Bonefeld, Werner

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Globalization and the

State: A Note onJoachim Hirsch

WERNER BONEFELD

Preface Globalization has become an organizing termof political-economic inquiry since the late 1980s.

Yet its precise meaning remains unclear. Generally,

however, it is assumed that globalization is an all-pervasive

force in the modem world, and that the idea of a cohesive

and sequestrated national economy and domestic society no

longer holds. Instead, we are witnessing the creation of a

truly global economy and society where everyday life is

dependent on global forces beyond the regulative power ofthe national state.

Joachim Hirsch's "Globalization of Capital, Nation-States

and Democracy" (SPE 54) supplies a welcome departure

from mainstream globalization orthodoxy. While his argu-

ment is not particularly unconventional, his account com-

bines an analysis of the impact of globalization with a

reconceptualization of a politics of emancipation. It is for

this reason that his contribution needs to be taken seriously

and its theses and arguments need to be examined in a thor-

ough manner.

Introduction My assessment expresses a dissenting view-

point.! It is far from easy to attempt to synthesize Hirsch's

argument. His contribution to SPE is a very condensed sum-

mary of his recent book, Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat.s

In both publications, he develops his argument somewhat

cautiously. At the same time, he stresses the devastating andcatastrophic impact of globalization. This, and the complex-

ity of his position, make it very difficult to assess his con-

tribution.

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Studies in Political Economy

His notion that the national state has been "hollowed out"

focuses this difficulty.fHe argues this in three ways. First,

from a post-Fordist analytical perspective, he argues that

the "state form" is determined by the "needs" of the accu-mulation regime and he identifies the way in which the post-

Fordist state has adjusted to the requirements and challenges

of globalized capital. At the same time, however, he argues

similar to Held4 that previous state-centred strategies of de-

mocratization are outmoded and rendered obsolete. This sec-

ond view suggests that globalization has tipped the balance

against the ailing "democratic" state and that a democratic

movement would be well able to redress this loss of nationaldemocratic control over capital by making democracy a tran-

snational affair. Third, with the neo-Gramscian school of

international political economy.> Hirsch argues that the na-

tional state has not come to an end but, rather, it has been

transformed. In this view, the state was, in the past, able to

regulate its national economy but since the onset of the capi-

talist crisis in the early 1970s, the state has been interna-

tionalized by adapting to the exigencies of the worldeconomy. This led to a greater role for more market-oriented

state apparatuses and a new form of consensus formation

between these and non-governmental international institu-

tions such as the IMF. In this view, the state is actively

involved in adjusting the national economy to global capital

requirements.

Each of these theoretical perspectives poses quite a dif-

ferent view on the "hollowing out of the state" thesis. The

first perspective suggests that the state is powerless vis-a-vis

economic relations; it merely responds passively to a Fordist

or post-Fordist economy and provides the political "func-

tions" adequate to economic "needs." The second suggests

that the democratic state was powerful in the past but has

become powerless because of globalization and that democ-

ratization adequate to the new reality of capital would redress

the imbalance. The third argues that the state has not been

hollowed out but that it is, in fact, actively involved in regu-lating capital/labour conflicts through the internationaliza-

tion of state functions. Hirsch's account endorses each of

these views but his argument develops none of them in a

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concise manner. Hence my note of caution: I am aware that

my critique might well be subjected to the inevitable riposte

of having misread his contribution. If one wants a debate,

however, one has to start somewhere.

The Crisis of Fordism and Post-Fordlsm Hirsch identifies

the capitalism of the Twentieth Century as Fordism. There

is no need here to detail his analysis of Fordism; suffice to

say that it follows his earlier work on this topic closely. In

the context of this paper, the connection between the crisis

of Fordism and the emergence of globalization is crucial.

Following the argument in his book, Fordism is said to havebeen undermined by the emergence of a structural crisis of

accumulation in the late 1960s/early 1970s (1995, p. 84).6

The core of this crisis is identified as a combination of a

structural reduction of capital profitability in metropolitan

countries and a growing destabilization of international

mechanisms of regulation which impressed itself upon, and

reinforced, the crisis of individual national states. The crisis

of Fordism is also seen to be a crisis of credit and finance.

He argues that Taylorism was exhausted, leading to the "ten-

dency of the rate of profit to fall" at the same time as Fordist

counter-tendencies were too weak to reverse the fall in the

rate of profit. This exhaustion led not only to a decline in

the rates of profit but also to an increase in finance capital

(1995, pp. 84-5). With the help of neo-liberalism, finance

capital liberated from production forced the deregulation and

flexibilization of the capital relation, supplying the finance

for productive capital to move around the globe in search

of profitable locations. In addition, "an essential factor con-

tributing to the final demise of the Fordist system was the

inter-nationalization of capital," leading to erosion of na-

tion-state regulation (1991, p. 41).

The "flexibilization" of capital relations on a global scale

is seen to be based on the emergence of multinational en-

terprises that, for Hirsch, are not only footloose but also

dominant actors in the world market scene.s For him, thesecompanies seek the most favourable conditions for direct

economic gains and their world-wide sourcing activities are

seen to build the foundations of an extended world economy

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through which the profitability of international capital may

be established and secured."

Hirsch's analysis is not concerned with the contradictory

constitution that the dissociation between monetary accu-mulation and productive accumulation presents. The capital

relation is not conceived in terms of the capital-labour re-

lationship but, rather, in terms of a self-relation between

capital and capital. As a consequence, the crisis-ridden dis-

sociation between monetary accumulation and productive ac-

cumulation is not appreciated.f For Hirsch, the contradiction

is not that between labour as the source of value and the

monetary accumulation of wealth-an accumulation thatcredits the future exploitation of labour with debt because

the exploitation of labour does not supply the values relative

to the accumulation of wealth represented by monetary ac-

cumulation.

Thus, the globalization of capitalist competition is seen

as an increase in the power of capital over the national states,

rather than as a manifestation of capital's crisis of accumu-

lation? and shows capital's inherent ability to overcome a

crisis of productivity (1995, p. 180). Whether the crisis of

productivity has really been overcome is, of course, still a

very contentious issue and it might well be argued that

Hirsch is guilty of confusing capital's self-presentation with

reality. Yet while globalization appears to have provided a

resolution to the crisis of Fordism, post-Fordism entails a

new crisis dynamic insofar as the "flexibilization of capital

reinforces international competition and, in doing so, simul-

taneously undermines the existing relationship of power,domination and dependency" (1997, p. 42). Post-Fordist glo-

balization fosters state-versus-state economic competition

indicating the dynamic of the post-Fordist structural contra-

diction and its potential for crisis. Again, the "labour ques-

tion" appears to be insignificant for capitalist development

and its crises. In sum, Hirsch's work lacks a critique of the

political economy of capital. Money capital and productive

capital are merely seen in terms of a competitive relationshipwhose common foundation, the value-creating power of la-

bour, falls outside Hirsch's conceptual work and is replaced

by what he identifies as structural contradictions.

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The National Competition State Hirsch sees globalization

as the economic-political project ofneo-liberalism, a project

whose promise of prosperity remains unfulfilled (p. 45).

Neo-liberalism's project of globalization is said to havestarted in the United States of America after the breakdown

of the system of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. US-capi-

talism is said to have set upon liberalizing international trade

and opened up new spaces for investment to regain com-

petitiveness particularly in relation to Japan (1995, p. 85).

Globalization, for Hirsch, undermines the state-centred

form of accumulation and regulation under Fordism: capital

is seen to have "de-nationalized" itself. The flexibilizationof the capital relation that facilitated the international op-

eration of capital, "points to the ability of capital to transcend

national borders in search of the most favourable conditions

for direct economic gains, and the highest possible margin

of profit" (1997, p. 41). Fordism was characterized by a

relatively contained economic and social space (1995, pp.

94-5). Post-Fordism is defined by its contrast to Fordism:

the post-Fordist accumulation of capital is global.For Hirsch, then, globalization undermines the ability of

the Fordist state to regulate "its" economy in a comprehen-

sive and coherent way through money and law (1995, p.

199). He uses Reich's metaphor of the "one national boat"

(1997, p. 46) to indicate the inclusive character of Fordism.

The "national boat" is no more because capital's global ex-

tension and its search for profitable conditions beyond the

national state has transformed the state into a competition

state whose primary concern is to secure its territory as a

location for global capital investment.lv For Hirsch, the com-

petition state is characterized by its subordination to the

dictate of securing the national space as a location for capital

investment (locationism). This state seeks to supply, in com-

petition with other states, the right conditions for investment

to cajole globally mobile capital to its shores and then to

retain it there. Thus the "competition state" appears to collide

with conditions of democratic government. Instead of ademocratic project of a comprehensive social and economic

development, the competition state merely adapts to capital

demands and preferences whatever the social and ecological

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costs. The competition state, then, mobilizes all and every-

thing to prepare its national territory and its people in the

"economic war" for capital investment (1995, pp. 109, 155).

The post-Fordist competition state is conceived in terms of

a hyper-liberal state without liberal democratic institutions

and processes. These, for him, appear to have characterized

the social-democratic-Fordist state.

There are a number of problems with this argument. The

notion that the Fordist state was able to provide "relative

homogeneous conditions for economic and social life"!!

begs the question if the state, Fordist or not, is, in fact, able

to regulate the capital relation. Of course, the capitalist state"regulates" the "economy" through law and money. But it

does so only in a contradictory fashion, reproducing the con-

tradictions of capital in a political form.R Furthermore, as

Poulantzas noted, "institutions or apparatuses do not 'pos-

sess' their own "power" but, rather, express and crystallize

relationships of class power."!3 From this perspective, does

it really make sense to argue that Fordism was typified by

a state whose concern was the creation of a "one nationalboat?" Bienefeld's critique of Reich shows, with devastating

force, the sheer absurdity of the concept of a one-national

US American boat, and Mishra argues convincingly against

ideal type conceptions of the development and restructuring

of the Western-European welfare states.H These works throw

a spanner into the conception of the Fordist state whose

priority was domestic welfare and a policy of full employ-

ment. Hirsch's conception of Fordism abstracts from the his-

torical development of capitalism post 1945 and provides

an image of post-Fordism that rests on a rigid contrast be-

tween Fordism and post-Fordism; while in post-Fordism, the

ability of the national state to regulate the economy in a

socially responsible way is hollowed out, the Fordist state

is characterized by its ability to have done just that.

Second, in his book, Hirsch argues his case against the

background of the German political economy. This has ob-

vious limitations for his conception of globalization. Look-ing, for example, at the "British national economy,"

"globalization" has always been its main characteristic and,

in Hirsch's Own view, the "era" of Fordism was based On

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the global reach, or hegemony, of the United States of Amer-

ica. It seems, thus, that his characterization of Fordism as

a national project of capitalist accumulation and of post-

Fordism as a global project of capitalist accumulation is notonly schematic but, also, in contradiction to his own con-

ception of Fordism. Were one to espouse the notion of

Fordism in an uncritical fashion, one would have to con-

clude, as indeed he does, that it was, in fact, a global system

based on the global reach of American production methods,

American-based multinationals and, of course, the US Ameri-

can currency: the dollar. Indeed, the term Fordism, at best,

indicates "globalization," namely of Fordist principles.This leads us to ask "when was Fordism?" Since condi-

tions were dire during post-war reconstruction of the 1950s

(1995, p. 83ft), and since Fordism went into crisis by the

late 1960s, Hirsch seems to suggest that the golden era of

Fordism was the 1960s. The 1960s, however, witnessed a

liberalization of the global relations of exchange and trade.

The laissez-faire principle of the post-war world was realized

only gradually during the 1950s; full convertibility of othercurrencies with the dollar, one of the pillars of the Bretton

Woods system, was achieved in 1958 and under Kennedy

in the early 1960s, GATT negotiations to reduce commercial

tariffs-that is, to liberate international trade-became the

centrepiece of international economic policy. Furthermore,

Hirsch argues that in post-Fordism, multinational companies

have become determining actors forcing national states to

adapt to their demands and requirements. There had, how-

ever, already been a major increase in the internationalization

of trade, investment, and finance capital in the 1950s and

1960s. It was in the 1950s that the total out-flow of private

and official capital reached a peak. The expansion of US-

based multinationals declined during the so-called golden age

of Fordism. This, however, was compensated by the greater in-

ternationalization of European and Japanese firms from the

mid-1960s onwards.l> It was not only productive capital that

"internationalized" during and before the golden age of Fordism.Banks also "globalized," particularly US-American banks dur-

ing the 1960s. British banks were already operating on a

global scale since the colonial period of British imperialism.

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Trade liberalization, as Brett reports, began in earnest during

the 1960s. These developments led Murray to argue about

a growing "territorial non-coincidence" between an increas-

ingly interdependent global economic system and the na-

tional state. Others, for example Kindleberger, posed the

question of whether "the national state is just about through

as an economic unit."16 Kindleberger's view appears to echo

Hirsch's conception of the post-Fordist competition state.

In contrast to Hirsch, however, Kindleberger's focus is on

the 1960s which, for Hirsch, presents the golden age of

Fordism.

The argument, then, that events of the 1970s led to anew type of capitalism, that is, globalization, is misleading.

Following on from the war economies during the Second

World War, substantial "globalization" had already occurred

during the 1950s and 1960s, recouping the terrain lost during

the period of war. Furthermore, the post-war boom occurred

against the background of a stable demand for private in-

vestment, backed up by the national states as lenders of the

last resort. In other words, the so-called Fordist era was notcharacterized by the political planning of national capital

accumulation and deficit financing associated with Keyne-

sianism.l? Keynesianism understood as a policy of deficit-

financing of demand occurred from the mid-1970s onwards,

especially during the 1980s. It obtained this during the period

where, according to the schema of Fordism versus Post-

Fordism, it was not scheduled to have appeared.

The uncritical understanding of the period post-1945 leads

to two conclusions. First, post-Fordism is said to pose the

question of survival in earnest leading to the portrayal of

Fordism as a golden past that, however, never was. Second,

the image of a post-Fordist future seems to rely on "pre-

Fordist" conditions-neo-liberalism's struggle to resolve the

persistent contradictions of the world economy against the

background of an accumulation of unserviceable debt, mass

unemployment, social dislocations, low investment, etc.-

provoked social upheavals that led, in some cases, to bar-baric regimes. This is, in brief, how Polanyi summarizes

the conditions of the early 1930s. Hirsch supplies an image

of globalization that is quite similar to Polanyi's view of

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the 1930s. The difference between the competition state of

the pre-Fordist era and the post-Fordist competition state is

that the latter is subjected to global capital's demands as a

territorially fixed entity whereas the former pre-Fordist-com-petition state sought to travel with capital by expanding its

territory through war and conquest (1995, pp. 107. 169).

For Hirsch, however, globalization does not by-pass the na-

tional state because, for him, it is "the state itself' that

adopted neo-liberal policies of globalization. This would im-

ply that the state's "regulative" ability has not been made

redundant but that it is, rather, emphasized.If

Hirsch's argument is blinkered. Fordism is identified asbeing regulated by a democratic state. Insofar as post-

Fordism is construed as the opposite to Fordism, the post-

Fordist political regulation merely characterizes the state as

a strong state that provides a forceful backup to the operation

of the free market. This back-up "function" of the compe-

tition state should not be identified, however, as Hirsch ap-

pears to argue, with a loss of the state's ability to intervene

in the economy. Hirsch, himself, argues that the competitionstate seeks to mobilize the resources within its territory, in-

cluding its people, to comply with "global" capital's dictate

for profitable locations. For Hirsch, however, this mobili-

zation stands condemned because it does not summon a just

and fair-that is, a socially and ecologically responsible-capi-

talism. Globalization has undermined the national "material

basis [that] can facilitate social and political integration of so-

cieties" (1997, p. 46) and this loss, he charges, has to be re-

couped through a transnational-democratic movement. In short,

the competition state is not hollowed out as such. Although

its scope for intervention is restricted, it is essentially liberal

democracy that has been hollowed out (1997, p. 45).

Globalization and Democratic Renewal Neo-liberalism is

seen as a project of de-democratization effected through glo-

balization. For Hirsch, globalization "liquidates" the basis

of democratic national self-determination (see SPE, p. 51)and undercuts a politics of social integration. National

governments unleashed the capitalist globalization offen-

sive in order not to dissolve national states but to destroy

Keynesianism and therewith the state-centred mode of

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Fordist regulation (1995, p. 90). Neo-liberalism's globaliza-

tion offensive, then, aims to solve the crisis of Fordism not

only by renewing the foundations of capitalist profitability

through "flexibilization" but, also, by restricting the eco-

nomic costs of democracy. As he argues in his book, the

neo-liberal conception of democracy is based on market-cri-

teria such as efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Democ-

racy in the competition state is merely concerned with filling

out the detail in an effective manner, leaving the grand design

of social-political development to the market. The world

market becomes, then, a means by which national states, on

their own initiative, are compelled to establish low-cost de-mocracies. Social marginalization and division can thus be

legitimized: there is no alternative to cost-cutting, unem-

ployment, deregulation and wage restraint. Nobody can be

blamed for deteriorating conditions as everything appears

to derive from the invisible hand "personified" by globalizedcapital.

Globalization, in short, entails that society is increasingly

fractured on socio-economic lines. This leads Hirsch to assertthat the term "society" is increasingly questionable and prob-

lematic (SPE, p. 46). The inference is that, during Fordism,

"society" was not problematic because it stood for integrated

social relations. Again, his argument appears to suffer from

his schematic contrasting of Fordism and post-Fordism.

From its inception, the term "bourgeois society" has stood

for a class-divided society. Hirsch's notion that the Fordist

one-national society is replaced by a post-Fordist society

that is fractured on socio-economic lines seems to vindicate

this insight and to dismiss it at the same time. Furthermore

for him, post-Fordist social divisions are summoned to in-

dicate the degree of repression "sections" of "society"--es-

pecially the "neglected" (SPE, p. 45}--might face. The social

conflicts that these divisions are able to provoke are merely

those of an repressive and "uncivil kind" such as "neo-ra-

cism." There is, however, one exception to his distrustful

assessment of the political economy of social conflict underconditions of globalization: the Mexican Zapatistas. Their

struggle, he argues, shows that neo-liberalism is inherently

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weak and that democratization is urgently required (1995,

pp. 204-5).

Concerning his proposals for a democratic renewal,

Hirsch argues that "national politicians are no longer in aposition to solve the economic, social and ecological prob-

lem" (SPE, p. 51), that the basis of national democratic self-

determination is undermined (SPE, p. 44), and that the

"traditional form of a national state-centred reform policy

along social democratic lines has become antiquated" (SPE,

p. 52). Yet while he seems to say that the national state is

no longer adequate as a framework for political practice, he

maintains that only the national state "can offer the terrainupon which democratic self-determination can begin to de-

velop" (SPE, p. 51). This is because a "world society based

on democratic political institutions does not exist" (ibid.).

He seeks to resolve the contradiction between the nation

state as, on the one hand, a terrain for democratic renewal

and, on the other, as a redundant unit by arguing that de-

mocracy has to be sought simultaneously at all levels and

that the movement for democracy has to operate both within"and if necessary against the prevailing political institution"

(SPE, p. 53). The national state, then, seems to offer some

sort of opportunity structure however corrupted and com-

promised by global forces. Furthermore, "local" democrati-

zation processes and "world citizenship" do not stand in

contradiction to one another; rather, they necessitate one an-

other (SPE, p. 56). In the last instance, the demand for demo-

cratic renewal is directed at putting into question the

"capitalist state form: the national state" (SPE, p. 52).

This politics of democratic emancipation is not a "class

strategy" but a citizenship effort. Hirsch charges, rightly,

that the debate on globalization ignores human beings. As

he puts it, "one barely acknowledged side-effect of the glo-

balization of capitalism is the fact that human beings have

been principally removed from the debate. They remain im-

prisoned within the parameters of the nation-state, which,

in turn, serves as a precondition for the disposability of acheap labour force and congruent differentiated expressions

of 'locational politics'" (SPE, p. 47). Referring to their

plight, he focuses, rightly, on the form-determined role of

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the state as an enforcer and guarantor of the bourgeois forms

of equality and freedom, and this would mean the treatment

of human productive power as a labouring commodity. His

argument, however, remains silent on capitalist command

over labour in the production process. Indeed, in his pro-

posals for democratic renewal, capitalist social relations ap-

pear to lose their exploitative character. As he sees it,

democratic self-determination "can begin to develop in jux-

taposition to the global rule of economic mechanisms" (SPE,

p. 51).

What is to be understood by "economic mechanisms?"

The implication seems to be that global capital's devastatingsocio-economic rule is such only because ofneo-liberalism's

flexibilization of the capital relation. Would it be too far-

fetched to conclude that Hirsch's proposals aim at a rationale

organization of capitalist social relations to meet the social

needs of the citizens of the world? And what of the working

class? The national state, as he rightly argues, "still governs

over the labour force" (SPE, p. 47).19 This "by no means

minor" activity of the nation state constitutes the "decisivebasis of valorization of capital" (SPE, p. 48). Despite this

insight, his argument is constructed such that the only issue

is whether democraticization might secure the guarantee of

human rights. In short, while commendable, his espousal of

human rights remains abstract unless, of course, one were

to argue, as he seems to do, that the treatment of human

activity as an exploitable resource during a part of the day

does not mark the whole daily activity of human social prac-

tice. There is no reason to assume that such a differentiation

can be drawn.

Conclusion There is no doubt that governments invoke the

language of globalization to legitimate the attack on the

working class. Is this attack a consequence of the hollowing

out of democracy or what is creating it? The answer to this

question is important. The first part of the question suggests

that democracy has lost out because capital has globalized,leaving the state with no means of continuing on the national

democratic path of socio-economic development. The answer

to the second part is different. Here the state is actively

pursuing a politics of "de-democratization," rendering the

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state not only strong and capable but also directly involved

in the managing of the "labour question." It also suggests

that the state does so by trying to insulate itself from the

social consequences of its policies through the depoliticiza-tion of policy-making.s'' In Hirsch's account, both answers

are affirmed. Yet the second is of little consequence to his

analysis because the resolution to economic crisis has been

effected by globalization. His emphasis falls on the first

part of the answer: de-democratization is conducive to the

survival of national states within the global world of "foot-

loose" capital.

De-democratization, then, is not seen as a "class politics."Rather, it seems to mean that the "state" no longer has the

ability to respond in a democratic fashion to the social and

ecological consequences of capital's crisis resolution. Social

demands, the human rights of citizens and calls for ecologi-

cal protection appear cut-off from previously existing chan-

nels of democratic influence and expression. In this way,

Hirsch's analysis emphasizes democracy's reforming poten-

tial to cope with the social, economic, and ecological con-sequences of capitalism's "economic mechanisms." Is it

really possible to overcome ecological destruction, to secure

human dignity and to achieve democratic self-determination

without touching relations of exploitation and therewith ana-

lyzing relations of class? The solution to ecological destruc-

tion is not just a question of the relationship between nature

and Man but, rather, a question of the relationships between

the human beings themselves, and that would imply the over-

coming of relations where humans exploit humans for the

sake of an accumulation of abstract wealth.

Notes

1. For a class-based analysis of so-called globalization, see W. Bonefeld

and J. Holloway (eds.), Global Capital, National State and the Politics

of Money (London: Macmillan, 1995).

2. J. Hirsch, Der Nationale Wettbewerbsstaat (Berlin: Edition ID-Archiv,

1995). Given this, I will draw upon both this and his 1997 article

in SPE 54 in discussing his viewpoints, prefacing page references

by the publication dates to make clear the particular source to which

Iam referring,

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14. R.B. Reich, The Work of Nations (Vintage, New York, 1991); M.

Bienefeld, "Is a Strong National Economy a Utopian Goal at the End

of the Twentieth Century," and R. Mishra "The Welfare of Nations,"

both in R. Boyer and D. Drache (eds.), States Against Markets (Lon-

don: Routledge, 1996).15. On this: R. Murray "The Internationalisation of Capital and the Na-

tional State," New Left Review 67 (1971); E.A. Brett, The World

Economy since the War(London: Macmillan, 1985); E. Mandel,

Europe versus America (London: New Left Books, 1970).

16. C.P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad (New Haven: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1969), p. 207.

17. See for example A. Glyn, "Social Democracy and Full Employment,"

New Left Review, 211 (1995).

18. On this: E. Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); G. Epstein, "International

Capital Mobility and the Scope for National Economic Management,"

in R. Boyer and D. Drache, States Against Markets, (1994).19. On this issue in relation to the debate on globalization see: L. Panitch

"Globalization and the State," in R. Miliband and L. Panitch (eds.),

Socialist Register 1994 (Merlin, London, 1994).

20. On this in the context of the British national economy: W. Bonefeld

and P. Burnham, "The Politics of Counter Inflationary Credibility in

Britain, 1990-94," Review of Radical Political Economy 30 (1998).

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