Bodhicaryāvatāra 9_2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths in the Prāsangika...

7/28/2019 Bodhicaryvatra 9_2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretations of the Two Truths in the Prsangika Mdhyamika

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THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFBUDDHIST STUDIES

E D I T O R - I N - C H I E F

A . K. NarainUniversity of Wiscon sin, Mad ison, USA

E D I T O R SHeinz Bechert Leon Hurvitz

Universitat Gottingen, FRG UBC , Vancouver, CanadaLewis Lancaster A lexander W. MacDonald

University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, FranceB.J. Stavisky A lex Wayman

WN UR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA

A S S O C I A T E E D I T O R

Stephen BeyerUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 2 1979 Number 2


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C O N T E N T S

I. ARTICLESDharmasri on the Sixteen Degrees of Comprehension

by Leon Hurvitz 7Indrabhuti's 'Confession of Errors in the FundamentalTe ach ing s of the Vajrayana', A Critical Edition, EnglishTranslation and Discussion, by Nathan Katz 31Non-duality of the Tw o Tru th s in Sinitic Madhyamika: Originof the 'Third Truth' , by Whalen Lai 45Transpersonal Psychological Observations on TheravadaBuddhist Meditative Practices, by James Santucci 66Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 as a Focus for Tibetan Interpretationsof the Two Truths in the Prasangika Madhyamikaby Michael Sweet 79

II . SHORT PAPER1. Some B uddh ist Poems in Tamil, by G. Vijayavenugopal 93

I I I . BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICESReviews:1. The Prajnaparamita Literature, by Edward Conze 992. Two Ways to Perfection: Buddhist and Christian

by Shanta Ratnayaka 1033. An Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systemsby F. D. Lessing and A . Wayman 1044. Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia;

Religion and Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka;Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laosand Burma, by Bardwell Smith 1075. Studies in Pali and Buddhism, Edited by A . K. Narain 109


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Notices:1. B uddh i s t Wisdom . The m ys te ry o f the self, by George Grimm 1112 . B uddhi sm . A se l ec t b iography , by Satyaprakasli 1123 . Liv ing B uddh i s t Mas te r s , by Jack KornjieUl 1124 . Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis , by Steven T. Katz 112

I V . N O T E S A N D N E W S1. O n B uddh i s t R esea rch In fo rm at ion (B . R . I . )

of the Ins t i tu te for Advanced Studiesof W orld Rel ig ions ( IASW R), New York 113O B I T U A R Y H 6

L I S T O F I A B S M E M B E R S 117

The Edi tor - in-Chief wishes to express thanks to Roger Jacksonand Rena Crispin for their assis tance in the production of this issue.


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Bodhicaryavatara 9:2 As A Focus ForTibetan Interpreta t ions of the Two TruthsIn the Prasangika Madhyamika1

by Michael J. Sweet

i.The two truths (satyadvaya) have always been viewed by theMadhyamikas as vital for an accurate understanding of their school; 2significant d ifferences in ontology, epistemology and religious practicerest on the definition of this concept. T he controversy amo ng T ibetanscholiasts revolving around the interpretation of the second verse inthe ninth chapter (pmjnaparamitapariccheda) of Santideva's Bodhicaryavatara (BCA) brings some basic divergences in their exegesis of the twotruths into sharp relief. This verse reads as follows:

sarnvrtih paramarthasca satyadvayam idaiii matam/buddheragocarastattvam buddhih samvrtirucyate//'The conventional (sarnvrtih) and the ultimatethese are accepted as the tw o truths. Reality(tattvam) is beyond the sp here of the intellect;intellect is called 'concealing' (sarnvrtih)."T he G eluk view, exemplified by Gyaltshap (Rgyal Tshab) and T sgonkhapa,ho lds tha t t he second half of this stanza shou ld no t be taken in its literalsense, because if ultimate truth were not the object of some type ofintellectual understanding, it would be unknowable, and it wouldtherefore follow that all religious practice aiming at the realization ofthe ultimate would be in vain.3 The earlier Sakya and later Nyingmacom m en tators dissented from this line of interpretation, argu ing thatultim ate t ru th "can not be objectified by the m ind because it transcendsall discu rsiveness (prapanca)"* althou gh these com m entators do affirm

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a non-intel lectual intui t ion of the ul t imate. This confl ict of opinion isg ro u n d ed in a d i f fe rence of emphas i s between Geulk and non-Gelukap pr oa ch es to re lig ious know ledge , which may be roughly des igna tedas "scholast ic" versus "yogic", or cognit ive versus experiential . In thepresent endeavor to clarify this quest ion we wil l deal with differingM ad hy am ika def ini t ions of the two t ru ths , its t rea tm en t in the BCA, th etexts an d ar g ue m en ts m ost of ten ut i lized by Tib etan scholars on thispoint and the his tor ica l context of th is controversy.

I I .The Madhymika asser t ion of two t ruths should not lead one to

assume that this school accepts two different levels or degrees ofrea l i ty; f rom ear l iest t imes Bu dd hist texts have de nie d tha t there is amul t ipl ic i ty of t ruths , 5 an d th e M adh yam ika is in accord wi th this .Samvrtisatya is usual ly t ran sla ted semant ica l ly as "conve nt ional t ru th "( = i/yavaharasatya)6 but from a strictly etymological point of view itshould be explicated as "truth for a concealing [cognit ion]"; i t is "thatth ro u g h which the com preh ens ion of rea li ty is concealed and blocked."7Even th ou gh the Prasangika M adhyam ika dis t inguishes between a " t ruec o n v e n t i o n a l " (tathyasamvrtih), def ined as the ord ina ry pe rcep t ion ofany objec t by an inimpaired sense organ 8 , and a "false conventional"{mithyasamvrtih) compris ing i l lusions, mirages and the l ike 9 , bothaspe cts of con ven t iona l t ru th are rega rd ed as "fa lse f rom the s tand point of the ul t imate", that is , from the viewpoint of the true vision ofthe Sa in t s .1 0 A ltho ug h con ven t ional t ru th i s thu s ac tually fa lse f rom theperspective of the ul t imate, i t retains i ts ut i l i ty as a means of point ingthe way towards the u l t ima te . " The Prasangika Madhyamika "s t r iveson ly to pro ve th at it [ i.e . co nv en tion al t ru th ] is no t valid from the po intof view of the absolute ." 1 2

Cri ti c s o f the M adhy am ika such as R um an ia have a rgu ed tha t theMadhyamika cannot va l idly c la im to have a dual t ruth s ince i t sconve nt iona l t ru th is "a eup hem ism for un t ru th (mithya) or unreal i ty."1 3Madhyamika thinkers were a lways on the a ler t to avoid this objec t ion;N ag ar ju na replies to an accusation of nihil ism by stat ing tha t "things l ikea car t , a po t , a c loth e tc . , th ou gh devo id of ow n-bein g because of be ingdependent ly or ig ina ted , a re occupied wi th the i r re spec t ive func t ions ,e .g . carrying. . .conta ining. . .protec t ing f rom the cold." 1 4 It is not theem pir ica l fact which is rejected as false, bu t the intel lect 's in ter pr eta t io n80


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of i t; a con ven t ion al t ru th is def in ed on tologica lly as any ph en om en onwhich a r i ses in dependence of ano the r 1 5 clear ly not an asser t ion ofnon - e x i s t e nc e .Sant ideva as wel l t rea ts the same problem at 9 :105c-106b: anopponent ob jec t s tha t on Madhyamika premises " the convent iona ldo es n o t ex i s t how can the re be two t ru ths?" T h e r ep ly is by no me ansc lea r , as i ts m ea nin g is d i spu ted by va r ious com m enta to r s , pe r hap sref lec t ing the di le m m a which the Ma dhy am ika faces on this score . T h emain th rus t o f San t ideva ' s a rgument appear s to be tha t the causa lef fic iency of ph en o m en a is unaf fec ted by the ir epis temologica l s ta tusas co nv en t ion al t ru th s : " tha t which is def ini te ly su bseq uen t exis ts"(9:107 c) , th a t is , a de pe nd en t ly p rod uc ed conv ent ional objec t can beemp i r ica l ly de te r m ine d to ex is t subsequ ent to its p rod uc t ion , a l thoughproduct ion and cessa t ion are , in the f ina l analys is , imaginat ivecons tructs . I t must a lways be borne in mind tha t the two t ruths haveboth an epis temologica l and ontologica l charac ter ; f rom the la t te rview poin t con ven t iona l t ru th is def ined as " tha t objec t which is foun dby con ven t iona l m ean s o f valid kno w ledg e" l 6 the object itself, as well asthe non -analy t ica l un im pa ired sense consciousness by which it isascer ta ined, a re reckoned as convent ional t ru ths . Such an objec t i s nota mere f ict ion, al though the mode in which i t is perceived isinextr icably bound up with false reif ication. 1 7

The ambigui t ies of th is problem have contr ibuted to an uneasytens ion within the Prasangika Madhyamika between more subs tant ia l -is t ic and more negativis t ic views of the conventional. I f Candrakir t i ' sin terpre ta t ion be taken as normat ive for th is school then i tsp redominant t endency seems to be nega t iv i s t i c . For Candrak l r t i ,co nv en tio na l t ru th is ju st th e object of those w ho have false vision(rnrsadarscmay*; it is an artif icially c on stru cte d (krtrimam) t ru th , and it isequa ted wi th de lus ion (moha). 19 The difficulties th at this view gives riseto w ere recognize d by Bhavaviveka and oth er Svatantrika M adhyamikas ,w ho su bd ivid ed conv ent ion al t ru th on the bas is of its emp ir ica leff iciency o r non-eff iciency. H ow eve r , such a dis t inction can only bemade i f one accepts the Svatantr ika c la im that the convent ional lyexistent exis ts in i ts own r ight (mngjigo.nas.grub.pa.)20 and thus isamenable to ver i f ica t ion (Lsad.mas.griib.pa). That the conventional isen do w ed wi th such an ind ep en de nt ex i s tence is empha t ica lly den ied bythe Prasangikas, and Santideva concurs in this (9: 108, 111-115); hisequat ion of the convent ional wi th in te l lec t (buddhi), i .e . , with ig no ran cea n d e r r o r , 2 1 is completely in l ine with the Prasangika view that the81
http://lsad.mas.griib.pa/http://lsad.mas.griib.pa/


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conventional is wholly false from the standpoint of its mode ofperception.Tibetan scholars in the Geluk tradition have given a differentem pha sis to th eir explication of the conventional. It was an innovationof Tso ng kh ap a, the found er of this school, "to present the conventionalvalid existence of all phenomena, detailing the acceptability of thecertification of the conventional existence of all phenomena by validcognizers."22 According to Tsongkhapa and subsequent Gelukscholars the task of the Prasangika Madhyamika is not only to refutefalse notions which obscure the nature of ultimate reality; it must also

definitely validate all the phenomena comprising samsara andnirvana,2* Th is leads to the assertion that conventional pheno m ena areestablished by a conventional means of valid knowledge which certifiestheir causal efficiency. This position has been extensively criticized bySakya and Nyingma scholars for being more in harmony with thelogical methods of Dharmaklrti, who establishes the ultimate existenceof phenomena using the same criterion.24

I l lAside from their disagree m ent over w hether or not conventionaltruth can be verified, the fundamental problems raised by Tibetanscholars in connection with BCA 9:2 have dealt with the nature of theultimate. Their point of departure is 9:2c: "Reality is not within thesp he re of the intellect." He re again we find Sakya and N yingma interpretations raised against those of the Geluks, in this case over thecrucial issue of w he the r an u ltima te tru th can be an object of cognition(Jneya). Since Santideva has clearly stated that ultimate truth is notwithin the range of the intellect, the Tibetan debate has centeredaround the question of whether or not such a denial is logically andscripturally justifiable, and hence w hether Santideva's statemen t is tobe taken literally or requires interpretation.T h e tr ans cen de nt an d inexpressible natu re of the ultimate is arecurrent theme in the Prajnaparamita sutras: "it canno t be grasped, itcannot be talked about, it is neither a dharma nor a non-dharma."25 T heSatyadvayavatara-sutra, which is cited by Prajnakaramati and many ofthe Tibetan commentators as well, states this viewpoint with greatclarity:

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"If, Devaputra , the ultimate tru th should be the object of body,speech a nd mind in an ultimate sense (paramarthatah) it would no tbe reck one d an 'ultimate tru th ', it would be a conventional t ru th.But, Devaputra, ultimate truth entirely transcends all conventional usage; it is without distinctions, non-arisen and non-ceasing,free from designatum and designation, object of cognition andcognition, even as far as transcending being an object of thegnosis of the omniscience which is endowed with the best of allmodes."26

Similarly, Nagarjuna observes that "the character of reality is non-dependent, quiescent, non-discursive, non-constructive, non-dual."27Candrakirti as well holds that "ultimate truth is not an object ofcognition."28

The bulk of scriptural and authoritative Indian commentarialevidence app ears to support a literal reading of BCA 9:2; such a view isupheld by all of the Indian commentators on this passage, includingthe most imp ortant ones, Prajnakaramati and Vibhuticandra. Accordingto the latter, the ultimate is not an object of any constructivecognition,29 nor is it within the operational sphere even of saruakara-jnana However, despite this seemingly comprehensive denial, hedo es n ot entirely rule ou t the possibility of some type of appre hen sionof the u ltima te, stating that it is the object of "the partless ad am antinemeditative ab sorption." 3 ' T he literal read ing of BCA 9:2 is followed bySakya and Nyingma com mentators.32

On whan then does the Geluk school base its idiosyncraticposition tha t Santideva's words cannot be taken on their face value inthis instance? T h e scriptu ral passage most frequently cited by them inthis connection 33 is drawn from the Pitrputrasamagamasutra, and isfound in the Siksasamuccaya:

"This much is what is to be known, the conventional and theultim ate. Since the Blessed O ne sees and knows and expe riencesthese as Em ptiness, he is called T h e Om niscient\"34This passage does indeed seem to establish that ultimate truth is anobject of cognition, at least for a Bud dha. How ever, the sutra goes on tosay that "furthermore, that which is the ultimate is inexpressible,incom preh ensib le, uncognizable, unexp lained, undeclared " 35 aseemingly unambiguous denial of the inaccessibility of the ultimate,which, significantly, goes unquoted by Geluk authors.83


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Th er e ap p ea r s t o b e a p a r ad o x i n t h e P r a san g i k a M ad h y ami k at re at m e nt of th e u l t ima te . It is ineffable a nd non -con cep tual , but a t thesa m e t im e "it is rat io na l in th e sense that it is de ve lop ed th ro ug h ar a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e " 3 6 i . e . t h rough the Madhyamika c r i t i que . Consequ en t ly , the re m ust be "a k ind of un ex pla ine d leap from the d ialectic tothe acquis i t ion of ins ight ." 3 7 No Madhyamika den ies tha t t he u l t imateis i n tu i t ed in some m an ne r o r o th er . Accord ing to Ca ndra k i r t i , fo rexample, i t is " the object of r ight vision of the saints who knowrea l i ty . "3 8 The di f f icul ty l ies in determining by what means anap p a r e n t l y u n k n o w ab l e u l ti ma t e can b e ap p r e h e n d ed . T h e m o r elogical ly or iented of the Madhyamika th inkers could not be sat i s f iedwi th a mys te r ious l eap beyond concep tua l i za t ion , and a compromisedeve loped wi th in the Madhyamika which seemed to r ender theul t im ate m or e accessib le . T hi s was ef fected by Bhavaviveka, fou nd er ofthe Sva tan t r ika M adhy am ika , who b i fu rca t ed u l t ima te t ru t h in to ac tua l(aparyaya) an d an a l o g o u s (paryaya) aspects. The actual ul t imate is equivalent to the u l t imate of the Prasangikas; i t i s t ranscendent , and i t sin tu i t ion is f ree o f d iscurs iveness {nisprapanca). The ana logous aspec tmerely accords wi th the u l t imate , and i t s percept ion involvesd i s cu r s i v en es s .3 9

IVI t is un qu est i on ab le that the Svatant r ika posit ion had a p rof ou nd

effect on T ibe tan B ud dh ism d u r in g its per iod of ini tial grow th an dd ev e l o p m en t . T h e i n it ia t o r o f T i b e t an mo n as ti c B u d d h i sm , acco r d i n gto Tib eta n historiograp hy, was the great Svatantr ika scholar Santaraksita;according to Tibetan accounts h is pupi l Kamalasf la upheld theSvatant r ika posi t ion at a debate held a t Samye monastery a t the end ofthe e igh th cen tu ry u n d e r the ausp ices o f King Tr i so ngd et sen , a t wh ichon e o f t he ma in ques t ions a t i ssue was the imm ane nce o r t r ansce nde nceof u l t ima te know ledge . A l thou gh d ou b t has been cast on the occurenc eof an ac tua l f ace-to- face d eba te be tween In d ian an d Chinese Bud dh i s t sat Samye, there was , in any case, a s igni f icant cont roversy betweenadvoca tes o f Ind ian and Chinese Buddh i s t doc t r ines ex tend ing over anumber o f year s dur ing the l as t decades o f t he e igh th cen tu ry . 4 0According to the t radi t ion universal ly accepted by the Tibetans theCh ines e Ch 'an m as te r H os ha ng M ahayana advoca ted a r ad ica l " l eap"t h eo r y o f en l i g h t en men t :84


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He who has no thoughts and inclinations at all, can be fullydelivered from Phenomenal Life. The absence of any thought,search or investigation brings about the non perception[anupalabdha] of the reality of seperate entities. In such a m ann erone can attain (Buddhahood] at once.41

Th is v iewpoint is identical to that ascribed to Hu i-neng in the PlatformSutra42 , an d it can be justified by reference to much Indian Buddhistmaterial as well.43 Nevertheless such an approach appeared hereticalto Indian teachers like Kamalasfla, who advocated a progressive pathof ethical and intellectual practice44 which became the predominantorientation for religious training in the Tibetan monastic tradition.

The Geluk interpretation of Santideva's formulation of the twotru th s, altho ug h from a professedly Prasangika point of view, seems tohave been influenced by the Svatantrika position. Gyaltshap arguesthat San tideva 's assertion of the inaccessibility of reality to the intellectrefers only to an intellect endow ed with dualistic perception {gnissnanggi bio); he maintains that Emptiness does become the object of directnon-dualistic means of valid knowledge.45 Tsongkhapa also observestha t "without the concept (don.spyi) of the object of negation (dgag.bya)>i.e. true existence, it is impossible to ascertain true non existence.T his view posits the necessity for a positive cognition to lead one to theinexpressible actuality of the ultimate; this would seem similar incontent and function to the analogous ultimate of the Svatantrika.There is little foundation for this view in the BCA itself; Santidevamakes it clear that the apprehension of non-substantiality is a non-apprehension:

"W hen im agined entities are no t contacted, their non-existence isnot contracted, since if an entity is false it is clear that its nonexistence is false." 9:139In 9:47c-48 he rejects the notion that liberation can be obtained whileany conception, regardless of how elevated, remains in the mind:

"A mind with an object must remain fixed somewhere. Without[an understanding ofl Emptiness a fettered mind will beprodu ced aga in ... T herefore Emptiness should be contemplated."M oreover, in the verse which tradition declares was the occasion for hislevitating o ut of the sight of his audience d uri ng the first recitation of85


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the B C A, Santideva states that o ne who has truly attained a realizationof the ultimate has not done so through a process of cognition, butra th er thr ou gh the extirpation of all views:"When neither existence nor non-existence remains before them ind as the re is no oth er c ond ition, it is pacified." 9:34T hus , ther e may be some substance to the N yingma claim that theGeulks are actually following the Svatantrika in their explication ofSantideva's position on ultimate truth .47 An accurate determ ination ofthe validity of this charge is, however, beyond the scope of the pres en tarticle, as it would require a full examination of the long, drawn-outpolem ics between Geluks and non-G eluks on this subject.48 Even if theNyingma characterization were accurate, it may indicate a differencein pedagogic method, rather than a real disagreement over the finalna tu re of the ultimate. What the G eluks advocate is an intermediateconceptual state of cognition preceding the final non-dual apprehension of the actual, inexpressible ultima te; this accords with Naga rjuna's

statem ent that "W ithout reliance on convention the ultimate cannot beexpressed."4 9 All major Tibetan autho rities accept that E mptiness is apure negation {prasajyapratisedha), and according to Bu.ston there is nodifference between the Svatantrika and the Prasangika regarding thetrue nature of the ultimate;50 their apparent differences are merelypro pa ed eu tic. T h e Svatantrika, like the Geluk, recom me nds that therefirst be meditation upon an ultimate which can be understoodconventionally, through an image, while the Prasangika, like theNyingma, advocates from the outset a direct intuition of Emptinesswhich is free from the four extremes (catuskoti) and thereby not withinthe sphere of word or thought.51 Few Tibetan Buddhists would go asfar as the Ch 'an m asters in den ying any usefulness to ratiocination, atleast as a prelim inary aid to the realization of the u ltim ate, nor wouldthe G eluk claim tha t in the final analysis the ultimate is within the realmof discursive thought.52

Santideva, with exem plary Madhyamika even-handedness, takes am idd le of the roa d position on this problem ; he affirms that "all investigation is expressed thro ug h recourse [to conventional designations] asthey are know n [in the w orld]" (9:108), but he does not concede thatthis will necessitate an infinite regress of investigations; Madhyamikaanalysis has an inh er en t "self-destruct m echanism", since tha t analysisis itself included among the phenomena which are determined to be86


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17. See Gyal tshap, op. c i t . , p .218.18 . Madhyamakavatara 6:13 , quo ted BCAP, p. 174.26-29.19. Ibid., p. 171.15-18.2 0 . G. Sopa and E . Jon es , "Th e Two T ru t hs in the Svatan tr ika Madhyam ika"(un pub l . pape r , n .d . ) , pp .15 , 22 .2 1 . BCAP, p. 170.30, com m ent ing on 9:2 .2 2 . J . H o p k i n s , Meditation on Emptiness, Ph.D. thesis (University of Wisconsin,

1973), p . 2 1 1 . E m p h a s i s m i n e .2 3 . Ib id . , p .235 .24. Ibid . , pp. 235-44 and Mipham, op. c i t . , pp. 3-4.2 5 . Vapacchedika, t rans la ted in E . Conze, Buddhist Wudom Booh (London: Allen

and Unw in , 1958) , p .36 .2 6 . BCAP, p. 177.9-12.2 7 . MMK, 18:9.28 . See the commenta ry to Madhyamukavatara 6:28 in Dbu Ma La Hjug Pa

(D har am sala : C ounci l of Cu l tura l an d Rel igious Affa irs , 1968), p .88 .2 9 . V i b h u t i c a n d ra , Byangxhub.kyu spyod.pa.la.'jug.pa'i. dgongs.pu'i.giel.pa.khyad.

par.gsal.byed (his own translation of Visesadyotani) PT 5282, vol. 100. f. 307a.7:"r tog.bcas .kyi . j i . snad.pa ' i .yul . rna .yin .zhing".

3 0 . Ibid. , f . 307b.4.3 1 . Loc. cit.3 2 . For example in Bsod .nams Rgya l .mtshan , Spyod.'jug.rnam.bshad (New Delhi :

N . To pg ay , 1970) , pp .30 6-307 ; Bu .s ton Rin .chen . g ru b Byang.chub.kyi.sems.gsal.bar.byed.pa'i.od.zer, Vol. 19 (dza )of T h e Collected Works o/Bu-Ston.ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi :In te r na t io na l Academ y of Ind ian Cul tu re , 1971), pp .502 .4 -504 .5 ; Mipham , op . c it ., p .8 :" d n g o s . p o ' i . g n a s . t s h u l . d o n . d a m . p a . n i . y o d . p a . d a n g . m e d . p a . d a n g . g n i s . k a d a n g /gn i s .min .gy i .mth ' .kun . dang .b ra l .bas .na .b lo .y i . spyod .yu l .min" .

3 3 . F o r e x a m p l e i n T s o n g k h a p a Dbu.ma.dgongs.pa.rab.gsal, PT vol. 154, p.176,Gy a l t shap , op . c it ., p .208 .

34. Sikshsamuccaya of Santideva, ed. by P.L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Insti tute,1961), p. 136.26-27.

3 5 . Ibid . , p . 136.29-30.36 . K. Pot ter , Presuppositions oj India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-

Hal l , 1963), p .2 38 .37 . I b i d . , p . 2 3 9 .38 . In BCAP, p. 174.22-23.39 . Sopa an d Jon es , o p. c it ., p . 13.40 . S e e Y . l m a e d a , " D o c u m e n t s T i b e t a i n s d e T o u e n -H o u e n g C o n c e rn a n t l e

Conc i le de T ibe t" in Journal Asiatique, 1975, pp. 125-141.4 1 . B u . s t o n , History oj Buddhism (Chos. 'byung), trans, by E. Obermiller, 2 vols . ,

1931-32 rpt . (To kyo : Suzuki Research F oun dat io n, 1965), p . 193.4 2 . Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, trans, by P. Yampolsky (New York:Co lum bia U nivers i ty Press , 1967), pp . 137-139.

4 3 . Candrakir t i h imself expresses the view that " the s topping of concept ionsthe sages say that this is the fruit of crit icism. O rdi nar y p eople are b ou nd by conceptionsthe ascet ic who does not conceive goes to del iverance" in Madhyamakavatara, Tibe tantran s la t io n, Ch ap ter 6 , p . 117. Th is is echoed by Ab hayak ara : "H e who does not conceive88


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anything is liberated in this lite", quoted in A. Wayman, "Contributions to theMadhyamika School of Buddhism", JA OS v.89, n.I . p. 151. Also see the citations fromscripture utilized to defend this position by the Chinese side in P. Demieville . /^Cwnt//^Lhasa (Paris: lmprimerie Nationaie, 1952), pp. 53-63, 95-107.

44. Bu.ston, History of Buddhism, v.2, pp . 194-195 and Kamalasila, Bhavanakruma,translated by G. Sopa and E. Jon es (un publ. ms., n.d.), pp . 52-82.

45. In Sweet, op. cit., p. 175.46. Tsongkhapa, op. cit., p. 129.47. Mipham, op. cit., pp. 4-6.48. For a full discussion of the works produced by this controversy, many of

which are no t yet available in the W est, see the introdu ction by Gene Smith to M ipham'sRah.lan (Gangtok: Sonam Ka2>, 1969), pp. 8-11.49 . "vyavaharamanasritya param artho na desyate", MMK 24: lOab.

50 . Tsongkhapa, op. cit., p. 149; Mipham, Sher.'gret.nor.bu.ke.ta.ka, p.4.9-10. Onprasapa-pratisedha see Matilal, op . cit., pp . 162-164.

51. Mipham , op . cit., pp . 6-8.52. Since the type of non-dualistic intellect that comprehends the ultimate,

according to Gyaltshap, op . cit., p. 175, completely transcends discursiveness.53. BCAP,^ .25Q.U2.54. See pp . 197-198 of bisByangxhub.sems.pa'i.spyod.pa.lo. jug.pa'i.'gtei.paJegs.par.

bshad.pa'LrgwMtsho (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974).

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