of his circumstances and requested assistance from area police officers. Detective A advised PSR A of his location, provided a description of his vehicle, the other vehicle and its occupants, and a brief narrative of the type of crime he believed had been committed. PSR A relayed this information to Department patrol personnel who began to respond to Detective A’s location.

According to Detective A, his intention was to safely trail the vehicle and serve as a witness until patrol personnel arrived on scene. Detective A attempted to maintain a distance between his vehicle and the vehicle he was following. Detective A lost sight of the vehicle several times. Detective A believed that the distance he had created would make the occupants of the vehicle feel less threatened and provide him with a margin of safety.

Detective A continued to follow the vehicle as it drove into a residential area and stopped in front of a residence. The stop caught Detective A by surprise, and he stopped his vehicle. Several of the vehicle’s occupants exited. One occupant (Subject 1) went to the front porch area of the residence, bent over, and retrieved a holster that contained a revolver.


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As this was unfolding, Detective A determined he was at a tactical disadvantage and needed to create space between himself and the subject. Detective A then saw Subject 1 walking towards him with the handgun. With his own handgun still in his hand, Detective A attempted to shift his vehicle into reverse. Detective A inadvertently placed the vehicle in neutral and was unsuccessful in attempting to back up.

Meanwhile, Subject 1 removed the handgun from its holster and fired one round at Detective A. The round penetrated the front of Detective A’s vehicle and disabled it. Fragments resulting from the round’s impact struck Detective A, causing a minor abrasion to his wrist.

Detective A exited his vehicle and, standing behind the open driver’s door of his vehicle, fired six successive rounds at Subject 1 who, still holding the handgun and looking back over his shoulder at Detective A, was now running away. None of the rounds fired by Detective A struck Subject 1.

With his vehicle now disabled, Detective A abandoned it and took cover behind a pickup truck parked at the curb.

As Detective A was awaiting the arrival of Department personnel, Witnesses 1 and 2 walked out of the residence and asked Detective A if he was the police. Detective A replied with an expletive.

Department personnel arrived and a perimeter was established. Subject 1 was subsequently located and detained.

The BOPC noted that Detective A observed a vehicle that failed to stop for a red tri-light traffic signal. In order to avoid a traffic collision, Detective A applied his brakes and simultaneously honked his vehicle horn. When Detective A’s vehicle was adjacent to the vehicle, its occupants yelled expletives, made obscene hand gestures and displayed what he believed to be gang signs. Detective A responded by yelling an obscene remark through the open window of his vehicle.

The BOPC noted that Detective A’s confrontational demeanor escalated the situation. Directly following the verbal dispute, the occupants of the vehicle proceeded to throw items at Detective A’s vehicle. Detective A accelerated past the vehicle, retrieved his cellular phone and called directly to the Area Detective Desk. Detective A spoke to PSR A, identified himself and reported his status and location. The BOPC noted that phoning the Area Detective Desk was problematic as PSR A was not equipped with a radio and could only broadcast over the police station’s internal intercom. Detective A should have called 911, which would have put him in contact with a police dispatcher and prevented any delay in dispatching help to the detective.

As Detective A continued driving, the vehicle accelerated and pulled up alongside the passenger side of his vehicle. Detective A drew his service pistol that was secured in a holster concealed underneath a bag on the front passenger seat, extended his arm across his passenger seat and pointed the service pistol toward the passenger door just below the window jam. It was evident the occupants of the vehicle observed Detective A’s service pistol as the vehicle immediately


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swerved away from Detective A’s vehicle and accelerated while all of the passengers ducked down.

Once Detective A deemed the immediate threat was over, he placed his pistol under his leg. It would have been safer had Detective A secured his service pistol back in its holster, thereby minimizing the risk of a negligent discharge.

Detective A followed the vehicle. It would have been tactically prudent for Detective A to have stopped his vehicle, allowed the subjects to continue forward and waited for the arrival of responding personnel.

Detective A then observed the vehicle parked in the roadway. Detective A immediately stopped his vehicle, and three individuals, including Subject 1, exited. Detective A retrieved his service pistol from underneath his leg and observed Subject 1 run to the front porch of a residence. Subject 1 crouched down with his back to Detective A as if retrieving something. Subject 1 then stood up and walked directly toward Detective A while holding a holstered handgun in his hand. Detective A attempted to place his vehicle in reverse; however, he attempted to simultaneously manipulate the gear shift and hold his service pistol. Operating a motor vehicle with a service pistol in hand could increase an officer’s chance of having a negligent discharge.

As he placed his foot on the gas pedal, he heard his engine rev and believed that he had inadvertently placed the vehicle in neutral rather than reverse. The BOPC was concerned that Detective A remained in his vehicle once he observed Subject 1 advancing toward him with a handgun. Detective A should have exited his vehicle and prepared for a potential confrontation with an armed subject.

The BOPC was highly critical of Detective A’s apparent inability to control his emotions as the incident unfolded. As a police officer, he failed to remain objective and tactically assess the situation. He determined the subjects were possible gang members and observed a minimum of four occupants. At every intersection he made a conscious decision to continue to follow the subjects without resources such as a partner, vest, handcuffs, radio, or less lethal options.

The tactical errors made by Detective A compounded to make his performance seriously deficient. The BOPC found Detective A’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval. The BOPC noted that, after avoiding a traffic collision with a vehicle, the vehicle’s occupants threw items at the detective’s vehicle and displayed what he believed to be gang signs. Detective A attempted to accelerate away; however, simultaneously an uninvolved vehicle in front of him unintentionally blocked his avenue of escape and the vehicle approached on the passenger side of his vehicle. Fearing the subjects may again throw items at his vehicle, and feeling he had no avenue of escape, Detective A drew his service pistol.


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The BOPC noted that Detective A became involved in a road rage incident with possible gang members wherein he was a victim of an assault; however, the BOPC did not believe that the items thrown at him constituted a deadly weapon. In addition, the BOPC determined that Detective A’s failure to properly assess the situation and his alternatives led to the unnecessary and premature drawing of his service pistol. The BOPC concluded that Detective A’s basis for drawing his service pistol was not reasonable and that there was insufficient information to believe the situation may escalate the point where deadly force may become necessary.

The BOPC found Detective A’s drawing to be out of policy, warranting administrative disapproval.

The BOPC found Detective A’s use of lethal force to be in policy. HS 112-05

Officers A and B responded to a motel to attempt to locate Subject 1, who had an outstanding felony warrant. Officers A and B parked their marked police vehicle in an alley near the motel and took a position behind a tall cinderblock wall that separates the alley from the motel parking lot. From that position, the officers were able to observe the motel and parking lot.

The officers observed some pedestrian and vehicular activity, but did not see Subject 1. Then, Officer B spotted a vehicle Stratus drive into the motel parking lot and park in a stall in the corner of the parking lot. Officer B was able to see over the cinderblock wall and noted that there was a female driving the vehicle (Witness 1), and a male sitting in the front passenger seat (Subject 2).

Officer B watched as Witness 1 exited the vehicle and walked into the motel office. According to Officer B, a few minutes later, Subject 2 exited the vehicle and walked toward the center of the parking lot. Officer B stated that Subject 2 was wearing a hooded sweatshirt and baggy clothing. Officer B could not see Subject 2’s face. Officer B believed Subject 2 to be suspicious, due to the way he was wearing the hood over his head and looking around the parking lot, as if he was “casing.” Officer B also noted that it was his understanding that this motel was a hangout for local gang members. Based upon the officer’s knowledge of the motel, the fact that the officers were looking for a felony warrant suspect, and the suspicious activity of Subject 2 including Officer B’s belief that Subject 2 was “a gang member type,” Officer B informed Officer A that he thought they should go see who the subject wearing the hooded sweatshirt was.

Officers A and B decided to approach Subject 2 to identify him. Officers A and B approached the vehicle on foot. Officer A indicated that he drew his pistol as he was walking and held it down by his side, given that Subject 2’s attire resembled gang attire and he believed that gang members are commonly armed.

According to Officer B, a van was parked next to the vehicle. He peered around the front of the van and noted a silhouette of an individual inside the passenger seat of the vehicle. Officer B walked to the rear of the van, drew his service pistol and held it down towards his side. Officer B drew his pistol because he believed he had reasonable suspicion that Subject 2 was a gang


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member, the motel was a known narcotics and gang location, Subject 2 was suspicious based upon the way he was dressed and his actions in walking around the parking lot, and Officer B could not see Subject 2’s waistband or inside the vehicle.

Officers A and B then approached the rear of the vehicle with Officer B in the lead. Officer B walked toward the passenger side of the vehicle while Officer A stayed at the driver-side rear of the vehicle to cover the driver side of the vehicle.

Officer B walked towards the passenger door of the vehicle and then used his flashlight to illuminate the interior of the vehicle. As soon as he did so, Subject 2 jumped out of the front passenger seat and stated, “It’s not me officer. It’s not me. It’s not me.” According to Officer B, Subject 2 was no longer wearing his hood. As soon as Subject 2 exited the vehicle, Officer A recognized him as a person Officers A and B knew was wanted for attempted murder. Officer A informed Officer B of Subject 2’s identity. According to Officer B, Subject 2 rushed him and Subject 2 used both of his hands to attempt to push past Officer B. As Subject 2 pushed, Officer B was able to grab onto Subject 2 with his left arm, while he used his right hand still at his side holding his pistol. Officer B attempted to control Subject 2 so that he could re-holster his pistol. After a few seconds of struggling with Subject 2, Officer B was able to re-holster his pistol. Officer B then used a bear hug technique and took Subject 2 to the ground.

Subject 2 landed prone on the ground or slightly on his side. Officer B also fell into a prone position, on top of Subject 2’s back. According to Officer B, Subject 2 had both of his hands underneath his body near his waistband area. Officer B then focused on gaining control of Subject 2’s hands, which were still underneath Subject 2’s body. Officer B was able to gain control of Subject 2’s right hand and bring it out from underneath his body. According to Officer B, the entire time Officer B and Subject 2 were on the ground, Subject 2 was attempting to buck Officer B off by pushing his body up and attempting to get onto his feet.

Because Subject 2 was thrashing around so violently and kicking his legs, Officer A used his ASP collapsible baton (ASP) in its closed state and hit Subject 2 on the legs four to five times. Officer B then focused his attention on Subject 2’s left arm. According to Officer B, he reached with his left hand underneath Subject 2’s body and grabbed hold of Subject 2’s left hand. Officer B stated that Subject 2’s left hand was in a fist. Officer B used his hand to feel over Subject 2’s left hand. According to Officer B, he could feel a hard/solid object, which he believed to be a gun, in Subject 2’s left hand.

Officer B told Officer A, “He’s got a gun.” Officer B believed that Subject 2 was trying to get to his feet to arm himself. Officer B tried to push Subject 2 to the ground using his body weight. Officer B then released his hold on Subject 2’s left hand.

Believing that Subject 2 was attempting to get a gun out and use it on him or his partner, Officer B indicated that he believed that lethal force was justified. According to Officer B, the only


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body part that was exposed was Subject 2’s head. As such, Officer B hit Subject 2 on the head three times with his pistol.

Having heard his partner yell “gun,” Officer A moved up to a position where he was able to assist Officer B in controlling Subject 2’s arms. Officer B focused on controlling Subject 2’s right arm while Officer A focused on controlling the left arm. Officer A indicated that he attempted to pull Subject 2’s left hand from underneath his body but was unable to do so. Instead, Officer A used his body weight to hold Subject 2’s left arm down against the ground.

Officers A and B held Subject 2 to the ground until the arrival of backup officers. Officers C, D, E, and F arrived at the motel. Officer A yelled out to the backup officers that Subject 2 had a gun. Officer F arrived and grabbed Subject 2’s left arm, relieving Officer A. Officer E arrived, placed his knee and shin on Subject 2’s shoulder, and took control of Subject 2’s right arm using firm grips, relieving Officer B. Officers C and D controlled Subject 2’s legs using bodyweight. Officers A and B, both tired from the struggle, disengaged while Officers E and F handcuffed Subject 2.

Searches of Subject 2 and of the area of the incident were conducted and no gun was found. However, a cellular telephone, a marijuana pipe, and a cigarette lighter were all found in the immediate area where Subject 2 had been prone on the ground. A set of keys was discovered a short distance away.

The BOPC noted that the intent of Officers A and B was to monitor the motel to determine if Subject 1 was at the location. If Subject 1 was seen at the motel, the officers intended to request an additional unit and a supervisor to affect the arrest. The officers devised a plan; however, they did not adhere to it. Officers A and B could have maximized their ability to take Subject 2 into custody without incident by waiting for an additional unit before taking action. In addition, the BOPC would have preferred that the officers had notified a field supervisor or the watch commander of their intentions, in the event that their activities evolved into a tactical situation.

The BOPC noted that although Officer B did not initiate the contact between Subject 2 and himself, the BOPC would have preferred that Officer B re-holstered his pistol prior to taking hold of Subject 2. This would minimize the potential for a negligent discharge as well as reduce the likelihood of losing control of the weapon to a suspect.

The BOPC noted that Officer B utilized a one-man takedown and Subject 2 fell to the ground in a prone position with both hands concealed underneath his body. Officer B landed on top of him, and as he attempted to retrieve Subject 2’s left hand, Officer B felt what he believed to be a handgun and communicated this information to Officer A. Officer B relinquished this hold on Subject 2’s left hand. The BOPC is concerned that Officer B did not maintain control of Subject 2’s left hand, when he knew that Subject 2 was wanted for attempted murder and he believed Subject 2 was holding a handgun in his left hand. The BOPC noted that during the struggle, Officer A requested “help” via CD. As responding officers drove into the parking lot, they did not see a black and white police vehicle, nor did they see Officers A and B. Believing Officers A and B were possibly inside one of the rooms, the officers began to walk toward the motel, until they were redirected by a citizen to the corner of


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the parking lot. In a situation where location is not readily apparent, broadcasting an exact location is vital should the incident deteriorate and additional assistance is required.

The BOPC was concerned that Officer B yelled out “He’s got a gun” to his partner when Officer B could not confirm that Subject 2 was actually armed with a gun. When Officer A heard the unconditional statement, “He’s got a gun” and saw Subject 2 and Officer B struggling, Officer A may have decided it was necessary to utilize lethal force, given that Officer B had identified an unconditional lethal threat. Given that other officers are entitled to rely on the information provided to them by their partners, officers must always be careful about identifying a lethal threat until they are reasonably sure that one exists. Notably, in addition to Officer B advising Officer A that Subject 2 was armed, Officer A used that information and informed the arriving backup officers that Subject 2 had a gun. Several of the officers that arrived to assist Officers A and B heard an officer say that Subject 2 had a gun or may have a gun. This information, which proved to be false, could also have led one of the backing officers to use lethal force. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer B had informed Officer A that he felt a hard object or that Subject 2 may be armed, rather than calling out, “He’s got a gun.” The BOPC was concerned that a pistol was used as an impact device. Even if lethal force was justified under the circumstances, utilizing a pistol as an impact weapon poses several tactical concerns. First, the risk of a negligent discharge increases dramatically. Second, the risk that the subject could take the pistol away from the officer increases substantially. Third, the risk of the pistol becoming inoperable and useless should it need to be fired increases as well. Thus, the BOPC would have preferred that Officer B had not utilized his pistol as an impact weapon. The BOPC noted that Officer B walked between two parked cars when initially approaching Subject 2, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. Given that Officer B recognized the possibility of (1) a subject exiting the vehicle unexpectedly and (2) a subject exiting the vehicle and posing a threat to Officer B, the BOPC was concerned that Officer B nevertheless decided to walk between the two parked vehicles in a confined space and approach the passenger door of the vehicle with his pistol drawn. Doing so not only closed the distance between Officer B and any potential danger, but it also placed him in an extremely confined area wherein he had very little room to maneuver or re-deploy. Moreover, Officer B placed himself in this tactically disadvantageous position while still holding his service pistol. The combination of these factors seriously limited Officer B’s force options and also increased the chance of danger to himself should he be attacked in such a confined area. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer B had maintained a position of advantage and a position of cover behind the vehicle next to the vehicle. From that position, Officer B could have called out to Subject 2 and requested that Subject 2 exit the vehicle and walk back towards Officer B. The BOPC noted that Officer B indicated that when Subject 2 charged at him, Officer B struggled to keep Subject 2 at bay while he re-holstered his pistol. Officer B then used a bear hug technique to take Subject 2 to the ground. Officer B stated that because he was focused on other things, he did not issue any commands to Subject 2 at that time. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer B had also verbalized with Subject 2.

The BOPC noted that Officer A’s radio battery was dead. This precluded Officer A from placing his initial assistance call to CD and forced Officer A to use Officer B’s radio instead. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer A had maintained a charged battery for his ASTRO radio and


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had ensured that his radio was functioning prior to contacting Subject 2.

The BOPC found that Officer B’s tactics warrant administrative disapproval, and Officer A’s tactics to warrant formal training.

The BOPC noted that according to LAPD policy, officers may draw their pistol when they have a reasonable belief that there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. In this case, Officers A and B believed that Subject 2 was acting suspiciously by walking around the parking lot with a hooded sweatshirt on, combined with the high crime and gang activity in the area.

Given that Officers A and B did not suspect Subject 2 to be involved in any specific criminal activity and given that they did not believe Subject 2 to be the subject they were looking for and simply wanted to see who Subject 2 was and identify him, the BOPC found that Officers A and B’s decision to draw their pistols was unwarranted.

The BOPC determined that Officers A and B had insufficient information to believe the situation might escalate to the point where deadly force may become necessary and found the officers’ drawing and exhibition of a firearm to be out of policy, requiring administrative disapproval The BOPC found Officers A, B, C, D, E, and F’s use of non-lethal force to be in policy. The BOPC noted that Officer B decided to use lethal force in the form of a head strike with an impact weapon because he believed that Subject 2 concealed a handgun underneath his body in his left hand. This belief was based upon Officer B using his left hand to feel the outside of Subject 2’s left hand, which was located underneath Subject 2’s body at the time. Officer B described this object as “hard” and “solid,” and did not indicate what else, if anything, made him believe that the object felt like a handgun. Indeed, Officer B provided no explanation for his conclusion that what he felt underneath Subject 2’s body inside Subject 2’s left hand was in fact a gun.

The BOPC also noted that some of Officer B’s actions were inconsistent with his stated belief that Subject 2 was holding a gun in his left hand. First, instead of continuing to hold Subject 2’s left hand underneath his body believing that it was holding a gun, Officer B elected to release the hand. The BOPC found that Officer B’s decision to release Subject 2’s left hand was inconsistent with his stated belief that Subject 2 was holding a gun in his left hand.

Further, the BOPC noted that after three strikes with the impact weapon, Officer B discontinued hitting Subject 2 in the head and then continued to struggle with him. The BOPC found that Officer B’s decision to discontinue the head strikes with an impact weapon before the perceived threat ended was inconsistent with his stated belief that Subject 2 was holding a gun.

The BOPC noted that there is no conclusive evidence to show that there was any solid or hard object in Subject 2’s left hand at the time Officer B hit Subject 2 in the head with an impact weapon. Although a cellular telephone, marijuana pipe, cigarette lighter, and keys were found in


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the area, there is no evidence to show that Subject 2 held any of these items in his left hand at the time Officer B determined that a deadly threat existed.

The BOPC determined that under the circumstances presented in this case, it was unreasonable for Officer B to believe that Subject 2 was armed and was about to shoot him or his partner. Rather, Officer B’s belief that Subject 2 was armed was speculative at best. The BOPC noted that speculation alone does not form the basis for a reasonable belief that a lethal threat exists.

The BOPC found that Officer B did not reasonably believe that Subject 2’s actions presented an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death, and found Officer B’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval.

HS 007-06

On January 31, 2006, Officer B received an anonymous telephone call informing him that narcotics activity was occurring at a specific location in Harbor Area. Officer B completed a Narcotics Report, which indicated that the anonymous caller stated that there was “heavy pedestrian traffic loitering on the front sidewalk in the evening.” On February 1, 2006, Detective A received another anonymous telephone call, indicating that a subject who was on parole was currently at the above location preparing to move out. Detective A called Officer B and informed him about the additional information. Officer B and his partner, Officer A, subsequently proceeded to the location to conduct an investigation. Officers A and B were both wearing plainclothes and were armed with their service pistols. The above location contained three building structures aligned one behind the other. There were walkways along the east and west sides of the structures that allowed access from the first structure to the third structure on the other side of the property. As Officers A and B walked toward the structures, they heard voices and determined that there were people talking in the courtyard area between the second and third structure. Officer A indicated that he was approximately ten feet from the door to the third structure when he heard the voices. Officers A and B continued to walk to the courtyard and encountered five subjects. Officers A and B believed one of the subjects to be Subject 1. Officer A noticed that Subject 1 was holding a glass jar in his left hand containing an off-white residue resembling methamphetamine or cocaine. Officer A greeted the group and identified himself as a Los Angeles Police Officer. Officer A also displayed his badge, which was clipped to his pants pocket. In response, Subject 1 said something to the effect of, “You’re not the police.” Officer B also displayed his badge and confirmed to the group that they were police officers. Officer A noticed that Subject 1 was placing the cap on the jar he was holding. Officer A told Subject 1 to stand up. Subject 1 immediately “tensed up” and Officer A could see anger in his face. Based upon Subject 1’s reaction, as well as Officer A’s belief that Subject 1 may be a gang member, Officer A decided to draw his pistol. Officer A ordered Subject 1 to keep his hands


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where Officer A could see them. According to Officer B, at or about that time, Subject 1 stood up and “became very vocal” with the officers, possibly creating a distraction. Subject 1 also began to place his hands near his waistband and Officer B noticed that Subject 1 had a black nylon pouch near his waist. Subject 1 then abruptly turned around, ran through the courtyard, and entered the third structure via a door. Subject 1 shut a metal security door behind him and then shut the interior wooden door. Officer B ordered Subject 1 to return to the courtyard, to no avail. Officer B then decided to force his way into the structure, by pulling open the security gate and then kicking in the wooden door.

After kicking in the door, Officer B entered the structure and drew his duty pistol, believing that Subject 1 may have entered the structure to arm himself. Officer B entered a laundry room and then “pied” the corner towards the kitchen area. From the kitchen area, Officer B could see Subject 1 in the living room area and heard Subject 1 yell, “shoot him, shoot him, shoot him!” Also in the living room was a female who was crying and telling Subject 1, “just listen to him, just listen to him.” Subject 1 then entered another room and Officer B lost sight of Subject 1. Officer B decided to back out of the structure.

Note: According to Officer A, when Officer B kicked the door in and entered the structure, he placed a “help” call to CD.

Meanwhile, Officer B exited and took a position where he could watch the rear of the structure. From that position, Officer B observed a window at the rear of the structure and observed Subject 1 stick his head out of the window. Officer B observed white powder begin to disperse in the air. Officer B believed that Subject 1 was discarding/destroying methamphetamines. In response, Officer B pointed his pistol at Subject 1 and ordered Subject 1 to stop what he was doing. Subject 1 disappeared back inside the structure. Subject 1 then emerged from the structure and ran along the walkway. Officer B holstered his pistol and began a foot pursuit of Subject 1. Officer A paralleled the pursuit on the opposite side of the structures on the property. As Subject 1 ran in front of the first structure on the property, Subject 1 collided with Officer A, and then ran away. Officer A took over the lead in the foot pursuit, chasing Subject 1 with Officer A’s gun in his right hand and his radio in his left hand. Subject 1 continued to run past all three structures and then into an alley. Subject 1 attempted to open a chain link gate but was unsuccessful. Subject 1 then turned and faced Officer A, who was close behind him. Subject 1 used his left hand to grab Officer A’s left arm. In response, Officer A tucked his pistol, which was in his right hand, to his right side. Officer A then observed Subject 1 reaching for the black pouch at his waist. Believing that Subject 1 may be reaching for a weapon, Officer A struck Subject 1 two times in the head with his pistol. Officer B observed Subject 1 attempt to climb the chain link fence, pause, and then turn towards the officers and take a fighting stance. Officer B observed Officer A administer a strike. Officer


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B assisted by grabbing Subject 1’s left arm and giving it a firm tug, pulling Subject 1 to the ground into a prone position. While on the ground, Subject 1 began to struggle. As such, Officer B placed his knee on Subject 1’s back and used his body weight to control Subject 1 while he attempted to place Subject 1’s left arm behind his back. Meanwhile, Detective B heard the help call, advised plainclothes Detective C and plainclothes Officer C of the help call, and all three officers responded to the location. Detective B was the first to arrive and observed the foot pursuit in progress. Detective B parked her vehicle on the street and joined the foot pursuit, trailing behind Officer B as the foot pursuit proceeded from the walkway towards the alley. Detective C followed behind Detective B. When Detectives A and B arrived in the alley, Subject 1 was already on the ground in a prone position. Detective C joined the struggle and used a wrist lock to gain control of Subject 1’s right arm, allowing Detective B to handcuff Subject 1. According to Detective B, she heard officers yelling “stop” during the foot pursuit and heard officers giving verbal commands to Subject 1 while Subject 1 was on the ground, such as, “Release your hands. Bring them on top.” Detective C also heard commands being given to Subject 1 when he was on the ground.

Subject 1 was transported to a hospital where he was treated for a two-centimeter laceration to his head and a sprained right elbow. The BOPC noted that prior to Officers A and B’s arrival to the location, they had minimal information about the subject and location, which reduced their ability to ensure officer safety. It appeared that the officers intended to complete the narcotics investigation to close out the Narcotics Report. The BOPC determined it would have been tactically prudent for the officers to discuss tactics prior to their arrival to solidify the purpose of the investigation and define appropriate actions.

The BOPC was concerned with the officers’ decision to confront Subject 1 in plainclothes without the support of additional personnel resources, preferably uniformed officers for identification purposes, since the officers were clearly at a tactical disadvantage with the number of persons in the courtyard and were not sufficiently equipped to address the various tactical concerns inherent to the circumstances.

The BOPC noted that Officers A and B were concerned that Subject 1 entered the structure with the intent to destroy narcotics evidence or arm himself with a firearm. In order to prevent this from occurring, the officers elected to force entry. The BOPC determined that the decision to forcefully enter the structure placed the officers at a significant tactical disadvantage. The BOPC would have preferred the officers to establish containment on the structure and requested the required personnel resources to handle the situation as a potential barricaded suspect incident.

The BOPC noted that during the foot pursuit, Officers A and B paralleled each other. The BOPC was critical of the officers decision to separate during the foot pursuit, as they were not in a


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position to come to one another’s immediate aid should either be confronted by Subject 1 or any other potential subject.

The BOPC noted that Officer A’s force options were limited because of his decision to engage in a foot pursuit with his service pistol drawn in his right hand and his police radio in his left hand.

The BOPC found Officer A’s and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval.

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s drawing and exhibition of a firearm and their non-lethal use of force to be in policy.

The BOPC found Officer A’s use of lethal force to be in policy.

HS 017-06

While driving on a freeway, Officers A and B observed a vehicle pass at a high rate of speed and, without warning, cross several lanes of traffic, nearly colliding with the center divider. Officer B sped-up to catch the vehicle and shone his spot lamp in the direction of the vehicle in an attempt to get the driver to slow down. The vehicle, driven by Subject 1, continued and swerved, nearly colliding with another vehicle. Officers A and B formed the belief that Subject 1 was under the influence. Officers A and B broadcast their observations to Communications Division (CD). Officer B activated the police vehicle’s emergency lights and sirens in an attempt to stop Subject 1, but Subject 1 did not yield. A lengthy pursuit ensued, during which Officers A and B were joined by Officers C, D, E, F, G and H, and Sergeants A, B, C and D. The pursuit terminated when Subject 1 collided with two other vehicles. Immediately after the collision occurred, Officers C and D drove past the collision, stopped and exited their vehicle, took cover behind a pickup truck and drew their pistols. Officers E and F stopped behind Subject 1’s vehicle, exited their vehicle, drew their pistols, and took cover behind their vehicle’s doors. Officers A and B drew their pistols and positioned themselves behind Officers E and F’s police vehicle. Officer H, who had also arrived at the termination point of the pursuit, drew his pistol. Officers C, D, E and F issued commands to Subject 1 to exit his vehicle, but Subject 1 did not comply.

Note: An Air Unit was orbiting over the location where the pursuit terminated. The noise from the aircraft may have impeded the subject’s ability to hear commands and the officers’ ability to hear one another.


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Officer E re-holstered his pistol, drew his baton and announced that he was approaching Subject 1’s vehicle. Officer E then struck the driver’s window of Subject 1’s vehicle with his baton, causing the glass to break. Officer E reached through the open window frame and began pulling Subject 1 from the vehicle. Officers A, B and F re-holstered their weapons and joined Officers C and D to assist Officer E.

Note: Officer E’s announcement he was approaching Subject 1’s vehicle was not heard by the other officers at the scene.

Officer H observed Subject 1 being pulled from the vehicle, re-holstered his pistol and also ran up to assist in taking Subject 1 into custody. Officers B and E placed Subject 1 face-down on the pavement, and Officer E placed his knee on Subject 1’s left shoulder. Officers D and H used their body weight to control Subject 1’s legs and back. Officers B and H placed Subject 1’s hands in the small of his back, which enabled Officer F to handcuff him. Subject 1 subsequently alleged that he was hit in the face by the baton when Officer E broke the window of his vehicle. The BOPC noted that at the termination of the pursuit, Subject 1 collided with two other vehicles. The primary unit, Officers C and D, did not use proper tactics at the termination of the pursuit when they drove beyond the collision, stopped and exited their vehicle. This placed Officers C and D in a disadvantageous position, limited the ability of the other officers on scene to maintain sight of their location, and created a crossfire situation.

Officers C, D, E and F issued multiple commands to Subject 1. The issuance of multiple commands may confuse the subject, and should be avoided. Officer E announced that he was going to approach Subject 1’s vehicle, removed his baton, approached the door and broke the window. However, Officer E’s announcement was not heard by the other officers, and they were unaware of his intentions.

The officers at scene would have been better served had there been communications between them at the conclusion of the pursuit. The officers did not develop a safe plan to take Subject 1 into custody. Officer E did not properly communicate with the officers present and unilaterally approached Subject 1’s vehicle. This action forced the other officers to leave their positions of cover and exposed all of the officers to multiple potential threats within Subject 1’s vehicle. Further, Officer E’s actions unnecessarily created a chaotic situation and eliminated the tactics of time and command and control.

The BOPC determined that Officer E’s use of the baton to break the window was inappropriate. Other options, such as checking to see if the doors of Subject 1’s vehicle were unlocked or if a window not directly adjacent to Subject 1 could have been broken instead, were not tried. Further, once the window was broken, Officer E could have unlocked the door in order to extract Subject 1. The BOPC found Officer E’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval, Officers C and D’s tactics to warrant divisional training, and Officers A, B, F and H’s tactics to be appropriate.


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The BOPC noted that, at the termination of the pursuit, Officers A, B, C, D, E, F and H drew their weapons while preparing to confront a felony suspect. Officers A, B, C, D, E, F and H had sufficient information to believe the situation might escalate into a deadly force situation. The BOPC found Officers A, B, C, D, E, F and H’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that as Officers B and E pulled Subject 1 from the vehicle, Subject 1 was placed face-down, and Officer E placed his knee on Subject 1’s shoulder. Officers D and H used their bodyweight to control Subject 1’s legs and back. Officers B and H placed Subject 1’s hands in the small of his back, enabling Officer F to handcuff him.

The BOPC determined that Officers B, D, E and H’s non-lethal use of force was reasonable to overcome Subject 1’s resistance and to affect his arrest. The BOPC found Officers B, D, E and H’s non-lethal use of force to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that as a result of the allegations by Subject 1 that he was struck in the face with the baton when Officer E broke the window, and because he had injuries to his face, the incident was investigated as a categorical use of force. The BOPC determined that the investigation supported the conclusion that the strike to the head, if one occurred at all, was inadvertent. The BOPC found Officer E’s lethal use of force to be in policy.

HS 104-06

Officers A and B were patrolling a location known to the officers for gang and narcotics-related activity. The officers were aware that a gang-related homicide involving a handgun had occurred at this location approximately two weeks earlier. The unknown perpetrator and the murder weapon were still outstanding. Officer B had discussed the case with area homicide detectives, who had told him they were interested in any gun-related arrests that might provide a link to the homicide or the homicide suspects. As Officers A and B drove in their vehicle, they observed a male, Subject 1, standing on the sidewalk. The officers decided to stop and contact Subject 1, with the intention of obtaining any information from him that would assist the area homicide detectives with their investigation. As the officers approached Subject 1, he looked in their direction and began running. As he ran, Subject 1 made movements toward his waistband that appeared to Officer B to be consistent with someone trying to conceal either a weapon or contraband. Based on the fact they were in the location where the homicide had occurred, Officer B focused on this hand movement. Officer B exited the vehicle and pursued Subject 1 on foot while Officer A trailed the foot pursuit in the officers’ vehicle. Subject 1 then turned into a breezeway located to the rear of a residential apartment building, followed closely by Officer B.

Once he cleared the end of the breezeway, Subject 1 turned left and continued to the corner of an open courtyard where a kayak had been propped up against a cinder block wall that enclosed the


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courtyard. Subject 1 then attempted to scale the wall by climbing up the kayak. Officer B caught up to Subject 1, jumped up, and, using both arms, grabbed Subject 1 around the waist. Officer B hoped to pin Subject 1’s arms and use his body weight to pull Subject 1 off the kayak.

Officer B pulled Subject 1 down from the kayak. Officer B continued to reach around Subject 1 and attempted to secure both of Subject 1’s arms/hands; however, Officer B was unable to secure one of Subject 1’s arms. Subject 1 then began to turn toward Officer B, at which time Officer B saw a handgun in Subject 1’s hand.

When Officer B saw the handgun, he pushed at Subject 1 and simultaneously reached down and drew his own holstered handgun. As Subject 1 continued to turn toward Officer B, Officer B used his un-holstered handgun to deliver a downward strike at Subject 1. Officer B intended to incapacitate Subject 1 with this strike and cause him to drop the handgun. Officer B landed the strike with his handgun but was not sure whereabouts on Subject 1’s body the strike landed. The force of the strike, in conjunction with the push from Officer B, caused Subject 1 to stumble forward and fall, and caused Officer B to fall backward. Officer B reached for his radio as he lay on the ground in order to broadcast a “help” call; however, the radio fell from his hand and he was unable to complete this task. Officer B and Subject 1 both started to regain their footing as Officer B began to shout commands at Subject 1 to stop and put his hands up. Subject 1 then began to crab crawl away from Officer B. As Subject 1 did this, Officer B heard a sound, looked in the direction of the sound and saw a handgun on the ground. Officer B assumed this was the handgun Subject 1 had been holding. Subject 1 then began to run for the breezeway and Officer B, with his un-holstered handgun in his hand, followed. Before reaching the breezeway opening, Subject 1 abruptly stopped. Officer B’s momentum carried him into Subject 1 and the resulting collision knocked Officer B off of his feet. This fall caused Officer B’s eyeglasses to fall off of his face and Officer B momentarily lost sight of Subject 1. Officer B immediately looked around and saw someone running toward the rear fence. He also heard what he thought were other people running. Officer B knew this to be a gang location and was aware that he had not taken the time to tactically clear the corners of the courtyard for other gang members.

Officer B picked up his glasses, put them back on, and saw a figure wearing a white shirt going over the rear fence. Officer B quickly cleared the courtyard and then ran back to see if he could find his radio. The radio was in the corner of the courtyard where the initial altercation had taken place. Officer B picked up his radio and observed a semiautomatic handgun lying on the ground. Officer B picked up the handgun.

Officer B was exiting the courtyard when he encountered his partner, Officer A, coming in through the breezeway. Officer B told Officer A that he had recovered a handgun and that the suspect had climbed out of the courtyard.

Officer A immediately returned to the police vehicle, which was parked adjacent to the breezeway opening. As Officer A was returning to the police vehicle, he saw Subject 1 running.


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Officer A entered the police vehicle and began to drive after Subject 1. Meanwhile, Officer B pursued on foot.

Officer B stopped at a street intersection, then broadcast his location and the fact that the officers were in pursuit of a male with a gun. Officer A then lost sight of Subject 1. Both officers then stopped pursuing Subject 1 and directed responding units to establish a perimeter.

Officer A noticed that Subject 1’s pistol had the hammer in the “cocked” position. Officer A took the pistol from Officer B and emptied the ammunition from the weapon by chambering and ejecting the rounds it contained.

Sergeant A heard Officer B’s radio broadcast and proceeded to the scene. In the sergeant’s initial conversation with Officer B, Officer B indicated that he was uncertain as to where the strike with his handgun had landed on Subject 1’s body.

A search of the area was initiated, and an individual suspected of being Subject 1 was detained. Sergeant A allowed Officers A and B to drive together to a nearby location in an attempt to identify whether the detained person was in fact Subject 1. The officers determined that the detained person was not Subject 1, and the search continued.

Sergeant A subsequently allowed Officer A to participate in the search for Subject 1 while it still remained unclear if the incident was to be handled as a categorical use of force (CUOF) incident. Sometime after it was determined that the incident was going to be investigated as a CUOF, Officer A was separated and monitored.

Subject 1 was not located during the search. However, he was taken into custody at a later date. The BOPC noted that Officers A and B observed Subject 1 and intended to speak with him to gather information related to a prior homicide. As the officers approached, Subject 1 became aware of their presence and ran while holding his waistband, as if supporting a weapon. At this point, Officers A and B believed Subject 1 was likely armed.

The BOPC noted that Officer B’s decision to pursue Subject 1, whom he believed to be armed, without first advising CD of his location or broadcasting the foot pursuit, was inconsistent with the tactical standards established by Department training. There were no notifications made to CD until after the use of force incident had occurred and Subject 1 had escaped. It is vitally important for officers to advise CD of their location and activities to ensure timely response of additional resources. A more effective use of available resources could have proven beneficial in the apprehension of Subject 1. Additionally, it would have been safer and more effective for the officers to pursue Subject 1 for the purpose of monitoring his progress while requesting additional resources to establish a perimeter for containment.

The BOPC also noted that Officer A remained inside of the police vehicle and did not accompany Officer B in the foot pursuit. This course of action was inconsistent with the tactical standards established by Department training and resulted in Officer B becoming involved in a potentially deadly physical altercation without the assistance of his partner. The amount of time that elapsed while Officer B was engaged in the altercation was substantial and indicative of a significant separation between Officers A and B.


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Officer B stated that he and Officer A previously discussed foot pursuit tactics. He reported that he and his partner had determined that in the event a foot pursuit, both officers would exit the vehicle and remain together. The BOPC noted that the officers did not adhere to their previously discussed tactical plans. Their actions were in direct conflict with their tactical discussion and compromised their safety.

Officer B broadcast that he was in foot pursuit of a man with a gun after Subject 1 had already fled from the officers. Due to the severity of the prior altercation, a request for help or assistance may have been more appropriate. This would have expedited the response of the necessary personnel to effectively establish containment and maximize the likelihood of apprehending Subject 1.

Using a firearm as an impact weapon may render the weapon inoperable or cause a negligent discharge. Using a firearm as an impact weapon to strike a person in the head is deadly force and should be the last resort. The BOPC noted that in this specific incident, Officer B’s use of his firearm as an impact device was a last resort.

Officer A noticed that Subject 1’s pistol had the hammer cocked as Officer B held it in his hand. Officer A assumed control of Subject 1’s pistol and rendered it safe. The manner in which Officer A did this could have caused an accidental/negligent discharge. It would have been preferable for Officer A to have carefully secured the weapon in the trunk of the police vehicle without cycling rounds through it, then ensuring that the appropriate notifications were made to address the safe handling of the firearm. Additionally, the excessive handling of the firearm potentially removed or contaminated physical evidence that could be have used in the identification and prosecution of Subject 1.

Finally, the BOPC noted that Officer B did not have a baton on his person when he exited the police vehicle.

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval.

The BOPC found Officer B’s drawing, use of non-lethal force, and use of lethal force to be in policy.

ICD 012-07

On the evening of February 3, 2007, Officers A and B observed a vehicle that was being driven with a broken right rear brake light. Officers A and B conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle.

Officer A approached the driver (Subject 1), while Officer B approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Officer A asked Subject 1 whether he had a valid California Driver’s License. Subject 1 produced a California Identification Card and stated that his driver’s license had been lost. Officer A then noticed an open beer container inside the vehicle.

Officer A then asked Subject 1 if he was on parole or probation, and Subject 1 replied that he was not. Around this time, Officer B noticed a tattoo on Subject 1’s forearm that appeared to relate to a local street gang. Officer B notified Officer A of this observation. Officer A asked


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Subject 1 if he was from the street gang, and Subject 1 replied in the affirmative. Officer A asked Subject 1 what his moniker was, and Subject 1 told him. Officer A told Subject 1 that he was aware of a gang member with the same moniker, but that the gang member’s real name did not match the one on the California Identification Card provided by Subject 1.

At this point, Officer A asked Subject 1 to step out of his vehicle and put his hands on his head, and Subject 1 complied. Officer A observed that Subject 1’s vehicle had dark tinted windows, and he indicated that he could not see whether anyone else was located in the backseat of the vehicle. Officer A directed Subject 1 to walk to the rear of the officers’ police vehicle, and then Officer A began to look into Subject 1’s vehicle.

While Officer A was looking into Subject 1’s vehicle, and as Subject 1 reached the officers’ police vehicle, Subject 1 began to run away. Officers A and B pursued Subject 1 on foot and Officer B broadcast a request for backup. While pursuing Subject 1, Officer A told Officer B that he should return to their police vehicle because if it was left unattended it would be stolen or vandalized. Officer A also told Officer B to use the police vehicle to drive parallel with him as he continued to pursue Subject 1 on foot. Officer B returned to the police vehicle, which still had its engine running, and began to drive parallel with Officer A.

Officer A pursued Subject 1 southbound through a residential area. As Officer A turned around the corner of one of the buildings in the area, he saw Subject 1 grab his waistband and throw a metal object to the right. Officer A heard a metal clink and continued running after Subject 1. As Subject 1 reached the end of a building, he fell to the ground. Officer A drew his service pistol and ordered Subject 1 to stay on the ground. Subject 1 stood up and stared at Officer A.

Officer A observed Subject 1 begin to walk toward him. Officer A told Subject 1 not to move and he advised Subject 1 that he would shoot him. Officer A broadcast a request for backup. Subject 1 continued to walk toward Officer A, who re-holstered his service pistol and transitioned to his collapsible baton. As Subject 1 approached him, Officer A delivered one baton strike to his left elbow and another to his left leg, near his knee. Subject 1 fell to the ground, and Officer A told him to stay on the ground.

Subject 1 immediately got up, looked at Officer A, and started walking away. As Subject 1 moved eastbound through the residential area, Officer A resumed his foot pursuit. Officer A told Subject 1 to stop, triggering Subject 1 to look back at him. Subject 1 then started walking toward Officer A for the second time. As Subject 1 approached him again, Officer A delivered one baton strike to his elbow and another to his leg. Subject 1 fell to the ground again, and then he got back up again. Subject 1 then resumed walking eastbound through the area, away from Officer A.

At one point, when Subject 1 was near a parking lot, he called to a group of approximately five to ten individuals who were outside, saying, “Hey, you guys help me. Help me. Help me.” Officer A repeatedly told Subject 1 to get down on the ground. Subject 1 again looked at Officer A and again began to advance toward him. Officer A delivered another baton strike to Subject 1’s elbow and another baton strike to his leg. Subject 1 then resumed walking eastbound, away from Officer A.


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Officer A indicated that he was getting tired at this point in the foot pursuit and that he drew his service pistol again. Officer A pointed his pistol at Subject 1 and said, “I’m going to kill you.” Subject 1 looked directly at Officer A and began to walk toward him again. Officer A used his radio to broadcast a request for help by saying, “I need help. 41510 man on PCP.” Officer A observed that Subject 1 did not have a weapon. Officer A re-holstered his service pistol and re-drew his collapsible baton. Officer A delivered another baton strike to Subject 1’s elbow and another baton strike to his leg.

Subject 1 went down to the ground, and then began to walk away again. Around this time, Officer B pulled his police vehicle into a nearby driveway and observed both Officer A and Subject 1. Officer B exited the vehicle approached Officer A and Subject 1. Subject 1 turned toward Officer A again, and Officer A delivered one baton strike to Subject 1’s leg.

As Officer B arrived to assist his partner, Subject 1 moved toward Officer B. Officer B punched Subject 1 three times in the face. Subject 1 then bent at the waist and reached for Officer B’s legs. Officer B delivered a knee strike to Subject 1’s upper chest area, forcing him down to the ground. At this time, additional units began to arrive at the officers’ location in response to the backup and help calls, and Officer A stood back as they approached Subject 1.

Among the officers who responded were Sergeant A and Officers C, D, E, F, and G. Officer D observed Subject 1 fighting with Officer B and attempted to grab Subject 1’s left arm. Officer D indicated that Subject 1 pulled his arm away and then refocused his attention toward Officers A and B. Officer D struck Subject 1’s left temple area with a closed fist, although he observed no visible reaction from Subject 1.

Meanwhile, Officer C also observed Subject 1 making movements toward some of the officers who were present. Officer C delivered a front kick to Subject 1’s front torso. Officer D then verbalized the need to take Subject 1 down to the ground, and he and Officers B and C affected a takedown. Officer D attempted to gain control of Subject 1’s left hand, but Subject 1 pulled it away and grabbed at Officer D’s equipment belt. In response, Officer D struck Subject 1 in the ribcage/chest area at least two more times with a closed fist.

Officer D was subsequently able to use his body weight and a firm grip to gain control of Subject 1’s left hand, which he placed behind Subject 1’s back. Officer C gained control of Subject 1’s right hand, and Subject 1 was then handcuffed. Officers E and F grabbed hold of Subject 1, and Officer F conducted a quick pat-down search. Officers E and F then walked Subject 1 to Officer E’s police vehicle, which was equipped with a cage that separated the front seat from the back seat.

Once there, Officer F conducted a more thorough search of Subject 1 and recovered a dollar bill that was folded in the front right coin pocket of Subject 1’s pants. Officer F handed the bill to Officer E, who opened it up and observed what appeared to be “a white […] powder or crystal meth.” As soon as Officer E had opened the folded bill, Subject 1 blew its contents onto Officer E’s uniform shirt and onto the trunk of the police vehicle.

10 “415” refers to Section 415 of the California Penal Code, which addresses, among other things, individuals who unlawfully challenge others in a public place to fight.


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Officers E and F then sat Subject 1 in the backseat of the police vehicle, at which point Sergeant A directed Officer F to secure a hobble restraint device (HRD) around Subject 1’s ankles. Officer F asked Subject 1 to lift his legs, and Subject 1 complied. Officer F applied the HRD without incident.

Officers E (driver) and G (passenger) then transported Subject 1 to the Hollenbeck Area Police Station (Hollenbeck Station). Before departing, Officer E informed a supervisor at the scene that he would request a rescue ambulance (RA) for Subject 1 as soon as they arrived at the Hollenbeck Station due to the use of force that had occurred.

Note: Subject 1 was not secured with a seatbelt during the ride to the Hollenbeck Station. Officer E later indicated that Subject 1 was too agitated, and would not let officers secure him with a seatbelt.

Officers E and G arrived at the back of the Hollenbeck Station with Subject 1. Upon arriving at the station, Officer E observed that Subject 1 remained seated in rear seat on the driver side of the vehicle, and it seemed like Subject 1 was breathing, though he was not answering any of Officers E or G’s questions. Officers E and G got Subject 1 out of the police vehicle, and, according to Officer E, Subject 1 took a couple of steps.

Officer E loosened the HRD and adjusted it up to Subject 1’s knees so that he could walk. Then, Subject 1 went limp, requiring officers to carry him. Officers H and I, who were exiting the station at the time that Officers E and G arrived with Subject 1, assisted by grabbing onto Subject 1’s legs and right arm, respectively.

Meanwhile, Officer E grabbed onto Subject 1’s left arm and Officer G assisted Officer H with Subject 1’s legs. The officers then carried Subject 1 up a flight of stairs and into the station.

The officers took Subject 1 directly to a booking cell inside the Hollenbeck Station, at which point Officer H departed. Officer E indicated that the officers sat Subject 1 up on the floor of the booking cell. He also indicated that Subject 1 was still breathing at this time, but that his breathing was “kind of getting low.”

At this point, Officer I left the cell. Then, four minutes after Officers E and G had initially arrived at the back of the Hollenbeck Station with Subject 1, Sergeant B entered Subject 1’s booking cell. He saw that Subject 1 had his head slumped forward, with his chin to his chest. Sergeant B bent down to look at Subject 1’s face and observed that he was drooling. He also observed that Subject 1 was non-responsive and was breathing fairly shallowly. Sergeant B stepped away from Subject 1 momentarily to address another arrestee and, when he returned, he noticed that Subject 1’s breathing appeared to be somewhat shallower than it had been before.

Sergeant B spoke to Officer E and told him that they were going to get an RA for Subject 1. Officer E told Officer G to request an RA and Officer G used his radio to broadcast the request. The broadcast was made four minutes after Officers E and G arrived at the back of the station with Subject 1.


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Around this time, Officer E observed that Subject 1 had his head down. Officer E lifted Subject 1’s head to try to make sure that he was okay, and he saw that Subject 1’s pupils were dilated. Six minutes after Officer G requested an RA, personnel from the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) arrived at the Hollenbeck Station. LAFD Firefighters A and B made their way to Subject 1’s booking cell, and Firefighter B observed that Subject 1 was unconscious. Firefighter B observed that Subject 1 was not breathing. Firefighter B asked to have Subject 1’s handcuffs removed, and Officer G removed them. Firefighter B then saw that Subject 1 had a blank stare in his eyes and confirmed that he was not breathing. Firefighter B checked Subject 1 for a pulse but did not find one. Firefighter B also noticed that Subject 1’s body felt cold.

Firefighter B laid Subject 1 down on the floor and continued administering medical treatment. Moments later, additional LAFD personnel arrived, including Firefighter/Paramedics A and B. Firefighter/Paramedic A noticed that Subject 1’s skin was a little mottled, that his pupils were dilated, that his eyes were slightly glassed over, that his body was pale and very cold to the touch, and that he had a bloody nose and an abrasion to the mid-forehead. An EKG monitor indicated that there was no activity in Subject 1’s heart. Subject 1 was turned over, and Firefighter/Paramedic A observed the presence of lividity11 in his lower back and buttocks. LAFD personnel were unable to resuscitate Subject 1 and, nine minutes after the first LAFD personnel had arrived at the Hollenbeck Station, Firefighter/Paramedic A determined that Subject 1 was dead.

The cause of Subject 1’s death was determined by the Department of Coroner (DOC) to be the effects of cocaine and methamphetamine use, with coronary artery disease acting as a contributing condition. The manner of Subject 1’s death was determined to be accidental.

The BOPC noted that, as Officers A and B were driving, they observed a vehicle with an inoperative right rear light. The officers subsequently stopped the vehicle for the aforementioned vehicle code violation, notifying CD of their status and location. Officer A questioned Subject 1 through the open driver’s side window and requested his California Drivers License. Unbeknownst to Officer A, Subject 1 falsely identified himself and produced a California Identification Card with someone else’s name on it. Upon further questioning, the officers learned that Subject 1 was a gang member with a specific moniker. Officer A, while questioning Subject 1, revealed to him that there was a gang member who went by the same moniker, but had a different name. By informing Subject 1 of the aforementioned information, Officer A quite possibly alerted Subject 1 that the officers knew what his true identity was, and thus set the stage for Subject 1’s ultimate flight from the officers. Officer A ordered Subject 1 out of the vehicle, instructed him to place his hands on his head and directed him to the rear of the vehicle. As Subject 1 was walking to the rear of the vehicle, Officer A turned his attention away from Subject 1 to momentarily look in the interior of the vehicle. Subject 1 seized this opportunity and ran from the officers.

11 When discussing his observation of the presence of lividity in Subject 1’s lower back and buttocks, Firefighter/Paramedic A indicated that he was referring to a discoloration that is usually caused when the blood pools down to an area of the body.


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Both officers pursued Subject 1 on foot. After running approximately 25 feet from their police vehicle, Officer A directed Officer B to return to the police vehicle and drive parallel to the foot pursuit.

Note: Officer A believed their police vehicle, and/or its contents, would be stolen or vandalized if left unattended.

Officer B returned to the police vehicle and drove in search of Officer A and Subject 1. Officer safety should never be sacrificed at the expense of property. Officers are taught to discuss tactical issues when working together and pre-plan responses. When faced with the decision to pursue a suspect on foot and abandon an unsecured police vehicle, or remain with the vehicle, officers must assess the seriousness of the crime and the inherent danger to the public, among other things. Regardless of the officers’ decision, it should be based on pre-planning, communication and sound tactics. In this case, the officers’ actions, although well intentioned, resulted in a substantial separation and a one-on-one confrontation between a suspect and officer. As the foot pursuit continued, Subject 1 lost his footing and fell to the ground. Officer A ordered Subject 1 to remain on the ground; however, Subject 1 ignored the commands, stood up and walked toward Officer A. Officer A deployed his collapsible baton and delivered two strikes to Subject 1. Subject 1 fell to the ground, immediately regained his footing and walked away from Officer A. Officer A continued to follow Subject 1 and ordered him to stop four additional times. Subject 1 would stop, turn around and advance toward Officer A, necessitating the delivery of additional baton strikes. As the fifth confrontation was unfolding between Officer A and Subject 1, Officer B arrived at the location and provided assistance. Officer B arrived at that location after the foot pursuit had traversed approximately 903 feet. Officer B was unable to assist Officer A during the four proceeding encounters when he was confronted by Subject 1. This separation was not only problematic from an officer safety perspective, but it also limited the options that were available to Officer A, such as a team takedown. Officer A made a conscious decision to pursue Subject 1 while alone. Officer A clearly initiated the foot pursuit with the intent to apprehend Subject 1, as he followed from a close distance and repeatedly ordered him to stop. Once the foot pursuit crossed a nearby street and proceeded in-between buildings, Officer A should have increased the distance between Subject 1 and himself and waited for responding officers. Instead, Officer A pursued Subject 1 believing that Subject 1 had possibly discarded a handgun.

Note: A loaded handgun was recovered from the area where Officer A believed an object had been discarded by Subject 1.

Additionally, Subject 1 had exhibited signs of being under the influence of PCP, the foot pursuit took place in a residential area that Officer A indicated was frequented by gang members, and Officer A was becoming increasingly fatigued.


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At the termination of the foot pursuit, Officer A broadcast a help call to CD. This broadcast was preceded by two back-up requests made by Officer A. The totality of the circumstances surrounding this incident warranted an assistance or help call. Moments later, Officers B, C and D arrived at the scene and took Subject 1 into custody. Once handcuffed, Subject 1 was assisted to a standing position and escorted to a police vehicle. As a preventative measure, the HRD was applied around Subject 1’s ankles. Officers E and G transported Subject 1 approximately two miles to the Hollenbeck Station. Officer E appropriately removed the HRD and additional Hollenbeck Patrol Division personnel assisted with carrying Subject 1, who was conscious, from the police vehicle to a holding cell. Upon placing Subject 1 into a holding cell, the officers noted he appeared to be unconscious, but breathing and Officer G broadcast a request to CD for a rescue ambulance. Los Angeles Fire Department paramedics responded to the scene, noted Subject 1 was pulse less and not breathing, initiated CPR and attached an Automatic External Defibrillator to Subject 1. Subject 1 failed to respond to medical treatment and LAFD personnel determined Subject 1 to be dead. Officers E and G did not secure Subject 1 with a seatbelt when they transported him to the Hollenbeck Station in their police vehicle. According to Officer E, Subject 1 “was too agitated and he wouldn’t let us.” Properly securing Subject 1 with a seatbelt was an important safeguard that should have been applied. In the event of a traffic collision during transportation, the failure to use a seatbelt could have potentially cost Subject 1 his life. Even if Subject 1, who was handcuffed and secured with an HRD during transportation, was agitated and uncooperative, Officers E and G should have obtained whatever assistance was necessary to seatbelt him into the back seat of the police vehicle. Additionally, the Department Training Bulletin regarding Restraining Procedures and Devices advises, “The Hobble Restraint Device is designed to allow officers to transport violent arrestees in an upright, seated position, while maintaining an acceptable level of restraint. To secure a hobbled arrestee in the rear seat of the vehicle, first utilize the seat belts to hold the arrestee in place.” The BOPC found Officers A and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval and Officers E and G’s tactics to warrant divisional training. The BOPC found Officers C and D’s tactics to be appropriate. The BOPC found Officer A’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that, as Officer A pursued Subject 1 on foot, he issued verbal commands on five separate occasions. After each instance, Subject 1 advanced toward him and Officer A used his collapsible baton. During the first four confrontations, he delivered one baton strike to Subject 1’s left elbow and one to the left knee. During the fifth and final confrontation, Officer A delivered one baton strike to Subject 1’s left leg. As Officer B approached the termination of the foot pursuit, he observed the final confrontation between Officer A and Subject 1. Subject 1 walked toward the officers with a clenched fist and Officer B delivered three punches to Subject 1’s nose and mouth area. Subject 1 appeared


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unaffected as he bent over at the waist and reached for Officer B’s legs. Believing Subject 1 was attempting to wrap both arms around his legs, Officer B delivered one knee strike to Subject 1’s upper torso.

Officers C and D arrived at the scene and observed the confrontation between Subject 1 and Officers A and B taking place. Officer C utilized a firm grip to the right arm, a team takedown and a front kick to Subject 1’s left torso. Officer D utilized a firm grip to the left arm, a team takedown, one punch to the left temple and two punches to Subject 1’s right torso. After Subject 1 was taken into custody, he was assisted to a standing position and escorted to a police vehicle. As a preventative measure, the HRD was applied to his ankles; however, force was not utilized in its application. The BOPC found Officers B and D’s use of force to warrant divisional training, and found Officers A and C’s use of force to be in policy.

LERI 091-06

Officers A and B observed a truck stopped in the roadway. Officer A monitored the truck and formed the opinion that an individual next to the truck (Subject 1) was attempting to rob the driver of the truck. Officer A advised his partner of his observations and told him to turn their police vehicle around. Officer B then negotiated a U-turn. The officers then observed Subject 1 riding a bicycle on the sidewalk.

The officers used their vehicle spotlights to illuminate Subject 1. Officer A commanded Subject 1 to stop. Officer A observed Subject 1 look in their direction several times and attempt to conceal an object with a blue rag. Officer A further indicated that Subject 1 looked back in their direction while grabbing his waist with his right hand as if attempting to retrieve a handgun.

Officer B also observed Subject 1 look in the officers’ direction several times and drop a sweater or sweatshirt at the corner. Officer B observed that Subject 1 was in possession of a utility tool belt.

Subject 1 did not comply with the commands to stop and turned onto a side street. Officer A observed what appeared to him to be the handle of a handgun in Subject 1’s waistband.

As the officer continued to follow, Subject 1 slowed down and grabbed his waistband, prompting Officer A to open his door, exit the vehicle with his gun drawn, and tell Subject 1 to get off of the bike and to place his hands up. When Subject 1 again sped away on his bicycle, Officer A holstered his service pistol and closed his door.

Subject 1 turned his body and Officer A saw an object he believed to be a handgun. Officer A informed his partner that Subject 1 had a gun. Officer B then turned his patrol car toward Subject 1 and intentionally struck him with the front portion of the vehicle.


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As a result of the impact, Subject 1 was pinned between the front end of the police vehicle and a fence, which partially collapsed as a result of the impact. The impact of the collision also bent the wheels of Subject 1’s bike.

Following the collision, and believing that Subject 1 was armed, Officer A immediately exited the patrol car, and, with his service pistol drawn, ordered Subject 1 to raise his hands.

Pinned between the vehicle and the fence, Subject 1 struggled to free himself and motioned toward his waist several times. Neither officer observed a weapon in Subject 1’s possession at this time. Moments later, Subject 1 freed himself and ran, prompting Officer B to follow him on foot. Officer B then tackled Subject 1 around his upper torso and a struggle ensued between the two. At one point during the struggle, Subject 1 lifted Officer B off of the ground and carried him a distance of three to four feet before Officer A arrived to render assistance.

During the course of the struggle, Officer B placed his bodyweight on Subject 1’s back and torso and applied firm grips to both of his arms. Officer B also delivered six to ten elbow strikes to Subject 1’s torso, neck and head area. Officer A placed bodyweight upon Subject 1’s upper body and neck using his knee. Officer A also utilized firm grips to Subject 1’s hands, wrists and right arm. Officer A delivered two to three knee strikes to Subject 1’s head and upper torso, and a punch to his face, which may not have been a direct strike. In addition, Officer A delivered approximately two elbow strikes to Subject 1’s upper body and approximately two kicks to his groin area; however the strikes to the groin area did not connect. As the struggle ensued, Officer A felt something hard on Subject 1’s person.

Note: A wrench was subsequently recovered from the location where Subject 1 was placed under arrest.

As the officers sought to control him, Subject 1 swung his arms and did not comply with the officers’ verbal commands to stop resisting.

The officers’ combined use of their bodyweight enabled them to overcome Subject 1’s resistance and place him under arrest without further incident. A search of Subject 1’s person revealed that he was not armed. Then, Officer B contacted CD, advised it of their location and requested a supervisor. Officer B also subsequently requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA).

Once Subject 1 was secured in the police vehicle, the officers noted that a group of individuals had formed and was upset over the manner in which Subject 1 had been arrested. Wanting to secure evidence and ensure that it was not compromised by the group, Officer B left his partner and recovered items of evidence. The BOPC noted that Officers A and B observed what they believed to be a robbery. There were several opportunities for Officers A and B to follow Subject 1 at a safe distance and request additional units and an Air Unit. While continuing to follow Subject 1, Officers A and B ordered him to stop, which he refused. The officers believed Subject 1 to be in possession of a gun, and came within close proximity of him on several occasions. These tactics compromised their safety and reduced their ability to effectively engage Subject 1. The BOPC was critical of


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Officers A and B’s failure to immediately advise CD of their observations and request the necessary resources to apprehend Subject 1. Officers A and B did not advise CD of their location or activities until after Subject 1 was in custody. It is vitally important for officers to advise CD of their location and activities to ensure timely response of additional resources. A more effective use of available resources could have proven beneficial in the apprehension of Subject 1. Officers A and B followed Subject 1 as he rode his bicycle on the sidewalk. Officer B, fearing that Subject 1 would point a firearm at the officers, drove the police vehicle at him, striking him and pinning him between the vehicle and a fence. The police vehicle, driven by Officer B, struck Subject 1 and the fence with such force that the fence partially collapsed. This course of action risked causing the police car’s airbags to deploy, which could have temporarily incapacitated the officers and inhibited their ability to appropriately respond to any threat Subject 1 could have presented. After Subject 1 freed himself, Officers A and B pursued him on foot. The officers did not indicate that they considered, or attempted, a foot pursuit broadcast at this time. This lack of communication led to a lengthy and violent struggle with Subject 1 without the benefit of additional resources responding to assist. The BOPC was critical of the decision to physically engage Subject 1 with the potential that he was still in possession of a handgun. It would have been more appropriate to engage in a foot pursuit for monitoring purposes rather than with the intent to apprehend. After pursuing Subject 1 a short distance on foot, Officer B tackled him to the ground with the assistance of Officer A. It is preferable to push suspects to the ground during a foot pursuit, instead of tackling them, so as to avoid injury to the involved officer. Finally, the BOPC noted that Officer B did not have a baton on his person when exiting from the police vehicle to pursue Subject 1 on foot. Officer B also dropped his flashlight, which he previously maintained between his legs, onto the ground when he exited the police vehicle to pursue Subject 1. The BOPC found Officers A and B’s tactics to warrant administrative disapproval.

The BOPC noted that Officer A drew his service pistol on two separate occasions during this incident. Officers A and B followed Subject 1 as he rode his bicycle. Subject 1 slowed his speed on the bicycle and grabbed at his waistband area with his right hand. Officer B slowed and then stopped the police vehicle in response to Subject 1’s actions. Fearing that Subject 1 was about to engage the officers in gunfire, Officer A drew his service pistol while in the police vehicle with the passenger side door open. After Officer B pinned Subject 1 between the police vehicle and the fence, Subject 1 continued to reach toward his waistband area, even after he was ordered to place his hands up. Officer A, while still seated inside the police vehicle with the door open, again drew his service pistol, fearing that Subject 1 was about to fire upon them.


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The BOPC determined that Officer A had sufficient information to believe that the situation might escalate to the point where deadly force may become necessary and found Officer A’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that, after Subject 1 freed himself from between the police vehicle and fence, he ran on the sidewalk. Officer B tackled Subject 1 and a ground struggle ensued. The incident ultimately resulted in a violent physical struggle on the ground in a concerted effort to detain Subject 1. Officer B used bodyweight on Subject 1’s back and torso, and firm grips to both arms during the struggle. Officer B also delivered six to ten elbow strikes to Subject 1’s torso, neck and head area. Officer A used bodyweight upon Subject 1’s upper body and back of his neck with his knee. Officer A also utilized firm grips to Subject 1’s hands, wrists and right arm. Officer A delivered two to three knee strikes to Subject 1’s head and upper torso, and a punch to his face, which may not have been a direct strike. In addition, Officer A delivered approximately two elbow strikes to Subject 1’s upper body and approximately two kicks to his groin area. The BOPC noted that during the efforts to detain Subject 1, both Officer A and B struck areas not designated as primary target areas. This portion of the incident was recognized as a violent struggle to detain an aggressive and possibly armed subject. While it was objectively reasonable for Officers A and B to utilize strikes that were not purposefully delivered to primary target areas during this violent struggle with a potentially armed suspect, these force options were used as a result of deficient decision making leading up to the violent struggle itself. The use of knee strikes to Subject 1’s head may have presented an undue risk of serious injury. The head is not a primary target for knee strikes, and such strikes are generally disfavored as a means to cause a suspect to submit to arrest or to stop an offensive action. The BOPC determined that Officers A and B reasonably believed that Subject 1 presented an immediate threat of bodily harm and found Officers A and B’s use of non-lethal force to be in policy, warranting divisional training. The BOPC noted that, as Subject 1 continued to ride his bicycle, Officer A advised Officer B that Subject 1 had a gun. Subject 1 continued to reach toward his waistband area and Officer B believed he needed to be stopped immediately to prevent him from raising and firing what he believed was a handgun inside of his waistband area. Department policy provides that, “An officer is authorized to use deadly force when it reasonably appears necessary to protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.” Further, policy requires that deadly force “shall only be exercised when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impracticable.” In this case, Officer B indicated that Subject 1 had his hand in his waist in a pistol grip. Officer B saw something that looked to him like a pistol. Officer A also saw a gun in Subject 1’s possession and yelled, “gun!” As soon as Officer B heard his partner’s alert, he made the


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decision to drive the patrol car into the suspect to prevent any further action. Neither officer observed Subject 1 draw a weapon.

While Officer B’s belief that Subject 1 was armed was reasonable, the manner in which Officer B responded to that potential threat was not. Deadly force is an option of last resort than can only be utilized when an officer reasonably believes that they face an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. In this case, the subject’s actions did not support a reasonable belief that he was about to launch a deadly attack on the officers. Further, other options were available to the officers. These included Officer B drawing his service pistol while still seated inside of the patrol car or stopping the patrol car, exiting, and drawing his service pistol to confront the perceived deadly threat.

The BOPC determined that it would have been appropriate for Officer B to stop and exit the vehicle, and to point his pistol toward Subject 1, continually assessing the situation as he did so. This course of action would have been consistent with the actions officers routinely take when they confront subjects who may be armed. Such action could have facilitated Officer B defending himself, had Subject 1 gone on to present to an immediate deadly threat, but would not have necessitated that deadly force be employed. As such, the BOPC determined that Officer B did not exhaust all reasonable alternatives, or that the use of such alternatives was impracticable, before he resorted to the use of deadly force.

By a 3-to-1 vote, the BOPC found Officer B’s use of deadly force to be out of policy, warranting administrative disapproval. Animal Shooting 107-06

Several uniformed and plainclothes officers responded to a radio call regarding suspected burglary subjects in a residence. Upon arrival at the residence, Officer A observed an open door to an attached garage and assembled an entry team to determine if the residence could be accessed through the garage. Officers A, B, C, D, and E next proceeded towards the garage and Officer A was the first to enter the garage. Officer A immediately observed a large dog running towards him. Officer A backed out of the garage and fired one round at the dog, which changed direction and ran toward Officer B, who was standing to the left of Officer A. Officer B fired one round at the charging dog, which ran past Officer B towards the walkway leading to the front of the residence Officer C, who was located at the walkway observed the dog running and proceeded to backup. Officer C fired one round at the dog, which appeared to have no effect. Officer C fired two additional rounds at the dog, which caused the dog to slow down and run past Officer C. Meanwhile, Officer D ran past Officers B and C to the front of the residence. Officer A sustained a gunshot wound to the right foot and Officer B sustained grazing wounds to his right hand and right shin.


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The BOPC noted that, after the officers established a perimeter, they failed to establish a tactical frequency to communicate with each other and perimeter officers were not advised of Officers A and B’s observations. The BOPC was also concerned that no effort was made to replace any of the plainclothes officers occupying perimeter positions with uniformed officers. Furthermore, the BOPC noted that the plainclothes officers were equipped only with their service weapons and handcuffs, which would prevent them from being readily identified as police officers had a combative situation occurred. Additionally, the BOPC noted that when Officer D abandoned his/her position and ran past Officer B and C, his/her actions compromised the integrity of the entry team and diminished the overall safety of the officers.

The BOPC found that the tactics of Officers A, B, C, and D to warrant administrative disapproval. The BOPC found that the officers had sufficient information to believe that their response to a burglary call could escalate to the point whereby deadly force might become necessary and found Officers A, B, C, D, and E drawing to be in policy. The BOPC found Officers A and B’s use of force to be in policy. The BOPC found Officer C’s use of force to warrant formal training.

DRAWING/EXHIBITING/HOLSTERING

Of the 115 incidents involving a CUOF reviewed by the BOPC in 2007, two (HS 112-05 and OIS 111-06) resulted in a finding of “out of policy, administrative disapproval.” The findings for the drawing/exhibiting/holstering in the other 113 incidents were “in policy” or “does not apply.” Summaries of the two incidents that resulted in a finding of “out of policy, administrative disapproval” are provided in the Tactics section of this report.

USE OF LETHAL FORCE

The Department considers discharges of a firearm, carotid restraint control holds and head strikes with an impact weapon to be lethal force. Of the 115 incidents involving a CUOF reviewed by the BOPC in 2007, 2% (2) resulted in a finding that the use of lethal force was “in policy, training,” and 10% (12) resulted in a finding that the use of lethal force was “out of policy/accidental/negligent, administrative disapproval.”12 The remaining incidents either did not involve the use of lethal force (e.g., ICD) or resulted in a finding of “in policy” or “does not apply” for the use of lethal force.

12 These findings and actions applied to at least one of the involved officers in an incident. If at least one of the officers involved was found to have acted out of policy, then the finding for that incident was considered “out of policy.” If at least one of the officers involved was found to require additional training, but did not act out of policy, then the finding for that incident was considered “in policy, training. “


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Of the 12 incidents where the finding was that the use of lethal force warranted “administrative disapproval,” one was an incident involving an OIS in which an officer unintentionally discharged a firearm during a tactical situation; nine were Negligent Discharges; one involved a head strike with an impact weapon; and one involved a CRCH. Of the two incidents where the finding was that the use of lethal force warranted “training,” one was an incident involving a head strike with an impact weapon and the other involved a Negligent Discharge. A summary of one incident which resulted a finding of “out of policy/accidental/negligent, administrative disapproval” for the use of lethal force (HS 112-05) is provided in the Tactics section of this report. One incident resulted in a finding of “out of policy, administrative disapproval” for one officer’s use of less-lethal force. A summary of this case (LERI 091-06) is provided in the Tactics section of this report. The remaining cases that warranted a finding of “accidental/negligent, administrative disapproval” or “out of policy, administrative disapproval” for the use of lethal force are summarized below. OIS 061-06 Officers A, B, and C were assigned to monitor gang-related activities. The officers drove into an alley that was frequented by gang members. Officer A noticed a vehicle parked in the alley and a male (Subject 1) wearing what appeared to be gang attire standing near the vehicle. Officer A believed that Subject 1 was trying to break into the vehicle either to steal the vehicle itself or to steal items from within the vehicle. Officers A and C noticed that Subject 1 began to duck down near the vehicle as if to hide from the officers. Officer B stopped the police vehicle near the vehicle. As Officers A, B, and C exited the police vehicle, Subject 1 began walking past the parked police vehicle. Officer A told Subject 1 to stop. Subject 1 continued to walk and reached towards his waistband. This led Officer A to believe that Subject 1 was arming himself. Officer A drew his pistol to a low ready position and notified his partners of his observations. Meanwhile, Officer B broadcast the officers’ location to CD. Subject 1 ignored Officer A’s commands and left the officers’ sight. Officers A and B followed Subject 1. Officer C remained with the police vehicle. Officers A and B “pied” the corner when approaching the walkway as they proceeded after Subject 1 and systematically cleared the area. Officers A and B then observed Subject 1 ahead of their location. Officer A sought cover behind a wall and a pillar at the base of a flight of steps. As Officer A walked toward a position of cover, he removed his radio with his left hand with the intent to broadcast Subject 1’s location to responding units. Officer A held his pistol in his right hand. Officer A slipped and lost his footing, fell backward, and extended both arms to break his fall. As Officer A landed, he lost his


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grasp on his service pistol and in an attempt to reacquire his grip, he unintentionally pressed the trigger, discharging one round.

Officer A quickly stood up and holstered his pistol. Officer B ensured that Officer A was uninjured and then realized that Officer A had had a negligent discharge. The officers then observed Subject 1 and broadcast to Officer C to drive to the area where Subject 1 was running. Officer C responded to the location where he detained Subject 1 without incident. The BOPC noted that Officer A observed Subject 1 attempting to open the door of vehicle. Upon seeing the officers, Subject 1 attempted to conceal himself behind another parked vehicle, and later walked away from the officers.

Officer B advised CD of their location. However, based on the suspected armed status of Subject 1, the BOPC determined that it would have been prudent for Officer B to include additional information in his broadcast and request additional resources. Responding units could have assisted with Subject 1’s capture and should have been provided information such as a description of the suspect, his direction of travel, that he may possibly be armed, and a direction to approach.

Officer B parked the police vehicle in close proximity to the vehicle, where Officers A and C observed Subject 1. Officer A indicated that as he was exiting the police vehicle, Subject 1 walked past the police vehicle. This placed the officers at a tactical disadvantage, given that they were still in the process of exiting their vehicle when Subject 1 walked quickly past them. The BOPC is concerned that the positioning of the police vehicle placed the officers in danger, given the close proximity to Subject 1. The close proximity did not allow the officers sufficient time to exit their police vehicle before Subject 1 walked past the vehicle in the opposite direction. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer B had stopped the police vehicle farther from the vehicle and would have preferred that the officers approached Subject 1 on foot, so as to provide them with a tactical advantage.

Officers A and B proceeded to the buildings where Subject 1 was last seen and tactically deployed, thus minimizing the risk of an ambush. Officer C was advised by Officer B to stay with the police vehicle and to determine if there was observable vehicle tampering to the vehicle. Once Officers A and B committed to conduct a search, Officer C should have joined them. Officers A and B were facing a suspect that actively resisted detention and was potentially armed. Additionally, there exists the possibility that an armed suspect could double back and pose a threat to a lone officer.

The BOPC would have also preferred that once Officer C inspected the vehicle and determined that there was no evidence of any crime, he had relayed that information to Officers A and B,


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who were still actively pursuing Subject 1, so that Officers A and B would have the benefit of that information when deciding whether to continue to pursue Subject 1.

As Officers A and B walked, they systematically cleared their path. Officer A observed Subject 1 and proceeded to simultaneously retrieve his radio in his left hand, maintain his service pistol in his right hand, monitor Subject 1’s actions, and move toward cover down a descending flight of steps. The BOPC determined that it would have been prudent for Officer A to establish a position of cover prior to retrieving his radio, or to task Officer B with the responsibility of communicating.

Upon realizing that Officer A had a negligent discharge, Officer B used his radio to call for additional resources and a supervisor to respond to the scene. The BOPC would have preferred that Officer A had indicated the nature of the situation, including the fact that an officer had a negligent discharge, in order to prevent Officer C, who was in the area and heard the gunshot, from thinking that Subject 1 had fired at the officers. The BOPC found Officers A, B, and C’s tactics to warrant divisional training.

The BOPC found Officer A’s drawing to be in policy.

The BOPC noted that when Officer A observed Subject 1, he retrieved his radio with his left hand while holding his service pistol in his right hand. With both hands occupied, Officer A descended a flight of steps.

Officer A lost his footing, fell backward, and extended both arms to break his fall. As Officer A landed, he lost his grasp on his service pistol and in an attempt to reacquire his grip, he unintentionally pressed the trigger, discharging one round.

The BOPC is critical that Officer A failed to adhere to the basic firearm safety rules while handling his service pistol. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to be negligent, warranting administrative disapproval.

CRCH 081-06 Witness A was at home in an apartment. Also at the apartment was Witness A’s brother, Subject 1, who suffered from schizophrenia. Subject 1 threatened Witness A with the leg of a small wooden alter that was being dismantled. Witness A then left the apartment. When she returned, Subject 1 was standing outside holding a backpack. When Witness A and Subject 1’s mother, Witness B, returned home, Witness A told her what had happened. Witness B called 911 and told the operator that Subject 1 suffered from mental problems and had threatened her daughter with a stick.


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CD broadcast that a “violent male with mental illness” was standing in front of the apartment. CD also provided a description of Subject 1, and indicated that he was “armed with a piece of wood” and had attempted to strike his sister. The call was assigned to Harbor Area Patrol Division uniformed Officers A and B. Upon arrival at the call location, Officers A and B observed Subject 1 standing on the landing in front of the stairs to his apartment. The officers approached Subject 1.

Note: According to Officer A, upon arrival at the call he broadcast that his unit was at the scene. However, this broadcast was not received by CD.

Subject 1 looked in the officers’ direction, but did not appear to be focusing on them. Officers A and B observed that Subject 1 had a backpack slung over his left shoulder. The officers did not see a piece of wood protruding from the backpack, nor did they see anything in Subject 1’s hands; however, they were concerned that the piece of wood was inside the backpack. Officer A began verbalizing with Subject 1, asking him to drop the backpack; however, Subject 1 did not acknowledge Officer A. Witness B was watching out of her apartment window, and called down to Subject 1 to comply with the officers. Officer A asked Witness B to let the officers handle the situation. Officer B then began speaking with Subject 1, telling him that they were not going to hurt him, that they were there to help him, and asking him to drop the backpack. Subject 1 occasionally made statements that did not make sense to the officers, but was otherwise unresponsive. After approximately five minutes of trying to talk to Subject 1, Officers A and B discussed a plan of action to remove the backpack from Subject 1, and to take him into custody. The officers decided that Officer A would approach Subject 1 from the front, and Officer B would approach Subject 1 from the rear. Officers A and B initiated their plan, and Officer A was able to knock the backpack off of Subject 1’s shoulder and kick it away. Officer A then placed Subject 1’s left hand in a wrist lock. As he was retrieving his handcuffs, Officer A lost control of Subject 1’s hand. Subject 1 then became agitated and grabbed the handcuffs with his right hand. Officer A told Officer B that Subject 1 had grabbed the handcuffs, and held on to the handcuffs to prevent Subject 1 from taking full control of them. As Officer A and Subject 1 struggled for control of the handcuffs, Officer B struggled to control Subject 1’s right hand. The officers struggled with Subject 1, attempting to maintain control of the handcuffs and get his arms behind his back. Subject 1 struggled against the officers’ efforts. Subject 1 and the officers then fell onto the stairwell leading up to the apartment. Subject 1 landed face-down, with Officers A and B on his left and right sides, respectively. The officers continued to struggle for control of Subject 1’s arms. Officer A repeatedly told Subject 1 to “Stop resisting.” For his part, Subject 1 was saying, “Ow, ow,” and “Don’t hurt me.” Officer A retrieved his handcuffs from Subject 1’s grasp.


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Witnesses A and B heard Subject 1 shout “Mom,” exited their apartment and stood on the stairway. From that position, the two observed Subject 1 on his stomach on the stairs, struggling with the officers. Officer A decided to spray Subject 1 with oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, and drew his canister. However, Officer A decided that there was not enough space to use OC without spraying Officer B. Officer A then re-holstered his OC canister and the struggle continued. Meanwhile, Subject 1 was calling to Witnesses A and B, asking them for help. Witnesses A and B told Subject 1 to comply with the officers’ orders. As the struggle continued, Officer A, who was becoming fatigued, again drew his OC canister. Officer A advised Officer B that he was going to use the spray. Officer B turned away to avoid being affected by the spray; however, Subject 1 turned his head away as well. Officer A then re-holstered the OC canister, losing control of Subject 1’s left hand as he did so. Subject 1 then reached out for Witness A, who was on the stairs, grabbed her hand, and asked her for help. Officer A attempted to get Subject 1’s hand away from Witness A and, as he did so, Subject 1’s left hand landed on the TASER Officer A had holstered on his left side.

According to Officer B, Subject 1’s hand became entangled in the webbing of the TASER holster. Officer B, concerned that Subject 1 was “actually going after that [TASER] and utilizing it on us” told Officer A, “He’s stuck. He’s in by the [TASER] … we need to do something. Get him away from the TASER.” Officer B then grabbed Subject 1’s right wrist and applied a wrist lock.

Note: By Officer B’s account, Officer A’s attempt to deploy OC spray occurred after Subject 1’s hand was entangled with the TASER and as Officer B continued to apply the wrist lock. Note: According to Officer A, he noticed that the retention strap on the top of his pistol holster was unsnapped and that the pistol was in the forward position. As such, Officer A believed that the pistol was not secure and that there was nothing to prevent his weapon from sliding out of the holster.

Officer B then shot a one-second burst of OC spray into Subject 1’s left eye. Officer B was unsure whether the OC spray affected Subject 1. Officer B attempted to offer some “comfort” to Subject 1, and, to that end “grabbed his hand and said, “I am here. I want to help you. I don’t want to hurt you. Please calm down. Please put your hands behind your back. Do so.” According to Officer B, Subject 1 -“grabbed onto [Officer B’s] hand like he wanted [Officer B] to help him. But his actions were saying something different.” Officer B then let go of Subject 1’s right hand and struck him twice in the head with a fist. When the punches proved ineffective, Officer A told Officer B, “I’m putting out a help call,” and activated the emergency button on his radio.


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Concerned that the punches had not worked, no assistance had arrived, and nothing that the officers had done was working, Officer B told Officer A to “choke him out.”

Note: Officer B subsequently explained that “everything [the officers] were trying to do until that point wasn’t working.” Officer B was concerned that Subject 1 would take the TASER, use it against the officers and “immobilize” them. Officer B also felt that the officers were exhausted and that back-up was “quite a few minutes” away. Officer B did not believe that the use of a baton was an option, as they were in an “enclosed area” and she did not think that it would be possible to “get a good strike” on Subject 1.

Officer A heard Officer B’s direction to “choke him out” and applied a carotid restraint control hold (CRCH) to Subject 1’s neck using his right arm. Officer A was unable to fully “lock” the restraint due to pain he was experiencing in his hand. As Officer A was applying the CRCH, the officers and Subject 1 fell down onto the landing at the foot of the stairwell, with Officer A landing on his back and Subject 1 lying on top of Officer A. As Officer A continued to apply the CRCH, the officers turned Subject 1 over, onto his stomach. As Office A continued to apply the CRCH, Officer B observed Subject 1’s feet “kind of twitch a little.” Meanwhile, Officer A heard Subject 1 gasping for air and noticed that Subject 1’s level of resistance was declining.

Note: Officer A indicated that he did not use the TASER during the struggle because it had the cartridge attached and he believed that it could not be used in the “close contact” mode in this condition.

Shortly after the help call was broadcast, Officers C and D arrived at the location of the incident. Upon their arrival, Officers C and D observed Subject 1 resisting and Officers A and B on top of him. Officers C and D told Subject 1 to stop resisting. Subject 1 stated that he needed his medication. Officer C told Subject 1 to put his arms behind his back and they would get the medication. Subject 1 complied, and Officers C and E handcuffed him. Having handcuffed Subject 1, Officers C and D broadcast that the subject was in custody, and that they needed a supervisor and Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Officers A and B. Subject 1, whose nose was bleeding slightly, was examined at the scene by paramedics. Officers A and B were transported to a local hospital, where Officer A was treated for a wrist injury, and Officer B was treated for arm and leg contusions. The BOPC noted that, as Officers A and B arrived at the location, Officer A broadcast their status and location via his handheld radio; however, CD never received Officer A’s transmission. Officers A and B should have ensured CD received their transmission prior to approaching the subject. Officer A attempted to engage Subject 1 in verbal communication. After numerous attempts, the officers switched roles and continued to provide Subject 1 with verbal commands. Subject 1


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remained unresponsive and in possession of a backpack, which may have contained a weapon. It would have been tactically safer for Offices A and B to request a back-up unit prior to making any attempts to approach Subject 1.

After several minutes, Subject 1 remained unresponsive to the officers’ verbal commands. Officers A and B formulated a plan and approached Subject 1 with the intention of taking him into custody. Officer B approached Subject 1’s right side and controlled his right arm as Officer A approached Subject 1’s left side. Officer A removed Subject 1’s backpack and controlled his left arm. As Officer A removed his handcuffs and placed them on Subject 1’s left wrist, Subject 1 broke free and grabbed the metal links between the handcuffs. It was apparent that Officer A did not adhere to the proper handcuffing techniques. It would have been tactically safer for Officer A to ensure he had control of Subject 1’s left wrist prior to removing his handcuffs. Additionally, Officer A should have maintained control of the handcuffs.

As the officers were attempting to overcome Subject 1’s resistance, Officer B requested a back-up unit through CD. It would have been prudent for Officer B to request “assistance” or “help” after becoming involved in a struggle. Officer A subsequently upgraded the request to a help call by activating the emergency trigger on his handheld radio.

As the struggle continued, the officers and Subject 1 fell to the ground. There, Officer B deployed OC spray into Subject 1’s face from a distance of less than three feet. Officer B should be reminded that the optimal distance for OC spray deployment is between three and twelve feet. A distance less than three feet does not allow the active ingredients to mix properly. Also, at close range, there is potential for eye injury.

Officer was equipped with a TASER. The BOPC noted that although the officers were properly equipped with the necessary tools, they did not use them. Officer A indicated he did not use the TASER’s direct stun feature because he believed that the TASER could not be deployed in direct stun mode with a cartridge attached. Officer A should be reminded that nothing precludes him from using the TASER’s direct stun feature with or without the cartridge attached.

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s tactics to warrant formal training.

The BOPC found Officers A and B’s non-lethal use of force to be in policy. The BOPC noted that Department policy states that a CRCH may only be used when lethal force is authorized and shall only be exercised when reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impracticable. The BOPC further noted that Department policy regarding the use of deadly force provides that, “An officer is authorized to use deadly force when it reasonably appears necessary to protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, or…To apprehend a fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of deadly force where there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed…Deadly force shall only be exercised when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impracticable.”


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As such, Department policy authorizes the use of a CRCH at a threshold that is essentially the same as the threshold at which the use of a firearm is authorized.

The BOPC noted that Officer A believed that the security of his pistol had been compromised, was experiencing significant pain as a result of a wrist injury, and was fatigued. These factors, in concert with Officer A’s very limited field experience, limited knowledge regarding his available force options (i.e., the TASER), and, most notably, a direction from his Officer B (Officer A’s Training Officer) to apply a CRCH, support the reasonableness of Officer A’s decision to apply the hold.

The BOPC noted that, although the evidence in this case established that Officer B had engaged in a prolonged struggle, was fatigued, and had exhausted or deemed impracticable certain force options, it did not establish that Officer B’s direction to apply a CRCH conformed with the policy regulating the use of deadly force. Specifically:

• The evidence did not establish that Officer B reasonably believed that an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death existed. Officer B asserted the belief that Subject 1 could obtain the TASER from Officer A. However, there was no evidence to indicate that Officer B saw Subject 1 make an attempt to take the TASER at any time during the incident. Rather, Officer B saw Subject 1’s left hand in proximity to the TASER at some point during the struggle.

Officer B did not articulate a plausible reason for believing that Subject 1 would take the TASER and use it against the officers. Rather, the stated belief appears to have been highly speculative. Other than his holding Officer B’s hand, neither of the involved officers indicated that Subject 1 attempted to assault them during the incident. The evidence was indicative of a scenario where Subject 1 strenuously resisted placing his arms behind his back for handcuffing by pulling his arms away from the officers’ grasps. As such, there was no basis for a reasonable belief by Officer B that an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death existed.

• The crime reportedly committed by Subject 1 did not reach the threshold of a “crime involving serious bodily injury or the use of deadly force where there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed.” As such, deadly force was not authorized to avoid a delay in his apprehension.

• The evidence did not indicate that Officer B had exhausted reasonable alternatives to the use of deadly force, or that such alternatives appeared impracticable, at the time the direction was given for the CRCH to be applied. Most notably, there is no indication that Officer B considered the available option of a TASER. More broadly, there was no evidence indicating that the officers were precluded from disengaging from a demonstrably ineffective close-quarters struggle with Subject 1 so as to distance themselves from any potential threats he presented and to facilitate the deployment of other non- or less-lethal force options (e.g., kicks, baton strikes).


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The BOPC recognized the very difficult circumstances with which the officers were confronted, and the apparent good faith in which they attempted to control a resistive subject while fatigued and injured. The BOPC’s finding regarding Officer B’s use of force be found out of policy is based strictly upon an analysis of the available evidence and the policy that regulates the use of deadly force.

The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force (i.e., the application of a CRCH) to be in policy.

The BOPC found Officer B’s use of force (i.e., the direction to Officer A to “Choke him out’) to be out of policy, warranting administrative disapproval.

ACC 037-06 Officer A approached the loading barrel to unload his service pistol in preparation for qualifying. He was in possession of an empty magazine secured behind his ammunition pouch. While in front of the loading barrel, Officer A drew his service pistol and removed the loaded magazine, locked the slide to the rear and placed the live round from the chamber in his hand. Officer A inadvertently inserted the loaded magazine in the pistol. Believing he had cleared his pistol, Officer A began to place his pistol in the holster and pressed the trigger to drop the trigger. In doing so, he fired one round into the concrete walkway.

The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 048-06 While pursuing a Subject 1 on foot, Officer A decided to holster his service pistol. As he did, Officer A pushed his service pistol straight down into his holster and a tactical negligent discharge occurred. Officer A’s round was fired in a downward direction and impacted a concrete sidewalk. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 058-06 While preparing to clean his service pistol, Officer A removed the magazine from his service pistol. Prior to fully unloading his pistol, Officer A used the restroom, leaving his pistol unattended and loaded upon a desktop. Upon his return, Officer Salazar depressed the trigger in order to complete the unloading/disassembly process, resulting in the negligent discharge of a single round. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training.


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ACC 071-06

While at home with his family, Officer A heard his wife scream in an adjacent room, grabbed his service pistol, and went toward his wife. As Officer A entered the room where his wife was, he unintentionally pressed the trigger, firing one round. The round traveled through the living room window and into an open field.

The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 088-06 While at home after his shift, Officer A removed his service pistol from the holster secured on his waistband and heard the hammer partially cock. A visual inspection of his service pistol confirmed that his hammer was partially cocked, however, Officer A did not use the de-cocking lever to render his pistol safe, as trained by the Department. Instead, Officer A attempted to guide the hammer forward by placing his thumb on the hammer while simultaneously pressing the trigger. The hammer slipped from his control, causing the service pistol to fire. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 098-06 After using the restroom, Officer A picked up his gun belt from the sink where he had placed it and fastened it to his waist. Officer A then picked up his service pistol and began to holster it. In the process of holstering, Officer A’s service pistol became jammed on the portion of the holster that accommodates the trigger guard area, preventing him from completing the holstering. Officer A attempted to complete the holstering process, but his finger slipped into the holster and became trapped between the holster and the trigger area. This caused Officer A’s finger to force the trigger back, resulting in the firing of one round into the floor. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 101-06 During an investigation, Officer A recovered a revolver. Officer A noted that the hammer was cocked and the trigger was staged. Officer A attempted to open the cylinder but was unable to. Officer A turned her head and called out to her partner. As she turned back around, the revolver fired. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training.


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ACC 108-06 While serving a search warrant, Detective A noticed large cabinets and a tall door which he believed were large enough to conceal a person. Detective A approached the cabinet door and allowed his shotgun to hang in front of him in a three-point sling position as he removed his service pistol from his holster. Detective A cleared the first two cabinets without any incident and then approached the tall door, but was unable to open the door. Detective A transitioned his service pistol from his primary hand to his left hand and removed a folding knife from his right front pants pocket. Detective A simultaneously held his service pistol in a left-hand close contact position pointed at the door, while using the knife to pry the cabinet door open. Detective A lost his grip on his service pistol and, in an attempt to reacquire his grip, he unintentionally pressed the trigger, firing one round. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training. ACC 031-07 Officer A, while assigned to the front desk, was responsible for performing a shotgun check at the beginning of her shift. Officer A removed the shotgun from the front desk and responded to the rear of the station to conduct the required check. While performing the check, Officer A inadvertently loaded a live round into the chamber of the shotgun. As Officer A continued the shotgun check, she disengaged the safety and pulled the trigger to the rear, a required step of the shotgun check, resulting in the firing of one round into the air. The BOPC found Officer A’s use of force to warrant administrative disapproval. Further, the BOPC directed Officer A to additional firearms training.

BPC# 09-0008

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Transcript of BPC# 09-0008