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Difªculties faced in Materializing a Transnational ENGO Conservation Network Iosif Botetzagias, Prue Robinson, and Lily Venizelos

Accounting for Difªculties faced inMaterializing a Transnational ENGOConservation Network: A Case-Studyfrom the Mediterranean

•

Iosif Botetzagias, Prue Robinson, and Lily Venizelos

Introduction

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) “are strategic organizations whose ar-senal includes the formation of coalitions, tactical lobbying and multi-levelcampaigning.”1 The most basic linkage form, of paramount importance forany subsequent coalition’s formation, lobbying etc., is networking. Networksare considered as open, ºexible, dynamic, horizontal organizational forms orsets of interconnected nodes—as opposed to hierarchies and market-basedexchanges2—which “communicate . . . sharing values or goals”3 in a “voluntary,reciprocal and horizontal” way.4 As Stone argues, “a network ampliªes and dis-seminates ideas, research and information to an extent that could not beachieved by individuals or institutions alone.”5

Organizations opt for networking since in the long run it can offer them anumber of potential beneªts, such as increased access, efªciency, visibility, credi-bility or legitimacy, reduced isolation as well as providing solidarity and sup-port.6 Network participation gives free access to information, expertise and(possibly) ªnancial resources while it is also initiated by the (potential) mem-bers’ realization that some goals can be better attained through collaborationthan by acting alone,7 especially since each network member brings along itsspeciªc strengths and fulªls a particular role.8 For small and peripheral NGOs(especially in the South, or developing countries) participation in a transna-

1. Yanacopulos 2005, 37–38.2. Hudson 2001, 334.3. Castells 1996, 470, cited in Hudson 2001.4. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 91.5. Stone 2002, 3.6. Liebler and Ferri 2004, 28–29.7. Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992.8. Richards and Heard 2005, 31.

Global Environmental Politics 10:1, February 2010© 2010 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

tional network can provide both a broader forum and an audience to address9

as well as transfer status. This is important in situations of large power asymme-tries between actors, as the less powerful ones can challenge these asymmetriesby “speaking with one voice.”10 As Meadows et al. succinctly point out, “one ofthe most important purposes of a network is simply to remind its members thatthey are not alone.”11 Similarly, Keck and Sikkink,12 discussing networks be-tween NGOs in countries of varying socio-economic capabilities, point out thatNGOs in less developed countries seek out international allies to help them cir-cumvent the resistance of their own governments (the “boomerang effect”)while Rohrschneider and Dalton13 argue that it is the particular issue at handthat largely determines the occurrence of transnational cooperation. Environ-mental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) that challenge the dominantsocial paradigm are more likely to look beyond their borders for allies whoshare such principles. More recently, it was shown that a restrictive domestic po-litical opportunities structure makes it more likely for ENGOs to become activeat the supranational level.14

Yet it is also the inherent transnational nature of most environmentalproblems that prompts ENGOs to cooperate across borders—if they wish to beeffective.15 Such an option is all the more attractive since the sophisticatedadvances in communications and transport allow NGOs to share informa-tion, expertise and resources with other groups abroad much more easily.16

And past research has demonstrated that successful transnational networkingcan indeed have substantial effects: framing the issue at hand in new ways,changing the identities of the institutions the NGOs lobby/interact with andultimately altering the existing policies.17 Thus, taking into account the bene-ªts of participation—the enhanced possibilities of inºuencing policy-makersand changing policies, and the availability of the means for coordination andcontact—it is not surprising that recent research reports a dense network of in-ternational cooperation among environmental groups.18

Yet ENGOs’ transnational networks occasionally fail to materialize evenwhen the beneªcial outcomes of their establishment seem obvious. Availableresearch is rather mute on this issue, as previous researchers have pointed out.19

Thus this article takes its lead from the call “to write about cooperative effortsthat failed (or those possible cooperative activities that never developed).”20 It

116 • Difªculties faced in Materializing a Transnational ENGO Conservation Network

9. Duwe 2001, 178.10. Yanacopulos 2005, 100–101.11. Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1992, 275.12. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13.13. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002, 516.14. Poloni-Staudinger 2008.15. Richards and Heard 2005.16. Henry, Mohan, and Yanacopulos 2004; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; and Yanacopulos

2005.17. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 121–163; Park 2005; and Wapner 2002.18. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002.19. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002, 513.20. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002, 513.

analyzes the efforts to establish a Mediterranean Network for Sea Turtle Conser-vation (MEDSETCON), proposed in the early 2000s and spearhead by a num-ber of regional ENGOs, and identiªes the major reasons why the proposed net-work did not materialize.

The paper develops in three major sections. First we deal with the theoreti-cal reasons of why ENGO networks sometimes fail to materialize. In the ªrstpart we argue that this could occur when a number of environmental condi-tions are missing: the issue at hand is not considered important/urgent, the in-volved parties lack the resources necessary for networking, or there are no indi-viduals who could act as the “glue” that brings organizations together. Yet thisapproach fails to account for the cases when networks did not materialize inspite of the existence of favorable environmental conditions. We deal with thisissue in the second part of the introduction of our theoretical frameworks,where we argue in such cases it is the actors’ rational considerations of costs andbeneªts of network participation that determine the outcome. These costs andbeneªts are calculated over the organization’s resources, labelled as intellectual,political, ªnancial and membership assets. Thus if an organization perceivesthat network participation will increase its stock of resources it is more likely toopt for membership and share the burdens of the network’s management. Inthe methods section we then discuss our data and methods and offer an intro-duction to the Mediterranean ENGOs’ cooperation on sea turtle conservation aswell as a chronology of MEDSETCON. In the results section we explore the exis-tence or otherwise of the conditions necessary for network creation for theMEDSETCON case. First we examine the environmental conditions and we con-clude that they ought to permit the creation of a network. But when we move tothe question of resource exchange, we demonstrate that the MEDSETCON ini-tiative could not have provided the involved parties with the relevant powerleverages and we conclude that this was the reason for the network’s failure tomaterialize. Finally, in the closing section we discuss our ªndings and offer sug-gestions for further research.

Theoretical Framework

Prerequisites for Network Formation

For an ENGO network to get established, and in the longer run to operate, anumber of environmental conditions should exist, including structural, organi-zational and personal conditions. Concerning the structural conditions, on onehand it is necessary to have a challenge,21 a complex problem that the prospec-tive participants feel has to be addressed and that can adequately be addressedthrough transnational cooperation. As already argued, this is usually the casefor most environmental problems.22 On the other hand, there should also

Iosif Botetzagias, Prue Robinson, and Lily Venizelos • 117

21. Taschereau and Bolger 2006, 9–10.22. Richards and Heard 2005.

exist opportunities,23 such as the existence/opening/creation of political spacewhere the network can operate and make a difference. To that extent, the exis-tence of international governmental organizations, especially ones such as theUN and the EU,24 which offer permissible international political opportunitystructures25 to ENGOs, constitute the political space where transnational net-works can operate and try to make a difference.

Even if the structural conditions are perceived to be met, an organization’sproªle is also of importance. Networking can offer a variety of beneªts, yet it isalso conditioned by the NGO’s material capacity and resource limitations, suchas the obvious demands on human-hours and resources for maintaining con-tacts with other members. Especially for smaller ENGOs, participation can behindered by their often scarce means.26

Yet the most important parameter is the personal one. This is neither onlybecause it is individuals who perceive and represent structural conditions asconducive to networking, nor only because it is individuals (as members ofboards) who assess and decide about the demands made on their organization’smaterial capabilities (on these two aspects see the next section), but also be-cause it is necessary to have a (number of) individual(s) who would initiate—and most probably subsequently lead—the process of network formation.These individuals, usually acting as front persons of their respective organiza-tions, should have the vision, and also possess the moral and material re-sources, “to convene and mobilize actors to collaborate in pursuit of that vi-sion.”27 The necessary resources include skills, expertise, seed funding as well ascredibility, legitimacy and trust. Organizations’ networking is in most cases theformalized outgrowth of individuals’ networks of friendship and acquaintances,past cooperation, information exchange and/or common campaigning.28 Inother words, for organizations to network, key individual members should havedone it already. Thus, prima facie, networks will fail to form if some of these con-ditions are missing, most importantly the personal ones.

We argue that the environmental conditions account for only part of a big-ger picture because, contrary to the rosy picture often painted, there is “fre-quently a disparity between the rhetoric and reality of partnership betweenNGOs.”29 Whether involved in networks or not, NGOs are actually involved indirect competition with one another in terms of campaign proªles, sponsor-ship, membership base, media attention and identity. This, usually unspoken,yet nevertheless very real, situation means that NGOs would be unwilling toshare center-stage with their competing comrades, fearing that they could be


23. Taschereau and Bolger 2006, 9–10.24. Van Der Heijden 2006.25. i.e. open formal institutional structures and integrative informal elite strategies.26. Stone 2002, 8.27. Taschereau and Bolger 2006, 9–10.28. See Keck and Sikkink 1998, 133–163 for relevant evidence.29. Lister 2000, 229.

overshadowed by their more high-proªle peers.30 Recent research on the Dutchenvironmental movement showed that the media visibility of one organizationis negatively affected by the visibility of its peers, underlying a reality of intra--organizational competition for public attention.31 Particularly in times of mount-ing competition and/or scarce resources, organizations are more inclined to “as-sert their difference”32 and appear as the main or legitimate interlocutor in theeyes of authorities and founding bodies than to submerge into broad (and ob-scure) networks. The above are all the more relevant in cases of overlap in termsof ENGO campaign focus, such as speciªc species’ conservation, where the needto cooperate for achieving better results could more likely be counterbalancedby heightened competition and disputes over campaign ownership. And whileNGOs would ultimately retract from a cooperative scheme which they do notªnd beneªcial to themselves,33 a perceived disparity between participation’sbeneªts and costs can also preclude networking. Thus accounting for a failure tonetwork should take into account the existence (or otherwise) of both the envi-ronmental conditions as well as the organization’s own rational calculationsconcerning the network’s appeal. And while it is true that the former are the nec-essary conditions, prompting actors to consider networking in the ªrst place,they are not sufªcient: actors also have to perceive participation as beneªcial tothemselves and their agenda before proceeding to network.

In effect, the decision to get involved in a network is not simply aboutmobilizing (or not) existing resources, but also about calculating potential costsand beneªts within a framework of organizational competition. Taschereauand Bolger are right in arguing that individuals have to use their personal andorganizational resources for mobilizing others into networking—the notion ofleadership—yet they fail to explain why and under which circumstances theseindividuals would want to do so. Especially when organizational resource allo-cation and competition are a consideration, positive, incentives to network,such as vision and better outcomes, could be counter-balanced by negative,cost-beneªt calculations, through which the costs of demands made by otherorganizations or the network on the NGO’s own resources are weighed againstthe beneªts of the resources offered in exchange.

Thus, if we wish to understand networking outcomes, we have to paygreater attention to the NGOs’ possession, evaluation and, ultimately, exchangeof resources. These resources are the organization’s different “sources of lever-age, or capital, [that] NGOs . . . rely on to transmit information and to inºuencedecision-makers,” and have been described as the intellectual, (specializedknowledge and advice the organization can provide to decision-makers); themembership, (the number of members the NGO has); the political, (the organi-zation’s access to politicians/decision-makers); and ªnally the ªnancial base,


30. Richards and Heard 2005, 37–38.31. Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005.32. Barman 2002.33. Yanacopulos 2005, 103.

(the ªnancial resources which can be used for campaigning, lobbying and re-search).34

The importance of each of these sources of leverage for a given NGO is re-lated to the organization’s preferred strategy for inºuencing political decisions.Diani and Donati35 distinguish between organizations opting for disruptive(such as protest, boycotts, etc.) versus conventional forms of pressure (such aspetitions, lobbying, and so on). Organizations may use professional (bureau-cratic organization, specialized and professional staff, and so on) or participa-tory resources (rank-and-ªle involvement in running the organization, volun-teer employees, etc.). Such a categorization is reminiscent of Gulbrandsenand Andresen’s distinction between activist (securing funding and legitimacythrough offering membership) and advisory organizations (securing fund-ing and legitimacy through their provision of expert knowledge to decision-makers), which can opt either for an insider or an outsider strategy (trying to in-ºuence through inside cooperation with decision-makers and the provision ofknowledge versus trying to inºuence through protest and mobilization of publicopinion). Though any combination of organizational form/strategy and tactics/resource mobilization is possible, it is obvious that some combinations aremore likely. An organization opting for an advisory role is more likely to de-pend on professional resources and pursue an insider strategy. For such organi-zations, their intellectual base has been argued to be their prime weapon.36

More relevant to our topic, previous research on European marine ENGOsconªrmed that they consider their scientiªc and political expertise as theirprime strengths, which “ultimately feeds into these organisations’ research andlobbying potential.”37 On the other hand, their limited ªnancial resources arethought of as their greatest weakness, a problem more acute for non-EU organi-zations.38 Thus, for the kind of NGOs we analyze in the present article, intellec-tual and political power leverages are considered most important while they arealso the assets European marine ENGOs (claim to) possess. Financial assets arealso considered important but there is a lack of them. Membership assets seemnot to be of direct relevance to advisory groups, yet perhaps this kind of asset isindirectly important, by enhancing a group’s ªnancial power.

Networking as an Outcome of Resource Exchange

Recent research has challenged the earlier assumptions that networks “[are]web[s] of connections among equals.”39 Rohrschneider and Dalton’s40 analysis


34. Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 58.35. Diani and Donati 1999.36. Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 56.37. Richards and Heard 2005, 35.38. Richards and Heard 2005, 35–36.39. Meadows et al. 1992.40. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002, 529.

of transnational cooperation among ENGOs concludes the exact opposite, andother research on NGO networks has pointed out the existence of subtle pro-cesses of gate keeping, patronage, elitism, and domination of certain interests,as well as power relationships.41 Such ªndings testify to the reality of asymmetri-cal power leverage between organizations. Although this incongruence of powerleverage might have negative effects on the operation of networks in the longerrun, we nevertheless argue that it is rather important for network formation. It isprecisely in such a situation, when organizations possess and need differentkinds of resources, that they are more likely to enter into trade-offs (i.e. coopera-tion and networking) for securing what they consider important. As other re-searchers have argued, it is the different resources of participating organizations,“each with different strengths and fulªlling a different role,”42 that is also con-sidered as one of the greater strengths of networks.43 These exchanges need nei-ther be pro rata nor to entail the same kind of resources. The case of the ClimateAction Network (CAN) can help to illustrate this point. CAN brings together ac-tivists (whose main asset is membership) and advisory ENGOs (whose main as-set is intellectual).44 It joins Northern and Southern ENGOs of different capabil-ities, understandings and agendas.45 In light of the trade-off argument, theNorthern ENGOs’ ªnancial and intellectual assets are the quid exchanged forthe Southern groups’ political power leverage pro quo, i.e. the latter’s accessto and ability to put pressure on national politicians, an important yet often ne-glected component of NGOs’ ability to inºuence international environmentalregimes.46 In another variation of the same theme, local partners are needed, de-spite all their structural weaknesses, in cases where an ENGO’s area of interestand activity lies beyond the boundaries of its country of origin, as is usually thecase for migratory species. Indigenous organizations in such cases are welcomenetwork members since they can enhance the foreign ENGO’s legitimacy.47

The possible combinations of power leverage trade-offs between twoorganizations and subsequent networking outcomes are portrayed in Graphs 1and 2. The ªrst considers the supply side, the assets offered by a member-to-be(Actor A), while Graph 2 deals with the demand side, the assets an actor seeks tosecure by participating in the network. It follows from Graph 1 that an exchange(i.e. networking) is likely only when the asset being offered is both currently un-available and considered as valuable (outcome 1.3). Offering an asset already insupply and considered as invaluable results in no cooperation (outcome 1.2).The remaining two combinations return conditional results. Offering an assetalready in supply and considered valuable (outcome 1.1) could lead to net-


41. Duwe 2001; Henry, Mohan, and Yanacopulos 2004; and Stone 2002.42. Richards and Heard 2005, 31.43. Richards and Heard 2005, 35–36.44. Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 61.45. Duwe 2001.46. Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 60–61; and Skodvin and Andresen 2003, 67–69.47. Lister 2003.

working depending on what is demanded in return (we shall return to this be-low, see outcome 2.1). Offering an asset that the actor does not possess anddoes not consider valuable is unlikely to lead to an exchange (outcome 1.4). Inthe latter scenario, networking should be anticipated only if the asset asked forin return is of lower value to the one offered.

Similar considerations are in play for the demand side (Graph 2). Net-working will not occur if Actor B does not possess what Actor A wants (out-come 2.3). Asking for an asset which is considered invaluable is likely to resultin networking since this is a low-intensity demand (outcome 2.2). The last sce-nario, asking for an existent and valuable asset (outcome 2.1) is the counterpartof outcome 1.1 in Graph 1: networking is dependent on which assets are sup-posed to be exchanged.

The above graphs highlight that networking depends both on the exis-tence and, more importantly, on the subjective evaluation of different assets byinteracting NGOs. We have already referred to the relative rating of these assetsby marine ENGOs, which are the focus of our case study. In descending order ofimportance, these are: (a) intellectual, (b) political, (c) ªnancial and lastly(d) membership. Thus, taking cues from Graphs 1 and 2, in Table 1 we presentthe probability of different power asset transactions taking place, or, in otherwords, of networking between two actors.

Based on the relative importance of the assets, it is quite self-explanatorywhy some combinations are unlikely. Trade-offs of the same asset or of highlyesteemed ones (such as intellectual and political) are dependent on their partic-ular characteristics. For example an intellectual to intellectual trade-off wouldoccur if both parties consider the provision of additional/new data as enhanc-


Graph 1Networking Outcomes as a Result of Assets Exchange between Actors. The Supply Side

ing their relevance to decision-makers. Similarly, political to political exchangeswould be considered acceptable only if they offer access to political actors previ-ously unreachable and/or only superªcially contacted. As for the membershipcase, this would be considered in cases where, for example, a public campaignor signature collection is involved—thus in cases where inºuence is to be exer-cised through numbers. Lastly, the ªnancial asset presents a particular case. Al-though it is not the most highly esteemed, this is nevertheless the power assetmarine ENGOs are in almost constant need of, and securing it can contribute tothe procurement of intellectual assets (i.e. funds made available for research). Itis therefore likely that access to higher assets could be granted in exchange forsubstantial and sustained funding.

In real life situations, calculations regarding these transactions occur si-multaneously, over all kinds of resources and for all actors active in the net-work’s formation. Successful networking is then more likely to occur when anumber of resource transactions are considered as acceptable for at least someof the actors involved. This can be illustrated by referring to the examples of twoexisting marine ENGO networks and demonstrating how resource consider-ations can help us account for their formation: the WIDECAST (Wider Carib-bean Sea Turtle Conservation Network) and the i-Monk Alliance.48

WIDECAST was founded in 1982,49 following a recommendation by thehighly inºuential IUCN (the International Union for Conservation of Nature,the oldest and largest global ENGO network) that a “[w]ider Caribbean Sea Tur-tle Recovery Action Plan should be prepared . . . consistent with the [UNEP] Ac-


48. We do not wish to downplay the importance previous cooperation and socialization processeshave played in the creation of these two networks nor the obvious beneªts networking has forspecies conservation.

49. WIDECAST currently spreads over 40 countries and territories. The network depends on the vol-untary work of its ‘Country Coordinators’ and project partners and has but two employees as itscoordinating staff. WIDECAST 2009a

Graph 2Networking Outcomes as a Result of Assets Exchange between Actors. The Demand Side

tion Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programme.”50 The call was answeredby MONITOR International, an NGO created by Milton Kauffman—a seasonedand highly successful environmental activist and NGO network-builder.51

WIDECAST’s ªrst coordinator in the early 1980s, Dr. Peter Pritchard, has had along-standing research presence in the region and was later selected as one ofTIME magazine’s “Heroes for the Planet.”52 WIDECAST met all the environmen-tal conditions we identiªed. In addition, right from its creation, WIDECAST hasbeen a partner organization to the Caribbean Environment Programme ofUNEP,53 thus being able to offer its prospective members substantial (interna-tional) beneªts of political leverage. For their part, these members could bringalong their national intellectual, political and membership54 assets, as is shownin Table 2. WIDECAST can be viewed as a case of successful networking follow-ing external mobilization. It was not the Caribbean ENGOs themselves thatstarted the process but an external group of individuals. Yet the existence ofasymmetrical and different sources of leverage between initiators and regionalENGOs, as shown in Table 2, made networking appealing to all those involved.

The i-Monk Alliance (International Monk Seal Conservation Alliance), onthe other hand, was the outcome of internal mobilization of the ENGOs’ them-selves. The Alliance was created on November 9, 2008 as

the result of long-term and amicable collaboration among its foundingmembers. Following many years of determined effort to protect the species,the founding members concluded that the time had come to join forces andcreate an international framework that would strengthen existing and sup-port new conservation and research initiatives.55


50. UNEP/Caribbean Environment Program 1992,51. Mr Kaufmann was selected for the UNEP’s “The Global 500: The Roll of Honour for Environ-

mental Achievement” in 1990 (WIDECAST 2009b).52. TIME 2000.53. Eckert and Hemphill 2005.54. WIDECAST itself does not have an individual membership base.55. i-Monk’s founding members are CBD-Habitat (Fundación para la Conservación de la Biodivers-

idad y su Hábitat) of Spain, IFAW (International Fund for Animal Welfare), MOM (The Hellenic

Table 1Possible Power Asset Transactions for Marine ENGOs

Actor Aoffering(1–4)and askingin return(a–d)

Actor B Possessing:

ASSETS a. Intellectual b. Political c. Financial d. Membership

1. Intellectual Dependent Dependent Conditional Likely2. Political Dependent Dependent Conditional Likely3. Financial Conditional Conditional Non relevant Conditional4. Membership Unlikely Unlikely Conditional Dependent

Note: The probability of a transaction—and thus networking—occurring is reported in each cell.

Similar to WIDECAST, all the environmental conditions were met: a press-ing environmental need and the available political space,56 a group of powerfuland inºuential NGOs and a number of well-acquainted and respected individu-als. Yet again, the Alliance’s creation made sense in resource terms as well. Its in-ternational members, such as the prestigious International Fund for AnimalWelfare (IFAW) and the only specialized online journal The Monachus Guardian(TMG), contributed considerably to its international political leverage while itsnational members, MOM-Greece and SAD-AFAG-Turkey (eastern Mediterra-nean) and CBD-Habitat and Parque Natural da Madeira (eastern Atlantic) re-spectively, brought their own intellectual, national political and membershipsources of leverage. Thus i-Monk’s formation can be perceived as the outgrowthof sustained resource transactions. Over the years IFAW has ªnanced most of thescientiªc work of national actors57 while TMG has been duly reporting to an in-ternational audience the NGOs’ efforts to mobilize their respective governmentson the conservation of monk seals. More recently, IFAW ªnancially supportedMOM in running an EU-funded LIFE program, aimed at reducing monk sealmortality due to ªshing activities in the Greek seas (2005–2009).58 One of theprogram’s other funders, the Piraeus Bank of Greece, even supported TheMonachus Guardian by advertising on its website the Bank’s own LIFE project—GREENbanking4LIFE.59 As we show in Table 3, the possession of differentiatedpower assets meant that a number of acceptable resource transactions wereavailable to the actors involved. Similar to the WIDECAST case, this should havemade taking the next step, from mere cooperation to a more concrete network-ing, more appealing to the organizations involved.

We can now formulate the analysis of our case-study. As we argued above,ENGO networks would fail to form when the environmental conditions (struc-tural, organizational and personal) are missing. These are necessary conditions:in their absence the need for networking most likely would not have risen. Wewill begin our analysis by checking whether these objective conditions had beenpresent in the MEDSETCON case. Yet the mere existence of these conditionsdoes not sufªce. Individuals (acting as organizational representatives) have to


Society for the Study and Protection of the Monk Seal) of Greece, The Monachus Guardian (aninternational journal and website dedicated to monk seals), the Parque Natural da Madeira ofPortugal and SAD-AFAG (Underwater Research Society / Mediterranean Seal Research Group)of Turkey. TMG 2008a.

56. Until recently the international political space for the Mediterranean monk seal’s conservationwas void, giving the i-Monk initiative the opportunity to ªll in. Just a month before the Alli-ance’s formal establishment, the IUCN started to exhibit an interest on the species and ex-pressed its intention to support and promote its own collaborative projects. TMG 2008b.

57. IFAW 2008.58. MOFI: Monk Seal and Fisheries, Mitigating the Conºict in the Greek Seas.59. The GREENbanking4Life deals with an integrated approach for dealing with an enterprise’s en-

vironmental impacts (http://www.greenbanking.gr). The Piraeus Bank’s CSR spokespersonmentioned that choosing The Monachus Guardian for advertising the program was related to theBank’s ‘ongoing support to MOM’s work.’ Email communication with Mr. Dimitrios Dimopou-los, Environment Department, Piraeus Bank Group Headquarters, 31 March 2009.


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take the decision to network, and their decisions are informed by an evaluationof the costs and beneªts involved. Thus, the next step in our analysis would beto examine each organization’s stock of assets or sources of leverage (intellec-tual, political, ªnancial and membership). By identifying which assets each or-ganization had (or not) we can assess which of the combinations presented inTable 3 (and anticipated outcomes) would be most likely for each of the partici-pants. We argue that if it turns out that for most of MEDSETCON’s participantsthe perceived combinations seemed unsatisfactory, that this would explain whythe network failed to materialize.

Methods and Data Sources

The data for our analysis come from a variety of sources. Archival data includethe minutes of the two consultation meetings concerning the creation ofMEDSETCON (1999 and 2000) and the results of a questionnaire which wassent by the initiating parties to Mediterranean sea-turtle organizations and spe-cialists in mid-2000.60 We also analyze the archived email correspondence con-cerning MEDSETCON provided by one of the ENGOs involved. We have alsotried to gather ªrst-hand data by contacting and surveying all persons active inthe deliberations. In Spring 2007 the principal author of the article contacted all19 individuals present at either of the two consultative meetings, asking them toªll in an on-line questionnaire under conditions of anonymity: only 5 answerswere received (response rate 26.3%). In Autumn 2008 the principal author emailedagain all 19 participants asking them for a phone interview, again under condi-tions of anonymity. Only three individuals responded to this call. Althoughrepresenting only a fraction of the people engaged in the MEDSETCON deliber-ations, our interviewees are individuals who were deeply involved in the net-work’s development. All of them were members of MEDSETCON’s 10-memberstrong Interim Executive Committee. DHKD and MEDASSET hosted the net-work’s Interim Secretariat and they were also members (alongside STPS-Greece)of the Bylaws Task Force. Every effort was made to contact the representatives ofWIDECAST and STPS, but without success. Accordingly, the subsequent analysisis based primarily on documentary analysis and secondary on information de-rived from the interviews. Data originating from the two questionnaires will beused to complement our points wherever needed.

Analysis: A Chronology of Efforts to Create MEDSETCON

Mediterranean networks dealing with environmental protection are not uncom-mon. A number of thriving regional networks currently exist, such as MIOECSDE (the Mediterranean Information Ofªce for Environment Culture and


60. Available from MEDCOAST’s webpage, www.medcoast.org.tr/medsetcon, accessed 14 April2009.

Sustainable Development), a federation of NGOs supported by the EU,61

and MEdIES (Mediterranean Education Initiative for Environment and Sustain-ability),whose core group includes the Greek and Italian Ministries for the Envi-ronment, UNESCO, UNEP-MAP62 and MIO ECSDE. A regional network isMEDCOAST which, by “enhancing scientiªc and professional collaborationamong individuals and institutes,”63 aims at utilising improved coastal manage-ment practices to contribute to coastal and marine conservation in the Mediter-ranean and Black Sea. It also contributes to existing international efforts withsimilar goals. A regional newcomer is the “i-Monk” alliance, aiming to: “de-velop and implement joint, collaborative actions, where warranted and agreedby its constituent members; document the joint efforts of its member organiza-tions; disseminate information; raise awareness; promote marine conservation,and facilitate the recovery of the Mediterranean monk seal throughout its cur-rent and historical range.”64

The Mediterranean has witnessed some early efforts to coordinate the pro-tection of its endangered sea turtle species, especially the loggerhead (Carettacaretta) and the green turtle (Chelonia mydas). As early as 1985, the Parties to theBarcelona Convention included among their priority targets the protection ofMediterranean marine turtles (Genoa Declaration, September 1985). The Ac-tion Plan for the Conservation of Mediterranean Marine Turtles was adopted in1989 and in 1996 the Parties included all ªve species of marine turtle recordedfor the Mediterranean in the List of Endangered and Threatened Species an-nexed to the Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Di-versity in the Mediterranean (Barcelona, 1995). The 1989 Action Plan was thor-oughly revised between 1998 and 1999, and a new version of the text wasadopted at the 11th Meeting of the Parties to the Barcelona Convention in Maltain October 1999.65 It was again revised in Palermo, Italy in June 2007.

Despite these developments at the international level, there have been nobilateral agreements among Mediterranean states related to the conservation ofsea turtles. Within national governments the responsibility lies with severalministries and agencies.66 This national piecemeal approach is obviously inef-fective in implementing or facilitating comprehensive conservation actions. Fur-thermore, the existence of quite a few organizations dealing with sea-turtle con-servation in the Mediterranean67 has not led to the creation of a regional ENGO


61. Founded in 1996 as a joint initiative by the EEB (European Environment Bureau) and one ofthe oldest Greek ENGOs, it currently has 105 members form 24 countries. MIO ECSDE hasbeen generously funded by the EU ever since its creation: for the period 1997–2007 MIO it hadreceived approximately 2.11 million £ for the “Co-ordination of Mediterranean ENGO activi-ties.” EU Commission 2009

62. United Nations Environment Programme—Mediterranean Action Plan.63. Currently 15 research institutions (from Turkey, the Netherlands, Italy, UK, Spain, Malta, Israel,

France, Croatia, Egypt and Tunisia) formally collaborate under the umbrella of MEDCOAST.MEDCOAST 2009.

64. TMG 2008a.65. Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law 2009.66. Kasparek 2001.67. Kasparek 2001, 143, lists three intergovernmental organizations, ªve Pan-Mediterranean

network, contrary to the Caribbean case, where WIDECAST has been activesince the early 1980s.

In 1998, at a PEW Fellow Meeting in the USA, Drs. Erdal Ozhan (chair-man of MEDCOAST) and Karen Eckert (Executive Director of WIDECAST) con-ceived the idea of a Mediterranean network to deal with the conservation of theregion’s sea-turtles. In 1999, Ozhan and Eckert addressed an open letter to someprominent ENGO representatives dealing with sea turtle conservation in theMediterranean stressing that:

the implementation of conservation efforts has been largely orchestratedand undertaken at the national level, with little international collaborationfor regional management. Such collaboration is essential due to the migra-tory nature of these species. It is clear that despite national efforts, sea turtlescan be effectively protected in one area of the Mediterranean Sea whilst stillbeing killed in another area of the basin.

This gloomy assessment was coupled by the comment that despite the factthat “the Mediterranean Action Plan . . . provides a uniquely useful inter-govern-mental forum for regional strategic action, what is lacking is a regionally inclu-sive and largely non-governmental network to advocate for sea turtle conserva-tion in ways that are not practicable at the inter-governmental level.”68

The letter served as an invitation to a ªrst consultation (FC) meeting to fa-cilitate the creation of a Mediterranean Sea Turtle Conservation Network—MEDSETCON. The meeting was held in Dalyan, Turkey, in June 1999, wherethe 13 attendees adopted a Resolution agreeing:

To pursue the feasibility and the creation of a Mediterranean sea turtle con-servation network, which has as its goal “to create an inclusive regional net-work of sea turtle NGO’s, scientists, conservationists, educators, policy-makers and others capable of taking effective, collaborative action to preventthe extinction and promote the recovery of sea turtles in the MediterraneanRegion.”69

MEDCOAST and WIDECAST asserted their willingness to serve as facilitators inthe creation of the new network, yet it was stressed that “as the network be-comes functional, it will be an independent NGO.”70

In late August 2000, the initiating group circulated a questionnaire toaround 150 organizations and individual researchers active in Mediterraneansea-turtle conservation. Forty-four responses were received and the majority ofrespondents agreed that the creation of the network would be “useful” and “en-hance their work” and they would “actively participate” in it.71 The results were


ENGOs (i.e. operating throughout the region) and approximately twenty national and localNGOs, “which either deal exclusively with marine turtles, or for which marine turtles are at leasta major activity.”

68. Ozhan and Eckert 1999.69. MEDSETCON 1999a.70. Ozhan and Eckert 1999.71. MEDSETCON 2000a.

discussed, amongst other issues, at the second consultation (SC) meeting inCairo, in November 2000. Although the questionnaire had managed to stirsome regional political passions, by the unfortunate wording of “Northern Cy-prus” as the country of origin for some of the questionnaire’s respondents,72 theissue was discussed and apparently resolved at an early stage and the meetingproceeded to debate and decide on other matters. Three interim bodies wereelected: an Executive Committee, a Bylaws Task Force and a Secretariat. The lat-ter was assigned with taking the lead in maintaining correspondence within theExecutive Committee, working closely with the bylaws team, and circulating,editing and revising the draft bylaws, as well as organizing the follow-up meet-ing. A ªnal deadline (June 2001) was set for circulating the draft bylaws to theExecutive Committee.

Developments after Cairo were extremely slow and quite disappointing. Ittook eleven months to circulate the SC minutes and the June deadline passedwithout debating the draft bylaws within the Task Force. According to e-mail re-cords, both the Secretariat and the other Executive Committee members hadnot been particularly active either. For example the Secretariat’s appeal to theparticipants of the two consultative meetings to provide examples of their ownorganizations’ bylaws was met with widespread apathy.

The third consultation (TC) meeting held during the First MediterraneanConference on Marine Turtles in Rome in 2001 proved similarly inconclusive.The two network initiators, Drs. Eckert and Ozhan were not able to attend dueto other commitments. The Bylaws Task Force did convene but failed to reachany agreement while there had been “quite some discontent about the Secretar-iat’s seeming lack of attention to their responsibility this past year.”73.

After 2001 the idea of MEDSETCON withered. It did surface from time totime, yet it was either delegated to future meetings or was not discussed in anydetail or with much commitment. Table 6 summarizes the previous discussionand highlights some of the most important events concerning the deliberationsabout MEDSETCON.

Results: Creating MEDSETCON: Exploring the EnvironmentalConditions

Structural Conditions

As various researchers and activists have long stressed,74 marine environmentalissues in general, and sea-turtle conservation in particular, necessitate interna-tional co-operation due to their transboundary character. As WIDECAST’s cur-


72. The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) is a self-proclaimed independent state lo-cated in the occupied northern part of Cyprus. TRNC is dependent on and recognized only byTurkey. The United Nations recognize the de jure sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over thewhole island.

73. Email archive.74. Campbell 2007; Kasparek 2001; and Richards and Heard 2005.

Tab

le4

Ch

ron

olo

gyo

fM

EDSE

TCO

NR

elat

edEv

ents

TIM

EFR

AM

EM

ain

Act

ivit

ies

&Ev

ents

Res

ults

Nov

embe

r19

97:

Co

nce

pti

on

of

pro

ject

toJu

ne,

1999

:Fir

stC

on

sult

atio

n(F

C)

mee

tin

gre

gard

ing

MED

SETC

ON

(Dal

yan

,Tu

rkey

)

Emai

lexc

han

ges

•Fa

ce-t

o-f

ace

dis

cuss

ion

sat

the

FC(1

3at

ten

-d

ees,

two

of

wh

ich

wit

hO

bse

rver

stat

us)

1

•V

ote

atth

eFC

,of

nin

ep

arti

cip

ants

pre

sen

t—ex

clu

din

gh

ost

san

do

bse

rver

s—o

nN

etw

ork

’s“O

bje

ctiv

es”

•R

eso

luti

on

ado

pte

din

FC,a

gree

ing

top

urs

ue

the

feas

ibil

ity

and

the

crea

tio

no

fa

Med

iter

ran

ean

Net

wo

rk•

Som

ep

rese

nt

wer

ese

lect

ivel

yta

sked

(Fac

ilita

tors

)2w

ith

:1.

Pro

du

cin

gth

eFC

’sM

inu

tes

2.C

reat

ing

are

gio

nal

mai

lin

gli

st3.

Pre

par

ing

the

Qu

esti

on

nai

re3

4.A

rran

gin

gfo

rth

ese

con

dco

nsu

ltat

ion

5.Fu

nd

rais

ing

July

1999

:Lo

gist

ical

pro

ced

ure

sto

Nov

embe

r20

00:

Seco

nd

Co

nsu

ltat

ion

(SC

)m

eeti

ng

(Cai

ro,E

gyp

t)

•Em

aile

xch

ange

s•

09/9

9Q

ues

tio

nn

aire

circ

ula

tio

n(s

ent

to15

0in

div

idu

als

in13

cou

ntr

ies)

-44

an-

swer

sre

ceiv

ed10

/99

•SC

po

stp

on

edto

May

2000

•Se

vera

lGre

ekEN

GO

sq

ues

tio

nth

ein

volv

e-m

ent

and

wo

rdin

go

f“N

ort

her

nC

ypru

s”in

MED

SETC

OM

thro

ugh

“res

tric

ted

”em

ail

circ

ula

tio

n.

•Fa

ce-t

o-f

ace

dis

cuss

ion

sat

the

SCm

eeti

ng

(10

atte

nd

ees)

4

•Th

e‘N

ort

her

nC

ypru

s’is

sue

dis

cuss

edan

dre

solv

ed•

The

SCm

eeti

ng

esta

bli

shed

:1.

Inte

rim

Exec

uti

veC

om

mit

tee5

2.In

teri

mSe

cret

aria

t(D

HK

Dw

ith

MED

ASS

ET’s

aid)

3.B

ylaw

sTa

skFo

rce

(DH

KD

(cha

ir),

STPS

&M

EDA

SSET

)•

MED

TUR

TLE6

tob

eu

sed

asth

en

etw

ork

’sli

stse

rv

Tab

le4

(Con

tinu

ed)

TIM

EFR

AM

EM

ain

Act

ivit

ies

&Ev

ents

Res

ults

Dec

embe

r20

00to

Oct

ober

2001

:Fi

rst

Med

iter

ran

ean

Co

nfe

ren

ceo

nM

arin

eTu

rtle

s(R

om

e,It

aly)

•Em

aile

xch

ange

s•

Inte

rim

secr

etar

iat

larg

ely

inac

tive

•SC

min

ute

sci

rcu

late

db

yW

IDEC

AST

•Th

ird

con

sult

atio

nto

occ

ur

inR

om

e.M

EDC

OA

ST&

WID

ECA

STre

pre

sen

tati

ves

un

able

toat

ten

d.

•M

EDA

SSET

sugg

ests

on

lyth

eB

ylaw

sTa

skFo

rce

con

ven

e

•Th

eB

ylaw

sTa

skFo

rce

met

inR

om

eb

ut

fail

edto

agre

eo

nth

en

etw

ork

’sB

ylaw

s.A

two

-mo

nth

’ext

ensi

on

was

agre

ed7 .

•Th

ere

leva

nt

Co

nfe

ren

ce’s

pre

ssre

leas

em

enti

on

edth

atth

e“N

GO

s’gr

ou

pw

illc

on

tin

ue

thei

ref

fort

sto

war

ds

sett

ing

up

an

etw

ork

[...

]an

dap

pea

lfo

rw

ider

par

tici

pat

ion

inth

eir

effo

rt.”

Nov

embe

r20

01to

Apr

il20

02:

Med

iter

ran

ean

Sea

Turt

leM

eet-

ing

atth

e22

nd

An

nu

alSe

aTu

r-tl

eSy

mp

osi

um

(Mia

mi,

USA

)

•Su

gges

tio

nto

pu

tth

en

etw

ork

on

the

Sym

-p

osi

um

Age

nd

a•

Mo

sto

fth

eEx

ecu

tive

Co

mm

itte

e’s

mem

-b

ers

asw

ella

sD

HK

D(S

ecre

tari

at)

an-

no

un

ced

they

can

no

tat

ten

dth

eM

iam

im

eeti

ng

du

eto

ªsc

alco

nsi

der

atio

ns

•Fa

ce-t

o-f

ace

dis

cuss

ion

sin

Mia

mi

(20

ind

ivid

ual

sfr

om

10co

un

trie

sp

lus

thre

eo

bse

rver

sat

ten

ded

)

The

issu

ew

asra

ised

asan

item

on

the

agen

da

du

rin

gth

eM

edit

erra

nea

nSe

aTu

rtle

Spec

iali

stM

eeti

ng

atM

iam

ibu

tas

on

eN

GO

rep

rese

nta

tive

men

tio

ned

“th

eti

me

was

no

tri

ght

for

such

aco

mp

lex

exer

cise

.”

May

2002

toM

arch

2003

:Sec

-o

nd

Med

iter

ran

ean

Sea

Turt

leSp

ecia

list

sG

rou

pM

eeti

ng

atth

e23

rdA

nn

ual

Sea

Turt

leSy

mp

osi

um

(Mar

ch20

03,

Ku

ala

Lum

pu

r,M

alay

sia)

•N

oac

tivi

ties

The

issu

eo

fth

en

etw

ork

was

on

the

agen

da

of

the

Seco

nd

Med

iter

ran

ean

Sea

Turt

leSp

ecia

list

sG

rou

pM

eeti

ng

inK

ual

aLa

mp

ur,

bu

tw

asn

ot

dis

cuss

ed.

Tab

le4

(Con

tinu

ed)

TIM

EFR

AM

EM

ain

Act

ivit

ies

&Ev

ents

Res

ults

Mar

ch20

03to

Febr

uary

2004

:Th

ird

Med

iter

ran

ean

Sea

Turt

leSp

ecia

list

sG

rou

pM

eeti

ng

atth

e24

thA

nn

ual

Sea

Turt

leSy

mp

osi

um

(Feb

ruar

y20

04,

San

Jose

,Co

sta

Ric

a)

•N

oac

tivi

ties

The

issu

eo

fth

en

etw

ork

was

refe

rred

toth

efo

rth

com

ing

2nd

Med

iter

ran

ean

Co

nfe

ren

ceo

nM

arin

eTu

rtle

sin

Turk

ey.

Febr

uary

2004

toM

ay20

05:2

nd

Med

iter

ran

ean

Co

nfe

ren

ceo

nM

arin

eTu

rtle

s(M

ay20

05,

Kem

er,T

urk

ey)

•17

7p

arti

cip

ants

fro

m16

Med

iter

ran

ean

cou

ntr

ies

atte

nd

ed.

•A

tth

eev

ents

’pro

gram

ato

pic

read

ing:

“Dis

cuss

ion

on

Med

iter

ran

ean

Net

wo

rk(b

yin

vita

tio

n)—

2h

ou

rsin

len

gth

”w

asin

clu

ded

•D

r.Er

dal

Ozh

alp

resi

ded

ove

ra

len

gth

yd

iscu

ssio

no

nth

en

etw

ork

.Par

tici

pan

tsq

ues

tio

ned

the

reas

on

sfo

rit

sn

eces

sity

.Th

ep

oss

ibil

ity

of

net

wo

rkin

gam

on

gre

scu

ece

ntr

esin

the

Med

iter

ran

ean

was

rais

ed.T

he

MTS

Gre

gio

nal

chai

rco

n-

clu

ded

that

may

be

the

tim

ew

asn

ot

yet

righ

tfo

rsu

cha

net

-w

ork

1.Th

eat

ten

dee

sin

clu

ded

the

rep

rese

nta

tive

so

fth

eM

EDC

OA

STan

dW

IDEC

AST

Net

wo

rks,

on

eEn

glis

han

do

ne

Ital

ian

acad

emic

(Un

iver

sity

of

Swan

sea

and

ICR

AM

),re

pre

sen

tati

ves

form

UN

EP/C

MS,

UN

EPM

edit

erra

nea

nA

ctio

nP

lan

RA

C/S

PA

asw

ella

sa

rep

rese

nta

tive

for

the

Turk

ish

Min

istr

yfo

rth

eEn

viro

nm

ent.

On

lyª

vew

ere

ENG

Ore

pre

sen

tati

ves:

on

eIt

alia

n(C

hel

on

),o

ne

Turk

ish

(DH

KD

—So

ciet

yfo

rth

eP

rote

ctio

no

fN

atu

re,t

he

WW

Faf

ªli

ate

inTu

rkey

),o

ne

Gre

ek(S

TPS-

Sea

Turt

leP

rote

ctio

nSo

ciet

yo

fG

reec

e)an

dtw

ofr

om

MED

ASS

ET(T

he

Med

iter

ran

ean

Ass

oci

atio

nto

Save

the

Sea

Turt

les,

Gre

ece

and

UK

).2.

The

Faci

lita

tors

wer

eco

mp

rise

do

ftw

on

atio

nal

NG

Os

(STP

S,D

HK

D),

two

regi

on

alN

GO

s(W

IDEC

AST

,MED

-CO

AST

)an

do

ne

ind

ivid

ual

mem

ber

(Dr.

An

net

teB

rod

eric

k,U

niv

ersi

tyo

fSw

anse

a).

3.To

“so

lici

tfe

edb

ack

fro

mco

llea

gues

thro

ugh

ou

tth

eR

egio

no

nth

ed

esir

abil

ity,

feas

ibil

ity

and

crea

tio

no

fa

Med

iter

ran

ean

sea

turt

leco

nse

rvat

ion

net

wo

rk.”

4.Th

eyin

clu

ded

the

rep

rese

nta

tive

sfr

om

MED

CO

AST

,WID

ECA

ST,U

NEP

Med

iter

ran

ean

Act

ion

Pla

nR

AC

/SP

Aan

dth

eU

niv

ersi

tyo

fSw

anse

a.Si

xw

ere

ENG

Os’

rep

rese

nta

tive

s:tw

ofr

om

STP

S,tw

ofr

om

MED

ASS

ET,o

ne

fro

mD

HK

Dan

do

ne

fro

mth

eIo

nia

nSe

aR

esea

rch

Cen

tre

(alo

calG

reek

ENG

O,n

olo

nge

ro

per

atin

g).

Itis

inte

rest

ing

ton

ote

that

seve

no

ut

of

the

ten

atte

nd

ees

had

par

tici

pat

edat

the

FCas

wel

l,w

hil

eth

eU

Kre

pre

sen

tati

vew

asre

pre

sen

tin

g“b

oth

him

self

and

his

wif

e”i.e

.th

eU

niv

ersi

tyo

fSw

anse

a’s

par

tici

pan

tin

the

FCm

eeti

ng.

5.C

on

sist

ing

of

allo

rgan

izat

ion

sp

rese

nt.

Ch

elo

nan

dM

TSG

(Mar

ine

Turt

leSp

ecia

list

sG

rou

p)

wer

ead

ded

po

st-m

eeti

ng.

6.Th

en

ewly

esta

bli

shed

list

serv

of

the

Med

iter

ran

ean

Sect

ion

of

the

Mar

ine

Turt

leSp

ecia

list

Gro

up

(MTS

G).

On

this

see

also

nex

tse

ctio

n.

7.Th

eB

ylaw

sTa

skFo

rce

has

no

tm

etsi

nce

.

rent Executive Director, Dr. Karen Eckert bluntly put it, “Sea Turtles will notsurvive in the Caribbean Sea without unºinching regional cooperation andcoordination of conservation and management programs.”75 Nobody hadthought that in the Mediterranean it would be any different. Attendees at the FCmeeting pointed out that “the protection of sea turtles can only occur if we allwork together at all levels”76 while the network’s most important feature had tobe “the commitment of people to work together to enhance the survival pros-pects of shared populations of sea turtles.”77 The need to address this latterproblem was described as “urgent” while a Med-level network was deemed ap-propriate as existing European approaches were considered as “too big.”78 Thusthe existing situation was perceived as a challenge that needed to be metthrough international cooperation79. Accordingly, the Background Document tothe FC envisaged the creation of an “inclusive regional network of sea turtleNGOs, scientists, conservationists, educators, policy-makers and others capableof taking effective, collaborative action to prevent the extinction and promotethe recovery of sea turtles in the Mediterranean Region.”80

On the other hand, the existence of a favorable political space where thenetwork could act had been an issue of consideration and debate. The Back-ground Document itself envisaged the ideal situation where the network wouldserve as “a Partner Organization of RAC-SPA / MAP-UNEP.”: 81 This relationshipwas clearly modelled on the WIDECAST-UNEP/Caribbean Environment Pro-gramme (CAP), where “CAP publishes and distributes WIDECAST’s major out-puts, including national sea turtle recovery action plans, standard guidelinesand criteria for conservation and management, etc.”82 At Dalyan other inºu-ential agencies’ representatives also stressed the importance of connecting withRAC-SPA. Thus the representative of UNEP/Convention for Migratory Species(CMS), after indicating his agency’s “willing[ness] to be a supporting partnerand collaborator” for MEDSETCON, mentioned that the emerging network“should work in collaboration with the existing RAC/SPA network, as govern-ments are already comfortable with RAC/ SPA.”83 The RAC/SPA representativehimself, after stressing his agency’s long-standing collaboration with and spon-sorship of regional NGOs (making “RAC/SPA . . . a very successful mechanismfor regional cooperation”), expressed the “hope to work closely with any NGOnetwork which might develop.”84


75. Eckert 2002.76. STPS representative.77. MEDCOAST representative.78. MEDCOAST representative.79. MEDSETCON 1999a.80. Ozhan and Eckert 1999.81. The Regional Activity Centre for Specially Protected Areas (RAC/SPA) (established in 1985) is a

Secretariat overseeing the implementation of the relevant SPA protocol of the UNEP Mediterra-nean Action Plan.

82. Ozhan and Eckert 1999.83. MEDSETCON 1999a.84. MEDSETCON 1999a.

The emergence of new actors cast some doubts over the incipient net-work’s political relevance. In 1998, MAP-UNEP convened a Meeting of Expertson the implementation of its Action Plan for the Conservation of Mediterra-nean Sea Turtles, and in 1999 the Mediterranean Section of the Marine TurtleSpecialist Group (MTSG) was established.85 Accordingly, the relevance and dis-tinctiveness of MEDSETCON was based on its conception and promotion as anadvocacy network. The Background Document to the FC meeting, while ac-knowledging the importance of MAP-UNEP’s initiative, maintained that “Whatis lacking, however, is a regionally inclusive and largely non-governmental net-work to advocate for sea turtle conservation in ways that are not practicable atthe inter-governmental level.”86 Similarly the creation of the MTSG Med Sectionwas not considered as diminishing either the need or the importance ofMEDSETCON. As it was mentioned at the FC,

the extension of the IUCN Marine Turtle Specialist Group into the Mediter-ranean Region would not likely be sufªcient to “stir the passions” of the re-gion, simply because the MTSG was, by deªnition, a global body of expertsassembled to serve the purposes of IUCN and not conceived to be an inclu-sive network at regional or sub-regional levels.87

What was really needed—and obviously lacking—was “a Med network of NGOsthat can say what needs to be said and can lobby governments in a unitedway.”88

Stressing such a division of labor was all the more appropriate since mostparticipants at the FC were concerned with how MEDSETCON would ªt in withother regional efforts. Thus the MTSG’s regional role was to be taken into ac-count “so as to avoid a duplicate effort.”89. Other participants followed suit. Al-though they recognized the need for a network, they stressed, for example, that“RAC/SPA had many of the same objectives [as were listed in the BackgroundDocument] in mind and that related activities were already being implementedat inter-governmental levels,”90 while “some of the objectives listed in the Back-ground Document were being undertaken by NGOs, as well, especially regionalNGOs (e.g., WWF, IUCN) and some of the larger national groups.”91 To theseconcerns the rejoinder was that MEDSETCON (being an advocacy network)


85. The MTSG is one of the Specialist Groups and Tasks Forces of the powerful and inºuentialIUCN-The World Conservation Union. In early 1999, that is a few months before the Dalyanmeeting, the MTSG, having “recognized the need to concentrate more on regional collaborativeefforts for conserving marine turtles” established (amongst others) its Mediterranean Section(‘tasked to identify key issues, focus MTSG actions on regional priorities and establish collabo-rations with key organizations and institutions at all levels’) with Mr. Dimitris Margaritoulis,then president of the STPS-Greece, as its ªrst Head. MTSG 2009.

86. MEDSETCON 1999b.87. MEDCOAST representative. MEDSETCON 1999a.88. Chelon representative.89. Chelon representative.90. RAC/SPA representative.91. MEDASSET Greek representative.

would be a qualitatively different scheme and one caring for hitherto unat-tended regional needs. Thus when the STPS representative suggested that since“There are many sea turtle projects in the region, and competition for moneyand other ‘turf’ considerations offer persistent impediments to collaboration”then “the ªrst step should be to ascertain whether Mediterranean project ad-ministrators wanted to work together as a network,” one of the meeting’s hostsresponded:

networks bring people together, not projects. The new network would not beresponsible for the success of projects, and the history of an individual proj-ect would not feature as importantly in the structure and function of the net-work as the commitment of people to work together to enhance the survivalprospects of shared populations of sea turtles (emphasis in the original).92

The need for integrating all involved parties was even highlighted by the UNEP/CMS Secretariat observer who mentioned that “grassroots groups and resourceusers are not represented at the inter-governmental level, nor are ªsheries ex-perts.”93

The issue of ªtting with existing schemes was further debated at the SCmeeting in Cairo (2000). There the MTSG Mediterranean Regional Chair com-mented that:

he had reviewed the Minutes and he wondered, “what is the need for such aregional network?” With the success of intergovernmental commitmentsand activities, what more is there to contribute? It is the business of RAC-SPA, for example, to pass Resolutions and to implement the MediterraneanAction Plan—who implements “our” Resolutions or recommendations?Maybe the primary role of a regional sea turtle conservation network, at leastat the beginning, should be to deªne the relationship between the newnetwork and the existing convention entities. He suggested that the Pan-Mediterranean Conference might be a good forum for this discussion. Healso noted that the network cannot produce an Action Plan (because the re-gion has already negotiated such a Plan), but the network could have a for-mal role in implementing the Action Plan at the local level.94

A RAC/SPA representative agreed and suggested that

. . . such a discussion (i.e. the relationship between the new network andexisting regional collaborative mechanisms, especially those at the inter-governmental level) be placed on the agenda for the [then forthcoming]Pan-Mediterranean Sea Turtle Conference.95

Other participants counter-argued that while the network’s relation to theMediterranean Action Plan was an issue deserving serious attention, there were


92. MEDCOAST representative.93. MEDSETCON 1999a.94. Mediterranean Regional chairman (and STPS head).95. MEDSETCON 2000b.

nevertheless many aspects of sea turtle conservation that were not covered by ex-isting venues—as they were identiªed during the FC meeting.96 In particular,“there is a need in the region for a broader vision and more collaboration at theproject level, including information exchange, personnel training, standardizedreporting, and advocacy, when appropriate, from the non-governmental scien-tiªc community”97. Thus the new network “would logically play a role in imple-menting the existing Action Plan at the local level, but also contribute to it andadvocate for change as necessary”98. These rejoinders were met with the soberremark that some kind of alignment with the Mediterranean Action Plan

. . . might lend continuity to the regional agenda already in place, “visibility”and “stature” to the network (as has already been discussed), and strengthenexisting mechanisms. Also, by ªtting into the agenda set by the Action Plan,it might be more likely that the network would receive funding fromUNEP.99

Therefore, we conclude that despite the existence of other actors in the po-litical arena at that time, the space necessary for the creation of a transnationaladvocacy network was available. Thus MEDSETCON was envisaged as an all-inclusive network whose

. . . membership should not be conªned to established academics, NGO per-sonnel, or project directors, but instead embrace people from any walk oflife whose daily responsibilities involve sea turtles, coastal habitat manage-ment, or related conservation issues. This might include protected areasmanagers, local educators, or specialists in coastal zone management, pollu-tion, or sea turtle husbandry/ rehabilitation.100

Such a network was surely missing in the Mediterranean, as all participants atthe SC (members of other regional bodies and not alike) ªnally came to agree.Thus the second structural precondition we have identiªed in the theoretical in-troduction was also met for the MEDSETCON case.

Organizational and Personal Conditions

Participants of the two consultative meetings were amongst the most inºuentialand powerful organizations concerned with sea turtle management in the Medi-terranean. We have already mentioned their multiple afªliations with otherinºuential bodies (UNEP/CMS, RAC/SPA, MTSG, MEDCOAST), and Table 5 of-fers an overview. As a case in point, when one of the participants at the FC meet-ing questioned its representativeness, “after considerable deliberation, none of


96. WIDECAST representative. MEDSETCON 2000b.97. University of Swansea specialist. MEDSETCON 2000b.98. MEDCOAST President. MEDSETCON 2000b.99. MTSG Med Regional Chair/STPS President. MEDSETCON 2000b.

100. WIDECAST Executive Director. MEDSETCON 2000b.


Table 5MEDSETCON Member Afªliations

STPS (ARCHELON)Based in Greece.

ARCHELON is a Partner to the UNEP/Mediterra-nean Action Plan, a member of the EuropeanUnion for the Conservation of the Coasts (EUCC).Members of ARCHELON participate in the IUCN/Marine Turtle Specialist Group.

MEDASSETBased in Greece and the UK

Since 1988 the organisation has been a partner toUNEP/MAP and a permanent observer-member tothe Standing Committee of the Convention on theConservation of European Wildlife and NaturalHabitats (Bern Convention); a member of theEUCC, British Chelonia Group (BCG) and MIO-ECSDE. Members of MEDASSET participate in theIUCN/Marine Turtle Specialist Group.

DHKD(Turkish Society for the Protec-tion of Nature) Based in Turkey

One of the oldest Turkish ENGOs. Reshufºed intoWWF-Turkey in 2001

MEDCOAST(A network of 14 InternationalUniversity Departments andResearch Institutes)

Consultative status with: UNEP’s MediterraneanAction Plan; GEF Black Sea EnvironmentalProgramme; Institutional organisational membersof: International Center for Coastal and Ocean Pol-icy Studies, ICCOPS- Joint Research Center of EC(Genoa, Italy). Institute for Remote Sensing, JointResearch Center, European Union, (Ispra, Italy).Priority Actions Programme Regional Activity Cen-ter (PAP/RAC), Mediterranean Action Plan, UNEP(Split, Croatia).

Marine Turtle Research Groupwhich was based at the Schoolof Biological Sciences at theUniversity of Wales, Swanseain 1999 but now based at theUniversity of Exeter.

Afªliated with Centre for Ecology and Conserva-tion, University of Exeter in Cornwall, UK, con-ducting research on the northern shores of Cyprus

CHELONMarine Turtle Conservationand Research Programme,based in Italy

An NGO based at the Tethys Research Institute inMilan since 1992 and collaborating with RAC/SPA;no longer working under that name.

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY De-partment Of Biology AquaticLife Laboratory, Turkey.

University Department

the participants could think of a major sea turtle project in the region that wasnot represented at the meeting.”101

These were the organizations best suited, in terms of their organizationalresources, to spearhead the MEDSETCON initiative. Table 5 shows that they alsopossessed high levels of political leverage, being connected to important policy-making bodies. They also had high stocks of intellectual capital: their onlinepublication lists contain a number of research articles published in prestigiousscientiªc journals.

We conclude that the organizations involved at MEDSETCON possessedboth the organizational as well as the personal resources necessary for the en-deavour. The participants in the two meetings were personal acquaintances (insome cases even friends), their organizations were well respected and theirscientiªc record was impeccable. Everything looked auspicious for the new net-work at the closing of the Cairo meeting, as both the minutes and our interview-ees document. Why then did the professed engagement of all those importantactors fail to translate into concrete action over the coming years? As we willshow in the next sub-section, this was because the MEDSETCON initiative hadnot been able to provide any kind of leverage to its constituent members. Inshort, they had no incentive to actively engage in this scheme.

Analyzing MEDSETCON: Exploring the Sources of Leverage Considerations

One of the most important beneªts networking could offer was access to thedata of other members. After all, as was mentioned at the FC meeting, “we areonly as strong as our [individual and collective] database.”102 The importance at-tributed by all involved to the procurement of intellectual resources is plainlyevident when the focus is on the priorities-to-be of MEDSETCON. When theparticipants at the FC meeting held a vote on this issue, typical transnational ad-vocacy network priorities103 (shown in italics in Table 6) were overall given lowerpriority (third column of Table 6) than issues of scientiªc information sharing,standardization and fund raising. Similar rankings resulted from the responsesreceived to the questionnaire circulated soon after Dalyan to the broader com-munity, on which a similar vote was held (fourth column of Table 6).104 As Ta-


101. MEDSETCON 1999a.102. DHKD representative. MEDSETCON 1999a.103. Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8–25.104. Forty four answers from 13 countries were received, which recorded an almost unanimous

agreement that ‘it would be useful to create a regionally inclusive and largely NGO-based’ net-work and that ‘such a network could enhance your work, particularly at local and national lev-els’ as well as that the respondent ‘will actively participate in a Mediterranean network for seaturtle conservation’ (For all answers 98% Agree/Strongly Agree or Deªnitely Yes/Probably Yes, re-spectively).

Concerning the network’s priorities, different scales were used in the two votes. For the FCmeeting’s vote four options were available: ‘1’ Highest priority; ‘2’ Second Priority; ‘3’ ThirdPriority; ‘4’ Least Priority. For the questionnaire circulated at the wider ENGO communitythree options were offered instead: ‘1’ Critically Important; ‘2’ Important’; ‘3’ Not Important.

ble 6 (column 5) shows, for some priorities we ªnd statistically signiªcant dif-ferences between the two groups’ answers. Yet these differences are due to thefact that the broader community groups consistently gave higher scores to everysingle priority offered, possibly testifying to these organizations’ scarcer ªscaland informational resources, as well as to their limited inºuence in policy for-mulation and implementation—both nationally and internationally. Yet thepattern of priorities is similar even for this latter group: (transnational) advo-cacy priorities were deemed less important than issues related to the ENGOssources of leverage.

We thus ªnd a disparity between the rhetoric of claims and the reality ofneeds for the organizations involved. An advocacy network was surely missingin the Mediterranean, and for such a network there existed some political space,taking into account the reservations and/or points raised by various participantsat the consultation meetings. But it seems that both the organizations spear-heading the MEDSETCON initiative and the general NGO community hadmore tangible priorities in mind for this new scheme.

We argue that it is this discrepancy which accounts for the failure ofMEDSETCON to become established while all the environmental prerequisiteswere in place. As we argued in the theoretical section above, network formationcan also be understood as the outcome of acceptable resource transactions.In the case of MEDSETCON, the organizations initially involved already pos-sessed high levels of both intellectual and political leverage (see previous sec-tion), and they would have liked to obtain more. And, as it follows from Col-umn 3, Table 6, what they wanted out of the network was more information(intellectual leverage), more policy input (political leverage) and more funds(ªnancial leverage)—in that order.

We argue that such rational calculations would have pointed against com-mitting to the network. In other words, we argue that the way MEDSETCON wasenvisaged, promoted and supposed to operate would have failed to persuadethe initiating members that it could enhance their sources of leverage. And ifthis was indeed the case, then these groups had no material incentive either tobear the costs of participation or to exchange their existing power assets. Inother words, they had no incentive to pursue networking. In the following threesub-sections we shall analyze why this was the case for the intellectual, politicaland ªscal sources of leverage in turn.

Intellectual Leverage

Virtually all scientiªc information concerning the Mediterranean sea turtles hadcome from the research and publications of the involved actors, as can be seen


For our analysis we consider the two scales identical. We merged the former’s categories ‘3’ and‘4’ into a new category ‘3’: ‘Lowest priority.’ Also we have deleted from the broader commu-nity’s sample those individuals who had already answered the questionnaire at the FC meet-ing.

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from their voluminous publication records. Yet a closer look also reveals a lackof scientiªc cooperation. Take for example the case of joint scientiªc publica-tions, conferences presentations, etc. The online dataset of publications of theSTPS105 returns one single joint scientiªc publication with other NGOs active inthe Mediterranean (out of approximately 60 publications over a span of 20years). The case had been similar both for MEDASSET106 and the Marine TurtleResearch Group.107

Thus, despite eagerly wanting access to others’ data (ranked ªrst inTable 6), the regional actors were not particularly keen on sharing their own. Asone of our interviewees suggested, this might be attributed to two differentmindsets. On one hand, academics were not eager to share their data beforepublication—a process which evidently was not compatible with the ENGOs’need to get their hands on up-to-date information and use it as swiftly as possi-ble for lobbying politicians and the public into action. On the other hand,ENGOs themselves were not particularly keen on sharing their data, not onlybecause they too had a scientiªc agenda, but also because they were targeting acommon population and, in some cases, the very same nesting beaches. Givingout data before it was properly reported by and credited to yourself could run therisk of being used by your faster, more resourceful, more active or aggressivepeers in enhancing their own leverage and public image.

Furthermore, the issue of information sharing and exchange began to beaddressed (albeit partially and in a limited fashion) through other schemes, de-veloped independently of MEDSETCON. Thus the MTSG Mediterranean sectionhad just been created and its newly established listserv (MEDTURTLE) aimedspeciªcally to spread and circulate information amongst the region’s specialists/NGOs. Quite importantly, the listserv was free from any organizational/personal costs relating to networking formation and maintenance. As a directresult of the MTSG creation, the ªrst Mediterranean Conference on Marine Tur-tles became a reality in less than two years (2001) and there has been a “Meetingof Mediterranean [Sea Turtle] Specialists” in every relevant international sympo-sium since that time (starting with Miami, USA in 2002). These occasions pro-vided an opportunity for annual face-to-face meetings and exchange of ideas(thus meeting one of MEDSETCON’s primary would-be beneªts), as wellas providing for the low intensity interaction that was the most regionalactors could (or would) cope with. Some of the very same issues raised atMEDSETCON’s consultative meetings were also debated in the specialists’ meet-ings (e.g. tagging procedures, exchange of data, networking, etc.) with equallydisappointing results. For example, the idea of a “Rescue Centres” network hadbeen suggested, but never came to fruition because sea-turtle tagging confor-mity proved rather difªcult in practice. A suggestion at the Miami (2002) Medi-


105. STPS 2009.106. MEDASSET 2009.107. MTRG 2009.

terranean meeting “to create a database of all tagged turtles captured at sea” wasmet with “The general consensus . . . that most turtle groups want to use theirown data, consequently it is unlikely that such a database would work. Instead,it was suggested to encourage projects within the Mediterranean to publish theirdata regularly.”108 Apparently then, the interested actors felt both that their exist-ing intellectual assets sufªced and that any addition could and would comethough more regular publications. As such, a formal network was not consid-ered beneªcial. An illustration of this point emerges from the MediterraneanSpecialists’ meeting of 2005 where cooperation/networking in the Mediterra-nean was discussed:

The issue of networking in the Mediterranean is considered very importantbut until now attempts were unsuccessful. It would be good to have anofªcial network, but available solutions from other regions are not perceivedas possible at the moment. Whatever develops, the need for national repre-sentatives is considered important. It was agreed that, at the present time,the only way for networking is through speciªc projects or activities.109

It is evident that for (most of) the Mediterranean ENGOs an intellectual tointellectual exchange was not acceptable. Most of them were happy with gather-ing and working with their own data—and waiting for their peers’ publications.More data was surely welcomed—and sought after, but not at the price of shar-ing one’s own depot of such a valuable resource.110

Political Leverage

As we have demonstrated in Table 1, intellectual assets can be—under certainconditions—exchanged with other resources such as political leverage. Yetagain, for the MEDSETCON case this was not possible. To start with, and as itfollows from Table 5, all initiating actors’ political leverage was already high.Furthermore, as one of our interviewees mentioned, most ENGOs had beenquite mindful (and perhaps apprehensive) of how this new network would in-terfere with their national conservation efforts in the ªeld. Thus participation inMEDSETCON would have been attractive if it resulted in even higher politicalrelevance and especially at the international level. This could only occurthrough closer association and cooperation with important regional bodies,which in the past had supported and added muscle to various ENGOs’ efforts,and this was made explicitly clear by different actors’ remarks during the consul-


108. Margaritoulis and Glenn 2002, our emphasis.109. Casale et al. 2005.110. All ªve of our online questionnaires respondents “(Strongly) Agreed” that one of the reasons

MEDSETCON failed to get established was that “Some of the parties did not wish to sharetheir own scientiªc data.” This has to be complemented with the view that “The sea turtle or-ganisations are very territorial and the Mediterranean’s nesting beaches have in a sense been‘carved up’ between them, with disputes in rights to research the beaches” (60% “StronglyAgreeing,” 40% “Nor/neither”).

tative meetings. The new network had to work together not only with nationalgovernments, but most importantly with international bodies if it wished to beof relevance. As was mentioned at the Cairo meeting, MEDSETCON “[had] tocourt relationships with larger entities in the Mediterranean . . . UNEP, IUCN,WWF” and secure “an air of ofªcial status and ‘glamour’ . . . similar to the rela-tionship that WIDECAST has with the UNEP Caribbean Environment Pro-gramme”111. And this had to be achieved while making sure not to duplicate, by-pass and/or antagonize existing initiatives and/or relations.

As we have shown, partly in trying not to step on the toes of any of the op-erating schemes, MEDSETCON was promoted as an advocacy network, clearlydifferent from anything that already existed. Yet trying to avoid the risk of re-dundancy eventually led the network initiative into irrelevance. Spurred by awell-intended, yet quite puritan, understanding of advocacy, a number of offersby important regional bodies were not taken up. Thus, when the UNEP/CMSrepresentative indicated that his agency “would be willing to be a supportingpartner and collaborator [for MEDSETCON]” this was not pursued further.112

And when the RAC/SPA representative asked the participants at the Cairo meet-ing “whether RAC-SPA could host the new regional network,” this offer fromthe region’s most powerful actor was kindly rejected:

[MEDCOAST Head] responded that, in his view, NGOs and governmentstend to view things differently, and perhaps a complementary relationshipwould be more beneªcial for both parties. Nonetheless, when the criteriahave been established and the Bylaws adopted, UNEP should feel free to ex-press its desire, if it has one, to host the network. (A short discussion of thispoint ensued, and the consensus was that NGOs and academics wouldbeneªt from an apolitical forum in which to collaborate, exchange informa-tion, and advocate to the inter-governmental community.)113

MEDSETCON thus consciously chose not to cooperate (at least initially)with these high-proªle actors. As a result it would not be in a position to en-hance its perspective members’ political capital. Quite logically, for most of theinitiating actors it would have made little sense to invest in a network which wasnot providing another important asset, political leverage, while at the same timemaking claims over their intellectual resources.

Financial Leverage

Last—but not least—we turn our attention to issues of monetary resources.Their importance and relevance is hard to miss, particularly for the initiating or-ganizations. As it follows from Table 6, these were actors which have considered“bolstering the fund-raising capacity of Mediterranean sea turtle conservation


111. MEDASSET Greece representative. MEDSETCON 2000b.112. MEDSETCON 1999a.113. MEDSETCON 2000b.

projects” as an important priority (Ranked 4th out of 11), unlike the generalcommunity (Ranked 9th). This may come as a surprise since the former werebetter resourced and more afºuent organizations. Yet they were also the oneswith the larger conservation and research projects—thus in need of more andlarger funding. Furthermore, as one of the participants at the FC meeting ob-served, regional “competition for money and other ‘turf’ considerations offerpersistent impediments to collaboration.”114 Thus, in order to be attractive toparticipants, MEDSETCON had to offer some solutions to these ªnancial de-mands. Again, ªscal beneªts might have counterbalanced the unavailability ofpolitical and intellectual resources—it might even have persuaded some groupsto give access to their stocks of either of these resources.

But ªnancial bonuses were not readily available. The consultative meet-ings were only made possible due to the availability of funds by the Pew Trust.And as these funds withered, so did any ªnancial appeal of MEDSETCON. Thenegative role played by the lack of follow up funding—and its crippling effecton future developments—is evident through the email exchanges at the time,115

and was conªrmed both by our interviewees and by the respondents’ answers/comments to our online questionnaire.116 One of the latter commented “partici-pants only attended as their expenditures were paid,” and “they did not feel thatthey [had] to engage themselves in the absence of funding.”

Arguably, a successful network would enhance the participants’ fundingprospects. At the FC meeting the “competition-over-money” claim was counterargued by pointing out that “networks can serve to enhance project funding byemphasizing cooperation, not competition ([and] this is viewed favourablyby donors).”117 Yet MEDSETCON simply lacked the ªnancial resources neces-sary to overcome the initial inertia. Similarly, a suggestion at the First Mediterra-nean Specialists’ meeting (in Miami in 2002) to create a regional fundraisingmechanism for encouraging funding and administrating such funds was wel-comed yet never materialized. Devoting desperately scarce resources to a non-guaranteed bid for securing more funds in the future was obviously not appeal-ing.

We summarize the previous discussion in Table 7. It shows that the distri-bution of particular power assets meant that no transactions were feasible or de-sirable. MEDSETCON could not provide any of the important resources. We ar-gue that this was why this initiative could not have developed into an operatingnetwork.


114. MEDSETCON 1999a.115. “I know it’s not much of an excuse, but this project doesn’t provide any salary time [. . .], and it

seems that when a signiªcant chunk of time is needed (such as in compiling these minutes), itis so very difªcult to ªnd a week to devote to it.” Email communication between selectedMEDSETCON participants.

“I agree however that meetings are becoming more and more expensive for most of us!.”Email to all MEDSETCON participants.

116. Four out of ªve agreeing that lack of (follow up) funding and organizational resources neededfor the network’s creation contributed to MEDSETCON’s failure to materialize.

117. MEDSETCON 1999a.

Tab

le7

Dis

trib

uti

on

of

Po

wer

Ass

ets

for

the

Act

ors

Invo

lved

inth

eM

EDSE

TCO

NFo

rmat

ion

MED

SETC

ON

po

sses

sin

g

Inte

llec

tual

asse

tsPol

itic

alas

sets

Fina

ncia

las

sets

Mem

bers

hip

asse

ts

ENG

Os

(pre

sent

atth

em

eeti

ngs)

poss

essi

ng

Ver

yLo

w

Hig

h(n

atio

nal)

Ver

ylo

w(i

nte

rnat

ion

al)

Var

iabl

eye

thi

gher

than

MED

SETC

ON

Nil

Var

iabl

eye

thi

gher

than

MED

SETC

ON

Nil

Var

iabl

eye

thi

gher

than

MED

SETC

ON

Discussion and Conclusions

This article has focused on an unsuccessful attempt to establish a transnationalENGO network, the MEDSETCON (Mediterranean Sea Turtle Conservation net-work). Very little research has been undertaken on why networks fail to emergeeven when favorable environmental conditions exist. MEDSETCON was such acase: the issue of transnational co-operation for the conservation of sea turtleshas been (and was perceived) as a real and pressing problem by a number ofprominent regional ENGOs and other organizations. Furthermore, the actorsinvolved could clearly see a number of potential beneªts in the establishmentof such a network.

Researchers investigating NGO network formation have placed a strongemphasis on the importance played by common ideas and beliefs, a shared vi-sion, past collaboration, and the availability of political space. They have alsoemphasized the role played by anticipated, future beneªts (increased solidarity,access to resources, acting with one voice), which presumably have the ability tolure organizations into cooperating and networking. All these reasons are bothvalid and important. Yet, while they are quite successful in explaining instancesof success, they offer us little help in cases of failure. Why should it be that weªnd cases when networks do not form in spite of all these prerequisites beingpresent?

We have argued that the answer lies in the fact that the above consider-ations are not the only ones pertaining to network participation. ENGOs, likeany other organization, depend on a number of resources for their mainte-nance, operation, growth and impact. These can be broadly deªned as intellec-tual, political, ªnancial and membership resources. Thus, successful networkformation is also related to the extent prospective members feel that their in-volvement will secure them some of these resources. It is important to note thatwe do not intend to downplay the importance of common values and beliefs, ofpast socialization and of any other ideational and/or values-led factors in bring-ing ENGOs together. Rather, we wish to complement these factors with somemore tangible ones. Accordingly, network formation will also be dependent onindividual actors’ cost-beneªt calculations over relevant resources. If an NGOperceives networking as a way of enhancing its stock of valuable resources, thenthis NGO is more likely to join a network. Such a positive evaluation wouldmake the organization more willing to share the costs of membership (i.e. man-hours and/or ªnancial resources devoted to network activities, sharing of data,and conforming with the group’s decisions).

These considerations are all the more important during a network’s incipi-ent stage: some beneªts have to be readily available if only to counterbalancethe initial inertia and the immediate costs (i.e. demands on the participantNGO’s resources). Successful NGO network formation elsewhere supports thisview, as we have shown for WIDECAST and i-Monk. But it was a completely dif-ferent story for MEDESETCON. The network was unable to provide its prospec-


tive members any of the important power leverages—each for different reasons.Thus membership considerations were irrelevant for the particular case whileªnancial resources drained out very quickly. The participants in the consultativemeetings, arguably in an attempt not to duplicate existing cooperative schemesand/or upset the regional power balance, shied away from institutional afªlia-tions with important transnational bodies—thus denying the network any earlypolitical relevance. Finally, MEDSETCON could only provide new intellectualresources through sharing and disseminating the existing ones, at least in theshort to medium term. We have demonstrated that organizations were not par-ticularly keen on sharing this prized resource. Furthermore, when scientiªc in-formation was becoming more and more available through other schemes tak-ing off at the time (such as the Mediterranean Specialists’ meetings and theirlistserv), it would have made little sense for organizations to bear costs for ser-vices which could be secured free of any charge. It was these kinds of consider-ations, over the management and exchange of important power assets, whichmade the MEDSETCON option unattractive to most of the participants andthus sealed its fate.118 And it is probably those same considerations and calcula-tions still at work—more than any personal and/or organizational grievancesand shortcomings, lack of vision, and lack of past cooperation—which have notto date allowed the creation of a formal Mediterranean network for the conser-vation of the sea turtles.

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