Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
-
Upload
gretel-r-madanguit -
Category
Documents
-
view
230 -
download
0
Transcript of Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
1/25
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 117857 February 2, 2001
LUIS S. WONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR 118561which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on three (3) counts of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) violations, and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay private respondent the
amounts of P5,500.00, P6,410.00 and P3,375.00, respectively, corresponding to the
value of the checks involved, with the legal rate of interest from the time of filingof the criminal charges, as well as to pay the costs.1wphi1.nt
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press. Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of
calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then give them to agents to present to
customers. The agents would get the purchase orders of customers and forward
them to LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to
the customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the payments.
Petitioner, however, had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly
acknowledged in a confirmation receipt he co-signed with his wife.2
Hence,
petitioners customers were required to issue postdated checks before LPI wouldaccept their purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling
P18,025.00, all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI, asfollows:
(1) Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-C for
P6,410.00 (Exh. "B");
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
2/25
(2) ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P540.00 (Exh. "C");
(3) ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh. "D");
(4) ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "E");
(5) ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. "F");
(6) ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "G").
These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers
who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI
refused to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the
checks to the payment of petitioners unremitted collections for 1984 amounting toP18,077.07.
3LPI waived the P52.07 difference.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the
checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged
on his promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the
reason "account closed." The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBCreturn slip.
On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notified the petitioner of the
dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5)banking days.
On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 224
under three separate Informations for the three checks amounting to
P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00.5
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as follows:6
That on or about the 30th
day of December, 1985 and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time
of issue of the check she/he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then
and there issue, make or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No.
660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
3/25
Limtong which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said
accused, but when the said check was presented with said bank, the same
was dishonored for reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite notice anddemands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and
refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of
P5,500.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No.
660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC
Check No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to the same trialcourt.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testified on behalf of the company,
Limtong averred that he refused to accept the personal checks of petitioner since it
was against company policy to accept personal checks from agents. Hence, he and
petitioner simply agreed to use the checks to pay petitioners unremittedcollections to LPI. According to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the
checks, Wong requested him to defer the deposit of said checks for lack of funds.
Wong promised to replace them within thirty days, but failed to do so. Hence, upon
advice of counsel, he deposited the checks which were subsequently returned onthe ground of "account closed."
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee
the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the
checks not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his
customers. In fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the
total amount of the calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused, namely,
Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn
Mill (P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00),
New Asia Restaurant P3,375.00), and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00).
Although these customers had already paid their respective orders, petitioner
claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.
On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as follows:7
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
4/25
"Wherefore, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Luis S. Wong
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violations of Section 1
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3) Counts and is hereby sentenced
to serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS for each count; to pay
Private Complainant Manuel T. Limtong the sums of Five Thousand Five
Hundred (P5,500.00) Pesos, Six Thousand Four Hundred Ten (P6,410.00)
Pesos and Three Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Five (P3,375.00) Pesos
corresponding to the amounts indicated in Allied Banking Checks Nos.
660143451, 66[0]143464 and 660143463 all issued on December 30, 1985
together with the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the
criminal charges in Court and pay the costs."8
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28, 1994, it
affirmed the trial courts decisionin toto.9
Hence, the present petition.10
Petitioner raises the following questions of law -11
May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22 --- if there is
no more consideration or price or valueever the binding tie that it is incontracts in general and in negotiable instruments in particularbehind the
checks?if even before he deposits the checks, he has ceased to be a holderfor value because the purchase orders (POs) guaranteed by the checks werealready paid?
Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated, isit not then the duty of complainantknowing he is no longer a holder for
valueto return the checks and not to deposit them ever? Upon what legalbasis then may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?
Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason
for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account long after 90 daysfrom maturity of the checks?
May the prosecution apply theprima facie presumption of "knowledge of
lack of funds" against the drawer if the checks were belatedly deposited bythe complainant 157 days after maturity, or will it be then necessary for the
prosecution to show actual proofof "lack of funds" during the 90-day term?
Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase
orders (POs) of his customers. He contends that private respondent is not a
"holder for value" considering that the checks were deposited by private
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
5/25
respondent afterthe customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the
checks, private respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner
further assails the credibility of complainant considering that his answers to cross-
examination questions included: "I cannot recall, anymore" and "We have no more
record."
In his Comment,12
the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been
initially intended by petitioner to guarantee payments due from customers, but
upon the refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per company policy, the
parties had agreed that the checks would be used to pay off petitioners unremitted
collections. Petitioners contention that he did not demand the return of the checks
because he trusted LPIs good faith is contrary to human nature and sound businesspractice, according to the Solicitor General.
The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for paymentof petitioners unremitted collections is a factual issue involving as it does the
credibility of witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by the trial court and
Court of Appeals. Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the
purchase orders of customers, they found the checks were eventually used to settle
the remaining obligations of petitioner with LPI. Although Manuel Limtong was
the sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was found sufficient to prove all
the elements of the offense charged.13
We find no cogent reason to depart from
findings of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases elevated from the Court of
Appeals, our review is confined to allege errors of law. Its findings of fact are
generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the findings by the respondent courtare entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand.
14The lack
of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly held,
this Court is not a trier of facts.15
Moreover, inLlamado v. Court of Appeals,16
we
held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthlesscheck is malum prohibitum." Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under
B.P. Blg. 22.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
6/25
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that
the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds
therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check whenpresented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.17
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case,
are:18
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account orfor value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for thepayment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not thedrawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the checks were
not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation
from the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were
issued as guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee werealready paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having
both ruled that the checks were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as
guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it wasissued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
19
As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumptionjuris tantum that the
second elementprima facieexists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present.20
Thus, the makers knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds.21
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986, or
157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of
knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to
him. He further claims that he should not be expected to keep his bank account
active and funded beyond the ninety-day period.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
7/25
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.The making, drawing andissuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall beprima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficultto establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge
where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check." To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute
provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements forpayment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
22
Contrary to petitioners assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require
a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clearimport of the law is to establish aprima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the
maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for theprima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time
thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must bepresented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By
current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6)
months,23
or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days
after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
8/25
could still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial
court, private respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of
petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was
constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner
was duly notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment
within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that
petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitionersinsistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the respondent courts affirmanceof his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines inAdministrative Circular No. 12-
2000, which took effect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner
should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the checks that were dishonored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is
hereby MODIFIED so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner
is ORDERED to pay a FINE of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of
the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent
to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12058, and
(3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal
Case No. CBU-12055, with subsidiary imprisonment24
in case of insolvency to pay
the aforesaid fines. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered to pay toLPI the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon
from the time of filing the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay thecosts.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
9/25
Search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998
EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996,1
and the resolution, dat
1997,2 of the Court of Appeals, affirming their conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Q(Branch 100) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc. (Ervin
engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, pet
Nieto, is the firm's purchasing manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check fo
the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partia
security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Bank
(CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branBoulevard, Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in cash
the check within seven days from notice. The letter was received by Ervine on the same d
petitioners did not pay within the time given.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
10/25
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The check was d
Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check was to replace the di
the P9,860.16 balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check
were received by a GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS di
dishonored check.
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a criminal com
petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After preliminary investigation, an information w
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 97). However, the case was dismissed by th
11, 1989, upon motion of the prosecution, on the ground that Ervine had already paid the
check.
On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo B. Ali
another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against petitioners. This resulted in the fi
information against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year i
and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently denied petitioners'reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the
failed to prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction oweakness of the evidence of the defense rather than on the
evidence of the prosecution.
C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on
"mistake of fact" and "lack of knowledge."
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the deci
court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment.
By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an affidavit of deby GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago which states that the case arose from a mere
difference" between petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any daof the issuance of the check in question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in pros
On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time invoking the r
Lao v. Court of Appeals,3in which this Court reversed a conviction for violation of B.P. B
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
11/25
showing that the accused had no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts ofLao v. Court of Ap
different from those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of desistance of Dominador Sa
moment, such affidavit having been made only after petitioners' conviction.
After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners' conviction for violat22 is well founded.
First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing,
any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payme
full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank fo
of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, withou
cause, ordered the bank to stop paymnent.
4
The maker's knowledge is presumed from the check for insufficiency of funds.5Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly provides:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.The making, d
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee becaus
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) d
of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insuf
or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amou
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such chec
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid b
In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous chec
gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim that this check had been intended by th
bad check they had previously issued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS
however, the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills, on
of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the peri
to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if such check was intended to replace the
issuance on April 13, 198815 days after petitioners had been notified on March 29, 19
dishonor of their previous checkcannot negate the presumption that petitioners knew oinsufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
such check be given within five (5) days from the notice of dishonor to them.
Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling inLao v. Court of Appeals,6
they s
acquitted because the preparation of checks is the responsibility of the company accountan
is sign the checks. They claim that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are sthe bank to pay for the checks.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
12/25
In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by her employer,
Investment House, to countersign checks in bank. The accused was a mere employee who
anything to do with the issuance of checks for the company. She did not know to whom th
be paid as the names of payees were written only later by the head of operations. Moreove
dishonor was given to her as required by B.P. Blg. 22 2. It could thus rightly be conclude
accused issued checks to apply to account not knowing that at the time of issuance funds w
to pay for the checks.
Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. While it ma
was the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains th
the owners and officers of the company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "Where the c
a corporation, company, or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored, he instrucompany accountant to prepare a replacement check.
7This belies petitioners' claim that th
in the preparation of checks8
and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of
Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than passin
claim that this case was simply the result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and pet
the former did not really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. Afte
case below with tenacity, complainants going so far as to file another complaint after their
been dismissed, it is trifling with this Court for complainants to now assert that the filing o
simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance, like retractions,
disfavored. 9 The affidavit in this case, which was made after petitioners' conviction, is nominute attempt to save them from punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a
issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.
Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by deleting the sent
imprisonment and, in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them. In su
plea, they allege that they do not have any record of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca i
age (late 60s); and, that they come from good families. Petitioners claim that "with their f
background and social standing there is no reason why they, will refuse to pay a due and d
of only P10,000.00. It is precisely because of their founded belief that the subject obligatithat they refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge."
The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of petitione
think so ourselves. However, we believe that they can be considered in determining the ap
penalty to impose on petitioners.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
13/25
B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days bu
one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the chec
shall in no case esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment a
of the Court." Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who pre
contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all
although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, t
simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a p
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of di
by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observe
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal li
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.10
In this case w
fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate pena
each of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modificationsentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of P20,0
equivalent to double the amount of the check.
SO ORDERED
Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., is on leave.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
14/25
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998
EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996, 1 and the
resolution, dated December 2, 1997, 2 of the Court of Appeals, affirming their
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
15/25
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc.
(Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment,
while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firm's purchasing manager.
On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General
Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial
payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was
drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment
in cash of the amount of the check within seven days from notice. The letter was
received by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did not pay within the time
given.
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The
check was drawn on the Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that
the check was to replace the dishonored check, the P9,860.16 balance being partial
payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check and the voucher were
received by a GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS
did not return the dishonored check.
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a
criminal complaint against petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After
preliminary investigation, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 97). However, the case was dismissed by the court on May
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
16/25
11, 1989, upon motion of the prosecution, on the ground that Ervine had already
paid the amount of the check.
On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo
B. Alindaya, filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against
petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). After trial, petitioners were
found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently deniedpetitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to
prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction on the allegedweakness of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence
of the prosecution.
C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on grounds of "mistake
of fact" and "lack of knowledge."
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that
the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine
but without imprisonment.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
17/25
By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an
affidavit of desistance executed by GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago
which states that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference" between
petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any damage as a
result of the issuance of the check in question and, that GARDS was no longerinterested in prosecuting the case.
On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time
invoking the recent decision in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 3 in which this Court
reversed a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the accused
had no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts of Lao v.
Court of Appeals are different from those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of
desistance of Dominador Santiago is of no moment, such affidavit having been
made only after petitioners' conviction.
After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners' conviction forviolation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well founded.
First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank forinsufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop paymnent. 4 The
maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of
funds. 5 Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly provides:
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
18/25
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holderthereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their
previous check, petitioners gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim that
this check had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had previouslyissued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however,
the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one
for the period of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and
another one for the period of March 16 to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But
even if such check was intended to replace the bad one, its issuance on April 13,
198815 days after petitioners had been notified on March 29, 1988 of the
dishonor of their previous checkcannot negate the presumption that petitioners
knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check.Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5) days from
the notice of dishonor to them.
Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of Appeals,
6 they should be acquitted because the preparation of checks is the responsibility of
the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks. They claim that they
rely on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay
for the checks.
In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by her
employer, Premiere Investment House, to countersign checks in bank. The accused
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
19/25
was a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the issuance of checks
for the company. She did not know to whom the checks would be paid as the
names of payees were written only later by the head of operations. Moreover, no
notice of dishonor was given to her as required by B.P. Blg. 22 2. It could thus
rightly be concluded that the accused issued checks to apply to account notknowing that at the time of issuance funds were insufficient to pay for the checks.
Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds.
While it may be true that it was the company's accountant who actually prepared
the rubber check, the fact remains that petitioners are the owners and officers of the
company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company, or entity, the person or persons who actually signed thecheck in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored, he
instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check. 7 This belies
petitioners' claim that they had no hand in the preparation of checks 8 and shows
that petitioners were in control of the finances of the company.
Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than
passing mention. The claim that this case was simply the result of a
misunderstanding between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did not
really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. After
prosecuting the case below with tenacity, complainants going so far as to file
another complaint after their first one had been dismissed, it is trifling with this
Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their case was simply a
mistake. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance, like retractions, are
generally disfavored. 9 The affidavit in this case, which was made after petitioners'
conviction, is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from punishment.
Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
20/25
check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied.
Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.
Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by deleting
the sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be
imposed on them. In support of their plea, they allege that they do not have any
record of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s); and,
that they come from good families. Petitioners claim that "with their family
background and social standing there is no reason why they, will refuse to pay a
due and demandable debt of only P10,000.00. It is precisely because of their
founded belief that the subject obligation has been paid that they refused to be
intimidated by a criminal charge."
The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of
petitioners' guilt. We think so ourselves. However, we believe that they can be
considered in determining the appropriate penalty to impose on petitioners.
B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirtydays but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than
double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case esceed two hundred
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court."
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this
appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the
range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. 10 In this
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
21/25
case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check
involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
SO ORDERED
Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., is on leave.
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
22/25
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 February 21, 2001
RE : PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance
of a Check Without Sufficient Funds for Credit and for Other Purposes) imposesthe penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
(1) year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check, which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000, or both such fine andimprisonment at the discretion of the court.
In its decision inEduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16
November 1998; 298 SCRA 656, 664) the Supreme Court (Second Division) per
Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of finein an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court
said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought
this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have
accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a
prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the
penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Section 1, par. 1, the samephilosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely,
that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation f personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to
the protection of the social order. In this case, we believe that a fine in an
amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate
penalty to impose on each of the petitioners In the recent case of Rosa Lim
v. People of the Philippines (G. R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000), the
Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of
imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the
maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded
that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing
policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
23/25
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The Court Administrator shall cause the immediatedissemination of this Administrative Circular to all courts and judges concerned.
This Administrative Circular, referred to and approved by the Supreme Court en
banc, shall take effect upon its issuance.
Issued this 21st day of February, 2001.
[Sgd.] HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
24/25
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 February 14, 2001
TO : ALL JUDGES
SUBJECT : CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
12-2000 ON THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSABLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING CHECK LAW.
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding the
operation ofAdministrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000. In
particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to:
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations ofBatas Pambansa
Blg. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused who is
found guilty of violating the provisions ofB.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the
fine which he is sentenced to pay considering thatAdministrative Circular
No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of
the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the
Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could beresorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention ofAdministrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule ofpreference in the application of the penalties provided for inB.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislativeintent behind the law.
Thus,Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions ofB.P. Blg. 22 such that where thecircumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone
rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more
-
7/29/2019 Bouncing Checks Law - Cases
25/25
appropriate penalty,Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed ahindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1.Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as analternative penalty for violations ofB.P. Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of theRevised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En Banc
in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session of 13 February 2001.
The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court Administrator shall
immediately cause the implementation of this Administrative Circular.
This Administrative Circular shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation not later than 20 February 2001.
Issued this 14th day of February, 2001.
[Sgd.] HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice