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Bottom Up Urban Planning – A Case Study

by Dr Edward CY Yiu Associate Professor

Dept of Geography and Resource Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Urban Studies in a Nutshell, Urban Studies Programme, CUHK

URSP1002

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Planning becomes a Political Process

• When someone make the decisions for others, it becomes politics.

• A political fight for benefits, because planning involves benefit transfers and aims to achieve equity by the knowledge of planners.

• Nigel’s (2007) definition of Urban Planning from “Urban Planning Theory” as a technical and political process concerned with the use of land and design of the urban environment, including transportation networks, to guide and ensure the orderly development of settlements and communities.

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Top Down Urban Planning Approaches: Government-led v Private-led

Private (developer)-

led

Government-led

Objectives Profit maximization for

share holders

Implementation of government

policies, and strike a balance

between cost efficiency and

social justice

Comprehensiveness piecemeal comprehensive

Procedural justice No Public engagements, gazetting,

hearings, and other formal

procedures of planning are

believed to reflect public

interests.

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Actors in Property-led Urban Planning

Land

Government Planning

Finance

Developers

Contractors /

Suppliers /

Professionals

Property Buyers

Estate agents /

Lawyers /

Professionals

Finance

Dev Controls

Land and Monetary Controls

• Private interests: land owners, bankers, developers, investors, potential customers;

• Professional interests: lawyers, surveyors, engineers, building contractors and sub-contractors, planners, architects;

• Public interests: planning authorities, land authorities, highway authorities, building control, etc.

• Community interests: amenity groups, local communities, environmentalists, conservationists, post-80s generation…

• Government’s interests: ? • If the government is also the landlord, whose interests

is the government caring?

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Actors in Property-led Urban Planning

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Theory 1: New Urbanism

• Because of the professional knowledge and

power,

• Urban plans should be done by professional

planners.

• They know better than you, and their plans can

achieve an optimal public interests.

• But why they would care for the public interests

more than their self interests?

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Principal-Agent Problem

• Principal-agent problem • No principal-multiple

agent problem • Engagement versus

consultation

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Principal-Agent Problem

• the principal–agent problem or agency dilemma concerns the difficulties in motivating one party (the "agent"), to act in the best interests of another (the "principal") rather than in his own interests.

• Public interests (the principal) • Planners / Town Planning Board / Politicians

(the agent)

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Principal-Agent Problem • Who represents the public at large? • Who shall plan, decide, and implement (control)? • If they are different groups of people, with

different group interests, then it becomes a well known principle-agent problem

• Any incentives for the decision makers / planners to care about the public interests?

• Any mechanism to align their group interests with the public interests?

• Any liabilities of the decision makers / planners if the plans do harm?

• Any evaluations of the performance of urban plans?

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Problem of Govt-led Planning

• Principle-agent problem?! • Mismatch between power and liability • Who pays but no say; • Who says and get pays without worrying about being laid

off; • Who stays or dislocated faces the May Day.

Taxpayers

• Bear all the costs, but no say

Politicians/Planners

• Make the decisions, but no responsibility

Residents/to-be-dislocated

• Bear all the consequences, but no say

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No Principal, But Multiple Agents Problem

• Urban planning is not simply a principal-agent problem, but a no-principal-but-multiple-agent problem;

• As no one can represent the principal, there is basically no principal;

• There are multiple agents (planners, TPB, politicians), doing different things, with different self-interests, but no liabilities;

• As there is no principal, no one evaluates the agents’ performance;

• There is no improvement system!

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Decision Makers • Planners – plans; • Public – engages; • TPB – decides. • Who are TPB members? Can you name 3 of them? • Who choose the members? The Chief Executive • Are they planners or related professionals? Not at

all, but almost all of them are no-pay part-time • Are there any incentives for them to care public

interests? • Do they bear any liabilities for making wrong

decisions? • i.e. No Competitions, No Incentives

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Theory 2: Participative Planning Framework

Source: Fainstein, S.S. (2000) New Directions in Planning Theory

http://uar.sagepub.com/content/35/4/451.full.pdf+html

• Empowering and Engagement:

– City building for the benefit of nonelite groups

– requires empowering those who are excluded not just from

discussions but from structural positions that allow them genuine

influence.

– Ability to participate is one resource in the struggle for power, but

it must be bolstered by other resources, including money, access

to expertise, effective organization, and media coverage.

– [But] Communicative planning theory has evaded the issue of

universalism by developing a general procedural ethic without

substantive content.

聯和墟：由下而上的城市規劃典範 A Bottom Up Planning Case: Luen Wo Hui

研究團隊：姚松炎，姚偉彤，陳淑美，劉仕豪，鄭雪妍，姚葦杭

研究資助機構：文化葫蘆 Organizer: Hulu Culture

24/1/2014

CUHK Urban Forum 5 April 2013

兩河匯聚，二路相連

Two Rivers, Two Roads

上梧桐河

Indus River

麻芴河 Ma

Wat River

聯和墟

LWH

戰前，稻米之鄉

Before WWII, Rice Fields

圖片來源：政府檔案

圖片來源：政府檔案

墟不應求 Lack of Markets

清朝嘉慶年間，

新安縣志記載香港三個墟市In Qing Dynasty, there were only 3 markets in HK：

＊元朗大橋墩墟

(Yuen Long Mkt)

＊上水石湖墟

(Sheung Shui Mkt)

＊大埔舊墟

(Tai Po Mkt)

大埔墟概覽

墟市地圖

資 料 來 源 ： 吳 倫 霓 霞 ， 〈 香 港 新 界 墟 市 之 興 起 與 衰 落—大 埔 墟 研 究 〉 ， 《 漢 學 研 究 》 第 3 卷 ， 第 2 期 (1985年)，頁633-653，頁640。

1595

1892

1898

1898年石湖墟 Shek Wu Hui

1898年《展拓香港界址專條》附圖中的石湖墟（Shek-u-hü）

1927年，沙頭角公路開通

Sha Tau Kok Road was built

圖片來源：政府檔案 粉嶺交通便利

Fanling became more convenient

聯和墟建墟起因

Why a New Bazaar?

1. 不滿石湖墟多收秤佣 Discontent with the commission

charges of Shek Wu Hui (參考《聯和風采》)；

2. 政府不滿舊墟衛生情況 Discontent with the hygienic

conditions of other bazaars (參考政府年報,1946)；

3. 新界農地用途急遽改變 abrupt change of agricultural

land uses (參考陳國成,2008)；

4. 政府農業政策 government agricultural policy change

(參考陳國成,2008)。

1950s年代石湖墟 Shek Wu Hui

1964年石湖墟 Shek Wu Hui

戰後，菜農湧現 After WWII, Vegetable Fields

1950年代，70萬中國難民湧入香港 (700,000 refugees to HK from Mainland in the 1950s)；

難民掌握種植蔬菜技術，在新界種菜 (Most are experienced farmers esp vegetables) ；

收入比種米多達3.5倍，地主多願意租田種菜 (production rate increased by 3.5 folds cf rice)；

令菜田面積在短短7年間增加3倍 (vegetable farmland up 3 folds)。

農地面積 (公頃 ha) 1954年 1961年

米田 (Rice Fields) 20,191 16,796

菜田 (Vege Fields) 2,254 6,172

共 (total) 22,445 22,968

香港糧荒，米價限制 Famines: Rice Price Control

香港糧荒 Famines in HK 1940 - 1960

1942年4月，日治時期，限購6兩4錢食米 (beginning of WWII)

1945年7月，二戰尾聲，每日70-80人餓死 (end of WWII)

1950年3月，70萬難民湧入，發配米證 (Refugees influx in 1950)

1956年10月，石硤尾騷亂，米價高漲 (riot in 1956)

農業政策形成墟市雛型

Agriculture Policy 戰後，政府嚴格控制食米價格，實行配米證制度 (After WWII, rice quota policy was implemented)；

蔬菜方面，政府只統籌收集、營銷，並收取佣金 (govt centralized vegetables sale and charged commissions)；

圖片來源：政府檔案

農業政策形成墟市雛型

Agriculture Policy 故此，雖然1950年粉嶺安樂村已設立農作物收集站，很多農民仍然將收割的蔬菜帶到當時仍未建墟的這個地方買賣，免除政府食佣，形成聯和墟的前身。(many farmers formed farmers’

bazaars, because selling the produces

at farmers’ bazaars can save the

commissions to the government)

新界首個由村民規劃發展項目 The 1st Bottom Up Planning Project

村民不滿石湖墟多收秤佣 (參考《聯和風采》) Discontent with the commission

charges of Shek Wu Hui ；

政府不滿舊墟衛生情況 (參考政府年報,1946) Discontent with the hygienic

conditions of other bazaars ；

鄉紳提出發展新墟市，政府全力支持Villagers proposed to build a new market；

原以全私人發展新市鎮設計模式。

由下而上的新市鎮發展，由村民規劃、設計、建造、出售、管理。(the villagers plan, design, build, sell and manage)

圖片來源：政府檔案

新市鎮發展規劃 - 市

(Bazaar) 整項發展佔地600,000呎sf(size 230x250m)

分為市、鎮兩部分 (incl. mkt and town)。

墟市包括： 有蓋街市18,000呎sf(mkt size 60x30m)，提供60檔，一層新式建築 (60 stalls)；

露天街市24,000呎(open mkt size 60x40m)，提供100多檔乾貨，中間有井 (100 stalls)；

以農產品為主(a farmers’bazaar)。

《聯和風采》

新市鎮發展規劃 - 鎮 (Town)

城鎮部分包括 Incl.：

周圍商鋪324,000呎sf(90 shops area 324,000sf)，提供90間鋪位，兩層新式建築，鋼筋混凝土，臨街懸臂式大騎樓(Tong Laus)；

主要銷售農業工具及相關行業(farming related)；

共設有誤樂場所，包括戲院 (cinema)；

住宅佔地60,000呎，提供100間小白屋，樓高15呎、長30呎、闊13呎；兩層(地下連閣仔)設計，一廳兩房，有廚房及小天井(100 small houses)；

中間分成多6條街道(原為私家街)，原設計還有公共設施，如消防局、警署、公廁浴室、停車場、公共空間等(public facilities)。

鎮中有市，中西合璧

Town Country – East meets West

圖片來源：陳國成 (2008) 粉嶺

聯和墟街市 LWH Bazaar 全項目以中軸對稱平衡為主調，

街市座落正中，建築物本身亦以中軸對稱平衡為設計特色 (symmetrical, balanced)；

全項目講求比例與工能配合，2:1為主要比例格局，街市亦以闊200呎，深100呎設計，為全項目中最大規模之地標建築 (emphases proportion 2:1)；

正門裝飾以Art Deco風格，配合戰後簡約白色設計，建築師為YC Mok (Art Deco style, white color simplicity)。

商鋪唐樓設計

Tong Lau Design

2:1 (240' x 120') 地盤面積，臨街露台，圓角對街，下鋪上居，相連閣樓。

街市西式建築設計

Western Style Bazaar

西式教堂、港式戲院 Western Style Church, Hong Kong Style Cinema

圖片來源：心繫香江 - 重溫往日情及粉嶺聖約瑟堂

聯和新村 - 百間簡約白屋住宅

Luen Wo Sun Chuen – 100 houses

100間小白屋，樓高15呎、長30呎、闊13呎； 兩層(地下連閣仔)設計，一廳兩房，有廚房及小天井；

政府提供土地優惠

Government’s Concessions 1954年7月12日 (land grant on 12 Jul 1954)

政府賣出流經小涌土地 land sale；

免補地價(農地轉屋地[商住用地]) waived land premium for modifications;

批准規劃建築設計 approved town planning and design；

提供基建設施及免息貸款等 provided infrastructure and interest-free loans。

但政府並沒有提供區內公共設施 but no provisions for amenities within the site；

並在新契內加入新增屋地條款 and some new clauses。

政府提供土地優惠

Land Premium Concession

優化合作模式，政府收回土地

Land Resumption & Regrant

因為公共設施有爭議，政府於1961年1月指發展項目未符地契條款 Quarrel between govt and villagers on the responsibility of provisions of public facilities： 建築契諾 (Building Covenants);

轉售限制 (Alienation Clause);

改建申請 (Prior Approvals on Alterations and Additions);

道路維修 (Road Maintenance)。

政府出價60萬賠償已建築成本 (land was resumed by govt)；

允許繼續第三期建設，但政府要求補繳地價每方呎六元，以為區內建路築渠 (the 3rd phase was granted by charging a premium of $6/sf)。

聯和墟發展費用

Development Costs 建造費 Cost 數量 Qty 合共 Total

聯和新村

Housing

2,000 100 200,000

鋪位 Tong Lau

(連地價)

22,000 -

28,000

90 1,980,000 -

2,520,000

街市 Bazaar 2,000? 60 120,000?

合共 Total 2,300,000 - 2,840,000

(未計公共設施，已超支10% - 30%?!)

集資 Shares 100 21,918股 2,191,800

(pre-sale預售樓花?!)

Overbudget by 10-30% before providing public facilities

補地價令白屋成本大升3倍

300% cost increase 建造費 Cost 數量 Qty 合共 Total

聯和新村

Housing

2,000 100 200,000

地價 Land

Cost

4,800 100 480,000

每呎計 psf $2.5($6地價) 800 呎 $2,000 ($4,800)

已預售24間

Sold price

$3 / 呎 (因而改為20年期?)

合共 Total 6,800 100 680,000

土地三權分立

3 Types of Ownership 地盤面積60萬平方呎(6公頃) Total site area 6ha； 地價：每呎2.67元(16萬元向政府及私人買入) land price $2.67/sf；

後因公共設施建造成本高昂(單計排污渠一項，政府收取十二萬元，等於8年項目利潤)，聯和置業把街市和商鋪的地權歸還政府，但保留聯和新村地權 govt charged $120,000 for providing drainage system)；

形成聯和墟三(地)權分立：(3 types of ownership) 政府把商鋪唐樓地契重新批出給買家 (tong lau)； 政府重新批出街市營運權給聯和置業，繼續管理秤佣制 (management rights of the bazaar)；

聯和置業把聯和新村以20年期佔用權賣出 (20-year leasehold interests)。

聯和置業股份

LW Company Shares

圖片來源：陳國成 (2008) 粉嶺

聯和置業股份

LW Company Shares

圖片來源：政府檔案

聯和墟街市租金

LWH Market Rent 有蓋街市

Covered

Bazaar

肉檔 (meat stalls)

魚雞鴨檔(fish, chicken,

duck stalls)

鹹魚檔 (salt fish stalls)

菜豆腐檔 (vege stalls)

共 Total

數量 16 16 14 14 60檔stalls

1951租金rent $48/月mon $48/月mon $48/月mon $48/月 $34,560/年yr

露天街市 open bazaar 128檔stalls

1951租金rent $10/月 $15,360/年yr

資料來源: 政府檔案

聯和墟每月秤佣收入 LWH Monthly Weighing Commissions

年份 Period 共 Total

1960 - 1968 $5,000 - $9,000

1969 > $20,000

1977 - 1981 $100,000

1983 - 1988 $120,000 – $160,000

1989 - $40,000 (a new market was built)

* 秤佣以專利權出售予競投者

(限創辦股原居民，承辦1年)

圖片來源：陳國成 (2008) 粉嶺

聯和墟公秤收費表 Fee Scale of the Commission 貨物類別

Type

重量 Weight 秤費 Fee 備註

Remarks

大豬 L Pig 50斤以上 每隻5元 買賣各半

小豬 S Pig 50斤以下 每隻3元 買賣各半

雞、鴨、鵝 - 每隻2元 買賣各半

蔬菜 Vege 每秤50斤以下 每秤3元 買賣各半

超過50斤 每秤4元 買賣各半

* 至1980年代，秤佣仍是每秤4元。(資料來源：陳漢林)

資料來源：陳國成 (2008) 粉嶺

完

•資助機構：文化葫蘆

•研究、文字：姚松炎

•繪圖、製片：姚葦杭

•日期：2014年1月24日