Bolivian Drug Control Efforts: Genuine Advances, Daunting Challenges

7/29/2019 Bolivian Drug Control Efforts: Genuine Advances, Daunting Challenges

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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS:

GENUINEPROGRESS,DAUNTINGCHALLENGES

ByKathrynLedeburandColettaA.Youngers


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2 BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS

Introduction

Followingalandslidevictoryatthepolls,EvoMoralesbecamepresidentofBoliviainJanuary2006.1

Headofthecoca-growersfederation,Moraleswasalong-standingfoeofU.S.drugpolicy,andmany

observersanticipatedacompletebreakinU.S.-Bolivianrelationsandhenceanendtodrugpolicy

cooperation.Instead,bothMoralesandtheGeorgeW.Bushadministrationinitiallykepttherhetoricatbayanddevelopedanamicableenoughbilateralrelationshipthoughonethatattimeshasbeen

fraughtwithtension.FollowingBoliviasexpulsionin2008oftheU.S.Ambassador,PhilipGoldberg,for

allegedlymeddlinginthecountrysinternalaffairsandencouragingcivilunrest,andthesubsequent

expulsionoftheU.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA),theWhiteHouseuppeditscriticismofthe

BoliviangovernmentandforthepastfiveyearshasissuedadeterminationthatBoliviahasfailed

demonstrablyduringtheprevious12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcotics

agreements.2U.S.economicassistanceforBoliviandrugcontrolprogramshasslowedtoatrickle.

Nonetheless,in2011thetwocountriessignedanewframeworkagreementtoguidebilateralrelations

andarependinganexchangeofambassadors.Moreover,cooperationcontinuesbetweentheprimary

BoliviandrugcontrolagencytheMinistryofGovernmentsViceMinistryofSocialDefenseand

ControlledSubstancesandtheNarcoticsAffairsSection(NAS)oftheU.S.embassy.

Attheinternationallevel,Boliviaisseekingtoreconcileitsnewconstitution,whichrecognizestheright

tousethecocaleaffortraditionalandlegalpurposesandrecognizescocaaspartofthecountrys

nationalheritage,withitscommitmentstointernationalconventions.InJune2011,thecountry

denouncedthe1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugsasamendedbythe1972Protocoland

announceditsintentiontore-accedewithareservationallowingforthetraditionaluseofthecocaleaf.

(The1961Conventionmistakenlyclassifiescocaasadangerousnarcotic,alongwithcocaine.)Unless

morethanone-thirdofUNmemberstatesobjectbytheJanuary10,2013deadline,theBolivian

reservationwillbeacceptedandthecountrywillonceagainbeafullPartytotheSingleConvention.

TheapproachingdateforBoliviaspotentialreturntothe1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs

providesanopportunemomenttoevaluatetheBoliviangovernmentsprogressachievingitsdrugpolicy

objectives.Moreover,theMoralesadministrationhasbeeninofficefornearlysixyears,providinga

cleartrackrecordtoevaluate.Adoptingacocayes,cocainenoapproach,Boliviahassoughtto

decreasethecultivationofcocatherawmaterialusedinmanufacturingcocainewhileincreasing

actionsagainstcocaineproductionanddrugtraffickingorganizations.In2011,thelandareadevotedto

cocacultivationinBoliviadroppedby13percent,accordingtoU.S.governmentfigures,incontrastto

netincreasesinPeruandColombia.Seizuresofcocapasteandcocaineanddestructionofdrug

laboratorieshavesteadilyincreasedsincePresidentMoralestookoffice.Yetdespitethepositiveresults

achievedtodate,thegovernmentfacesincreasingchallengesastheamountofcocapasteandcocaine

flowingacrossitsbordersfromPeruhasincreased,theproductionofcocaineinBoliviaitselfhasrisen,

anddrugtraffickershavediversifiedandexpandedareasofproductionandtransportationwithinthe

country.

TheBoliviangovernmenthasmadesignificantprogressfacingtheongoingchallengesofdrugproduction

andtrafficking,inpartduetotheassistanceprovidedbytheEuropeanUnion(EU),theUnitedStates,


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BOLIVIANDRUGCONTROLEFFORTS 3

andothers.TheU.S.governmentshouldnowrecognizethisprogressinitsannualdeterminations.The

stringofnegativedeterminationsareincreasinglydisconnectedfromrealityinBoliviaandretainlittle

credibilitywiththeBoliviangovernmentorwithothergovernmentsintheregion,whichcontinuetosee

theannualU.S.ratingasoffensiveandpoliticallymotivated.Thesigningoftheframeworkagreement

markedsignificantprogressinU.S.-Bolivianbilateralrelations.Bothgovernmentsshouldbuildonthat

successbyusingtheaccordasavenuetodiscussareasofconcern,friction,andconsensus.While

differenceswillundoubtedlyarise,itisinthebestinterestsofbothcountriestomaintainanopen

dialogue.

CocaCultivation

InSeptember2012,boththeUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC)andtheU.S.

governmentreleasedtheir2011statisticsoncocacultivationinBolivia.TheUNandU.S.

estimatesdifferedbyonlyonepercent(instarkcontrasttostatisticsproducedforother

countries).Theconvergenceofthecocacultivationestimatespointstotheeffectivenessofthe

governmentscocacropmonitoringstrategy,whichbenefitsfromcocagrowercooperation,amoreconcentratedcocacrop,andtechnologicaladvancesinmeasuringcultivation.Inshort,

themonitoringsysteminplaceallowsforafarmoreaccuratemeasurementthanisthecase

witheitherPeruorColombia,theprimaryproducersofcocafortheillicitmarket.(Accordingto

theUNODC,in2011Colombiacultivated64,000hectaresofcocaandPeru62,500hectares,

representingthreeandfivepercentincreases,respectively.)ItalsoprovidestheBolivian

governmentandtheinternationalcommunitywithanopportunitytodevelopcollaborative

policiesbasedonreliableinformationaboutcocatrends.

Source:UNCropMonitoringReports

27200

62500

64000

HectaresofCocaProducedin2011

UNFigures

Bolivia

Peru

Colombia


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Source:UNCropMonitoringReports

TheUNODCs2011CocaCultivationSurvey,3releasedonSeptember17,2012,indicatesthatcoca

cultivationinBoliviafellto27,200hectares4in2011from31,000hectaresin2010a12percent

decrease.Thereportnotesthatcocacultivationdeclinedineveryimportantcoca-growingregioninthe

country,bringingtheoverallareaundercultivationtonearthe2005level.TheUNattributesthis

significantdecreasetoeffectivecontrolthroughcooperativecocareductionanderadication.The

UNalsoreportsa13percentreductioninoverallcocaleafyields,downto48,100metrictonsin2011

from55,500metrictonsin2010.AccordingtotheheadoftheUNODCofficeinBolivia,CsarGuedes,

TheprogressinBoliviaisundeniable.Thisyear,Boliviaistheonlycountrywithadecreaseincoca

cultivationThefactsaresufficientlyclear,notonlywithregardstococacultivationbutalsowithalong

listofverifiablesuccesses.5

Similarly,theWhiteHousesSeptember14determinationreportsthatthe2011U.S.governmentcoca

cultivationestimateforBoliviawas30,000hectares,a13percentdecreaseinBoliviascocacrop.6Ina

July2012interview,theU.S.EmbassyinBoliviasChargdAffaires,JohnCreamer,statedthattherehad

beenanimpressivenetreductioninthenumberofhectaresofcocain2010and2011. 7Nonetheless,theSeptemberdeterminationwhichconcludesthatBoliviahasfaileddemonstrablyduringthe

previous12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcoticsagreements

downplaysthesignificanceofthecocareduction,referringtothe13percentdecreaseasonlyslightly

lowerthanthe2010estimateof34,500hectares.

12%

5%

3%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

Bolivia Peru Colombia

PercentageChangein

CocaCulvaonin2011

UNFigures


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.

Source:UNCropMonitoringReportsandU.S.InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReports

CooperativeCocaReductionandSocialControlBegintoShowResults

ThesuccessoftheMoralesadministrationscooperativecocareductionstrategyhingesonthevoluntaryparticipationoffarmersfromallcoca-growingregionsinthecountryandonbalancingpressuresfrom

theinternationalcommunitywiththedemandsofitscoca-growingconstituents.Successful

collaborationbetweenBolivianauthoritiesandthoseofneighboringcountries,notablyBrazil,andwith

internationalorganizationsandforeigndonorshasalsocontributedtoimprovingtheeffectivenessof

themonitoringeffort.

BoliviascooperativecocareductionstrategyallowseachChaparefarmertogrowonecatoofcoca,8

continuingapolicyadoptedbytheCarlosMesagovernmentin2004.Anycocagrownbeyondthatis

subjecttoelimination.TheBoliviangovernmenthasexpandedthisapproachintoareasofthecountry,

suchaspartsoftheLaPazYungas,wherenosignificantcocaeradicationhadpreviouslyoccurred.Asa

resultofthecatoagreement,theviolenceandconflictgeneratedbyforcederadicationintheChapare

has,withrareexceptions,ceased.Italsowasinitiallysuccessfulinstabilizingcocacultivationand2011

marksthebeginningofwhatFelipeCaceres,BoliviasViceMinisterofSocialDefenseandControlled

Substances,expectstobeasustaineddownwardtrendincocacultivation.9

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

EsmatedHectaresofCocaCulvaon,

UNvs.U.S.Figures

UNFigures

USFigures


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Photo:SaraShahriari

Therelativesuccessofthepolicystems,inpart,fromthecocagrowersfederationsabilitytoenforce

theagreement.10

Inturn,limitedproductionmaintainsastableandrelativelyhighpriceforcoca,a

guaranteedsubsistencebase,andfreedomfromtherepressionthataccompaniedforcederadication.

AccordingtotheUNODC2011report,thepriceforcocainthelegalandillegalmarketsisthesame,

providinglittlecomparativeincentivetodeviatefromlegalsales.Thesecureincomegeneratedfromthe

catoofcocaalsoallowsforexperimentationwithotherincome-generatingactivitieswith

complementaryimplementationofeconomicdevelopmentprogramsthroughtheNationalAlternative

Developmentfund(FondoNacionaldeDesarrolloAlternativo,FONADAL)andotherprogramsthatoffer

additionalsourcesofincome,oftenreferredtoasintegrateddevelopmentwithcoca(seebelow).

Finally,thesanctionsimposedbythefederationsforfailuretocomplywiththeonecatolimitare

severe,includingthelossoftherighttogrowcocaand,ultimately,landexpropriationforrepeat

offenders.

AsexplainedbyfederationleaderRolandoVargas,thereisatwo-prongedstrategyforcocacontrol:the

internalcontroloftheunionandstatecontrol,whichincludesaerialsurveillanceandeliminationofcocathatisgrowninviolationofthecatoagreement.

11AccordingtoViceMinisterCaceres,duringthe

firstyearoftheMoralesgovernment,150cocafarmerslosttheirrighttogrowcocaforoneyear.From

JanuarytoSeptember2012,thenumberroseto600farmers.12

Asecondoffenseresultsinthe

permanentlossofcocagrowingprivileges.Toenforcethisorincaseswherecocaisgrowninareasnot

coveredbythecatoagreementtheBoliviangovernmenthasformedthe GrupoSurazo(namedaftera

bitingcoldfrontthatquicklydescendsintropicalregions),anelitemilitaryunitoftheJointTaskForce


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thatenterscommunitieswithout

warningandforciblyeradicates

excessorunpermittedcoca.

However,thenewunits modus

operandiraisesconcernsaboutthe

potentialforabuses,particularly

mistreatmentofthecommunities

affected,ofthekindthat

characterizedthepastforced

eradicationcampaigns.

Finally,theMoralesgovernment

hasconsistentlymetitsannualcoca

reductiontargets.Accordingtothe

ViceMinistryofSocialDefenseand

ControlledSubstances,asofmid-November2012,10,201hectares

hadbeeneliminated.Thegoalfor

2012isareductionof11,000

hectares.

CocaMonitoringfromFieldstoMarkets

Theheartoftheseeffortsisthecocamonitoringstrategyitself,whichiscarriedoutcollaborativelyby

Bolivianstateinstitutions.Boliviancross-referencedcocamonitoringisauniquemodelincorporating

theactive,voluntaryparticipationandengagementofcocafarmerswithstateinstitutions,aswellas

informationsharingandengagementwithinternationalentitiesandagencies,includingtheUnited

Nations,theEuropeanUnion,theUnitedStates,andBrazil.TheGeneralCocaProductionDirectorate

(DireccinGeneralDeDesarrolloIntegralDeLasRegionesProductorasDeCoca,DIGPROCOCA)registers

thecatosandprovidesfarmerswithlandtitles.Thatregistryispartofasophisticateddatabase,

SYSCOCA,whichcross-referencestheinformationwithsatelliteimages,aerialphotography, ensitu

inspections,andmeasurementswithGPSandlaserdistancemetersandrecentlyupdatedlandtenure

information.Thisinformationisthenusedtoplancooperativecocareduction.SYSCOCAispartofthe

EU-fundedCocaSocialControlSupportProgram,andthedatabaseisalsosharedwiththeUNODCsCoca

MonitoringProject.Mostcocaplotsaremonitoredseveraltimesayearbysatellite,groundverificationbythreedifferentoffices,andwithaerialphotography.

UNODCsatelliteimageryclearlydelineates catosofcocain

theChapare.1


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Key

CGU Cocagrowers'unions

SixFederationsoftheCochabambaTropics,ADEPCOCA

inYungas,andothers.

DIGGeneralCocaProductionDirectorate(DIGPROCOCA)

EconomicandSocialDevelopmentUnits(Chapare,

UDESTRO,andYungas,UDESY)register,measureand

monitorcocaplotswithGPS,laserdistance-meters,etc.DatasharedwithUNODCandSCEU.

SCEU SocialControlSupportProgram

FundedbytheEU,theprojectincludestheCocaCrop

MonitoringSystem(SYSCOCA),asophisticateddatabase

thatcross-referencesmonitoringdata,landtitles,

satelliteimagery,andcocacroplocations.Thesystem

willincludecocamarketingandtransportinfutureyears.

OfficiallypartoftheViceMinistryofSocialDefense.

JTF BolivianJointTaskForce Bolivianmilitary/policecocareductionforce

NAS U.S.NarcoticsAffairsSection

Aerialmonitoring,purchaseofGPSandLaserDistance

MetersthroughTrilateralAgreement.

UN UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime

CropMonitoringProgramincludesanalysisofsatellite

imagery,aerialphotography,andgroundverification.

Publishesannualreport.SharesdatawiththeVice

MinistryofSocialDefense,DIGPROCOCA,andProgram

toSupportSocialControl.

BD BlackDevils BolivianMilitaryAirDrugControlUnit

BR Brazil

Real-timemonitoringwithdrones,softwareandtraining

forDIGPROCOCAtointerpretandanalyzeimagery.

ProvidedthroughTrilateralAgreement.Datasharedwith

ViceMinistryofSocialDefense,UNODC,DIGPROCOCA,

andtheU.S.NAS.


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Asapartofthemonitoringeffort,theEUhasfundedabiometricregistryofcocaproducers,eachof

whomistoreceivehisorherownpersonalidentificationcard.Theregistryofover48,00013

producers

hasbeencompletedandtheIDcards,whichcontainanelectronicchiptofacilitategovernmentcontrol,

willbedistributedtoeachauthorizedfarmer.TheSYSCOCAdatabasedescribedaboveprovidesBolivian

governmentofficialswithup-to-dateinformationonthepreciseamountofcocaplanted,towhomit

belongs,andwhetheritcomplieswithnationallaw.ThroughtheelectronicIDandtheinformation

obtainedintheregistry,governmentofficialswillbeabletotracetheharvestofthecocaleafandits

saleinthelegallocalmarket.Theideaisthatgovernmentauthoritieswillthenbeabletotracecocathat

hadbeendivertedfromthelegalmarketwithgreaterefficiencyandwillbeabletodeterminewhoisnot

sellingtheircocatolegalmarkets.14

Ofparticularsignificance,theBoliviangovernmentplanstoextendthebiometricregistry,withEU

support,tocontrolthetransit,sale,andmarketingofthecocaleaf,fromthefieldtotheconsumer.

SocialControlSupportProgramofficialshavealreadyovercomewhatwaspotentiallythemost

significantimpedimenttothissystem:theconsentofcocafarmers.Thefarmershaveagreed,primarily

becausetheregistryvalidatestheirrighttothe cato.Eventually,anyoneinvolvedinthelegaltransportationorsaleofcocawillhaveanidentificationcardandwilltherebybeenteredintothe

system.Thenthegovernmentwillbeabletomonitorthetransportationofcocabyregistered

intermediariestothetwoauthorizedwholesalemarketsanditsdistributiontoindividualvendors,all

throughthescanningoftheirrespectivebiometricidentificationcards.Whenfullyimplemented,the

system,whichrequiresthetechnologicalequivalentofasmartphone,willrepresentadramatic

improvementoverthecurrentpaperrecords,whereregisteredmerchantshavestampedformsthat

allowthemtotransportcoca.Incontrast,thebiometricregistrywillallowformorecompleteandrapid

informationsharing.

Nosystemisfoolproofandmultipleobstaclesstillstandinthewayoftheeffectiveimplementationofthemonitoringprogram,asdrugtraffickersareadeptatadaptingtonewtechnologicalchallenges,and

corruptioncouldunderminetheeffort,withopportunitiesfordiversiontotheillicitmarketallalongthe

way.Nonetheless,itrepresentsapragmatic,ambitious,andpotentiallyviableefforttocontrolthe

diversionofcocatoillicitmarkets.Ifsuccessfullyimplemented,thiseffortwillarguablyprovidethemost

precisecocamonitoringsystemavailableintheregion.

EconomicDevelopmentintheChapare

Thesuccessofcocareductioneffortsdependsinlargepartontheabilityofcocafarmerstodiversify

theirsourcesofincome.InthecaseoftheChaparecoca-growingregion,effortsareunderwayto

improvetheoverallqualityoflifeofthelocalpopulation.Concretedataishardtocomeby,butthere

aresignsthatfarmersaretakingadvantageofarangeofincome-generatingopportunities.TheUNODC

pointstosignificantagriculturaldiversificationinthecoreareaoftheChapareregion(excludingnational

parks)wherecooperativereductionhasbeenimplementedsincelate2004.Accordingtoits2011coca

monitoringsurvey,bananascoveredthelargestareacultivatedintheChapare,followedbycitrusfruit

andpalmhearts,andthencoca.UNODCattributedthisphenomenontosustained,integrated


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developmentefforts.15

Butitisalsoimportanttonotethattheguaranteedsubsistenceincomeprovided

bythesmallparcelofpermittedcocaalsoallowsfarmerstotakeriskswithothercrops.16

AJune2012

reportbytheU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)cametoasimilarconclusion,notingthat

USAIDsactivitiesinBoliviahavecontributedtoimprovedpovertyindicators,andhectaresofprincipal

alternativecropssuchasbananasandcitrushaveincreasedmorethancoca.17

IninterviewsconductedbyAINandWOLAinlateSeptember2012,Chaparemunicipalandnational

governmentofficials,cocagrowers,andrepresentativesofinternationalorganizationsallagreedthat

theoverallqualityoflifeintheChaparehasimprovedduetoincreasedgovernmentinvestmentin

educationandhealth,andimprovedtransportation.AgenerationofchildrenofChaparecocagrowers

hasnowgraduatedfromlocaluniversities,returningtotheareawitharangeoftechnicalskillstooffer.

BananaexportstoArgentinahavebecomeamainstayofthelocaleconomyand,inadditiontothecrops

listedabove,farmersareinvestingmoreinproductssuchashoney,coffee,andchocolate,andsomeare

investingincattle.Othersaregettinginvolvedinsmall-scalebusinesses,suchasmarketingor

transportationservices.AsonefemalecocagrowertoldAINandWOLA,Wedontwanttobe

dependentoncoca.Thatiswhyitismandatoryformembersofouruniontogrowotherthings.18

AccordingtothemayorofShinahota,RimerAgreda,oneofthemostimportantadvancesintheregionis

theimprovementinbasicservices,particularlytransportation.Wenowhaveroadsandbridgesto

about80percentofthezone,whichallowsforthetransportationofotheragriculturalproducts.Now

manypeoplehavetheircato,buttheyarealsoexportingbananasanddrivingatrucktoo.Such

economicdiversificationappearstobeslowlyincreasinglocalincomes,thoughdocumentationasto

howmuchisnotavailable.Agredaalsopointsout,however,thatitisalsothecasethatcocagrowers

arenowaccustomedtohavingtheir catoofcoca.19

TheMoralesadministrationhasalsopromotedthedevelopmentoflicitusesofthecocaleafasameans

ofgeneratingadditionalincome.Theindustrializationofthecocaleafisprobablytheweakestpillarin

theMoralesstrategy,yetsomeadvanceshavebeenmade.Severalyearsbehindschedule,acoca-

processingplantbeganoperationsintheChapareinlate2011.Thehighpriceofcoca,combinedwith

difficultiesinobtainingorganiccoca(whichisrequiredforeveryproduct),haveslowedproductivity.

Dealingwiththeveryhighhumidityinthezonealsopresentsachallenge,asfoodproductsquicklygo

stale.Nonetheless,thefactoryhasbeguntomanufactureavarietyofproducts,includingcocachips

forthesubsidizedpublicschoolbreakfastprogram,cocaliquor,energydrinks,flour,ointments,and

cocaholidaycakes.WhenWOLAandAINstaffvisitedtheplantinlateSeptember2012,productionhad

pausedforaweeksothemachinerycouldbecleaned,butwewereabletomeetwiththetwo

technicianswhoruntheplant.Theysaidthataboutthirtylocalpeopleareemployedattheplantand

thattheyarepresentlyfillingordersastheycomein,withthehopesofmovingtofull-scaleproduction

overtime.


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BeyondtheChapare

Formanyyears,cocaproductionittheChapareregionfarexceededthatinLaPazYungas.Butthe

successofcooperativecocareductionintheChaparehasmeantthattheYungasisnowthecountrys

largestcocaproducingregion,with67percentofthenationalcrop.20

Prioradministrationswereunable

toreduceexcesscocaplantinginthisregion,buttheMoralesadministrationhasinitiatedreductionsthroughextensivenegotiationandintegrateddevelopmentefforts,whichseektocomplementincome

providedbycoca.Beginningin2006,FONADALwithfundingfromboththeBoliviannationaltreasury

andfromtheEUhasimplementedhundredsofinfrastructure,economicdevelopment,institutional

strengthening,andsocialdevelopmentprojects,primarilyincoca-producingzones,withanemphasison

consultationwiththeparticipatingfamiliesandfoodsecurity.21

Launchingtheseparticipatory

developmentinitiativesbeforenegotiatingcocareductionhashelpedtheMoralesadministrationreach

agreementsinspilloverzones,implementthe catosystemintheYungas,22

andestablishcoca

productionceilingsforYungassub-regions.Thesefactorslargelyexplainthe11percentreductionin

cocacultivationintheYungasin2011reportedbytheUNODC.Furthermore,forthefirsttime,farmers

withinthetraditionalcoca-growingzoneoftheYungashaveagreedtoworkwiththeBolivian

governmenttolimittheirproduction,althoughdifficultiesremain.23

AccordingtotheUNODC,in2011cocacultivationdeclinedinallcoca-growingregions,including

nationalparks(resultinginthenationwide12percentdecreasenotedearlier).IntheYungas,therewas

an11percentdecrease,Apolo-NortedeLaPaz,sevenpercent,andtheChapare,15percent.National

parksalsosawa15percentreduction,resultingfromforcederadication.Nonetheless,theUNODCdata

showthatcooperativecocareductionthroughsocialcontrolisthedrivingforcebehinddecliningcoca

cultivation.

Still,thegovernmentfacesthechallengeofthecontinuingspreadofcocaintonewareas,including

nationalparks.AccordingtoUNODCestimates,between2010and2011,therewasa30%increaseinthe

priceofcocaleafinauthorizedmarketsanda16% increaseinunauthorizedmarkets.24

Thesignificant

priceincreaseshaveledtococaplantinginnewregions,aspeopleplantcocaormigratetonewareas

andplantasameansofgeneratingfamilyincome.Forexample,cocareductionoccurredforthefirst

timeinNovemberintheAyopayaProvinceofCochabamba,wherenococahadbeenpreviously

detected.25

TheMoralesadministrationimplementedforcederadicationintheIsiboroSecureNationalPark

Indigenousterritory(ElTerritorioIndgenayParqueNacionalIsiboro-Secure,TIPNIS)inanefforttoallay

fearsthatthehotlycontestedhighwayplannedthroughtheregioncouldprovokeanexplosionofcoca

andcocaineproductionthere.Thisscenarioisimprobable.SettlersintheTIPNISplantcocaasaresultof

poorroadinfrastructureandaccesstomarketsforothercrops,andtraffickersalreadythriveinareas

likeTIPNISwithmultiplewaterwaysflowingtowardBrazil.Theroadwouldclearlyprovidegreateraccess

fordrugcontrolefforts,butishighlycriticizedasitwillprovokesevereenvironmentaldamageandopen

theregiontocommercialagricultureandtrade.


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EffortstoDisruptDrugTrafficking

Eventhoughcocaproductiondeclinedsignificantlyin2011,theBoliviangovernmentconfrontsa

growingdrugtradeinthecountry.Thegovernmentsstatedpoliticalwillandincreasedenforcement

effortshaveledtoasteadyincreaseinseizuresofcocapastaandcocaine,aswellasdestructionof

laboratoriesmostlysmall-scaleproductionsitessincetheMoralesadministrationtookofficein2006.AccordingtotheEUsNicolausHansmann,goingafterthedrugtradeisoneofthetoppriorities

ofthegovernmentastheyknowthatbothinternallyandexternally,theworstdamagethattheycando

to[theMovementforSocialismparty,MAS]istoassociateitwithdrugtrafficking.26

BolivianForeign

MinisterDavidChoquehuancaemphaticallystatesthatwearefullycommittedtothefightagainstdrug

traffickingwhichthreatensourchildrenandgrandchildren.

Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandSpecialForceagainst

DrugTrafficking(FELCN)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

TonsSeized

CocaineSeizuresinBolivia2000-September

2012

CocainePaste

Cocaine


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Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandFELCN

Bolivianauthoritieshaverepeatedlyexpressedconcernaboutthepresenceofrepresentativesof

internationaldrugtraffickingorganizationsinthecountry,somethingtheyattributetoBoliviascentral

locationinthecontinent,easyaccesstothecorridorthroughArgentinaandontoWestAfrica(nowa

majortransshipmentpointforillicitdrugsenroutetoEuropeandotherpartsoftheworld),and

proximitytothesecondlargestcocainemarketintheworld,Brazil.Inaddition,Boliviaoffers

comparativelylowoperatingcostsduetosignificantfuelsubsidiesandtheabsenceofsustained

violenceassociatedwithdrugtraffickinginMexicoandColombia.Letsfaceit,notespoliceColonel

GonzaloQuezada,werestrategicallylocatedfortraffickersandBoliviaisaniceplacetoworkwithout

gettingkilledforemissariesfromcartelswhowanttoexploretheiroptions;butthatdoesntmeanthat

wearentdoingeverythingwecantostopthem.27

HeclaimsthatfourColombiandrugtraffickinggroupshavesentpeopletoBolivia;however,othernationalitiesarerepresentedaswell.Drugtrafficking

detentionstatisticsconfirmthesedynamics.FromJanuarytoSeptember2012,Bolivianpolicearrested

peoplefrom30differentcountries.

Untilthelate1990s,elite,geographically-concentratedfamiliesdominateddrugtraffickinginBolivia.

However,inrecentyearstraffickingnetworkshavediversified,tendtoconcentrateononepartofthe

drugtraffickingchainandhavespreadthroughoutthecountry.Thegreatbulkofdrugproductionand

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Asof

Sep.

2012

NumberDestroyed

CocaineLaboratoryDestruconinBolivia2000-

September2012

Refinement

Laboratories

Recycling

Laboratories


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traffickinginBoliviaisnowcarriedoutbysmallfamilyclans,noneofwhichhasasignificantshareof

themarket.Theycanbebrokendownintofourdifferentgroups:thosewhobuycocaforillicitpurposes;

thosewhobuyprecursors;otherswhoprovidethelaborandtemporaryinfrastructureformakingcoca

paste(macerationpitsformakingcocapastehavebecomeathingofthepast,astraffickershave

adoptedtheeasierColombianmethodwherebythecocaisgroundupwithweedwhackers);and

thosewhotransportittococainelaboratoriesoracrosstheborderintoBrazilwhereitisusedfor

makingpaco,ahighly-addictivecocainederivative.28

Thearrestanddisbandingofonegroupmakesa

negligibledent,ifany,inthedrugtradeasitisquicklyandeasilyreplaced.

Source:Vice-MinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesofBoliviaandFELCN

TheinfluxofcocapasteandcocainefromneighboringPeruposesanothermajorchallengefacedfor

Bolivianauthorities;accordingtoCol.Quezada,approximatelyhalfofthecocapasteandcocaineseized

inthecountryoriginatesinPeru.AsthepriceofakiloofcocapasteisUS$200higherinBoliviathan

Peru,moreandmorecocainepasteisbeingbroughtfromPeruintoBolivia.Bolivianpolice

investigationsshowthatmostoftheinfluxiscomingfromtheVRAEregionofPeru(nowreferredtoas

theVRAEMbythePeruviangovernment).Whilemostisbroughtintothecountryinsmallerquantitiesbymules,orsmall-scaletraffickers,itisalsobeingtransportedbysmallairplanesintoBolivian

territoryforprocessingandthensentontoBrazil.ThisisaparticularconcernoftheBolivianpolicegiven

thecountrysverylimitedcapacitytocontrolthecountrysairspace.

TheU.S.governmentclaimstheexpulsionoftheDEA,whichleftBoliviainJanuary2009,permanently

impededBoliviasabilitytodealwithdrugtrafficking,generatingdebateabouttheMorales

administrationspoliticalwilltoimplementeffectivedrugcontrolpolicies.Otherinternationalofficials

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011Asof

Sep.

2012

NumberDestroyed

CocaineFactoryandMaceraonPitDestrucon

inBolivia2000-September2012

Factories

MasceraonPits


15/24


aremoresupportiveofBoliviasdeterminationtoaddresstheproblem.AsnotedbytheEUsHansmann,

thereisagreatwill[byBolivianofficials]tomoveforwardondrugcontrolpolicybutthisdoesnt

necessarilyconformtowhattheUnitedStateswants.HealsopointsoutthattheU.S.focuson

eradicatingcocahasbeendetrimentaltobroaderdrugcontrolefforts:Therestwascrippled,thereis

noexperience,institutionalreformsdidnothappen,theyfailedtopassgoodlegislation.29

TheFELCNsCol.Quezadaagreesthatinstitutionalstrengtheningandarangeofnewlawsareneededto

strengthenthehandofenforcementindealingwiththedrugtrade.Healsopointsoutthathistop

priorityrightnowisnotattheinternationallevel,butthedomesticarena.Asthedrugtradehas

expandedinBolivia,sohasmicro-traffickingandothersmall-scaleoperationsnowfoundincommunities

aroundthecountry.Wearefocusedonoperationsthatprotectourcitizens.30

Theinstitutional

challenges,however,remainformidableasBoliviafacesseverebudgetlimitationsandlimitedtechnical

capacityindealingwithacomplexcriminalenterprisewithvirtuallyunlimitedfunds.

WiththeDEAsdeparture,Boliviahasbeguntoworkcloselywithitsneighborsonarangeofdrug

controlinitiativesandhassignedbilateralagreementswithBrazil,Peru,Argentina,Paraguay,Colombia,andothers.BrazilisprobablyBoliviasmostvisiblepartnerindrugcontrol;thetwocountrieshavehad

frequentbilateraltalks,havesignedmultipleagreementstostrengthenbordercontrol,andBrazilian

dronesareusedtoidentifycocainepasteproductionsites.31

Thejointmilitarizationofthesharedborder

could,however,providemorechallengesthansuccesses.LongerthantheU.S.-Mexicanborderand

muchlessmonitored,physicallyblockingtheflowofdrugsisimpossible.Atthesametime,theborderis

notwelldefinedandBraziliantroopshavecrossedoverintoBolivianterritory.Asaresult,theincreased

militarypresencealongtheborderhasattimesfueledbilateraltensions.32

Boliviaalsosignedtwoimportanttrilateralaccords:onewithBrazilandtheUnitedStatestosupport

cocacultivationmonitoring,andonewithBrazilandPeruonbordercontrolsandinterdiction.Most

recently,onNovember13,2012,theBolivian,Brazilian,andPeruviangovernmentsformedapermanent

workinggrouptosystematizedrugcontroleffortsandtodevelopprotocolstosecurethecountries

airspaceinanefforttoaddresstheproblemofover-flightsdescribedabove.Theplanincludesthe

placementofradaronthenationsbordersinordertobeabletoshootdownflightsidentifiedas

transportingillicitdrugs.33

Unfortunately,pastshoot-downpoliciesinothercountrieshavebeenfraught

withproblemsandhaveledtothedeathsofinnocentcivilians.34

Alsoofnote,onNovember25,2012,

theBrazilianmilitarysigneda$420millioncontractforthefirstphaseoftheIntegratedBorder

SurveillanceSystem,includingradar,drones,andsensorstobeinitiallyputintoplacealongtheborder

betweenBoliviaandParaguay.35

VaryingEstimatesofPotentialCocaineProduction

Estimatesofpotentialcocaineproductionarearguablyamoreimportantmeasureofthesizeofa

countrysillicitproductionandtraffickingthanareestimatesofthelandundercocacultivation.Wide

discrepanciesbetweentheUNandU.S.incocaineproductionestimatesinBoliviaandalackof

transparencyregardingU.S.estimationmethodshaveledtocontentionoverhowmuchcocaineis

likelybeingproducedinBolivia.Despitereportingthatthelanddevotedtococacultivationhas


16/24


diminishedin2010andagainin2011,inSeptember2012theU.S.governmentannouncedastunning

increaseinBoliviaspotentialcocaineproduction:fromanestimated195metrictons,whichheldsteady

from2008to2010,toapotentialproductionof265metrictonsfor2011.Inotherwords,evenwiththe

U.S.-estimated13percentreductionincocahectaresandthe13percentdeclineincocaleafyield

reportedbytheUN,theU.S.governmentassertedthatBoliviaspotentialcocaineproductionincreased

by36percent.Foritspart,theBoliviangovernmentestimatesthatapproximately80metrictonscould

beproducedinthecountry.

WOLASeniorAssociateforRegionalSecurityPolicyAdamIsacsonhascalculatedthat265metrictonsof

cocainefrom30,000hectaresofcocaamountstoanastonishing8.83kilogramsofcocaineperhectare

ofcoca,instarkcontrasttoColombiawhereU.S.datashows2.70kilogramsperhectare.36

Inother

words,theU.S.figuresimplythatBoliviancocaleafisyieldingthreetimesmorecocainethanColombian

cocaleaf.(GiventhatasizableproportionofBoliviascocayieldisproducedfortraditional,legal

purposes12,000hectaresaccordingtopresentBolivianlawthecoca-to-cocaineconversionratio

impliedbytheU.S.figuresisevenhigher.)TheU.S.governmentestimatesthattheamountofpotential

cocaineproductioninColombiafellbetween2010and2011by25percent,from270to195metrictons.

Bycontrast,theUNcalculatedColombiaspotentialcocaineproductionat345metrictonsfor2011,

usingU.S.governmentdatafortheconversionfrompastetococaine.

Source:U.S.InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReports

U.S.officialsmaintainthattheincreaseinpotentialcocaineproductioninBoliviaisduetomoreefficient

processingmethods(ironically,thesamemethodsusedinColombia)and to thematurityof existing

fields,whichcontributetohigheryields.Allagreethatmorecocainecanbeproducedwithlesscocain

Boliviatoday.Yetthatwouldbeunlikelytoaccountforsuchadramaticincreaseinpotentialproduction.

Furthermore,theU.S.governmentannounceda50percentincreaseinitsestimatesofBolivias

potentialcocaineproductionin2008,usingthesameargumentmoreefficientcocaineprocessing

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011

EsRmatedTonsofCocaine

U.S.FiguresforPotenalCocaineProducon

(MetricTons)

USOfficialFigure-Colombia

USOfficialFigure-Bolivia

USFigureforBolivia

Subtracng12,000Hectare

AllowanceforTradionalUse


17/24


methods.37

Inshort,U.S.officialsclaimthatpotentialcocaineproductionmorethandoubledinthree

years,despitereductionsincocacultivation,eachtimepointingtotheadoptionofColombian

processingmethods.Mostdisturbingly,theU.S.governmentprovidesnoinformationwhatsoeverabout

howtheyderivethesestatistics,givingcredencetoallegationsthatthenumbersareconstructedfor

politicalpurposes.

U.S.officialsdosaythatOperationBreakthrough,initiatedinBoliviain1993,providesthebaseline

methodologytocalculatepotentialcocaineproductionintheAndes.(AINwasabletoobtainthe

OperationBreakthroughmethodologyviaadeclassifiedDEAdocument.)38

Yetcurrentestimates,which

reportedlycontinuetoemploythesemethods,demonstratesomedramaticcontradictions.First,

OperationBreakthroughestimatedin2000thattheColombiancocaineprocessingmethodis

approximately25percentmoreeffectivethanthemacerationpitsystemsinitiallyusedinPeruand

Bolivia.39

Inaddition,OperationBreakthroughidentifiedcriticalelementstoestimatecocaine

production:

1) numberofhectaresundercultivation;2) thecocaleafyieldperhectare;3) thecocaleafalkaloidcontentwithintheleaf;4) theefficiencywithwhichthecocainealkaloidintheleafisconvertedintococainebase;and5) theefficiencywithwhichcocainebaseisconvertedintococainehydrochloride(HCL) 40

Thestudyprovidedthefollowingformula:

YetU.Sofficialsacknowledgethattheyarepresentlyunabletodeterminecocaleafyieldsandhaveno

datatocalculatetheefficiencyofthealkaloidextraction,bothindispensabletocalculatepotentialcocaineproduction.TheU.S.governmentcomplainedinMarch2012thattheyhavebeenunableto

carryoutyieldstudiesinBoliviasincetheexpulsionoftheDEAinJanuary2009.42

Inotherwords,U.S.

officialsdonothavethebasicinformationneededtocalculatepotentialcocaineproductioninBolivia

viatheOperationBreakthroughmethodology.TheUNODCs2011cocacultivationreportonBoliviadidnotprovideanydataonpotentialcocaine

production,althoughtheyreporteda13percentdecreaseincocayields,whichwouldsuggesta

reduction,ratherthananincrease,inpotentialcocaineproduction.Concernsthattheprevious

methodologyisoutofdateandmaynotproduceaccuratestatisticsledtheUNODCtorevampitsdata

collectionandanalysis.Theorganizationdevelopedanewmethodology,whichincludesgathering

informationfromincarcerateddrugtraffickerstodeterminecocaine-manufacturingmethodsinorderto

replicatethemindifferentareastoestimatecocayieldsandpotentialcocaineproduction.Thiswillbothimprovestatisticsatthenationallevelandfacilitatecomparisonsbetweencountries.Thenew

methodologyisalreadybeingimplementedinPeruandColombia,andinSeptember2012theUNODC

andBoliviasignedanagreementtoallowitsimplementationinBolivia.TheUNODChopestoreleasethe

newdatainmid-2013.43

Calculatingpotentialcocaineproductionisalwaysachallengingtask.InBolivia

alone,thereareatleasteightecosystemsthatwillleadtodifferentcocayields.However,thenew

methodologydevelopedbyUNODC,ifimplementedaccuratelyandcompletely,offersthepossibilityfor

morereliable,transparent,andcrediblestatisticsonpotentialcocaineproduction.

maturecocaleafcultivationXcocaleafyieldXcocainealkaloid

contentXlaboratoryefficiency=cocainebase(MT)41


18/24


U.S.PolicytowardBolivia

ThedebatesparkedbytheWhiteHousesSeptember2012determination,andinparticularitsclaims

regardingpotentialcocaineproductioninBolivia,hasstrainedwhathasbeenfairlysteadybilateral

collaborationondrugcontrolprograms.DespitetheexpulsionoftheDEA,theBolivianMinistryofGovernmentsViceMinistryofSocialDefenseandControlledSubstancesandtheU.S.embassys

NarcoticsAffairsSection(NAS)maintaindailycooperationontheground.InOctober2011,Assistant

SecretaryofStateforInternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairsWilliamBrownfieldtolda

congressionalcommittee:

InBolivia, eradicationefforts area highlightofa sometimes-difficultbilateral relationship

and actually exceeded the 2010 target of 8,000 hectares. These efforts appear to have

stoppedtheexpansionofcocacultivationFurthermoretheU.S.estimateactuallyshowed

a500-hectaredecreaseinlandundercocacultivation.InBolivia,U.S.assistance,including

supportfortrainingandcanineprograms,hasresultedinBolivianseizuresofcocaleafthat

are19timeshigherthantheywereadecadeago.44

TheNAScontinuestofunddrugandcocacontroleffortsalbeitwithareducedbudgetand

coordinateswiththeBoliviangovernmentonadailybasis.U.S.ChargdeAffairesJohn

Creamer45

confirmedonJuly15,2012thatdespiterumorstothecontrary,NASisstaying[Its]

missionischangingasaresultoftheBoliviansgovernmentsnationalizationofthedrugwar,an

initiativewewelcomesoweareapprovinglessoperatingcostsandemphasizingtrainingmore.

AframeworkagreementthatformallyrenewedbilateralrelationswassignedinNovember2011andthe

governmentsannouncedtheirintentiontoreinstateambassadors.Althoughsincethattimeboth

countrieshavereiteratedthispoint,itisunclearhowlongthisprocesswilltake(andevenaftertheU.S.

governmentannouncesacandidateforthepost,significantdelaysintheU.S.Senatesconfirmation

processcouldoccur).Theframeworkagreementincludesrecurringdialogueondrugpolicy.InJanuary2012,Bolivia,Brazil,andtheUnitedStatessignedatrilateralcocacultivationmonitoringagreement.At

the2012SummitoftheAmericas,PresidentObamaobserved,TherecentagreementbetweentheU.S.,

Brazil,andBoliviatogoafter(excess)cocacultivationinBoliviaisthekindofcollaborationweneed.46

U.S.economicassistancetoBoliviahasdeclinedsteadilysincePresidentMoralescameintooffice.Thisis

largelyduetooverallbudgetcuts,vocaloppositiononthepartofkeyRepublicanmembersofCongress

toMoralesrelationshipwithVenezuelanPresidentHugoChvezandCubasRaulCastro,andinprotest

oftheexpulsionoftheDEA.However,fromtheBoliviangovernmentspointofview,lessaidisbetter

thanmoreaidwithstringsattached.AsnotedbyForeignMinisterChoquehuanca,Wewanttohave

goodrelationswithallcountries.Butrelationsbasedonrespect.Ihavefoundunderstandinginthe

UnitedStates.WearenotafraidoftheUnitedStatesaspreviousgovernmentswere.Weareasmallcountry,butonewithdignity.HeconcludedthatcomprehensionofthesituationinBoliviaonthepart

ofsomeU.S.officialsiswhatallowedforthesigningofaframeworkagreementbasedonmutual

respect,adding,Wewouldratherhavegoodrelationswithouteconomicassistancethaneconomic

assistancewhoseuseisdictatedbytheUnitedStates.47


19/24


Source:U.S.InternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairs(INL)reportsviaJusttheFacts.

However,twoissuesinparticularhaveputsignificantstrainonthebilateralrelationship.The

continuationoftheunilateralU.S.drugcontroldetermination(previouslycalledcertification)in

whichtheUnitedStatesjudgeswhichcountriesareeffectivelymeetinginternationaldrugcontrol

obligationsiswidelycriticizedacrossLatinAmerica,furthererodingU.S.credibilityinaregionnow

openlyquestioningtheprevailingdrugpolicyparadigm.TheObamaadministrationhascontinuedthe

practiceofitspredecessorofgivingBoliviaafailinggrade(alongwithVenezuelaandMyanmar)each

September.However,inthecaseofBolivia,thenumerouserrorsandinaccuraciesparticularlyevident

inthe2012determinationgivetheimpressionthatthedecisionisbasedonpoliticalmotivations

ratherthananaccurateassessmentofdrugcontroleffortsontheground.Forexample,the2012determinationstatedthattheUNODChadreportedaslightincreaseincocacultivationin2011,whenin

factthreedayslatertheUNODCannounceda12percentdecrease.ItalsoassertedthatBoliviaremains

oneoftheworldslargestproducersofcocaleafforcocaineandotherillegalproducts.Asnoted

previously,BoliviascocacropissignificantlysmallerthaneitherColombiaorPeru(together,theseare

theonlythreecountriesthatproduceandexportsignificantquantitiesofcoca),particularlywhencoca

usedforlegalpurposesistakenintoaccount.

TheWhiteHousesSeptember14determinationconcludesthatBoliviahasfaileddemonstrablyduring

theprevious12monthstoadhereto[its]obligationsunderinternationalnarcoticsagreements,basing

thisassertiononadismissalofthegainsmadeviadecliningcocacultivationandwhatappeartobe

exaggeratedestimatesofpotentialcocaineproduction.

48

ThelackoftransparencyabouthowU.S.officialscalculatecocaineproductionestimates,asdescribedabove,combinedwiththecontentionthat

BoliviaisproducingmorecocainethanColombiadespitehavingfarlesslandundercocacultivation

thanColombiaorPerufurthererodesU.S.credibilityinBolivia.Moreover,itisnotlostontheBolivian

governmentthateveryyearPeruislavishedwithpraisefromWashington,despitesignificantandsteady

increasesinbothcocacultivationandestimatedpotentialcocaineproductioninthatcountry.

$-

$20,000,000.00

$40,000,000.00

$60,000,000.00

$80,000,000.00

$100,000,000.00

$120,000,000.00

$140,000,000.00

$160,000,000.00

$180,000,000.00

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

U.S.DrugControlFundingtoBolivia

Aid


20/24


Boliviaand1961SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs

AnotherpointofcontentioninbilateralrelationsisU.S.oppositiontoBoliviasre-admissiontothe1961

SingleConventiononNarcoticDrugsasamendedbythe1972Protocol.Boliviaisseekingtoreconcileits

newconstitutionwithitsinternationalcommitments.Article384ofthe2009Constitutionstates:TheStateshallprotectnativeandancestralcocaasculturalpatrimony,arenewablenaturalresourceof

Boliviasbiodiversity,andasafactorofsocialcohesion;initsnaturalstateitisnotanarcotic.Its

revaluing,production,commercialization,andindustrializationshallberegulatedbylaw.The

Constitutionallowsforaperiodoffouryearsforthegovernmenttodenounceand,inthatcase,

renegotiatetheinternationaltreatiesthatmaybecontrarytotheconstitution.

Hence,inJune2011,thecountrydenouncedthe1961SingleConventionandannounceditsintentionto

re-accedewithareservationallowingforthetraditionaluseofthecocaleaf.Unlessmorethanone-third

ofUNmemberstatesobjectbytheJanuary10,2013deadline,theBolivianreservationwillbeaccepted

anditwillonceagainbeafullPartytotheSingleConvention.

TheU.S.governmentsJuly2012formalletterofobjectionstates:

The United States considers the Convention tobeone of the cornerstones of

internationaleffortstopreventtheillicitproduction,manufacture,trafficinand

abuse of drugs, while ensuringthat illicit drugs areavailable formedical and

scientificpurposes. TheUnitedStatesis concernedthatBolivia's reservation is

likelytoleadtoagreatersupplyofavailablecoca,andasaresult,morecocaine

will be available for the global cocaine market, further fueling narcotics

traffickingand relatedcriminalactivitiesinBoliviaandthecountriesalong the

cocainetraffickingroute.49

Butinseekingthereservation,BoliviahasbeenfollowingestablishedConventionguidelines.ItalsotookthisactionafteritsefforttoamendtheSingleConventionbydeletingitsprovisionobligatingthatcoca

leafchewingmustbeabolishedwithin25years(Article49).TheU.S.governmentledoppositiontothis

amendment,eventhoughitisquiteclearthattheeliminationofcocachewingisnotfeasibleandthat

thatthepracticeiswidelyacceptedinmanysectors,inBoliviaandinternationally.Incontrast,with

regardtoBoliviasintenttore-accedetotheSingleConventionwithareservation,U.S.officialsclaim

thattheyarenotorganizingoppositiontoBoliviasactionsandthattheydonotexpectmorethanone-

thirdofUNmemberstatestoobject.Atthetimeofthiswriting,onlytheU.S.governmenthad

presentedaformalobjection,althoughothershaveindicatedthattheywouldalsodoso.

TheBoliviangovernmentisoptimisticthattheywillbereturningtotheConventioninJanuary2013.

ForeignMinisterChoquehuancadidatourofEuropeancountriesinOctober2012topressthegovernmentscase.AccordingtoViceMinisterofCocaDionicioNuez,Theinternationalcampaignhas

gonewell.Weareoptimisticthatwewillbeabletoreturntotheconvention.50

Onestickingpointwith

EuropeangovernmentsisthereleaseofanEU-fundedstudyonthetraditionalusesofcoca,whichis

intendedtoprovidethebaselineforhowmuchcocashouldbeproducedinBoliviaforlegalpurposes.It

isnowyearsbehindschedule,butBolivianauthoritieshavestatedthattheyarefinishingsome

complementarycomponentsofthestudyandthatitwillbereleasedinthefirsthalfof2013.51

TheBoliviangovernmentregisteredadiplomaticadvanceattheNovember2012Ibero-American


21/24


SummitheldinCdiz,Spain.Atthatsummit,aspecialcommuniquwasadoptedonthetraditionaluse

ofcocachewinginwhichthepresidentsunanimouslystated:

Conscious of the importance of conserving the ancestral and cultural practices of

indigenouspeoples,intheframeworkofrespectforhumanrightsandthefundamental

rights of indigenous peoples, in accordance with international instrument We

recognizethatthetraditionaluseofcocachewing(akulliku)ofthecocaleafisacultural

andancestralmanifestationofthepeopleofBoliviaandPeruandshouldberespected

bytheinternationalcommunity.52

Inotherwords,BolivianowhasatleasttacitsupportfromallLatinAmericancountries,aswellasSpain

andPortugal,foreliminatingtheinternationalstigmapresentlyanderroneouslyassociatedwiththe

cocaleaf.

Conclusions

CriticsofBoliviasUNcocainitiativeareforcedtobalanceconcernsoftheprecedentsetbyallowinga

countrytore-accedetothe1961SingleConventionwithareservationagainsttheimplicationsof

Boliviaspermanentwithdrawalfromtheinternationaldrugcontrolsystem.Staunchdefendersofthe

conventionsfearthatpermittingBoliviatore-entertheSingleConventionwithareservationupholding

traditionalusesofthecocaleafcouldpotentiallyopenupaPandorasbox,withothercountries

proposingchangesthatcallintoquestionthefundamentalsofthecurrenttreaties.However,the51-

yearoldinternationaldrugcontrolregimemustprovethatitcanadaptandadjusttothechanging

dynamicsofthedrugtrade.Theinclusionofthecocaleafinthe1961Conventionwasahistoricerror

whosecorrectionislongoverdue.Moreover,regardlessofwhetherornotBoliviareturnstotheSingle

Convention,cocacultivationwillcontinueinBolivia,andtheUNconventionsshouldbeadaptedtoalign

withthatreality.

TheBoliviangovernmenthasmadeclearitsintentiontocontinuetoengagewiththeU.S.government,

theEuropeanUnion,andneighboringcountriesondrugcontrolandhassignificantlyreducedoverall

levelsofcocacultivationandhasincreaseddrugseizures,amongotherdrugcontrolactions.Inother

words,Boliviaclearlywishestocontinueplayingbytheestablishedrulesofthegametoaddressillicit

drugtrafficking.

TheBoliviangovernmenthasinfactmadesignificantprogressfacingtheongoingchallengesofdrug

productionandtrafficking,inpartduetotheassistanceprovidedbytheEU,theUnitedStates,and

others.TheU.S.governmentshouldnowrecognizethisprogressinitsannualdeterminations.Thestring

ofnegativedeterminationsisincreasinglydisconnectedfromrealityinBoliviaandretainslittle

credibilitywiththeBoliviangovernmentorwithothergovernmentsintheregion,whichcontinuetosee

theannualU.S.ratingasoffensiveandpoliticallymotivated.Alongthesamelines,thepotentialcocaine

statisticspresentedbytheU.S.governmentinlastyearsdeterminationweremetwithdisbeliefin

Bolivia.Giventheongoingdoubtsaboutthereliabilityofsuchestimates,theU.S.governmentshouldbe

transparentaboutexactlyhowitperformsthesecalculations.

ThesigningoftheframeworkagreementmarkedsignificantprogressinU.S.-Bolivianbilateralrelations.

Bothgovernmentsshouldbuildonthatsuccessbyusingtheaccordasavenuetodiscussareasof

concern,friction,andconsensus.Whiledifferenceswillundoubtedlyarise,itisinthebestinterestsof


22/24


bothcountriestomaintainanopendialogue.

Boliviafacesdauntingchallengesfromdrugproductionandtrafficking.Whilethegovernmenthasan

innovativenationalstrategyforaddressingthesechallenges,theincreasingmilitarizationofitsborders

andproposedairinterdictionraiseavarietyofconcerns.Moreover,thecontinuedgrowthinregional

andglobalcocaineconsumptionmeansthatBoliviacannotandshouldnotbeexpectedtosolvethe

problemsassociatedwithcocaineproductionandtrafficking,evenwithinitsownborders.Bolivias

effortsmustbecarriedoutintandemwitheffectivedemandreductionstrategiestocontainand

eventuallyshrinktheglobalcocainemarket.

KathrynLedeburistheDirectoroftheAndeanInformationNetwork(AIN)basedinCochabamba,

Bolivia.ColettaA.YoungersisaSeniorFellowattheWashingtonOfficeonLatinAmerica

(WOLA).WOLASeniorAssociateJohnM.Walsh,WOLAProgramAssistantAdamSchaffer,and

AINProgramAssistantJessicaRobinsonalsocontributedtothisreport.

ThisreportwasmadepossiblewiththegeneroussupportoftheOpenSocietyFoundations.


23/24


1MoraleswontheDecember2005electionswith53.7percentofthepopularvote.HewasreelectedinDecember

2009.2TheWhiteHouse.WhiteHousePresidentialDetermination:MemorandumofJustificationforMajorIllicitDrug

TransitorIllicitDrugProducingCountriesforFiscalYear2013.Washington,D.C.:September14,2012.

3UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivodeCoca,September19,2012.https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/September/coca-crop-cultivation-

falls-significantly-in-bolivia-according-to-2011-coca-monitoring-survey.html 4Onehectareisroughly2.5acres.

5Authorsinterview.September28,2012.

6ColettaA.YoungersandKathrynLedebur.WOLAandAIN.WashingtoninWonderland.

http://www.wola.org/commentary/washington_in_wonderland7Laparadojaesquehaymenoscocalesperohaymscocana,PginaSiete,July14,2012.

8Acatois1,600squaremeters,oraboutathirdofanacre,intheChapare,and2,500squaremetersintheYungas

(wherefarmersarguethecocaplantyieldislessthanintheChapare).9Authorsinterview,September26,2012.

10IntheChapareregion,therearesixcocagrowerunionsthattogetherformtheSixFederationsofthe

CochabambaTropics(SeisFederacionesdelTrpicodeCochabamba).11Authorsinterview,September24,2012.12

Authorsinterview,September26,2012.13

Seehttp://www.mingobierno.gob.bo/pdf/vicemindefsocial.pdfformoreinformation.14

AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,AttachtotheCooperationSectionoftheEuropeanUnionin

Bolivia,September28,2012.15

UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).EstadoPlurinacionaldeBolivia:MonitoreodeCultivode

Coca,September19,2011,47.16

Formanysmallfarmers,cocaisthefamilysonlysourceofcashincome.17

USAIDreportedsupportingthecultivationof39,834hectaresofalternativecropsandthecreationof22,386

jobsinBoliviainfiscalyears2006through2010.Atthetimeofthiswriting,USAIDsresultsforfiscalyear2011

havenotyetbeenfinalized.SeeU.S.GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO).CounterdrugAssistance:U.S.

AgenciesHaveAllottedBillionsinAndeanCountries,butDODShouldImproveitsReportingofResults,GAO-12-824,

June2012.17.18




Coca.September19,2012,5.21

InformacinInstitucional.FONADAL.

http://www.fonadal.gob.bo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=9222

Asnotedearlier,intheYungasthecatoismeasuredat2,500squaremeters,orone-quarterofahectare,rather

than1,600squaremetersintheChapare,whereyieldsarehigher.23

Authorsinterview,DionicioNuez,September27,2012.24


Coca,September19,2012.5.25

FELCNyFTCinicianoperativosenCocapataLosTiempos,November14,2012.

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20121115/felcn-y-ftc-inician-operativos-en-

cocapata_192426_409446.html 26


Authorsinterview,September27,2012withCol.Quezada,DirectoroftheSpecialForcetoFightDrugTrafficking,

FELCN,Boliviasdrugcontrolpolice.28

AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,September27,2012.29

AuthorsinterviewwithNicolausHansmann,September28,2012.


24/24


30


CarlosValdez.BolivianofficialsaysBraziliandronesaidinlocatingillegalcocainelabs, AssociatedPress,June

21,2012.32

Brasilesperaunarespuestabolivianasobreaccinmilitar,LaRazn,April30,2012;Boliviarefuerzacontrolmilitarenla

fronteradondelincharonabrasileo,EFE,August18,2012;andBrasilcierrasufronteraconBoliviapor

supuestosexcesos,ElDiario,November26,2012.33

Bolivia,BrasilyPerproyectancrearunfondoparalaluchaantidrogacondinerosdelaextincindebienes,LaRazn,November14,

2012.http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/Bolivia-Brasil-Peru-extincion-

antidroga_0_1724827563.html34

TheTransnationalInstitute.TheDrugWarintheSkies.November17,2005.http://www.tni.org/article/drug-

war-skies35

EmpresaaeronuticadiseavigilanciaparafronterabrasileaconParaguayyBolivia,LaRazn,November26,2012.http://www.la-

razon.com/mundo/Empresa-aeronautica-vigilancia-Paraguay-Bolivia_0_1731426897.html36

UNandU.S.EstimatesforCocaineProductionContradictEachOther.JusttheFacts.July31,2012.

http://justf.org/blog/1?page=137

Excesscocaleafisbeingdivertedtotheproductionofcocainehydrochloride.Compoundedbyimproved

processingmethods,theUnitedStatesGovernmentestimatespotentialcocainehydrochlorideproduction

increasedinBoliviaduring2008by50percentto195metrictons.U.S.DepartmentofState.Bureauof

InternationalNarcoticsandLawEnforcementAffairs.2010InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReport,March

1,2010.http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137190.htm.38

SpecialthankstoJeremyBigwoodforprovidingdocumentationonOperationBreakthrough.39

Usingawater-pit,leaf-stompingtechnique,boththePeruvianandBolivianchemistswerecapableof

extractingsome45percentofthecocainealkaloidfromtheleafColombiancocainebaseprocessorsuseand

entirelydifferentproductionmethoditisreasonablethatColombianchemistsmaybecapableofextractingas

muchas70percentofthecocainealkaloidfromtheleaf.DCICrimeandNarcoticsCenterandtheDrug

EnforcementAdministration.Colombia:CocaCultivationandPreliminaryResultsfromOperationBreakthrough,

May2000,8.http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/bigwood_coca_op_breakthrough.pdf.40

U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministrationIntelligenceReport.OperationBreakthrough:CocaCultivation&Cocaine

BaseProductioninBolivia,July1994,DEA-94032,1. 41

Ibid.16.42

InternationalNarcoticsControlStrategyReport:Bolivia,March7,2012.43

AuthorsinterviewwithCsarGuedes.September28,2012.44

TestimonyofAmbassadorWilliamR.Brownfield,AssistantSecretaryofState,BureauofInternationalNarcotics

andLawEnforcementAffairsbeforetheSenateCommitteeonForeignRelationsSubcommitteeontheWestern

Hemisphere,PeaceCorps,andGlobalNarcoticsAffairsHearingonASharedResponsibility:Counternarcoticsand

CitizenSecurityintheAmericas,March31,2011.45

Laparadojaesquehaymenoscocalesperohaymscocana,PginaSiete,July14,2012.46

WilliamsFarfn.ObamadestacaelpactoantidrogasconBoliviayBrasil, LaRazn,April14,2012.

http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/Obama-destaca-antidrogas-Bolivia-

Brasil_0_1595840433.html 47


http://cts.vresp.com/c/?AndeanInformationNet/c7a7203e06/4b02934804/d7ae0745eb49

TheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations.UnitedStatesOfAmerica:ObjectionToTheReservationContained

InTheCommunicationByThePlurinationalStateOfBolivia,July3,2012.Reference:C.N.361.2012.TREATIES-VI.18.50


Difundirnenmayoestudiodelacoca,basedefuturaleyantidrogas,LosTiempos,November26,2012.

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20121126/difundiran-en-mayo-estudio-de-la-coca-base-

de-futura-ley_193581_412158.html52

AuthorstranslationfromoriginalSpanish.

Bolivian Drug Control Efforts: Genuine Advances, Daunting Challenges

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