BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON A WHISTLEBLOWER THE REAL MRAP STORY ... · BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON A...
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BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON A WHISTLEBLOWER: THE REAL MRAP STORY By Steve Chill Paper and emails (as approved for release) at www.stevechill.com This analysis does not in any way reflect the official policy or position of the United States Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Copyright 4/20/2017
Transcript of BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON A WHISTLEBLOWER THE REAL MRAP STORY ... · BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON A...
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BLOWINGTHEWHISTLEONAWHISTLEBLOWER:THEREALMRAPSTORY
BySteveChillPaperandemails(asapprovedforrelease)atwww.stevechill.comThisanalysisdoesnotinanywayreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesMarineCorps,theDepartmentoftheNavy,theDepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.Copyright4/20/2017
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
ThereisaperceptionthattheMarineCorps,ormorespecificallyMCCDC,wasnegligentinprovidingarmoredvehiclesupportforthewarfightersinOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF).ThisnegligencewaspurportedtohavecenteredontheMRAPeffort,butnegligenceaccusationsextendedtomultiplesystems.TheseperceptionsaboutMarineCorpsnegligencesurroundingtheMRAPeffortsreflectignoranceofthefacts.ThenegligencestorywaslargelyfabricatedbyFranzGaylanddrewtheinterestofthepress.TheperceptionsarealsodrawnfromaDODIGreport,theconclusionsofwhicharebasedonincompleteinformation,andaMarineCorpsthatfailedtoadequatelyexplainthetruthwithsupportingevidence.Thisstudywillexplainwhatoccurredandprovidetheevidencenecessary(includinghundredsofemails)todisprovetheallegationsofnegligence. Betweendeployments,thisauthorwastheDirectorofOperationsattheMarineCorpsWarfightingLab(MCWL)andassuch,wastheMCWLvotingmemberontheCapabilitiesDevelopmentBoard(CDB)(eventuallyaddingIntegrationtobecomeCDIB)andtheJointIEDDefeatOrganization(JIEDDO)JR2ABcouncilofColonels.ThisauthorwasinauniquepositiontoobservemanyoftheeventsGaylincorrectlydescribes.ThisstudyonlycoversaportionoftheflawsinGayl’sstudyandusesonlyaportionofthethousandsofemailsthisauthorpossesses.
FranzGaylbecameawhistleblowerovertheMRAPissue.Thisstudyisnotanindictmentofwhistleblowers,rathertheintentistosettherecordstraight.
TherearetwoseriesofeventsassociatedwithMRAP:theMarineCorpseffortproviding
armoredvehiclesandtheportrayalofthiseffortbyGayl.ItisnotdifficulttoseparatethetwoasGayl’sinvolvementwithMRAPcameafterthemostsignificantMRAPevents.
• Providingarmoredvehicles:Theterm“HejlikUUNS”willbeusedfortheFeb2005IMEF
MRAPUUNS.TheCMCdecidedtoprovidem1114asthematerialsolutioncoveringtheHejlikUUNS.TheExecutivesoftheMarineCorpswereinvolvedinthisdecision.TheHejlikUUNSwasreducedtoanUNS,takingitoutofimmediateneedsconsiderationsbutnotendingit.TheHejlikUUNSwasremovedfromfurtherMROCconsiderationandfromtheitineraryofthedozensofflagofficercommandsthatwereresponsibleforit.NoMarineCorpscommandcontinuedpursuingtheUUNS.Therewasanabsenceofaction(duetoanabsenceofdemand)betweentheremovalofMRAPfromMROCconsiderationinAugustof2005untilMayof2006whenIMEFsubmittedaneedfor185JERRV.Thesubsequentsubmissionfor1000MRAPbroughtthetotalrequirementto1,185whichtheMarineCorpspursuedintheDODandinCongress.
• Gayl’sportrayal:GaylcreatedhisfirstbriefforDDR&EinMarchof2007.ItwasnotMRAPfocusedandonlyoneslidefocusedonMRAP.Gayl,despitescantfirsthandknowledgeaboutMRAP,becametheMRAPwhistleblower.Gaylpublishedhisstudyin
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Jan2008promptingtheMRAPDODIG.Botheffortswereflawed.SenatorBiden,inconjunctionwithGayl,establishedthe“MarineCorpsnegligence”storyinthepress.
MRAP Overtheperiodofdecadesbeforethe2005HejlikUUNS,severalmid-levelMarinesnotedtheeffectivenessofMRAP-typevehiclesandwroteseveralarticles/papersaboutthem.Theydidnotconvincetheirleadershiptotakeaction,nordidtheyaggressivelypursueMRAP-typevehiclepurchases.Therestofthecombatdevelopmentcommunity,toincludeAdvocates,ServiceComponents,theMEFs,andtheMarineCorpsleadershipandtheirStaffsdidnotdevelopaneedforMRAPs(Chapter10).OtherServices,theJointcommunity,theDOD,andothercivilianorganizationsthatarenotMarineCombatDeveloperscouldhavedevelopedMRAP-typevehicleneedsanddidnot.MCSC,however,continuedtoresearcharmoredvehiclerequirementstoincludeMRAP-typevehicles. InFebruary2005BGenHejlik(IMEFDCG)submittedanUUNSfor1,169MRAPs.ThatUUNSwasreceivedbyMCSC,P&R,andMARCENTperorderanddirective(Chapter4-6).MCCDCandtheAdvocatesprocessedthatUUNS(Chapter11).TheUUNScontainedlanguageallowingforseveralmaterialsolutions(asdirectedinordersanddirectives(Chapter4-6)).TheUUNSaskedforavehiclethatprotectedagainstIEDs,smallarmsfireandRPGs.Theonlyvehiclethatexistedatthetimethatcoulddoallthreewasamainbattletank.Nopersonneltransportcoulddefeatallthree,andeventankscouldbedefeatedwiththerightEFPIED(Chapter13).
TheUUNSwasbriefedattheExecutiveSafetyBoard(ESB-March05)andtheExecutiveOff-Site(EOS-May05)(Chapter11).Betweenthetwobriefs,theentiretyoftheMarineCorpsExecutivebodyandMROCwerebriefedandconsideredMRAP-typevehicles(Chapter9and11).ThisincludedtheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.CMCselectedthem1114withadvicefromhisExecutivesandwiththefullknowledgeoftheHejlikUUNS(Chapter11).TheCMCdecisiontoanswerthe2005HejlikUUNSwithm1114seffectivelyendedtheurgentstatusofthe2005HejlikUUNS(Chapter11).
On21June2005theACMC,GenNyland,testifiedtotheHouseArmedServices
Committee(HASC):“RecentandongoingeventsinIraqrequireustocontinuetoshapeandrefineourrequirements.WehavedeterminedthattheM1114/M1116Up-ArmoredHMMWV(UAH)isthebestavailable,mostsurvivableassetthatmeetsourevolvingvehicleunderbodyprotectionrequirements.InordertomeettheMarineCorps'immediaterequirementandprovidetherangeanddepthtosupportforcerequirements,weareintheprocessofidentifyingtherequirementforM1114/M1116vehicles.Thisrequirementisbeingrefinedtodaybythewarfighter,MARCENT,andHeadquartersMarineCorps.”(Nyland,2005)GeneralNylandhadparticipatedinboththeESBandEOS.Healsonotedthattherequirementwasimmediateandthereweresignificantconcernsaboutmaterialavailabilityandmanufacturingability(Nyland,2005).
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AkeypointisthatIMEF(Fwd)intheIraqiTheaterofOperations(ITO)wasaskingform1114s.M1114procurementwasadecisionsupportedintheITObythedeployedMEFs.
TheMROCcontinuedtobebriefedontheHejlikUUNSthroughAugust2005(Chapter3
and11).InAugustof2005theMROCendedconsiderationoftheHejlikUUNSasthem1114decisionbyCMCwasimplemented.Otherorganizationsthatalsoendedtheirconsideration(perMRAPDODIG)ofthe2005HejlikUUNSincludedIMEF,IIMEF,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,MARCENT,PP&O,AdvocatesandMCCDC.EachoftheseorganizationshadHejlikUUNSresponsibilities(Chapter9-11).
TheHejlikUUNSsolutionwasdecidedattheExecutivedecisionlevelwiththem1114
decision(attheEOS).Them1114decisionwasadecisionthatequippedtheentiretyoftheforceintheITO.ItdefieslogicthattheMarineCorpsExecutiveswouldfieldboththem1114andtheMRAP-typevehiclesimultaneouslytothesameunits.Therewasnopartialfieldingplanform1114swhileadecisiononMRAP-typevehiclesoccurred.Therewasnodecisionasidefromafullfieldingofthem1114.ThisoccurredwithfullknowledgeoftheHejlikUUNS.TheideathattheHejlikUUNSremainedactiveasanUrgentneedonceagaindefiesfactsaswellaslogicalanalysis.
The2005HejlikUUNSwasdowngradedtoanUNSwhichchangedthestatusofMRAPs
awayfromacriticalneedbyaCommanderinvolvedinoperationstosavelives(Chapter11).ThereductiontoanUNSplacedMRAPintheregularcombatdevelopmentprocesswhereitcontinuedtobeconsideredbyMCSCasapotentialvehiclesolutionforthefuture.MARFORPACreflectedthisreductioninitsUUNStrackerandreflectedthe2005HejlikUUNSascomplete(Chapter10and11).IIMEF(2005-2006deployment),intheITO,didnotpursuethe2005HejlikUUNSoranydifferentrequestforMRAPs.IMEF(2006-2007deployment),initsprioritizedlistingsbeforedeploymentneitherlistedMRAPasaprioritynorasaneedatall(Chapter9-10).TheentirecombatdevelopmentcommunitytoincludetheMEFs,MARFORs,AdvocatesandMROCregardedtheHejlikUUNSasresolvedandreducedtoanUNS.TheDODIGwouldlaterincorrectlysummarizeBGenHejlik’sassertionthattheUUNSwasreducedasafabrication.
ApproximatelyninemonthsafterHejlikUUNSremovalfromMROCconsiderationIMEF,
backintheITO,submittedanUUNSfor185JERRVs(May2006).ThenamerequestedwasnotMRAP.Thenumberrequestedwasnot1,169.CombatdeveloperspressuredIMEFtoaskformorevehiclesandtosubmitforjointfunding.IMEFrefusedtoaskformorethan185(Chapter9).
EventuallyIMEFsubmittedasecondrequestfor1000morevehicles(July2006),this
timecallingthemMRAP.ThenamechangeoccurredasthedowngradedHejlikUUNSwas“uncovered”.ThemotivationbehindthenamechangetoMRAPremainsunknown(Chapter8).
Thenumberrequested,however,wasknown.IMEFsubmittedtwoUUNSfor185
vehiclesand1000vehicles.Thetotalrequestwasfor1,185vehicles,whichhadnonumericalrelationto1,169.Simplegradeschoolmathdemonstratedthatthesewerenewrequestsand
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notacontinuationoftheHejlikUUNS.Thenumber185wasrepresentedasthefullvehiclerequestandthenthenumber1,185wasrepresentedasthefullvehiclerequestinMARCENTandIMEFUUNStrackers(Chapter9-10).
TheMarineCorpsI.G.ofIMEF(Fwd)thatconcludedinMayof2006foundno
documentedneedforMRAP.IMEF(Fwd)didnothingtoindicateanyexistingMRAPneedduringthisI.G.onceagainindicatinganabsenceofdemand(Chapter7).
StartinginMay2006theMarineCorpssupportingestablishment,toincludeMCCDC,
diligentlyprocessedandworkedthenewrequestevenbeforeitwasofficiallysubmitted.Congresswasbriefed.MarineCorpsleadership,uptoandincludingtheCMC,advocatedforMRAP(Chapter3).
TestingofdifferentMRAP-typevehiclesfromdifferentcompaniesoccurredin2006.
BudgetissueswereworkedforMRAP.TheprogramofficewascreatedandMRAPbecametheMarineCorps’number1priority.CongressandDODleadershipweresupportiveofMarineefforts(Chapter3).
Acontractwasawardedfor200vehiclesinFebof2007withtheintentoffielding
capabilityimmediately.TheMarineCorpsMRAPneedwasconsideredtobeover800withexpectationsofahighernumberrequired.ThatexpectationwasrealizedasthejointrequirementinFeb2007grewtoalmost7,000vehicles(Chapter3).
TheMarineCorpsutilizedtheArmytestingrangesatAberdeenwhereMRAPbecame
thepriority.TheprogramofficecontinuedtobeestablishedandfundingissuescontinuedtobeworkedasfullfundingfortheentireMRAPeffortwasnotprovided.Production,howevercontinued.TheMRAPprogramwasrecommendedforACAT1status(Chapter3).
InMay2007SECDEFGatesdesignatedMRAPasthenumberoneDODpriority(this
paragraph/itemistheonlyoverlappingitemwithGayl’swhistleblowing).
GAYL FranzGaylwashiredinPP&Oin2002.PP&Owas(andis)theGroundCombatAdvocatefortheMarineCorps.TheAdvocatehadresponsibilitiesforcombatdevelopmentthatwereindependentofQuantico.Advocateresponsibilitieswereverysimilarinnaturetotheroleofacivilianlawyerforacivilianclient.They“oversaw”thecombatdevelopmentprocessonbehalfoftheir“client”.TheMarineCorpsAdvocates,however,hadadditionalandmuchgreaterresponsibilities.TheyweremembersoftheprocessandtheprocesscouldnotcontinuewithoutAdvocateparticipation.GaylusedhisstandingasamemberoftheGCEAdvocatetolendanairofauthoritytohisstudy(Chapter5). Gayl,asamemberoftheGCEAdvocate,wasabsentfromthedevelopmentofMRAPfromhishiringin2002,throughthe2005HejlikUUNS,throughthesubmissionofthe185JERRV
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UUNS(thenJUONS),andthroughthesubmissionofthe1000MRAPJUONS(Chapter3).HiscritiqueofthosewhodidnothavetheforesighttobuyMRAPthroughoutthistimeperiodnevermentionedhisownAdvocateresponsibilities(whichweremoredefinedandgreaterthantheresponsibilitiesofthosehecritiques)(Chapter5and12). GaylrotatedtotheaterinSeptember2006,wellafterMarineGeneralshadbriefedCongressandwellaftertherequirementfor1,185hadbeenestablished.TheMarineCorpshadestablisheditspositiononMRAPbythetimeGayldeployed.Thestatementofneedfor805(Marineportionof1,185)MRAPswasissuedinOctober2006absentanyparticipationbyGayl.Contractswereawardedin2006,absentanyparticipationbyGayl.Testingbeganin2007absentanyparticipationbyGayl.CMCwasaconstantadvocateforMRAPthroughoutthistimeframe.CivilianleadershipintheDODwerewellawareoftheMarineCorps’needsandpositions.TheDODwasinvolvedandsupportiveoftheMarinerequestabsentparticipationbyGayl. ThenGaylreturnedtoPP&OandcreatedabriefforDDR&E(March2007).ThiswasthefirsttimeGaylestablishedanysignificantpresence.Itisunclearwhat,ifanything,Gayl’snewpresenceaddedtoMarinesreceivingMRAPs.Therewere31GaylDDR&Eslides,onlyoneofwhichwasforMRAPandanotherdealtwithanarmoringsolution.ThebriefwassimplynotfocusedonMRAP.Twomonthslater,GaylwasfocusedonMRAP.Thechangeinfocuswasnotexplained(Chapter3). InitiallyGaylmadelittleheadwayashischargeswereweakandhisevidencewasunsupported(Chapter12).Gayl’sactivitiescontinuedtocontributenothinginternaltotheMarineCorps.IndustrycontinuedtoproduceandtestMRAPprototypes.TheCMCandServiceSecretaryaswellasDODleadershipsupportedthelargerMarineMRAPbuy.Congresshadbeenbriefedforthebetterpartofayear.MRAPhadbeentheMarineCorpstopprocurementpriorityforalmostayearbythetimeGaylstartedtoblowhiswhistle.Gayl’sMRAPwhistleblowingwasirrelevanttotheMarineCorpsinternaleffortstogetMRAP(Chapter3).
Gayl’schainofcommandprobablyalsorealizedthatwarrantlessattacksagainstthecombatdevelopmentprocessatMCCDCwerealsoattacksagainstthemselvesastheAdvocate.Gaylwasunknowinglyfabricatingattacksagainsthisownunitandhimself.Ironically,thisincludesMajGenZilmerandBGenNeller(theeventualCGandDCGofMNF-WduringGayl’sdeployment)whoweretwoofthethreeDivisionHeadsinPP&OduringthetimeframeGaylassertstheMarineCorpsfailedtodeterminetheworthofMRAP.PP&OalsohadresponsibilitiesfortheMRAPUUNSsoncetheyweresubmitted.Itislittlewonderthathischainofcommandwas“concerned”asGayl’scharges,iftrue(theywerenot),reflectedPP&Onegligence(Chapter5and8).
GaylfiledforwhistleblowerstatusinMayof2007andstartedcoordinatinghismessagethroughthepress.SenatorBidenthencoordinatedabroadermediaeffortthatsmearedtheMarineCorps.Bythistime,GaylhadshiftedtoaMRAPfocusedpresentation.With
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Biden’ssupport,Gayl’sallegationswerepublishedasfactinUSATODAYandothernewsoutlets(Chapter8).
In2007,whiletheMarineCorpswasincombat,Gaylwasfabricatingacaseagainstthe
MarineCorps.HestatedthatitwasonlyacaseagainstMCCDC,butthosewhounderstandtheMarineCorpsalsounderstandthatcombatdevelopmentisaCorps-wideeffort.Gaylworkedonhisstudythrough2007andpublisheditinJan2008.Gayl’sstudyreflectshisbeliefswhichalsoreflectmanyofthepressarticleswrittenaboutMRAP.Mostofhisimportantpointsareincorrect.Othersarefabricated(Chapter12). ThisstudydoesnotcoveranyactionsassociatedwithGayl’sjobsecurityorhisrighttobeawhistleblower.Hehasarighttoblowthewhistlebutalsohasaresponsibilitytobeaccurateandforthcoming.AsawhistleblowerGaylwasneitheraccuratenorforthcoming.Gayl’sstudyreflectedhispositionandinfluencedthepressandpoliticians,noneofwhichseriouslyquestionedGayl’spoints.Despitethemyriadofinaccuracies,thestudywasperceivedascredible(Chapter8). OneofthedistortionsGaylpromulgatedwasthatIMEFpreferredusingthejointprocessforsubmittingneeds.Hispointwasfabricated.TheMarineCorpswasslowtotakeadvantageofjointfunding(Chapter14)andIMEFclearlypreferredworkingthroughMCCDC(Chapter12).
TheACMCaskedforaDODIGtolookintotheaccusationsinGayl’sstudy.TheMRAPDODIGdidnotcovermajorpointsinGayl’sstudysuchasISR(Chapter15).Italsodidnotcovernon-lethalweapons(NLW)suchaslaserdazzler.AlaterlaserdazzlerDODIGtotallyrefutedGayl’sclaims(Chapter16). TheMRAPDODIGoccurredovertwoyearsaftertheeventsitwasinvestigating.Marineshadrotatedoutoftheirbilletsandemailsweredeleted.TheDODIGfailedtouncoverkeyevidence(providedherein)contradictingGayl’sclaims.WhiletheDODIGdidnotvalidatethegreatmajorityofGayl’sclaims,itdidnotfullydisprovehisstudy.HadtheDODIGpossessedtheinformationinthisstudy,theirconclusionswouldhavebeendifferent.Theywerenotasthoroughastheyshouldhavebeen(Chapter19). Thepressandpoliticianswereeitherdupedorcomplicit(Chapter17and18).Infairness,mostoftheDODwasalsoduped.Gayl’sconclusionsandrecommendationshavebeenlargelyignored(Chapter20)showingthatevenwhenduped,theMarineCorpsdidnotmakeimprudent“fixes”. Thewhistleblowingcontinuedandon14May2009GayltestifiedbeforetheHouseCommitteeonOversightandReformontheWhistleblowerProtectionAct.Gayl’sstudyonMRAPwassubmittedfortherecorddespiteitnothavinganycontentonwhistleblowing.Gaylstated“WhileIdon’twanttobefired,thatmaybethecostofmedoingmydutyasaMarineandcivilservant.Thelegislationyouarediscussingtodaywillprobablycometoolatefor
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me.”(GaylTestimony,p15)Thismelodramaticover-statementreflectsyetanotherfailureofGayltoappreciatethesituation.TheprotectionofSenators(includingVicePresidentBiden)andCongressmenassuredhisjobprotectionandalatersettlementprovidedhimaverysignificantcashsettlement,anaward,andanewjob.ThiswhistleblowervictoryoccurreddespitefailinginhisjobasaMarineandacivilservant,notbecauseofajobwelldone.
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TABLEOFCONTENTSCHAPTERSUMMARIES1. FORWARD
a. AUTHORBACKGROUNDIDEALFORTHISSTUDYb. THISSTUDYWRITTENTOCORRECTTHERECORDc. WHATTHISSTUDYISNOT
2. INTRODUCTIONa. AIMOFTHISSTUDYb. HOWTHISSTUDYISORGANIZEDc. ASIDESd. EMAILSINTOTOe. THEWHISTLEBLOWER’SHYPOCRISY
3. TIMELINE4. WARTIMEMARADMINSDICTATERESPONSIBILITY
a. COMBATDEVELOPMENT(MRAP)ORDERSDIRECTIVESANDRESPONSIBILITIES5. THEADVOCATE(GAYL’SCOMMAND)ORDERSANDRESPONSIBILITIES6. THEUNS/UUNSPROCESSMISUNDERSTOOD7. THEINSPECTORGENERALFINDSNOEVIDENCEOFMRAPNEED8. WHYWASTHEMARINECORPSINCORRECTLYHUMBLED?
a. THETWOFACESOFSENATORBIDENb. NOBODYREADSORHASTHECAPABILITYTOREADc. GAYLPRESENTATIONMISLEADSd. GAYLCONFLATEDWHISTLEBLOWERSTATUSWITHMRAPISSUESe. MARINECORPSRESPONSEWASPOORf. THETYRANNYOFTIMEg. THECHANGINGNATUREOFOIF:FROMBUSTOMRAPh. MRAPNAMESMISLEADINGi. THEMRAPDODIGWASCONSTRAINEDj. SERIESOFISSUES(NOTMRAP)WITHIMEFG-9CAUSEDDISCORD
9. IMEFREJECTEDMRAPS10. MARINESDIDNOTDESIRE/PURSUEMRAPS
a. “CONSTANTDEMAND”NOTSOCONSTANTb. RESPONSIBLEPARTIESFORTHELACKOFDEMANDc. PRIORITIZEDLISTSSHOWLACKOFMRAPNEEDS
11. WHATHAPPENEDTOTHEHEJLIKUUNSa. GUIDANCEUNDERWHICHTHEHEJLIKUUNSWASSUBMITTEDb. THEMEANINGOF“MRAP”INTHEHEJLIKUUNSc. PROCESSIGNORANCECONTRIBUTEDTO“HEJLIKUUNSCONCLUSIONS”d. MONTHLYUPDATESINDICATETHEREALMRAPTIMELINEe. KEYTIMELINEISSUESf. THE1-BILLION-DOLLARUUNSg. RESPONSIBILITYLISTFORTHEUUNSh. THEFAILUREOFTHEDODIG
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i. THEREASONHEJLIKUUNSPROCESSINGSTOPPEDj. ALWAYSSOMEONESAYINGNOk. WHOKNEWANDWHOWAS“RESPONSIBLE”
12. GAYLSTUDYFLAWSa. FLAWEDWRITINGTECHNIQUES
i. WRONGORDERSARETHEBASISFORGAYL’SSTUDYii. MCCDCCRITICISMINCLUDEDNOINTERVIEWSWITHMCCDCPERSONNELiii. USEOFPARTIALEMAILiv. NOPROCESSDISCUSSIONv. GAYLLATETOISSUEANDRELIANTONOTHERSvi. UNPROFESSIONALCRITICISMOFFELLOWMARINESvii. NODOCUMENTSANDSPECULATIONviii. IRRELEVANTSOURCES
b. GAYL’SFLAWEDPERCEPTIONSi. EXAMPLESOFTACTICALERRORii. MARINECORPSEFPEFFORTSiii. MAKANDM1114iv. PROOFOF“PUSHBACK”v. NOTINVENTEDHERE-THEREALDIRTYLAUNDRYvi. MARCENTNOTNEGLIGENTvii. IMEFG9NOTSUPPORTIVEOFJUONSviii. GAYL’SMRAPNUMBERSDON’TADDUPix. BATTLEBUREAUCRACYATQUANTICOx. BIZARRECLAIMTHATHEJLIKUUNSINTENTIONALLYKEPTFROMMROCxi. 185SUBMISSIONWORKEDWITHALACRITYxii. GENERALS/GENERALISTSxiii. JLTVFACTSxiv. CORRECTROLEOFTHEWARFIGHTERxv. UUNSEMPLOYEDASFORCINGFUNCTIONSxvi. “MCWLVENDORS”xvii. IMEFG9SLOWEDPROCESSxviii. COMPARISONOFIMEFG9ANDQUANTICOSOLUTIONS
13. ARMOR/EFPANDTHETHREATa. THETHREATSINTHEHEJLIKUUNSb. EFP
14. UUNSVSJUONSa. USMCGETTINGSHORTCHANGEDATJOINTFUNDINGb. JIEDDOc. PROPERJUONSSUBMISSIONBYIMEFONLYd. DODIGBOTCHEDTHERECOMMENDATIONe. GBOSSSHOULDHAVEBEENJOINTf. THEJOINTPROCESSSUMMARIZED
15. G-BOSS-THEIMEFG-9DISASTERa. QUANTICOISRACTIONSLEADTHEWAY
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b. ISRASACAPABILITYc. IMEFG-9FLUBBSTHEGBOSSTECHNOLOGYd. COMMANDERFORWARDUUNS/JUONSDECISIONSe. C-RAMANDITSROLEf. GBOSSPROCESSFOULSg. GBOSSCONCLUSION
16. LASERDAZZLER-IMEFG9DISASTERNUMER217. REPORTCARDONPEOPLETAKINGCREDITANDPEOPLEASSIGNEDBLAME18. THEDUPEDANDCOMPLICITPRESS19. ANEVALUATIONOFTHEMRAPDODIG20. GAYL’SFLAWEDCONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS21. CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTERSUMMARY
CHAPTER1 BetweendeploymentstoIraq,thisauthorwastheDirectorofOperationsattheMarineCorpsWarfightingLab(MCWL).Assuch,thisauthorwasinapositiontoobserveand/orparticipateinmanyoftheeventssurroundingMRAP.Gayl’sstoryonMRAPisfabricated.Gayl’sfabricatedstory,andhiscapitalizationonit,meritsresponse.CHAPTER2 Thisstudywill:
• CorrecttheRecord:TheperceptionofMarineCorpsnegligencesurroundingMRAPisfalse.Thefacts,someofthemunreporteduntilnow,arepresented.
• Identify/correcttheflawsintheGaylstudy/testimony:GaylisthesourceformostoftheMRAPfabrications.OnlyseveralhundredoftheGaylStudyflawswillbediscussedintheinterestofbrevity.
• Explainevents:Basedonfacts,thisauthorexplainstheeventssurroundingMRAP.• Teach:MostoftheMRAPcommentaryreflectsignoranceaboutMarineCorpscombat
development.Thisstudyprovidesenoughbackgroundtodispelthatignorance.CHAPTER3TheMRAPtimelineshows:
• AlackofdemandforMRAPpriorto2005.ThisincludedtheAdvocates(toincludeGayl),MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,IandIIMEFsandtherestofthecombatdevelopmentcommands.ItalsoincludedtheArmy,NavyandAirForceaswellasalljointcommands.
• TheabsenceofGayl’scontributionashisfirstnotableparticipation(hisDDR&Ebrief)wastenmonthsaftertheMarineCorpssupportedashifttoMRAP.Gaylreliesonrumorandspeculationashewasnotinvolvedinmanycriticalevents.
• TheabsenceofMRAPdemandduringportionsoftimeGaylandthepressstatethattherewasconstantdemand(themajorityofthetimebetweenFeb2005andSept2006-19months).
• TheMarineCorpswasinfullsupportandactingontheMRAPrequestsbyIMEFinMay2006,longbeforeGayl,GatesorBidenbecameinvolved.
CHAPTER4
WartimeMARADMINsdictatethatthereweredozensofGeneralOfficersinmultiplecommandsthathadresponsibilitiesforMRAPUUNSdevelopmentandprocessing.IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thenalloftheseGeneralswouldhavehadtohavebeennegligentintheirassignedduties.ThosewhoareignorantofMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentpointtowardsMCCDCforallMRAPresponsibilitieswhileordersanddirectivesassignedvariousresponsibilitiesforMRAPcombatdevelopmenttocommandsacrosstheMarineCorps.
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CHAPTER5TheAdvocate,toincludeGayl,hadseveralresponsibilitiesfortheHejlikUUNS.The
coverpagefromGayl’sstudyciteshiswhistleblowercredentialasthe“GCEAdvocateS&TAdvisor”.IfGaylistobebelieved,thenhetoowasnegligentastheAdvocate(S&TAdvisor).AdvocateresponsibilitiesaredelineatedinorderanddirectiveandarealsoincludedonthecoverpageofeveryUUNS.TheAdvocate(includingGayl)hassoleresponsibilityforseveralstepsandisacontributorformanyothers.Gayl’scritiqueoftheMarineCorpsisalsoacriticismofhisownjobperformance…orhiscritiqueisfatallyflawed.CHAPTER6
TheUUNSprocess(HejlikUUNS)hadstepsadministeredby:• MCCDC• TheAdvocates• TheMROC• P&R• MCSC• ServicecomponentsincludingMARCENT,MARFORPACandMARFORLANT• Theoperationalcommands(tworotationsofIMEFandonerotationofII
MEF)AnyresolutionoftheHejlikUUNS,oranylackofresolutionoftheHejlikUUNS,would
dependonthesecommandsexecutingtheirsteps.TheydidsofortheHejlikUUNS.TheaforementionedcommandswouldhavehadtoabandontheirUUNSresponsibilitiesforGayl’sMRAPallegationstobetrue.Theydidnot.CHAPTER7
TheIGMCfoundnoevidenceofanyexistingrequestforMRAPsafterAugust2005andpriortotheIMEFsubmissionof185inMayof2006.IMEFhadtheopportunitytoidentifyaMRAPneed(neworold)totheIGMCanddidnotdoso.TheIGMCprocessallowedforresultreviewbyCGIMEF(Fwd)andyettherewasstillnoMRAPdemand.ThisevidencestheabsenceofthepursuitofMRAPsbyIMEFinOIF.TheIGallowedforIMEFcritiqueoftheirresultsyetIMEFdidnotmentionMRAPatall.CHAPTER8
SeveralcontributingfactorsassistedintheestablishmentofthefabricatedMRAPstory:• SenatorBidenandhisstafforchestratedbadpresscoveragefortheMarineCorpsand
protectedGaylasheestablishedfalseclaims.• FewpeoplecouldcomprehendGayl’stermsletaloneunderstandtheirapplicability.• Gaylmisleadsthroughdistortions,fabricationsandomissions.• GaylenergizedsupportforhisMRAPstorybyestablishinghimselfasawhistleblower.
ThewhistlebloweradvocatesblindlybelievedGayl’sMRAPstory.• TheMarineCorpsresponsewaspoor,probablyduetothefocusoncombatoperations.• NoinvestigationoftheHejlikUUNSoccurredforyearsallowingevidencetoerode.
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• PresentismshapedtheunderstandingoftheIEDthreatinthatmanyassumedunderbodyattackswerealwaysthemainthreat.Theyweren’t.
• Theterm“MRAP”hadseveraldifferentmeaningsbutwasinterpretedtohaveauniformmeaning.
• TheMRAPDODIGwasfocusedonMCCDC,nottheMarineCorps,negatingitseffectivenessinuncoveringthetruth.
• AseriesofissuesexistedwithIMEFG9.TheseissueswerethebasisforGayl’sinitialcomplaints.
CHAPTER9IMEF(Fwd)rejectedMRAPs.Thisisevidencedinthreedocuments.
• InanemailtheIMEFG9statesthattheIMEFChiefofStaffrelayedthattheIMEFpositionwasthattheydidnotdesiremorethanthe185MRAPthatwererequestedinMayof2006.Thiswasinthemiddleofthe“19month”windowoftencitedastheperiodwhenoperatingforcesweredemandingMRAP.
• IMEFmovedtheHejlikUUNSintothecompletedUUNSsectionoftheirUUNStrackerandcalledit“missionclosed”.TheUUNStrackerwaspublishedanddistributedthroughouttheMarineCorps.Theactofmovingittothecompletedsectionandcallingit“missionclosed”withoutanysubstitutemeansthattheynolongerdesiredtheHejlikMRAPs.ThisstudypresentstwoseparateUUNStrackers.
Inanotherformofrejectionofthe1,169HejlikMRAPs,IMEFbriefedaneedfor522
MRAPsatthe2005ESB.Itisnotclearwhy,onemonthaftertheirreturn(onemonthaftertheHejlikUUNSsubmission),IMEFnolongersupporteda1,169request.CHAPTER10
Inadditiontotheoutrightrejections,therewereaseriesofdocumentsprovingthatMNF-WdidnotdesireorpursueMRAPs.DespitehavingampleopportunitytomanifestanysortofMRAPrequirementinseveraldocuments,IMEFdidnotdoso(neitherdidIIMEForMARCENT).CombatdevelopmentorganizationstoincludetheMROC,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,theGCEAdvocate,theotherAdvocates,P&R,MCSC,MCCDC,andotherorganizationsthatwereresponsibleforidentifyingneeds,didnotidentifyMRAPasaneed.Thedailycoordinationofneedsbetweenthedeployedforceandsupportorganizationsrequiredtheidentificationofpendingcapabilities.
TherearesufficientofficialdocumentstodocumentthelackofMRAPneedsoriginating
fromIMEFandMARCENT.Thedocuments(providedinthisstudy)include:• TheMRAPDODIGwhichidentifiesagapof9-10monthsbetweenMRAPactivities(Aug
05toMay06)• EmailcorrespondencedealingwithMRAPrequirementsinwhichnotasinglementionof
theneedfor1,169wasmentioned.• IMEFtechnicalprioritieslistrequiredbyorder/directive(19Oct05)withnomentionof
MRAP
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• IMEFUUNStrackerrequiredbyorder/directive(30April06)withMRAPbeingacompletedUUNSandbyIMEFdescription“missioncomplete”
• IMEFUUNStrackerrequiredbyorder/directive(7May06)withMRAPbeingacompletedUUNSandbyIMEFdescription“missioncomplete”
• MARCENTspreadsheetindicatinganeedofonly185MMPVrequired,not1,169oranynumberrelatedto1,169(requiredbyorder/directive)(31July06)
• IIMEFUUNS/JUONSPrioritizationreflectinganeedfor1,185MRAPs(requiredbyorder/directive).Thereisnomentionofanyneedfor1,169.
• MARCENTinputintoaconsolidatedcounter-IEDequipmentneedlistreflectinganeedfor180JERRV,not1,169MRAP(26June06)
• Aconsolidatedcounter-IEDequipmentneedlistsubmittedtoJIEDDOreflectingtheupdatedMARCENTnumberof185JERRV,not1,169MRAP(29June06)
InadditiontotheabovedocumentsarethreeIMEF(Fwd)liaisonupdatesthatshowthe
presenceofthejointMRAPrequestsbutalsoshowthelackofanypendingMarineCorpsrequests(includingtheHejlikUUNS).Theseupdatesareprovidedinthefollowingemails:
• Tomczakdtd14August2006• Murraydtd11Sept2006• Murraydtd25Sept2006
ThesedocumentsincludeallIMEF,IIMEFandMARCENTneedsliststhatthisauthor
possesses.ThetotalnumberofofficialdocumentsthatdidnotidentifyanMRAPneedreflectonething:theabsenceofMRAPneed.Therewasneverany“constantdemand”andtheportrayalofa“constantdemand”wasafabricationoroutrightlie.CHAPTER11
GaylandtheDODIGbothfailtocorrectlyaddresstheHejlikUUNS.TheHejlikUUNSallowedforthem1114asasolutionandspecificallycalledthesolution“HMMWV-like”.IMEFwasdirectedtosubmitcapabilityneeds,notspecificequipmentdesires.MRAPasacapabilityallowedfortheconsiderationofthem1114.
OncetheHejlikUUNSwasresolvedperthem1114decisionofCMC,theHejlikUUNSwasreducedtoanUNS.TheDODIGdisputedthisfact.TheIMEFUUNStrackerrequiredbyorder/directiveevidencesthereduction:
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(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006)
ThereductiontoanUNSdemonstratedthereductionfromurgenttoregulartimelines(approx2-5yearsforanUNS).
TheDODIGwasespeciallyatfaultinthattherewereMarineswhotoldthemthecorrect
resolution,yettheyignoredthisinput.TheDODIGstatedthattheydidnothaveanyconcreteprooffromMARFORPACthattheUUNSwasreduced.TheyapparentlyfailedtocheckwithIMEFwhichwastaskedwithprovidingmonthlyupdatesonsubmittedUUNS(perorder/directive).ThisstudyprovidestwoUUNSupdatesstatingthattheHejlikUUNSwasreducedtoanUNS(noturgent)andcompletedasanUUNS.
AccusationsthattheHejlikUUNS,withanestimatedcostofonebilliondollars,waslost
arenonsensical.Everymajorcommand(overadozen)inthecombatdevelopmentprocessstoppedprocessingtheHejlikUUNSatthesametime(shortlyaftertheCMCm1114decision).ThisincludedIMEFaswellasMARCENT(commandedbythesameGeneralwhosubmittedtheUUNSinthefirstplace).TheHejlikUUNSrequestednumber,1,169,neverfiguredintoanyMNF-WdemandorcalculationforanyfutureMRAPrequest.Instead,itwasusedsolelyinattemptstodiscredittheMarineCorps.
CHAPTER12
Gayl’sMRAPstudy,thesourceformostMRAPconflict,iscriticallyflawed.Manyoftheseflawshavebeenexposed,butnotdiscussed.Theyarediscussedinthisstudy.Theyinclude:
• Theuseofirrelevantorders/directives(noneofwhicharecitedbytheDODIG).• NointerviewswithMCCDCpersonnel(orseveralotherMarinecombatdevelopment
commands)andtheuseoflessthan10emailsasasubstitute.• Arelianceonother’sperceptionsduetoGayl’sownlackofparticipation.• UnprofessionalcriticismoffellowMarines.
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• AlackofdocumentationinmanycasesandafailuretodiscoverofficialdocumentssuchastheMROCDMindicatingMROCbriefsthatGaylstateddidnotexist.
• Useofworkinprogress,thepress,andactionofficerbriefsasdefinitiverepresentationsofcommandpositions.
• ThefailuretoappreciatetheMarineCorps’involvementinjointforumsthatwereworkingonsolutionstopotentialMNF-Wneeds(e.g.EFP).
• ThefailuretoappreciatethespecificrequestsofMNF-WforMAKandm1114insteadofMRAP.
• Baselessaccusationsofpushbackbycombatdevelopersagainstapprovedrequirements.• Gayl’sinappropriatefavoritismforhisowntechnicalpreferencesandpreferredcivilian
companiesformaterialsolutions.• AfailuretodiscusstheroleofMARCENTandIMEFintheHejlikUUNSprocess.
Specifically,ifGaylweretobebelieved(heisnot),IMEFandMARCENTdidnotcontinuecoordinationinviolationoftheirUUNSprocessingdutiesfortheHejlikUUNS(byorder/directive).
• AfabricatedportrayalofIMEF’spreferenceforJUONSvsUUNS.IMEFfavoredUUNS.• AfailuretodothesimplemaththatdisprovesMRAPaccusations.IMEFrequested185
JERRVsandtheirtotalrequestwas185.Theyaddedanotherrequestforathousandandthentheirfullrequestwas1,185.Nowheredoes1,169figureintotheIMEFcalculation.
• AfabricationthattheMROCdidnotconsidertheHejlikUUNS.Itdid.• AfabricationthatMCCDCdidnotsupporttheIMEFUUNS/JUONSfor185JERRV.
MCCDCactuallywantedIMEFtoaskformoreandferventlyadvocatedforthe185.• AfabricationthatMCCDCandseniorGeneralswerenotintimatelyinvolvedwithMRAP
andHejlikUUNSdecisions.Theywere.• AfabricationthattherewassignificantpushbackonMRAPduetoJLTV.Whilethere
weresomelowlevelactionofficersthatdrewacomparison,theoverwhelmingmajorityofMCCDCsupportedMRAP.
• AskewedpresentationoftheworthofGayl’stechnicalrecommendations.Theywereoftendismissedbythosewhoactuallywerecompetentinthosetechnologyfields.IMEFneedswereansweredwithbettertechnologies,notGayl’s.
CHAPTER13
MRAPsdidnotfullydefeatallofthethreatsidentifiedintheHejlikUUNS.TherewerethreethreatsprimarilyidentifiedintheHejlikUUNS:IED,RPGandSAF.Them1114defeatedsideIED(thepredominantthreatatthetime)andSAF.ItdidnotdefeatunderbodyIEDsandRPGs.OtherMRAP-typevehiclesdidnotfullydefeatsideIEDorSAFandnovehiclefullydefeatedRPG.Thedecisiontooptforthem1114makesmoresensewhenviewedagainstthearticulatedthreatatthetime.
CHAPTER14
TheMarineCorpsdidnotmaximizetheuseofavailablejointprogramsandfunding.ThefailuretodosowasaCorpswideproblem.WhileacceptingtheMarineCorps’failuretomaximizetheuseofjointfunding,theDODIGrecommendationshowedignoranceonhowthe
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MarineCorpscouldhavedoneso.TheDODIGrecommendationforServicestosubmitneedstoCombatantCommandsignoresthechainofcommand.ThecorrectsolutionistohaveMarineComponentsofjointforces,suchasMNF-W,submitneedsthroughthejointchainofcommand.
CHAPTER15
GBOSSdemonstratedtheincompetenceofIMEFG9toperformallphasesofcombatdevelopment.GBOSSwasaforwardthinkingUUNS.Itwasthefirstneedtoestablisharequirementforsurveillancecapabilityatthelowerlevelsthatcouldalsofeedhigherlevelsurveillanceneeds.
IMEFG9engineeredtheirownsolutionincludingcontracting/payingfortheirsolution
despitejointandServicesupportforGBOSS.Emailsfromthecontractorshowincompetentcontractingefforts.Thisincludedsigningcontractsthenaskingthevendorwhatwasinthecontract.Inaddition,IMEFG9rejectedFSRsandsparepartswhenoffered,rejectedmorecapablesurveillancesystemsandrejectedtheuseofjointprocesses/fundingthatcouldhaveprovidedMarineswithvastlysuperiorcapabilities.Fortunately,MarineCorpsleadershiprejectedtheIMEFG9approachandequippedtheforcewiththesuperiorcapability.
Thischapterdefinitivelyestablishesacasestudyonwhythewarfightershouldnotbe
involvedwithprocurement.Theyshouldremainfocusedonwarfighting,asIMEFdid.TheIMEFG9andGayldidnot.
CHAPTER16
TheMarineCorpslaserdazzlereffortwassubjectedtoaseparateDODIGthattookyearstocomplete.TheconclusionsoftheDazzlerDODIGwereinconflictwithGayl’sconclusionsandportrayalsinthepress.TheDODIGfaultedMCCDCforactuallylisteningtotheIMEFG-9andGayl.
IIMEFapprovedadazzlerthatwaslasersafetyreviewed/approvedanditworked.IMEF
(afterRIPTOA)thenrejectedtheIIMEFsolutioninfavorofanon-approvedsystem.IndangerofviolatinginternationallawsofarmedconflictaswellascreatinganunsafesituationforciviliansandMarines,MCCDCrefusedtofieldtheuncertifiedsystem.IMEFrefusedtoacceptthesafeIIMEFsystemwhileMCCDCrefusedtosendtheunsafesystem.
TheDODIGfoundthatMCCDCshouldhavesenttheinitiallyapprovedsystemanyway.
TheMCCDCpositionwasnottofieldsystemsthatwerenotdesiredbytheoperatingforces.Theapprovedsystemswereeventuallyfieldedandaccomplishedthemission.IMEFboughtseveraloftheothersystems,whichdidnotworkandwereneverused.
CHAPTER17
Severalindividualshaveincorrectlytakencredit(orbeenprovidedcredit)orbeenassignedblameforMRAP-relatedevents.Aselectfeware:
• SenatorBiden:TheMarineCorpswasactivelypursuingMRAPforapproximatelyafullyearbythetimeSenatorBidensentaletterofconcerntotheDODaboutMRAPdelays.
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Biden’sentrytotheMRAPissuewascloudedbyhisslanderoftheMarineCorps.WhilehemayhavebeenoneofthefirstSenatorstobeinvolved,Bidenwasinreality,latetotheissue.
• SECDEFGates:InFeb2007USDAT&LwascorrespondingwithalloftheServiceSecretariesandtheViceChairmanoftheJCSaboutMRAPasanACAT1Dprogram(documentedinasignedmemorandum).SecretaryGateshadalreadybeenSECDEFfortwomonths.InMayof2007GatesbecameengagedintheprocurementofMRAP,threemonthsaftertheUSDmemorandumonACAT1Dstatus.TheMarineCorpshadMRAPasitstopprioritytheentiresixmonthsbetweenhisappointmentasSECDEFandGatesinvolvement.GateswasSECDEFfor6monthswhiletheMarineCorpsaskedforMRAP,thenhedevelopedapassionforMRAPafterreadingaboutitinthenews.
• FranzGayl:GaylwaslatetotheMRAPdiscussionandtheMarineCorps,withthesupportoftheArmy,wasalreadyblowinguptestMRAP-typevehiclesatAberdeenwhenGaylcreatedhisfirstbrief.BythattimetheCMChaddesignatedMRAPashisnumberonepriorityforoverhalfayear.Gaylalsocriticizesmanywhohadcombatdevelopmentresponsibilitiesbutfailstoself-criticizeeventhoughhehadmanyofthesameresponsibilities.Eitherhewaswronginhisstudyorhewashimselfnegligent(byorder/directive).
• LtGenMattis:GeneralMattishasbeenrepeatedlyandunjustlysmeared.GeneralMattis,asCGMCCDC,didnotdecidethefateofMRAP(positiveornegative).Hedidnothavetheauthoritytodoso.CMCandtheMROCwereawareofMRAPandtheymadethedecisions.
• MCCDC:The“bureaucratsatMCCDC”didnotmakeMRAPdecisionstoincludeburyingtherequest.Thisisoneofthemorebizarreaccusations.Mostofthe“bureaucrats”(akaMarineofficerswhohaddeployedtimetoIraqorsoonwould)supportedMRAP.
CHAPTER18
ThepressremainswoefullyignorantoftheMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentprocessyetfeelscomfortablecriticizingportionsofit.Gayl’sthousandsoferrorswerenotscrutinizedbythepress.Gayl’saccusationsweresensationalandreceivedwidespreadcoveragebutthepressdidnotbelieveitnecessarytocheckGayl’s“facts”beforereporting.
CHAPTER19
TheMRAPDODIGfailedtodiscoverthatIMEFcompletedtheHejlikUUNSasevidencedinthisstudy.TheMRAPDODIGalsofailedtoexploretheactionsofothercombatdeveloperstoincludeMARCENT,PP&O,theMROC,andmanyothers.IfGaylwastobebelieved,andheisnot,thentheDODIGshouldhavefoundnegligenceacrosstheMarineCorps.TheDODIGfailedtofindevidencethatIMEFcompletedtheHejlikUUNS(containedinthisstudy),failedtoexplainthecommonsensedecisionsbyMarineCorpsExecutivesandCMC(containedinthisstudy),andfailedininterpretingsomeverysimpleordersanddirectivesassigningcombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.
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CHAPTER20Gayl’sconclusionsandrecommendationsareflawed.Therehavebeenarticlesinthe
pressaskingwhynoonewasheldaccountableforhisinterpretationofMRAPevents.TheansweristhattherewasnonegligencewiththeHejlikUUNS.Factsbackthatup.Gayl’sallegationsneverheldenoughtruth.Gayl’srecommendationsbasedonhisconclusionsareequallybaseless.ManyofGayl’srecommendationsformoreinvolvementbythe“forcesincombat”incombatdevelopmenthavebeenrejectedinthebestinterestsofcombatforces.CHAPTER21Thefollowingrecommendationsareprovided:
• Gayl’sstudyshouldberemovedfromtheCongressionalRecordasaflaweddocumentnotmeetingstandardsforaccuracy.
• TheMRAP“story”shouldbeusedasanexampleoforganizationalcrisesresponse.Therearetwolessons:
o TheMarineCorpsrespondedwellinthatnoonewasincorrectlypunishedo TheMarineCorpsrespondedpoorlyinthatMRAPwas(andis)poorly
portrayedinthepressandCongress• OneoftheMarineCorps’firststepsincrisesresponseshouldbetodetermine
applicableordersanddirectives.• TheMarineCorpsshouldnotsolelyrelyontheDODIGtoinvestigateMarineCorps
issues.SomeissuesrequirespecificknowledgethattheDODIGdoesnotpossess.TheMRAPDODIGshouldbecorrected.
• CombatdevelopmentdocumentationwasflawedduringtheprocessingoftheHejlikUUNS.ThisincludesMCCDC,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,IMEF,IIMEF,theMROCanditsmembercommands,theAdvocatesandothers.TheUUNStrackingsystemhasbeenimproved,andshouldcontinuetotakeadvantageofnewtechnologies.
• Theinabilityofforcesincombattoperformmostcombatdevelopmentfunctionsshouldguidetheassignmentofcombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.MarineCommandsincombatshouldbelimitedintheirassumptionoftheseresponsibilities.
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1-FORWARD
TheresponsetoaccusationsofUSMCnegligenceintheMRAPsequencehasbeenseverelylacking.Howisitthattheworld’sfinestfightingforcehasbeensothoroughlyhumiliateddespitetheabsenceofacompellingcase?PartoftheansweristhattheMarineCorpsisafightingforce,notalitigatingforce.ThisstudywilladdressboththeMRAPaccusations,largelymanifestedintheGaylstudy,aswellasthe“how”andthe“why”oftheefforttoembarrasstheMarineCorps.
1A-AUTHORBACKGROUNDIDEALFORTHISSTUDY
AftermydeploymenttoIraqin2005andpriortomydeploymentin2007-2008Iwasthe
DirectorofOperations(DirOPS)attheMarineCorpsWarfightingLab(MCWL).IwasresponsibleforMCWLC-IEDeffortstoincludeproviding06(Colonel)levelrepresentation(asan05)totheJointIEDDefeatOrganization(JIEDDO)andOICoftheUSMCCounter-IEDWorkingGroup.ThisUSMCorganizationwastaskedwithcoordinatingC-IEDeffortsacrosstheMarineCorpsaswellasrepresentingtheMarineCorpsintheJIEDDO(Budget:approx$4Bil).IwasalsotheMCWLrepresentativetotheCapabilitiesDevelopmentandIntegrationBoard(CDIB),the06levelboardwhichwastaskedtocoordinatedevelopmenteffortsacrossQuanticoandtheMarineCorps.
Iparticipatedinand/orobservedtheMarineCorpseffortsintheC-IEDfightinIraqand
Afghanistan.IalsoobservedandparticipatedinthedevelopmentofMRAPs,persistentsurveillanceandmanyothercapabilitiesusedinIraqandAfghanistan.Iobservedtheactionsofdifferentorganizations,Commanders,andStaffsfromtheGeneralOfficerleveltotheciviliancontractorlevel.IwatchedasGaylarrivedonthesceneandfabricatedhisstudy.IspenthourswiththeMRAPDODIGlawyers.IkepttrackoftheprogressionoftheGayl/MRAPeventsandwasapartytomanyofthem.AtthattimeIcouldnotspendmuchtimeonGaylastheMarineCorpswasatwarandGayl’sissueswereinsignificantcomparedtothetaskofwarfightersupport.
MypastbilletsalsoincludedatourasaBranchHeadatHeadquartersMarineCorps
(HQMC)whereIhelpedestablishJIEDDOandledMarineCorpseffortsinHomelandDefenseandATFP.Myunderstandingofcommandrelationshipsandresponsibilitieswastesteddaily.Combinedwithabackgroundthatincludedwritingcommandandcontroldoctrine,mytimeatHQMCprovidedagoodunderstandingoforders,directivesandauthorities.IappliedthisunderstandingtothisstudyinordertocutthroughtheignorantassignmentofblamethatpermeatesthisMRAPissue.
IprovidedemailstotheDODIGthatdisprovedmanyoftheirinitialmisconceptions.
Unfortunately,theychangedtheirfocusandIdidnothaveanopportunitytocorrecttheirnewmisconceptions.ThisstudywillalsocorrectmistakesintheDODIGstudy.
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1B-THISSTUDYWRITTENTOCORRECTTHERECORD
Gaylandhisacolyteshavebeenmisleadingpeopleforthebetterpartofadecade.Thisincludespress,Congressandmilitaryreaders.Unfortunatelyitalsoincludestheparents,spouses,andchildrenofthosewhowerekilledorwoundedincombat.Normally,whensomeoneleviesanaccusationagainsttheMarineCorps,theygettheirsay,aninvestigationoccurs,andthematterisresolved.Marinesdon’tbelaborthepoint.Ifguiltisassigned,punishmentisharshandswift.Ifthereisnoguilt,thenMarinesmoveon.Inthiscase,noonewasfoundguiltybytheDODIGandyetGayl’saccusationspersist.In2014Newsweek,Time,FOXandothersranstoriesonGaylandhisaccusations.TheGaylstoryisnotgoingaway,thereforeitdemandsafactualresponse.
Gaylstates:“However,whenIreturnedtotheU.S.,advocacythathadearnedme
praisefromtheCommandingGeneralinthefieldbroughtmeretaliationfromthebureaucratsinQuantico”(Gayltestimonyp4).Gaylcontinues,“ButitistheMarineCorpsIhonor,nottheQuanticoandbeltwaycorporateMarineCorps,acorruptedculturewhichactsonincentivesandexhibitsprioritiesthatareoftencompletelydivorcedfromthoseofMarinesinharmsway”(GaylTestimony,p14-15).Moreaccuratelysaid:“ItistheMarineCorpsIhonor,exceptforanyonewhodisagreeswithme”.
TheMRAPstoryresonatesbecauseitcastsblameontheMarineCorpssupporting
establishmentforMarinedeaths:“Asaconsequence(ofcombatdeveloper’sactions),hundredsofMarinesdiedandthousandswerepermanentlymaimedincombat,unnecessarily”(GaylTestimonyp3).ItisapatentlyfalseassertionusedtolendtheultimategravitastoGayl’sposition.Notonlyisitfalse,buttheinvocationofMarinedeadtofurtheraflawedargumentshowsahubrisnotnormallyfoundintheCorps.Thereisnothinghumbleaboutthisaccusation.
TheMarineCorpsdoesnotmanQuanticowith“bureaucrats”.TheMarineCorpsrotates
itspersonnelbetweenthe“OperatingForces”(includesforcesincombat)and“SupportingEstablishment”(includesQuantico).ThisrotationkeepstheSupportingEstablishmentcurrentontheneedsoftheOperatingforces.ItalsoensuresthattheMarinesfieldingthegearwilleventuallybeusingsaidgear.InmybranchIhadveteransofAfghanistanandIraq.MyoperationsbranchdeployedsixofficerstothesamestaffasGaylinIraq.MyCommandingGeneralswereveteransofIraqorAfghanistan.WehadwoundedMarinesandMarineswithkidsincombatonstaff.IlivednexttoveteransinQuanticoand,asitturnedouttwofutureRegimentalCommanders.Mykidsplayedandwenttoschoolwiththechildrenoffriendswhohadheadwounds.Asthewarwenton,therewerefewerandfewernon-vetsatQuantico.Uponreturnfrommyseconddeployment,Ifoundmyoldoperationssectionstaffedalmostexclusivelywithveterans.TherestofQuanticowasthesame.Yes,therewerecivilians,buttheyweresmallinnumberandevensmallerindecision-makingauthority.Theterm“bureaucrat”asitisappliedtoQuanticoisanattemptedinsultbythosewhodonotknowbetter.
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OtherselectquotesbyGaylinclude:
• “Instead,theMCCDCorientationwastosavemoneyandacceptriskinOIFnotjustwiththeMRAPbutalsomanyotherCOIN-enablingcapabilities.Inthissense,beforeMRAPnoaspectofQuanticocombatdevelopmentwas“atwar,”andthisitcanbearguedhadasadirecteffecttheprolongingoftheentirewar.”(Gayl,p31)
• “DespiteunambiguousandcontinuousfeedbackfromthedeployedMarinesMCCDCatQuantico,theMarineCorpsturnedablindeyetorequestsforurgentlyneededequipmentwheneverthoserequestsconflictedwithparochialconceptoracquisitionprioritiesinacompetitionforresources.”(GaylTestimony,p3)
• OfMCCDC:“OIFwouldbeshortanddistractionsfromOIFcouldbe“waitedout.”Thiswasespeciallytrueduringtheperiodoflate2004throughsummer2006,theperiodofgreatestISR,NLWandMRAPinvestmentneed.”(Gayl,p85)
FranzGaylhasbeenexploitinghisversionoftheMRAPstoryforovernineyears.Hehas
madeTVappearancesandhasbeencitedonCNNandFOX.HehashadcomplimentarystoriesrunintheWashingtonPostandNewYorkTimesandnewspapersacrossthecountry.HehastestifiedbeforeCongressandhasenjoyedthebackingofSenatorsandevenVicePresidentBiden.HeisthedarlingofthewhistleblowercommunityashepointedouttheflawsofMarineCorpsGeneralsandtheall-powerfulprocurementcommunity.HeispaintedasahumbleDavidtotheMarineCorps’Goliath.NoonedeniesGayl’srighttoblowthewhistleandbeheard…butGayl,whowas/iswrong,shouldhavereconsideredbeingsovocalaboutit.
24
1C-WHATTHISPAPERISNOT Thisstudyisnotanindictmentagainstwhistleblowers.
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2-INTRODUCTION2A-AIMOFTHISSTUDY
Thisstudywillaccomplishfourobjectives.TheseobjectiveswillcenteronMRAP-type
vehicles,buttheywillalsoaddresseventssurroundingthe“MRAP-typevehicleissues”.Thisstudywill:
• Correcttherecordtoincludetheprovisionofpreviouslyundisclosedfacts• CorrectandpointouttheflawsinGayl’sarguments• ExplainMRAPeventsandhowtheylinktogether• Teach
CORRECTTHERECORD TheperceptionsassociatedwiththeMarineCorps’MRAPeffortsarecoloredbyfabrications,erroneousassumptions,individualpoliticsanddesires,andanabsenceoffact.ThisstudywillprovideactualfactsthattellthetrueMRAPstory.IntheprocesstheCongressionalrecord,theDODIGreport,thepress,andmilitaryandcivilianofficialswillbecorrected.IDENTIFY/CORRECTTHEFLAWSINTHEGAYLSTUDY/TESTIMONY
TherearetoomanyflawsintheGaylMRAPstudytoaddress,sothisstudywilladdress
whatthisauthorviewsasthetopseveralhundred.Somewillbeleftout,however,readersshouldnotassumethattheseomittedpointsarecorrect.Theyaresimplyunaddressedduetotimeandspaceconsiderations.GaylisthesourceformuchoftheerroneousMRAPinformationthereforehisstudyandtestimonywillbeafocus.
Therehasbeenagreatdealofmisinformationabouttheprovisionoflifesaving
equipmenttotheMarinesinIraqandAfghanistan.MuchofithasbeenprovidedbyMrFranzGayl.Thisstudywillprovidethefacts,notthehalf-truths,misleadingconclusions,falseassumptionsandinnuendoprovidedbyMrGayl.MrGaylhasbeencitedbymanyinthepressandinthepoliticalworldfortworeasons.One,hehasbeengivenalotofcreditforcausingtheMarineCorpstoprocureMRAPsandotherequipmentforMarinesinAlAnbar,Iraq.ThiscredithasbeenbestowedbySenators,Congressmen,andthepress.Two,hehasestablishedhimselfasawhistleblowerextraordinaire,someonewho“spoketruthtopower”andwaspunishedforit.Gaylhasarighttobeawhistleblower,buthewasincorrectandnooneinthepressorCongressbotheredtoquestionGayl’sfalsestatements.
ThisstudywilldisprovethemajorpointsofGayl’sMRAPstudy.Itwillalsodisprove
manyofhismajorpointspresentedtotheHouseOversightCommittee.Itwillalsodisprovehismajorpointsasdeliveredinthepress(USAToday,Newsweek,TheWashingtonPost,CNN,FOXetc.).ThisstudywillalsocritiquetheMRAPDODIGinvestigationresultingfromGayl’smisleadingstudy.Thisstudywillnotonlyshowthehalf-truthsanderrorsintheGaylefforts,butitwillalsotellwhatreallyoccurred.Finally,therehavebeenplentyofslanderousaccusations
26
againstMarinesandacceptancesofcreditbythosewhoareundeserving.Thesewillbedisprovenorproven.EXPLAINEVENTS
ThisstudywillfocusontheMRAP.TheflawedbodyofworkonMRAPissizeable.Simplycorrectingtheerroneousinformation,however,isnotenoughtoachieveunderstandingofwhatreallyoccurred.ThepoliticsandpressofMRAPmustbeexplainedaswellasissuesthathavenotreceivedanyattentionatall.
Thispaperwillshowthattherewereperiodsoftimeafterthe2005HejlikUUNSwhere
therewasnodemandforMRAPs.ThispaperwillshowtheresponsivenessofdifferentorganizationsandindividualswhohavebeenlambastedbyGaylandthepress.ItwillalsoaddressthecredithogswhohaveattemptedtoclaimcreditforprovidingtheMRAPcapabilitytowarfightersinIraq.Othersimilarequipmentissues,suchasISR(GBOSS)andNLW(LaserDazzler)willbeaddressed.MuchoftheMRAPstoryhasbeendictatedbyonlyafewindividualssuchasFranzGayl.Thisstudywillexplaintherestofthestory.
Gaylcannotbeheldfullyaccountableforallofhismistakes.Hewasnotinvolvedwith
theMRAPissueuntilitwasverymature.Assuch,hereliedontheperceptionsandfactsprovidedtohimbyothers.TheirincorrectexplanationsofeventsinfluencedGayl.TEACH
Thisstudywillteach.Ordersanddirectives(vsinnuendoandshallowanalysis)shouldhavebeenusedtoanalyzeMRAP.TheDODIG,Gaylandthepressshouldhaveacquiredadditionalinformationinordertohavemadeinformeddecisions,buttheydidnot.ThechainofcommandandassignedindividualresponsibilitieswerelargelyignoredinMRAPanalysis.Processandprocedurewereignoredinordertostrengthenpreconceivedconclusions.InordertounderstandeventssurroundingMRAP,onemustunderstandaleveloftactics,procurement,componency,advocacy,commandrelationships,commandresponsibilitiesandothermilitaryissues.Thisbodyofunderstandingisnotfullyachievable,evenbycareermilitaryofficers.CivilianshavevirtuallynohopeofunderstandingtherangeofissuesneededtounderstandMRAP.Thisstudywillteachrelevantelementsofthemilitary“ecosystem”.
Forexample,alackofunderstandingofthecombatdevelopmentprocesserroneously
leadsonetoconcludethatQuanticodeliberatelyburiedthe2005HejlikUUNS.Thispaperwillshowthatfortheseaccusationstobetrue,manyothercombatdevelopmentorganizations(responsiblefortheUUNS)withintheMarineCorpswouldhavehadtoalsoburytherequest…toincludeFranzGaylhimself.DISCLAIMER
BeforediscussingtheresponsibilitiesandactionsofMarines,itisworthnotingthattherewasnoMRAPdemandsignalfromresponsiblepartiesinthewholeofgovernment
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(Severaloftheseorganizations/individualswillbediscussedlater).ThesewholeofgovernmentorganizationsandindividualswhodidnotestablishtheMRAP-typevehicleneedpriortotheMarineCorpsincludes:
• TheSecretaryofDefenseandtheentiretyofhisDODStaff(SecretariesRumsfeldandGates)andallDODOrganizations
• AllSenatorsandCongressmen(ToincludeSenatorsBidenandBond)• TheCombatantCommandersandtheirstaffs(CENTCOMandotherCOCOMs)• MultinationalCorpsIraq(ThehigherheadquartersforMarinesinIraq)• TheArmy• TheNavy• TheAirForce• Others
Theabovelistisnotintendedasacritique.Itmerelydemonstratesthat,atthetime,the
needwasnotestablished.TheMarineCorpswasthelead.Gayl’sstudypointstowardsseveralindividualswhorightlydeservecreditforadvancinganidea,butafewindividualspositinganideaisvastlydifferentfromanorganizationalefforttoestablisharequirement.OfnoteisthattheIMEFMRAPsubmissionsweretheonlysizeableMRAPsubmissionsforoverayear.
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2B-HOWTHISSTUDYISORGANIZED
ThisstudywillnotusenamestoconductwarrantlesscharacterassassinationasoccurredintheGaylstudy.Thisstudywillonlycritique(usingnames)thosewhohavepublishedormadepublicstatements.ItisobviousthatGaylreliedheavilyoninformationprovidedbyIMEFG9andLtColJankowski(MARCENT).GaylandJankowskiwerevocalintheircriticisms,whereastheIMEFG9personnelwerelargelyabsentfromthepublicdomain.Onlythenamesofthosewhoenterthedebatewillbeused.Otherswillbereferredtosimplybytheirorganizations(e.g.“IMEFG9”willrepresentallofthosepersonnelintheIMEFG9inordertomaintainanonymity).Futurewritingscanaddressthosewhocommentpublically.
Thisstudywillusefactandexcerptsfrompublisheddocuments.Personalstatementswillbeminimizedeventhoughthisauthorwaspartytomanyconversationsonvariouselementsofthisstudy.DocumentssuchasthewrittenstudyofMrGayl,writtenandoraltestimonyofGayl,thewrittenDODIGandotherinvestigations,ordersanddirectiveswillbeused.Atimelineofconcreteeventsisprovided.AdifferencewithGayl’sstudyisthatthisstudywillusethefactsinMarineCorpsOrders/Directivesthatexistedduringtheseevents.Theseorders/directivespromptawholeseriesofquestionsnotaskedbythepressoranyoneelseinapositionofauthoritysaveperhapstheDODIG(whichmayexplaintheirrecommendationthathasnothingsimilartoanyofGayl’srecommendations).ThisisimportantbecauseanyonecanreadGayl’sstudy,lookathisreferences,andnotseeanyoftheMarineCorpsOrdersandDirectivesthatdictateresponsibilityforvariouselementsoftheMarineCorpsinCombatDevelopment.ThefinalfactswillbedrawnfromhundredsofemailsfromSeniorGeneralOfficersintheMarineCorps(includingtheCommandant)toMrFranzGaylhimself.Theseemails(asapprovedforrelease)willbeprovidedinfullsoasnottobemisleading.Mypersonalobservationsandrecollectionsfromthetimewillbeannotatedassuch(ingreyscale).WORDSMATTERSeveraltermsusedinthisstudyrequiredefinitionordescription.
WhenreferringtoMRAPsonemayseetheterm“MRAP-type”vehicles.MRAP-typevehiclesisatermusedtoencompassavarietyofarmoredvehicles.MRAPsreferstothespecificnameofthevehicleswhichonlybecamewidelyusedafterthesummerof2006.Therewasaconstantflowof“MRAPtypevehicles”intotheaterfrom2003.ThispaperwilldiscussMRAP-typevehiclerequestsasthoserequestsforover150vehiclesunlessspecificallyannotated.Thisnumberwouldsupportalargergeneralpurposeforcevsthesmallernumbersthatgenerallysupportedengineers.Costestimatesforapproximatelyonethousandvehicleswereintheneighborhoodof$1Bil.Thatfigurewillbeusedthroughoutthepaper.TheUrgentUniversalNeedStatement(UUNS)isavarietyofUNS.TheUUNSsignedbyBGenHejlikin2005forMRAP-typevehicleswillbereferredtoastheHejlikUUNS,the2005UUNS,the2005HejlikUUNSoranycombinationoftheabove.OnceitwasreducedtoanUNSthesametermsmaybeusedwithonlyone“U”(UNSvsUUNS).
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IMEFwasthedeployedcommandinIraqfortheHejlikUUNS.IIMEFrotatedbackand
forthwithIMEFforaperiodofoneyear.IandIIMEFwerealsodesignatedasthejointcommandMulti-NationalForcesWestorMNF-W.Termssuchas“thecustomer”,deployedforces,thewarfighter,troopsinharm’sway(etc.)refertoMarineForcesinIraq.Customersaretheoneswhodecidewhattheywant.Onecangiveacustomeraproduct,butiftheydonotwantittheyarenotgoingtouseit.Customersmaychangetheirmind.IMEF,asthecustomer,fitsthesedescriptions.IMEFandIIMEFwerethedeployedMarineforcesintheIraqTheaterofOperations(ITO). “Combatdevelopment”isoneofthemostmisunderstoodtermswhenaddressingtheMRAPissue.OnemightassumethatcombatdevelopmentisperformedbytheMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC).Itis,however,otherorganizationsalsoperformmajorelementsofcombatdevelopment.ThereareresponsibilitiesacrosstheMarineCorpsforcombatdevelopment.ItisnotthesoleresponsibilityofMCCDC.ThisconceptispoorlyunderstoodbyGaylaswellasthepressandpoliticians.ItisexplainedinChapter4-6. Militarydocumentsareoftendraftedandstaffedpriortobeingofficiallysignedorofficiallysubmitted.Draftsarepreliminarydocuments.TheofficialsignaturedateforUUNSandUNSwillbeusedunlessspecificallyreferencedasadraft. Thereareseveralsectionsofthisstudythatmayappearrepetitive.Thisoccursassomeevidenceappliestomorethanonechapter.Therepetitionisprovidedinordertoallowreaderstoachievechapterunderstandingwithoutreadingtheentirestudy.
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2C-ASIDES
“Asides”willbeusedwhenalengthierfirst-handaccountbymyselfispresented.Theywillalsobedesignatedingreyscale.ForexampletheasidebelowmaydescribehowtheMRAPissuecametobe:
MRAPwasnotacaseofneglect.Itwasacaseofmanipulatinginformationtopresenta
pictureofneglect.
In2006theMarineCorpsWarfightingLaboratory(MCWL)establishedtheMarineCorp’sC-IEDWorkingGroup(C-IEDWG).TheC-IEDWGwastaskedastheMarineCorp’sleadinworkingwithJIEDDO.JIEDDOhadbeeninexistenceinvariousformsforseveralyearsandIwastheMarineCorpsleadduringtheinitialestablishmentofJIEDDO(initiallycalledJointIEDTaskForce).TheevolutionofJIEDDOcausedarationalsub-organizationandtheUSMCC-IEDWGwouldmimicit.JIEDDOwasorganizedalongfivepillars,oneofwhichwasthemitigatepillar.Themitigatepillarwasprimarilyfocusedonvehicleandcrewprotection(amongstseveralothers)orhowtomitigatetheeffectofanIEDblastonavehicle.MajorJohnMoorewasplacedinchargeofC-IEDWGmitigateeffortsand,asthemitigatelead,coordinatedmitigateissuesacrosstheMarineCorps.
Inearly2006thefocusofeffortinIEDmitigationwasonprovidingbetterarmorforHMMWVs.ThedemandsignalfromtheMEFsincontactindicatedthatthenumberoneprioritywasbetterarmorprotectionforthesoft-skinnedHMMWVsthatMarineswereusingontheroadsofIraq.Thearmorkitswerereferredtoasfragkitsandfragkit5wasthearmorkitforthecrewcompartmentoftheHMMWV.TheMarinesatthetimewereweldingscrapmetaltotheirvehiclesinordertoprotectfromsideblasts.Fragkit5wasthereforeinhighdemand.Fragkit5,unfortunately,didnotprotectfromunderbodyblasts.Therewasnoeffectiveunderbody,orbottomofthevehicle,solutionfortheHMMWV.
TheMCWLC-IEDWGanalysissuggestedthatthefamilyofarmoredvehicleswithV
shapedunderbodieswerethebestoptionformitigatingtheblasteffectsofIEDs.Therewasnoonenameforthesevehiclesandeachwasslightlydifferentfromtheother(SeeMRAPnomenclaturesection).TheC-IEDWGwascomfortablethat,witharequest,severalfullprotectionvehicleoptionswouldbeavailable.TheonlythingrequiredwasarequestfromIMEF(Fwd).
TheMCWLC-IEDworkinggrouphadrecentlytriedtoestablishcriticalISRassetswithI
MEF(Fwd)andtherewasconsiderabledebateindeterminingthebestmaterialsolutionfortoweredcameras(seeGBOSSsection).Inaddition,therewereothertechnologiesthatIMEFarguedweretechnologicallylacking(seeLaserDazzlerChapter).Insteadofcreatingyetanothertechnologydebatewiththeforcesforward,theC-IEDWGcontactedMARCENTtoadvocateformoreMRAPS.MCWLwastryingtoconvinceMARCENTthatjointfundingmaybeavailableforMRAP:
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IbelievethiseffortistiedinwiththetalkswehadyesterdayaboutallthepurplemoneyavailableforCIED.
(Gayl,p49)EmailfromtheIIMEFSYSCOMliaisontoaMCWLliaisonatIIMEFreflectingthe
understandingthatpurplemoneywasavailableforCIED.Thedifferentsourcesofmoneywereoftenconfusingtothosewhodidnotregularly
dealwithDODfinancing.OneoftheuniqueaspectsofOIFwastheestablishmentofJIEDDOwithover$4Bilinfunding.JIEDDOwasajointorganizationthatreceivedDODfundingwithoutworkingthroughtheServiceSecretaries.Theterm“purplemoney”referstothebillionsofdollarsavailablethroughthisneworganization.AstheMarineCorp’sliaisontoJIEDDO,MCWL(C-IEDWG)undertookeffortstoensuretheCorpsunderstoodthisnewfundingsource.TherequestprocessforJIEDDOfundswasdifferentthantheServiceprocess.OnehadtofollowtheJointrequestprocessvstheServicerequestprocesstoaccessJIEDDOfunds.TheaboveemailreflectstheMCWLefforttoadvertisethenew“purple”moneyasavenueforarequestforadditionalMRAPs.
IMEFeventuallychangedtheirpositionandsupportedalargeMRAPbuybutthesearch
foranoldrequirementcontinued(seeHejlikUUNSsection).TheHejlikUUNSwaseventuallydiscovered.DespitebeingcompletedasanUUNS,itwaspresentedasanactiveUUNS.OncetheHejlikUUNSwasidentified,IMEFstartedusingthetermMRAP(seeChapter8)andrequestedanadditional1000vehicles.ThesearchforanoldneedcausedthediscoveryoftheoldHejlikUUNS.WithouttheoldHejlikUUNS,therewasnoabilitytofabricatea“delay”astheHejlikUUNSwasresolved.
ThediscoveryoftheoldUUNSwasthecatalystinthesupposed“delay”.
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2D-EMAILSAVAILABLEINTOTO Thisstudy,asopposedtoGayl’sstudy,willprovidetheentiretyofeachemail(asclearedforrelease).Therewillbeopportunityforthereadertoestablishcontextandseetheflowofthediscussion.Thereisadditionalinformationinattachments.Thereferenceswithinthisstudywillbetowardstheemaildateofthefinalsenderwhich,insomecases,wastwoyearslaterthanthereferencedemail.Emailsthatmaybecriticalorembarrassinghavebeenredactedsothatnamesdonotshow.Thosewhohavedecidedtopublishwillnothavetheirnamesredacted.Shouldfuturedebateoccur,otheremailswillbeprovided.Thoseemailsthatareincludedaresufficienttoillustratetheissues.
Theseemailsareallunclassified.Theinabilitytoaccessclassifiedemailswasdetrimentalinthatclassifiedemailsfurtherbolsteredthepointsinthisstudy.Nevertheless,theunclassifiedemailssufficeforthisstudy.TheDODIGwasprovidedclassifiedemailswhichrefutedGayl’sstudy,however,thoseemailsarenolongeravailabletothisauthor.
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2E-THEWHISTLEBLOWER’SHYPOCRACY
Thisstudydoesnottakeissuewithwhistleblowers.Thisauthorbelievesthattheyareanothercheckandbalanceand,aslongastheyoperatewithinthelaw,theyshouldnotbepunished.Thewhistleblower,however,shouldbeaccurate.Thewhistleblowershouldbecritiquedontheir“facts”.Blowingthewhistledoesnotabsolvethewhistleblowerfromaccountability.
Gayl,ifhiswhistleblowingistobebelieved,washimselfnegligent.“Iandseveralother
MarinesfirstbroughtthisissuetotheattentionofmyPentagonchainofcommandwhileIwasstillinIraq”(GaylTestimony,p3).AsamemberoftheGCEAdvocatestaff,GaylshouldhavebroughttheMRAPissuetotheattentionofhischainofcommandearlier(ifitwastheissueheportrays).HejoinedPP&Oin2002.Theaccountabilitythathedemandsoftherestofthecombatdevelopmentcommunityshouldbeappliedtohimself.
“However,whenIreturnedtotheU.S.,thesameadvocacythathadearnedmepraise
fromtheCommandingGeneralinthefieldbroughtmeretaliationfromthebureaucratsinQuanticoandmysupervisorsatthePentagonwhoweredispleasedwithmyvocalcandidnessregardinglackingcapabilitiesinIraq.”(GaylTestimony,p5).ThebureaucratsinQuantico(alongwiththeGeneralsinQuantico)hadnoauthoritytoretaliateagainstGayl.TheconceptofchainofcommandseemstohaveeludedGayl.Retaliationagainstawhistleblowerhastocomefromthosewithsomeauthoritytoretaliate,notthosewhoareonlyinapositiontodisagree(Quantico).
Gaylstates:“Iintendtosuccessfullyachieveadegreeofaccountabilityandconcrete
changeatQuanticoorIwillbefiredintheprocessoftrying”(GaylTestimony,p15).Gayl’sattemptstoachieveaccountabilityatQuanticoareoutsideofhisjobdescription.QuanticoiscommandedbyaLtGenandthentheCommandant.Gaylisacivilianemployeeofadifferentcommand.Gayldoesnothavetheauthorityorresponsibilitytoholdanyoneaccountable.Hecanairhisgrievances,nomatterhowdeceptive,byblowinghiswhistle.Hehasnoauthoritytodomore.TheaccountabilityheseeksforQuanticoisnotreciprocatedbyanofferforhisownaccountability.
Gaylstates:“Althoughmychargeshavebeenlargelyconfirmed,myprofessionallife
hasbeenanightmareeversince,andIanricipatefurtherretaliationformyvoluntaryappearancetoday.”(GaylTestimony,p1).Gayl’s“charges”willberoundlydiscreditedinthisstudy.Duringtheconductofthisstudyseveralofthisauthor’speersdeclinedtoassistoutofconcernthattheiractionsmayreflectsomesortofanti-Gaylpersecution.Theirfearwasthattheircommandmaybeadverselyaffected.Thisauthoriscurrentlyretiredandnotemployed/associatedwithanyMarineCommand.NoMarine,MarinecivilianorMarineCommandassistedinthedevelopmentofthisstudy.
GaylhastestifiedbeforetheHouse,andSenatorshavechampionedhispersonalcause
toincludethenSenatorBiden.Gaylhasbeenchaperonedbywhistleblowerorganizations
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acrossthelandandhasbeenaherotoelementsofthemedia.Hehaslittletofearinthewayofretaliation.HehasmorejobsecuritythananyactivedutyMarinethisauthorknows.Marineshaveonlytheirperformancetorelyupon,notSenators,Congressmen,andtheVicePresident.
ThisauthorhasdeliberatelynotalignedorworkedwithanyMarineCommandinthedevelopmentofthisstudy.
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3-Timeline
TimelinesalonedebunkmanyofthemisunderstandingsofMarineCorpsMRAPevents.Timelineswillalsobeaddressedindifferentsectionsofthepaperbutthefollowingfoursummationsarenoteworthy.TimelineIssue:IntroductionofMRAP
Priorto2005therewasvirtuallynoMRAP-typevehiclediscussionofanysignificanceoutsideoftheEngineerCommunities.Gaylcitesseveralarticlesbyjuniorandmid-gradeofficersbut,whiletheywereexcellentschoolwork,theydidnottranslateintoanysortofflagofficeractiontoprocure.TheorganizationsthathadtheabilitytosubmitMRAP-typevehiclerequestsdidnotdoso.Theorganizationsthathadtheresponsibilitytosubmitneedsdidnotdoso.TheefforttoequipMarines(outsideoftheengineercommunities)withMRAP-typevehicleswasnon-existent.TheabsenceofMRAP-typetimelineentriesintheDODIG,Gayl’sstudy,andServicedocumentsindicatetheabsenceofexpressedneed.ThisabsenceincludestheUSMCGCEAdvocate(Gayl’sCommand).TherewasnoseriousorcredibleMRAP-typevehicleneedpriortotheHejlikUUNS.TimelineIssue:Absenceofcrediblesources
MuchofthecriticismoftheMarineCorpsisbasedonspeculationofthemotivesofthoseinvolvedwithvehiclearmor(andotherissues).MuchofthepresshavecitedGayl’sfaultystudywhenwritingaboutMRAP.GayldidnotdeploytoIraquntilapproximatelySept2006.AstheGCEAdvocateS&TAdvisorhehadnosignificantMRAP-typevehicleinvolvementpriortohisdeployment.ThisincludestheperiodoftimeafterthesubmissionoftheHejlikUUNSin2005.Hethereforehasnofirsthandknowledgeoftheeventsofwhichhespeaks.HissupportingdocumentationdealingwithMarine’smotivesisoftenpurespeculation.Thatwhichisnotspeculationisoftennotsubstantiatedbyemailsorotherdocuments.HisfirstsignificantpresentationofanysortwastoDirectorDefenseResearchandEngineering(DDR&E)inMarch2007.ThispresentationcontainedoneMRAPslideandonearmorslideoutoftheentirepresentationof31slides.MRAPwasnotGayl’sfocus.
MuchofGayl’sinformationcomesfromMARCENTorIMEF(G-9).TheMARCENT
informationseemstocomefromLtColJankowski,aGaylacolyte(seebelow).TheinformationcomingfromIMEFG-9wasproblematicasIMEFG-9hadauniqueperspectiveonhowtheMEFshouldbesupported.InsteadoftheG-9statingneeds,IMEFG-9shoppedforequipment,coordinatedwithvendors,contracted,andmadeprocurementdecisions.TherestoftheMarineCorpswasinapositionwhereithadtosupportIMEFG-9decisions.Thisstudydiscussesaproposaltoprohibitcombatforcesfromengaginginprocurementphasesofequippingtheforce(allowingmorefocusonthecombatmission).IMEFG-9wasoftenatoddswithQuantico.ThisisthesourceformuchofGayl’sinformationandisbestdemonstratedintheGBOSSandDazzlerChapters.MRAP,ontheotherhand,wasnotcontentiousasIMEF,IIMEF,MARCENT,MCCDCandtherestoftheMarineCorpswereinconstantagreement.
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TheemaildocumentationcitedbyGaylstartsinJune,2006.LtColJankowskiarrivedat
MARCENTduringthistimeframe.Gayl’sreferencedemailscoincidewithJankowski’sactivationandreflectemailconversationsthatJankowskiparticipatedin.ThesetypesofsourcesarefarsuperiortotheinnuendoGayloftenused.Jankowskiemails,however,arerestrictedtohisactivationfromJune06toMar07.TimelineIssue:TheAbsenceofMRAPDemand
ThegapinMRAP-typevehicleeventsoccurredfromAug2005toMay2006.ThisgapreflectsanabsenceofanyMRAPdevelopment.Thisincludesthedeployedforces,MARCENT,theAdvocates,MCCDC,theMROCandeveryotherMarineCorpscommand.ThegapisdepictedintheDODIGreport: TheGap
(DODIG,p56)
Gaylestablishesasimilargap,howeverhisextendsfromJune05(twomonthslonger
thantheDODIG).ThisgapindicatingabsenceofactionrendersillegitimateanyassertionthattheoperatingforceswereconstantlydemandingMRAPs.ThisgapisalsoconsistentwiththeMarineCorpspositionthattheUUNSwasaddressedbym1114sandconcluded.Thisgapisalsoconsistentwithaneweffortsubmissionofthenewjointrequestsin2006.Thisgapisalsoconsistentwiththedifferentnamesused(JERRVandMMPVvsMRAP).Thisgapisalsoconsistentwiththetermingofthe2005HejlikUUNSas“completed”byIMEF.ThisgapisalsoconsistentwiththenumberofMRAP-typevehiclesbeing185onlyafterarequestfor185MRAP-typevehiclesoccurredinMay2006.Thisgapwillbeaddressedthroughoutthestudy.
Thefollowingtimelineofdemand(consistingoftheeventdate,numberofMRAP-type
vehiclesrequestedandtheauthoritativedocument)isprovidedasaquickreference:
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TimelineIssue:TheMarineCorpswasintheprocessofprovidinglargenumbersofMRAPswellbeforeGaylwasinvolved.Gayl’sfirstMRAPeventwasinMarch2006.Priortohis“arrival”,thefollowinghadoccurred:
• IMEFrequested1,185MRAPs.• MCCDCexpeditedtheprocessingoftheMRAPrequests,shapedthemasjointrequests
(JUONs)andwasverysupportiveoftherequests.• SECNAVwasbriefedbyseniorMarinesthatMRAPwasneedednow.• CongresswasbriefedinmultipleforumsthatMarinesneededMRAPsimmediately.• MarinesbriefedCongressthatotheroptionswerenotsufficient.• NineMRAPcontractswereawardedtobuildMRAPsfortesting.• CMCbriefedCongressanddeclaredhehada“moralresponsibility”tobuyMRAPsand
JLTVwasnotanoption.• TestingofMRAPsbeganatAberdeen,Md.Testinginvolvedamajorpartofthe
Aberdeentestingcommand.• TheUndersecretaryofDefense(AT&L)issuedamemorandumindicatingdesignationof
theMRAPprogramasanACATIDprogram(highestpriority).ThismemorandumwasdistributedtoalloftheServiceSecretariesandtheJointStaff.
ThenGaylmadeabriefforDDR&E.TIMELINEPriorto2005
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Priorto2005 Priortothe2005HejlikUUNSGaylstatesthefollowingastheonlyMRAP
actions:• ACaptainwritesanarticleina1996MarineCorpsGazette• In2003twoMajorswriteMRAPpapersfortheircareerlevelschoolandbrief
someoneatMCSC• In2003/2004twoMajorsbriefedBGenTrautmanandLtGenGregsonat
MARFORPAC(fromwhichtherewasnorequestforMRAP)• AColprovided8CasspirstoMNF-WviatheRapidEquippingForce.
(Gayl,p2-10)GaylreferencesnoAdvocateeffortsinthistimeframe.
Nov26,2002 “MarineCorpsOrder3900.15A,“MarineCorpsExpeditionaryForce
DevelopmentSystem,”November26,2002,establishedtheExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem.”(DODIG,p6)ThisorderestablishesinitialMRAPresponsibilitieswhichwereaugmentedbyMARADMINs.ItshowsthebreadthofcombatdevelopmentresponsibilitiesbeyondMCCDCtoincludeGaylandtheAdvocate.
Dec2003andMar2005 “InDecember2003andMarch2005,theMCCDCvalidated
MRAP-typevehiclerequirements,separatefromtheFebruary2005UUNS,andMarineCorpsSystemsCommand(MCSC)subsequentlycontractedforMRAP-typevehicles.Further,inMarch2005,midlevelMarineCorpsofficersbriefedtheExecutiveSafetyBoardoncapabilitiesthatMRAP-typevehiclescouldprovidetoprotectforcesintheater.”(DODIG,p9)Theserequirementswereforengineerspecificfunctionsandnotforinfantryrequests(e.g.MRAP).
Nov21,2003 USMCpublishedMARADMIN533/03,“OperationIraqiFreedomIIUUNS
Process”.(DODIG,p7)ThisMARADMINprovidedHejlikUUNSguidance(seeChapter4).
April2004 “InApril2004,theMCCDCissuedastatementofneedfor27Hardened
EngineerVehiclesinresponsetoaDecember2003UUNSfromtheIMarineExpeditionaryForce.”(DODIG,p9)Thesevehicleswereforengineerunits.
Sept2004 “InSeptember2004,IMarineExpeditionaryForceissuedapolicyletter
definingitsarmoringrequirementstoincludetheuseoftheMarineArmorKit,orGenerationIIIarmor.”(DODIG,p7)IMEFdidnotidentifyanMRAP-typevehicleinthispolicyletter.
Sept28,2004 USMCpublishedMARADMIN424/04,“OperationIraqiFreedomIIIUUNS
Process”.(DODIG,p7)ThisMARADMINcontinuedtoprovideUUNSguidance.
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Oct2004 HardenedEngineerVehiclesweredeployedinOctober2004.(DODIG,p9)20052005 “TheformerCommandingGeneral,MarineCorpsForcesPacificstatedthatin
2005MRAP-typevehiclesneededtobefieldedintheaterinadditiontothem1114up-armoredHMMWVinsomenumbersforoperationsinhighriskareas.Hestatedthathedidnotknowwhatactionwastakenonhisrecommendationforamixedvehiclefleet.”(DODIG,p8)TheCGMARFORPACdidnotpursuethebilliondollarUUNSasthesolutionwasdeterminedtobem1114.TheUUNS,afterbeingreducedtoanUNS,didnotcontinuetobedebatedbyCGMARFORPAC.
Jan2005 “ThefirstMAKsweredeliveredtoMarinesintheaterinJanuary2005,andthe
numberofsystemscurrentlyfieldedis5,550.”(DODIG,p8)TheMAKwasrequestedbytheMEFs.
Feb17,2005 “OnFebruary17,2005,theDeputyCommandingGeneral,IMarine
ExpeditionaryForce,throughtheCommandingGeneral,MarineCorpsForces,Pacific,submittedanUUNSfor1,169MRAP-typevehiclestotheMCCDC.”(DODIG,p2)Startofthe“19monthdelay”accordingtoGayl.
Mar1,2005 I&LrespondsintheirAdvocateroletothe2005HejlikUUNS:I&Lwrote:“It
appearsthatthisismoreappropriateasanUNSthanasanurgentUNS.Manyissuesareunclear.Whatisthecapabilitygapwearetryingtofill?”(Gayl,p18)
Mar292005 “OnMarch29,2005,midlevelMarineCorpsofficersbriefedtheMarineCorps
ExecutiveSafetyBoardonmine-resistantvehiclesandproposedintroducingMRAP-typevehiclesintheateronalargescale.”(DODIG,p9)TheseofficerswerefromIMEFand,withBGenHejlikpresent,briefedavehiclerequirementof522.BGenHejlikwastheIMEFDCGandsignerofthe1,169requirementinthepreviousmonth(Gayl,p15).
Mar2005 “TheDOTMLPFWorkingGroupsubmittedaninformationpaperwithoptions
forsatisfyingtheUUNStotheDeputyCommandant,CombatDevelopmentandIntegrationattheendofMarch2005.”(DODIG,p12)
Apr2005 “InApril2005,theJointIEDTaskForceapprovedthereleaseof$92.14million
fromtheIraqFreedomFundfortheprocurementof122JointExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalRapidResponseVehicles(JERRVs),thejoint-ServiceversionoftheHardenedEngineerVehicle.Ofthe122JERRVs,38werefortheMarineCorps.”(DODIG,p9)Therewasnocorrespondingeffortfor1,169vehicles.
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May2005 Executiveoff-siteoccurswhereCMCdecidestosatisfyvehicleneedswithm1114.CMCbriefedMarineCorpsexecutivesonhisdecision.TheCMCdecisionwaswithfullknowledgeoftheHejlikUUNS.
June20,2005 ACMC&MCSCArmorHearing-CMCbriefsdecisiontoreplaceallHMMWVswith
m1114(DODIG,pi).ThisbrieftoCongressconfirmedtheCMCdecisiontogowithm1114insteadofMRAP-typevehicles.
June,2005 “AfterreceivingtheMay2005emergencysupplementalfunds,the
CommandantoftheMarineCorpsdirectedtheDeputyCommandant,InstallationsandLogisticsinJune2005tocoordinateanoverallefforttoprocureenoughM1114up-armoredHMMWVstoreplaceallHMMWVsintheater.”(DODIG,p8)CMCdidnotdirecta“mixedfleet”ofm1114andMRAP.
June2005 “RelayingtheCommandant’sdecisioninaJune2005e-mail,theDeputy
Commandant,InstallationsandLogisticsstatedthattheM1114up-armoredHMMWVwasthebestavailable,mostsurvivableassettoprotectMarineforcesandmeetimmediatemissionrequirements.”(DODIG,p8)Thedecisiontoselectthem1114wasnotaMCCDCdecision.
June10,2005 “This10June05EFDCinfopaperaboveisthelastknown(i.e.knowntothis
casestudyauthor)formalcommunicationthattheMRAPUUNShadbeendelayedorcancelledatMCCDC.ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbytheMROCSecretariat.TheMRAPUUNSwasallegedlyhandledanddecideduponoutsideofthestandardprocess,inthatitwasneverproperlybroughtbeforetheMROCforaformaldecisionforsubsequentrecordinginanMROCDecisionMemorandum.”(Gayl,p38)GaylwasunawareofsubsequentMarineCorpsMRAPactions(toincludeMROCaction)despitetheirimportanceinilluminatingtheMRAPissue.
Aug15,2005 MROCDM55-2005datedAug15,2005recordedthestatusupdateoftheMRAP
UUNSfortheMROCmeetingdatedAug82005.TheMRAPupdatewasincludedintheExecutiveSummaryandtheslidepresentation(Daschemaildtd10/20/2005).TheMROCmemberswerebriefedontheHejlikUUNSinseveralvenuestoincludetheMROCitself.
Aug2005 “Inreaction,theMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)
stoppedprocessingtheUUNSforMRAP-typevehiclecapabilityinAugust2005.”(DODIG,pi)TheDODIGdidnotstatethattheMROCalsostoppedprocessingtheUUNSinAugust2005.
Aug2005 ThefirstJERRVwasfieldedinAugust2005.(DODIG,p9)
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Aug8,05 “ChairmanDOTMLPFbriefedtheMROConstatusofMRAPUUNS.MCCDCwasunabletoprovidedocumentationshowingthatafterAugust82005,DOTMLPFfulfilledactionsforprocessingUUNSasrequiredinorder3900.15a.”(DODIG,p13)ThenextMRAPeventbyanyMarineCorpsCommand,toincludetheMROC,isinninemonths(May2006)whenIMEFsubmittedaJERRVrequest.Thelackofprocessingactionsisexplainedinthisstudy.
Oct19,2005 IMEFsubmitsTechnologyprioritizedlist.ThereisnomentionofMRAP.2006Jan26,2006 USMCpublishedMARADMIN045/06,“UUNSProcess”.(DODIG,p7)This
MARADMINwasineffectfortheIMEFdeploymentduringwhich1,185MRAPswererequested.
Feb/Mar2006GaylstatesMAJGENZilmerandBGenNellerbecomeawarethatMRAP-type
vehiclesmaybeneeded.IMEF,IIMEF,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MCCDCandrestoftheMarineCorpsarenolongerworkingthe2005HejlikUUNS.
March,2006 MCCDCPersistentISRstrategydeveloped(Johnstonemaildtd7/14/2006).May2006 TheInspectorGeneraloftheMarineCorpsprovidesabsolutelynomentionof
the2005HejlikUUNSoranytypeofMRAPrequirementinitsassessmentofequipmentreadinessinIraq.GaylrecommendsthattheIGitselfmaybeworthyofinvestigation.
May17,2006 MrBlasiol(MCCDC)expeditesdraftJERRV(MRAP-typevehicle)UUNS.MCCDC
hasvisibilityandcoordinatesJERRVUUNSwithIMEFpriortosubmission.MCCDCrecommendstosubmitJERRVUUNSasaJUONS.The“attachments”referencedbelowareUUNS(notJUONS)fortheJERRVandminerollers:“AttachmentsarethetwoUUNSthathaveDCCDIvisibility.Weneedtoexpedite.AdvisefeasibilityofbriefingCDIB25May.Also,Jeff,pleaseaskBGenNellertopursueJUONS,aspreviouslydiscussed.MCWLPOCisMr.ChandlerHirsch”(Hirschemaildtd5/18/2006).MrHirschworkedatMCWLandrepresentedtheMarineCorpswithJIEDDO.ThisdemonstratedMCCDC’sleadershipinsubmittingajointrequest.
May17,2006ColOltmannotesthatMARCENThadnotyetreceivedtheJERRVUUNSwhile
MCCDCwasalreadyinaction.ColOltmannotedJIEDDOrulesetsforJUONSsubmission.“MARCENThasnotreceivedthisUUNS.MARCENTreportsthatithasnotyetbeensignedbyaGO.Theyexpectitinthecomingdaysbutasof103017Mayithasnotbeensigned.”…“RemembertheJIEDDOrulesforanyCIEDUUNSarethattheybeprocessedbytheCombatantCommanderasa
42
JUONS.JUONSaresubmittedfromtheCCtotheJSwheretheJ-8sendsittotheservicesforvalidationandcomment.”(Hirschemaildtd5/18/2006)
May18,2006CGMARCENT(LtGenSattler)endorsesMCWL(MCCDC)proposalforthecreation
andstaffingofaC-IEDCellwithinthedeployedMEFs(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006).ThesedeployedMCCDCpersonnelworkedwithGayl.
May21,2006 “OnMay21,2006,theCommandingGeneral,Multi-NationalForce-West
submittedaJointStaffRapidValidationandResourcingRequestfor185MRAPvehiclestotheJointRequirementsOversightCouncil(JROC).InJuly2006,theCommandingGeneral,Multi-NationalForce-WestsubmittedasecondJointStaffRapidValidationandResourcingRequestfor1,000MRAP-typevehiclestotheJROC.”(DODIG,p2)TheserequestswerethefirstsuchrequestsfromIMEFofanykind.TheywerenotlinkedwiththeHejlikUUNS.ThefirstrequestwasnotforMRAP(theDODIGassertionisflawed).ItwasforJERRV.
June2,2006 MajMooreprovidesslideindicating“interimvehicle”requiredaspartofthe
pathforwardforC-IEDefforts.ThisrecommendationwasprovidedtoCGMCWL.“Future–TheJointLightweightTacticalVehicle(JLTV)willbethereplacementfortheHMMWVbutisrealisticallynotexpectedtohitthefleetuntil2014.Aninterimvehicleisrequiredinthemeantime.Urgencyofaninterimvehicleiselevatedbythefactthatcome2007theUSMCwillnolongerbeabletoreplacewornoutand/ordamagedHMMWVsduetoproductionbeingdiscontinued.”(Mooreemaildtd6/2/2006)MCCDCunderstoodthatJLTVwasadistantsolutionandMRAP-typevehicleswererequired.
June6,2006 G-BOSSUUNSsubmitted(Donlanemaildtd8/23/2007).TheGBOSSUUNSwas
submittedmonthsaftertheUSMCPersistentSurveillanceStrategywaspublished.
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June12,2006LtColChillsendsbrieftoMrBlasiolconcerningavailabilityofjointfundsthroughJIEDDO(Blasiolemaildtd6/21/2006).MCCDCcontinuedtocoordinatewithjointentitiesforfunding.
June16,2006TheChiefofStaffIIMEF,ColCariker,indicatesMARCENTdoesnothave(andis
notworking)the2005HejlikMRAPUUNS.“Gents,IwillsendyouabriefonSiprthatcallforCIEDvehiclesandsomerequestedhelpfromusbyMarcent.TheyareaskingforustoseeifwecanfindanoldUUNSsignedbyGenHejliksometimeagoreferencingMineResistantAmbushProtectionVehicle(MRAP).”(Murrayemaildtd6/16/2006)
June20,2006IMEFG9indicatesthattheChiefofStaffIMEFandMNF-Wrejectsadditional
MRAPsbeyondtherequestof185JERRV.ThisemailwasnotfullyquotedinGayl’sstudy.“Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERVvehicles.Wedon'twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,let'sputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.”(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006)
June202006 MrMurraydistributesofficialmessagetrafficstatingIIMEFdesirefor1,169
MRAPsperresolved2005HejlikUUNS.“3.A.IIMEFSTRONGLYCONCURSWITHTHEIMEFFWDJUONSOF21MAY2006FOR185MMRVS,ANDTHEIMEFFWDUUNSOF17FEB2005FOR1169MRAPS.”(Murrayemaildtd6/20/2006)IIMEFstartedmentioningtheHejlikUUNSonlyafteritwasrediscovered.Priortothispoint,IIMEFhadnotsubmittedanylargerequests(>150)forMRAP-typevehicles.
June26,2006ColButter(MARCENT)resubmitsMARCENTprioritiesforC-IEDstatingthat
MARCENT’stopC-IEDpriorityis180JERRVbutthenumbershouldbemodifiedtobetween600and1100.TheMARCENTsubmissiondidnotmentionthe2005HejlikUUNSrequestfor1,169MRAP.(Butteremaildtd6/26/2006)
June27,2006ColButterconfirmsthenewUUNSfor185JERRV.ColButterstatesMARCENT
changedtheUUNStoaJUONSandsubmitted.ThereisnomentionofadditionalMRAPnumbers.(Butteremaildtd6/27/2006)
June27,2006MrDoyledistributesprioritizedlistforJIEDDOsubmissionofC-IEDrequirements.
185MRAPsisthehighestnon-trainingequipmentpriority.JIEDDOpreviouslyindicateditwouldonlysupporttrainingrequirementsdirectlyfromtheServices.1,169MRAPs(oranyclosenumber)wasnotsubmittedasarequirementbyMARCENT.(Doyleemaildtd6/27/2006)
June27,2006ColButterstatesIMEFisexpandingtheirJERRVrequirementbutIMEFhadnot
yetfinalizedtheirneed.Therequirementatthetimeremained185.“MNF-WG9isworkingontheexpandedrequirementnow.Iexpecttoseeitinlessthan
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oneweekfromtoday.I’lltrytogeta*draft*copytoday.”(Butteremaildtd6/27/2006)
June29,2006MrDoylesubmitsfinalizedlistofC-IEDpriorities.JERRVnumberremains185.
(Doyleemaildtd6/29/2006)June/July2006MARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFpriorityrankinglistshows185MMPVistop
priority.Thenumberremains185andthevehicletermusedisMMPV(notJERRVorMRAP)(Johnstonemaildtd7/31/2006).TheJuneprioritylistwasusedthroughJulytoAugustwhenanotherprioritizedlistwascompleted.Thereisnorequestfor1,169oranyactionontheHejlikUUNS.
July10,2006 First“MRAP”requestsubmittedsince2005HejlikUUNS.Thisrequestfollowed
theJERRVorMRAP-typevehiclerequest.“EnergizedbyrapidJointStaffprocessingoftheJERRVJUONS,andthesupportthatMARCENTwasofferingtheMEFthroughdirectinteractionandaccesstoCMC,IMEF(Fwd)submittedamuchlargerMRAPJUONSontheheelsofthe1stMRAPJUONS(Referencer.11.).This2ndMRAPJUONSrequestedafamilyof1,000MRAPvehicleson10Jul06.TogetherwiththeJERRVs,thecombinedtotalnowapproachedthe1,169MRAPsrequestedintheoriginal2005UUNS,intendedforSoldiers,SailorsandMarinesservingunderMNF-Wcommand.”(Gayl,p51)Gayl’s“combinedtotal”(MRAPJUONSfor1,000plusJERRVJUONSfor185)wasbuiltthroughtworequestshavingnobasisintheHejlikUUNS.Therequestednumberwouldcontinuetogrowtoovertwicethisamount.
July17,2006 MCWLjointfundingbriefprovidedtoMARCENTleadership(Bakeremaildtd
7/20/2006).MARCENTrequiredbriefingonthepotentialforjointsupport.Aug2006 LtColJankowskiindicatesseparationofUUNSandJUONSsubmissions(Skelly
emaildtd8/1/2006).JUONSsubmissionsforJune/July2006totalfourwhileUUNSremainover50(Johnstonemaildtd7/31/2006).IMEFcontinuedtobereluctantusersofthejointprocess.
Aug17,2006 IMEFG-9complainsabouttheJointequippingprocess(JUONs)asunresponsive
toMarines.“Jeff,Iamgladwespokeonthephonetonight.MyleadershipdoesnotwanttogototheJUONSprocesswithG-BOSS.Wehaveyettoreceiveanymaterialsolutionfromthatvenue,ourfirstJUONSwentin10FEB2006.DespitewhatLtColChillmentioneditismorecomplicatedandtakesmoretime,theprocessisnotstackedinourfavor.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006)DespitetheincorrectassertionsbyGayl,IMEFcontinuedtobereluctantusersofthejointprocess.
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Aug17,2006 GBOSSTechnologycoordinationrevealslackofunityandpoorequipmentcapabilityunderstandingamongstIMEF,MARCENTandMCCDC.(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006)
Aug18,2006 MCCDCofferstodraftaGBOSSJUONSforIMEF.IMEFrejects.“Ijustspokewith
GenZilmeragainonthisissue,heisnotinterestedintheJUONSprocesswithregardtoG-BOSS.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006)IMEFremainsreluctanttousejointprocesses.
Aug18,2006 IMEFG-9rejectsArmyequipmenttosatisfyGBOSSas“badtechnology
programs”.(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006)Aug18,2006 IMEFG9rejectslackofJUONSuseandstatesIMEFhassignificantJUONSinthe
system.“SomehowthisLtColChillofMCWLhasconvincedeveryonethatwearenotusingtheJUONSprocessandweneedtobeshownhow.Wecurrentlyhave14JUONSinthesystemwith3moreontheway.”(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006)IMEFstartsincreasingJUONSfrom4inJuneto14inAug.
Sept2006 Endofthe“19monthdelay”(fromFeb2005accordingtoGayl).Sept2006 FranzGayldeploystoIraq(GaylTestimony,p2).GaylparticipationinIMEF
issuescommences.Nov72006 “Thecombatdevelopmenttrackingsystem,whichcollectsinformationonthe
processingofUUNS,didnotincludeinformationontheprocessingofMRAPUUNSafterMarch22,2005,untilanITspecialistclosedtheUUNSonNov7,2006.”(DODIG,p13)TheDODIGcorrectlyreferencestheCDTS,butfailstomentionthedocumentedMROCevents.ItisclearthattheCDTSdidnotdocumenteveryeventintheprocessingoftheMRAPUUNS.
Nov16,2006 29PalmssurveillancesuiteofequipmentnearingfinalizationwellbeforeGBOSS
technologysuiteofequipmentisestablished.(Albrechtemaildtd11/16/2006)Dec142006 CongressmanTaylorbriefedonMarineCorpsneedforMRAP.(Fisheremaildtd
12/26/2006)Dec19,2006 SECNAVofficetoldthattheshifttoMRAPwasduetotheincreaseinunderbody
attacks(Fisheremaildtd12/26/2006).ThelevelofinvolvementtopurchaseMRAP-typevehicleshasrisentotheSECNAVlevel.
Dec2006 SeriesofemailsshowMarineCorpsleadershippursuingMRAPwithCongress
andSECNAVleadership.LtGenAmos,LtGenMattis,BGenKellyallvocalAdvocatesfor“MRAPnow”.LtGenAmosstatesMRAPrequirementupto3330.(Fisheremaildtd12/26/2006)
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Dec27,2006 JIEDDOwillingtobuyGBOSSbuttheyneedaJUONS(Allesemaildtd
12/27/2006).IMEFcontinuestoresistJUONSsubmission.2007Jan2007 CMCandseniorMarineGOsinformedofCongressmanTaylor(Chairmanofthe
HASC'sSubcommitteeonSeapowerandExpeditionaryForces)interestinMRAPs.MarineCorpsincreasedMRAPrequirement.(Allesemaildtd1/8/2007)
Jan2007 BGenAllesstatementtotheHASCnotingMarineCorpsMRAPrequirements.
“TheapprovedUSMCrequirementis1022withanewrequestfromtheforcecommanderinIraqformore,uptotriplethecurrentrequirement,whichtheMarineCorpsiscurrentlyvalidating.”(Beyleremaildtd1/18/2007)
Jan2007 MARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFprioritynumberoneis1,185MRAPs(Kingemaildtd
1/24/2007).Therecontinuestobenolinkto1,169.Jan2007 DraftG-BOSSJUONstaffedthroughCENTCOM.(Allesemaildtd1/25/2007)Jan7,2007 G-BOSSJUONSsubmitted(Donlanemaildtd8/23/2007).Jan16,2007 BGenBroganidentifiesMarineCorpseffortsatMCSCforJointMRAPina
statementtoHASC:“LastmonthIawardedsolesourcecontractfor200additionalvehiclestoacompanythatisalreadyinproduction.Thatisabridgetogetusintoafullandopencompetitionsothatwecanexpandtheproductionbaseandmorerapidlyputthesevehiclesinthehandsofourwarfighters.Thiseffortwillprocureandfielduptoanadditional4,060MRAPvehiclestoournation'sjointforces.”(Tomczakemaildtd1/19/2006)
Jan19,2007 UpdateonGBOSSincludesRAIDtowersandarequestfromIMEFforintegration
assistance.(Allesemaildtd1/19/2007)ThisiscontrarytotheGaylnarrative.Jan24,2007 GaylcomplimentsMCCDCGenerals“TheGeneralOfficersatMCCDCandthe
entireSYSCOMhavebeenextraordinarilysupportiveofG-BOSSandtheMEF.”(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007)
Jan26,2007 NineMRAPcontractsawarded.(Allesemaildtd1/27/2007)Jan30,2007 GBOSSJUONSsignedbyMNCI.(Jankowskiemaildtd1/30/2007)Jan31,2007 LtColJankowskidistributeserroneousinformationconcerningG-BOSSandC-
RAM.(Jankowskiemaildtd1/31/2007)
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Feb2007 “ThesystemwasnotfieldeduntilFebruary2007becausetheG-BOSScapabilityhadtobedeveloped.AsofJuly2008,theMarineCorpshadfielded120G-BOSSsintheater.”(DODIG,p9)TheDODIGdidnotdifferentiatebetweentheGBOSSelements,severalofwhichhadbeendeployedbeforethistime.
Feb8,2007 TheUnderSecretaryofDefenseAT&Lissuesmemorandumstatingheplansto
designateMRAPasACATID(highestACATlevel)oncethefullrequirementisestablished.USD(AT&L)sendsmemorandumtoServiceSecretaries(Army,Navy,AirForce),theViceChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,CommanderUSSOCOM,andhisimmediatesubordinates.HealsotaskstheNavy,asexecutiveagent,toprovideaMRAPjointacquisitionapproachby15March2007.(Allesemaildtd2/9/2007)
Feb16,2007 DeputyCommandantforProgramsandResourcesprovidesMRAPupdatebrief
indicatingJROCapprovedMRAPrequirementas6,738vehiclesatanestimatedcostof$7.04Billion.(Kingemaildtd2/18/2007)
Feb21,2007 CMC,CNOandSECNAVappearbeforeHAC-DandanswerquestionsforSenator
Levin.TheMRAPsummary:“MRAP.Thiswasatopicofdiscussioninallthreevenues,withSECNAVengagingfrequentlyontheprogrammatic,andhowhewillmakethiswork-withoutdelays.TherewassomequestioningaboutMRAPandEFPsthatCMCpuntedonduetoclassification.AlsosomediscussionabouttheArmy'sconcern(asexpressedrecentlyinanInsidetheArmyarticlethatMRAPwilladverselyimpacttheJLTV.CMCrespondedthatwenormallystayinstepwithArmywhen/wherewecan,butthathehasa"moralresponsibility"toprotectthetroopsnow.Thistranslatestoahardrequirementfor3,700MRAPsforthiswar.HefurtherexplainedthatwetooarelookingforwardtotheJTLV,butit'syearsfromnow.ThatrightnowMRAPistherequirement,andthatweareconfidentwecanbeat100%byend08.SECNAVdidgoodworkexplainingMikeBrogan'sacquisitionstrategy.”(Tomczakemaildtd2/21/2007)
Mar(approximately)2007“TothisendImadedirectcontactwithprofessionalacquaintances
intheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)toinformthemofpressingissues.ThisledtoaninvitationtomeandmembersoftheMEFstafftobrieftheDirector,DefenseResearchandEngineeringonurgentServiceandJointneedschallenges”(GaylTestimony,p5).ThiscontactwasestablishedafterGaylreturnedfromdeploymentinFeb.ThisisGayl’sfirstinvolvementandthelatenessisnoteworthy.
Mar2,2007 BGenAllesinformsLtGenAmosthatG-BOSStrainingat29Palmshasbeeninthe
workssincebeforetheG-BOSSJUONSwassubmitted.(Allesemaildtd3/2/2007)
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Mar15,2007“ACMCtestifiedyesterdayandpointedouttoCongressmanTaylorthattheMRAPisnotfundedtothelevelsweneedbyOSD.CongressnotawareMRAPnotfullyfunded.GenGardnerwillbriefTaylorinAprilonthefundingandcostofMRAP.”(Allesemaildtd3/15/2007)
Mar13,2007GaylpreparesbriefforDirectorDefenseResearchandEngineering.Thiswasthe
firstconcretebrieforpresentationbyGaylonanyaspectofMRAP.ItonlyincludedoneMRAPslideoutofthetotalofthirty-oneslides.(Gayl,p54)
Mar16,2007 LtColJankowskidemobilizes.(Jankowskiemaildtd3/13/2007)Mar25,2007 LtGenGardnergivesaccountofMRAPtestingatAberdeen.250personnel
working24/6+explodingandrepairingvendorMRAPvehicles(Allesemaildtd3/28/2007).TheMarineCorpswasfarintothedevelopmentofMRAPpriortoGaylactionswiththepressandCongress.
Mar26,2007CMCprepsforSASChearing.MRAPisoneofthreetopprioritiesforCMCto
stress.(Allesemaildtd3/27/2007)May2,2007 OnMay2,2007,theSecretaryofDefensedeclaredthattheMRAPacquisition
programwasthenumberoneacquisitionpriorityfortheDepartmentofDefense.(DODIG,p2)
May22,2007SeveralarticlesaboutMRAPdelayaregeneratedbythepress(usinginformation
providedbyGayl).May22,2007LtGenAmosinformsCMCaboutthedecisiontobuym1114s(notMRAPs)atthe
EOS:“Iwasn'thereinFeb05andneitherweremostofmyguys...butIcantellyouthatthedecisiontobuy1114'sbytheCMCwaswellthoughtoutanddiscussedthoroughlyatanEOSinmid05.”Hecontinued,“ThisUNNSwassentininFeb05...laterthatspring/summerGenHageeagreedatanEOSthathewouldreplace100%ofalltheaterMAK'dHMMWVswithwhathecalled"theGoldStandard,"...theM1114.”Hecontinued,“Welookedatthethreatin05anddeterminedthatthe1114'sweretheanswer...asthethreatratchededupin06wechangedourtackandagreedthattheMRAPswerethewaytogo.”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007)LtGenAmosconfirmsCMCactionsin2005thatendedtheurgentnatureoftheHejlikUUNS.
May22,2007ColDallas(MCCDC)indicatesactionstoaddressMRAPissue.(Tomczakemaildtd
5/23/2007)May23,2007BGenKellystatesthefocusin2005wassideattacksfromIEDs.Hecontinued,
“ByOctoberlastyeartheundercarriageattackswerereallyontherise,andthisisaboutthetimewestartedworkingtheCongressionalsidetoaskus
49
aboutMRAP,effectiveness,etc.WehavegoodrelationswiththeBidenofficeandwillbackbriefthemoncewegetthepaperfromQuantico.”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007)
May24,2007MajGenHejliksumsupaMRAPdiscussionwiththepress.“Sir--Iwasinonthe
conferencecallwithBoomer,journalistsandMCCDCMarines.v/r,Theyarestillmisrepresenting(inthisarticle)whatwassaidyesterday.Doyouwantmetofollowupwithaletter--notsosurewewillgainanymoretractionandtheyareseeingwhattheywanttosee.”(Allesemaildtd5/24/2007)
May24,2007BGenMilsteadindicatesthetermMRAPisbeingusedindifferentways.“They
arehungupontheuseofMRAPintheUUNSandareviewingitasapplestoapples.WemadeitclearyesterdaythatthedecisiontogowiththeM1114wasthebest(andfastest)COAtogetourfolksinprotectedvehicles.TherecentshifttotheMRAPweknowtodayresultedfromachangeinthethreat.Again,ourchallengeisthattheverbagedescribingMRAPintheFeb05UUNSisverysimilartowhatweusetoday.”(Allesemaildtd5/24/2007)
May24,2007BGenKellycommentsondealingwithSenatorBiden’soffice:“Onanotherissue,
Sir,wewereworkingthis05MRAPissuelateintolasteveningandwillpickitupagaintoday.Media,andinmylanemoreimportantlytheSenate,hasasenseweareeitherlying,incompetent,orboth.I'veinsulatedthebossfrommostofthis,butifwecan'tturnthecornerontheHill(particularlyinSenatorBiden'soffice)wewillhavetopleadthe6th(stupidity)andbegforgiveness.Itoldhim(CMC)lastnightthatontheseissueswemustconsiderhowourexplanationssoundstothemediaandHill,notourselves.Anexplanationthatconvincesus,mightnotmakesensetotheHillwhowantstobelieve,andcertainlymakenosenseatalltothemediathatseeminglyworkshardtoneverbelieve.”Hecontinued:“TheAPreporterbriefedyesterdaywentrighttoMr.Biden'sofficeandcounteredourexplanationandcharacterizeditasBS,but,moreimportantly,wasatoddswiththeinformationweprovidedtheHillyesterdaymorning.”(Allesemaildtd5/24/2007)Biden’sofficehadalreadyorchestratedadditionalpresscoveragebythetimeBGenKellycomposedthisemail.
May29,2007LtGenAmoscreatesresponseforSenBidenandadds“Indoingthiswewillhave
(andforthemostpartalreadyhave...butIwanttobedropdeadaccurate!!)alloftheinfoneededtocraftaresponsetoSenatorBiden;IbelievethatCD&IshoulddothatfortheCommandantandwillheadthatdirectionunlesstoldotherwise.”(Nelsonemaildtd6/1/2007)
May29,2007MarineCorpsreceivesadraftcopyoftheBidenMRAPletter.(Nelsonemaildtd
6/1/2007)Theletterwassignedon23May.
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May30,2007GayldraftDDR&Epresentationcompleted.(McCordemaildtd5/30/2007)July16,2007 “Morethan2yearslater,onJuly16,2007,theformerDeputyCommanding
GeneralissuedamemorandumtotheDirector,MarineCorpsPublicAffairs,statingthatthe2005decisiontofieldM1114up-armoredHMMWVswasthecorrectMarineCorpsdecisioninresponsetothethreatin2005.TheformerDeputyCommandingGeneraltoldtheauditteamthatheissuedthememorandumtoclarifythathisintentinsigningtheUUNSwasfortheMarineCorpstoacquireandfieldtheMRAPwithin2to5years,asstatedearlier.”(DODIG,p11)The2to5yeartimeframeisrequiredforaregularUNS(noturgent).ThisstatementiscorrectiftheHejlikUUNSwasreducedfromanUUNStoanUNS.Itwas.
2008Jan22,2008 “ThisauditwasinitiatedattherequestoftheAssistantCommandantofthe
MarineCorpsinresponsetoallegationsofmismanagementregardingtheidentificationandfulfillmentofarequirementforMRAP-typevehiclesmadeinthe“MineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicle(MRAP)GroundCombatElement(GCE)AdvocateScienceandTechnology(S&T)AdvisorCaseStudy,”January22,2008.”(DODIG,p1)TheDODIGrequestcitesGayl’sstudy.
July2008 “InJuly2008,theJointRequirementsOversightCouncilapprovedatotalDoD
requirementof15,838MRAP-typevehicles.Ofthese,2,225wereallocatedfortheMarineCorps.”(DODIG,p2)ThenumberofrequiredMRAPscontinuestogrow.
Dec8,2008 DODIGpublished“MarineCorpsImplementationoftheUrgentUniversalNeeds
ProcessforMineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicles”.(DODIG,pb6)
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4-WARTIMEMARADMINSDICTATERESPONSIBILITY
4A-COMBATDEVELOPMENT(MRAP)ORDERS,DIRECTIVESANDRESPONSIBILITIES
Overview
EveryMarineisrequiredtomemorizetheirGeneralOrdersuponentryintotheMarineCorps.GeneralOrdersoutlinethesimpleandbasicresponsibilitiesoftheMarineonguard.Theyapplytobothofficersandenlisted,andMarinesarenegligentiftheydonotfullyunderstandthem.TheconceptofunderstandingordersanddirectivesisdrilledintotheyoungMarineondayoneoftheirtimeintheMarineCorpsandiscontinuedthroughouttheircareer.ThereisnoexcuseforaMarinetonotunderstandtheirresponsibilitiesandactaccordingly.
ThereareordersanddirectivesforeverylevelofcommandintheMarineCorps.There
arealsoordersanddirectivesforcombatdevelopment.Itisclearthatagreatdealofignoranceexistsabouttheordersandresponsibilitiesofindividualsandorganizationsinthecombatdevelopmentprocess.Gayl’suseofmarginallypertinentordersreflectshisignoranceofthecombatdevelopmentprocess.ThosewhogivecredencetotheaccusationsofMCCDCnegligencehavethereforebeenmisledandremainignorantof“whowasresponsibleforwhat”intheMRAPissue.
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot(theHejlikUUNSwasnotactive),thefollowingGeneralswouldhavehadoversight/actionresponsibilitiesforMRAPdevelopmentandtheHejlikUUNSbasedonMARADMINs533/03,424/04,621/05and045/06:
• IMEF(2004-2005deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandstaff• IMEF(Fwd)(2006deployment)-MajorGeneralandstaff• IMEF(rear)(2006deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• IIMEF(Fwd)(2005-2006deployment)-MajorGeneralandStaff• IIMEF(rear2005-2006deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• MARFORPAC(providedIMEFrotationsandforcesfrom2004on)-LieutenantGeneral
andstaff• MARFORLANT(providedIIMEFrotationandforcesfrom2004on)-Lieutenant
Generalandstaff• MARCENT(2005-2006)-LieutenantGeneralCGdualhattedasMARFORPAC-
MARCENTStaff• TheAdvocates(2004-2006)-FourLieutenantGeneralsandstaffs• DC,P&R-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• DC,CDI-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• CGMCSC-BrigadierGeneralandStaff
SeveraloftheabovebilletswereoccupiedbymorethanoneGeneralduringtheindicatedtimeframe.Somebilletsweredualhatted.
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Thischapterwillprovidethecorrectorders(nottheonesthatGaylused…seeChapter
12)andhowtheydebunkmanyoftheaccusationsofnegligenceagainsttheMarineCorps.Thisdescriptionwillrendermanycriticismsirrelevant,incorrectorhypocritical.ItwillshowthatifGaylwastobebelieved,thenheandhiscommandwereasnegligent(ifnotmorenegligent)thanthoseheblames.
MarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)containsthewords“Combat
Development”.TheuneducatedmayassumethatallcombatdevelopmentisthereforeperformedbyMCCDC.Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.TheentiretyoftheMarineCorpsisresponsibleforcombatdevelopmentandvariouscommandsarechargedwithspecificresponsibilitiesneededtodelivercapability.
CombatdevelopmentordersanddirectivesareJointorServicerelated.Thischapterwill
dealwiththeServicerelatedordersanddirectives.ThejointprocesswillbeaddressedinChapter14.Itisimportanttounderstandthatthetwoprocessesarenotthesame.Theyareexecutedbydifferentorganizations.
TheordersanddirectivesthatarepertinenttoMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentare
largelycitedintheMRAPDODIG.Theordersanddirectivesafter2007willnotbecitedasthefocusofthisstudyispriorto2008(by2008theMRAPeffortwasfullyestablished).Similarly,MARADMINSwillbeconsideredfrom2003-2006.Theyinclude(frompage6and7oftheDODIG):
• MarineCorpsOrder3900.15a“MarineCorpsExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem”
(dtdNov26,2002)• MarineAdministrativeMessage(MARADMIN)533/03,“OperationIraqiFreedomIII
UUNSProcess”(dtdNov21,2003)• MARADMIN424/04,“OperationIraqiFreedomIIIUUNSProcess”(dtdSept28,2004)• MARADMIN045/06,“UUNSProcess”(dtdJan26,2006)
InadditiontothecitedordersanddirectivesintheDODIG,MARADMIN621/05,“DC,CDIReorganization”(dtdDec23,2005)providescriticalguidance.
Gayl’sPosition
Gayldidnotusepertinentordersanddirectives.Onepossibleexplanationforthislapse
isthatanybasicreadingofthepertinentordersanddirectiveswouldyielddifferentconclusionsthanthoseofGaylandhisacolytes.Apre-establishedconclusioncanonlysurviveifordersanddirectivesdonotcontaincontradictoryfacts.Gayl’sargumentsstarttocrumblewithasimplereviewofthecorrectorders.
OneoftheGayl’soft-repeatedaccusationsandrecommendationisthat:“Officialsmust
beheldaccountablefortheirpastwillfulblindnesstoknownthreatsthatcausedtragic
53
consequences.”(GaylTestimony,p15)Thesameaccountabilityforwillfulblindness(ifitoccurred)thatcausedtragicconsequencesshouldbedemandedofGayl.GaylwasamemberoftheGCEAdvocate.Thischapterwill(inpart)discusshis,andhiscommand’s,responsibilities.Ifwillfulblindnessoccurred,ashecharges,thenheshouldalsobeheldaccountable.
Gaylstates:“ThestudyusesarecentexampleofaGroundCombatElement(GCE)-
requestedcapabilitythatencounteredcombatdevelopmentchallengesinordertoilluminatesomeofthesystemicproblemsinherentandendemictotheExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem(EFDS)atMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC).”(Gayl,pvi)Gayldoesnotprovidetheordersanddirectivesrequiredtoanalyzecombatdevelopmentchallenges.Instead,hemakesunsupportedassumptionsaboutEFDS,MCCDCandcombatdevelopment.Basedontheseassumptionshethenprovidescriticism.ThischapterwillprovidekeyorderanddirectiveanalysisrequiredforsubsequentUUNSandMRAPanalysis.ThisanalysiswillfocusontheMARADMINs.
MARADMIN533/03
MARADMIN533/03wasdevelopedforthedeploymentofIMEFtoIraqin2004/2005.ThiswasthedeploymentwhereBrigadierGeneralHejlikservedastheDeputyCommandingGeneralunderthecommandofLieutenantGeneralSattler.Atthetime,IMEFwassubordinatetoMARFORPAC.MARFORPACwasdual-hattedastheServiceComponent(representative)forCENTCOM.Thepurposeof533/03wasfocusedonUrgentUNSandstated:PURPOSE.INANTICIPATIONOFMARINEFORCESDEPLOYINGTOIRAQ(OIFII)THISMARADMINPROVIDESURGENTUNSGUIDANCE.Theportionofthemessagedealingwithprocessbasicsstated:3.ACTION.OPERATINGFORCESIDENTIFYINGURGENTNEEDSFOROIFIIAREREQUIREDTOFOLLOWTHEPROCESSOUTLINEDINPARA5AND6ANDSUBMITANURGENTUNSTHROUGHTHEIRCHAINOFCOMMANDTOCG,IMEF,INITSCAPACITYASTHESUPPORTEDCOMMANDER.CG,IMEFWILLCONSOLIDATEANDPRIORITIZEALLURGENTUNS'ENSURINGTHATSIMILARUNS'(I.E.TWOMSCSREQUESTINGSAMEORSIMILARCAPABILITY)ARECONSOLIDATED.IMEFWILLPROVIDEPRIORITIZEDLISTINGOFMSCUNSINTHREECATEGORIES-CRITICAL(CAT1),ESSENTIAL(CAT2),ORIMPORTANT(CAT3)TOCOMMARFORPAC.MARFORPACSUBMISSIONOFUNS'WILLINCLUDEAMARFORCOMMANDERSTATEMENTASTOWHETHERSUPPORTEDCOMBATANTCOMMANDERCONCURSTHATTHEITEMISREQUIREDINORDERTOACCOMPLISHTHEASSIGNEDMAGTFMISSION.DC,CDWILLCONDUCTANIMMEDIATEDOTMLPFASSESSMENTANDWILLSUBSEQUENTLYSTAFFTHEUNS'TOTHEMARINEREQUIREMENTSOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL(MROC).DEADLINEFORSUBMISSIONTODEPUTYCOMMANDANTFORCOMBATDEVELOPMENT(DC,CD)IS15DEC03,HOWEVEREARLIER"BATCHED"SUBMISSIONSAREENCOURAGED.
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TheaboveparagraphstatesthatIMEFwouldsubmititsUUNStoMARFORPACwho
wouldconcurornotconcur.DC,CDIwould,uponcompletionoftheDOTMLPFassessment,staffittotheMROC.Thismessagewasintendedforpre-deploymentneedsastheduedatewas15Dec03.Thenextmessage(424/04)extendedthisprocessthroughtheentireIMEFdeployment.533/03didnotincludestaffingdetailssuchaswhowouldconducttheDOTMLPFassessmentorhowtheUNSwouldbestaffedtotheMROC.Otherdocumentswoulddoso.533/03doesincludevettingthroughMARFORPAC,aLieutenantGeneral(oneofthemostseniorGeneralswithintheMarineCorps)withaccesstotheCommandant.MARFORPACwasresponsiblefortheUNSthroughtheMROC.TheguidancegivenforthesubmissionofanUUNSwassupplementedbyguidanceforthecontentofUUNS:(2)INCLUDETHEFOLLOWINGINFORMATION:(A)DESCRIPTIONOFNEEDALONGWITHASTATEMENTTHATAGENERALOFFICERHASSIGNEDTHEUNSANDTHATITHASBEENVETTEDTHROUGHTHECHAINOFCOMMANDTOINCLUDETHEMARFOR.DESCRIBETHENATUREOFTHENEEDANDHOWITWASIDENTIFIED.NOTETHATTHEDESCRIPTIONSHOULDNOTIDENTIFYSPECIFICMATERIELSOLUTIONS,BUTRATHERTHECAPABILITYREQUIRED. ThesubmissionsofUUNSwouldthereforefocusontheneedandnotthespecificmaterialsolution.Theneedformineresistantambushprotectioncouldthereforebesatisfiedbyanumberofmaterialsolutions.Asubmissionforaspecificvehicleproducedbyaspecificcompany(MRAPbyForceProtection)wouldbeinviolationofthisMARADMIN.
MARADMIN424/04
MARADMIN424/04wastoprovideguidanceforUUNSsubmissionforthenextdeployment.ThisMARADMINappliedtothenextOIFrotationledbyIIMEF(IMEFMRAPUUNSwassubmittedinFeb05asIMEFwasrotatingoutoftheaterandIIMEFwastransitioningintotheater.)ThepurposewasverysimilartoIMEFpurpose:2.PURPOSE.INANTICIPATIONOFMARINEFORCESDEPLOYINGTOIRAQ(OIFIII)THISMARADMINPROVIDESADDITIONALURGENTUNSGUIDANCE.
TheproceduresareslightlydifferentasIIMEFhasareportingchainthroughMARFORLANT.Inaddition,MARCENTwaseventuallyputunderthecommandofadesignatedLieutenantGeneralwhoalsohadtoapproveallUUNS.424/04alsoextended533/03fortheremainderoftheIMEFdeployment.The424/04taskremainssimilartothe533/03task:3.ACTION.REFERENCE(A)REMAINSINEFFECTFORIMEFFORTHEDURATIONOFOIFII.UNITSDEPLOYEDINSUPPORTOFOEFANDHOAWILLCONTINUETOSUBMITURGENTUNSTOMARCENTFORAPPROVAL.THISMARADMINIDENTIFIESPROCEDURESFOROPERATINGFORCESDEPLOYINGIN
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SUPPORTOFIIMEFANDOIFIII.ALLUNITSINSUPPORTOFIIMEFWILLBEREQUIREDTOFOLLOWTHEPROCESSOUTLINEDINTHISMARADMINANDSUBMITURGENTUNSTHROUGHTHEIRCHAINOFCOMMANDTOCG,IIMEF.INITSCAPACITYASTHESUPPORTEDCOMMANDER,CG,IIMEFWILLCONSOLIDATEANDPRIORITIZEALLURGENTUNSENSURINGTHATSIMILARUNS(I.E.TWOMSCSREQUESTINGSAMEORSIMILARCAPABILITY)ARECONSOLIDATED.IIMEFWILLPROVIDEPRIORITIZEDLISTINGOFURGENTUNSTOMARFORLANT.MARFORLANTWILLAPPROVEANDFORWARDTOCOMUSMARCENT.MARCENTWILLCONSOLIDATEURGENTUNSFROMEACHCAMPAIGN,APPROVEANDTHENFORWARDTHEUNSTOMCCDC.DC,CDWILLCONDUCTANIMMEDIATEDOTMLPFASSESSMENTANDWILLSUBSEQUENTLYSTAFFTHEUNSTOTHEMARINEREQUIREMENTSOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL(MROC).
ThecoordinationofUUNSthroughMARCENTindicatestheauthorityofMARCENTtoconsolidateUUNSissuesintheCENTCOMAOR.MARCENTthereforeassumedresponsibilityfortheIMEFUUNSthatwereinprogress.MARFORLANTwouldapprove/tracktheUUNSforIIMEF.IIMEFwouldmaintainvisibilityoftheUUNSinprogressaswell.AnymajorUUNS(forexampleMRAPatacostof$1Bilandanequipmentchangethatwouldimpacttheentireforcedowntothesquadlevel)thattransitionedfromIMEFtoIIMEFwouldhavethetaskedsupervisionofthreeLieutenantGenerals.Failuretosupervisewouldconstitutenegligence.Inaddition,thetwoMEFcommanderscommandedthemajorityofdeployableMarineunits.
MARADMIN045/06
MARADMIN045/06“UUNSProcess”providedasubstantialincreaseinguidancefortheUUNSprocess.ThisMARADMINwasissuedinJan2006immediatelypriortoIMEF’snextdeploymenttoOIF.Themaindifferencesstartedinthepurposesection:2.PURPOSE.THISMARADMINPROMULGATESTHEPROCEDURESFORSUBMITTINGANDSTAFFINGANUUNS,ANDDEFINESTHEROLESANDRESPONSIBILITIESATEACHLEVELOFTHESTAFFINGPROCESS.WHILETHISMARADMINREFERENCESORGANIZATIONSCURRENTLYINVOLVEDINOEF,OIF,ANDHOA,THESEPROCEDURESCANBEAPPLIEDBYEVERYMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERINSUPPORTOFANYCAMPAIGNORTHEATER.
ThisMARADMINisanefforttodealwithprocessandresponsibilityidentification.TheparticularsareestablishedinthenextparagraphsstartingwiththedefinitionofanUrgentUNS:3.DEFINITION.ANUUNSISANIMMEDIATEREQUESTFROMUNITSTHATAREDEPLOYEDTOORAREAWAITINGIMMINENTDEPLOYMENTTOACOMBATTHEATER.THEUUNSISAREQUESTFORACAPABLILITYTHAT,IFNOTFILLED,PLACESTHEACCOMPLISHMENTOFTHEUNIT'SMISSIONINJEOPARDYORUNDULYINCREASESTHERISKOFCASUALTIES.
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TheresponsiblestaffsandleaderswerebeingtoldthatfailuretosatisfyanUUNSwillresultinmissionfailureorcasualtiestoincludedeaths.Processingshouldbeconductedaccordingly.ThestaffingflowcontinuestoinvolveCOMMARFORLANT/COMMARFORPAC(astheforceproviders):4.STAFFINGFLOW.MARINEEXPEDITIONARYFORCES(MEF)WILLCONSOLIDATESUPPORTINGMAJORSUBORDINATECOMMAND(MSC)REQUIREMENTSANDFORWARDTOTHECOMMANDERMARINEFORCES(COMMARFOR)(E.G.COMMARFORPAC/COMMARFORLANT)WITHANINFORMATIONCOPYTOTHEAPPROPRIATEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERFORTHETHEATER(E.G.COMUSMARCENTFOROEF,OIF,ANDHOA).THECOMMARFORWILLSTAFFANDFORWARDTHEUUNSCOMMENTSTOTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.THEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERWILLSTAFFANDFORWARDTHEUUNSTODC,CD&I,(WITHANINFOCOPYTOMCSCANDDC,P&R).DC,CD&IWILLPROCESSFORDETERMINATIONOFASOLUTION,THENFORWARDTOTHEMARINEREQUIREMENTSOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL(MROC)FORUUNSAPPROVAL.DC,P&RWILLDETERMINETHERESOURCINGSTRATEGY.
ItisimportanttonotethatforOIF,MARCENTreceivedUUNS(informationcopy)asCOMMARFORPAC/COMMARFORLANTconducttheirinitialstaffing.MARCENTthenreceivedtheUUNSofficiallyforapprovalafterCOMMARFORPAC/COMMARFORLANTapproval.ThenextsectionoftheMARADMINdescribedresponsibilitiesandactionsfortheelementswithintheUUNSprocess.ThesectionsthatarediscussedbelowarethosethatwereapplicabletoanUUNSthathadalreadybeensigned(MRAPUUNSsignedinFeb05).Thissectionalsocoversthoseunitsthatneededpreviouslyrequestedequipmentwithoutwhichmissionaccomplishmentwouldhavebeenjeopardizedorcasualtieswouldhaveoccurred(e.g.thoseunitsthatassumeamajorcapabilitywasbeingprocessedontheirbehalf).5.RESPONSIBILITIESANDACTIONS.A.MARINEEXPEDITIONARYFORCES(1)GATHERANDCOLLATEMSCREQUIREMENTS,INCLUDINGMARINEEXPEDITIONARYUNITS(MEU)IFTHEFORCESARESCHEDULEDTOSUPPORTTHEMEF.THEUUNSMUSTACCOUNTFORALLUNITSTHATWILLBEINSUPPORTOFTHEMEFDURINGDEPLOYMENTTOTHEATER,TOINCLUDESMCRUNITS.
ThegatheringandcollatingrequirementstaskabovepertainstotheIMEFdeploymentthatfollowed(2monthslater).TheMEFwasalsotaskedtoprovideaprioritizedlistofUUNSyettobefielded:(3)ONAMONTHLYBASIS,PROVIDEAPRIORITIZEDLISTOFTHOSEUUNSYETTOBEFIELDEDTOTHEAPPLICABLECOMMARFORANDTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.Forexample,taskA3requiresthathadtherebeenanunfilledIMEFUUNSforMRAP,IMEF
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wastaskedtolistitmonthly.ItwouldbereasonabletothinkMRAPwouldhavebeenlocatedatornearthetopofthelistasitwouldhavebeenanimportantUUNS.TheCOMMARFOR(forceprovider)wastaskedsimilarly.B.COMMANDERMARINEFORCES(3)FORWARDTHEUUNSTOTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.PROVIDEACOPYOFTHEUUNSWITHAGENERALOFFICER'SSIGNATURE(SEENOTE1).CONCURRENTLYSENDACOPYTOANYOTHERCOMMARFORSTHATAREALSODEPLOYEDTOTHEAORORPREPARINGTODEPLOYTOTHEAORTOASCERTAINIFTHEUUNSISALSOREQUIREDTOSUPPORTTHEIRFORCES.(4)FORWARDAPRIORITIZEDLISTWITHRECOMMENDATIONSTOTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.FORCOMMARFORPAC,CONSOLIDATEIANDIIIMEFPRIORITIZEDLISTSINTOASINGLEPRIORITIZEDLISTFORFORWARDINGTOTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.(5)ONAMONTHLYBASIS,PROVIDEAPRIORITIZEDLISTOFALLUUNSNOTYETFIELDEDTOTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.
COMMARFORPACandCOMMARFORLANTwerealreadyconductingthecoordinationthatistaskedinparagraphB3above.MARADMIN045/06formalizedthecoordination.TheMarineCorpsrotationplanensuredbothMARFORsprovidedsubordinateforcestoeachOIFrotationwhilealternatingMEFcommandelements.TheCOMMARFORswerealsotaskedwithprovidingaprioritizedlisttoMARCENT(thecomponentcommanderforCENTCOM).Again,perthistasking,anyUUNSfor1169MRAPsthatwasunfilledwouldbelistedontheMARFORPACand/orMARFORLANTlists.ThesupportedMarineComponentCommander(MARCENT)alsohadUUNSresponsibilities.MosthavebeenaddressedbutparagraphC7(taskforMARCENT)echoestheresponsibilitiesofMEFsandotherMARFORs.
C.SUPPORTEDMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER(7)ONAMONTHLYBASIS,PROVIDEAPRIORITIZEDLISTOFALLSUBMITTEDUUNSNOTYETFIELDEDTODC,CD&I.THISPRIORITIZEDLISTINCLUDESUUNSFROMFORCESASSIGNEDTOTHESUPPORTEDMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER,ASWELLASUUNSFROMFORCESPREPARINGTOBEASSIGNEDTOTHESUPPORTEDMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER'SAOR.
Insum,threeorganizationscommandedbytwoLieutenantGeneralsandoneMajorGeneralweretaskedwithidentifyingthoseUUNSnotyetfielded.TwooftheseofficersanswereddirectlytotheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.Afourthcommand,MARCENT,wouldconsolidatethelistsandprovidethefinalprioritizedlistforthemonthtoDC,CDI(akaMCCDCorQuantico).Thislist,createdbyorder,wasatrackingdocumentfromOIFforces.AnunfilledUUNSfor1169MRAPswouldhavebeenat/nearthetopofalloftheprioritieslists.TheselistswerenotcreatedorshapedorapprovedbyMCCDC.Byorder,DC,CDI(MCCDC)receivedthelistsinordertoactiononthem.DC,CDIalsohadothertasks.D.DEPUTYCOMMANDANTFORCOMBATDEVELOPMENT&INTEGRATION(DC,
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CD&I)(1)PROCESSALLUUNSRECEIVEDFROMTHESUPPORTEDMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDER.(2)ENTERTHEUUNSINTOTHECOMBATDEVELOPMENTTRACKINGSYSTEMFORPROCESSING.(3)ENSUREALLAPPLICABLEAGENCIESHAVERECEIVEDACOPYOFTHEUUNS.(4)ASSIGNANINTEGRATIONDIVISIONWITHINCDDASTHELEADFORTHEDOTMLPFASSESSMENTANDSOLUTIONIDENTIFICATION.(5)ENSUREEACHUUNSISBRIEFEDTOTHECAPABILITIESDEVELOPMENTBOARD(CDB).(6)PREPAREANDBRIEFTHEUUNSFORMROCAPPROVAL.(7)INTFSMS,ASSIGNATAMCNTOMROCAPPROVEDUUNSEQUIPMENTITEMSTHATDONOTHAVEANEXISTINGTAMCNANDDESIGNATETHETAMCNASANUUNSINTHEAPPROPRIATEDATAFIELD.(8)INTFSMS,ASSIGNTHEITEMEXITDATEFOR18MONTHSFROMTHETIMEOFTAMCNCREATION.(9)ASSESSTHEUUNSFORDEVELOPMENTASAFUTUREPROGRAMOFRECORD(POR).BRIEFPORRECOMMENDATIONSTOTHEMROCWITHINTHREETOSIXMONTHSOFEQUIPMENTBEINGFIELDEDTOTHEWARFIGHTER.(10)PROVIDEUPDATESTOALLAPPLICABLEAGENCIESVIATHEUUNSTRACKINGSHEETONCDTS.(11)INTFSMS,ANNOTATEALLPROJECTEDREQUIREMENTS(BYTHEANTICIPATEDDEPLOYEDUIC)ASUNFUNDED.(12)ADJUDICATETHEPRIORITYFORFIELDINGBETWEENMULTIPLE,ON-GOINGUUNSDELIVERIES.
ThelistoftasksforDC,CDIispresentedinfull.SeveralorganizationshadchangednamesandresponsibilitiesbetweenthesubmissionoftheMRAPUUNS(Feb05)andtheissuanceofthisMARADMIN(Jan06)butresponsibilitiesremainedsimilar.OfnoteisthatMCCDCdoesnothavethetasktooriginateUUNS.ThistaskisspecificallygiventoIMEFandIIMEF.TheDC,CDIwouldalsodevelopsub-proceduresinordertoaccomplishhistasksinthisMARADMIN.MarineCorpsSystemsCommand(MCSC)wasalsotaskedforUUNS:E.MARINECORPSSYSTEMSCOMMAND(MCSC)(1)ASSESSTHEABILITYTOPROVIDEAMATERIELSOLUTION,ACCOUNTINGFORPRODUCTIONTIMES,DELIVERYESTIMATES,TRAININGSUPPORT,ANDMAINTAINABILITYFOREACHUUNS.(2)PROVIDEPRODUCTIONANDDELIVERYESTIMATES,COSTINGINFORMATION,ANDSUPPORTABILITYANDMAINTAINABILITYESTIMATESTOTHEAPPROPRIATECDDINTEGRATIONDIVISION.(3)TRACKDELIVERIESOFMATERIELTOTHEWARFIGHTER,PERTHEFIELDINGPLAN,ANDPROVIDEUPDATESTODC,CD&IANDDC,P&R.(4)REPORTBELOWTHRESHOLDREPROGRAMMING(BTR)ALTERNATIVES
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WHENREQUESTEDBYDC,P&R.(5)WHENTAMCNHASBEENCREATED,SUBMITACATALOGACTIONREQUEST(CAR)TOMCLCVIATFSMS.(6)INTFSMS,ANNOTATETHEPLANNEDPROCUREMENTQUANTITIESANDALLIDENTIFIABLECOSTINFORMATIONFIELDS.
MCSCalsohadnoauthoritytoinitiateUUNS,andtheirprocurementprocessisgovernedbylaw.Theirjobintheprocesswastoprovidethecapabilitythatwasrequestedbythewarfighter.TheyhadflexibilitytoactwithintheboundsofanUUNS/UNStoselectamaterialsolution(incoordinationwithMCCDCandthewarfighter).ProcurementlawisverystrictandestablishedbyCongress.Theneedisdevelopedbythewarfightingcommands.Nevertheless,theprocurementaspectofcombatdevelopmentisacriticalelementforanyrequest,thereforetheCGMCSCisprovidedanearlycopyoftherequestfromthecomponentcommander(inthiscaseMARCENT).TherankoftheCGMCSCfortheMRAPrequestwasaBrigadierGeneralselect(andeventuallypromoted).ThisofficeralsoreportstotheSecretaryoftheNavyanditwouldbedifficulttoimagine,inthecourseofhisduties,thathewouldnotalerttheSecretaryoftheNavyaboutapotentialpurchaseofonebilliondollarsforMRAPs.TheprocurementisfundedthroughtheDeputyCommandant,Programs&Resources(theheadfinanceofficerintheMarineCorps).Hewastaskedasfollows.F.DEPUTYCOMMANDANT,PROGRAMS&RESOURCES(DC,P&R)(1)DETERMINETHEAPPROPRIATEFUNDINGSTRATEGYFOREACHUUNS.(2)ENSURETHATFUNDINGRESOURCESAREALLOCATEDTOEACHUUNS.
Inadditiontothetwotasksinparagraph5f,theDC,P&RisprovidedacopyoftheUUNSfromMARCENTasfinancialplanningfornewneedsmustbeaccomplished.Onceagain,apurchaseof1169MRAPsforanestimatedcostofapproximatelyonebilliondollarsisamajoreventfortheMarineCorps’headfinancialofficerandwouldbetrackedaccordingly.TheDC,P&RalsoanswersdirectlytotheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsandisaLieutenantGeneral.
Inadditiontothespecificdelineationofresponsibilities,thisMARADMINalsoprovidedprocessrules.6.BUSINESSRULESFORUUNSMANAGEMENTB.UUNSPRESENTEDTOTHEMROCWILLBEREPRESENTEDASMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERWARFIGHTINGREQUIREMENTS,VICEMEFORMSCREQUIREMENTS.
Paragraph6BestablishesUUNSrequirementsascomponentrequirements,notMCCDCrequirements.Thecomponentcouldthereforechange,adjustorwithdrawtheirrequirement.
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MARFORPACwasthecomponentcommanderfortheMRAPUUNS.Paragraph6DestablishesthetimingandauthoritytopresenttotheMROC:D.UUNSWILLBEPRESENTEDTOTHEMROCASSOONASTHEURGENTWARFIGHTINGNEEDHASBEENAPPROVEDBYTHEMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERANDDC,CD&I,ANDWHENREQUIRED,AMATERIELSOLUTIONHASBEENIDENTIFIEDBYMCSC.
Paragraph6Dcontinuestoshowtheresponsibilityofthecomponentcommander(inadditiontoDC,CDI).
TheMARADMINsforUUNSprocessingincreaseindetailthrough2006.ManyoftheseprocesseswereinplacebutnotarticulatedinaMARADMINuntil2006.The2006MARADMINwasissuedafterthe2005MRAPUUNSbutsectionswouldstillbeapplicableforexisting(alreadysubmitted)UUNS.BasedonMARADMINs,thefollowingGeneralswouldhavehadoversight/actionresponsibilitiesfortheHejlikUUNS(ifitwasactive):
• IMEF(2004-2005deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandstaff• IMEF(Fwd)(2006deployment)-MajorGeneralandstaff• IMEF(rear)(2006deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• IIMEF(Fwd)(2005-2006deployment)-MajorGeneralandStaff• IIMEF(rear2005-2006deployment)-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• MARFORPAC(providedIMEFrotationsandforcesfrom2004on)-LieutenantGeneral
andstaff• MARFORLANT(providedIIMEFrotationandforcesfrom2004on)-LieutenantGeneral
andstaff• MARCENT(2005-2006)-LieutenantGeneralCGdualhattedasMARFORPAC-MARCENT
Staff• TheAdvocates(2004-2006)FourLieutenantGeneralsandStaffs• DC,P&R-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• DC,CDI-LieutenantGeneralandStaff• CGMCSC-BrigadierGeneralandStaff
TheaboveLtGensandMajGenshadflagofficersasdeputies.EveryGeneralandstaff
hadaresponsibility(byMARADMIN)forthe2005UUNS.Responsibilitiesincludedataminimumtrackingandplanning.Theoperationalcommands“owned”theUUNS(MARFORPAC/MARFORLANT/MARCENT/IMEF/IIMEF).ThesizeoftheHejlikUUNSandtheimpactacrossthevariouselementsoftheMarineCorpswereunderstoodandsignificant.EveryLieutenantGeneralhaddirectaccesstotheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.ThedeployedGeneralshadaccesstotheCommandant.ThosewhohadUUNSresponsibilitiespertheMARADMINunderstoodthegravityoftherequest,andyetcredibilityisgiventotheideathatabureaucratinMCCDCcoulddecidethefateofthisUUNS.
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Inaddition,GaylpointsthefingeratMCCDCforignoring“commonsenseCOINrequirements”.“Itisworthrepeatingaparagraphfromearlierinthecasestudy.Again,thereasonthattheMRAPprogramhasgrowninscopeisbecauseMCCDCignoredcommonsenseCOINrequirements,aswellasthegrowingIEDemergencyinMNF-W.TheCOINcapabilitiesthatmighthavepreventedtheemergenceofasignificantIEDthreatinthefirstplacehadnotbeenprovidedbyMCCDCcombatdevelopers.TheseincludedISR,armedISR,NLW,IO-supportivecommunicationsequipment,real-timelanguagetranslation,andothertools.”(Gayl,p86)CommonsenseCOINrequirementscouldhavebeensubmittedbyanyoneoftheoperationalcommanderslistedabove.
Thereare,however,otherauthoritativedocuments(andorganizations)thatpertaintoMRAP.MARADMIN621/05isoneofthem.
MARADMIN621/05
MARADMIN621/05DC,CDIReorganization,waspublishedinDecemberof2005(after
the2005MRAPUUNSbutbeforethe2006deploymentofIMEFandtheirMay2006JUONSfor185MRAP-typevehicles).1.SITUATION.A.PURPOSE.PERCMCINTENTANDREF(A),DEPUTYCOMMANDANTFORCOMBATDEVELOPMENTANDINTEGRATION(DC,CD&I)ASSUMESTHERESPONSIBILITYASTHEMAGTFINTEGRATOR.REF(A)ISTHEMARINEREQUIREMENTOVERSIGHTCOUNCIL(MROC)DECISIONMEMORANDUMAPPROVINGDC,CD&ITOREORGANIZEIOTSUPPORTMAGTFINTEGRATIONOFUSMCWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITIESDEVELOPMENT.
Gaylstates:“TheMRAPcasesstudyhasdemonstratedthatMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentorganizationsarenotoptimizedtoprovideresponsive,flexible,andrelevantsolutionstocommandersinthefield.”(Gayl,pxv)AccordingtoGaylthislackofoptimizationwouldincludehimselfasamemberoftheGCEAdvocateStaff.621/05reorganizesMCCDCbutitalsolistsresponsibilitiesandthemannerinwhichMCCDCwouldinteractwithothercombatdevelopmentorganizationstoincludetheAdvocates.ThisDC,CDIreorganizationimpactedAdvocateresponsibilitiesaswellastheresponsibilitiesofsubordinateMCCDCorganizationssuchasMCWL.
CGMCWLorganizationwasasfollows:
(C)CGMARINECORPSWARFIGHTINGLAB(MCWL)/HQSTAFFSUPPORTEDBYEIGHTDIVISIONS.MCWLRETAINEDALLPREVIOUSRESPONSIBILITIESANDGAINEDTHERESPONSIBILITYTODEVELOPUSMCCONCEPTS/CONOPSANDIDENTIFYUSMCCAPABILITIESTOSUPPORTTHECBPPROCESSFORCOMBATDEVELOPMENTACTIVITIES.NOTE:THEFIRSTTHREE
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DIVISIONSBELOWWEREFORMEREFDCDIVISIONS.1CONCEPTSANDPLANS2JOINTCONCEPTDEVELOPMENTANDEXPERIMENTATION(JCDE)3CENTERFOREMERGINGTHREATSANDOPPORTUNITIES(CETO)4OPERATIONS&CIED5EXPERIMENTATION6TECHNOLOGY7SEAVIKING8WARGAMING.
BetweendeploymentsthisauthorwastheDivisionHeadforOperationsandCIED(line4above).
TheCapabilitiesDevelopmentDirectorate(CDD)includedtheMAGTFIntegration
Directorate(MID)whichwastaskedtoconduct“integrationmeetings”calledCapabilityDevelopmentBoards(CDB)(eventuallyaddingIntegrationtobecometheCDIB).TheCDBwasthefollow-ontotheDOTMLPFWorkingGroup(DWG)andwasdesignedtoinvolveallDeputyCommandantsinthecapabilitydevelopmentprocess.2.CONCEPTOFOPERATIONS.WITHINCDD,THEMIDWILLDRIVETHESYNCHRONIZATIONOFCOMBATDEVELOPMENTACTIVITIESTHROUGHTHESIXINTEGRATIONDIVISIONS,ANDTFSD.EACHDIVISIONWILLSERVEASAFUSIONCENTERFORINTERNALANDEXTERNALINTEGRATIONACROSSTHEPLANNINGSTAFFSOFTHEDEPUTYCOMMANDANTS,MARFORS,ANDSE.THEMIDWILLCONVENEACAPABILITIESDEVELOPMENTBOARD(CDB)ONAROUTINEBASISCONSISTINGOF0-6LEVELDECISIONAUTHORITYFROMTHEPLANNINGSTAFFSMENTIONEDABOVE(INPERSONORTHROUGHVTC)TOENSURETHATMAGTFINTEGRATIONISACHIEVED.THEREVISEDCOMBATDEVELOPMENTPROCESSENCOMPASSESTHREECRITICALDECISIONPOINTSINTHEFORMOFMROCS.MROCSWILLBETHEFORUMFOROBTAININGSENIORLEVELLEADERSHIPGUIDANCEANDAPPROVALASITAPPLIESTOPRIORITIZATIONOFDESIREDWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITIESANDIDENTIFICATIONOFREQUIREMENTSOLUTIONS.
Inadditiontotheirregularduties,fourDeputyCommandantsweregivenadditionalguidanceasAdvocates.TheAdvocateresponsibilityisveryimportanttounderstandinthecontextofcombatdevelopmentandtheMRAP,andwillbeaddressedlaterinChapter5.TheMARFORCommandersandotherSupportingEstablishmentCommandersalsohadresponsibilitiesforcombatdevelopment.B.REQUESTMARFORANDSUPPORTINGESTABLISMENT(SE)COMMANDERS.(1)PROVIDESUBJECTMATTEREXPERTISEASREQUIREDTOCONDUCTMAGTFINTEGRATEDCOMBATDEVELOPMENTACTIVITIESWITHINTHEINTEGRATIONDIVISIONSOFCDD.
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(2)DEVELOPUNSFORALLIDENTIFIEDCAPABILITYGAPSINSUPPORTOFCOMBATANTCOMMANDERINTEGRATEDPRIORITYLIST(IPL).(3)(MARFORS)SUBMITUNSINSUPPORTOFFORCESASSIGNEDFOROPERATIONSANDCONTINGENCIES.(4)PROVIDE0-6LEVELREPRESENTATIONATTHECDBTOENSUREMAGTFINTEGRATIONANDSUPPORTDEVELOPMENTOFTHEPRIORITIZEDMAGTFCAPABILITIESLIST(MCL)ANDMAGTFREQUIREMENTSLIST(MRL).
MARFORandSECommandersweretoprovideSubjectMatterExperts/Expertise(SME)totheintegrationdivisions.TheseSMEshadtheopportunitytoelevateissuestothevariouselementsofCDD.MARFORsalsohadtheresponsibilitytodevelopandsubmitUUNS.Thespecifictaskto“developUNS”meansthatsomelevelofanalysisisrequired.MARFORs,withspecificgeographicfocus,wouldanalyzetheirAORs,coordinatewiththeirforces,andsubmittheirneeds.Theywereinthebestpositionto“geographicallylookforward”astheywere,andare,theexpertsfortheirAOR.IncomparisontoQuantico,theyhadsuperiorknowledgeabouttheirAORasQuantico/MCCDChad/hasaworld-widefocus.Finally,theMARFORsweretaskedwithprovidingrepresentationtotheCDB.TheserepresentativescouldbringupanyissuesofconcernduringtheregularscheduledCDBmeetings.ThetaskinB4actuallydirectsthattheydoso.InadditiontotheMARFORs,SupportingEstablishment(SE)Commandershadthesametasks(exceptforUUNSsubmission).Insum,allmajorMarineCorpsCommandshadresponsibilitiestoconductcombatdevelopment.
TheHejlikUUNShadalreadybeensubmittedwhen621/05wasissued.Supporttasks
requiredduringtheprocessingoftheHejlikUUNS,however,remainedtaskedtotheMARFORsandtheremainderoftheappropriatesupportingestablishmentCommanders(e.g.-TrainingCommandwouldconcernthemselveswithdrivertrainingfortheMRAPfleet).Thefinaltasksinthe621/05wereforP&RandMCSC:C.REQUESTDC,P&RPROVIDEANALYTICALSUPPORTTOTHEDC,CD&ITOENSUREAFISCALLYINFORMEDMCLANDMRL.D.REQUESTCG,MCSCPROVIDEPROGRAMMANAGERANDACQUISITIONEXPERTISETODC,CD&ITOFACILITATETHEANALYSISOFDESIREDCAPABILITIESWITHEXISTING/FUTURESYSTEMSCAPABILITIES.
Bothweretoprovideanalyticsupport.TheyarenotspecificallytaskedtotrackorAdvocatebutitishardtoimagineeithercommandneglectingaplannedbilliondollarprogram.OnewouldthinkthatanactiveMRAPUUNSwouldhavepromptedsomediscussion.IftheUUNSremainedactive,P&RandMCSCwouldhavecontinuedafullefforttoprovideaMRAPfleet.Theydidnot(astheMRAPUUNSwasconcluded).
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5-THEADVOCATE(GAYL’SCOMMAND)ORDERSANDRESPONSIBILITIES
ThischapterdescribessignificantMarineCorpsAdvocateordersandresponsibilities.
TheAdvocatesarenotlawyers,buttheydorepresenttheirconstituencyinthecombatdevelopmentprocesses.Theyalsohaveuniquecombatdevelopmentabilitiesoftheirown.CMCPolicyMemorandum1-02establishedtheAdvocatesin2002.TheseAdvocateassignmentsremainedineffectthrough2008whentherewereseveralminorresponsibilityadjustmentsbutthemainelementsremainedthesame.GaylwasontheGCEAdvocatestaffandtheseordersandresponsibilitiesapplytohimalso.
Gaylstates,“Intheend,neithertheIMEF(Fwd)HQ,theIIMEF(Fwd)HQ,noranyof
thetacticalcommanderslosingincreasingnumbersofMarinestoIEDsinMNFWhadavoteontheMRAPUUNS.Lackingprocesstransparencyalsocausedadelayingeneraloperatorawarenessofnon-fulfillment.”(Gayl,p28)ThissectionwillshowthattheAdvocateisresponsibletorepresentIMEF,IIMEFandalloftheGCEtacticalcommandersinprocessingandvotingontheMRAPUUNS.ThissectionwillalsoshowtheAdvocateresponsibilitiesforprocessingandtransparencyonbehalfoftheoperatingforces.CombinedwithChapter4,AdvocateresponsibilitiescanbeseenasmoreimportantthananyothercombatdevelopmentorganizationforGCEcapabilitydevelopment.
CMCPolicyMemorandum1-02
InadditiontotheresponsibilityastheMarineCorp’sOperationsDeputy,PP&OisalsotheAdvocatefortheMarineCorpsGroundCombatElement(GCE).Thecommand,airandlogisticselementsallhaveseparateAdvocates.AsdesignatedinCMCPolicyMemorandum1-02,AdvocatesaremembersoftheMROCandhavethespecificMROCresponsibilitydescribedbelow:
PP&OastheGCEAdvocate(toincludeGayl)haddefinedresponsibilitiesforUNS/UUNSandMRAPcombatdevelopment.TheGCEAdvocatewasresponsibleforsupervisingtheHejlikUUNS.IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,theAdvocatewasnegligentinsupervisingtheHejlikUUNS.Inaddition,theGCEAdvocate/GayldidnotidentifytheneedforMRAP(alongwiththerestoftheMarineCorps)despiteitsprimaryroleinGCEcombatdevelopment.
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TheMROCnotonlyprovidesaMRAPvenue,itprovidesthesenior-mostvenueofany
decisionmakingbodyintheMarineCorpsthatdoesnotinvolvetheCommandant.Thereisnosubject,policy,pieceofequipmentorpersonnelissuedealingwithcombatdevelopmentthattheAdvocatemaynotraiseattheMROC.TheAdvocatesreportdirectlytotheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.IfnotsatisfiedattheMROC,theAdvocatemayraisetheissuedirectlywiththeCommandantoftheMarineCorps.
PP&OservesastheMarineCorps’HeadquartersOperationsDepartment.PP&Oworks
directlyfortheMarineCorp’sServiceChief,theCommandantoftheMarineCorps.ThePP&Omissionistwofold;theyactastheMarineOperationsDeputyandinteractwiththeotherServices,COCOMsandJointStaff.Theyarealsotaskedwiththedevelopmentof“serviceplansandpoliciesrelatedtothestructure,deployment,andemploymentofMarineCorpsforcesingeneral”(HQMC,p1).ThiscurrentresponsibilityisconsistentwiththeresponsibilitiesofPP&Osince2001.PP&OisaseniordecisionmakerintheCorps,sitsontheseniordecisionmakingbodyintheCorps,andhasdailyinteractionwithCMC.IftherewasanissuewiththeHejlikUUNS,PP&OwastaskedwithrepresentingtheGCEforissueresolution.
TheAdvocateinMARADMIN621/05
Aspreviouslydiscussed,theMROCtaskedDC,CDItoreorganizeandtheDC,CDIsubsequentlyissuedcombatdevelopmentguidance.ThatguidanceincludedguidancefortheAdvocates:3.TASKS.A.REQUESTDEPUTYCOMMANDANTS(M&RA;AVN;PP&O;I&L).
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(1)PUBLISHCAMPAIGNPLANS.(2)PUBLISHCAPABILITYLISTSUSEDTODETERMINECAPABILITYGAPS,SHORTFALLS,ANDEXCESSES.(3)PUBLISHREQUIREMENTSLISTSUSEDTOIDENTIFYDOTMLPFRELATEDISSUESSUCHASMATERIEL/NON-MATERIELSOLUTIONS,SUSTAINABILITY,SUPPORTABILITY,SCHEDULEDDELIVERY,ANDAFFORDABILITYOPTIONS.(4)IDENTIFYANDPUBLISHPOINTSOFCONTACTATTHEDEPARTMENTLEVELANDSUBJECTMATTEREXPERTPOINTSOFCONTACTACROSSWARFIGHTINGFUNCTIONSTOCONDUCTMAGTFINTEGRATEDCOMBATDEVELOPMENTACTIVITIESWITHINTHEINTEGRATIONDIVISIONSOFCDD.(5)DEVELOPUNIVERSALNEEDSTATEMENTS(UNS)FORALLCAPABILITYGAPSPERTAININGTODEPUTYCOMMANDANT/PROPONENTFUNCTIONALAREA.(6)PROVIDE0-6REPRESENTATIONATTHECDBTOENSUREMAGTFINTEGRATIONANDSUPPORTDEVELOPMENTOFTHEPRIORITIZEDMAGTFCAPABILITIESLIST(MCL)ANDMAGTFREQUIREMENTSLIST(MRL).
Task(1)istopublishacampaignplan.ThePP&Ocampaignplan(thecampaignplanissuedimmediatelypriortothe2005MRAPUUNS)willbediscussedbelow.TheAdvocate,inconjunctionwiththeircampaignplan,wouldpublishcapabilitylistsandrequirementslists.OnewouldexpectMRAPtobefeaturedinboththecampaignplanandassociatedcapabilitylistastheAdvocateisresponsibleforplanningforthefuture.Itwasnot.
UUNSthatarenotfulfilledwouldremainascapabilitygaps(thereforeremaininginthe
requirementslist).ItwouldalsobethetaskoftheAdvocatetodevelopUNSforthosecapabilitygaps.Forexample,aneedforMRAPsistheresponsibilityoftheGCEAdvocate(PP&O)whoshouldthereforesubmitanUNSforMRAPstoDC,CDI(QuanticoorMCCDC).TheAdvocateresponsibilityistobothanalyzetodetermineneed,andtosubmitthepaperworkforthatneed.Finally,theAdvocateprovidesrepresentationtotheCDBtoensureintegrationandsupportfortheirissues/UNS/UUNS.
TheAdvocateisspecificallytaskedinparagraph3.a.2to“publishcapabilitylistsusedto
determinecapabilitygaps,shortfalls,andexcesses”.TheDCPP&OwasthereforetaskedwithestablishingcapabilitygapsastheyappliedtotheGCEandpublishingthem.TheDCPP&OdidnotestablishaGCEcapabilitygapforMRAPsuntilanUUNSwassubmittedbytheoperatingforces(UUNSactionswillbediscussedinChapter6).ThiswasclearlyataskfortheDCPP&O,andhisstaff.CombatdevelopersatPP&OdidnotdeveloptheneedforMRAPs.
Gayl’sPositioninPP&O
PP&Owas(andis)theGroundCombatElementAdvocate.ThetasksforPP&Opersonnel
overlapthetasksfortheGCEAdvocateandviceversa.TheauthorityGaylusesonhiscoverpagedescendsfromPP&OinHeadquartersMarineCorps,tothePlansDivision(oneofthree
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divisions)tohisspecificbranchwhichwastheInformationOperationsandSpaceIntegrationBranch(PLI).PLIwasthebranchwheretheScienceandTechnology(S&T)AdvisorworkedbuttheS&TAdvisorwasnotlimitedtoinformationoperationsorspaceintegration(ascanbeseenbythecasestudyonMRAPs).
(Gayl,Coverpage)
Gayl,onthecoverpageofhisMRAPanalysis,termshimselfthe“GroundCombatElement(GCE)AdvocateScienceandTechnology(S&T)Advisor”.Thispositionprovidesthe“authority”toconductthecasestudy.GaylispartoftheAdvocateStaffandtheAdvocatetasksthereforealsopertaintohim,especiallyastheS&TAdvisor.GaylreportedtoPP&Oin2002.
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Gaylcorrectlydescribeshispositiononpage1ofhisstudy.“Theperspectivessharedherearethoseoftheauthor,theScienceandTechnology(S&T)advisortotheDeputyCommandant,Plans,Policies,Operations(DC,PP&O)andGCEAdvocate.TheauthorofthiscasestudyalsoservedastheScienceAdvisortotheCommandingGeneral(CG)MultiNationalForces,West(MNF-W)duringmanyoftheeventsdescribedherein.”(Gayl,p1)AstheScienceandTechnologyAdvisor,GaylistaskedwithanalyzingtechnologiesthatmaysupportthewarfightingtasksoftheGCE.GaylistherepresentativeoftheAdvocateforthesetechnologies,toincludeMRAP.
“AsnotedearlierforMRAP,ahandfulofUSMCAdvocatesknewfromhistorythatmineswouldbecomeanever-moreattractiveinsurgentweapon.Unfortunately,theirrepeatedargumentsbegunin1996didnotswayUSMCdevelopers,toconsiderevenalimitedpurchaseofMRAPsforPrepositionedWarReserve(PWR)ordepotstoragetohedgeagainstuncertainties.”(Gayl,p86).The“handfulofUSMCAdvocates”(notthesameasUSMCAdvocates)didnothavetheassignedresponsibilitiesoftheofficialUSMCAdvocatesandtheofficialAdvocateStaff(Gayl).Inthisstatement,Gaylisoneofthe“USMCdevelopers”.
LtGenHuly(GCEAdvocate)CampaignPlan
“2MCCDCignoresrequirementfordevelopmentalleadtime:aWhenthreatsbegintoemergeonthebattlefield,itisincumbentuponanewUUNSprocessthatMCCDCnotfocussingle-mindedlyonfuturewheeledvehiclerequirementswithalong-term,multi-yeartimehorizon.”(Gayl,p74)MCCDCplansfortheleadtimeoncetheCorpsdecidesanewcapabilityisrequired.Theplanning,however,mustoccurbyallresponsibleparties.TheAdvocateistaskedwithlookingforwardina“multi-yeartimehorizon”.
TheAdvocatecampaignplanpublishedin2004byLtGenHulyfurtherdescribestheGCEAdvocateresponsibility.
(Huly,p2)
TheUSMCAdvocateresponsibilityisverysimilartocivilianAdvocates(lawyers).TheCommandantalsoestablishedaboardforeachelementundertheguidanceoftheAdvocate.TheGCEboardisdescribedbyLtGenHuly:
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(Huly,p3)
LtGenHulycorrectlyidentifiesGCEleaders’rolesin“issueidentificationanddevelopment”.DC,CDIisnotinchargeoftheGroundBoard,noristheGroundBoardpresidedoverbytheMCCDCstaff.TheseresponsibilitiesremainwiththeGCEAdvocate.LtGenHulyfurtherdescribeshisresponsibilities:
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(Huly,p3-4)
TheDeputyCommandantPP&OarticulateshisresponsibilitywithregardstoGCErequirementsintheaboveexcerpts.TheyincludetheadvancementofGCE“capabilities,deficienciesandissues”throughtheEFDS(toincludeUNS).LtGenHulyfurtheridentifieshistaskto“serveasthesinglepointofcontactandprovideoversightofGCEissuesfortheMarineCorpsleadership.”ShouldLtGenHulyexperienceanydifficultyinaccomplishinghistasksastheGCEAdvocate,hehadthevenueoftheMROCanddirectaccesstotheCommandantoftheMarineCorpstotakecorrectiveaction.
StatementssuchasthefollowingpointthefingerofblameatMCCDC,butordersanddirectivesandeventheAdvocate’sowncampaignplanshowthattheAdvocatehadequalresponsibilityforthedevelopmentofCOINcapabilities.“TheCOINcapabilitiesthatmighthavepreventedtheemergenceofasignificantIEDthreatinthefirstplacehadnotbeenprovidedbyMCCDCcombatdevelopers.TheseincludedISR,armedISR,NLW,IO-supportivecommunicationsequipment,real-timelanguagetranslation,andothertools.”(Gayl,p33)
ThereisnomentionofMRAPwithinLtGenHuly’sCampaignPlan.NeitheristhereanyconceptormentionwhatsoeverthattheGCEAdvocatewascontemplatinginanyway,arecommendationthattheMarineCorpsestablishtheMRAP,oranyMRAP-typevehicle,astheneededvehicleforanyforcesgoingtoorinIraq.Theclosestitcomesisasfollows:
• “Providearmorprotectedmobilityfromthesea-basethroughsustainedoperationsashore.”(Huly,p4)MRAPsarenot,norweretheyever,designedforthesea-base.
• “Acquirebetterarmorprotectionforvehicles.”(Huly,p7)-Thisisagenericobjective.ItisalsoapplicabletoarmorforHMMWVsandotherarmoringefforts.Itdoesnotsay“acquireanewfleetofdifferentvehiclescalledMRAP”.
• “EnsureMaximumsurvivabilityofMarinesonthemodernbattlefieldthroughdevelopmentofequipmentandtacticsthatbetterprotecttheforcewithoutsacrificingspeedandagility.”(Huly,p7).Thisisagenericobjective.ItisalsoapplicabletoarmorforHMMWVsandotherarmoringefforts.
• AnnexAliststhevehiclesforconsideration.TheEFV,thenextiterationofHMMWV,andtheVehicleArmorKitarelistedasGCEinitiatives.TheMRAPisnot.
GaylstatedaboutthelackofMRAPs:“IandseveralotherMarinesfirstbroughtthisissue
totheattentionofmyPentagonchainofcommandwhileIwasstillinIraq.”(GaylTestimony,
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p3).Histimelineiscorrect.HisfirstnotificationtohisPentagonchainofcommandwaswhilehewasinIraq.Thereisnorecord,astheAdvocates’S&TAdvisor,ofearliernotificationaboutthelackofMRAP-typevehicles.TheS&TAdvisertotheAdvocatedidnotbringupthe2005MRAPUUNSwhileperforminghisdutiesinPP&O,nordidhedosopriortothe2005UUNS.Hisfirstnotification,despitehisresponsibilities,wasinlate2006or2007.
“Foresightwouldhavedictatedthatthoseadditionalvehiclessourgentlyneededinbothcountriesbeshouldhavesimplystandingreadyforrapiddelivery.”(GaylTestimony,p8)ThisforesightisclearlyaresponsibilityoftheAdvocate.
“Furthermore,theMarineCorpsandotherswereawareofthethreatposedbyminesandIEDsinlowintensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistantvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.Yet,MarineCombatdevelopersatQuanticodidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlow-intensityconflicts.”(GaylTestimony,p9)ThecombatdevelopmentresponsibilityforinitiatingnewrequirementsrestedwiththeGCEAdvocateandtheoperatingforces.TheinitiatingeventwasthesubmissionofanUNS/UUNS.
Gayl,asanAdvocate,didnotdevelopMRAPtypevehicles.Inaddition,eitherGayliswrong
ortheGCEAdvocatefailedcatastrophicallyintheircombatdevelopmentduties.
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6-THEUNS/UUNSPROCESSMISUNDERSTOOD
TheMRAPUUNSitselfdescribesthelinkagebetweentheAdvocateandtheprocessfor
UNS.ManycopiesoftheMRAPUUNSomitthecover/firstpage.ThecoverpageforeachUNSshowsanddescribestheprocessthattheUNSwilltake.UUNSareavarietyofUNSthataredeemedUrgent,hencethetermUUNS.“DiagramA”(below)isthecoverpageandpage1fortheMRAPUUNSsubmittedbyBGenHejlik.UUNS,suchastheMRAPUUNS,weresubmittedwiththisasthefirstpageinordertoensurethatallhandlersoftheUNSwouldunderstandtheprocess.
TheAdvocateplayedanintegralpartintheUNSdevelopmentpath.TheMRAPUUNSshowstheprocesswhichincludestwoinstanceswheretheprocesswastotallycontrolledbytheAdvocate.AdvocaterejectionineitherofthesestepsequatestoahaltinUNSprocessinguntiltheAdvocateissueisresolved.TheAdvocatewasalsoalistedrepresentativeforothersteps(e.g.DOTMLPFanalysis).TheAdvocatewasalsoanunlistedrepresentativeforothersteps(e.g.ACMCviaMROCforValidation).
TheUrgentUNSprocess,pertheMARADMINs,wouldcontinuethroughtheDOTMLPF
assessmentandthentransitiontotheExecutivelevel.SeveralstepsintheUNSDevelopmentPath(seeDiagramA)requireactionfromtheDOTMLPFWorkingGroup(DWG).DOTMLPFisanacronymusedtodescribeconsiderationsforcombatdevelopment.
TheDWGCharterdescribestheroleofdifferentindividualsandorganizationsin
portionsoftheUNSDevelopmentPath.TheDWGCharterdescribesitsmembership:“TheDWGmembershipservesasanucleusofAdvocateandRequirements/AcquisitionrepresentativeswhoassistintheinitialDOTMLPFcategorizationofeachUNS.”(Watsonemail,11/30/2004).TheAdvocates,inadditiontotheirdesignatedportionsoftheprocessforwhichtheyweresolelyresponsible,alsofeaturedprominentlyintheDWGportionsoftheprocess.
TheroleoftheAdvocatewithregardstoanUNSintheUNSDevelopmentPathwasdescribed:“AnapprovedUNSischampionedbyanAdvocateandservesastheinitialrequirementsdocumentationneededforimplementationwithintheEFDS.”(Watsonemail,11/30/2004).Advocatesresponsibilitieswerespecificallylistedinparagraph7oftheCharter:7. Advocates. Advocates representation to the DWG is critical. Advocates alone can validate and approve an UNS for action within the EFDS. The Advocates provide broad-based experience and direct representation for each element of the MAGTF and the
TheUNS/UUNSprocessisadministeredandoverwatchedbyseveralorganizations.SeveralstepsoftheprocessareadministeredbyMCCDC,somebytheAdvocate,somebytheMROC,somebyP&RandMCSC,andsomebyoperationalcommands.Alloftheseorganizationswouldhavetoconspireto“bury”anUUNSastheyallhadresponsibilitiesforUUNSprocessing.
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Supporting Establishment. The DWG provides a venue for Advocates to both drive and participate in the UNS development process. Advocates are assigned to the DWG as follows:
a. Command Element: CG MCCDC, Combat Development b. Ground Combat Element: Deputy Commandant, Plans,
Policies, and Operations c. Aviation Combat Element: Deputy Commandant for Aviation d. Combat Service Support Element/Supporting Establishment:
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics
TheAdvocateapprovedUNSforactionwithinEFDS.TheAdvocatesareonceagainlistedandtheGCEAdvocatewasPP&OforwhomGaylistheS&TAdviser.
TheinteractionoftheDWGandtheAdvocateforaportionoftheprocesswasdescribed:“TheDWGwillreview,analyze,andassistinthedevelopmentofUNSCourseofAction(COA),andultimatelyrecommendoneoftheseCOA’stotheAdvocate.TheAdvocatewillendorsethisCOA(orselectanotherCOA)andgenerateaSolutionInitiatingDirective(SID).”(Watsonemail,11/30/2004).The“Advocaterepresentative”wasakeypartoftheDWGinitsrecommendationtotheAdvocate…whocouldacceptorrejectit.DWGandAdvocateresponsibilitiesaredescribedingreaterdetailinparagraph6oftheCharter.WhileMCCDCpersonnelremaintheExecutiveAgentfortheprocess,theAdvocateparticipatedinthemajorityofstepsandoutrightcontroledtheprocessinseveralsteps.
Gayl,fromapositionofignorance,states:“MRAPwasCOTSwithnocombatdeveloperAdvocate,onlyGCEandoperatorAdvocatesoutsideofprocesscontrol.”(Gayl,p25)TheAdvocateshadprocesscontrolatseveralpointsintheprocess.TheGCEAdvocatehadrepresentationinmoststepsandaccesstothehighestlevelsoftheMarineCorpstovoiceanyconcernsabouttheprocessoroutcomes.
DiagramAUNIVERSAL NEED STATEMENT (UNS)
PURPOSE
The completed Universal Need Statement is the most important information component in the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS). As the primary means of entry into the EFDS, the UNS acts as a “work request” for current and future capabilities within the EFDS. The UNS identifies operational enhancement opportunities and deficiencies in capabilities. Opportunities include new capabilities, improvements to existing capabilities, and elimination of redundant or unneeded capabilities. “Universal” highlights its common use by any Marine Corps organization to capture both current needs and future needs developed through analysis, assessment, and experimentation with future warfighting concepts.
All Universal Need Statements are entered into a web-based format for tracking purposes. The link for the Combat Development Tracking System (CDTS) web site is https://www.cdts.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil. Please ensure the letter “s” is included in the URL (https). For access to the web site, or if further information is
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required regarding this processing and status of your submission, please contact the Capabilities and Assessment Branch (CAB) CDTS representative. Personnel assigned to CAB, phone numbers and E-mail addresses can be found under http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/ by clicking on the CAB link. Information about the EFDS may be found by clicking on the EFDS link. The UNS development path is depicted below. Please see page 5 for further submission instructions.
GaylquotesaCaptainrepresentingPP&O:“PP&OAdvocateinputtotheUUNS:PP&Owrote:
“EnhancedsurvivabilityandmobilityofourMarinesoperatinginahazardousfireareaagainstmines/IEDs/RPGs/SAFsthreatsisaviablerequirement.AsweareseeinginOIFandOEF,aneedtoimprovetheMarineCorps'currentvehiclesandplatformsagainstcurrentandemergingmine/IED/RPG/SAFthreatsexist.ThiscapabilityisrequiredinallelementsoftheMAGTF.Theengineercommunityhasbeenpursuingamoresurvivableengineerplatform(EngineerSquadVehicle)foryears,buttheinitiativehasnevermadethecutintheARLranking.TheMarineCorpsiscurrentlyspendingagreatdealofmoneyandeffortinhardeningcurrentvehicles/equipmentand
NAVMC11475(Oct02)
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purchasingCOTs/NDIcapabilitiestomitigatethethreat.Theseeffortsaddressanefforttofix/improveoperatingforcesdeployedintheater,butdoesn'testablishaPORandfixtheMarineCorps'requirementinthelongterm.Aswritten,thisUUNSwillrequirebillionsofdollarstofund.RecommendpursuingsomeoftheserequirementsusingjointmoneyprovidedthroughtheJointIEDDefeatTaskForce.AlongwithfillingtherequirementsofthisUUNS,recommendtheMarineCorpsestablishaMRAPPORtoestablishthelogistictailandincorporatethiscapabilityintotheMarineCorpsforthelong-term.”PP&O,i.e.theGCEAdvocate,recognizedthatanMRAPPORwasessentialinordertofulfilltherequirement.ThePP&OrecommendationrepresentsquiteaccuratelywhathasoccurredwiththeMRAPprogramthatisbeingexecutedbyMCSCtoday,thoughalmosttwoyearslaterthannecessary.Additionally,PP&OrecognizedthatMRAPfulfillmentwouldbeexpensive.InsteadofrejectingfulfillmentinfavorofalessercapabilityastheCDIBwoulddolater,PP&Owassolution-orientedandsuggestedseekingJIEDDOfunds.”(Gayl,p20-21)
TheaboveresponsefromPP&OistheonlyknownGCEAdvocaterecommendationthat
occurredintheprocess(belowtheexecutivelevel)followingthe2005MRAPrequest.ItwassubmittedbyaMCCDCCaptain.TherewerenowrittenrecommendationsbythePP&OColonelontheCDIB,ortheColonel’sboss(aBrigadierGeneral)ortheColonel’sbossesboss(aLieutenantGeneralandTHEAdvocate).
ThematerialsolutionforoneAdvocatemaynotbethesameasthematerialsolutionfora
differentAdvocate.IftherequirementsoftheMRAPUUNSwerenotfulfilled,thentheGCEAdvocatecouldhavesubmittedanewUUNS.ThiswasnotdonebytheGCEAdvocate.
ThestaffofficerrecommendedsubmissiontotheJIEDDTF.Thiswouldhavetakentheprocess
outoftheUUNSprocessandputitintothejointprocess(discussedinChapter14).TheGCEAdvocatedidnotpursueadditionalMRAPcapabilitythroughtheJIEDDTF.
BywayofexcusingtheGCEAdvocate,Gaylstates,“Yet,nodocumentationexistsstatingthatit
wasbroughtbeforetheMROCoranExecutiveSessionofthatbodyforathoughtfuldeliberation,onethatwouldhaveincludedDC,PP&OastheGCEAdvocate.ThenormalMROCprocesswasevidentlynotfollowedandtherewasnooversightmechanismthatwouldhavecaughttheerrorinordertoreturntotheCDIBinordertoholditaccountable.”(Gayl,p38)TheMROCdidinfactgetbriefedonMRAP.TheUUNSoversightmechanismsdidinfactexistasdescribedin621/05.TherewasbothAdvocateoversightfortheprocessaswellasoversightfortheMRAPcapabilityneed.Thisoversightwasexplicitandnotimplied.AdditionaloversightguidancewasprovidedintheAdvocatetaskinginCMCMemorandum1-02.ThisisinadditiontotheoperatingforceoversightrequiredbyMARADMINandpolicy.
TheOffRamp
Step2statesthattheUNSprocesscanendifadeterminationismadethatasolutionalready
exists.FurtherprocessingisnotrequiredifanumbersincreaseforanexistingsolutionistheestablishedCOA.
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SupportingAdvocacyOneoftheexcusesGaylusesforhisandPP&Oinactionisthattheywerenotdesignatedasthe
leadAdvocate:“PP&O,theAdvocatefortheGCEatHQMC,wasplacedinasupportingadvocacyrollonly,eventhoughMRAPwasbeingrequestedbyforwarddeployedGCEwarfightersforthebattlefield.Aswillbeseenimmediatelybelow,theGCErepresentedbyPP&OatthePentagonrecommendedapprovingtherequest,anddevelopingandfieldingMRAPthroughanMRAPPORinearly2005.ThisrecommendationwasnotcarriedforwardtotheMROC,thebodyonwhichDC,PP&O(theGCEAdvocate)sitsasavotingmember.”(Gayl,p19)ThePP&Orecommendationwillbediscussedelsewhere,buttheconceptthataPP&OrecommendationwasnotcarriedforwardtotheMROCismisleading.PP&OsitsontheMROCasoneofthemembers.
Inaddition,theneedforcross-advocacycoordinationwasidentifiedintheDOTMLPFbrief:
(Gayl,p27)The2005MRAPUUNSwasassignedtotheLogisticsAdvocate(I&L)buttheGCE
Advocate(PP&O)haddesignatedpointsintheprocessforinput.Inaddition,PP&OhadrepresentationforeverystepoftheabbreviatedprocesstoincludeavoteintheMROC.
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Gaylfurtherstates:“Again,asseniorretiredMarines,theEFDSmanagerscontrollingtheUUNSprocessatMCCDCcouldalsonothavemissedthetechnicalandoperationalauthorityofthesignedUUNS,orthecompellingurgencyarticulatedwithinit.So,assigningaHQMCcivilianlogistician,havinglimitedgroundcombatinsightandcommittedtothehealthofstatesidePORs,astheleadAdvocateintheanalysisofaGCEUUNSassuredtheprocessoutcome.ThismisassignmentalsorelegatedthestrongGCEAdvocateendorsementparagraphfromPP&OtoasupportingAdvocateinput.Intheend,PP&O’sMRAPrequirementfulfillmentandPORestablishmentrecommendationsmeantlittle,infactaswillbeseenlatertheUUNSwasneverevenforwardedtoMCWLfortechnologicalinvestigation.”(Gayl,p21)Asseenintheprevioussectionsofthischapter,EFDSmanagersdonotcontrollargeportionsoftheprocess.Theassignmentofa“civilianlogistician”astheleadAdvocateactionofficerdoesnotnegatetheLieutenantGeneralGCEAdvocateresponsibilities(orthoseofhisstaff).OrdersanddirectivesapplynomatterwhoisassignedastheleadAdvocateactionofficer.
UUNSConclusion
Theprevioussectionofthestudyfocusedonthegenericresponsibilitiesofthe
AdvocatesinresponsetotheMRAPUUNS.Advocateresponsibilities,however,coveredotherequipmentdeficiencies.“WhiletheIEDemergencycouldperhapsnotspecificallybepredictedin2003,vastgapsinourtacticalpersistentsurveillance,non-lethalweaponscapabilities,andourdeficientcommunicationscapacitiesinanArabicandKurdishspeakingnationwere.”(Gayl,p85)TherewasanabsenceofGCEAdvocateUNSsubmissionsthatwouldhavesolvedthesegaps.Thesubmissionsthattheydidprovidemerelyscratchedthesurfaceoftheeventualsurveillance,non-lethalweaponsandtranslationneeds.Thesecapabilitieswillbediscussedinsubsequentchapters.
ThereisawidespreadignoranceofhowMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentoccurs.The
shallowanalysismightstatethatMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentisperformedbyMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)orQuantico(thelocationofMCCDC).However,thetruthisthatMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentisperformedacrosstheMarineCorpswitheachelementplayingacriticalrole.Theserolesareestablishedbyorders.Therearechecksandbalancessothatifoneorganizationfails,thereisredundancyandoversight.TheMarineOperatingForces,theComponents,theAdvocates,andMCCDCorganizationseachcontrolportionsoftheprocessbutnoorganizationhasamonopolyonthewholeprocess.EachofthefourelementshasaccesstotheCommandantandrepresentationontheMROC.
TheCDIB(akaCDBorDWG)iscomprisedofmembersfromacrosstheMarineCorps.
ThebelowCDBexistedinDec2005(duringthedisputed19months):CDB MEMBERSHIP ROSTER (Updated 2 Dec 05)
ORGANIZATION PRI/ALT RANK & NAME DC, CD&I PRI MR. STEVE CABRIAN ALT MR. ROY TOLIVER
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DC, AVIATION PRI COL STEVEN DRIGGERS ALT LTCOL KIRK JANSEN DC, PP&O PRI COL EDDIE RAY ALT LTCOL DARIO VALLI
DC, I&L PRI LTCOL KEITH REVENTLOW
ALT MAJ GEORGE MARKERT DC, P&R PRI MR. WILLIAM STRINGER ALT DC, M&RA PRI LTCOL RINGHOFFER ALT CAPT VADEN CG, TECOM PRI MR. LARRY RAMSEY ALT MRS. TRACEY WILLIAMS CG, MCWL PRI MR. FLOYD WATSON ALT LTCOL STEPHEN CHILL CG, MCSC PRI MR. DON BURLINGHAM ALT LTCOL NANCY HURLESS ADC, CD&I FOR J&EM PRI COL NATHAN WEBSTER ALT MR. JOHN MONTEMAYOR DIR, INTEL PRI MR. BOBBY STRAIGHT ALT LTCOL CHUDOBA DIR, C2 ID PRI LTCOL RICH HILBERER ALT LTCOL DEB BEUTEL DIR, F&M ID PRI MR. KEVIN MCCONNELL ALT MR. CRAIG BENSON DIR, LOG ID PRI MR. LAWRENCE PLATT ALT COL JON HULL DIR, FP ID PRI COL JEFF OLTMAN
ALT LTCOL MICHAEL JOHNSON
DIR, SEA ID PRI LTCOL JAMES WILSON ALT MR. DAN STORM DIR, TFS DIV PRI MRS. CYNTHIA CHEEK ALT LTCOL DENNY MIRELES DIR, OAD DIV PRI MR. MAX HIPSHER ALT MR. WAYNE BREAKFIELD DIR, HQMC C4 PRI LTCOL PAUL TIMONEY ALT MR. WAYNE BIEMOLT DIR, HQMC, INTEL PRI LTCOL JAMES WEST ALT MAJ JESSE CONSTANTE ADD-ONS FOR VISABILITY DIR, HQMC C4 LTCOL JEFFERY DIXON
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MAJ JASON PERDEW (Loweemaildtd12/2/2005) Ofnoteisthenumberofnon-MCCDCCommandsthatmadeuptheCDB.ColonelRayrepresentedGayl’scommandandwasoneoftheseniormembersoftheboard.
IfMRAPfailureistobeassigned,thenonecanpointtoordersanddirectivesinorderto
determinefailureresponsibility.AsGaylstatedtooneofhissupervisors“IintendtosuccessfullyachieveadegreeofaccountabilityandconcretechangeatQuanticoorIwillbefiredintheprocessoftrying”(GaylTestimony,p15).AsoneoftheAdvocaterepresentativeswhowasandisamajorelementofthecombatdevelopmentprocess,perhapsMrGaylshouldhavefocusedonhisownfailings/accountability.TheremainderofthisstudywillprovidethefactsthatshowthatthefailuresGaylarticulatesdidnotoccur.
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7–THEINSPECTORGENERALFINDSNOEVIDENCEOFMRAPNEED
TheInspectorGeneralservicingtheMarineCorpsiscalledtheDeputyNavalInspector
GeneralforMarineCorpsMatters(DNIGMC).TheDNIGMCispartoftheNaval(NavyandMarineCorps)InspectorGeneralofficewhichreportsdirectlytotheSecretaryoftheNavy.Inaddition,theDNIGMCistaskedwiththefollowing: Authority and Responsibility of the DNIGMC. The DNIGMC is the senior investigative official within the Marine Corps and the principal Marine Corps advisor to the CMC on all matters concerning inspections and investigations. The DNIGMC shall direct performance of the NAVINSGEN mission and function as it applies to the Marine Corps. A Marine Corps Order will implement this Instruction within the Marine Corps. The DNIGMC may communicate directly with the Secretary of the Navy concerning Marine Corps matters.(SECNAVINST 5430.57G, p 6)
TheDNIGMCthereforehastwosuperiorswithwhichtosettleissues,theSECNAVandtheCMC.TheMay2006DNIGMCEquipmentReadinessAssessmentreferencedbyGayladdressesanabsenceoffindingsonMRAPandheaccusestheIGinthefollowingmanner,“However,thecircumstantialevidencethat2006IGMComissionsmayhavebeendeliberateoratleastbasedonIGMCteammemberbiasesarecompelling,andpossiblyworthyofIGMCreview.”(Gayl,p48)The“conspiracy”topreventIMEFfromgettingMRAPs,inGayl’sanalysis,extendstotheIG.TheIGconclusionsandthefacts,however,supportdifferentconclusions.
TheIGconductedanassessmentofIMEFequipmentinIraqinMay2006.ThisassessmentoccurredpriortotheIMEFJUONSfor185JERRV.TheIGinteractswiththeappropriateelementsoftheinspectedunitsandthenoutbriefstheirresults.Thesetypesofassessmentsarenormallyoutbriefedtothehighestleveloftheunitbeinginspected.IMEFhadIGpersonnelattheircommandfortheassessment.IMEFhadtheopportunitytoaddtotheIGandalsocritiqueitandyettheymadenomentionofanyunfulfilledMRAP-typevehiclerequirements.
“First,the2006reportagainproposedthattheHMMWVwasrightchoiceforprotectioninMNF-W,andtherewasnomentionthattheMRAPwaswantedbyoperatorstoreplacethemorevulnerableHMMWVs.ThisiscurioussincetheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSwas
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thentheInspectorGeneraloftheMarineCorpswouldhavehadtohavebeeninvolvedintheburyingoftheHejlikUUNS.TheIGconductedaninspectionofthedeployedIMEFimmediatelypriortotheIMEFsubmissionfor185JERRV.TheIGfoundnoidentifiedneedforMRAPatthattimenordiditfindanyactiveUUNSforMRAPnordidIMEFidentifyanyunfulfilledneeddespitehavingtheopportunityanddutytodoso.
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stillunfulfilled.”(Gayl,p47)TheIGMCclearlydidnotmentionthelackofanyprogressonwhatwouldhavebeenabilliondollarUUNSforequipmentthatwouldimpactalmosteveryelementoftheMarineCorps(operatingforcesandsupportingestablishment).ThisdemonstratesthattheHejlikUUNSwasnolongerindemand.ItalsodemonstratesthattherewasnodemandwhatsoeverforalargeMRAPbuy.TheIGMCabsenceofMRAPcommentsupportsthisconclusion.
Gaylcontinuedlater:“Itisnoteworthyinthisregardthatthelackoffulfillmentoftheverysignificant17Feb05IMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSwasnotmentionedinthe2006IGMCAssessment,norwasthependingrenewedrequest.”(Gayl,p48)TheIGdoesnotassessfutureeventsinanydepthastheyarefluid.IfGaylistobebelieved,thenthe2005UUNS(ifineffect)shouldhavebeenthecentraltopicoftheIGreport,andyetitwasn’t.ThisagaindemonstratesthelackofMRAPdemand.
“InspiteofthiscloselookatUUNSandtheassessment’soverwhelmingfocusonvehicleprotection,thebody,findings,andrecommendationsoftheassessmentdonotcontainanyreferencetotheMRAPUUNSsubmittedbyIMEF(Fwd)ineither2005or2006.”AndlaterGaylstates:“Infact,itwouldappearthatMRAPandtheIMEFMRAPUUNSwereneverseenbytheIGMC,muchlessevaluated.”(Gayl,p65)GaylfinallydrawstheconclusionthattheIGMCdidnotreviewtheMRAPUUNS.Thisisacorrectconclusion.HislogicfortheIGnotdoingsois,however,incorrect.TheIGdidnotreviewtheUUNSbecauseitwascompleted.
“ThequestionforanyfutureinvestigationofthisissuewouldbewhethertheomissionoftheMRAPUUNSandanydiscussionoftheIMEF(Fwd)’sknowncontinueddeterminationtoacquirethecapabilityin06wasunintendedordeliberate.Inlightofthecasestudyconstraints,theauthor’sinsightislimited.However,thecircumstantialevidencethat2006IGMComissionsmayhavebeendeliberateoratleastbasedonIGMCteammemberbiasesarecompelling,andpossiblyworthyofIGMCreview.”(Gayl,p48)Gayl’sconclusionisthattheIGdeliberatelyomittedMRAPs,ortheIGteamwasbiased.Hethenblamesajuniormemberoftheteam(MajFranks).MostMarinesunderstandthattheIGinteractswiththehighestlevelsofcommandforIGassessments.TheIMEFGeneralOfficershadeveryopportunitytoinsertMRAPintothediscussionbuttheydidnotdoso.Otherstaffsectionscouldhavedonethesame.NonedidsobecausetherewasnoactiveUUNSforMRAPs.TheIGMCdidnotarriveatthesameconclusionthatGayldid,hence,GaylthinksthattheIGmustbecorruptinsomeway.Gayl’ssuggestiontoinvestigatetheIGforacorrupteffortisaninsulttotheIGandhisteam.
TheresultsoftheIGreflectonanotherprocesspoint.“Iftoday’sDC,CDIsenseofurgencywascodifiedandrepresentedinprocessrulesin2005,thentheMRAPUUNSwouldhavebeenfulfilledasrequested,andasafunctionofprocess,notcombatdeveloperintervention.”(Gayl,p75)TheIGMCdidinfactstudytheprocessandtheUUNSsintheprocess.TheIGMCassessedtheUUNSstatusinsupportofIMEFandfoundnoMRAPissuesbecausetherewerenoMRAPissues.MRAPwasnotanactiveUUNSandthereforeitwasnotsubjecttotheIGMC.Thecodifiedprocessoccurred.TherewasnoconspiracyorwrongdoingbytheIGoritsmembers.TheywerenotpartofafictitiousMarineCorpsefforttopreventthe
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operatingforcesfromgettingMRAPs.TheIGassessedtheprocessandfoundnothingwithregardstoMRAPoradversecombatdeveloperintervention.Thisstudyexplainswhy.
IftheGaylMRAPstudyistobebelieved,anditisnot,thenthereweremanycommands
thatdidnotperformaccordingtoorderanddirective.However,therewasnonegligenceastheMRAPUUNSwascompletedandreducedtoanUNSasinitiallyreportedbytheAdvocate.TheIGwasnotcorrupt.
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8-WHYWASTHEMARINECORPSINCORRECTLYHUMBLED
TheMRAPissueoccurredforseveralreasons.Asseeninthisstudy,thecombatdevelopmentprocessoccurredaccordingtoorderanddirectiveexceptfortheadministrativetrackingoftheUUNS.GaylfocusedattentiononQuantico,presentedaflawedperspectivethatseemedcorrecttotheignorant,usedselectdatatopaintapictureofneglect,andalliedhimselfwithelementsofthemediaandpowerfulSenatorswithagendas.ThisauthorbelievesthatSenatorBidenandhisstaffsawanopportunityandseizedonGayl’spositionfortheirownreasons.Asaresult,themyriadofflawsinGayl’swritingswentunchallenged. OnceGayl’sstorystartedtoberecognized,theMarineCorpsresponsewasattimesill-conceivedandatothertimesdisastrous.TheMarineCorpsdidnotrealizethatSenatorBidenwasorchestratingevents.TheMarineCorpsdidnotidentifySenatorBidenasalliedwithGaylearlyon.EffortstoengageGaylpersonallyorasawhistleblowerweredoomedfromthestart.Gaylwasprotectedandthepersonalattackssimplytookattentionawayfromhissubstandardwork.TheMarineCorpsfocusedonthemanandnotthefacts.SimultaneouslytheMarineCorpsfailedtoidentifythetrueaggressor.Bidenwasorchestratingevents,notrefereeingevents. TheMarineCorpsfailedtoadequatelyrespondpromptingtheACMCtoaskforaDODInspectorGeneralInvestigation(DODIG).TheinvestigationwasfocusedonMCCDCinsteadofallowingabroaderinvestigation.TheMarineCorpsshouldhavedemandedafullinvestigationthatincludedactionsbyAdvocates,theMROC,ACMC,MARCENT,P&R,Gayl,andeveryotherentitythathadUNS/UUNSresponsibilities.Instead,theMarineCorpsfocusedonMCCDC.Ifafullinvestigationhadoccurred,amorecompleteandtruthfulpicturewouldhaveemergedshowingtheflawsinGayl’sstudy.Ifthe2005HejlikUUNSwasnotresolvedinthesummerof2005,thenalloftheseorganizations/individualswouldhavehadunfulfilledresponsibilities.TheDODIGwouldhavehadtheopportunitytofindflawwiththeentireMarineCorps,butinrealitytheentireMarineCorpswouldhavebeenabletoshowtheflawsintheGaylposition.InsteadMCCDCwasofferedupasa“sacrificiallamb”.IntheendtheDODIGbothfailedinitsanalysisandalsofoundnofaultwithanyMCCDCpersonnel.TheDODIGfailedtoresolvetheissueforreasonsoutlinedinChapter19. WiththeDODIGfailureandthesupportofSenatorBidenandthepress,GaylcontinuedtocritiqueMCCDC.TheMarineCorpscontinuedtocritiqueGaylinsteadofhispoints.GaylwroteastudythatwouldeventuallybeofferedandacceptedintotheCongressionalRecord.ItisincorrectlycitedasfactandcontinuesafocusonMCCDC:“a.Purpose.ThestudyusesarecentexampleofaGroundCombatElement(GCE)-requestedcapabilitythatencounteredcombatdevelopmentchallengesinordertoilluminatesomeofthesystemicproblemsinherentandendemictotheExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem(EFDS)atMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC).”(Gayl,pvi)
Thischapterwilldiscussthe“why”behindtherealMRAPevents.
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ThestudyisconstrainedasstatedbyGayl:“c.Constraints.InaccordancewithDC,PP&Oguidance,thisstudydidnotincludeinterviewsorwrittenqueriesofanyemployeesorinstitutionscomingunderthecommandoroversightofthelargerMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentcommunity.TheseareunderstoodtoincludeMCCDC,theEFDC,MarineCorpsSystemsCommand(MCSC),theMarineCorpsWarfightingLaboratory(MCWL),theJointNon-LethalWeaponsDirectorate(JNLWD),andtheUSMCS&TProgramattheOfficeofNavalResearch(ONR).(Gayl,pvi)Theconstraintsindicatewhatshouldhavebeenaredflagforanyimpartialreader:Gayl’sstudydoesnotsourcefromtheindividualsorcommandsuponwhichthestudyfocuses.Onedoesnothavetobeamilitarypersontounderstandhowbaselessthistypeofstudyis.TheacceptanceofthisstudyintotheCongressionalRecordreflectspoorlyonCongress.ThelackofanycritiqueofsuchaflawedstudyallowsGayltocontinuehisone-sidedportrayalofevents.ForexampleGaylstated:“TheMRAPCaseStudywasconductedinanefforttobetterunderstandthechallengesUSMCoperatingforcesencounteredwhenseekingcombatdevelopersupportforacapabilityofinteresttotheGCEAdvocate.”(Gayl,pvi)Theblatantlyobviousquestionarisingfromthissentenceis,“WhatactiondidtheGCEAdvocatetakeforthecapabilitytheywereinterestedin?”Itwillbeansweredinthisstudyaswillmanyotherunansweredquestions. Gaylsucceededbecausehewasnotsufficientlychallenged.TheMarineCorpsdidnotsufficientlychallengeGaylforthereasonthattheseeventsoccurredwhiletheMarineCorpswasengagedinfightingawar.MarinesincombatstilldependedonthoseMarineswhohadanswerstoGayl’sassertions.Giventheopportunitytotrytosavelivesordealwithadisgruntledcivilianemployee,Marinesfocusonsavinglives.Gayltookadvantageofasituationwherethosewhocouldeasilydebunkhisstatementswerebusydoingmoreimportantwork.
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8A-THETWOFACESOFSENATORBIDEN
Forthisstudytheterm“Biden”willincludehisstaff(onemayassumehisstaffactedonhisdirection).INTRODUCTION
AtfirstBidenwasworkingwiththeMarineCorps(in2006)tofundtheCorp’snumberonepriority:MRAP.MomentumstartedtobuildforafullfundingofboththeMarineCorpsandArmyMRAPneeds.Billionsofdollarswereaddedtodefenseappropriationsproposals.Then,thefirstnegligenceaccusationbyGayl,intheformofablogcalled“DangerRoom”,waspublishedinMay2007.
OnewouldthinkthataUnitedStatesSenatorwouldquerytheMarineCorpsonevents
thathadoccurredtwoyearsprior(Feb2005)whentheHejlikUUNSwassubmittedfor1,169vehicles.Hedid,buttheMarineCorpsdidnotrecognizethat,nomatterwhattheiranswers,Bidenwasnotinterestedinanhonesthearing.TheCorpswouldhavebeenbetterpreparedhaditrecognizedthatBidenhadanagendawhichincludedbashingtheCorpsinnationalnews.Bidenwasnotinterestedinafairhearing,hewasinterestedintheexactopposite:awell-coordinatedsmearingoftheCorps.
InsteadofqueryingtheCorpsandwaitingforanswers,Bidenimmediatelyconspired
withmembersofthemediatowidelypublicizeGayl’s(andDangerRoom’s)falseaccusations.Simultaneously,whileaskingquestionsoftheMarineCorpswithwhomhehadbeenpartneringtobuyMRAPs,hecoordinatedwithDangerRoom,USATodayreportersandGayltotrashtheMarineCorpsonthenationalstage.TheresultwasthatUSAToday,“TheNation’sNewspaper”,ranseveralincorrectstoriestoincludeascathingandmisleadingfront-page-above-the-foldstoryonMarineCorpsnegligenceinbuyingMRAP.ThesestorieswerebasedonGayl’sfabricatedaccusationsandcoordinatedbySenatorBiden.Biden’scoordinationofthepresstosmeartheCorpsoccurredbeforetheCorpsleadershiphadreadthequestionsthatBidenasked,letalonehadtheopportunitytorespond.
SenatorBidenusedGaylandthepresstosmeartheMarineCorps.Specifically,Bidensawamisleadingblog(DangerRoom)thenorganizedGayl,DangerRoomandUSATodaytotakethemisleadingblognational.Whileorganizingthepress,BidenaskedtheMarineCorpstorespondtotheoriginalblog.TheMarineCorpsresponsesdisputingtheblogwerecorrect(albeitnotdetailed),andignored.TheMarineCorpsthoughtitwasdealingwiththeSenator’sofficeingoodfaith.TheCorpsleadership,toincludetheCommandantoftheMarineCorps,wasinvolvedinansweringBiden’squestions.TheydidnotknowthatwhileBidenwasaskingquestionshewassimultaneouslycoordinatingpresscoveragewiththespecificpurposeofsmearingtheCorps.ThesmearingoftheCorpsexpandedtoasmearingoftheBushAdministrationandwasusedtoargueforawithdrawalfromIraq.
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GeneralOfficers,toincludetheCommandant,recalledeventsbutdidnothaveon-handprooffromthetimeinquestion(twofullyearsprior)inordertorespondfully.EmailsshowtheCorpsscramblingtorespondtothestorywhileBidenorganizedthepress.Asemailsandtherestofthisstudyshow,theMarineCorpsleader’srecollectionswerecorrect,albeitabsenthardproof(providedinthisstudy).DespitetheMarineCorpssupportforMRAP,BidensmearedtheCorpsanyway.BidensatinjudgementoftheMarineCorpswhileactivelyworkingtounderminetheCorpswithafabricatedstory.
TheresultantUSATodaynegligencestorieswereusedbyDemocraticSenatorsasa
cornerstoneoftheirargumentstowithdrawfromIraq.ThemainUSATodaystoryranonthefrontpagethedaybeforetheSenatewastostayinsessionallnightbeforevotingontheLevin-ReedAmendment(settingadateforwithdrawalfromIraq).ThearticlewasrepeatedlyreferencedduringthisrareSenateovernightsessionasademonstrationoftheBushAdministration’sneglectintakingcareofthetroops.BidenstatedontheSenatefloor,“Ihaveabsolutelynofaith,nonewhatsoever,inthisPresidenttovoluntarilydowhatshouldbedone.TheonlywayitisgoingtohappeniswhenourRepublicanfriendsstopvotingwiththePresidentandstartvotingtoendthiswarbysupportingourtroops.Iyieldthefloor.”(Biden,p.s9441)The“supportingourtroops”linefollowedBiden’sdiscussionofGayl’sMRAPaccusations.MARINECORPSSUPPORTFORMRAP
TheMarineCorpssupportedalargeMRAPbuywellbeforeBiden’sinvolvement.InMay2006,185JERRVwererequestedinaJUONS.TheCommandingGeneralofSystemsCommandbriefedCongress(insupport)immediately.ThisoccurredpriortotheJUONSbeingapprovedintheater.
InJuly2006,MNF-WsubmittedanadditionalJUONSforanother1,000vehicles.The
MarineCorps(toincludeMCCDC)remainedinsupportoftheJUONS.InSeptember2006IMEFsubmittedthesamerequests(totaling1,185)asanUUNS
throughtheServicechain.ThisUUNSimmediatelybecametheMarineCorpsnumberonepriority.
BetweenSeptember2006andMay2007theMarineCorpskeptMRAPasitsnumber
onepriority.TheMarineCorpsrepeatedlybriefedbothCongressandDODaboutthisspecificpriorityandtestedandprocuredtheinitialMRAPfleet.InnowaydidBidencontributetoorinfluencetheCorp’sprioritizationofMRAPasitsnumberonepriority.HeeventuallysupportedtheMarineCorps’requestandstatedontheflooroftheSenateonMarch28,2007:
“MRAP vehicles provide four to five times more protection to our troops than up-armored HMMWVs. That statement, that these MRAPs provide four to five times more protection than up-armored HMMWVs, is not my estimate. That is the judgment of our military leaders. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, GEN James Conway, with whom I spoke as recently as
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this afternoon, wrote on March 1 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said: Multi-National Forces--West [that is, the Marines in Iraq] estimates that the use of the MRAP could reduce the casualties in vehicles due to IED attack by as much as 80 percent. He went on further and said that even though the MRAP is not expeditionary: It is, however, the best available vehicle for force protection. He concluded by saying: Getting the MRAP into the Al Anbar Province is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time. Let me repeat that: Getting the MRAP into the Al Anbar Province is my number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time. He went on to tell me today that although there is some disagreement in terms of priorities within this building, he was speaking to me from the Pentagon, he said, ``I believe this is a moral imperative.'' How many generals with four stars or three or two or one on their shoulders have you heard use that phrase? How often is something so fundamental it is called ``a moral imperative''? This is a man who is heading back out to Iraq soon. He is talking about protecting his kids,
his troops.” (Biden-2,p.s4033)Bidencontinued:
“Ever since the military began using MRAPs in Iraq, the requirement has grown, as commanders realize how much better they are at protecting their personnel. In May of last year the requirement was only 185. By July, it had risen to 1,185. By November, it had risen to 4,060. By February of this year, after the supplemental request was submitted, it rose to 6,738. One month later, the requirement went up again to the current level of 7,774. At this point every one in the military agrees,
we need 7,774 MRAPs.” (Biden-2,p.s4033) SenatorBidenclearlyunderstoodtheMarineCorps’needasexpressedthroughthe
Commandant’scorrespondencewiththeCJCS.BidenexpressedhisclearunderstandingoftheMarineCorps’number1priority(asseenintheabovestatements).AftertheCorps’fullthroatedsupportfor(andinitiationof)anMRAPprogram,BidenthenincorrectlyportrayedtheCorpsasunsupportiveofMRAP.
OfnoteisthattheCMC,CJCSandSenatorBidenwerealldeeplyinvolvedwithMRAPby
1March2007.The“credithogs”(Gayl,Gatesetc)shouldatleasthavehadthecommonsensetoestablishthedatesoftheir“self-describedcriticalefforts”aspriortodecisioneventsbythe
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seniormembersoftheSenateandArmedForces(asdescribedintheCongressionalRecord).TheabovestatementsfromBidenwereenteredintotheCongressionalrecordbeforeGaylorGateshadanysignificantparticipationinMRAP.
TheremainderofthissectionwillprovideproofofthesmearingoftheMarineCorpsby
Biden.ThefollowingtablesummarizesBiden’sactionsbetweenMayandJuly2007whentheMRAPstorybroke.Theactionsoftenoccurredonthesamedays,thusshowingthetwofacesofSenatorBiden.Adetaileddescriptionoftheelementsinthetableisprovidedafterthetable.
Biden Queries the Marine Corps Biden Works to Smear the Marine Corps
22 May 2007
• “Danger Room” posts first story alleging Marine Corps negligence.
• Marine Corps Senior Leadership, to include CMC, responds to “Danger Room” story.
• Marine Corps Congressional Liaison mistakenly presents “good relations with Biden Office”
same
23 May 2007
• Biden signs letter to the Marine Corps asking for answers to “Danger Room” allegations (due in mid-June). Marine Corps Generals attempt to respond to Biden office.
• Shachtman (Danger Room writer) identifies Biden as politically taking advantage of the situation.
• Biden aide calls Gayl and asks if Gayl would like to discuss MRAP flaws with congressional staffs and the press. Biden staff organize a meeting between Gayl and Tom Vanden Brook of USA TODAY who posts a MRAP article that night. Gayl starts providing information eventually leading to a front page article in USA TODAY.
24 May
2007 • Marine Corps Congressional
Liaison (BGen Kelly) briefs Marine Senior Leadership that the Marine Corps explanation is, for some reason, not resonating. The liaison still hopes for a fair hearing. The Marine Corps is unaware of Biden’s coordinated press effort against the Corps.
June • Marine Corps sends response to
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2007 Biden per Biden’s timeline. July
16/17/18 • USA Today front page MRAP
article runs the same day as Levin-Reed Ammendment debate (Iraq withdrawal)(vote next day). This “well timed” article is used by Senate (and House) Democrats as a reason to withdraw from Iraq.
MAY22,2007
OnMay22severalonlinepublicationspresentedafabricatedstudyonMarineCorpsMRAPnegligence.BidenvoicedcriticismoftheMarineCorps.MarineCorpsleadershipdisputedthestoryinaseriesofsharedemails.
OnMay22,2007at2:43PMNoahShachtmanpostedthefirststoryallegingthat“TheMarineCorpswaitedoverayearbeforeactingonan"priority1urgent"requesttosendblast-resistantvehiclestoIraq,DANGERROOMhaslearned.”(Shachtman,2007)
OnMay22,2007InsideDefensepickeduponthestoryandgotseveralquotesfrom
SenatorBidenbeforepublishing.““Iamabsolutelysickened,”hesaidinastatementissuedtoInsideDefense.com,whichapprisedBidenofthe2005request.”(Sherman,2007)SenatorBidenelaborated:““WeweretoldthatMarineCorpscommandersinIraqmadethefirstrequestforMRAPsonMay21,2006,for185vehicles,”Bidensaid.“NowwelearnthatMarinesonthegroundinIraqmadeanurgentrequesttotheircommandersformorethan1,000MRAPsasearlyasFebruary2005--butnothinghappened.Howisitpossiblethatarequestthatisliterallylifeordeathgotlost?”(Sherman,2007)OfnoteistheautomaticacceptancethattheCorpswasuntruthfulandthatthestoryofa“lostrequest”wasvalid(bothpointsdisproveninthispaper).
On22May,theMarineCorpsrespondeduptoandincludingtheCommandantofthe
MarineCorps:-----OriginalMessage-----From:ConwayGenJamesTSent:Tuesday,May22,200722:16To:AmosLtGenJamesFCc:MagnusGenRobert;KramlichLtGenRichardS;McKenzieColKennethFJr;DallasColGeorgeM;MilsteadBGENRobertE;LapanColDavid;KellyBGenJohnF;JohnsonMajGenStephenT;BroganBGenMichaelM;ConantBGenThomasL;BlasiolGS15LenA;BradyColRobertMSubject:RE:MRAP
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Jim,Iagreewithallyoucitebelow,andwouldaddthatwehaveonlygottenexcitedaboutMRAPsinceithasPROVENit'sabilityintheatretopreventinjuryandsavelives.Soclearlyourlittlebuddymaybelookingforsensationalism--vettedthrough20-20hindsight.Ifhewritessomethingwethinkiswrong,we'lleitherignoreit,orifit'sgrosslyinaccurate(ordamagingtooursenses)we'lltakehimtothewoodshedwiththefacts.S/FiC.----OriginalMessage-----From:AmosLtGenJamesFSent:Tuesday,May22,200721:55To:ConwayGenJamesTCc:MagnusGenRobert;KramlichLtGenRichardS;McKenzieColKennethFJr;DallasColGeorgeM;MilsteadBGENRobertE;LapanColDavid;KellyBGenJohnF;JohnsonMajGenStephenT;BroganBGenMichaelM;ConantBGenThomasL;BlasiolGS15LenA;BradyColRobertMSubject:FW:MRAPImportance:HighCommandant...myguyswillhavetheinfopaperonthe05MRAPUNNSmatterinthemorning.Honestly,thisisanonstoryinmymind.NoteveryUUNSturnsintoanimmediatebuy...wedon'tdobusinessthatway.AnUNNSisnotdirectiveinnatureasyouknow.Wetakeeachoneseriouslyandrunthetraplinestoseeifthereisatrueneedandareadilyavailablesolution.Iwasn'thereinFeb05andneitherweremostofmyguys...butIcantellyouthatthedecisiontobuy1114'sbytheCMCwaswellthoughtoutanddiscussedthoroughlyatanEOSinmid05.ThisUNNSwassentininFeb05...laterthatspring/summerGenHageeagreedatanEOSthathewouldreplace100%ofalltheaterMAK'dHMMWVswithwhathecalled"theGoldStandard,"...theM1114.We'llhavethefinalnumberboughtandsenttotheaterinthemorningbutitwillbearound3K'orso...asubstantialinvestment.Wealsoboughtin05-06~50+MRAPlikevehiclesforroadclearancemissions(CougarsandBuffalos...theseweretheresultofamid-05UNNS)...wealsoinvestedatonofmoneyin04todesignandinstallMAKkitsonallofourHMMWVsandMASkitsforour7tons.Allofthiswasanevolutionaryinvestmentstrategy,basedontheenemy'sactions,thatbeganin04andranuntilwebeganseriousMRAPdiscussionsinthefallof06.Welookedatthethreatin05anddeterminedthatthe1114'sweretheanswer...asthethreatratchededupin06wechangedourtackandagreedthattheMRAPswerethewaytogo.Fromthatpointonwe
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haven'tlookedback.Allofthiswillbelaidoutoveratimeline...noirresponsibilityonourpartasthisguyistryingtoimply.WeareonthehighgroundandIrecommendthatweapproachitfromthatperspective.Moretofollowinthemorning.SemperfidelisJim-----OriginalMessage-----From:DallasColGeorgeMSent:Tuesday,May22,200719:58To:AmosLtGenJamesFCc:BlasiolGS15LenA;ConantBGenThomasL;JohnsonMajGenStephenT;BradyColRobertM;HullColJon;OltmanColRogerJ;KarcherCOLDavidP;WelshColJamesLSubject:MRAPSir--wearetrackingnicelyonthepapertoaddresstheMRAP--JimhasrespondedwithaJune05EOSdecisionandMCSCispullingtheM1114history.Lenispreparingthetimelineaswediscussed--ColDallas
(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007)
MAY23,2007OnMay23MarineGeneralsthoughtthattheCorpshadgoodrelationswiththeBidenofficeandwouldbeabletoanswerBiden’squestions.Simultaneously,Biden’sofficecontactedGaylinanattempttofurtherspreadthestoryanddiscredittheCorps.MarineCorpsleadershipwasansweringBiden’squestionswhileBidenwasorganizingasmearoftheCorps.Biden’sofficedirectlycontactedGaylandputhimintouchwithUSATodaywhichpublishedseveralcondemningstoriestoeventuallyincludeafrontpagestory.
OnMay23theCommandant’sCongressionalLiaison(BGenJohnKelly)confirmedthepositionsoftheCommandantandLtGenAmos(above)andadded:“WehavegoodrelationswiththeBidenofficeandwillbackbriefthemoncewegetthepaperfromQuantico.Respectfully,JohnKelly”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007)
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ThefactsassertedbytheGeneralsintheaboveemailsareallcorrectandtruthful(asseenintheothersectionsofthisstudy).Unfortunately,MarineCorpsleadershipdidnotrecognizethattheissuewasmorethanapublicdebatewithelementsofthepress.AtthispointtheybelievedthattheyhadgoodrelationswithSenatorBiden’sofficeandthatafairansweringoftheMRAPpointsbroughtoutinthepresswouldbeenoughtoconvinceSenatorBidenthattherewasnowrong-doingornegligence.MarineGeneralswereunawareofBiden’sparticipationinspreadingthestory.
OnMay23SenatorBidenhadpreparedaletterthatheintendedtopresenttotheMarineCorps.ItincludedseveralcriticalparagraphsaswellasseveralquestionsthatforcedtheMarineCorpsintoareactivemode:
***
***
SenatorBidendidnotwaitfortheanswerstotheabovequestions.Despitetheabovepresentationofquestions,SenatorBidenhadalreadycoordinatedthepresstoembarrasstheMarineCorps.SenatorBidenestablishedaresponsedateof15June2007.(Tomczakemaildtd5/30/2007)
OnMay23(10:31pm)TomVandenBrookposted(forthe24Mayedition)inUSATODAY:“MorethantwoyearsbeforetheMarinecommandantdeclaredgettingnewarmoredvehicleshistoppriority,theCorpsdidnotfulfillanurgentrequesttobuy1,200ofthevehiclesfortroopsinAnbarprovince,accordingtoMarineofficialsanddocuments.”...“ThePentagonshouldhavemovedfaster,Bidensaid."Youcannottellmethatthiscountryis
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incapableinthenextsixmonthsofbuildingeverysingledamnoneofthesevehiclesthatneedstobebuilt,"hesaid.”(VandenBrook,2007)TheautomaticblameofthePentagonwaspickeduponbyShachtmanwhowrote,“AndatleastonePresidentialcandidateistryingtomakepoliticalhayoutoftheMRAPdelay."Youcannottellmethatthiscountryisincapableinthenextsixmonthsofbuildingeverysingledamnoneofthesevehiclesthatneedstobebuilt,"hetellsUSAToday.”(Shachtman,2007)The“makepoliticalhay”commentrefersspecificallytoSenatorBiden.HisquoteisrepeatedinbothwritingseventhoughShachtmandoesnotuseBiden’snamespecifically.ShachtmanisimplyingthatBidensawopportunityincriticizingtheMarineCorps.Shachtmanwasinapositiontoknowashewrotetheoriginal“DangerRoom”piece.Shachtmanalsolinksthe“politicalhay”thatBidenispursuingtohispoliticalaspirations.Thereisno“politicalhay”withoutthedelay.The“politicalhay”forBidenbecomesmoresignificantifthestorygoesnationalandalsoiftheMarineCorpsexplanationsarediscounted.
SenatorBiden’sofficeisparticularlymentionedinaretrospectivelaterpublishedintheWashingtonMonthly.Thisretrospectivestatedthe“DangerRoom”articlewaspublishedonthe22ndandGaylwascontactedthenextday(23rd)beforetalkingwithhiswifethatnight(23rd).ItnotesthatGayl’snamewasnotmentionedinthearticle,yetSenatorBiden’sofficeknewwheretheinformationcamefromandcalledGayl.AstheWashingtonPostreported,GaylemailedWeinberger:
“Sohee-mailedSharonWeinberger,attachingRoyMcGriff’soriginalMRAPrequest,andthatafternoon,May22,2007,adamningheadlineappearedonWired.com:“MilitaryDraggedFeetonBomb-ProofVehicles.”Thearticle,whichdidn’tmentionGaylbyname,madeitswaythroughthemilitaryinhours.ThenextmorningitwaspublishedintheDefenseDepartment’snewsbriefing.
TherebukesstartedflyingatthePentagonandonCapitolHill.AnaidetoDelawareSenatorJoeBidenthencalledGayl.DuringvisitstoIraq,BidenandthenMissouriSenatorKitBond(eachofwhomhasasonwhoservedinthemilitaryinIraq,Bond’sasaMarine)hadlearnedaboutMRAPsandweretryingtoappropriatemoneyforthem.They’dwrittentoPresidentBushandDefenseSecretaryRobertGateswithouteffect.WouldGaylbewillingtobrieftheirstaffsontheMRAPaffair,theaideasked—and,ifneedbe,talktothepress?
Gaylcamehomethatnightandspoketohiswife.”(Verini,p1)
MAY24,2007
MarineCorpsleadershipexpressedfrustrationthatthesimpleexplanationdidnotresonatewiththeBidenoffice.TheydidnotunderstandthatBidenwasworkingbehindthescenes.
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ThefollowingsequenceoccurredonMay24.TheMarineCorps,toincludethefutureCommandant,continuedtoorganizetheresponse.TheparticipantswereunawarethatBidenhadalreadycoordinatedthepresstosmeartheCorps.
-----OriginalMessage-----From:AmosLtGenJamesFSent:Thursday,May24,200706:38To:KellyBGenJohnFCc:MagnusGenRobert;GardnerLtGenEmersonN;RegnerBGenMichaelR;KramlichLtGenRichardS;CastellawLtGenJohn;SanchezColGeorgeF;OlsonColGregg;CoxLtColJamie;MilsteadBGENRobertE;LapanColDavid;DallasColGeorgeM;AllesBGenRandolphDSubject:RE:CMCPhoneconw/CreightonGreeneJohn...twomorepiecesofinfo...theimportantslidewillbetoyouhereinaboutanotherhourorso...SemperfidelisJim-----OriginalMessage-----From:AmosLtGenJamesFSent:Thursday,May24,20076:30To:KellyBGenJohnFCc:MagnusGenRobert;GardnerLtGenEmersonN;RegnerBGenMichaelR;KramlichLtGenRichardS;CastellawLtGenJohn;SanchezColGeorgeF;OlsonColGregg;CoxLtColJamie;MilsteadBGENRobertE;LapanColDavid;DallasColGeorgeM;AllesBGenRandolphDSubject:RE:CMCPhoneconw/CreightonGreeneImportance:HighJohn...Boomerhadseveralreportersinyesterdayafternoonfora1.5hrséanceovertheMRAPUUNSmatter.Whilethereporterwhowroteyesterday'sarticleforInsideDefensewasnotpresenthisamigo,andofcoursenostrangertotheUSMCChrisCastelli,waspresentalongwithanAPreporter.HaventseentheEarlyBirdthismorningsocannotcommentontheresultsofthemeeting.Attachedisapaperdealingwiththematter.Texbroughtmeaclassifiedslidelasteveningthatspeakstonumbersofattacksbymonthandyear.Ittellsthestoryaboutwhatthethreatwasdoingthatdroveourdecision-making.MyguysaredeclassifyingitfirstthingthismorningandIwillsendittoasap.
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SemperfidelisJim-----OriginalMessage-----From:KellyBGenJohnFSent:Thursday,May24,20076:12To:GardnerLtGenEmersonNCc:MagnusGenRobert;RegnerBGenMichaelR;AmosLtGenJamesF;KramlichLtGenRichardS;CastellawLtGenJohn;SanchezColGeorgeF;OlsonColGregg;CoxLtColJamieSubject:RE:CMCPhoneconw/CreightonGreeneSir, Thanksforthebriefback.TheCMCiscertainlyanupfrontGentleman,asheshouldbe,Iwishothers-however-wouldrefrainfromshootingonhistargets. Onanotherissue,Sir,wewereworkingthis05MRAPissuelateintolasteveningandwillpickitupagaintoday.Media,andinmylanemoreimportantlytheSenate,hasasenseweareeitherlying,incompetent,orboth.I'veinsulatedthebossfrommostofthis,butifwecan'tturnthecornerontheHill(particularlyinSenatorBiden'soffice)wewillhavetopleadthe6th(stupidity)andbegforgiveness.Itoldhim(CMC)lastnightthatontheseissueswemustconsiderhowourexplanationssoundstothemediaandHill,notourselves.Anexplanationthatconvincesus,mightnotmakesensetotheHillwhowantstobelieve,andcertainlymakenosenseatalltothemediathatseeminglyworkshardtoneverbelieve.Thisstartedfromwhathasbeendescribedtomeasathirdtierreporterfromathirdratepublication(InsideDefense)soitshouldn'tbetakenseriously.Thenetisthenet,however,andwe'vegotafirsttiercredibilityproblemonourhandsandtheissueisnowoutinthemainstreammedia.TheAPreporterbriefedyesterdaywentrighttoMr.Biden'sofficeandcounteredourexplanationandcharacterizeditasBS,but,moreimportantly,wasatoddswiththeinformationweprovidedtheHillyesterdaymorning.ImayneedyourhelponthistodaySir.Respectfully,JohnKelly
(Allesemaildtd5/24/2007)
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ItisclearthatMarineCorpsleadershiprecognizedthehostilenatureofthepress,butstillheldouthopeforanhonesthearingfromthehill“whowantstobelieve”.BGenKellywasmistakeninhisassessmentthatthehillwantedtobelieve.AtthispointtheMarineCorpsthoughtitwouldgetafairhearingfromSenatorBidenbeforehepassedjudgment.ItwasthoughtthatBiden’sjudgmentofthecircumstancessurroundingtheoldUUNSwouldbeinformedbytheMarineCorpsresponse.
Unfortunately,beforetheMarineCorpscouldrespond,SenatorBidenhadworkedbehindthescenestodiscredittheMarineCorps.HisstaffhadgottenintouchwithFranzGayl(thesourceoftheblogs)andofferedtoputhimintouchwithareporterfromUSATODAY(onthe23rd)inordertoincreasethevisibilityofthestorytoanationalnewspaper.ThefollowingsequenceisarticulatedbyGayl,Weinberger(BlogDangerRoom)andVandenBrook(USATODAY)inthemovie“WaronWhistleblowers:FreePressandtheNationalSecurityState”:Gayl:IcontactedSharonWeinbergeroftheblogcalled“DangerRoom”.Weinberger:HewasachampionforfightingagainstthePentagonbureaucracythatwasslowingthingsdown.Gayl:Military-industrial…andthemilitarypieceissupposedtobeincharge.Telltheindustry.Youknow.Butwhathappensisthebureaucracyhasitsowninterests.Weinberger:Wehaddocumentsbackingitupandsowewentaheadandpublishedit.Gayl:…publishestheactualdocumentonDangerRoomwhichwasveryveryhelpful.ThatgottheattentionofSenatorBidenandhisstaff.TheyaskedwhetherIwouldliketospeaktoUSAToday.IsaidyesandIgotacallfromTomVandenBrookIbelievetheverynextday.VandenBrook:..andassoonasIfindoutaboutFranzIthought“OhmyGod.IgotareallivehonesttoGodwhistleblowerwhoknowswhat’sgoingon.”Gayl:Iprovidedhimunclassifiedinformationwhichwaskeytounderstandingtheissue.VandenBrook:Ithoughtimmediatelywewereembarkingonabiggerprojecttofindoutwhythesevehicleshadn’tbeengettingthereinthefirstplace.Gayl:…andimmediatelyhetookandranwithitandheunderstoodandwasfortunatelyabletobringthistoafront-pagearticle.(Greenwald)
SenatorBiden’sofficeelevatedthestorytothenationallevelbyactivelyworkingtogetthestorypublishedinUSATODAY(frontpage).
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July16/17/18,2007OnJuly16,2007USATodaypublishedGayl’saccusationsinafrontpagestory.ThatstorywasimmediatelyusedbySenateDemocrats.OnJuly17,2007TheUnitedStatesSenatetookupdebateontheLevin-ReedAmendmentwhichwastobevotedupononthe18th.SenateDemocratsscheduledarareall-nightsessiononthisAmendmentwhichwouldrequireawithdrawalfromIraq(apositionopposedbythePresident).TheUSATodayarticlewasusedbySenateDemocratstobuttresstheirargumentandcriticizethePresident’ssupportofthetroops.
(Wong,p.1)
OnJuly16,2007USATodayrantheMRAPstoryonpage1asseeninSenatorReid’shandatapressconference.HewastheSenateMajorityLeaderandwasflankedbySenatorDurbin(TheMajorityWhip)andSenatorSchumer(DemocratThirdRankingMember).ThethemeoftheirpressconferencewasfocusedontheWarinIraqandtheupcomingovernightsessionscheduledfor17-18July.
ThearticlewasusedtobuttresstheDemocratsargumentsthatthePresidentwasnottakingcareofthetroops.TheSenatewastostayinsessionovernightcreatingmaximumvisibilityfortheDemocratledefforttowithdrawfromIraqpertheLevin-ReedAmendment.OneofthemajorpillarsoftheirargumentwasthatthePresidentwasnottakingcareofthetroops,thereforeawithdrawalwasinorder.ThemajorityofDemocratSenatorswerecriticalofthePresidentshandlingoftheIraqWartoincludethePresident’ssupportforthetroopsinharm’sway.ThecriticismofMRAPandtheuseoftheUSATodayarticleasthefactualsourceforthiscriticismwaswidelyusedbyDemocratsontheflooroftheUSSenate:
• SenatorBrown(D-OH):“EveryyearIseeIraqslipfurtherandfurtherintoacivilwarwithourNation’smilitarycaughtinthemiddle.ThePresidentsentourNation’smilitaryinto
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awarofchoiceonfailedintelligenceand,asweknow,withoutproperbodyarmor.Addinginsulttoinjury,literallyjusttoday,aUSATodayarticlerevealedthatnearly4yearslaterourtroopsarestillwithoutthelifesavingequipmenttheyneed.TheUSATodayarticlehighlightedthelackofplanningtoprotectoursoldiersridinginHumveesfromtheimpactofIEDbombs.Humveeshaveaverylowgroundclearance,alittlelessthanafootandahalf.ThebottomofahumveeisflatsowhenitishitbyanIEDblastfromthebottom,troopssufferthebruntoftheexplosion.TheMineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicle,orMRAP—theMineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicle,ontheotherhand,hasa3-footclearance,anditsbodyisV-shapedsowhentheexplosionhappens,theexplosion,ifyouwill,isdissipatedandmoreoftenthannotthetroopsarenotnearlyasbadlyinjured.Thesoldiersaremuchbetterprotected.ThefewMRAPSintheaterhaveproventheireffectivenessandclearlysavedlivesandclearlysavedmanyofoursoldiersandmarinesfrominjury.WhatinfuriatesmeandshouldinfuriateeveryoneacrossthisNationisthatthePentagonandtheadministration,similarlytobackin2002and2003whentheyfailedtoworkhardtoprovidethebodyarmortoprepareforthiswar,thePentagonandtheadministrationagaindidnotimmediatelyworktofixtheproblemofthehumvee’ssusceptibilitytoIEDs;theneedlesslossoflifefromthiswillfulignorancetocorrecttheglaringproblemoftheunprotectedhumveescouldhavebeenprevented,butarroganceandstubbornnessfromtheadministrationkepttheadministrationfromdoingtherightthing.”(CongressionalRecord,Brown,p.S9361)
• SenatorDodd(D-CT):“Ourmilitary’stopgeneralsandadmiralshavesubmittedtoCongresslistsofcriticalmilitaryprioritiesthatwouldnotbefundedunderthePresident’sfiscalyear2008budgetproposal.BillionsofdollarsaweekarebeingsquanderedinIraq,whileourNation’smilitaryiscallingoutforadditionalresourcestorepairthedamagecausedbytheadministration’spolicies.”(CongressionalRecord,Dodd,S9299)
• SenatorWhitehouse(D-RI):“AsItraveledaroundRhodeIslandinthelastfewyearsImetmotherswhofelttheyhadtobuybodyarmorfortheirsonswhowerebeingshippedtoIraqbecausetheycouldnottrustthisadministrationtoprovideit.Justthisweek,USATodayreportedextensivelyonthePentagon’sfailuretoaddresstheMarines’requestforMineResistantAmbushProtection—orMRAP—vehicles.”(CongressionalRecord,Whitehouse,p.S9403)
• SenatorBiden(D-DE):“Finally,Isaytomycolleagues,regardlessofone’sviewonthewarandhowtoendit,thereisonecommitmenteachandeveryoneofusshouldmake.Thatcommitmentissolongasthereisasingle—asingle—AmericantroopinIraq—asingleAmericantroopinIraq—thatweshoulddoallthatisneededtogivethemthebestpossibleprotectionthiscountrycanprovide,andthewaytostartwiththatistoreplacethehumveeswiththesemine-resistantvehiclesthatinourlastsupplementalIwasabletoconvinceourcolleaguestoadd1.7billionmoredollarstobuildthem.ThesevehicleshaveaV-shapedhullandtheycanreducecasualtiesfromroadsidebombsupto
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80percent.Rightnow,70percentofallthecasualtiestakingplaceinIraqisbecauseofroadsidebombs.IwillofferanamendmenttotheDefensebillwhenwegettoittomakeclear,withabsolutelynoambiguity,thatCongresswillprovideeverysingledollarneededandeveryauthoritynecessarytobuildthesevehiclesasquicklyaspossiblebecauseourkidsaredying,anditcanradicallyreducethenumberofcasualties.IconcludebysayingourRepublicancolleaguessay—allofwhomIrespect,buttheoneIparticularlyrespectisSenatorLUGAR—thattheyexpectthePresidenttovoluntarilychangecourse.Ihaveabsolutelynofaith,nonewhatsoever,inthisPresidenttovoluntarilydowhatshouldbedone.TheonlywayitisgoingtohappeniswhenourRepublicanfriendsstopvotingwiththePresidentandstartvotingtoendthiswarbysupportingourtroops.Iyieldthefloor.”(Biden,p.S9441)TheentiretyoftheDemocratPartyLeadershipintheSenateusedGayl’sinformation
andperspectiveinanefforttoendthewarinIraq.ItisunclearwhetherGaylwasanactiveparticipantoraconvenientdupe.Eitherway,GaylhadprovidedatremendousservicetosupportthepositionoftheSenateDemocrats.
HouseDemocratsalsocitedthisarticle:
• CongressmanHall(D-NY):“Inthelatestexample,USATodayrevealedthatthePentagonhasbeenevenslowerthanwethoughtinprovidingsafervehiclesforourtroops.Accordingtoe-mailswithinthePentagon,aMarinegeneralinIraqrequestedMRAPs,mineresistantambushprotectedvehicles,asfarbackasDecember2003.ThesevehiclesofferthebestprotectionfromIEDsforourtroops.ThenumberonekilleroftroopsinIraqareIEDs.However,whilePentagonleadershipdelayedinprovidingthesevehiclestoU.S.troops,theydecidedtoequiptheIraqiArmywiththesevehicles,whileleavingoursoldierswithHumvees.Thisresultedintheunnecessarydeathsofatleast600Americans.For$3,000,thetaxpayersofmydistrictpaidforthebestequipmentwecouldbuyfortheIraqiArmy,butleftoursoldiersandmarineswithsubstandardHumvees.Itistimewereorientourpriorities,protectourownsoldiers,andendthiswar.”(CongressionalRecord,Hall,p.H7856-7)AnyeffortthattheMarineCorpsmadetorespectfullyexplainthehappenings
surroundingMRAPweretoolateanddoomed.IftheMarineCorpsexplanationwastobebelieved,thentheSenators’positionswouldbeopentocriticismandthepresswouldbeobligedtoissueretractions.TheSenatorsittinginjudgment(Biden)wasactivelyundercuttingtheMarineCorps.AsSenatorBidenbecameVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates,theMarineCorps’positionbecameevenmoreprecarious.FranzGaylbecameuntouchablenomatterwhathesaid.FranzGayldidnot“speaktruthtopower”.Hewasusedbypowerandthenprotectedbypower:oneofthemostinfluentialpoliticiansontheplanet.ThatsupportwasbuttressedbythemostpowerfulSenatorsinCongressandthepress.TheMarineCorpswasoutgunnedfromthestartanddidn’trecognizeit.
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8B-NOBODYREADSORHASTHECAPABILITYTOREAD
TherehavebeenveryfewchallengestothecontentandveracityofGayl’sstudy.Many
feelhisstudyisaccurate.Hehasbeenquotedinthepress,butthepressdoesnothavethecapabilitytounderstandGayl’swritings.MostmilitaryreadersdonothavethespecializedknowledgeneededtounderstandGayl’swritings.TheendresultwasanacceptancethatGayl’sstudyandcommentarywerecorrect.InordertounderstandtheeventssurroundingMRAPaswellastheaccusationsleviedbyGayl,onemustunderstandthebasicsof:
• MarineCombatDevelopmentProceduresandResponsibilities• Advocacy• Componency• CommandRelations• CounterIED• Technology• ProcurementandBudget• Tactics
ThislackofunderstandingextendedtothosedirectlyinvolvedwithMRAP.EitherGayldidnotunderstandseveralofthesecriticalbasics,orhedeliberatelymisledhisreaders.Thisauthorhashadtheuniqueopportunitytoserveinbilletswhereanunderstandingofthesebasicswasrequired. ArandomlyselectedpageprovidesalistingofwordsandacronymsrequiredtoreadGayl.Understandingthetermsandtheirrelationshipsrequiresyetanotherlevelaboveknowledgeaboutthemeaningofthewords.Page25inGayl’sstudy(notafullpageandrandomlyselected)containsthefollowingterms:
• CDIB• Materialimpacts• MRAPUUNS• MRAP• UUNS• POR• FullyfundedPOR• MCCDC• Casualtyratedata• Strategicimpact• Operationalimpact• Tacticalimpact
Veryfewhavethevocabularytoread,letaloneunderstand,MRAPissues.Asaresult,manipulativeargumentsweremadewithoutchallenge.Inaddition,acriticalreadingofMRAPdocumentswasabandonedbyreadersunfamiliarwithesotericmilitarylanguage.
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• MNF-W• Quantico’slocalizedprogrammaticvision• Urgentneeds• COTS• Combatdeveloperadvocate• GCE• Operatoradvocate• Processcontrol(forcombatdevelopment)• Reprogramming• CDIBvotingmembers• S&T• ONR• HMMWV• JLTV• COTSMRAPS• MCCDCstaff• Urgentvehicleneeds• Longtermcapabilityplans• Combat-provenCOTSsystem• ImmaturefundedS&Tinitiatives• Developmentsystemadvocatesandmanagers• Operatingforces
Ifonecannotunderstandthewords,thenonecannotunderstandthesentencesand
paragraphs,andbyextensionthestudy.ThemilitaryusesitsownjargonandGayltookadvantageofthisbyusingplentyofitinhisstudy.WhileGayl’suseoftheaforementionedmilitaryjargonisgrammaticallycorrect,hisunderstandingofthejargonisincorrect(seetheremainderofthisstudy).Othercommentators,suchasMrJankowski(ColUSMCResandaGayladvocate)alsomadefundamentalusageerrorsleadingtoerroneousconclusions. Forexample,Jankowskipublishedseveralarticlesin“SmallWarsJournal”dealingwithMRAP.JankowskiwasanactivatedLtColwhowasontheMARCENTstaffandworkedtheMRAPissuebetweenJuly2006andMar2007.Hecriticizedthe“PentagonEstablishment”whilereferringtotheactionsofMCCDC,Quantico.“My2006studyofMCCDC’s“analysis”oftheMcGriff/Gregsoninitiativein2005madeitobviousthatitwasaPentagonEstablishmenthatchetjob.”(Jankowski,p1)MCCDCisnotpartofthe“PentagonEstablishment”.MCCDCiscommandedbyaLieutenantGeneralatQuanticoandisaservicecommandansweringtoCMC.Jankowski’scommandwasalsocommandedbyaLieutenantGeneralwhoalsoansweredtoCMC.Jankowskiusedtheterm“PentagonEstablishment”overthirtytimes.Someusagesappeartobecorrect.Otherswereincorrect.TheonlywaytodiscernwhichiswhichwouldbetoaskJankowskiwhichorganizationshewasaddressingforeachusage.IfaMarineLtColhastroublewithterminology,civiliansandthepresswouldhaveevengreaterdifficulty.Oneofthe
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civilianorganizationsthatneededextensivehelpunderstandingtheterminologyandassociatedprocesseswastheDODIG.
ThisauthorhadtheopportunitytobeinterviewedforfourhoursbytheMRAPDODIG.TheywereagroupoflawyersversedintheDODyetagoodportionofthefourhourinterviewamountedtoeducatingthemaboutcombatdevelopment.Thesewereallsharpandlearnedprofessionals,yettheMarinejargonandprocessrequireddetailedexplanation.TheDODIGreportusescorrectlanguagewhichreflectsasignificantimprovementbetweentheirinterviewstageandthefinalreport.Severaloftheirconclusions,however,wereincorrect(discussedinDODIGchapter).TheDODIG,aftermasteringthemeaningofthelanguage,stillfailedtomastertheimplicationsofthelanguage.
CompoundingtheDODIGlanguageissueswastheinterpretationoftheDODIGreportby
others.Gaylapparentlyreliedonthereaders’inabilitytounderstandthelanguageintheDODIGwhenhestated:
• “MyconcernsexpressedthenhavebeenoverwhelminglyvalidatedduringthecourseofanMRAPDODIGauditconductedsincethattimeandpublishedinDecember2008.”(GaylTestimony,p3-4)
• “Myconcernshavebeenvalidatedmultipletimesthroughindependentorganizationsexternaltomychainofcommand”(GaylTestimony,p6)
• “ThisauditwasconductedpriortoandseparatefromboththeDODIGMRAPUUNSAuditandtheGAOJNLWPaudits,butintheendthefindingsofallthreeturnedouttobeinterrelatedandcomplimentary.”(GaylTestimony,p7)
• “TheDODIGMRAPUUNSauditoverwhelminglyvalidatedmyMRAPcasestudy.ItrevealedmultipleinexplicablediscrepanciesbetweenthewordsanddeedsofofficialsatMCCDC,aswellasbetweenthestatementsofseniorUSMCofficersandfactualevidencedocumentedintheaudit.ItwassignificantthattheauditdidnotrefutemycasestudyfindingthatgrossmismanagementoftheMRAPrequirementwasevident,andthatinactionbyMCCDCofficialsonacquiringMRAPvehiclescostmanyMarinestheirlives.”(GaylTestimony,p9)
ThesefalsestatementsweregiventotheUnitedStatesCongress,yetnoonequestionedhisveracity.Thisauthorattributesthelackofquestionstoalackofunderstanding.Theabovestatementsareeasilydiscreditedinotherchapters. Gayl’spresentationsoverwhelmthereader.Thecontentissovariedanddifficulttounderstandthatonlyaveryfewindividualshaveanyhopeofunderstandinghislanguage,letalonehispoints.Hethereforereceivedafreepassbythosewhoshouldhavebeenexamininghisassertionsmoreclosely.SeveralofGayl’sassertionsshouldhavebeenquestioned:
“BasedupontheresearchprovidedinthiscasestudytheauthorsuggestsIMEFUUNSwasnotfulfilledbecauseindividualsthroughouttheEFDSperceivedtheMRAPasathreat,asitwouldcompeteforlimitedfundingagainstotherexistingprogramsandcombatvehicleinitiatives.”(Gayl,pvii)IfGaylwasprohibitedfromdiscussingMRAPwithEFDSpersonnelin
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MCCDC(hewas),thenhowdidhedeterminewhichindividualsperceivedMRAPasathreat?Subsequentquestionscouldbeaskedsuchas,“Didthoseindividualsactuallymatterinthefundingdecisions?”
“Duringthissecondattempt,IMEF(Fwd)requestedMRAPs,Intelligence,Surveillance,andReconnaissance(ISR),andotherCOIN-enablingcapabilitiesthroughJointchannelsandself-helpopenpurchases(Referencesr.8.,r.11,r.12.,r.13.,r.15.,r.16.,r.17.,r.18.,r.24.,r.25.,andr.28.).ThisapproachbetterservedtheMarines,Soldiers,Sailors,andAirmenofMNF-WbecauseitcircumventedtheEFDS.”(Gayl,pvii)TheEFDSincludesIMEF.Didtheycircumventthemselves?DidGaylunderstandthattheEFDSwasinvolvedintheJointpurchaseofbothMRAPandIMEFrequestedISRassets?DidGaylunderstandthatjointprocessesarecoordinatedwiththeServices?
“In2007,whenMRAPwascombinedwiththeIMEF(Fwd)’sotherself-acquiredcapabilitiesandthefavorabledevelopmentsresultingfromthe“AnbarAwakening,”theIEDemergencywascontained.”(Gayl,pvii)Whichself-acquiredcapabilitiesdoesGayladdress?MRAPwasnot“self-acquired”.
“IntheabsenceofcombatdevelopersupportforMRAPs,ServicesupportwasobtaineddirectlyfromtheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsbasedonastatisticallyverifiedcasualtyanalysisatMARCENT.”(Gayl,pX)MARCENTisacombatdeveloper.WhichcombatdevelopmentorganizationsdidnotfavorMRAP?
“Intheend,SECDEF,Congress,andGOAdvocatesinIMEF(Fwd)warfighterandMARCENTcomponentbilletswererequiredtoshepherdMRAPandotherrequirementsbymeansofforcingfunctions.”(Gayl,pxiv)Whatweretheforcingfunctions?IMEFsubmittedUUNSandJUONSperMarine/Jointordersanddirectives.
“Althoughmychargeshavebeenlargelyconfirmed”(GaylTestimony,p1)-WhatarethespecificchargesanddoesGaylhavetheauthoritytochargeorsimplytoaccuse?Whowasfoundguiltyofthesecharges?
“DespiteunambiguousandcontinuousfeedbackfromthedeployedMarinesMCCDC,atQuantico,theMarineCorpsturnedablindeyetorequestsforurgentlyneededequipmentwheneverthoserequestsconflictedwithparochialconceptoracquisitionprioritiesinacompetitionforresources”(GaylTestimony,p3)Whatistheproofofunambiguousandcontinuousfeedback?Whereistheproofofturningablindeyetoconflictingpriorities?
ThesimplequestionstosomeofGayl’slargestpointswereneverasked.Theyweresimplyignored.Thisstudywilladdresstheabovequestions.ThisauthorbelievesthatGayldidnothavetoanswermanysimplequestionsbecausehewasnotunderstood.
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8C-GAYLPRESENTATIONMISLEADS
Asdiscussedintheprevioussection,Gayl’spresentationswerehardtounderstand
basedonthecomplexityofthepointsandtherequirementtohaveaworkingknowledgeofmanyaspectsofthemilitaryandMarineCorps.ComplicatingtheabilitytounderstandGaylwasthewayhisevidencewascraftedtoleadtohisfalseconclusions.
ThisauthorwasanaddresseeonseveraloftheemailspresentedinGayl’sstudy.Most
ofthemcontainedselectmessagesfromastring,socontextwasleftout.OthersusedonlythesentencesthatGaylwishedtopresent.ThesehalfemailswereespeciallymisleadingwhenpresentingtheIMEFrejectionofmoreMRAPs.AsseeninChapter9,IMEFdeliberatelyrejectedmoreMRAP-typevehiclesafterthe185JERRVJUONS.Theinsistencethattheirrequirementwasonly185debunkstheideathattheywereconstantlyaskingformoreorthattheirrequirementwas1,169.Gaylomitsthispartoftheemail(discussedlater).
Gaylalsofailedtolinkhispointstoordersordirectives.Hisaccusationsaretherefore
basedonhisinterpretationofhowtheprocessworks.AdiscerningreadercannottraceGayl’saccusationstotheordersanddirectivesthatformthebasisforhisaccusation.Inthecivilianworldasimilarproblemwouldoccurifpoliceofficerschargedpeoplewithcrimesbasedontheirownsenseofrightandwronginsteadofestablishedlaw.
OftentimesGayldoesnotintervieworcitethesourcesforhisaccusations.Hesimply
makestheaccusationwithaboldassumptionthatheiscorrect.Thereaderislefttosearchfortheevidence(whichoftendoesn’texist).
GaylselectsslidesanddraftslidesfrompresentationsthatareprovidedonlywithGayl’s
interpretation.“ThepresentationreferredtobyRichardLardneraboveconfirmedthatthereareindeedchallengeswithintheMCCDCcombatdeveloperprocess,andperhapsevenamongstitspersonnel(Referencep.6.).Slidesfromthatdraftpresentationincludedthosepostedimmediatelybelowthisparagraph.”(Gayl,p117)DraftbulletpresentationsdonotconstituteMarineCorpspolicy.Inthiscase,thepresentationwascreatedbyGaylinhisDDR&Epresentation.ThisisaninstanceofGaylquotingapressreleasethatisquotingGaylhimselfandpassingitoffasindependentinformation.AnygenericreaderofGayl’sstudywouldhavetospendtimedeterminingthatGaylisquotinghimself.Mostreaderswouldsimplyacceptthepointandcontinuereading.
Gaylalsoinfersalotfromsimpleslidespresentedfordiscussion.Someforums,to
includetheCDIB,arerequiredtoestablishproblemareasintheirslides.ACDIBbriefermaypresentfivenegativepointsintheirUUNSslide,butbeapassionatesupporteroftheUUNS.
Gayl’sMRAPpresentationsrelyontheignoranceofprocessonthepartofthereaders.Intheabsenceofanunderstandingoftheinformation/processesGaylcritiques,areadercanbemisledinanywayGaylintends.
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ThenegativepointsdonotinanywayreflectthefinalpositionofthebrieferandtheycertainlydonotreflectthefinalpositionoftheCDIBintotal.Thesearedeliberativeslides,notafinalposition.Gayldoesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwocreatingnegativeimpressionsofeventsthatweresimplystaffdeliberations.ThebelowDoctrineslideisfromaMRAPCDIBbrief:
Gaylconcludes,fromthisslideandnootherinformation(suchasemailorinterview):“So,thefirstbulletobservedwithconcernthataheavierforcemightresult,eventhoughaheavierforceisexactlythematerialsolutionthattheMEFwanteddelivered.Unfortunately,theMEFsandMARCENTdidnothaveavoteontheMRAPoranyotherUUNSrequestedcapabilityduringtheconductoftheCDIBdeliberations.TheimmediateneedsoftheMEFforMRAPwereeclipsedbyfundedcombatdeveloperprioritiesbecauseMRAPwasanideainventedoutsideofQuanticoandlackedanyadvocacyamongstinfluentialvotingcombatdevelopers.”(Gayl,p24)Mostreaderswouldnotarriveatthatconclusionbasedontheaboveslide.Combatdeveloperswouldappreciatetheinformationastheywouldhavetoplanforadditionalfuel,lift,roads/bridges,maintenanceetc.
Gayl’somissionofcontentandcontext,especiallyintopicareasnotwellunderstood,leavesreadersbelievingflawedandunprovenconclusions.
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8D-GAYLCONFLATEDWHISTLEBLOWERSTATUSWITHMRAPISSUES
TheonlyreasontheMRAP“issue”receivedtheattentionthatitdidwasbecausethe
issueofwhistleblowingwasintroduced.ThewhistleblowercommunityparrotedGayl’sStudycomments,afterall,awhistleblowerneedssomethingaboutwhichtoblowthewhistle.EverytimeGayltestifiedaboutwhistleblowing,heusedthestagetopromulgatehisincorrectversionofMRAPevents:
GaylerroneouslylinkedhiswhistleblowingtodeathsinIraq.“AsacivilservantI
enjoyedanunblemishedrecorduntil2007,whenIblewthewhistleonaprocurementbreakdowncausedbyMarineCorpssupportinstitutionsatQuantico,Virginia.Ifeltitwasmyduty,becausevitalequipmentwasnotgettingdeliveredtothefield,andmanyliveswereunnecessarilylost-MarinesandSoldiers,aswellasIraqicivilians.”(GaylTestimony,p1)Gayl’swhistleblowingdidnotsolveanyprocurementbreakdowns.
Gaylerroneouslylinkedhiswhistleblowingtohisassignedduties.“Untilearly2007,IwasgrantedgreatfreedomininteractingwithcorporateMarineCorpsatHQMCandQuantico,aswellasthePentagonandlargerUSGovernmentCommunities.ThatfreedomandthescienceandtechnologyfocushadbeenbuiltintomyPositionDescription-itwaswhyIwashired.However,oncemyeffortsbegantopointoutflawsintheMarineCorpsprocurementsystem,notonlydidmysupervisorstakeawaymyprofessionalfreedomtointeractwiththepeopleandagenciesthatcouldsolvetheseproblems,theyalsobegantoretaliateagainstmeasawhistleblower.”(GaylTestimony,p2)Gayl’sresponsibilitiesdidnotincludeanalysisoftheprocurementsystemnordiditbenefittheMarineCorpsforGayltospreadhismisinformationthroughouttheDOD.
Gaylerroneouslylinkedhisvocalcandidness,orvocalopinion,tohisjobinIraq.“However,whenIreturnedtotheU.S.,thesameadvocacythathadearnedmepraisefromtheCommandingGeneralinthefieldbroughtmeretaliationfromthebureaucratsinQuanticoandmysuperiorsatthePentagonwhoweredispleasedwithmyvocalcandidnessregardinglackingcapabilitiesinIraq.”(GaylTestimony,p4)Gayl’s“vocalcandidness”didnotbeginwhilehewasinIraqsohis“CGinthefield”didnotendorsehispostdeploymentexpostfacto“vocalcandidness”.Gayl’sadvocacyintheaterwasdifferentfromhispostdeploymentwhistleblowing.
TheeventssurroundingMRAPhadlittletodowithGayluntilhebecameawhistleblower.TheServiceSecretaries,CongressandseniorDODofficialsunderstoodtheMarineCorpsneedforMRAPswellbeforethatpoint.InordertoincreaseGayl’sstanding,whistleblowerorganizationscreateda“fictitiousGayl”whose“heroic”MRAPeffortsdrovetheMarineCorpstobuyMRAP.Thisassumptionisfalseontwoaccounts:ItinvalidatestheMarineCorpseffortsuptothatpointanditincorrectlygivesGaylcreditforgettingtheMarineCorpstorespondtotheMRAPneed.
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GaylmaskedhisownlackofaccountabilitybyaccusingGeneralOfficersduringHouseTestimonyonwhistleblowing.“Officialsmustbeheldaccountablefortheirpastwillfulblindnesstoknownthreatsthathavecausedtragicconsequences.Similarly,theGeneralOfficerswho1)failedtosupervisethoseofficialsthenand2)continuetodefendtheirpastactionstodayshouldbeheldaccountableaswell.”(GaylTestimony,p15)GaylcomplimentedtheGeneralsinMCCDCinJanof2007(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007)butoncehestartedblowingthewhistle,hisevaluationofGeneralschanged.
Gaylstates:“AsIstatedtomysupervisorduringacounselingsessionin2007,IintendtosuccessfullyachieveadegreeofaccountabilityandconcretechangeatQuanticoorIwillbefiredintheprocessoftrying.”(GaylTestimony,p15)Gayl’sofferofhisfiringisfalsebravado.Gaylknew,ashetestifiedintheHouseofRepresentatives,thatwhistleblowingwasnotanissuethatwouldgethimfired.Heeventuallyhadproblemsduetosecurityviolations,notwhistleblowing.Onceagain,hiswhistleblowingtestimonyprovidedaplatformforpointingthefingeratQuantico.
OrganizationssuchasGovernmentAccountabilityProject(GAP),ProjectonGovernmentOversight(POGO)andCenterforPublicIntegrity(andothers)continuedfollowingGayl’swhistleblowingcase.Inthepursuitoftheirwhistleblowinginterests,theseorganizationsandothersalsopublishedGayl’sMRAPfabrications.Theirblindallegianceto“theheroicwhistleblower”allowedthemtobedupedintobelievingGayl’sstory.
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8E-MARINECORPSRESPONSEWASPOOR
TheMarineCorpsresponsetoMRAPaccusationswastepid,poorlyfocused,andtotally
inadequate.SomemaytakecomfortthattheMarineCorps’lawyeringskillsarenotasfine-tunedastheirexpeditionaryandamphibiouswarfareskillsare.Occasionally,however,theMarineCorpsfindsitselfinsituationswhereagoodsimpledefenseagainstscurrilouschargeswouldbehelpful.ThatsimpledefensewasabsentforMRAP.
ThefirstmistaketheMarineCorpsmadewastocedecontrolofthequestions.Gayl,
BidenandthepressfocusedtheMarineCorpsonansweringquestionsthatwereoutofcontextinthefirstplace.ForexampleSenatorBidenasked:“WasadecisionmadetodeployadditionalhumveeswithbettersideandundercarriagearmorinsteadofMRAPs?”(Tomczakemaildtd5/30/2007)Bidenmakesthedecisionseembinaryfocusedonsideandundercarriagearmor.ThereweremanyfactorsgoingintothevehicledecisionandforthoseMarinesinharm’sway,timelinessandreliabilitywerefactors.
Otherquestionsofferedopportunitytoforwardpointsthatcouldhavestoppedthe
inquirycold.ForexampleBidenasked:“WithregardtotheFebruary2005request,bywhomwasitconsideredandwhatwasitsdisposition?”(Tomczakemaildtd5/30/2007).Gaylchimedinlater“ThequestionforanyfutureinvestigationofthisissuewouldbewhethertheomissionoftheMRAPUUNSandanydiscussionoftheIMEF(Fwd)’sknowncontinueddeterminationtoacquirethecapabilityin06wasunintendedordeliberate.”(Gayl,p48) Simplegradeschoolmathprovidestheanswer.SupposeXistherequestedamountofMRAPsbyIMEFpriortotheirrequestfor185MRAPsinMayof2006.XrepresentsthefullMRAP-typevehiclesnumberrequestedbytheHejlikUUNSplusanynumbersuggestedbySenatorBidenthatwasignoredplusanyotherrequestofanysortfromthedeployedMEFsplusanynumberthatGaylsuggestswerenotprovidedupuntilthetimeoftherequestfor185.Insum,anyrequestedMRAPsofanysortfromIMEFpriortothe185requestisaddedintoX.
InJuly2006IMEFsubmittedaJUONSfor1,000MRAPs.ThetotalrequestedamountofMRAPswas1,185byAugustof2006.AllofthesenumbersarereflectedinGayl’sstudy,theDODIG,emailsandpressreleases.Thefollowingmathproblemapplies.SolveforX:
X+185+1000=1,185
ObviouslyXequalszero.ZeroisthenumberrequestedbyIMEFpriortotherequestfor185.ZeroisthenumberofMRAPsIMEFanticipated.ZeroisthenumberMCCDCignoredand
Ofnoteisthatresponses,criticismsandinvestigationalloccurredwhiletheMarineCorpswasperformingthevastlymoreimportantworkoffightinginIraqandAfghanistan(andsupportingthosefights).TheMarineCorpsresponsetotheMRAPissuewaspoor.Evensimpleargumentswentunmade.In-depthfact-findingdidnotoccur.
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zeroisthenumberthatcombatdevelopers,toincludeadvocates,wereresponsiblefordelivering.“WhendidIMEFdecidethattheydesirednoMRAPs?”isthequestionthatshouldhavebeenasked.Theassumptionthattherewasdemandis,bygradeschoolmath,disproven.ThisstudywilldiscussinmoredetailotherproofIMEFdidnotrequest/demand/submitneedsforMRAPs. InsteadofansweringquestionsaboutthelackofdemandforMRAPs,theMarineCorpswasforcedtoanswerquestionsaboutwhytheywerenotprovided.Thisstudywillprovidemanyanswersthatshouldhavebeenprovided,butwerenot.ItwillalsodisproveseveralofthebasicassumptionsthatshapedtheMRAPdiscussion.
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8F-THETYRANYOFTIME
TheamountoftimethatpassedbetweeneventsdealingwithMRAPwasamajor
probleminseparatingfactfromfiction.Emailsweredeleted.Peopleindecision-makingpositionschanged.Thosewhowereinterviewedwereaddressingissuesthatwereyearsold.Oftentimesstatementswerenotbackedbysomesortoffactualreferencesuchasabrieforemailorreportedstatement.Gaylstated:“Intheendnohistoricaltrailotherthanafewpresentations,processdocuments,andaMCCDCinfopaperareknowntoexist.”(Gayl,p39)Inthisatmospheretheuncoveringoffactsuffered.TheHejlikUUNSwassubmittedinFeb2005:
• TwoyearsandthreemonthslaterthefirstinquirybySenatorBidenoccurred.
• TwoyearsandelevenmonthslaterGaylpublishedhisstudy.
• Threeyearsandonemonthlater,theDODIGstartedcollectingdatafortheirinvestigation.
• ThreeyearsandtenmonthslatertheDODIGpublishedtheirresults.
Thoseinvolvedmayhavekepttheirunclassifiedemails.Marines,however,arenotallowed
tokeepacopyoftheirclassifiedemails.MuchoftheequipmentdiscussionwascarriedoutonthesecretnetworkssupportingthoseintheITO.Manyofthoseclassifiedemailsareandwereunavailable.ThisauthorprovidedemailstotheDODIGdebunkingmanyofGayl’scharges,however,thoseemailsarenotincludedinthepublishedDODIG.
TheunavailabilityofmuchofthedocumentationallowedGayltohypothesizewithoutany
contraryevidence.Thisstudyprovidesthatevidence(unclassified).
MRAPinvestigativeeffortsandcriticismsoccurredwellaftertheactualoccurrences.Responsesweredegradedbythegapintime.
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8G-THECHANGINGNATUREOFOIFFROMBUSTOMRAP
OnemustrememberthatthesituationinIraq(OIF)wasconstantlychanging.This
authortravelledintheITOduringvisitsin2004and2005anddeploymentsin2005and2007-2008.Initially,thegroundwarwassupportedwithsoft-skinnedHMMWVsandtruckswithnoarmoratall.Thegroundtransportfleetwaslargelyunarmoredandtacticswereusedtokeepthesevehiclesawayfromdirectcombat.
Inearly2004thisauthorwastheseniormilitaryofficialontheplanningtriptoturnthe
GreenZoneovertotheStateDepartment.WelandedatthemilitaryairstripatBaghdadanddeplaned.Wehadciviliansandmilitarypersonnel.WeboardedacivilianbuswithnoarmorandrodetotheGreenZone.Wehadapproximately20personnelontheunarmoredbusandnoammunition.ThisroadwouldlaterbecomeoneofthemostheavilyIED’droadsinIraqandwewerepackagedinanunarmedgroupof20onaseveralbusconvoy.Wedidnothaveweldedonarmor,MAKkits,m1114soranyotherarmor.Justasimplebus.
In2005manyofthevehiclesusedfortravelusedweldedsteelforarmorastheIEDthreatgrew.Armorkitsstartedtobefieldedandm1114sstartedtoshowup.ThesideblastIEDwasthemostcommonIEDandthosewhohadtheup-armoredHMMWVsappreciatedthem.Thisauthorhadtheopportunityto“borrow”oneduringatripthroughRamadi.The“lender”hadsurvivedseveralattackswhileusingthisvehicleandverygraciouslyextendedtheuseofhisvehicletothisauthor.Itwasthe“goldstandard”atthetime.
Underbodyattackswerenottheprevalenttypeofattacksandthem1114wasnotregardedasadeathtrap.“EmployingtheMRAPasanexample,sincethemid1990stheMarineCorpshasknownthatup-armoredHighMobilityMulti-PurposeWheeledVehicle(HMMWVs)are“deathtraps”intheirvulnerabilitytominesbecauseoftheHMMWV’sflatbottom,lowweight,lowgroundclearance,andaluminumbody.”(GaylTestimony,p3)
Gayl’stestimonyandwritingssufferfrompresentism.Attimesfrom1990through2005
them1114wasprized.Theeventualswitchtounderbodyattacksoccurredandthem1114swereovermatched,butthem1114effortpriortothattimesavedcountlesslives.TheportrayalofthenatureoftheconflictatdifferenttimesashomogeneouslentanairofcredibilitytoGayl.ThefailuretoconsidertheescalatingnatureofthethreatpresentsamisleadingpictureofMarinearmoringefforts.
ThecriticsoftheMarineCorpsusethetacticalsituationthatexistedin2006asthesolereferencepointforthenatureofthethreat.ThisformofpresentismmadeMarineCorpsequippingdecisionsseemincoherent.Thethreatmaturedtofocusonunderbodyattackswhereithadpreviouslyfocusedonsideattacks.
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8H-MRAPNAMESMISLEADING
Theterm“MRAP”wasoneofthekeyculpritsintheabilitytocriticizetheMarineCorps
for“delays”infieldingarmoredvehicles.TheconfusionoverthetermMRAPaddedtothemisconceptionsaboutMarineactions.TheDODIGusedtheterm“MRAP-type”becausenoothertermexists.Theconstantconfusionoftermswasinpartduetotheuseofsametermsfordifferentcapabilities(thedifferent“MRAP”usages)anddifferenttermsforthesamecapability(JERRV,MRAP,MMPV,Cougar).Onlyafterthe2005HejlikUUNSwasrediscoveredinMayof2006didIMEF(2006-2007)startrequestingMRAPs.Therecyclingofthetermin2006wasanefforttolendweighttothenewMRAPrequests.TheIMEFnamechangewasprobablypromptedbyarequirementssearchinitiatedbyMCWL.MCWL,asdescribedinChapter2,wasadvocatingformoreMRAPsandinitiatedasearchforoldUUNSsunderwhichmorearmorcouldbepurchased.OncetheoldMRAPUUNSwasdiscovered,IandIIMEFstaffstartedusingtheterm.Inaddition,theystartedusingtheoldUUNSasiftheyhadbeenadvocatingforthecapabilityallalong.Theywerenot.Theterm“MRAP”becamethedefaulttermandtheoldresolvedUUNSbecameportrayedasactive.ThisallowedafactfreecriticismoftheMarineCorpsbythoseignorantofMRAPhistory.ThepressfollowedalongandsimplyacceptedthatMRAPswerealwaysindemandbecausethenamesfortherequestswerethesame.
SimilarvehiclestoMRAP-typevehicleshadbeenrequestedsince2003.TheywerelumpedunderthetermHardenedEngineerVehicles(HEV)andwerefocusedonsatisfyingEngineeringneeds(notInfantryandothercombatarmsneeds).Thevehicle“Cougar”becameavariantof“HEV”.Thisoccurredbeforethe2005MRAPUUNS.ThesevehicleswereapprovedbytheMROCanddemonstratedthattheMarineCorpssupportedbuysofMRAP-typevehicles.ThenextnameusedforspecificvehiclesbecameJERRV(MRAPremainedadescriptiveterm).
Theinitial“MRAP-type”requestof2006wasactuallycalledtheJERRV:“Inordertoprovideaddedprotectiontoourexplosiveordnancedisposalteamsandcombatengineers,wealsopursuedtherecentprocurementoftheJointExplosiveOrdinanceDisposalRapidResponseVehicle(JERRV),commonlyreferredtoastheCougar.”(Gayl,p39)TherewasnomentionofMRAP,however,thelackofmentionofMRAPwasnotaneffectiveapproachforGayltomisleadreaders.
HechangedterminologyandusedthetermMRAPdespitetherequestbeingcalled
JERRV:“CMCimmediatelyauthorizedalargeprocurementofMRAPs.Thusempowered,IMEF(Fwd)immediatelysubmitteda2ndMRAPJUONSrequestfortheentirewarfighterneedat
Theterm“MRAP”haddifferentmeaningsatdifferenttimes.Itwasacapabilityaswellasaspecificvehicleatdifferenttimes.Othertermswereusedforthesamevehicle.Thelackofclarityalloweddisparateeventstobelinked.ThislinkagegavetheimpressionthattheMRAPissuewentbackmuchfurtherthanitactuallydid.
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thattimeforallforcesoperatingunderMNF-Wcommand—Soldiers,Sailors,andMarines.”(Gayl,p47)Flawswiththisstatementinclude:
• CMChasnoJUONSauthority(Chapter14).• ThisJUONSwaspushedbyMCCDC(Chapter11).• TherewasnofirstMRAPJUONS,itwasaJERRVJUONS.
TherealstoryisthatIMEFarrivedatapointwheretheywantedmoreJERRVsand
askedforthem.PressuredtoaskformoreanddiscoveringtheoldMRAPUUNS,theymadeasecondrequestandcalledtheentirerequestMRAPs.GaylthencommencedblamingQuanticowhilefalselyassumingthattheoriginal2005UUNSwasactivetheentiretime.ThisisonlypossibleifeveryrequestiscalledMRAP.Theywerenot.
TheJERRV(JointEODRapidRecoveryVehicle)wasoriginallyfocusedonEOD
requirements.ThespreadofIEDsandtheneedforadditionalarmorwasthepromptforIMEFtoexpresstheneedforJERRVs.IMEFsubmittedtheJUONSforJERRVsinsupportofinfantryandnon-EODunits.Untilthispoint,IMEFhadsubmittednoUUNSforanyMRAP-typevehiclenorhadtheyacknowledgedthattherewasalargeMRAP-typevehicleneed.WhenIMEF(viaMARCENT)requestedthesetypesofvehiclestheyrequestedJERRVs,notMRAPs:
(Butteremaildtd6/26/2006)
IMEFrequestedJERRVinemails,onspreadsheets,andtheJUONSwasaJERRVJUONS(oftenmistermedasaMRAPJUONS).TheterminologycontinuedtochangewiththeintroductionofMMPV(MediumMineProtectedVehicle).Onceagain,thetermMRAPwasnotused.MajGenCatto’sstatementtotheHouseArmedServicesCommitteeinJune2006usedthetermMMPV:“Intheinterim,we’removingforwardwithapprovalsfortheMediumMineProtectedVehicle(MMPV),whichhasbeenrequestedasaJointUrgentOperationalNeed.VarioustypesofIEDs,rocketpropelledgrenades,andsmallarmsfirein-theatermakeitnecessaryfortheMarineCorpstofieldavehiclecapableofsurvivingthesetypesofattacks,andbeabletocounterattack.TheMMPVprovidesthatincreasedsurvivabilityandmobility.TheMarineCorpsplanstoprocureandfield185MMPVs,whichwillprovideourforceswitha
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modularandscalablesystemcapableofincreasingthelevelofprotectioninaccordancewiththetypeofweaponsavailabletotheenemy.”(Catto,p13)ThebelowtableshowsMARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFpriorityinmid-2006astheMMPV.
(Johnstonemaildtd7/31/2006)
AfterMMPV,thenamechangedagainandMRAPstartedtobeused.WiththeuseofthetermMRAP,linkagesweremadebetweentheseparaterequests.Theuseofthesamenamemaketheselinkagesappearlegitimate.Forexample:“TheIMEF(Fwd)decisiontorequesttheJERRV(Cougar)MRAPsbymeansofJUONSwasdeliberate.IMEF(Fwd)wasawareofthefactthatMCCDChaddisapprovedtheMRAPUUNSthatithadsubmittedearlyin2005.InsteadofbattlingwiththebureaucracyatQuantico,IMEF(Fwd)decidedtotrytheJointresourcingroute.”…“ItisalsonoteworthythattheMEFaskedforonly185vehiclesasopposedtothe1,169ithadaskedforin2005.Thiswasadirectreflectionofthepsychologicaleffectofrepeatedcombatdeveloperrefusalstoproviderequestedequipment.”(Gayl,p49)ThisfabricatedanalysisindicatesthattheoldMRAPUUNSwaslinkedtothenewsubmission.However,theterm“JERRV(Cougar)MRAP”wasnotrequested.Onlytheterm“JERRV”wasrequestedanditwasunderstoodtheJERRVwasthesameasaCougar.
Gaylcontinued:“Theconfusionofthesewordsaboveintroducesthereadertoa
misleadinglyvaguedefinitionofMRAP,inspiteoftheabundantandcompellingdocumentationthatmeticulouslyandunambiguouslydefinedanMRAP.”(Gayl,p68)HadthetermMRAPbeenuniversallyunderstood,IMEFwouldnothaveaskedforMMPVorJERRVs.MARCENTcommented:“On20Jun06MajJosephAllenawrotetofellowMARCENTMRAPchampions:“...The185[JERRV]isdownrange.The1000+isare-energizedpreviousUUNS...Twodistinctefforts.(Gayl,p51)EvenMARCENThadtoadjustandfigureouttheterminology.Thetworequestswerefortheexactsamecapabilityandwereeventuallycombinedtoatotalrequestof1,185vehicles.
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GaylalsoaccusedCMCoffalselystatingthatthefirstMRAPrequestwasinJuly2006:“TheITPhadreportedonaletterfromtheCommandantoftheMarineCorps(CMC)totheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff(CJCS)inwhichheinaccuratelystatedthatthefirstcombatrequestforMRAPsoccurredmuchlaterthanitactuallyhad.”(GaylTestimony,p5)TheMRAPrequestin2005wasadescriptorofmanyvehicles.IMEFandMARCENTcontinuedtousedifferenttermsforMRAP-typecapabilitiesthrough2006.Thefirst2006requestwasforJERRV.ItisdisingenuoustoportrayaunifiedunderstandingofMRAP,MRAP-type,MMPVandJERRVrequests.BoththeauthoroftheHejlikUUNSandGeneralHejlikusedthetermMRAPtodescribem1114s(seechapter11B).TheCMCwascorrectbasedontheMRAPdefinitionofthattime.
ThefirstUUNSuse(HejlikUUNS)oftheterm“MRAP”wasagenericdescriptionofa
capabilitythathadovertensolutions(toincludethem1114).Theinterveningyear(betweentheHejlikUUNSandthe185JERRVrequest)sawmultipletermsapplyingtothesamecapability.ThesecondrequestusedthetermJERRVandthethirdrequestusedthetermMRAPagain.Thethirdrequest,however,wasunderstoodasspecifictypesofvehicles.Theterm“MRAP”hadclearlychangedmeaning.Moreimportantly,thetermMRAPwasinterpreteddifferentlyatdifferenttimes.Inanotherexampleofpresentism,Gaylusestheterm“MRAP”todescribeallofthesevehiclerequestssince2005wheninfactseveraltermswereinuse.
MCCDCdidnotdisapprovetheMRAPUUNSandwasverysupportiveofthenewJERRVJUONS.TherequestbymeansofaJUONSwasnotadeliberatechoicetogoaroundQuantico,itwasarecommendationBYQuantico.Gayl’spointsmakelesssenseiftheoldtermMRAPisnotlinkedtothenewtermMRAP.Hethereforelinksthem.Thereisnodebilitating“psychologicaleffect”ofbeingrejectedifthenewJUONSremainedasaJERRVJUONS(not“MRAPJUONS”).Thereisno“constantrejection”issueifthenewJUONSwasforsomethingotherthanMRAP(e.g.JERRVorMMPV)soGaylhastoincorrectlyusethe“MRAP”terminordertomakehispoint.
TheconfusionintermsgreatlyincreasedtheconfusioninresponsetoqueriesabouthowtheMarineCorpsrespondedtothe2005UUNS.TheDODIGcoinedtheterm“MRAP-type”vehiclesinordertoallowforeasierunderstandingoftheirinvestigation.TheaveragereaderoftheDODIGwouldnotbeabletodiscernbetweentheuseoftheterm“MRAP-type”and“MRAP”.OnemayevenarguethattheDODIGexpansionofterminologyexpandedtheirinvestigationbeyondtheircharter.TheDODIGchapterwilldiscussthispointfurther.
ThesametermswouldsuggestthattheMRAPeffortof2005waslinkedtotheMRAPeffortof2006.Theywerethesamewords,butthemeaninghadchangedfromcapabilitytospecificvehicle.
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8I-THEMRAPDODIGWASCONSTRAINED
InsteadofspendingthetimetocrushGayl’sargument,theMarineCorpsreliedona
DODIGtodeterminetheveracityofGayl’scharges.TheDODIG,however,waslimitedinscope(seetheDODIGChapter)andlefthugeswathsofthecombatdevelopmentprocessunconsidered.Beyondthat,theDODIGmissedcriticalinformationanddrewconclusionsbasedonasuperficialunderstandingofthecombatdevelopmentprocess.Despiteitsfailings,theDODIGdidproducesomenoteworthyconclusions.
TheDODIGproducedconclusionsfocusedonareasnotaddressedbyGayl.Theyalso
producedconclusionsdisputingGayl’sconclusions.Gaylstated:“TheDODIGMRAPUUNSauditoverwhelminglyvalidatedmyMRAPcasestudy”(GaylTestimony,p9)and“Itwassignificantthattheauditdidnotrefutemycasestudyfindingthat“grossmismanagement”oftheMRAPrequirementwasevident,andthatinactionbyMCCDCofficialsonacquiringMRAPvehiclescostmanyMarinestheirlives.”(GaylTestimony,p9)Bothofthesestatementsarefabrications.TheDODIGfoundno“grossmismanagement”nordidtheyvalidateGayl’sstudy.TheirmainconclusionwasnotevenmentionedasaconclusionintheGaylstudy(seeDODIGChapter).
TheDODIGhadtheopportunitytodisprovetheallegationsagainsttheMarineCorps.
Theyfailed.Asaresult,manycontinuedtoviewGayl’sunansweredallegationsascorrect.
TheDODIGwasfocusedonthechargesleviedbyBidenandGayl.HadtheDODIGbeengiventhelatitudetoinvestigatetheentiretyoftheissue,theirresultsmayhavebeenmoreaccurate.TheirinadequateinvestigationfailedtoclearuptheMRAPissue.
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8J-SERIESOFISSUES(NOTMRAP)WITHIMEFG9CAUSEDDISCORD
TheMRAPissuewasnotoneoftheproblemareasthatoccurredwithelementsofIMEF
(Fwd).TherewasaconstantdebatewiththeIMEFG9(Fwd)aboutotherequipmentsolutionsthatansweredIMEF(Fwd)needs.IMEFG9insistedondevelopingtheneed,butuponoccasionalsoinsistedinestablishingtheequipmenttoanswertheneed.Uponoccasion,IMEFalsoinsistedon:
• Assemblingdifferentequipmentsuites• Contractingforpartsandsupport• ActingasFieldServiceRepresentatives(FSR)• Actingasthesolemaintenanceentityforvariousequipment
ThisflawedapproachcreatedconflictwithcombatdevelopersasIMEFG9believed
theirsolutionsandproductioncapabilitiesinIraqweresuperiortotheCONUSsystem.IMEFestablishedseveraleffortsthatwereveryworthwhileearlyon.Theyfabricated
theirownarmorastheCONUSm1114effortwasexecuted.TheydesignedandweldedtogetherminerollerswhichwereattachedtothefrontofvehiclesandrolledoverIEDstriggeringthembeforethevehiclehit.ThesimpletasksoffabricatingequipmentthatwasnotcomplexfittheIMEF“incountry”approach.Morecomplexaspectsof“incountry”equipmentcombatdevelopment,however,becameproblematic.
IMEFG9startedtobelievethattheycouldpurchase,assembleandmaintainmore
complexequipment.TheGBOSSandLaserDazzlerchapterswillillustratetheneardisastersthatwerebarelyavoidedasIMEFG9attemptedtocontractandassembleequipmentbeyondtheircapability.ThesimplemistakesthatweremadebyIMEFG9wereeasilyavoidablebythosewhounderstoodequipment.OneofthebiggestlessonslearnedshouldhavebeenthatcertaintypesofsupportcouldbebetterperformedbyMCCDCresultinginbetterequipmentforthetroopsforward.
Compoundingthe“doityourself”mindsetwasatechnologyhubris.Gaylstatesthatthe
IMEFG9wastaskedwithconductingtechresearchanddefiningsolutions.HebelievedthattheIMEFG9inIraqhada“broadtechnologyfieldofregard”:
IMEFG9mistakenlybelievedthattheyhadthecompetencetoperformeveryelementofcombatdevelopment.Insteadofmaintainingafocusonarticulatingwellthoughtoutneeds,IMEFG9demandedaroleinassembly,maintenance,engineering,contracting,supportandselectionforseveraloftheirneeds.Despitebeingincombat,theIMEFG9staffbelievedthattheirproperrolewastoperformallofthefunctionsheretoforetheresponsibilityofthethousandsinthesupportingestablishment.ThisoccurredwithaIMEFG9staffofapproximately5.
MRAPwasnotacontentiousissueforIMEF.TheotherequipmenteffortswerethecauseforIMEFG9debateswiththesupportingestablishment.
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(McCordemaildtd5/30/2007)TheIMEFG9wasabletosendemailsandmakephonecalls.Unfortunatelytheself-
perceived“broadfieldofregard”turnedintoaself-delusionalperceptionofequipmentexpertise.NowherewasthismoreevidentthaninthewritingsofGayl.Gayl’s“techresearch”wasoftenincorporatedintoofficialneedsstatements.Needsstatementsoftencontainequipmentrecommendationsthatareenteredintoprocurementconsiderations.TheIMEFG9recommendationsoftenwentbeyondrecommendationandbecameIMEFG9demands.Withthedemandscamearefusaltouseequipmentthatwasnot“IMEFG9selected”.
TheGBOSSChapterillustratesthefullrangeofproblemsarticulatedabove.TheIMEF
G9GBOSSeffortincludedineptcontracting,poorresearch,selectionoflessercapability,poorbudgeting,andwhatwouldhavebeendisastrousmaintenanceandsupportplanshadnotseniorflagofficersintervened.TheDODIGforLaserDazzleralsoillustratesmanyofthesameflaws.LaterChaptersdiscussbothGBOSSandDazzler.
TheIMEFG9technicaloverreachisdemonstratedinGayl’sDDR&Epresentation.Gayl’s
DDR&Epresentationcontained31slides,twoofwhichdealtwithMRAPandarmor.Oftheother29,onlyfourcontainedtheacronymMRAP.ThemajorityofGayl’sissueswereinareasotherthanMRAP.Forexample,“LaserInducedPlasmaElectrostaticDischarge”,“sheerthickeningliquidarmor”,“PrecisionAirborneStandoffDirectedEnergyWeapon”,“DirectedEnergyLowAltitudeAirDefenseSystem”,and“CognitionBasedElectromagneticPatternAnalysisSystem”wereallofferedastechnologysolutions.Manywererejectedasunfeasible.Gaylwasobviouslynotanexpertinmanyofthefieldsforwhichheofferedsolutions.
SomeofhistechnicalpresentationswerealsotacticallyquestionablesuchasF-TAWS.
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(MCCordemaildtd5/30/2007)IMEFG9suggestedISRequippedattackdogstospoilorinterruptsniperattacks.Thisauthorwasinvolvedwithdogprogramsandwrotedoghandlerdoctrine.High
aggressiondogsoperatingawayfromahandlerisaquestionableconceptinacivilianpopulation.Inaddition,off-leashdogswouldgiveinsurgentsanopportunitytoorganizeadogmauling(women/children)andfilm/publishitblamingUSforces.AbetterunderstandingofdogcapabilitywouldhaveallowedGaylandIMEFG9tounderstandthatoff-leashcapabilitiesforhighaggressiondogscanonlybeusedinhighlycontrolledenvironments(asopposedtopreventivesnipermissions).ThefailuretoprovidethissolutiontoIMEFwasincludedinGayl’scomplaints.
CONCLUSION
Gaylwasadisgruntledscientistwhobristledeverytimeoneofhistechnicalsolutions
wasnotaccepted.Gaylwasdisgruntledaboutnon-MRAPissues.TheseissueswerethefocusofhisIMEFG9complaintsandonlylater,withtheinterestofthepressandSenators,didGaylfocusonMRAP.Ironically,hewasnotinvolvedwithmostoftheMRAPdevelopmentandhadnothingtodowiththeestablishmentoftheIMEFMRAPneeds.Hiscomplaintwasaboutothertechnologies,buthewasusedtoestablishaMRAP“whistleblowing”.
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TheseriesofissueswithIMEFG9andGaylpromptedoratleastfueledthesubsequentMRAPissues.
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9-IMEFREJECTEDMRAPS
OneofthemostpoignantandoftenmentionedfallaciesabouttheMRAPstoryisthat
MarineswerefightinganddyingwhiletheirconstantrequestsformoreMRAPSwerebeingdeniedbythoseintherear.Itisapowerfulstory;thoseinsafetydenyingthoseinharm’swaythegearthatwouldkeepthemalive.ItisthestorythatGaylusestopointtheblameatQuantico.Itisparaphrasedbypoliticiansseekingtoportraythemselvesasthe“savior”ofthemaninthefight.ItisthestorythatmakestherestofanyMRAPnewsarticleinteresting.Itisalsoastorythatispatentlyfalse.
IMEF(Fwd)wasthecommandelementfordeployedMarinesinIraqwhentheMRAP
UUNS/JUONSweresubmittedinandafterJune2006.TheyoutrightrejectedMRAPs.TheypublishedtheirprioritiesandindicatedMRAPswerenotapressingneed,andattimesnotaneedatall.TheyadvertisedtotherestoftheMarineCorpsthatthe2005MRAPrequestwascompleted.
PerMarineCorpsOrdersandDirectives(seeCh4-6),IMEFhastheauthorityand
responsibilitytosubmitneedsintheformofUUNS.TheysubmitthroughtheServiceComponent(MARFORPACand/orMARCENT).The2005MRAPUUNSwassubmittedthroughMARFORPAC.IMEFandMARFORPACarethereforetheownersoftheUUNS.Onemayviewthemas“thecustomer”.IfthecustomerstatesthattheydonotwantMRAPs,thenthesupportingestablishmentdoesnotdeliverthem.Thisisaverysimpleandbasicconcepteasilyunderstoodintoday’sciviliansociety.Similarly,ifMARFORPACand/orIMEFstatethattheydonotwantMRAPs,thenthesupportingestablishmentdoesnotforcethemintotheater.Thisisespeciallytrueifthe“customer”orMARFORPAC/IMEFweretheonesaskingforMRAPsinthefirstplace(andchangedtheirposition).
ThepressandGaylhavepublishedthousandsofarticlesonthetopicofMarinesinthe
fightasking/beggingforMRAPsandtheguysintherear(outofharm’sway)sayingno:
“ThequestionforanyfutureinvestigationofthisissuewouldbewhethertheomissionoftheMRAPUUNSandanydiscussionoftheIMEF(Fwd)’sknowncontinueddeterminationtoacquirethecapabilityin06wasintendedordeliberate.”(Gayl,p48)The“knowncontinueddetermination”willbedisprovenbelow.
IMEFrejectedMRAPsonseveraloccasionsafterthesubmissionofthe2005HejlikUUNS.IMEFemailtrafficbytheIMEFG9(quotingtheIMEFChiefofStaff)statedthatthedeployedIMEFdidnotwantmorethan185MRAPs.IMEFUUNStrackerslistedtheHejlikUUNSascompletedpriortotherequestfor185MRAPs.IMEFUUNStrackersshowstheHejlikUUNSasreducedtoanUNS.IMEF,immediatelyupontheirreturn,chosetoabandonthe1,169requestandstartedaskingforlessernumbersattheExecutiveSafetyBoard.Ineachcase,IMEFtookaffirmativeactionontheirowntorejecttheMRAPsrequestedinthe2005HejlikUUNS.
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“JimHampton,nowaretiredcolonel,questionswhythePentagonandCongressdidn't
domoretokeepthetroopssafe."Ihavecolleagueswhosaypeopleneedtogotojailoverthis,andinmymindtheydo…"Thiswell-researchedUSATODAYarticlerevealedahistoryofwiderDoDawarenessofandpushbackonMRAPthatwasoccurringconcurrentlywiththeMarineCorps’ownMRAPexperience.”(Gayl,p58)(Italicsfrom17July07USAToday“PENTAGONBALKEDATPLEASFORSAFERVEHICLES”)TheawarenessofMRAPsmayhaveexistedinsomequarters,butthefailureofMRAPstomakeprogresswasduetothelackofanactiverequest(asdescribedbelow).JimHampton,throughhisownignoranceofthesituation,probablythoughtthattherewasanactiveMRAPrequestthatwasbeingignored.ThebelowfactswillassistindispellingJimHampton’smisperceptions. “Also,althoughitappearslateintheletter,atleastCMCdidmentionthiskeyJLTVprogrambyname,arguablythemainseedofallMRAPdelaysandtheUUNS’eventualrejection.”(Gayl,p73)ThemainseedofMRAPdelayswasboththelackofdemandsignal(Chapter10)aswellastheclearindicationsfromIMEFthatMRAPswerenotrequiredorrequested.
“TheUUNSmighthavediedinvisiblyinMCCDCandoutsideofnormalMROCscrutinyastheSMEshadintended,wereitnotfortenaciouseffortsatMARCENTtoresurrectMRAPconsiderationinthesummerof2006,astheIEDemergencyworsenedintheater.”(Gayl,p73)TheUUNS“died”becauseMARFORPACandIMEFdecideditwoulddie.ItwastheirdecisiontodowngradeittoanUNSanddeterminethatitwascompleted.Thesupportingestablishment,toincludeMCCDC,wasactuallytryingtoresurrectMRAPconsiderations(seechapter12).ContrarytoGayl’sstatement,theMROC“scrutinized”andprocessedtheUUNS.
“DespiteunambiguousandcontinuousfeedbackfromthedeployedMarinesMCCDCatQuantico,theMarineCorpsturnedablindeyetorequestsforurgentlyneededequipmentwheneverthoserequestsconflictedwithparochialconceptoracquisitionprioritiesinacompetitionforresources.”(GaylTestimony,p3)ThefeedbackfromdeployedMarineswasneitherunambiguousnorcontinuous.TheMarinesatMCCDCdidnotturnablindeyetowardsrequestsforurgentlyneededequipment.
“Ingeneral,itcanbeconcludedthatacombinationofflawedactionsandinactionsbycombatdeveloperspertainingtoMRAPgenerallyandtheMEF(Fwd)urgentneedsforMRAPscreatedasignificantadverseimpactontheGCE’sabilitytoaccomplishitsmission.”(Gayl,p119)TheMEF(Fwd)urgentneedsaredeterminedbytheMEF(Fwd).TheMEF(Fwd)bothrejectedMRAPs,andwhentheydiddevelopneedsforMRAPs,thenumbersweresignificantlydifferentfromthe2005MRAPrequest.AttackingMCCDCfortheadverseeffectsofthesedecisionsisflawedthinking.
“Gaylandsomeformercolleaguessaythatthesechargesweretrumpedup,theculminationofathree-yearpatternofretaliationbytheCorps'leadershipfortheembarrassmentthathecausedandhiscontinuedeffortstoholdofficialsaccountablefor
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ignoringanurgentrequestforhelpbysoldiersunderfire.Hisoffense,Gaylsays,iscontinuingtosay"thatMarinesdidnottakecareofMarinesinharm'sway,"asacrilegeinsideaservicethatpridesitselfonprotectingindividualsoldiers.”(Smith,p1)OfficialsneitherignoredtheurgentrequestforMRAPsnordidtheyignoreanyotherurgentrequest(UUNS).Gayl’scharge“thatMarinesdidnottakecareofMarinesinharm’sway”isbaseless.
“InthecourseoftheseeventsIrepeatedlysawtheUSMCportionofthePentagonEstablishmentuseeachofthesebureaucratictrickstoattempttoblock,inhibitorslow-downMRAPsandseveralotherdevices.JointProgramOffice-MRAP’stheme,“UltimateTeamSport”buyingMRAPs2007-2010,wasgreattosee.Butitwasmadepossiblebythetechnologyinsurgencyof2006-2007.”(Jankowski,p1)The“bureaucracy”,atthePentagonoratMCCDC,wasnotusing“bureaucratictricks”toblockorstallMRAPs.Whiletherewere(andstillare)individualswhoargueagainstMRAPs,therewasno“bureaucracy”organizedagainsttheMRAP.OncetherequestsweremadeforMRAPinMay2006,theywereimmediatelyactedupon.Theself-styled“technologyinsurgency”didnothappenforMRAPsbecausethesupportingestablishment,atleastwithintheMarineCorps,wasavocaladvocateforMRAPsduring2006and2007.
“HundredsofU.S.MarineshavebeenkilledorinjuredbyroadsidebombsinIraqbecauseMarineCorpsbureaucratsrefusedanurgentrequestin2005frombattlefieldcommandersforblast-resistantvehicles,aninternalmilitarystudyconcludes.Thestudy,writtenbyacivilianMarineCorpsofficialandobtainedbyTheAssociatedPress,accusestheserviceof"grossmismanagement"thatdelayeddeliveriesofthetrucksformorethantwoyears.”(NBCNews)ThestudywasnotaMarineCorpsinternalmilitarystudy.ItwasaGaylinternalmilitarystudyandfulloferrors.Thereasonfordelaywasnotgrossmismanagement.TherewasnodelayatthetimetherequirementwasactuallyestablishedforMRAPs.ThehandlingoftheUUNSwillbeaddressedinChapter11.
IMEFrejectedMRAP-typevehicles.TheIMEFrejectionofMRAPsisconsistentinseveralvenues.ThisauthorbecametheDirectorofOperationsin2006sodocumentationabouttherejectionofMRAPsfrompriortimeswasnotaseasytodiscover.Keyinformation,asdescribedbelow,wasabletobeobtained.Theentireemailisable(onceapproved)tobereferencedinordertoshowpreviouscontentandtheflowoftheconversation.
Exhibit#1-TheChiefofStaffandG9Rejection
Inthesummerof2006MCCDCwasadvocatingforadditionalMRAPswithMARCENT(contrarytoGayl’sstatements).MARCENTwasinturnconferringwithIMEF.Bothorganizations(MARCENTandIMEF)hadconcludedthatmoreMRAP-typevehicleswererequired.MCCDChadorganizedtoworkwithJIEDDOanddesignatedMCWLastheleadforJIEDDOcoordinationwithintheMarineCorps.MCWLconversationswithMARCENTwerelargelybyphone,butthecontentwascapturedinseveralemailsthatwerealsoreferencedbyGayl.Severaloftheseemailsareprovidedintheirentiretybythisauthor.
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InMay2006,IMEFsubmittedaJUONSfor185MRAPs.ThisJUONSwasacteduponbytheJointCommunityaswellastheMarineCorps.“ItisnoteworthythattheCommander,MCSC(MajGenCatto)wasalreadyworkingonprocuringthe185JERRVsforIMEF(Fwd)usingJRAC(i.e.Joint/CIED)fundingasaresultofJRACJERRVJUONSapproval.MCCDCwashardlyaware,ifatallawareofMCSCactionswhichturnedouttobebeneficialforMARCENTandtheMEF(Fwd).TheworkaroundtoavoidMCCDCinvolvementinfieldingMRAPbyemployingthemoreresponsiveJUONS-JRACconnectionhadbeensuccessful.”(Gayl,p50)Thisstatementisanoutrightfabricationinseveralways(somediscussedlater).MCCDCwasawareoftherequestandcoordinatedtheJointeffort.IfithadcomethroughtheJ8toJIEDDO,itwouldhavefallentoMCWLtosupportwithintheJIEDDO.TheJUONSpathwaspoorlyutilizedbyMarineforces(seeJUONS/UUNSChapter)and,astheJIEDDOlead,MCWLwaslookingforwardtoworkingtherequest.TheJRAC,however,tookadifferentpaththatinvolvedMCSC.
Gaylcontinues:“Lateron19Jun06,MajJohnMooreofMCWLjoinedthediscussion
andclarifiedtherelationshipoftheIMEF(Fwd)UUNSfrom05totheJERRVUUNS.Headded:“ThisisanolderUUNSthatwasneverfundedduetosupportability.There'scurrentlyanUUNSfor185JERRVsbutMEFiswritingasupplementtothisthatwillexpandthatnumbersignificantly.Oncevalidated,therequestwillbetakentoJIEDDOforfundingconsideration.”(Gayl,p50).Ofnoteistheabsenceoftheterm“MRAP”.TherequestisforJERRVs(JEERVisatypoforJERRV),notMRAPs.Thereisnomentionoffulfillingthe2005HejlikUNSasitwasresolved(seebelow).MajorJohnMooreworkedformeatMCWL(MCCDC).UnknowntoGayl(Gaylwasnotyetinvolved),MajMoorewasinvolvedinthediscussionbefore19June.UponassumptionofdutiesastheDirOpsMCWL,IdirectedeachsectionofC-IEDtodevelopandcapturetheircurrentandfutureeffortsinasimpleshortslidepresentation.Afterseveraldiscussions,MajMooreandLtColPattersonsubmittedtheirinitialeffortforvehicleprotection.An“interimvehicle”(nottheHMMWVorJLTV)wasrequired(Mooreemaildtd6/2/2006).ThisoccurredseveralweeksbeforetheaboveemailfromGayl.WehadissuesworkingwiththeIMEFG-9soMajMoorewasdirectedtoworkthroughMARCENT(IMEF(Fwd)’sparentcommand)andminimizeinteractionwithIMEF(Fwd).MajMoore’sstatementthatMRAPwas“notfundedduetosupportability”wasbasedonspeculation.MajMoorewasunabletolocateanyMRAPdocumentation.TheDODIGlaterdeterminedthattherewasnocompletiondocumentation.
TheJERRVrequestendedupnotbeingtakentoJIEDDO.Gaylcontinues:“IMEF(Fwd)remainedacarboncopyrecipientoftheseMCWLe-mails,toincludeMCWL’simpressionthattheJERRVJUONSwouldsoonbesupplementedwithamuchlargerIMEF(Fwd)JUONSrequestfor1,000additionalMRAPs.However,on20Jun06IMEF(Fwd)staffwrotetoMARCENTstafftocorrectthatimpression,inspiteofMARCENT’sconcernsforthesmallerIMEF(Fwd)JERRVrequirement:“…ColMilburn[IMEF(Fwd)CoS]…willtakethissubjectuponFridaywithColSupnick[MARCENTCoS]whenhearriveshereatCampFallujah.Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERVvehicles…”(Gayl,p50).NotonlywasMCWLanticipatingalargerrequest,butMCWLwasadvocatingforalargerrequest.MajorMoorewas
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inregulardiscussionwithMARCENT.Gaylomittedthenextsentenceoftheemail.Thefullemailreadsasfollows:T.J.IjustcheckedwithColMilburn,hewilltakethissubjectuponFridaywithColSupnickwhenhearriveshereatCampFallujah.Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERVvehicles.Wedon’twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,letsputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.Marty(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006)
ThisemailfromIMEFG-9showsIMEFrejectingtheofferofexpandingthenumberofMRAPsupwardfrom185.ColMilburnwastheIMEFChiefofStaff.ColSupnickwastheMARCENTChiefofStaff.MartywastheIMEFG9.Theclearandunambiguousrejectionofanythingabove185runscontrarytothemanyclaimsthatMCCDCwasdenyingMRAPstoMarinesinharm’sway.Furthermore,Gaylomittedtheportionstating:Wedon’twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,letsputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.Therewasnoconfusionabouttherequirement.Itwas185,not186,not187andcertainlynot1,169.IMEFunderstoodthis.MARCENTunderstoodthis.Thesupportingestablishmentunderstoodthis.ThisomissionalonerefutesthelegitimacyofthemajorityofGayl’sarguments.ThisauthorsurmisesthatthesecondlinewasomittedbecauseitdestroysthemajorityofGayl’sargumentsthattherewasaconstantMRAPdemand.Therewere,however,otherdocumentsthatshowtherejectionofthe2005UUNS.
Exhibit#2:TheUUNSTrackers
ThefollowingtableisaportionoftheIMEFUUNStracker.TheMEFsweretaskedtoprovideamonthlyupdateperMARADMIN045/06(seeCh4).IMEFestablishedanUUNStracker.ThebelowMRAPentryisfromthe“completedUUNS”tab.Theothertabsare“ActiveUUNS”,“MCWL”and“ONS”.ActiveUUNSarethoseUUNSthatareinprogress.MRAPisnotundertheActiveUUNStab.“MCWL”includesthoseUUNSthatMCWLwasworkingon…thoseUUNSneededfurtherequipmentdevelopment(S&T)inordertobefielded.“ONS”wereforthoseneedssubmittedbyArmyunits(IMEFwasalsotheHeadquartersforMNF-WwhichhadArmyUnits).
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MineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicle(MRAP)(ThisisanUNS-notanUrgentUNS)
05053UB MFP 1,169
Validated&forwardedbyMFP.UUNSbeingdevelopedbyDWGwithMCSC.AwaitingplanningguidancefromDCCD.DWGcomplete.AwaitingMROCreview.Missionclosed.MFPhasdroppedthisfromanUrgenttoaRegularUNS.
(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006)
TheMRAPUUNSisreducedtoanUNS,notanUUNS,intwolocations(titleandstatuscolumns).The“Submittedby”columnreadsMFPforMARFORPAC.Thequantity(1169)remainsastheoriginalUUNSstated.Thestatuscolumnwasupdatedregularlyandpreviousstepswerenotdeleted.Thelaststepinthestatuswasthelasttime-sequencedstep.Inthisstep,IMEFshowsMFPdroppingMRAPfromanUrgenttoaregularUNS.
Thechangereflectsachangefromtherequester.ThischangemeansthatIMEFand
MARFORPACnolongerthoughtthattheMRAPneedwasurgent.ThereisnoauthoritybyMCCDCtocontradictthisdowngradeinstatus.ItisclearlyandunambiguouslyachangebyIMEFandMARFORPAC(customers).ThedecisionbyMARFORPAC/IMEFtochangethestatusoftheUUNStoaregularUNSandthedecisiontoplaceitinthecompletedsectionareclearandmutuallysupportingdecisions.THEMRAPUUNSwasnolongerineffectduetothedesiresofIMEF/MARFORPAC.TheinitialrecommendationbytheAdvocate(March2005)todowngradewasrealizedanddocumentedinthistracker.
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ThedecisiontoregradetheMRAPUUNStoaregularUNSprovidesclearguidancetoMCCDC,MARCENT,P&R(finances),PP&O(theGCEAdvocate),I&L(CombatServiceSupportAdvocate),IIMEF,MARFORLANT,andanyotherMarinecommandinvolvedwithequippingtheforce.ThemajorcommandsoftheMarineCorpsreceivedtheseupdates.ThedecisioncompletestheurgentlifethreateningaspectoftheoriginalUUNSandindicatesthatIMEF/MARFORPACnolongerthoughtMRAPsnecessarytoaccomplishthemission.ThenormalUNSprocesstakes(estimated)between2-5years.
Thedecision(byIMEF)tomoveittothe“completedUUNS”sectionindicatesthatno
furtherUUNSworkwasrequestedbyIMEF/MARFORPAC.ThosewhocitedtheMRAPUUNSasactivethroughthesubmissionoftheMayJUONSfor185JERRVs(andlater)areincorrect.Thisdowngradingandcompletionofthe2005UUNSbyIMEFisconsistentwiththerejectionofmoreMRAPs(than185)bytheG-9andChiefofStaffofIMEF.WhencombinedwiththeabsenceofdemandforMRAPs(Chapter10)andtherejectionofMRAPsbyIMEFinIraq,thedeliberatecancelationoftheUUNSpaintsadifferentpicture.
TherearetwoUUNStrackersfromApril2006andMay2006thatstatetheUUNSisno
longerineffect(Ouztsemaildtd5/10/2006and5/2/2006).BothoftheseUUNStrackersoccurredpriortothesubmissionfor185MRAP-typevehiclesonMay21,2006.ThesearetheonlyUUNStrackersthatthisauthorpossessesfrompriortoMay21,2006.OnemayassumethatthesameMRAPentrywasinplacepriortotheseentriesbutthisauthordoesnothaveadditionaldocumentation.ThesetrackersalonerendertheDODIGincorrect.
MCWL(aQuanticoorganization)advocated(throughMARCENT)formoreMRAPsand
wasinitiallyrejected(byIMEF).NotreflectedintheemailswereMCWLsadditionalofferstoactuallywritetherequirementandAdvocateforitthroughallofthestepsneededtogetthecapabilityonthebattlefield.TheemailrejectingthisMRAPcapabilitywassenttostafffromMARCENT,IMEF,IIMEF,MCCDC,andInstallationsandLogistics(I&L).Therewasaclearandwidespreadmessagebeingsent…”wedonotwantmoreMRAPs”.OneofthereasonsIMEFdidnotgetMRAPswasbecausetheyclearlyrejectedMRAPs.Chapter10dealswithasecondreason:IMEFwasnotaskingforMRAPs.
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IMEFChangesNeedImmediatelyAfterDeploymentIthasbeenallegedthatMarineswereaskingforMRAPsconsistentlyaftersubmitting
theUUNSinFeb2005.Thiswasprovenfalseintheprevioussection.Thelackoffollowthroughfor1,169MRAP-typevehicles(thetermMRAP-typevehiclesprovidesthewidestlatitudetoincorporateallofthepotentialV-hulledvehicles)isfurtherproof.
TheIMEFchangeincoursestartedimmediatelyaftertheirreturntotheUSandpriorto
themajorityofthedecision-makingmeetingsandeventsfortheoriginalUUNS.InMarchof2005,onemonthaftertheIMEFreturn,theMarineCorpssafetyboardmetandwasbriefedonMRAPsbyMajorMcGriff.Gaylstates:“LtGenMattis,thentheCGofMCCDC,waspresentattheMarch2005conference,aswereLtGenAmosandLtGenGregson,theoperationalMARFORAdvocatefortheMRAPcombatdevelopmentway-ahead.MajGenHejlik,whohadsignedtheUUNSauthoredbyMajorsMcGriffandDewetincollaborationwithhisGCEstaff,wasalsopresentattheconference.ItisnoteworthythatneitherGenMagnus(currentACMC)norGenConway(whostillservedastheJointStaffJ3)werepresentintheaudience.ThekeyslideexcerptfromMcGriff’sMRAPpresentationwastheCostSlide:
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Figure7.ThecostslideassociatedtheMRAPwithapricedfamilyofCougarvariants.(Gayl,p14-15)
Onemonthaftertheirreturn,IMEFhadchangedthenumberofMRAPsto522.Itisunclearwhether522wasanewproposalorareductiontotheoriginalnumberof1,169.Aclearmessagewasnotbeingsent.InattendanceattheconferencewasrepresentationfromacrosstheMarineCorps.Thepost-eventmessageincludedtheattendees:ASESTABLISHEDBYREFA,THEESBHELDITSELEVENTHSEMI-ANNUALCONFERENCEATMCASMIRAMARONMAR29-30,2005.THEACMCHOSTEDTHEFOLLOWINGESBMEMBERS:LTGENGREGSONCOMMARFORPACLTGENBERNDTCOMMARFORLANTLTGENBLACKMANCG,IIIMEFLTGENAMOSCG,IIMEFLTGENMATTISCG,MCCDCMS.DEWITTEDASN(S)MAJGENBICEIGMCMAJGENJONESCG,TECOMRADMBROOKSCOMMANDER,NAVALSAFETYCENTERMAJGENDONOVANCG,MCBCAMPPENDLETONMAJGENDICKERSONCG,MCBCAMPLEJEUNEBGENGASKINCG,MCRCBGENWILLIAMSREPRESENTING,DC,I&LBGENHEJLIKREPRESENTINGCG,IMEFBGENFLOCKCG,MCBCAMPBUTLER,OKINAWABGENJENSENCOMCABWESTBGENPAYNECG,LOGCOMBGENPAPAKREPRESENTINGCOMMARFORRESCOLROTENREPRESENTINGCG,MCBHAWAIICOLBULANDREPRESENTINGCOMCABEASTSGTMAJESTRADASMMCMR.RIDEOUTREPRESENTINGCG,MARCORSYSCOM(ALMAR019/05)
Overtwentyflagofficersortheirrepresentatives(toincludetheAssistantCommandantandSergeantMajoroftheMarineCorps)receivedthebrief,withthenumber522,immediatelyafterIMEFreturnedfromtheater.Therequestednumberatthebriefwasnot1169.Thispointisnotdesignedtobecriticaloftheneed.ThispointisnotdesignedtobecriticaloftheIMEFbrief.Itis,however,designedtoshowthatimmediatelyafteraneedwasidentified,thesolutionwasinflux.Thisnewnumberwasnotprovidedby“bureaucratsinMCCDC”,butbyI
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MEF.Itdemonstratesthataddressingcombatneedsisafluidprocess(needschange)requiringinteractionwithmanyorganizationsovertime.
Asanaside,theabovelistofGeneralOfficerswillbeaddressedinalatersectiondealingwiththeimplausibilityofMCCDCburyingtheUUNS.ThemajorityoftheaboveGeneralslisthadresponsibilitiestowardstheneedand/ortheUUNS.Gayl’sscapegoatingofMCCDCstartstobedisprovengiventheresponsibilitiesoftheassembledGenerals(seech4-6).
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10-MARINESDIDNOTDESIRE/PURSUEMRAPS
MARINESWEREFIRST
BeforediscussingthelackofdemandsignalfromresponsibleMarineCorps
organizations,itisworthnotingthattherewasnodemandsignalfromresponsiblepartiesinthewholeofgovernment.ThesewholeofgovernmentorganizationsandindividualswhodidnotidentifytheMRAP-typevehicleneed(thatGaylcomplainsabout)priortotheMarineCorpsincludes:
• TheSecretaryofDefenseandtheentiretyofhisDODStaff(SecretariesRumsfeldandGates)andallDODStaffOrganizations
• TheJointStaff• JointIEDDefeatOrganization(JIEDDO)• TheCombatantCommandersandtheirstaffs(CENTCOMandotherCOCOMs)• MultinationalForcesIraq• MultinationalCorpsIraq(ThehigherheadquartersforMarinesinIraq)• TheArmy• TheNavy• TheAirForce
Theabovelistisnotintendedasacritique.Itmerelydemonstratesthat,atthetime,the
needwasnotestablished.TheMarineCorpswasintheleadforacquiringMRAP.Gayl’sstudypointstowardsseveralindividualswhorightlydeservecreditforadvancinganidea,butafewindividualspositinganideaisvastlydifferentfromanorganizationalefforttoestablisharequirement.
TheDODIGacknowledgedtheDOD-wideroleinestablishingaMRAPcapability.Thismisplacedobservation(locatedinaDODIGoftheMarineMRAPUUNSprocess)showstheIGacknowledgementofaresponsibilityoftheDODforMRAP-typevehicledevelopment.“DoDwasawareofthethreatposedbyminesandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)inlow-intensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistantvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.YetDoDdidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlow-intensityconflictsthatinvolvedminesandIEDs.Asaresult,theDepartmententeredintooperationsinIraqwithouthavingtakenavailablestepstoacquiretechnologytomitigatetheknownmineandIEDrisktosoldiersandMarines.WearemakingrecommendationsonlytotheMarineCorpsbecausethescopeofourauditwaslimitedtoareviewofMarineCorpsactionstoaddresstheIEDthreat.WeplantoaddressotherServices’actionstocountertheIEDthreatduringfutureaudits”.(DODIG,pi)Theactionsoftheentire
BetweentheresolutionoftheHejlikUUNSinmid2005andthesubmissionofthe185JERRVUUNS,therewasnodemandfromtheMEFs,MARFORsorAdvocatesforMRAP.Equipmentdemanddocumentsreflectanabsenceofdemand.
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DODcanbecritiquedfornotdevelopingMRAP-typevehicles.TheDODIGitselfcouldbefoundtobeatfaultforthislackofdevelopment.AnynumberofDODIGeffortscouldhaveestablishedtheneedforMRAP-typevehicles,buttheydidnot.Inaddition,Congresscouldhavebeenfoundtobeatfault.Thereisawaytofindfaultwithmanyorganizations.Thisstudy,however,focusesontheMarineCorpsresponsibilitiesforestablishingMRAPneeds.
TheneedforMRAPswasclearlyrejectedbyIMEFasdescribedinChapter9.Thereisnofaultbeingassigned,afterall,nooneintheentiretyoftheDODhadestablishedaMRAPrequirementsimilartotheoneunderdiscussion.InearlyJuneof2006,theonly“need”forawidespreadbuyofMRAPswasintheMarineCorps.ThepriorrejectionofmoreMRAPsbyIMEFwaspartoftheprocessthateventuallyestablishedtheneedformoreMRAPs.Itis,however,instructivetoexamineneedforMRAPsfromaMarineCorpsperspective.
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10A-“CONSTANTDEMAND”NOTSOCONSTANT
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thenthistherewasaconstantdemandfor
MRAPs.Thedemandsignalforthis“constantdemand”wouldhavebeenoverwhelming.Thiswas,afterall,over$1billionworthofequipmentandwould’vechangedtacticsinorganizationsdowntothesquadlevel.ThisUUNSwouldimpacteveryinfantryunitaswellastherestoftheGCE.Commandelementswouldhavehadtoreconfigureformovement.Logisticseffortswouldhavehadtochangetheirsecurityposture.Logisticswouldalsohavehadtoaccommodateincreasedfuelneedsandatotallynewsupportchain(parts,spares,mechanicsetc.).However,therewasnoimpactastherewasno“constantdemand”.Notonlywastherenodiscussionofthenumbersrequired,buttherewasnodiscussionofthesupporteffortforaMRAPpurchaseofanykind.
Anotherlargestartupeffort,GBOSS,hadconstantcoordinationanddebatewellbefore
theUUNS/JUONSwasapproved.Training,equipmentconfiguration,numbersandallocation,integrationetc.werecoordinationpoints.GBOSShaddisagreement,argument,preferenceadvocacy,insults,decisioncriticism,incompetenceandconfusionfilledemailsandcounter-emails(seeGBOSSchapter).Yet,forMRAP,alargerprogram,therewassilence.
Oftentimestheexplanationforanoccurrenceisthesimplestandmostobvious
explanation.ThisisthecaseforMRAP.Therewasalackofdemandsignalfor1169MRAPsbecausetherewasnodemandfor1,169(oranynumberclose)MRAPs.
“Gaylhasclashedwithhissuperiorsinthepastandfiledforwhistle-blowerprotectionlastyear.Inhisstudy,herecommendedaninquirybeconductedtodetermineifanymilitaryorgovernmentemployeesareculpableforfailingtorushcriticalgeartothetroops."IfthemassprocurementandfieldingofMRAPshadbegunin2005inresponsetotheknownandacknowledgedthreatsatthattime,asthe(MarineCorps)isdoingtoday,hundredsofdeathsandinjuriescouldhavebeenprevented,"Gaylsaid."Whilethepossibilityofindividualcorruptionremainsundetermined,theexistenceofcorruptedMRAPprocessesislikely,andworthyof(inspectorgeneral)investigation."(Lardner,p1)Chapters4-6establishedtheresponsibilitiesforcriticalgear.ThissectionwillexplorethelackofconstantdemandforMRAPsfromthosewho,ifaneedexisted,couldhavebeenaskingforMRAP(pertheirresponsibilities).
“ThiscasestudyhasshownthatCommandersofMNF-W,MNC-I,MNF-I,MARCENT,ARCENT,NAVCENT,andCENTCOMhaveallapprovedlargeMRAPrequirements.WhatlackedwasthesupportofServicecombatdeveloperstofulfillthosevalidrequirements.Asaconscientiousboardofdirectors,SECDEFandCongresscametotheassistanceofunderservedwarfighters.Leadingwith“somemembersofcongress”inhispapersuggestedthatCongress
The“constantdemand”forMRAPswasinnowayconstant.Hugegapsindiscussion,letalonedemand,areevidentinthetimelineafterthe2005HejlikUUNS.DeployedforcessimplywerenotaskingforMRAP.
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isinitiatingtheMRAPrequirement,wheninfactCongressismerelyadvocatingexistingurgentwarfighterneedsforMRAP.”(Gayl,p82)ThisGaylstatementismisleadinginpartsandincorrectinothers.TherewasnolargeMRAPrequirementfromthelistofCommandersabovethatwasnotsupportedbycombatdevelopers.TheabovelististhelistofCommandersthatwouldhavehadtosignoffonaJUONStherebyapprovingit.Theonlylarge(over150)MRAP-typerequirementthattheseCommanderssigned(byJune2006)wastheMarineCorpsJERRVJUONSthatwaspromptedandsupportedbyMCCDC.ThetimelineandemailsshowMarineCorpssupportfrominception.SECDEFandCongresseventuallyjoinedthediscussionwellaftertheMarineCorps’rapidmovementstopurchaselargequantities.
In2008theDODIGreleaseditsMRAPresults.TheDODIGprovidedthemostthorough
reviewoftheMRAPUUNSprocess.TheDODIGtimelineforMRAPsreflectsactivitybeforeAugust2005andafterMay2006.Thereisatenmonthgapbetweenevents.ThiswastenmonthsofhighcasualtieswithnoactionbythemajorentitiesresponsibleforUUNS.Thetenmonths,however,isalsomisleadingastheMROCeventinAugustisashortMROCupdateandtheMay“MRAP”JUONSisreallyaJERRVJUONSfor185JERRVs.ThereisnodocumenteddemandbytheMEFsfortheMRAPstheyaresupposedly“beggingfor”duringthistenmonths.NeitheristheredemandbyMARCENT.ThereisnoadditionalactionbytheMROC.ThereisnoactionbytheSafetyBoard,theotherMARFORsorMCCDC,orMCSC.TheDODIGfindsnoMRAPactionoverthistenmonthtimeframe.TheonlyeventthattheDODIGcanfindisacontinuedJERRVbuyfortheengineersfromwhichtheMarineCorpsreceived38JERRVs,not1,169MRAPs.
(DODIG,p49)
TheresponsibilitiestoaskforMRAPsisestablishedinordersanddirectives(seeChapter4-6).TheabsenceofanyMRAP-typevehiclerequestasdepictedintheDODIGtimelineistheresponsibilityofmanyMarineCorpsorganizations(toincludeGayl).Thiswillbediscussedinasubsequentsection.
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ThisgapisalsoreflectedintheGaylstudy,exceptinhisstudythegapislarger.ThelastHejlikMRAPevent(intheGaylstudy)isreflectedastheApril2005DOTMLPFworkinggroup.ThenexteventGaylpresentsistheMay2006JERRVJUONS,agapof13months.TheothereventsGaylpresentsarenoteworthyfortheirlackofMRAPeffort.
TheMROCalsoobservesasignificantgapof12months.ThelastMROCconsiderationfortheHejlikUUNSwasinAugust2005.ThenextMROCconsiderationwasinAugust2006(accordingtotheDODIGandMROCDMs).
Thisauthor,inthepositionofDirOpsMCWL,wasunawareofanyMRAPeffortsuntiltheMay2006UUNS.
ThisbodyofevidenceshowsaclearabsenceofdemandfromAug2005throughMay2006.TheabsenceofdemandinthistimeframeisalsoexemplifiedbytherequestinMayof2006.TherequestinMay2006wasnotforMRAPs.ItwasforJERRV.TherequestinMaywasnotfor1169,itwasfor185.Onemayconcludethatthe2006JERRVJUONSwasaneweffort.Thatconclusionissupportedinseveralways,oneofwhichwastheexchangebetweenColButter(MARCENT)andMajMoore(MCWL).FromButter:Gentlemen,MARCENTconvertedtheMNF-WUUNSfor185JERRVstoaJUONS,whichwassubsequentlyvalidatedbyMNF-I.ItiscurrentlyatCENTCOMforapproval.FromMoore:Thankssir.Isthe185requirementstillintheprocessofbeingexpanded?S/F,MajMooreFromButter:MNF-WG9isworkingontheexpandedrequirementnow.Iexpecttoseeitinlessthanoneweekfromtoday.I’lltrytogeta*draft*copytoday.
TheMARCENTresponseinnowaymentionedanexistingrequirementfor1169.MARCENTremainedfocusedonthetermJERRVsvsMRAP.Thereisnomentionofthe185JERRVneedasanelementofalargerneed.ThebodyofevidencereflectsaclearlackofdemandforMRAP-typevehiclesthroughMay2006.
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10B-RESPONSIBLEPARTIESFORTHELACKOFDEMAND
AccusationshavebeenleviedbyGaylandparrotedbythemediathatMCCDC,Quantico
didnotdeveloprequirements(needs)forMRAP-typevehiclesdespitetheamplebodyofevidenceabouttheIEDthreat.ThissectionwilldiscusstheotherMarineCorpsorganizationsthatwereresponsiblefordevelopingrequirements/needsforMRAP,yetdidnotdoso.ThissectionwillrefertothegenericneedforMRAP-typevehicles,nottheactualUUNS(Chapter11).Onceagain,theMarineCorpswasfirstwhentherequirement/needfinallymanifesteditself.
“In2004IMEF(Fwd)determinedthatsuperiorvehicleprotectionwasimmediatelyneededinordertocountertheenemy’sstrategyofharmingourforcesandhinderingourmission.TheharmwassignificantenoughthatU.S.politicalleadersmighteventuallybecomeconvincedtogiveupthefightintheMNF-WAOR.Vulnerable1st,2nd,and3rdgenerationarmorHMMWVswerefailingtheMarinesinAlAnbarinthisrespect,andIEDcasualtiesrosedramatically.4thgenerationCOTSMRAPswereurgentlyrequiredtoimprovetacticalmobilityandcombatpowerbyincreasingconfidenceandeffectivenessofdeployedforcesinMNF-W.(Gayl,p10)GaylpointstotheneedforMRAPsasestablishedin2004.
Furthermore,theMarineCorpsandotherswereawareofthethreatposedbyminesandIEDsinlow-intensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistentvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.Yet,MarinecombatdevelopersatQuanticodidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlowintensityconflicts.Asaresult,theMarinesenteredintooperationsinIraqwithouthavingtakenavailablestepstoacquiretechnologytomitigatetheknownmineandIEDrisk.(GaylTestimony,p9)GaylpointsatQuanticoforfailingtorecognizeaMRAPneed. “RealizingthatIMEF(Fwd)wasconcernedthatalargerequirementlikethe1,169thathadbeenrequestedin2005woulddoomtheMRAPneedtoa2ndrejectionbyMCCDC,theCoSofIMEF(Fwd)hadunderstandablybecome“gun-shy”ataskingfortoomuch.”(Gayl,p50)ThissectionwillassumethatMarineCommandersarenot“gun-shy”andperformtheirdutiesperorderanddirective.Theabovequotecorrectlyreflectsaterminationofthe2005HejlikUUNS,althoughitincorrectlycallsitarejection.NomatterwhatthestatusoftheHejlikUUNS,therewasanunderstandingthattherewasnoactiverequestforMRAP-typevehicles.ThetimeframeaftertheHejlikUUNSwasavailableforthebelowCommandstoinitiateanMRAP-typeeffort. TheorganizationsthatcouldhaveinitiateddemandbutdidnotdosoareoftendiscussedasCGsorindividuals.ThisreflectstheunderstandingthatGeneralsareresponsibleforeverythingthattheirorganizationdoesorfailstodo.Generalshaveresponsibilitiesas
Therewerespecificcommandstaskedwithdeterminingneedsoftheoperatingforces.ThissectionusesthetasksinChapters4-6toanalyzethecommands/organizationsthatdidnotrequestMRAPs.TheyincludemostoftheseniorcommandsintheMarineCorps.
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individualsbutalsohavestaffstocarryoutthoseresponsibilities.Thesestaffsareincludedifnotmentioned.GCEAdvocate:PP&OandGayl
PerorderanddirectiveandasdiscussedinChapter5,theGCEAdvocatewastheprimarysupportorganizationwithintheMarineCorpsresponsibleforidentifyingequipmentneedsfortheGCE.AsdiscussedinChapter5,theGCEAdvocate,PP&O(notMCCDC)establishedneedsfortheGCE.TheAdvocateevenhadtheauthoritytosubmitUNS.Inaddition,theAdvocatehadsoleownershipofseveralstepsintheUNSprocess.PP&O(astheadvocate)wasresponsibleforestablishingGCEneeds,notMCCDC.TheabilitytoidentifyGCEneedsandsubmitthemrestedsquarelywithPP&OandtheOperatingForces.
TheGCEAdvocateneversubmittedanyMRAPneeds.GaylpositsthattheLieutenantGeneralsandtheirstaffsinchargeofPlans,PolicyandOperationshadnoinfluence:“MEPOPendedupbeingjustanotherexampleoftheinabilityoftheGCEAdvocatetoinfluencecombatdevelopersondevelopmentalinitiativesthatwerethoughtupoutsideofMCCDCandMCWL,andtheconsequencesofthatGCEimpotence.”(Gayl,p101)TheMEPOPUUNSwassubmittedbyPP&O(demonstratingthePP&Oroleinneedssubmission).TheGCEAdvocate,asdiscussedinChapter5,hasdirectedauthoritytosubmitandreviewneeds.TheGCEAdvocatesitsontheMROC.HealsorepresentstheCommandantinDoDdecisionmakingforums.HeoftenrepresentstheCommandantinCongress.Hehasnoshortageofinfluenceoraccess.TheGCEAdvocatewasnotimpotentasGaylsuggests.HesimplydidnotdevelopanyneedforMRAPs.
ItisparticularlyironicthatGaylescapescensurewhileblamingothersforhisfailures.HecreatedanMRAPstudyundertheauthorityoftheGCEAdvocate,butthenfailstoacceptresponsibilityforhispartintheGCEAdvocatefailureindeterminingtheneedforMRAPs.GaylassumedhisresponsibilitiesastheGCEAdvocateS&TAdvisor(titletakenfromcoverpageofGayl’sMRAPstudy)in2002.NotoncedidGaylsubmitanyneedsforMRAP.ThisincludestheperiodsafterthewritingoftheArticleshecites.ThisalsoincludestheperiodsoftimeaftertheinitialHejlikUUNSwasresolved.Therewasnoneedssubmissionnorwasthereanynotableefforttostarttheconversation.TheGCEAdvocateS&TAdvisercontributednothingtoanyeffortsuggestingtheMarineCorpsshouldmovetowardsMRAPs.InstallationsandLogistics(I&L)andtheCombatServiceSupportElement(CSSE)Advocate
TheCSSEAdvocatewasnottheAdvocatefortheGCEyetheaccomplishedequipmenttasksthataffectedtheGCE.Forexample,theCSSEAdvocatehadcognizanceovermanyvehicleissues.Assuch,theCSSEAdvocatewastaskedtoadministertheHejlikUUNS.TheCSSEAdvocatedidnotsuggestanypurchaseofMRAPspriortothesubmissionofthe2005HejlikUUNS.AftertheHejlikUUNSwasresolved,theCSSEAdvocatedidnotsuggestanytypeofMRAPUUNS.OnceagainanAdvocate(CSSE)withsizeableequitiesinvehiclearmoringsuggestednoneedclosetotheMRAPcapabilitythatwaseventuallyneeded.CommandElement(CE)Advocate
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TheCEAdvocatewasMCCDC.TheCEAdvocatealsohadcrossoverresponsibilitiesforcombatdevelopment.Forexample,communicationssystemsareheavilyinfluencedbytheCEAdvocatebutimpactacrosstheforce.WhilevehicleresponsibilitiesfortheGCErestwiththeGCEAdvocate,theCEAdvocatealsohastheabilitytoinfluencevehiclepurchases.TheCommandingGeneralofMCCDCcouldhaveinitiatedaMRAPneedfortheCEbutdidnotdoso.AstheCEAdvocate,MRAPswouldplayaroleinmovementandsecurityofcommandelementsacrosstheMarineCorps.SafetyConference
TheSafetyConferenceof2005isoftencitedastheconferencewheretheCGMCCDC“decided”tobuyMRAPs.TheCGMCCDCdoesnothavetheauthoritytodecidetobuylargequantitiesofMRAPsfortheMarineCorps.ThatwouldhavebeenillegalwithoutMROCapproval.Thesafetyconference,however,isaforumwheresafetyissuesarediscussed.TheMRAPdiscussionof2005couldhaveoccurredinanynumberofearliersafetyconferences.AneedtotransitiontolargernumbersofMRAPscouldhavebeenintroducedasasafetyissueinanyoftheearlierconferences.Thatdidnotoccur.IMEF
LtGenSattlerastheCGMNF-WandCGIMEF(Fwd)andBGenHejlikashisDeputydidnotrequestMRAP-typevehiclesbeforetheirdeploymentorduringtheirdeploymentuntilFeb2005,theirlastmonth.TheyweretaskedinMARADMIN533/03toidentifytheirneedsandsubmitUUNSpriortoandduringtheirdeployment.The2005MRAPUUNSwasthefirstneedsubmittedthatallowedforthepossibilityofalargeMRAP-typevehiclebuy.IIMEF
MajGenJohnsonastheCGMNF-WandCGIIMEF(Fwd)andBGenPaxtonashisDeputydidnotrequestMRAPsduringtheirdeployment.The2005UUNsoccurredimmediatelypriortoIIMEFassumingcommandinMNF-W.ThefirsttimeIIMEFindicatedaneedforMRAPswasJune2006(16monthslater)inresponsetoIMEF’sJUONSfor185JERRVs.IIMEFcitedthe185MRAPUUNsandestablishedanewneedbycitingtheoldHejlikUUNs.Priortothistime,IIMEFhadnotestablishedanyneedforlargernumbersofMRAPs.ItisnoteworthythatIIMEFwasfirst(beforeIMEF)toestablishalargerMRAPneed(over1000)inofficialtrafficwhentheycitedtheexpired2005UUNS.On19JuneIIMEFestablishedinmessagetrafficthefollowing:“IIMEFSTRONGLYCONCURSWITHTHEIMEFFWDJUONSOF21MAY2006FOR185MMRVS,ANDTHEIMEFFWDUUNSOF17FEB2005FOR1169MRAPS.THEADDITIONOFTHESEVEHICLESTOTHEFORWARDDEPLOYEDMAGTFWILLSIGNIFICANTLYENHANCEPROTECTIONFROMIEDS.”(Murrayemaildtd6/20/2006).
Thismessagetraffic,inaccordancewithordersanddirectives,establishedaIIMEFpositioninfavorofalargernumberofMRAPs.IIMEF’slackofawarenessabouttheresolutionoftheHejlikUUNSisreflectedinthismessage.IMEFwassoontofollowwithalargerMRAP-typevehicleUUNS.
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IMEFagain“FollowingRIPTOAinearly2006thenewCG,IMEF(Fwd),MajGenRichardZilmerand
hisDCG,BGenRobertNellerbecameimmediatelyawareofthecontinuingurgentneedforMRAPprotectiontocountertheIEDemergency.”(Gayl,p46)Thisstatementappearsaccurate.ThisstatementalsoimpliesthatMajGenZilmerandBGenNellerwerenotawareofaMRAPneedpriortodeploymenttoIraq.Chapters4-6detailstheresponsibilityofthedeployingforcetorequestadditionalneededequipment.ColLacrosse,infulfillmentofaportionofIMEFequipmentresponsibilitiespublishedthefollowing:All,BasedonguidancereceivedtodayfromGeneralsSattler(CGIMEF)andZilmer(CGIMEFFWD),ourtechnologyprioritieshavebeenupdatedandarereflectedbelowandintheattachment.
(Litakeremaildated10/20/2006)
ThereisnomentionofMRAPinthisOctober2005prioritizedlist.Onemayarguethatthegenericheadingof“vehicle&bodyarmor”couldeasilyencompassaMRAPeffort.Thespecificmentionsofequipmentthroughoutthelist(suchasC-RAMinthenumber2priority)however,pointstowardsagenericarmorneedvsaMRAPneed.ThislistisconsistentwiththeGeneralsbecomingawareoftheneedoncetheygottoIraq.TheGeneralsinchargeofIMEFdidnotestablishaneedforMRAPpriortodeployment,orduringthefirstfourmonthsoftheirdeployment.MROC
TheMROCistheseniordeliberativebodyintheMarineCorpsforresourcedecisions.ItsmembersincludeTheAssistantCommandantoftheMarineCorps,theAdvocateswhoareallDeputyCommandants(PP&O,I&L,AVNandCDorMCCDC),theDeputyCommandantfor
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ManpowerandReserveAffairs(M&RA)andtheDeputyCommandantforProgramsandResources(P&R).TheAdvocatesrepresent(orAdvocatefor)theremainderoftheMarineCorps.ThereisnoorganizationthatisnotrepresentedintheMROC.ThefollowingMROCDMshowstheattendanceatthelastMROCthataddressedMRAP(August82005):
(Daschemaildtd10/20/2005)
ThisdecisionmemorandumreflectstherecommendationsoftheMROC.LtGenKellyI&Lhadadeputyattend.TherewerenorecommendationsforalargeMRAPbuyfromanyoftheAdvocatesorotherMROCmembersthroughthesubmissionoftheHejlikUUNS.ThisincludesthetimebeforeFeb2005.AftertheHejlikUUNSwascompleted,therewerenorecommendationsintheMROCforalargeMRAPbuythroughAugustof2006,ayearafterthelastMROCconsiderationin2005.TheMROCmembershadthewherewithalandopportunitytorecommendorsubmitaMRAPUUNS,yetnoneofthemdidso.MARCENT
MARCENT,theServiceComponentforCENTCOMandthereforerepresentativeoftheforcesinIraq,hadcombatdevelopmentresponsibilitiesaswell.MARCENT(afteritsdesignationasanindependentservicecomponent)inheritedMARFORPAC/MARFORLANTprocessresponsibilitiestoidentifyneedsandsubmitUUNS.MARCENTresponsibilityfordevelopingneedsandsubmittingthemisestablishedinordersanddirectivesandisdescribedinChapter4.MARCENTdidnotsubmitanUUNSforMRAPpriortoSeptember2006(whentheMarineCorpswasalreadyvociferouslysupportingtheMRAPneed).MARCENTneverestablishedaneedforMRAPpriorto2005despitetheirtaskingforcombatdevelopmentyetoneofthewellpublishedmembersoftheMARCENTstaffpublishedthefollowing:
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“Thisratherhumorousstory,inanutshell,describesthePentagonEstablishmentandMRAPs.TheydidnotbuyMRAPsin2005becausetheydidnotwantthem,plainandsimple.Iftheywantedthemquickly,theywouldhaveboughtthemquickly.Theyboughtthemslowlyin2005and2006withoutcontingencyplanforrapidlyincreasingproduction,evidencethattheywantedtobuythemslowly.Theirhabitwastoignoresuggestionsfromtheoperatingforces,andtheirhubrisinspikingMRAPsandattemptingtospikeotherrequirementsin2005and2006wasbusinessasusual.Theyforcedustore-purchasethe30-year-oldlessonsoftheSouthAfricanswithourowncasualties.”(Jankowski,p1)
Jankowski’ssquarelypinsblameon“thePentagonEstablishment”fornotlearninga“30-year-oldlesson”andbuyingMRAPs.Thecost:Americancasualties.Thefailure,however,alsoextendstoMARCENT.TherewasnoMRAPneeddevelopedbyMARCENTdespitethetaskingtoidentifythesetypesofneeds.Jankowski,inadditiontoGayl,alsofocusesononeelement(thePentagon)ofthecombatdevelopmentestablishmentwhileignoringhiscommand’sresponsibility.
OfnoteisthatLtGenSattlerbecametheMARCENTCommanderafterhisdeploymenttoIraq.LtGenSattlerwastheCommandingOfficerofIMEF(Fwd)forthesubmissionofthe2005HejlikUUNS.Itmaybebettertermed“theSattlerUUNS”asLtGenSattlerhadultimateresponsibilityforitssubmissionfromIMEF.LtGenSattlerassumedcommandofMARCENTinAug05(thelastmonthwheretheMROCconsideredtheHejlikUUNS).TherewerenosubmissionsofanewMRAPneeduntilMay2006.TheCommanderoftheunitthatsubmittedtheoriginalUUNS,LtGenSattler,wasinchargeoftheServiceComponentresponsibleforsubmittingMarineCENTCOMneeds.AstheServiceComponentCommander,hedidnotdeterminethatMRAPswereneededuntilMay2006.MARFORPAC/MARFORLANT
MARFORPACandMARFORLANTaretheparentcommandsofIMEFandIIMEFrespectively.MARFORPACandMARFORLANTwere(andare)taskedwithsubmissionofneedsfortheirsubordinateforces.ThesetwoComponentCommandershavehistoricallysubmittedthemajorityofUNSastheyhousethemajorityofMarineCorpsoperationalforceswithintheircommands.Theyaretaskedwithcombatdevelopmentandthesubmissionofneedsstatementsbyorderanddirective.TheyhaveaccesstotheCommandant(andanyotherdeliberativebodywithintheMarineCorps).NeitheroneofthemestablishedaneedforMRAPspriorto2005.NeitherdidtheyconsideranewUUNSaftertheHejlikUUNSwasresolved.
“AffixingBlame”
Gaylstartsassigningblamestartingin2002-2003:“Intheend,MajMcGriff’sandMajSinclair’seffortstoconvinceQuanticoofficialsoftheimmediateneedforMRAPsin2002-03failed.”(Gayl,p7)
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TheimmediateneedforMRAP-typevehicleswasaneedthatwasunrecognizedbytheDOD.ThisincludeseverycommandelementintheMarineCorps.ItalsoincludesPP&O(theGCEAdvocate),FranzGayl(theGCEAdvocateS&TAdviser)andMCCDC.ItincludestheotherServicesandtheJointCommands.TheDODIGdeliberatelyexpandeditsinvestigativefindinginthisareatoincludetheentiretyoftheDepartmentofDefense:“DoDwasawareofthethreatposedbyminesandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)inlow-intensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistantvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.YetDoDdidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlow-intensityconflictsthatinvolvedminesandIEDs.Asaresult,theDepartmententeredintooperationsinIraqwithouthavingtakenavailablestepstoacquiretechnologytomitigatetheknownmineandIEDrisktosoldiersandMarines.WearemakingrecommendationsonlytotheMarineCorpsbecausethescopeofourauditwaslimitedtoareviewofMarineCorpsactionstoaddresstheIEDthreat.WeplantoaddressotherServices’actionstocountertheIEDthreatduringfutureaudits.”(DODIG,pi)WhilethefailuretoanticipateIEDsandaMRAPsolutionclearlyrestswithcommandsacrosstheDOD,somecontinuedtofocusonjustQuanticoorthePentagon.This,inandofitself,demonstratesignoranceofcombatdevelopmentandcommandresponsibilities.
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10C-PRIORITIZEDLISTSSHOWLACKOFMRAPNEEDS
ThetaskingofOperationalForcestosubmitprioritizedlistsofneedsandUUNSyettobefulfilledoffertheclearestdemonstrationsthatMRAPswerenotdesireduntilthesubmissionsofMay/Julyof2006.ThisauthordoesnothaveallofthelistsbytheoperatingforcespriortoMay21of2006,however,thisauthordoeshaveten…enoughtoproveGaylwrong.AccordingtoGayletal,1169MRAPswererequestedandnotprovidedfor19months(fromFeb2005toSept2006).Anyprioritizedlistwithinthistimeframeshouldhavehad1,169MRAPs,orsomeclosenumber.AnabsenceofMRAPsontheprioritizedlistsindicatesanabsenceofdemandforMRAPs.
IMEFTechnicalPrioritiesPerMARADMINAsdiscussedintheprevioussection,IMEFprovidedtheirtechnologyprioritiesinOctoberof2005:
(Litakeremaildtd10/20/2005)
TheprioritizedlistsrequiredbyorderanddirectivedidnotreflectaneedforMRAPsuntilthe185JERRVJUONSwassubmitted.ThefollowinglistsproveGayl,thepress,andtheDODIGwrong.
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ThereisnomentionofMRAP.VehiclearmoristheclosestthingtoaMRAPrequirementbutitalsoappliestovehiclehardeningforHMMWVsandarmoringtheentirevehiclefleet.ThissubmissiondemonstratesthatIMEFwasnotdemandingMRAPpriortotheirdeploymentandeightmonthsaftertheHejlikUUNS.Thisprioritizationwaswidelydistributed.
IMEFUUNSTrackers
TheUUNSupdateprovidedbyIMEFforApril302006reflectsthefollowing:
(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006)
ThisUUNStrackerreflectsfourtabsinthebottomleft.ThispageisascreenshotofthetopoftheActiveUUNSsection.TherearenoMRAPs.NorarethereanyMRAPsorMRAP-typevehiclesintheremainderoftheTab.TheMCWLandONSTabshavenorequestsforMRAPs.TheonlyplacewhereMRAPsexistsonthisspreadsheetisinthe“CompletedUUNS”section.
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(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006)
ThisentryreflectsthatMRAPwasnolongeranUrgentUNS.TheMRAPUUNShadbeenwithdrawnfromthegroupofurgentneeds.UrgentUNS,asopposedtoUNS,placed“THEACCOMPLISHMENTOFTHEUNIT'SMISSIONINJEOPARDYORUNDULYINCREASESTHERISKOFCASUALTIES.”(MARADMIN045/06).AdiscussionaboutwhyIMEFdecidedtodowngradeitmaycausedebate,butthefactthatitwasdowngradedbyIMEFisinarguableasshownintheabovespreadsheet.TheUUNS/UNSreflectsthedowngradebyMARFORPAC.UNSareestimatedtorequirebetween2-5yearstofulfill.ThisentryalsoreflectsacompletionoftheHejlikUUNS.Thisspreadsheetisconsistentwiththelackofdemandreflectedinotheremailsandmessagetraffic.Thespreadsheetfor7May2006reflectedthesameplacementforMRAP
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(Garciaemaildtd5/10/2006)
ThetwoabovespreadsheetsconfirmtheabsenceofdemandforMRAPorMRAP-typevehicles.ThisauthorpossessesnospreadsheetspriortothesesoitisunclearwhentheUUNSwasdowngraded.Onemightassumethatitwouldhavebeenduringthelatermonthsof2005astheIMEFprioritiesduringthattimeframeincludednomentionofMRAP.
Inadditiontotheaforementionedspreadsheets,thereweremultiplespreadsheetsdevelopedaftertheJUONSfor185JERRVswassubmitted.Thesespreadsheetsshowtherequestfor185JERRV.Theydonotshowtherequestfor1,169MRAPs.Theydonotshowarequestfor1,185MRAPs.Theonlynumberrequestedis185.Onceagain,thesespreadsheetsareconsistentwithothereventsdemonstratingtheabsenceofneedforMRAPsabovethe185level.ThesesubmissionsdemonstratethatIMEFwasnotdemandingMRAP.
MARCENTSpreadsheets
TheMARCENTprioritizedlisthasMediumMineProtectiveVehicle(MMPV)(akaJERRVakaMRAP-typevehicles)asprioritynumber1.
147
(Johnstonemaildtd7/31/2006)
TheprioritizationforMARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFisthesameatnumberonefor185vehicles.Thereisnorequestorentryfor1,169vehiclesoranyadditionalvehiclesbeyond185.ThedemandsignalisconstantacrosstheMEFsandMARCENT:185.TheabsenceofalargerdemandacrosstheseCommandsreflectsaconsistencyinthesolerequirementof185vehicles.
Thedemandsignalfromthesecommandscontinuedtogrowalmostimmediatelyaftertherequestfor185.Thereisnodisputethattherequirementsoonhoveredaround1,000(dependentontheinclusionofotherServices).ByJan2007theprioritizedlistreflectedtheneedfor1,185.Thislistwaspublishedsixmonthsaftertheadditional1,000MRAPswererequested.Ofnoteisthetotalnumberof1,185,not1,169.OfnoteaswellisthetermMRAPbeingusedtodescribethesetypesofvehicles(duetothediscoveryoftheoldHejlikUUNS).
148
(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007)
ThesesubmissionsdemonstratethatIMEFwasnotdemandingMRAPpriortothe2006JUONSs(thereisnopermutationofthenumber1,169andtheonlyrequestscreatingthe1,185numberweresubmittedinmid-2006).Inadditiontotheaboveliststhatweregeneratedperorder/directive,therewereprioritizedlistssubmittedforotherequippingefforts.
MARCENTInputtoUSMCConsolidatedC-IEDNeedsList
InJuneof2006CGMCCDCinitiatedanefforttoprovideafulllistingofC-IEDshortfalls
totheDirectorofJIEDDO.SeveraliterationsoccurredasMCCDCattemptedtosolicitinputfromthemajorUSMCCommands.ColButter(MARCENT)submittedthefollowingMARCENTprioritization:
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(Butteremaildtd6/26/2006)
Theestablishedquantitywas180(changedto185later),however,ColButternotedtheneedforadditionalvehicles.ThesevehicleswerenotyetrequestedinanUUNS.Therewasnorequestfor1,169vehicles.Therewasnorequestformorevehiclesthantheoriginal185request.ColButter’sexpansioncametopasstheverynextmonthasIMEFadded1,000totheirrequestinasecondJUONS.Atthispointintime,however,therequestremainedat185.Onceagain,thenumbersreflectanabsenceoftheneedfor1,169.
Asthefulllistmatured,theMARCENTnumberwasdebatedandLtGenMattisdirectedthatitbeestablishedhighontheprioritylist.JIEDDOindicatedthatfundingmaybeavailablefortrainingitems(seeUUNS/JUONSsection)sothetrainingitemsweremovedtothetopofthelist.TheendresultallowedJIEDDOtofundtrainingitemsonlyandtheprioritizedtrainingitemsreceivedfunding.Thefirstnon-trainingitemwasJERRVsatnumbernine:
(Doyleemaildtd6/29/2006)
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ThislistwasstaffedacrosstheMarineCorpsandreflectedMARCENTdesiresasfarasthenumberofMRAP-typevehiclesneeded.Onceagain,thenumberwasnot1,169or1,185.Itremained185.
InadditiontotheabovedocumentsarethreeIMEF(Fwd)liaisonupdatesthatshowthe
presenceofthejointMRAPrequestsbutalsoshowthelackofanypendingMarineCorpsrequests(includingtheHejlikUUNS).Theseupdatesareprovidedinthefollowingemails:
• Tomczakdtd14August2006• Murraydtd11Sept2006• Murraydtd25Sept2006
Thenumberofprioritizedlistswasobviouslygreaterthanthesamplingprovidedabove.
TheabovelistscompriseALLofthisauthor’slistsfromtheoperatingforces.Nonewereomitted.ItisclearfromtheaboveliststhattherewasnodemandforMRAP-typevehiclespriortotheHejlikUUNSoraftertheresolutionoftheHejlikUUNS(untilthe185request).ItisalsoclearthatthenumberofMRAP-typevehiclesrequiredwas185betweenMay2006andJuly2006.Itwasnot1,169oranynumberclosetoit.TheurgentneedforMRAP-typevehicleswasclearlynonexistentaftertheHejlikUUNSwasresolvedandbeforetheJUONSfor185wassubmitted.Theneedwasthen185untilthesecondJUONSfor1000wasadded.ThesepointsonlymakesenseifoneunderstandswhathappenedtotheHejlikUUNS.Chapter11answersthatquestion.
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11-WHATHAPPENEDTOTHEHEJLIKUUNS/UNS
ThedocumentusedtosubmitneedsstatementsintheMarineCorpsistheUNS.Ifitis
urgent,thenitissubmittedasanUNSthatisurgent,orUUNS.TheonlydocumentscitedastherequestforMRAPSandthegenesisoftheMRAPcontroversyistheHejlikUUNSofFebruary,2005.ThenextneedstatementforMRAPtypevehicles(inquantityover150)wasinMay2006for185.TheaccusationisthatMCCDCdelayed,denied,lost,did-not-act-on,etc.theHejlikUUNSandthereforeMarinesdied.Gaylstatedinhiscasestudy:“ThiscasestudywillexamineindetailhowandwhytheEFDSelectednottofulfilltheIMarineExpeditionaryForce(MEF)Forward(Fwd)MRAPUrgentUniversalNeedStatement(UUNS)of17Feb2005,therebycreatingasignificantadverseimpactontheMEF(Fwd)GCE’sabilitytoaccomplishitsmission.”(Gayl,pvi)
Gayl’scasestudydidnotexaminetheactionsoftheEFDSinanydepth.Insteadhe
focusedaccusationsonMCCDC.TheresponsibilityforUNSandUUNSrestwiththeentiretyoftheEFDS,notjustMCCDC.Thischapterwillexamineindetailtheresponsibilitiesandactionsassociatedwiththe2005HejlikUUNS.ThischapterwillexaminetheEFDSandnotsimplyMCCDCwhichonlyhasapartialresponsibilityforUUNSdevelopment.
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thenthebureaucratsatQuanticowere
responsibleforburyingtheUUNS.Inordertodoso,thebureaucratsatQuanticowouldhavehadtocausenegligenceanddisobedienceofordersacrosstheMarineCorpsfromtheAssistantCommandanttotheCombatantCommanders’OperationalCommanders.Thisideawillbedisproven.
“Yet,evidenceshowsthatcombatdevelopersknowinglydelayedrespondingtoanurgentrequestfor1,169MRAPsfromMarinesinIraqforaperiodofwhateffectivelyamountsto19months.Asaconsequence,hundredsofMarinesdiedandthousandsofMarineswerepermanentlymaimedincombat,unnecessarily”.(GaylTestimony,p3)NineteenmonthsisoftencitedastheamountoftimeMarineswentwithoutMRAPsandwillbeusedforthischapter.Thischapterwillexaminecombatdeveloperactionandinactionforthistimeframe.
“TheUUNSmighthavediedinvisiblyinMCCDCandoutsideofnormalMROCscrutinyastheSMEshadintended,wereitnotfortenaciouseffortsatMARCENTtoresurrectMRAPconsiderationinthesummerof2006,astheIEDemergencyworsenedintheater.”.(Gayl,p73)The2005HejlikUUNSwascompletedwiththefieldingofthem1114.Thissatisfiedthe
TheHejlikUUNSwasreducedtoanUNS.ThebelowfactsproveGayl,thepressandtheDODIGincorrect.TheDODIGshouldbespeciallynotedforcensureastheydoubtedtheaccountofMarineOfficersintheofficialDODIGreport.
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MROC,theAdvocates,MARFORPAC,MARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFaswellastherestofthecombatdevelopmentcommunity.Therewasno“tenaciousresurrection”atMARCENT.
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11A-GUIDANCEUNDERWHICHTHEHEJLIKUUNSWASSUBMITTED
OnFebruary172005BrigadierGeneralHejliksignedtheMRAPUUNS.Hedidsounder
theauthorityoftheCommandingGeneralLtGenSattlerwhowastheCommandingGeneralofIMEF.BGenHejlikwastheDeputyCommanderand,assuch,hadnoauthorityoutsidetheauthoritiesgrantedtohimbyLtGenSattler.The2005UUNSwasthereforesubmittedbyBGenHejlikundertheauthorityofLtGenSattler.BothGeneralscontinuedtobeinapositiontoaffecttheprogressoftheUUNS.
BGenHejliksignedtheUUNSinFeb2005andhisunitimmediatelyrotatedbacktothe
USafterayear-longdeployment.HewasinanidealpositiontooverseetheUUNS’progressandhehascommentedontheMRAPUUNSsolutionseveraltimestoincludethefollowing:“Thetermmine-resistant,ambush-protectedvehicle"wasverygeneric"andintendedtoguideabroaderdiscussionofwhattypeoftruckwouldbeneededtodefendagainstthechangingthreatstroopsinthefieldfaced,HejliktoldreportersinMay2007."Idon'tthinktherewasanyintentbyanybodytodoanythingbuttherightthing."(Lardner,p1)Hejlik’spositionwasthatthesolutionforthethreatwasnotthesamethingaspurchasingwhatwouldeventuallybecalledMRAPs.HispositionwasthatMRAPwasagenerictermandcouldbesatisfiedwithseveralsolutions.
ThispositionisreinforcedbythedirectiveinMARADMIN533/03whichprovidedUUNS
guidancespecificallytoIMEFandBGenHejlik:
(2)INCLUDETHEFOLLOWINGINFORMATION:(A)DESCRIPTIONOFNEEDALONGWITHASTATEMENTTHATAGENERALOFFICERHASSIGNEDTHEUNSANDTHATITHASBEENVETTEDTHROUGHTHECHAINOFCOMMANDTOINCLUDETHEMARFOR.DESCRIBETHENATUREOFTHENEEDANDHOWITWASIDENTIFIED.NOTETHATTHEDESCRIPTIONSHOULDNOTIDENTIFYSPECIFICMATERIELSOLUTIONS,BUTRATHERTHECAPABILITYREQUIRED.(MARADMIN533/03)
BGenHejlikwasgivenspecificguidancenottoidentifyamaterialsolution.TheMRAP
vehiclebecameaspecificmaterialsolution(anarmoredvehicle)but,atthetimeoftheUUNSsubmission,wasagenericcapability.BGenHejlikstatedasmuchandhisordersanddirectivesreinforcehisstatement.Them1114solutionwasthereforeviablefortheMRAPcapability.Inhindsight,however,them1114solutionwasnotthebestmaterialsolutionforthisUUNS(notbeingdebatedinthisstudy).
ThereareotheraspectsoftheUUNSthatarenotsatisfiedbyMRAPorHMMWV.There
areaspectsoftheUUNSthataresatisfiedbyboth.Theprovisionofamaterialsolutiondoesnot
TheguidanceforsubmittingandprocessingtheHejlikUUNSallowedforseveralmaterialsolutions,toincludethem1114.
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alwayssatisfyallofthecriteriaintheUUNS.Forexample,MRAPsdidnotallhavefiringportsonallfoursides.Inaddition,themajorityofMRAPsdidnothaveremotelycontrolledweaponssystems.BothofthesecharacteristicsarespecificallyrequiredintheHejlikUUNS.ThereareotherHejlikMRAPrequirementsthatwerenotsatisfiedbytheeventualMRAPsolution.MRAP,however,wasportrayedastheobviousandonlycorrectsolution.Itwasnot.
OftentimesasummarysheetisattachedtotheUUNSformat.Thiswasthecaseforthe
MRAPUUNS:
(Murrayemaildtd6/16/2006)
Inadditiontothebreakdownofthenumberrequired(1,169)therewasasummarydescriptionofthecapabilitybeingrequested.Line1ofthesummary(immediatelybelowthetable)states“Multi-MissionHMMWV-likecapability”.ThisisaclearlinktoaHMMWVsolution.ItdoesnotmandateaHMMWVsolution,butitprovidesguidanceonthethinkingforthesubmission.HMMWVsarevery“HMMWV-like”.ThistermisalsousedinthemainbodyoftheHejlikUUNS.
TheprocessthattheUUNSwentthroughwillprovideadditionalproofthattheHMMWVsolutionsatisfiedtheimmediateneedarticulatedbytheIMEFCommanderintheUUNS.Thisisnottosaythat,inhindsight,theHMMWVwastherightdecision.Thisauthorismerelysayingthat,withanunderstandingoftheorders/directivesandactionsoftheMEFleadership,theUUNSwassatisfied.
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11B-THEMEANINGOF“MRAP”INTHEHEJLIKUUNS
AsdiscussedinChapter4,MarineCorpsOrderandDirectiveprovidedguidancenotto
requestspecificnamedequipmentfromaspecificcompany.Theconceptwastorequestcapabilityandthespecificpieceofequipmentwouldbedeterminedthroughthecombatdevelopmentprocess.BGenHejlik’srequestwasforMRAPasacapability,notMRAPasavehiclename.TheanalysisoftheMRAPcapabilityincludedseveralvehicletypestoincludethem1114:“Thatstudydeterminedthat4and6wheeledCOTSCougar,RG-31,RG-32,Mamba,Casspir,Dingo,Cobra,ASV,Eagle,andLionCOTSMRAPvariantswereallsuperiortotheM1114infulfillingthebaselinesurvivabilityrequirementsoftheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNS.”(Gayl,p16).TherelativecapabilitiesofthedifferentvehicleswereanalyzedbutitisinterestingthatthetermMRAPincludedall-of-the-abovevehicleswherethetermMRAPin2006didnot.Ofnoteisthatthem1114wasincludedinthecomparison.
Theterm“MRAP”wasoriginallyusedforneedsdescriptioninthe2005HejlikUUNS.UponresolutionoftheHejlikUUNS,thetermwasnolongerinuseuntilthesummerof2006.Theterm“MRAP”wasaconfusionpointinlaterMRAPdiscussions:“From:MilsteadBGENRobertESent:Thursday,May24,20076:12To:HejlikMajGenDennisJCc:ConwayGenJamesT;MagnusGenRobert;FazekasLtColScottJ;DelarosaCaptManuelJ;KellyBGenJohnFSubject:Fw:CorpsRefused2005PleaForMRAPVehicle(USAToday)Importance:HighI'drecommendwelaunchyourlettertodayexplainingtheUUNSandtheuseofthetermMRAP.CaptDelarosainourofficewillassistgettingitwhereitneedstogo.Wemightwanttoshotgunittoeveryonewhowritesanarticletoday-IanticipateAPaswellasthisarticle.Nodoubtthere'llbeothersaswell.TheyarehungupontheuseofMRAPintheUUNSandareviewingitasapplestoapples.WemadeitclearyesterdaythatthedecisiontogowiththeM1114wasthebest(andfastest)COAtogetourfolksinprotectedvehicles.TherecentshifttotheMRAPweknowtodayresultedfromachangeinthethreat.Again,ourchallengeisthattheverbagedescribingMRAPintheFeb05UUNSisverysimilartowhatweusetoday.V/rBoomer”(Allesemaildtd5/24/2007)TheaboveemailiscommentaryonanarticlechargingtheMarineCorpsrefusedtheoperatingforceMRAPs.Infact,the2005MRAPrequestwasresolvedwithm1114s.Theuseofthesameterm(MRAP),asseenabove,createdalinkagebetweentheold2005UUNSandthenew2006requests.
TheHejlikUUNSwasprocessedusingordersanddirectivesrequiring“MRAP”tobeinterpretedasacapability,notaproductbyaspecificcompany.
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Immediatelyfollowingthe2005HejlikUUNS,MCCDCwasprovidedinformationaboutthevariousoptionsforHejlikUUNSresolution.Gaylstates:“Concurrently,theEFDCrequestedthatMCSCsurveythemilitarywheeledvehicleindustry.Thestudydeterminedthat4and6wheeledCOTSCougars,RG-31,RG-32,Mamba,Casspir,Dingo,Cobra,ASV,Eagle,andLionCOTSMRAPvariantswereallsuperiortotheM1114infulfillingthebaselinesurvivabilityrequirementsoftheUUNS.”(Gayl,pix)ThestudyalsoreflectedthatthetermMRAPwasagenerictermunderwhichallofthesevehiclesfit.Theslidesusedinthepresentationmanifestthispoint:
Figure9.Casspir,Mamba,RG-31,andRG-32wereallsuperiortotheM1114.
Figure10.Cougar,Dingo,Cobra,Eagle,ASV,andLionwereallsuperiortotheM1114.(Gayl,p17)
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Thesechartsindicateseveralthings.AsGaylstates,therewereoptionstosatisfy
equipmentelementsofthe2005UUNS.Thischartdoesnotanalyzeavailabilityormanyotheraspectsofanequipmentpurchase.NeitherdoesthischartanalyzethemajorityofthetypesofattacksagainstMarinevehicles(i.e.non-7.62SAFor7.62attacksatfurtherrangesorsideblastsofvaryingsizesorvaryingranges).Thesechartspresentnotionalthreats.Themostimportantaspectofthesecharts(forthissection)isthattheM1114wasoneofthepotentialsolutionslistedfortheHejlikUUNS.TheM1114wasaHejlikUUNSsolutionandwasanalyzedassuch.StatingthattheM1114satisfiedtheoldHejlikUUNSseemstobeacontradictioninterms,butonlyifthe2006MRAPtermisaccepted.By2005terminology,theM1114wasaHejlikUUNSsolution.
Gayl’sanalysisconfirmsthatMRAPwasnotaspecificvehicle,itwasadescriptionofvehicles.“ItisagainnoteworthythattheCasspir,aswellastheevennewerCOTSU.S.4thgenerationCougarandBuffaloMRAPswerespecificallymentionedasmaterialsolutioncandidatesintheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSthatwassignedbyBGenHejlikon17Feb05.”(Gayl,p4-5)Casspir,BuffaloandCougarwereacceptablepertheUUNS,butGayldoesnotincludetheUUNSaddendumspecificallymentioningHMMWVs.
Inadditiontotheaddendum,boththeauthoroftheUUNSandtheGeneralOfficer
signingtheUUNSthoughtthatthetermMRAPwasabroaderdescription.Theybothdescribedthem1114asafirstgenerationMRAP.MajorMcGriff,theauthor,providedasynopsisoftheMRAPtypesandstated,“Attheriskofrepeatingthingsyoualreadyknow:AttheEOS,GenGregsonprovidedabriefdiscussiononMineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)Vehicles.Thesearevehiclesthataredesignedfromthegrounduptoprovidesurvivabilityinsophisticatedmineinfestedenvironments.TheUAHisafirstgenerationMRAP.Itprovidesarmor.”(Maloneemaildtd12/27/2004).ThiswaslessthantwomonthsbeforetheofficialHejlikUUNSwassubmitted.GeneralHejlikhasalsoemphasizedthedescriptivenatureofthetermMRAP.Them1114wasananswertotheHejlikUUNS. The2005HejlikUUNSwassubmittedasacapabilityperMARADMINandalsobystatementsofBGenHejlik.SubsequentprocessingoftheHejlikUUNSwereinconjunctionwithMARADMINguidance.
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11C-PROCESSIGNORANCECONTRIBUTEDTO“HEJLIKUUNSCONCLUSIONS”
TheprocessusedfortheHejlikUUNSwasdescribedinordersanddirectives.Partsof
theprocessweretruncatedasthisUNSwasidentifiedasanUrgentUNS.TheprocessfortheMRAPUUNSwasdescribedinChapter4.Gaylmakesseveralerrorsinhisassessmentoftheprocess.Gayl’sfailuretounderstandtheprocessisreflectedinhisMRAPstudy.
“InordertomitigatetheIEDthreatIMEF(Fwd)submittedasolution-specificneedforaCommercial-Off-The-Shelf(COTS)4thgenerationarmorMRAPcapability.TherequestedsolutionsetincludedanurgentrequestforprotectionagainstExplosivelyFormedPenetrators(EFP)(Referencesr.2.).”(Gayl,pvii)EFPdefeatisoneofthemainargumentsGaylmakesinfavorofMRAPs.EFPdefeatislargelydependentontheEFPtype.AdditionalarmorpackageswereoftenaddedtoMRAPinordertodefeatEFP.TheprocessfoulisinaskingforacapabilitythatdefeatsEFP,thenaskingforamaterialsolutionthatdoesnotdoso.TheprocessfoulalsooccurredwhenthethreatofEFPdidnotmaterializeinMNF-W.ThematerialsolutionrequiredtodefeatEFPwasnotthesameasthematerialsolutiontodefeatunderbodyIEDs.ThepursuitofadefeatmechanismforEFPwaslargelyanArmy/JointeffortthattheMarineCorpswascloselyinvolvedwith,butnotleading.IfEFPhadmaterializedasaregularthreatinMNF-W,thenMRAPwouldnothavedefeateditbutMCCDCwouldhavebeenabletoprocurematerialsolutionsthatwould.
“InIraqIwitnessedthetangiblecostsinliveslostandseriousinjuriesincurredduetotheapparentgrossmismanagementofrequirementsattheMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)atQuantico.”(GaylTestimony,p2)TheMRAPprocessinQuanticowasandisaveryopenprocess.ThepresenceandauthorityoftheAdvocates(Gayl’sCommand)intheprocessensuresrequirementsaremanagedappropriatelyandwithadvocacyforthesubmitter.MRAPwasnodifferent.Theneeds/requirementsofMarinesincombatwerethefirstpriorityforMCCDC.Gaylstatesthatmismanagementwasinpartresponsibleforthe“19monthdelay”inMRAPs.Thisisacategoricallyfalseassertion.The2005MRAPdecisionsbyCMCandtheMROCweredeliberateandresolvedthe2005HejlikUUNS.ThefailuretodebunkGayl’saccusationsmaybecalledmismanagement.Thematerialresponsetothe2005MRAPUUNS,however,wasnotdecidedthroughmismanagement.Itwastheresultofadeliberativeprocess.
“SincetheoptimalcapabilitiesneededforeffectiveCOINwerebeingroutinelydeniedtotheMEFs,operatingforcevulnerabilitiestoIEDsandotherthreatsgrew,alongwithCFcasualties.”(Gayl,p86)OptimalcapabilitieswerenotroutinelydeniedtotheMEFs.TheG-BOSSsectionandtheLaserDazzlersectionwillprovideamoredetaileddiscussionoftwosub-optimalmaterialsolutionsdemandedbyGaylandIMEFG-9.Bothofthesechapters,however,willshowthattherewaspushbackanddebatebyIMEFontheproposedmaterialsolution.CG
SeveralofGayl’sconclusionswithregardtotheHejlikUUNSwerebasedonamisinterpretationoftheUUNSprocess.
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MCCDCstatedthatthedelayinfieldingtheLaserDazzlerwasduetoIMEFdesireforanothersystem,andtheDODIGagreed.Incontrast,therewasnopushbackofanykindtothefieldingofm1114sastheMRAPsolution.ThisincludedLtGenSattleratMARCENT/MARFORPACandBGenHejlikatMARFORPAC(theformerCGandDCGforIMEFfortheMRAPUUNS).Bothwereinincreasedpositionsofauthorityatthecomponentcommandsandremainedresponsiblefordeployedunits.Neithercomplainedofa“denied”capabilityfortheMRAPsolution.NeitherdidMajGenZilmerorBGenNeller,theCGandDCGofthe2006/2007IMEFdeployment.
“Intheend,neithertheIMEF(Fwd)HQ,theIIMEF(Fwd)HQ,noranyofthetacticalcommanderslosingincreasingnumbersofMarinestoIEDsinMNFWhadavoteontheMRAPUUNS.”(Gayl,p28)TheAdvocateswereintimatelyinvolvedintheMRAPUUNS.TheshortenedsequenceassociatedwithanUrgentUNSaffectedthestaffingprocess,buttheAdvocateshadmultipleinputs.Moreimportantly,theAdvocateshaveavoteandaseatattheMROCandtheearoftheCommandant.Theterm“vote”doesnotaddressthecapabilityandresponsibilityoftheAdvocatesfortheMRAPUUNS.TheMEFshadplentyof“votingpower”ontheHejlikUUNS.IftheMEFsdidnotlikehowa“vote”went,thentheyhadtheopportunitytoraiseobjectionthroughtheirchainofcommandorthroughtheAdvocate.Onceagain,iftheMEFswantedadditionalcapability,theycouldhaveresubmitted(whichtheyeventuallydid).
“EffectivelycircumventingMCCDCstaff,CMCwasdirectlygivenacompellingbriefinginJuly2006thatanalyzedcasualtyratesby-vehicle.AnupdateofthatbriefwaswidelycirculatedinDODinJan2007.CMCimmediatelyauthorizedalargeprocurementofMRAPs.Thusempowered,IMEF(Fwd)immediatelysubmitteda2ndMRAPJUONSrequestfortheentirewarfighterneedatthattimeforallforcesoperatingunderMNF-Wcommand—Soldiers,Sailors,andMarines.Thetotalrequirementatthattimewas1,185vehicles,remarkablysimilartothe1,169vehiclecountfrom2005(Referencesr.8.andr.11.).”(Gayl,p47)MilitarypeopleunderstandthatstaffsexisttosupporttheirCommander.Theyhavenoauthorityoutsideoftheircommander.TheMCCDCstaffwasnevercircumvented.Asstatedintheaboveparagraphs,theCGMARCENTalwayshastheauthoritytobrieftheCommandant.ManyinQuanticowereadvocatingforalargerMRAP-typevehiclerequirement.TherewaskeeninterestintheprogressoftheMRAPneed.MCSCwasalreadybriefingCongressontherequestfor185JERRVinJune,themonthbeforeLtGenSattlerbriefedCMC.IMEFcouldhaverequestedMRAPsinanynumberatanytime.Theydidnotneedtobe“empowered”.The“power”tosubmitneedswasalreadyspelledoutinordersanddirectives.Theysimplyneededtoact.
Theprocessisalsodesignedtoreachsomesortofconsensuswhentherearecompetingdemandsandpositions.Forexample,thetwopiecesofcorrespondencebelowwerereceivedonthesameday:EmailfromIMEF(Fwd)G9toLtColJankowski(MARCENT).“IjustcheckedwithColMilburn,hewilltakethissubjectuponFridaywithColSupnickwhenhearriveshereatCampFallujah.Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERV
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vehicles.Wedon'twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,let'sputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.”(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006)MessagefromIIMEF3.OPERATIONALNEEDS:3.A.IIMEFSTRONGLYCONCURSWITHTHEIMEFFWDJUONSOF21MAY2006FOR185MMRVS,ANDTHEIMEFFWDUUNSOF17FEB2005FOR1169MRAPS.THEADDITIONOFTHESEVEHICLESTOTHEFORWARDDEPLOYEDMAGTFWILLSIGNIFICANTLYENHANCEPROTECTIONFROMIEDS.(Murrayemaildtd6/20/2006)
ItwasincumbentonMCCDCandtheprocesstodeconflictthedifferentpositions.Ononehand,thedeployedforceisrejectingmoreMRAPsthanthe185alreadyrequested(email),andontheotherhandtheMEFintherearpreparingtodeploydesiresadditionalMRAPsandwascitingaresolvedUUNS(message).ThenumberofMRAPscontinuedtochangeonaregularbasisandinthiscase,bothMEFssentvastlydifferentrequirements.
CriticsoftheMarineCorpsoftenfabricatedblanketstatementswithoutunderstanding
theprocess:“DespiteunambiguousandcontinuousfeedbackfromthedeployedMarinesMCCDCatQuantico,theMarineCorpsturnedablindeyetorequestsforurgentlyneededequipmentwheneverthoserequestsconflictedwithparochialconceptoracquisitionprioritiesinacompetitionforresources.”(GaylTestimony,p3)InthecaseofMRAP,therewaslittleinthewayofcontinuousorunambiguousfeedback.Thedemandbecamenonexistent,thenchargesofnegligenceoccurredwhentheMEFchangedtheirmind.
ThepreviousexamplesofprocessignorancefueledchargesofMCCDCwrongdoing.Thatprocessignorancewasunfortunatelyparrotedbypressandpoliticians.
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11D-MONTHLYUPDATESINDICATETHEREALMRAPTIMELINE
ThemonthlyupdatesprovidedbyIMEFandMARCENTtellpartofthestoryoftheHejlik
UUNStimeline.ThistimelineindicatesthedemandaswellasthenumberrequestedbythedeployedMEF.Themonthlyupdatesprovideuncontesteddata.Thereisnoopinionassociatedwiththem.Thisauthordidnothavethemonthlyupdatesforeachmonth,however,conclusionsmaybedrawnfromtheupdatespresentedherein.
Thelasteventassociatedwiththe2005HejlikUUNSoccurredinAug,2005attheMROCwhereanupdatewasprovided.TheupdatewasincludedintheMROCDMwhichistheMROCminutes.TheMROCDMispublishedthroughouttheMarineCorpsandisalsopublishedtotheMROCmembers.TheAugust2005MRAPentrywasanunremarkableentryandoccurredshortlyaftertheMarineCorpsdecisiontoanswertheUUNSwithm1114s(June2006).ThisauthorhasnoadditionalupdatedocumentationuntilApril2006. InApril2006IMEFpublishedtheirUUNStracker.TheMRAPentrywasalreadyplacedbyIMEFinthe“CompletedUUNS”tabandreadasfollows(splitintotwoimagesforreadability):
(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006)ThetitleoftheUUNSindicatesthattheUUNShadchangedstatusfromanUUNStoanUNS(losttheUrgent).Thenumberinthiscompleteditemis1,169.ItisnowhereclosetotheJERRVrequestfor185.Thereisnoreasonthatitshouldbecloseasthetwodocumentsweredifferentrequestsatdifferenttimes.Thenextboxreflectstheneedasnolongerurgentaswell.
TheIMEFneedtimelinecanbeestablishedusingtheirownmonthlyupdates.
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ThisclearplacementoftheHejlikUUNSinthecompletedsectionofthepublishedUUNStrackeriscapturedinAprilof2006butitisunclearwhentheentrywasmade.ThisauthorhasnopreviousUUNStrackers.Onemayassumethatthe2005HejlikMRAPUUNSwaschangedtoanUNSpriortoAprilasthereisnoidentifiedactionwiththeUUNSafterAugust2005. ThepresenceoftheMRAPUUNSinthissectionisinarguableproofthattheHejlikUUNSwasdowngradedandcompleted.ItisclearthatinApril2006,theMRAPUUNSwasnolongeractive.ThenextUUNStrackersubmittedwasforMay2006.ThattrackermaintainedMRAPinthesamelocationwiththesamewording.(Ouztsemaildtd5/10/2006) BothtrackersindicatezeroactiverequestsforMRAP.ThesignificanceisthatMRAPwasnotbeingrequestedbyIMEF.TherewasnoconstantdemandforMRAPsfor19months.TherewasnonegligencebyMCCDCpersonnel.ArequestforMRAPs(UUNS)wouldhavebeenneededforMCCDCtobenegligentinitsprocessing.TheUUNSwasnot“lost”.Neitherwasitignoredorburied.IftherewasanactiveUUNsthenaccusationsofincompetence/negligence/wrongdoing/criminalneglect(etc.)mayhavebeenlegitimate.Allofthoseaccusationsarethereforenotfactual.Theyaremadefromapositionofignoranceormalice. InAprilof2006,IMEFdidnotrecognizetheHejlikUUNS.InearlyMayIMEFdidnotrecognizetheHejlikUUNS. InlateMayIMEF(throughMARCENT)submittedajointrequestfor185MRAPs.ThroughJuneandintoJulythenumberofMRAPsrequestedbyIMEFwas185.TheMARCENTUUNStrackerdidnotrecognizetheHejlikUUNS.
(Johnstonemaildtd7/31/2006) ShortlythereafterIMEFaddedasecondrequestforanadditional1,000.ThisJulyrequestbroughtthetotalnumberofMRAPsrequestedto1,185.TheJulyrequestdidnotrecognizetheHejlikUUNS.
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ByJanuary2007theMARCENTprioritizedlistreadasfollows:
(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007) ThetotalnumberofMRAPsrequestedhadreached1,185.ThisnumberwasacombinationoftheMay2006jointrequestfor185addedtotheJulyrequestfor1000.Onceagainthe2005HejlikUUNSrequested1,169,anumberthatcontinuedtobeabsentfromallotherrequests.TheJanuary2007listdidnotrecognizetheHejlikUUNS. TheclearconclusionfromtheUUNSupdatesisthatIMEFhadnoexpectationofreceivingMRAP-typevehiclesassociatedwiththe2005HejlikUUNS.
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11E-KEYTIMELINEISSUES
Thissectionwillestablishseveraltimelinesandassociatedconclusionsrelevantto
MRAP.Itisinchronologicalorderandpresentsmistakenperceptionsaswellascorrectfacts.
Feb2005-Sept2006“Unfortunately,theapparentdecisiontonottoseekMROCapprovaloftheUUNS
delayedtheramp-upinitiationbyapproximately19months,withmeasurableconsequencesinMNF-W.”(Gayl,p52)The19month“delay”ascitedbyGaylandoftenquotedinthepressisamisnomer.Thisperiodencompassesthetimefromthe2005HejliksubmissiontotherequestforfundingofthenewMarinerequirementof805MRAPs(Marineportionofthe1,185MRAPrequest).Asseeninprevioussections,theMROCwaswellawareoftheMRAPrequestandthedecisionwasmadetosupportwithm1114s.TherewasnoMROCignorance.
June10,2005
“This10June05EFDCinfopaperaboveisthelastknown(i.e.knowntothiscasestudyauthor)formalcommunicationthattheMRAPUUNShadbeendelayedorcancelledatMCCDC.ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbytheMROCSecretariat.TheMRAPUUNSwasallegedlyhandledanddecideduponoutsideofthestandardprocess,inthatitwasneverproperlybroughtbeforetheMROCforaformaldecisionforsubsequentrecordinginanMROCDecisionMemorandum.”(Gayl,p38)Asseenintheprevioussections,MCCDCdidnotcanceltheUUNS.AsseenintheDODIGaswellastheMROCDM,theMRAPcapabilitywasbriefedtotheMROConseveraloccasions.TheDODIGparseswordsandstatesthatMRAPwasnot“formallybriefed”.ThatwillbeaddressedintheDODIGsectionalongwithseveralotherDODIGfailings.TheMROCDM,however,isaformaldocumentandwassignedbytheACMCanddistributedtotheMarineCorps.ItincludedMRAPdecisions.TheMROCDMwasaformaldocumentsenttotheMROCmemberswhichconstitutesaformal“brief”.Thedisparity(intheDODIGconclusions)betweentheMROCnotbeing“formallybriefed”andissuingitsownformalfindingsinaMROCDMisnotaconsistentconclusionandreflectspoorlyontheDODIG.
TheMROCmemberswerebriefedinseveralforums.Memberswerebriefedatthe
ExecutiveSafetyConferencein2005.MemberswerebriefedattheExecutiveoffsite.MemberswerediligentlyanalyzingthevehicletypesneededforIraq.MemberswereawareoftherecommendationoftheDeputyCommandantforInstallationsandLogisticstoselectthem1114asthereplacementvehicleforup-armoredHMMWVs.TheCommandantreinforcedthatrecommendationbyselectingthem1114asthereplacementvehicleinthefaceoftheHejlikUUNS.Finally,notallMROCdecisionsrequiredabrieferwithpower-pointslidesanditwasregularpracticefortheMROCtocorrespondelectronicallytomakedecisions.
AnanalysisofissuesbasedontheirtimingpresentsaclearpictureofthewideconsiderationoftheHejlikUUNS,itsreductiontoanUNS,andtheabsenceofdemanduntilthesubmissionofthe185JERRVJUONS.
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TheassertionthattheMROCdidnotknowaboutMRAPsisfalse.TheassertionthattheMROCmemberswerenotbriefedonMRAPsisfalse.TheassertionthattheMROCdidnotmakedecisionsonMRAPsisfalse.TheassertionthattheMROCdidnotreceivea“formalbrief”isonlytrueifa“formalbrief”mandatesabrieferwithslidesstandinginfrontoftheMROCtalkingthemthroughtheissue(noformaldocumentsorelectronicbriefsorbriefsinothervenuessuffice).Feb/Mar2006
“FollowingRIPTOAinearly2006thenewCG,IMEF(Fwd),MajGenRichardZilmerandhisDCG,BGenRobertNellerbecameimmediatelyawareofthecontinuingurgentneedforMRAPprotectiontocountertheIEDemergency.DuringtheinterveningyearallactiononrespondingtoIMEF(Fwd)’soriginalUUNSforMRAPhadcometoanapparentstandstillatMCCDC.Realizingtheneedforhigherleveladvocacy,MARCENTquicklybecametheIMEF(Fwd)’soperationalchampionandtookthecauseofMRAPagain.MuchofthehistoryoftheFeb05MRAPUUNSwasunknownatthattime,astheUUNShadapparentlynotbeenpresentedtotheMROCbyMCCDCandDC,CDIforaformaldecision.”(Gayl,p46)GaylassertsthatfollowingRIP/TOAMajGenZilmerandBGenNellerbecameawareofaneedforMRAPs.ZilmerandNellerwerethetwoGeneralsinchargeofIMEF,thesameunitthatsubmittedtheHejlikUUNS.OnemayaskhowitoccurredthatthetwoGeneralsinchargeofthedeployingMEFwereunawareofthesupposedlyactiveHejlikUUNSthatwasinitiatedbytheirunit.Theydidnotrecognizeitintheirprioritiesbeforedeployment.GaylstatestheybecameawareofaneedforMRAPsoncedeployed.Thisisacorrectstatement.TheywereunawareofanyexistingMRAPneedbecausetherewasnone.IMEFhadnocontinuingMRAPneedandoncedeployed,establishedaneed.
GaylisalsocorrectwhenhestatesMCCDCwasnotworkingthe2005HejlikUUNS.TheywerenotdoingsobecauseitwasnotanactiveUUNS. GaylstatesthatMARCENTbecametheIMEF“operationalchampion”and“tookthecauseofMRAPagain”.MARCENTwasalwaysthe“operationalchampion”ofthedeployedMEF.Thatistheirmission.MARCENThadto“takethecauseofMRAPagain”becausetheywerenotworkingitcontinuously. Insum,afterIMEFdeployed,theyopenedaneweffortthatinvolvedMARCENTandMCCDC.MARCENT,IMEFandMCCDCwerenotworkingthebilliondollar2005HejlikUUNSpriortothispointbecauseithadbeenresolved.Gaylstatesthat“thehistoryoftheFeb2005MRAPUUNSwasunknown”asithadnotbeenpresentedtotheMROC.ThehistorywasunknownbecauseitwasnolongeranactiveUUNS.May2006
“First,the2006reportagainproposedthattheHMMWVwasrightchoiceforprotectioninMNF-W,andtherewasnomentionthattheMRAPwaswantedbyoperatorstoreplacethemorevulnerableHMMWVs.ThisiscurioussincetheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSwasstillunfulfilled.”(Gayl,p48)Thereferencedreportwasthe2006IGreportonequipment
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readiness.TheInspectorGeneraloftheMarineCorpsdidnotfindanydesireforMRAP-typevehiclesintheirMay2006inspection.Thefirstjointrequestfor185JERRVshadnotyetbeensubmitted.GayldescribesthislackofdesireforMRAPsascurious.TheIGresults,however,areconsistentwiththemonthlyupdates,thelackofanyMRAPactionsintheentiretyoftheMarineCorps,andtherejectionofmoreMRAPsaftertherequestfor185.TheonlyreasonthatitmayseemcuriousisthatGaylincorrectlyassumestheoriginalUUNSwasstillactive.TheabsencefromtheIGreportisyetanotherindicationthattheHejlikUUNSwasnolongeractive.
“In2006IMEF(Fwd)requestedanMRAPcapabilityagaininresponsetotheIEDthreat.”(Gayl,pvii)Thisstatementiscorrect.InMay2006(aftertheIG)andagaininJuly2006IMEFrequestedatotalof1,185MRAPs.TheyrequestedaMRAPcapabilityagainbecausetherewasnoactiverequestforthemtoutilize.Ifthe2005HejlikUUNSremainedactive,IMEFwouldhavesimplybeenabletopointtothatrequestforMRAPs.Instead,theystartedanewwitharequestfor185vehicles.
June16,2006
“Furthermore,CDTSdocumentationontheUUNSwasnotwellknown,andsomecombatdeveloperstaffmembersappearedunawarethatanUUNSforMRAPhadbeensubmittedin2005.”(Gayl,p46)GayliscorrectthatsomecombatdeveloperstaffmemberswereunawarethataMRAPUUNSwassubmittedin2005.MostofMCCDCwasunawareofthissubmissionasconcludedUUNSwerenotapriority.MCCDCwassupportingcurrentUUNSfromthewarfightersasdesignatedbyIMEFthroughMARCENT.WhileMCCDCwasunawareoftheoldUUNS,MARCENTalsohadtoaskotherunitsforacopyoftheoldUUNS.UnawarenessoftheUUNSwascommonplace(toincludeIMEFGenerals).
TheChiefofStaffIIMEF(ColCarriker)sentthefollowingemailtohisfellowChiefsofStaffandseveralofhisownstaff:“Gents,IwillsendyouabriefonSiprthatcallforCIEDvehiclesandsomerequestedhelpfromusbyMarcent.TheareaskingforustoseeifwecanfindanoldUUNSsignedbyGenHejliksometimeagoreferencingMineResistantAmbushProtectionVehicle(MRAP).”(Murrayemaildtd6/16/2006)OnJune16theIIMEFChiefofStaffwassearchingfortheHejlikUUNSbecausetheChiefofStaffofMARCENTdidnothaveit.AlogicalassumptionisthattheCOSMARCENThadalreadyaskedothercommandsforit.ThesimpleconclusionisthatMARCENTdidnothavethe2005HejlikUUNSandMARCENTwasnotworkingthe2005HejlikUUNS.
“IndependentofthereasonsfortheshelvingoftheUUNS,MRAPwasstillurgentlyneeded,andMARCENTencouragedIMEF(Fwd)toresubmitanurgentneed.”(Gayl,p46)ThereasonMARCENTencouragedasubmissionofanotherUUNSwasthattheyhadnoactiveUUNSwithwhichtorequestmoreMRAPs.MARCENTpromptedIMEFtorequestmoreMRAPsbasedontheirownanalysis,buttherewasalsoapromptingbyMCCDCtodoso.
“On16Jun06theMCSCLNOtoIIMEF,LtColStephenEckberg,wrotetoIMEF(Fwd)regardingtheoriginalOIF-III-MineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)Vehicle-05053UBUUNSnotedinColCariker’se-mail:“IjusttalkedtoSallyAmberger(theAdvocate)atHQMC
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I&L,andshesaidthatthesubjectUUNS(attachedbelow)hasnotbeentotheMROCyet,becausethereisnosolution.ShethoughtthatitwaspassedtoMCWLforasolution---canyoushedanylightontheMROCstatus?IbelievethiseffortistiedinwiththetalkswehadyesterdayaboutallthePurplemoneyavailableforCIED.”(Gayl,p49)BetweenAmbergerandEckbergtherewasacertainamountofguesswork.AmbergerstatedthattheUUNShadnotbeentotheMROC,however,theMROChadalreadyreviewedtheUUNS.AmbergerwasmorethanlikelynotingtheabsenceofafinalUUNSdecisionasthereductiontoanUNSwasnotwidelypublishedorknown.ShemayhavebeenunawareoftheMROCMRAPeventsthatoccurredalmostayearearlier.ThediscussionaboutthepurplemoneywaspromptedbyMCWLandtheavailabilityofsupportthroughJIEDDO.OfnoteisthatthedowngradedUUNS,akatheMRAPUNS,wasinthepurviewofI&L(Advocate).
June20,2006 AsdiscussedinanearlierchapterIMEF,whiledeployed,hadrejectedoffersforadditionalMRAPs:“IjustcheckedwithColMilburn,hewilltakethissubjectuponFridaywithColSupnickwhenhearriveshereatCampFallujah.Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERVvehicles.Wedon'twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,let'sputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.”(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006)ThisemailwasfromtheG-9ofIMEFtotheMARCENTstaffandCC’dMarineCorpssupportcommandsandhisownChiefofStaff.The2005HejlikUUNSwasfor1,169vehicles.Thereisnoreconcilingarejectionformorethan185vehicleswhilesimultaneouslyaskingfor1,169vehicles.ThesimpleconclusionisthatIMEFwasnotaskingfor1,169vehicles.Theywerenotworkingthe2005HejlikUUNSandhadnoexpectationofanynumberofvehiclescloseto1,169(untiltheychangedtheirmindandaskedformorethan185).The2005HejlikUUNSwas,infact,acompletedUUNS.Mar2007
“Since21May2006,whenMNF-WissueditsfirsturgentrequestforMRAP,over150servicemenandwomenhavebeenkilledandover1,500seriouslyinjuredinvehicleIEDincidents.”(Gayl,p52)ThenumberofcasualtiescalculatedintheprevioussentenceisbasedonthetimebetweentheIMEFsubmissionfor185JERRVsand1Mar2007.ItisprovidedbytheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.TheentiretyofthistimeperiodconsistedofunwaveringsupportbyQuanticoandtheMarineCorpsforMRAP.
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11F-THE1-BILLION-DOLLARUUNS
TheMRAPrequestfrom2005(alsoknownastheHejlikUUNS)issometimesreferredto
aslostorburied.ThisUUNSwasfor1169MRAP-typevehicles.ThecostofanUUNSfor1169MRAPswasaccuratelyestimatedatapproximatelyonebilliondollars.ThebelowestimateisfromtheinitialDOTMLPFassessment(referredtoastheCDIBassessmentinGayl’spaper):
(Gayl,p29)
ThisslidealertsbothI&LandPP&O(Advocates)thatthisUUNScouldcostabilliondollars.ThiswouldhaveimmediatelybecomethelargestnewpurchaseforeitheroftheAdvocatesandoneofthelargestintheMarineCorps(comparablewithaviationprograms).BothI&LandPP&OwererepresentedattheDOTMLPFworkinggroups.Gaylasserts:“ThisPOM
TheHejlikUUNSwasestimatedtocostoneBillionDollars.MRAPwasthemostexpensiveGCEprograminthehistoryoftheMarineCorps.AssertionsthattheHejlikUUNSwaslostormisplaceddefycommonsense.
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slideisthefirstsignthatMCCDCstaffwouldintentionallyslow-rollMRAPatthemiddlemanagementlevel,andahandfulofbureaucratswereabletoallowanUUNStogounfulfilledwhilemaintainingtherealtactical,operationalandevenstrategicimplicationsbelowtheleadershipradar.”(Gayl,p29)
GaylisstatingthatthebureaucratsatQuanticowereintentionallyslow-rollingabilliondollarUUNS.Partofthe“slow-roll”wasapparentlytoadvertiseinabrieftoalloftheAdvocatesandalloftheMCCDCstaffthattheHejlikUUNSwouldcostabilliondollars.P&R(theMarineCorps’financialstaff)alsowasprovidedthesebriefs.TheorganizationsrepresentedintheDOTMLPFWGincluded:
a. CommandingGeneral,MarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(CG,MCCDC)b. DeputyCommandantforAviationc. DeputyCommandantforPlans,PoliciesandOperationsd. DeputyCommandantforInstallationsandLogistics–DualhatsasCSSEand
SupportingEstablishmentrepse. CommandingGeneral,TrainingandEducationCommandf. Director,Intelligenceg. Director,C4h. Director,MarineCorpsWarfightingLaboratoryi. Director,MarineCorpsSystemsCommandj. Director,DoctrineDivisionk. Director,TotalForceStructureDivisionl. Director,StudiesandAnalysisDivisionm. Director,MaterielRequirementsDivisionn. Director,C2Divisiono. Director,FuturesWarfightingDivisionp. UNSoriginator,ifrequired
(Watsonemaildtd11/30/2004) Theabovecommandsalsoreceivedelectroniccopiesofthebrief.Theabilityofseveralbureaucratsto“slow-roll”abilliondollarprojectthathasbeenbriefedacrossthismanycommandsisnon-existent.TheMarineCorps,apenny-wiseorganization,hasseveralfinancialorganizationsthatwouldnothavetakentheireyesoffofthisrequirementifithadremainedinconsideration.TherestoftherepresentativeswouldhaveimmediatelybriefedtheirsuperiorsthatabilliondollarUUNSwasintheworks.ThissizerequestwouldhavehadramificationsacrosstheMarineCorps.Oncetheleadershipoftheseorganizationswerebriefedonthisbilliondollarproposal,thedecisionswouldhavebeenoutofthehandsofthe“bureaucrats”.Theabovefinancialawarenessdiscussionisindependentofthewarfightingdiscussionthatisdiscussedinasubsequentsection.Gayl’sassertions,onasimplefiscallevel,arenotcredible.
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11G-RESPONSIBILITYLISTFORTHEUUNS
TheignorantmaythinkthattheonlyresponsibilityforUUNSrestswithbureaucratsat
Quantico.Thisisafalsehoodthathasbeenperpetuatedbythepress.ResponsibilityforUUNSsrestwithmanyorganizations.Someresponsibilitiesareunique,othersareshared.Thefollowingsectionwilldiscusstheorganizationalresponsibilities(manyoutlinedinChapter4-6)andactionsastheyapplytothe2005HejlikUUNS.Iand/orIIMEF
ThedeployedMEFswerenotonlytaskedwithsubmittingUUNS,butalsowithtrackingthoseUUNSandidentifyingunfulfilledUUNS.
“Intheend,neithertheIMEF(Fwd)HQ,theIIMEF(Fwd)HQ,noranyofthetacticalcommanderslosingincreasingnumbersofMarinestoIEDsinMNFWhadavoteontheMRAPUUNS.”(Gayl,p28)IMEFandIIMEFhadadirectedresponsibilitytosubmitlistsofunfulfilledUUNS.Theydidnotidentifythe2005HejlikUUNSasunfulfilled.Nomatterwhatthe“vote”orwhereitoccurred,IandIIMEFhadtheopportunitytoidentifytheHejlikUUNSasunfulfilled.Theydidnotdoso.Inaddition,IandIIMEFhadtheopportunitytosubmitanotherUUNSorJUONS.TheydidnotdosountilMay2006.Conclusion:TheMEFsregardedtheHejlikUUNSascompleteandstartedaneweffort(whichincludedresurrectingtheoldUUNS).
“OnemonthafterRIPTOA,noMEF(Fwd)isinapositiontoprovideacomprehensiveandhistoricallyintegratedpictureofoperationalneedsintheMNF-WAORaswellastheMEF(Fwd)itrelieved.”(Gayl,p36)OnemonthafterRIPTOAanyMEFisabletopresentasimplepictureofpendingneeds.MEFspresentapictureoftheirneedspriortoactuallydeploying.RIPTOAisrepletewithbriefsandturnoverdiscussions.Thisincludesneeds.IMEFknewitsprioritiesaswellastheprioritiesofIIMEFandtheHejlikUUNSwasnotoneofthem.AnysuggestionthatIMEFwasunawareofabilliondollarneedthatwouldchangethemaincombatvehicleisincorrect.Onceagain,theHejlikUUNSwascompleteortherewascatastrophicignoranceonthepartofbothMEFs(andothers).
“RealizingthatIMEF(Fwd)wasconcernedthatalargerequirementlikethe1,169thathadbeenrequestedin2005woulddoomtheMRAPneedtoa2ndrejectionbyMCCDC,theCoSofIMEF(Fwd)hadunderstandablybecome“gun-shy”ataskingfortoomuch.Thispreciselyreflectedtheoperatorsenseoffutilityinaskingforcapabilitiesfromcombat
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thentherewasnegligenceacrosstheentireMarineCorpswithregardtotheprocessingofthedocumentknownastheHejlikUUNS.ThisnegligencewouldhaveincludedIMEF(2rotations),IIMEF,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,PP&O(Advocate)(includesGayl),I&L(Advocate),MCCDC,MROC(includingremainingadvocates)andtheirstaffs.Inaddition,severalorganizationswithUUNSsupportresponsibilitieswouldhavealsobeennegligenttoincludeMCSC,P&R,MCWLandthe11thESB.
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developersthatMajorsMcGriff,Allena,andSinclairhadobservedin2002-2003.”(Gayl,p50)TheabovepointisconfusingastheargumenthasbeenthatMCCDC“slow-rolled”the2005HejlikUUNS.IftheHejlikUUNSwasstillactive,whywouldIMEFneedtoconsideranewUUNS?AnUUNScannotbe“slowrolled”and“rejected”simultaneously.Iftherewasa“rejection”oftheHejlikUUNSasimpliedabove,thenthemajorityofGayl’spapercriticizingMCCDCfordelayisincorrect.Thepoorlogicaside,itistheMEF’sresponsibilitynottobe“gun-shy”.Theirdutywastoidentifyunfulfilledneedsoridentifynewneeds.ThecharacterizationbyGaylimpliesalackofresolveonthepartofIMEFandshouldbedismissedasfancifulwriting.Onceagain,theobviousconclusionthattheUUNSwascompletedisconsistentwiththesubmissionofa“secondrequest”.
“AMARCENTstafferlaterwrote:“…[we]feltlikewehadto"fight"IMEF(Fwd)togetabiggerrequirement.Soweendedupgoingtothe3-star(LtGenSattler),andgoingtoCMCtogivetheIMEF(Fwd)"topcover"fromCMC,sothatyou[IMEF(Fwd)]wouldapprovethelargerMRAPrequirement...Ourfeelingwas:MARCENTisanoperationalcommand.Ourjobistosupportthewarfighter...Youtelluswhatyouneed,and"demand"thatwesupportyouwithwhatyouneed,notwithwhatyouthinkwecandoforyougivenyourknowledgeofpoliticalrealitiesinWashington...”Again,ittookMARCENTadvocacyeffortstoconvincetheIMEF(Fwd)CoSandstaffthattheMEFnolongershouldfeelconstrainedtoaskforlessthanwhatittrulyoperationallyneeded,whetheritbetheMRAPvehiclesoranyothercapability.”(Gayl,p51)ThiswasobviouslyaflawedanalysisofthesystembyIMEFasthe2006MRAPrequestswerechampionedbyeverymajorcommandintheMarineCorps.MARCENTadvocacywassupportedbyMCCDCadvocacy.MARCENTactionsasstatedabovewereexpectedactions.TheMARCENTCGanswerstotheCommandantandshouldcoordinatedirectlyonmajorissues.OfnoteisthatCGMARCENTdidnotasktheCommandantwherethevehiclesfromthe2005HejlikUUNSwere.MARCENTactionsarefurtherdiscussedbelow.MARCENT/MARFORPAC
WhileMCCDCorchestratesmuchoftheUUNSprocess,MCCDCisnotthe“owner”ofanyoftheUUNSs.TheMEFsaretheoriginatorsofUUNSandownthemwithintheComponent.OncetheComponentCommandersignsoffontheUUNS,theUUNSbelongtotheMarineComponentCommander:B.UUNSPRESENTEDTOTHEMROCWILLBEREPRESENTEDASMARINECOMPONENTCOMMANDERWARFIGHTINGREQUIREMENTS,VICEMEFORMSCREQUIREMENTS.(MARADMIN045/06)
ThisMARADMINprecededIMEF’s2006deploymentmeaningthatcleardirectionwasestablishedforUUNSownershipatthetimeoftheMARADMIN.Inreality,thispracticewasunderstoodandUUNSwerepreviouslyconsideredfromtheoriginatingMARFORoritssubordinates.ThisparagraphisintendedtoreinforcetheideathatMARFORsownedtheUUNSvstheirsubordinateMEForMSC.MARFORUUNSwerenotrepresentedasMCCDCUUNSbecauseMCCDCdidnotownthem.
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TheowningMARFORfortheoriginalHejlikUUNSwasMARFORPAC(LtGenGregson).AtthetimeMARCENTwassubordinatetoMARFORPAC.InAugust2005MARCENTbecameafullMarineComponentindependentofMARFORPAC.TheCommandingGeneralinchargeofMARCENTbecameLtGenSattler.LtGenSattlerwastheCGofIMEFwhenBGenHejliksignedthe2005UUNS.BGenHejlikwasactingundertheauthorityofLtGenSattler.LtGenSattlerwasthereforethe“owner”oftheMRAPUUNSthathehadBGenHejliksignthepreviousFebruary.Fromhisassumptionofcommanduntilthe2006JERRVjointrequest,thereisnorecordofanyactiontakenbyLtGenSattlerontheHejlikUUNS.ThisisanotherindicationthattheHejlikUUNSwasresolved. Infact,LtGenSattler’sstaffatMARCENTdidnothaveacopyoftheUUNS:“On16Jun06ColThomasCarikerwrote:“Gents,IwillsendyouabriefonSiprthatcallforCIEDvehiclesandsomerequestedhelpfromusbyMarcent.TheareaskingforustoseeifwecanfindanoldUUNSsignedbyGenHejliksometimeagoreferencingMineResistantAmbushProtectionVehicle(MRAP).Chiefs/Staff,TheyarealsoaskingifwecanassignaCIEDgroundwheeledvehicleAdvocateforcurrentthreatvehicleadvocacy(notnextgenerationHummerreplacement).”(Gayl,p49)ItisclearthatMARCENT,andtheoriginalGeneralwhoauthorizedtheHejlikUUNS,werenolongerpursuingit.Theycouldn’tfindacopyofitintheirownfiles.ThereasonwasnotthatitwaslostorthatMARCENTwasincompetent,itwasthattheUUNSwasnolongeractive.
ThedraftUUNSforthenewJERRVrequest(185)in2006wasstaffedtoMCCDCandMARCENT.MrBlasiol(MCCDC)forwardedtheUUNSandrecommendedtoMARCENTthatitbesubmittedasaJUONS:“AttachmentsarethetwoUUNSthathaveDCCDIvisibility.Weneedtoexpedite.AdvisefeasibilityofbriefingCDIB25May.Also,Jeff,pleaseaskBGenNellertopursueJUONS,aspreviouslydiscussed.MCWLPOCisMr.ChandlerHirschXXX-XXXX.”(Hirschemaildtd5/18/2006)MrHirschworkedforthisauthor.ThisemailreflectedMCCDCdesiretoexpediteandalsorecommendedtheJointpathwithaJUONS.TheattachmentonthisemailwasforaJEERV(JERRV)UUNSindicatingthedesireofIMEFtosubmitthroughtheServicechain(nottheJointchainwithaJUONS).
AfterMrBlasiol’srecommendation,ColButterandMARCENTchangedtheUUNStoaJUONSandsubmittedthroughMNF-I.Butterwrote“Gentlemen,MARCENTconvertedtheMNF-WUUNSfor185JERRVstoaJUONS,whichwassubsequentlyvalidatedbyMNF-I.ItiscurrentlyatCENTCOMforapproval.”(Butteremaildtd6/27/2006)ThiswastheproperroleforMARCENT.TheabovesequenceandemailsarecontrarytoGayl’sassertionthatIMEFdeliberatelychosetheJUONSpathinordertoavoidMCCDC.
MARCENTassumeditsproperroleasServicecomponentinassistingIMEFtodevelopitsMRAP-typevehiclerequest:“On22Jun06MajAllenafollowedupwith:“I[think]theCOSisversedinthisenoughtobeabletodiscusswiththeMEFonhisvisit.Heseemedtoreallyembracethisinthebrieflastweek.Also,ColKanewske,ourG-3,isbackandwasbriefedbymeonthis,andsaidhewasgoingtomentionitwithColMarletto(MEFFWDG-3).Also,I
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talkedwithColButteronthisaswell.HeseemedtothinkthattheMEF-generatedUUNSwasnotabigobstacle.Notgoingtospeakforhim,butIgottheimpressionhewaswillingto"writeitforthem."(Gaylp51)ColButterhadofferedtowritetheUUNSforIMEFinordertorelievethemoftheworkload.ThiswasacommonofferingasMarinesinsupportrolesalsohaddeploymentstoIraqandunderstoodhowbusythestaffswere.
“MARCENTcapabilitywarplannersstudiedMCCDC’s2005handlingoftheMRAPUUNSandrealizedthatMRAPwouldmostlikelynotbefavorablyreceivedatMCCDCifitwereagainsubmittedasaUSMCUUNS.”(Gayl.p47)Thisisafalsehood.MARCENTdidnothaveacopyoftheoldUUNSanddidnotknowitexisteduntilJune2006(Murrayemaildtd6/16/2006).AccordingtoGayl,MARCENTwasstudyingtheMCCDChandlingofthe2005UUNSwithoutacopyoftheUUNS.Asestablishedabove,MARCENTstartedlookingforacopyofthe2005HejlikUUNSinJune2006.Itisdoubtfulthattheir“study”occurredor,atbest,itoccurredwithaveryshallowanalysis.
MostMarinesunderstandthecareerpathMarinestake.Marinesrotatearoundthe
MarineCorpsandintoandoutofbilletsgenerallyinthreeyearincrements.Ifthisstudyoccurred,thenMARCENTwouldhavemadethesimpleandlogicalconclusionthat,onaverage,halfoftheDWG/CDIBmembershipwouldhavechangedsincethe2005submission.Anysubmissionwouldthereforebeviewedbydifferentpersonnelwithdifferentperspectives.Gayl’s“studied”decision,ifastudywasconductedatall,wasmadeabsenttheoriginalUUNSandabsentanunderstandingofbasicMarinecareerpathsandcompositionoftheCDIB.
Asdescribedearlier,IMEFsubmittedtheJERRVneedasanUUNS.Then,withMCCDC
guidance,MARCENTchangedittoajointrequest.BothUUNSandJUONShadMCCDCinvolvementandMCCDCrespondedfavorablytothejointrequest.Gaylcontinued:“CoordinationbetweenwarplannersandMCSCwasalsominimized,givenknowninstitutionaloppositiontoalargeurgentMRAPpurchase.”(Gayl,p47)ThisflawedstatementmakeslittlesenseasMCSCandMCCDCwereprovidedacopyofthedraftUUNS.CoordinationwasestablishedthroughoutMCCDCbeforeMARCENTgotthejointrequestwritten,letalonesubmitted.TheHirschemaildtd5/18/2006reflectsMCCDCcoordination.Simultaneously,MCCDCwasworkingtheCongressionalanglewithBGenKellywhileensuringthejointrequestmadeitthroughthesystem.ColBlasiolwrotetoLtGenMattisandBGenAlles:“We'reworkingtheminerollerandJERRVissues(perBGenKelly'srecente-mail)rightnow,toensurethattheycomethroughJointchannelssothatwecangetourhandsonthatmoney.”(Allesemaildtd5/20/2006)ThisemailwasalsobeforetheJERRVrequestwassubmittedonthenextday.ThereisalmostnothingcorrectaboutGayl’spositioninthesestatements.Thisdeeplyflawedinformation,however,didnotoriginatefromGaylashewasnotinvolvedwithMRAPatallatthistime.Gayl’ssourcemayhavebeenthecauseofGayl’scriticallyflawedanalysis.
ADVOCATE
TheAdvocateistaskedwithsupervisingthecombatdevelopmentprocessandmakingsureitoccurscorrectlyforissuesconcerningtheAdvocate’sconstituency.ThetermAdvocate,inthissense,canbelikenedtothecivilianroleofalawyer.Oftentimeslawyersarecalled
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Advocates.Theynotonlyensuretheprocessiscarriedout,buttheyalsorepresenttheirconstituenciesintheprocess.ADVOCATE(I&L) InstallationsandLogisticswastheassignedleadAdvocateforthe2005HejlikUUNS.ItwastheirresponsibilitytoperformalloftheprimarydutiesassociatedwithUUNSadvocacy.TheseresponsibilitiesincludedsolutionapprovalaswellasprocesscontrolindifferentphasesoftheUUNSdevelopment.I&LhadaseatontheMROCandthelesserDOTMLPFworkinggroup.TheDeputyCommandantI&LcouldaddressanyissueswithanyUUNSdirectlywiththeMROCandtheCommandant.AsGaylcorrectlystates:“AkeyobservationisthatInstallationsandLogistics(DC,I&L)wasassignedasthe"LeadAdvocate"fortheGCE-initiatedMRAPUUNS.TheLeadAdvocateoftenleadstothesolutionway-aheadrecommendations.”(Gayl,p18)Inthecaseofthe2005HejlikUUNS,I&LdidinfactestablishtherecommendationfortheUUNSandownedmuchoftheprocesscontrol. Gayl’sanalysisoftheI&LeffortsrelatingtotheHejlikUUNSwerecritical:“TheI&LcommentsreflectalackofGCE-relatedinsightofthereviewer:TheI&LLeadAdvocate’scommentsaboutskillsetsandasetofquestionsthatfocusedonlogisticalconvenienceforthisurgentrequirementtolowercasualtieswereperplexing.Inthatanalysis,theI&LreviewerdemonstratedaclearlackofunderstandingoftheIMEF(Fwd)request.Asnotedabove,theleadAdvocatealsodidnotissueRFIsbacktoIMEF(Fwd)viaMARCENTinordertoclarifythoseareasinwhichshelackedunderstanding.Furthermore,thereviewermadenomentionofmineresistanceorambushprotection.TherewasnocomparativeanalysisofthedesignofarmorvehiclesandnoevidentawarenessthattheoperatorswereaskingforacombatprovenCOTStruckthatanaveragemilitarytruckdrivercouldfigureouthowtooperatewithminimalinstruction.AtbestonecouldsaythattheI&Lrepresentative,whoseleadAdvocateanalysisMCCDCeventuallydeferredto,wastechnologicallyandoperationallydeficient.Asaresult,atechnologicallyandoperationallylessqualifiedcivilianprovidedthedominantMRAPUUNSanalysisinputtotheCDTS.”(Gayl,p19)ThereissomemeasureofunderstandingoftheprocessinthiscritiquethatisabsentfrommuchoftheremainderofGayl’sanalysis.TheAdvocateisinfactresponsibleforselectingtherecommendedcourseofaction.GiventherecognitionofAdvocateresponsibilityinthisexcerptitisremarkablethattheremainderoftheGaylstudydoesnotrecognizetherestoftheAdvocateresponsibilities.Gayl’scritiqueoftheactionofficer,however,isunwarranted.ThisUUNScontinuedtobeworkedanddevelopedbeyondtheinitialactionofficerassessmentasperorderanddirective.Inaddition,therewasnorestrictionpreventingtheGCEAdvocatefromcontributingduringtheentiretyoftheprocesswithaccesstoCMCiftheirinputwasnotaddressed.ADVOCATE(PP&O)
TheGCEAdvocatewasandisPP&OwhichincludesGaylastheS&TAdviser.TheGCEAdvocatewasalsoamemberoftheMROCandhaddirectaccesstotheCommandant.TheGCEAdvocatewasalsothePlansPolicies&OperationsDeputyCommandantandoftensubstitutedfortheCommandantinjointforums.NodeputyCommandanthadmorecontactwiththe
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Commandant.IfGayl’sstoryistobebelieved,anditisnot,thenthefailuresoftheGCEAdvocatewerethemostsignificantintheentireprocess.
IfGayl’spremise,thattheactionofficersconductedadeterminativeassessment,was
correct,whichitisnot,thenthefollowingwouldalsobecorrect:
• Gayl’scharacterizationofthehandlingoftheHejlikUUNSfocussesblameonotherorganizationswhileexcusingPP&Oandhimself.OneofthefirststepsintheUUNSprocessistoconductaninitialassessment.Gaylstates:“PP&O,i.e.theGCEAdvocate,recognizedthatanMRAPPORwasessentialinordertofulfilltherequirement.”(Gayl,p21)TheestablishmentofaPORforabilliondollarUUNS,Gaylstates,wasrecognizedbytheGCEAdvocate.InresponsetheyassignedaCaptain(03)tocrafttheirresponse.TheresponsewasnotsignedbytheAdvocateortheAdvocatechainofcommand.TheresponsewasnotelevatedtotheBrigadierGenerallevelasthiswasapotentialbilliondollareffort.NorwasitelevatedtotheDCPP&O,aLieutenantGeneral.ThispotentialbilliondollarUUNSassessmentwassignedbyaCaptain.HadtheDCPP&Odesiredto,hecouldhavestoppedthisentireactionofficersequenceandelevateditwithflagofficerparticipation(orevenmid-gradeofficerparticipation).Instead,PP&OofferedaCaptainlevelanalysisoftheUUNS.GaylcontinuedhiscritiqueoftheI&Lactionofficer:“So,assigningaHQMCcivilianlogistician,havinglimitedgroundcombatinsightandcommittedtothehealthofstatesidePORs,astheleadAdvocateintheanalysisofaGCEUUNSassuredtheprocessoutcome.”(Gayl,p21)Gaylsuggeststhattheprocessoutcomewasassuredbythisactionofficersequence.Likewise,assigningaCaptaintospeakfortheGCEassuredtheprocessoutcomewouldnotbeseriouslyimpactedbyPP&O.
TheGaylcriticismis,however,incorrect.TheinitialassessmentbyanyoftheactionofficersisaverybasicfirststepthatwouldeventuallyendupattheSeniorExecutivelevel.AttributingthefateoftheHejlikUUNStoacivilianlogisticianandajuniorgradeCaptainsimplydemonstratesafailuretounderstandtheprocessresponsibilitiesofboththemainandsupportingAdvocates.Gayl’sfailuretoacknowledgeGCEAdvocateresponsibilitycontinueddespitethefollowingslidecitedintheDOTMLPFWG(CDIB):
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(Gayl,p27)
TheobviousconclusionisthattherewasaclearandwidespreadrecognitionthatGCEAdvocateparticipationwasrequiredandnecessary.TheremainderofthissectionwilldiscussGCEAdvocateperformance. TheperformanceoftheGCEAdvocatecanbeviewedthroughseveralprisms.OneofthemisthatGaylisfundamentallycorrect(whichheisnot).Ifhewascorrect,thenPP&O,theGCEAdvocatewasnegligentintheperformanceoftheirduties.ThisnegligenceincludesGaylashewastheS&TAdviserinPP&O.
Gaylstates:“MRAPwasCOTSwithnocombatdeveloperAdvocate,onlyGCEandoperatorAdvocatesoutsideofprocesscontrol.”(Gayl,p25)TheprocesscontrolisclearlydepictedonthecoverofeachUUNS.TheAdvocatesareclearlyparticipantsthroughouttheprocess.TheinputandcritiqueofAdvocatesisclearlycitedbyGayl.Thepositionthattherewasno“combatdeveloperAdvocate”whilecitinginputfromthecombatdeveloperAdvocateisacontradiction.TherewasadvocacyandtherewasGCEAdvocateinputanditoccurredinseveralechelons.TherewasAdvocateprocesscontrolintheproperplacesasdemonstratedintheinitialassessment.
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“Returningtothechronology,theIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSwasbriefedbeforetheCDIBinthespringof2005(Referencep.3.).ThereisnowrittendocumentationavailabletotheauthorthatindicatesasolutionwasvoteduponattheDWG/CDIB,thataMCCDCGOwasbriefedontheoutcomeofthemeeting(s),thattherecommendationwasforwardedtotheMROCforconsideration,orthattheMROCformallyapprovedordisapprovedtheMCCDCrecommendation.”(Gayl,p22)MostoftheseissuesaredocumentedintheDODIGorinthisstudy.Themainissue,however,isthattheGCEAdvocateS&TAdviserdidnothavedocumentationavailabletohim.ItistheAdvocate’sresponsibilitytoensurethatthecorrectprocessoccursandonemayaskwhytheAdvocatedidnotdemandthedocumentationatthetimetheUUNSwasunderconsideration.TheGCE(Gayl)AdvocatewasamemberoftheDWG/CDIB.Thatdocumentationcouldhavebeensourced“inhouse”atPP&O.PP&Ocouldhavecausedeverystepmentionedabovetooccur.Retrievingdocumentationisadifferentissuethantheeventoccurringornotoccurring.ThesourcingofdocumentationwellafterthefactisoneofthekeyissuesthatpromptedthewholeMRAPdiscussionandwillbediscussedinasubsequentchapter.Gayl’slackofdocumentationisreflectedinmanyofhiswritings.
“TheMRAPwasneitherinventednorAdvocatedatMCCDC,andaswithmany
relevantUNSsbefore(especiallytacticalISR)andUUNSsthatwouldfollow,withoutaMEF(Fwd)voteonCDIBprocessesnewideaswereindefinitelyassigndthestatusof‘deferredforstudy.”(Gayl,p28)TheGCEAdvocatewas(andis)responsibleforadvocacywithinthecombatdevelopmentprocessandatMCCDC.FailuretodosoistheresponsibilityoftheGCEAdvocateandrunscontrarytoexplicitordersanddirectives.TheS&TAdvisor,specifically,shouldhavebeenadvocatingatMCCDCforGCEissues.Onceagain,theAdvocatevotesintheDWG/CDIB.
“Finally,therewasnomentionofreviewingtheMRAPrequirementwiththeArmy
acquisitionrequirementcounterparts,andnoattemptbytheLeadAdvocatetogetherquestionsanswered.”(Gayl,p31)TheGCEAdvocatecouldhavereviewedtherequirementwiththeArmyacquisitioncounterparts.Gaylhimselfcouldhavedonesoandstillbewellwithinhisdutiesandresponsibilities.IftheGCEAdvocatehadquestionsthatwereunanswered,thentheGCEAdvocateshouldhavefoundtheanswers.
“Thispreciselyreflectedtheoperatorsenseoffutilityinaskingforcapabilitiesfrom
combatdevelopersthatMajorsMcGriff,Allena,andSinclairhadobservedin2002-2003.Theoperatingunitsfeelobligatedtopolitically“game”theUSMCcombatdevelopersandtheirprioritiesiftheyaretoexpectanythingtoday,astheoperatorsunderstandtheyareatthemercyofaprocesstheydonotcontrol.”(Gayl,p50-51)TheentiretyoftheMarineCorpsisbuiltuponcapabilitydevelopment.Everyprocurementhasbeenaskedfor.Theonlycapabilitiesthatareprovidedabsentastatedneedarethosethatareexperimental.TheabovestatementbyGaylisdemonstrablyfalse.Onesimplyhastounderstandthateverybullet,rifle,MREorfixedwingaircraftstartedasaneedbytheoperatingunits.ThelistsofUUNSsubmissionspreviouslycitedcontainhundredsofadditionalrequestsbytheoperatingforces(seeOuztsemaildtd5/2/2006forexamples).Combatdevelopersdonotdevelopcapabilitiesinavacuum.CapabilitiesareneedsbasedwhichispreciselywhyMCCDCandMARCENTwereencouragingareluctantIMEFtosubmitarequestforlargernumbersofMRAPsinJuneof2006.Onceagain,
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processcontrolisexecutedbytheAdvocatesaswellasMCCDC.AdvocatescanalsosubmitneedsasseenbyUUNSsubmittedbyPP&O.
“On22Nov04,thenDC,PP&OLtGenJanHulyastheGCEAdvocatesignedanUNS
requestingimmediateinvestmentorpartneringbytheMarineCorpsinpromisinguntetheredtacticalhighaltitudeairshipsinitiativesatDARPA,DDR&E,andtheMissileDefenseAgency(MDA).”(Gayl,p97)ThedemonstratedabilityoftheGCEAdvocatetosubmitUNSwasmanifestedbytheMEPOPUNS.TherewasnosimilarUNSorseriesofUNSforMRAP.MEPOPwasforanundevelopedcapabilitythathadnotshownthedegreeofmaturityneededtobefielded.PP&O,however,couldhavesubmittedotherUNSforISRcapabilities.Instead,Gaylmakesthefollowingfancifulclaim:“Itcanbearguedthatifcombatdevelopershadcommencedtodeveloptheuntethered15,000(+)footISRequippedMEPOPcapabilityincooperationwithotherswhentheUNSwassubmittedin2004theIEDemergencywouldnothavebeenpermittedtodeveloptotheextentthatithas.”(Gayl.p100)AstheAdvocate,PP&OcouldhavepushedthiscapabilityattheMROCandattheseniorlevelsoftheDOD.Theydidnotdoso.TheMEPOPcapabilitywasneverinhighdemandandeventuallyIMEFsubmittedamuchmorereasonedUNSforGBOSSISRcapabilities.
ThecritiqueoftheI&LactionofficerisunwarrantedgiventheresponsibilitiesoftheGCE
AdvocateandGayl.IftherewasafailuretoactontheHejlikUUNSin2005/2006,itwastheprimaryfaultofPP&O,theGCEAdvocate.Fortunately,theMarineCorpsdidactontheUUNS.
MCCDC(akaQuantico)
SeveralcommandsexistatMarineCorpsBaseQuanticoandtheterm“MCCDC”isoftenusedsynonymouslywiththeterm“Quantico”.
MCCDCresponsibilityforthe2005HejlikUUNSwasbothadministrativeanddevelopmental.DevelopmentalinthatMCCDCparticipatedinthedevelopmentofthematerialsolutionandadministrativeinensuringtheproperprocesswasfollowed.ThedevelopmentoftheMRAPcapabilityisdiscussedelsewhere.Thelistattheendofthischapterprovidesthenamesandbilletsofthosewhowerebriefedonorawareofthe2005HejlikMRAPUUNS.ThatcombinedwiththeacceptedsolutionestablishedbytheAdvocate(I&L),combinedwithMROCdecisions,combinedwiththeMARFORPACdesignationoftheUUNSascompleteallshowalegitimateconsiderationandsolutionbytheauthoritiesintheMarineCorps(toincludeCMC).MCCDC’sfailingwasinthedocumentationofthesedecisionsandtheterribleresponsetotheGaylaccusations.
“ItisclearthattheMCCDCstaffwassuccessfulatkeepingtherealreasonsforshelving
theMRAPurgentneedconcealedfromtheviewofGenHageein05,andnowGeneralConwayin07and08.”(Gayl,p73)Thereareseveralfalsehoodscontainedinthissentence,somefaciallyobviousbutothersbyimplication.TheMCCDCstaffdidnotshelvetheMRAPurgentneed.Ifoneweretousethisterminology,MARFORPACshelvedtheUUNSwhenitwasdowngradedtoaregularUNS.TheAdvocatesshelvedtheUUNSwhentheydidnotpursueMRAPafterthem1114decision.MARCENTshelvedtheUUNSastheyactuallyowneditstarting
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inAug2005(stand-upofMARCENTindependentofMARFORPAC).MCCDCdidnothavetheauthoritytoshelvetheUUNSandthelistofseniorofficersbriefedonthecapabilityshowsthatMCCDCcouldnotburytheUUNS.DC,PP&O(Gayl’sboss)couldhaveelevatedanyissueswiththeUUNStotheCMCatwill.ThelistofGeneralsandstaffsawareoftheUUNSensuredthatitcouldnotbeshelved.GeneralHageedoesnotabidebythedecisionsofMCCDCstaff(neitherdoesanyotherGeneral).IftheCMCwantedanactionontheUUNS,thenhewouldsimplyorderit.BoththeACMCandDC,CDIcouldalsodirectactiononanyUUNS.
“TheUUNSmighthavediedinvisiblyinMCCDCandoutsideofnormalMROCscrutiny
astheSMEshadintended,wereitnotfortenaciouseffortsatMARCENTtoresurrectMRAPconsiderationinthesummerof2006,astheIEDemergencyworsenedintheater.”(Gayl,p73)Onceagain,UUNSresponsibilityforthe2005HejlikUUNSexistedatIandIIMEF,MARFORPAC,MARCENT,DCPP&O,DCI&L,DCP&R,DCCDI,andDCAVN.TheUUNSwasscrutinizedbyalloftheMROCmembers.ThisstatementwronglyportraysMCCDCasthesoledecision-makerforUUNS.ThatwasnotcorrectbyorderorinpracticeforthisspecificUUNS.
“Inthespringof2005theDoctrine,Organization,Training,Materiel,Leadership&Education,Personnel,andFacilities(DOTMLPF)WorkingGroup(DWG)(todayknownastheCombatDevelopmentIntegrationBoard[CDIB])mettodecidethefulfillmentfateoftheMRAPUUNS.”(Gayl,pix)TheDWGdoesnotdecidethefateofUUNS.TheDWGconsistsofMCCDCpersonnelandAdvocatessuchasPP&Owhoallhavea“vote”.The2005HejlikUUNSfatewasdecidedbytheI&LAdvocateandtheExecutivesoftheMarineCorpsattheEOS.TheabovestatementfalselyimpliesthattheDWGhadauthoritythatitdidnothave.
“BytakingService-specificMCCDCrequirementsofficialsoutofthefundingapprovalchain,theMRAPfieldingeffortmovedquickly,andcontinuestosotoday.”(Gayl,p51)MCCDCrequirementsofficialsarenotinthefundingapprovalchain.
“ThisPOMslideisthefirstsignthatMCCDCstaffwouldintentionallyslow-rollMRAPatthemiddlemanagementlevel,andahandfulofbureaucratswereabletoallowanUUNStogounfulfilledwhilemaintainingtherealtactical,operationalandevenstrategicimplicationsbelowtheleadershipradar.”(Gayl,p29)Mid-levelmanagementdidnothavetheabilitytoslow-rollMRAP.Anynumberofofficialswithinthecombatdevelopmentprocesscouldelevateanyattemptat“slow-rolling”totheirrespectiveGenerals.The“belowtheleadershipradar”statementisnoteworthyasitisprovenfalsebyGayl’sownstudy.HecorrectlystatesthattheESBandMARFORPACandMARCENTwereallparticipantsinreviewsorevensignature-officialsfortheHejlikUUNS.Hislistisincomplete.ThefulllistofawarepersonnelconsistsofthemajorityoftheleadershipoftheMarineCorps.Itisavailableattheendofthischapter.
“Interestingly,noneofthesepointswerediscussedattheCDIBin2005.Morelikely,thisrationalewasaddedafterward,whenMCCDCstaffwereatriskofbeingembarrassedbytherejuvenationoftheMRAPprogramin2006and2007.”(Gayl,p32)PriortothisstatementGaylpointsoutconcerns,voicedbyMCCDC,withamajorMRAPbuy.Gaylwasnotpresentatthe2005CDIBandhadtorelyonslides.TheCDIB,however,isneverrestrictedtotheissues
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presentedontheslides.AsaformerCDIBbriefer,thisauthordidnotputallrelevantpointsontheslides.AsaCDIBvoter,theslidesnevercapturedallofthediscussionpoints.CDIBmembersrarelyhelpedcreatetheslides.Aswithmostbriefingtechniques,thebrief(createdbyactionofficers)promptsdiscussionfromthosebeingbriefed(theCDIB).
ThesecondsentenceimpliesthatCDIBmembersmayhavebeenembarrassedwhenthe
MRAPeffortgotunderwayin2006/2007.Thiswasnotthecase.In2006/2007thisauthorwasamemberoftheCDIBandmostmemberswererelievedthatIMEFhaddecidedtosubmitalargeMRAPneed.TherewasanoccasionwhereaJLTVadvocateattemptedtoraiseMRAPimpactontheJLTVprogramasanissue.SeveralCDIBmembersrespondedimmediatelyandMrBlasiolimmediatelyterminatedtheMCSCrepresentative’spoint.MRAP,asseeninemailsandasthisauthorsawintheCDIB,wasenthusiasticallysupported.MROC
TheMROCwaswellawareofthe2005HejlikUUNS.TheMROChadseveralvenuesthroughwhichtheyreceivedbriefs.ThemajorityofbriefswerepresentedattheMROCinastandardform.Adecisionwouldthenberendered.AnalternativewasthattheMROCwouldbebriefedelectronically(anelectronicMROC)afterwhichdecisionswouldbemade.Finally,aswasthecasewithMRAP,briefsweregiveninanotherforumwhereMROCmemberswerepresent.FormalbriefsinpersonwerenotalwaysrequiredfortheMROCtomakedecisions.
InthecaseofMRAP,nofullformal-in-personMROCbriefwaspresented.Membersof
theMROC,however,werebriefedontheoptionstoreplaceHMMWVsattheExecutiveOffsiteinJuneof2005.ThedecisionestablishedattheEOSwastoreplaceHMMWVswithm1114s.LtGenAmosbriefedGeneralConway(CMC)inMay2007“Iwasn'thereinFeb05andneitherweremostofmyguys...butIcantellyouthatthedecisiontobuy1114'sbytheCMCwaswellthoughtoutanddiscussedthoroughlyatanEOSinmid05.ThisUNNSwassentininFeb05...laterthatspring/summerGenHageeagreedatanEOSthathewouldreplace100%ofalltheaterMAK'dHMMWVswithwhathecalled"theGoldStandard,"...theM1114.”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007)ThisdecisionwasimplementedwiththefullknowledgeandparticipationofeverymemberoftheMROC.
Gaylstates:“MCCDCalsoapparentlydidnotforwardtheUUNStotheMarine
RequirementsOversightCouncil(MROC)forreviewanddecision.”(Gayl,px)Gaylcontinued,“InresearchingMROCstaffdocumentsattheMROCSecretariatstaff,theauthorcouldnotlocateanyMROCSecretariatrecordsofanMRAPUUNSpresentationoranyMROCDecisionMemorandum(DM)pertainingtothe17Feb2005MRAPUUNS.”(Gayl,pX).TheHejlikUUNSwasintheMROCupdatebriefdated8Aug2005andcapturedinMROCDM55-2005(Daschemaildtd10/20/2005).Insum,theMROCwasbriefedattheEOSandupdatedregularlyuntilAug2005.Gayl’serroneousstatementreflectsthelackofdepthinhisresearch.
Gayliswrongagainwhenhestates:“Itisofspecialconcernfromanaccountability
standpointthatitappearsthatdeterminedeffortsofMCCDCpersonnelmanagedtokeeptheIMEFUUNSoutofthenormal,formalMROCprocess.Theperceptionisthatadvicewasgiven
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(includingtheIGMCvisitresults)anddecisionsultimatelymade“behindcloseddoors.”ThereisnoknownMROCDecisionMemorandumonthisUUNS(wehavecheckedwiththeMROCSecretariat),inspiteofthefactthatithadanear-termresourceimplicationthatequaledorevenexceededUSMC’sothertoptierprogramssuchasEFVandevenOsprey.Intheendnohistoricaltrailotherthanafewpresentations,processdocuments,andaMCCDCinfopaperareknowntoexist.”(Gayl,p38-39)“KnowntoexisttoGayl”and“knowntoexist”aredemonstrablydifferentphrases.Thedocumentationthroughoutthisstudyistestamenttotheexistenceofsufficientdocumentationtodrawcorrectconclusionsaboutthe2005MRAPUUNS.
11thSemiAnnualExecutiveSafetyBoard(ESB)
OnMarch29-30theEleventhSemiannualExecutiveSafetyBoardmet.InattendancewastheACMC,fiveLtGens,fourMajGensandanassortmentofBGensandCols.Thelistofattendeesispresentedattheendofthischapter.AsGaylstates:“UponreturningtotheUSfollowingIMEF(Fwd)’sReliefinPlaceandTransferofAuthoritytoIIMEF(Fwd)(RIPTOA),MajMcGriffwasdirectedbyLtGenGregsontobrieftheUUNS-articulatedMRAPrequirementbeforetheMarch2005USMCSafetyConference.”(Gayl,p14)RIPTOAhadoccurredinFeb2005,theHejlikUUNSwassubmittedinFeb2005andthenextmonthMcGriffwasbriefingtheESB.ThefollowingslidewaspresentedattheESBbyMcGriff:
(Gayl,p15)
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OnemonthafterthesubmissionoftheHejlikUUNS,theauthorwasrequesting522vehicles,not1169vehicles.Oneexplanationisthatthenumber522isaseparaterequestfortheseparticulartypesofvehicles.TheHejlikUUNSwasalreadyinstaffingandacutintherequirementby50%onlyonemonthlaterwouldreflectaverylooselyconceivedrequirementinthefirstplace.Asecondexplanationisthattherequirementshiftedfrom1169to522.ThisisthemorelikelyexplanationasLtGenGregson,accordingtoGayl,askedforaMRAPbriefbasedontheHejlikUUNS.Inthiscasethechangeinnumbersreflectsastill-developingrequirement. Despitetheconfusionthatmayhaveresultedfromtheshiftingnumbers,theHejlikUUNSwasdiscussedandbriefedattheESB.TwomembersoftheMROCwerepresent,theseniorofwhichwastheACMC.AthirdMROCmember(DCI&L)hadflagofficerrepresentationattheconference.TheACMCdirectedCGMCCDCto:(3)LOOKINTOTHEFEASIBILITYOFDEVELOPINGORBUYINGANEWMINE-RESISTANTTACTICALVEHICLEINORDERTOREPLACETHEHMMWV.INCORPORATEINTOTACTICALWHEELEDVEHICLESTUDY.(ALMAR019/05)
DespitereportedstatementsthatCGMCCDCunilaterallydecidedattheESBtopurchaseMRAPs(Gayl,p15),CGMCCDCdidnothavetheauthoritytomakesuchadecision.Hedidhavetheabilitytostatehisopinionwhichcaneasilybemisinterpretedbythosewhodonotunderstandcombatdevelopmentauthorities.
MajMcGriffpresentedhisESBbrieftoasignificantportionofMarineCorpsCommands.HisDCGandthesigneroftheUUNS,BGenHejlik,wasalsopresent.ManyofthecommandsrepresentedattheESBhadUUNSandcombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.AftertheESBbrief,thosepresentcanbecountedinthenumbersofthoseawareoftheHejlikUUNS.ThepossibilitythatMCCDCbureaucratshadtheabilitytoburythiswidelybriefedUUNSshrinkswiththesetypesofmassbriefings.InspectorGeneraloftheMarineCorps(IGMC)
InMay2006theIGMCassessedthedeployedIMEFreadiness.ThisassessmentincludedanassessmentofUNSandUUNS.Gaylstates“First,the2006reportagainproposedthattheHMMWVwasrightchoiceforprotectioninMNF-W,andtherewasnomentionthattheMRAPwaswantedbyoperatorstoreplacethemorevulnerableHMMWVs.ThisiscurioussincetheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSwasstillunfulfilled.”(Gayl,p47)GayloffersnoexplanationofwhytheIGdidnotmentionthebilliondollarHejlikUUNSthatwouldimpacteveryMarinegroundunitinIraq.Hesimplynotesitiscurious.ThisinspectionwaspreviouslydiscussedbutthisassessmentbytheIGMConceagainshowsthatinMay2006theHejlikUUNSwasnolongeractive.MarineCorpsWarfightingLab(MCWL)
“On16Jun06Mr.BradStillabowerofMCWLwrotetotheMCWLCoS,ColJeffTomczak.ColTomczak,whowasjustthendiscoveringtheexistenceofanurgentMEFneed
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forMRAPsatMCCDC.Mr.StillabowerexplainedthattheMCWLhadnotworkedontheMRAPandwasjustthenbeingfamiliarizedwiththeexistenceoftheoriginalMRAPUUNS(OIF-III–MRAP-05053UB).“...wehaven'tworkedthisinTechDiv,asfarasIknow.AccordingtoCDTS,thisMRAPUUNSwasenteredintoCDTSinFeb05,wasbriefedtoDWG(nowcalledCDIB),buttherecordshowsnorecommendationcomingoutoftheDWG.ItwasnotpassedtoMCWL,asfarasIcantellfromtheCDTSrecord...MRAPsoundsalotlikeMMPV,aJUONSwhichMGenCattoincludedinhisHASCtestimonythisweekonUSMCFPefforts:MGenCatto'stestimony:‘Intheinterim,we'removingforwardwithapprovalsfortheMediumMineProtectedVehicle(MMPV),whichhasbeenrequestedasaJointUrgentOperationalNeed.VarioustypesofIEDs,rocketpropelledgrenades,andsmallarmsfireintheatermakeitnecessaryfortheMarineCorpstofieldavehiclecapableofsurvivingthesetypesofattacks,andbeabletocounterattack.TheMMPVprovidesthatincreasedsurvivabilityandmobility.TheMarineCorpsplanstoprocureandfield185MMPVs,whichwillprovideourforceswithamodularandscalablesystemcapableofincreasingthelevelofprotectioninaccordancewiththetypeofweaponsavailabletotheenemy.’"Thise-mailprovidedmoreevidencethattheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSof17Feb2005wasintentionallykeptfromtheattentionoftheMROCbyMCCDC.”(Gayl,p50)ColTomczak,likeIMEF,MARCENT,IIMEF,theAdvocatesandtherestoftheMarineCorps,wasalsodiscoveringtheIMEFnewneedforMRAP-typevehicles.InconjunctionwiththenewneedforMRAPs,MCWLandtheMarineCorpswerediscoveringtheexistenceofthe2005HejlikUUNS.MCWLwasclearlyunawareoftheHejlikUUNS.Thisauthor,aspreviouslyexplained,taskedMajMooretoscourtheMCCDCdatabasesandtalkwithMCCDCpersonneltodetermineiftherewasanyrequirementunderwhichMCWLcouldprovidemoreMRAP-typevehicles(withJIEDDOsupport).Therewasnot.Onceagain,thisemailshowedpositiveandaggressiveMCSCactionwithMajGenCattobriefingCongress(HASC)insupportoftheMMPVandtheIMEFjointrequestfor185.
ThenextsentencebyGayldefiescommonsense.Hestates“Thise-mailprovidedmore
evidencethattheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSof17Feb2005wasintentionallykeptfromtheattentionoftheMROCbyMCCDC.”(Gayl,p50)Stillabower’semailsimplyreflectsalackofknowledgeaboutthecompletedHejlikUUNS.MCWLhasalesserroleinUUNSprocessingandwouldnormallynotbeawareofallcompletedUUNS.
Gaylstates:“Lateron19Jun06,MajJohnMooreofMCWLjoinedthediscussionandclarifiedtherelationshipoftheIMEF(Fwd)UUNSfrom05totheJERRVUUNS.Headded:“ThisisanolderUUNSthatwasneverfundedduetosupportability.There'scurrentlyanUUNSfor185JERRVsbutMEFiswritingasupplementtothisthatwillexpandthatnumbersignificantly.Oncevalidated,therequestwillbetakentoJIEDDOforfundingconsideration.”(Gayl,p50)MajMoorewasnotlinkingthetwoUUNSintoasinglerequirement.TheoldHejlikUUNShadbeenidentifiedelsewhereandMajMoorewasprovidingaperceptionforanUUNSthatMCWLneverworked.
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MarineCorpsSystemsCommand(MCSC)
MCSCwasworkinghandinhandwithMCCDCinsupportoftheMRAPcapability.“ItisnoteworthythattheCommander,MCSC(MajGenCatto)wasalreadyworkingonprocuringthe185JERRVsforIMEF(Fwd)usingJRAC(i.e.Joint/CIED)fundingasaresultofJRACJERRVJUONSapproval.MCCDCwashardlyaware,ifatallawareofMCSCactionswhichturnedouttobebeneficialforMARCENTandtheMEF(Fwd).TheworkaroundtoavoidMCCDCinvolvementinfieldingMRAPbyemployingthemoreresponsiveJUONS-JRACconnectionhadbeensuccessful.”(Gayl,p50)MCCDCwastheinitialorganizationtorecommendaJUONS(Hirschemaildtd5/18/2006).OnlyafterMCCDCpromptingdidMARCENTdeliverajointrequest.MCSCandMCCDCarerequiredtoworkhandinhandformanyreasons(capturedintheacronymDOTMLPF).MARCENTshiftedtheUUNStoaJUONSwithMCCDCpromptingandthiscreatedthesuccessfulrequestGaylmentions.MCSCactionedonthissuccessfulrequestandMCSCactionswerecoordinatedwithMCCDC. GaylmakesadditionalcommentsaboutMCSC:“CoordinationbetweenwarplannersandMCSCwasalsominimized,givenknowninstitutionaloppositiontoalargeurgentMRAPpurchase.”(Gayl,p47)GaylcitesthepositiveactionsofMCSCinthepreviousparagraph.ItisdifficulttounderstandifGaylwasbeingcriticalorcomplimentaryofMCSCactions.ItisclearthatGaylpresentstheactionsofcommands(positiveornegative)basedonthepointGaylismaking. Afterthesubmissionofthefirstjointrequestfor185vehiclesanditsinitialsuccess,IMEFgeneratedanotherjointrequestforanadditionalthousandvehicles.“Consequently,MARCENTwarplannerssupportedtheIMEF(Fwd)decisiontosubmitthefullMRAPcapabilitythroughtheJointchainintheformofanMNF-W-generatedJointUrgentOperationalNeedsStatement(JUONS).”(Gayl,p47)ThefullMRAPcapabilitywouldcontinuetoincreaseasamorethoroughanalysisofneedswascompleted. IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thentherewasnegligenceacrosstheentireMarineCorpswithregardtotheprocessingofthedocumentknownastheHejlikUUNS.ThisnegligenceincludedIMEF(2rotations),IIMEF,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,PP&O(Advocate)(includesGayl),I&L(Advocate),MCCDCD,MROC(includingremainingadvocates)andtheirstaffs.Inaddition,severalorganizationswithUUNSsupportresponsibilitieswouldhavealsobeennegligenttoincludeMCSC,P&R,MCWLandthe11thESB.
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11H-THEFAILUREOFTHEDODIG
TheDODIGfailedinseveralelementsoftheMRAPinvestigation.Themajorityofthose
flawswillbeaddressedintheDODIGChapter.TheUUNSprocessportionoftheirinvestigation,however,isacriticalelementasitimpactstherestoftheDODIG.TheflawedfindingoftheDODIGintheprocessingoftheHejlikUUNScolorstherestoftheirinvestigationandcreatedtheinaccuratecriticismsoftheMarineCorps.ThissingleflawcascadedintomultipleflawedconclusionswithintheDODIG.ItwillbeaddressedinthissectiontomaintainUUNSunderstandingcontinuity.
TheDODIGstatedthattheycouldnotfindanydocumentationstatingthattheHejlik
UUNSwaschangedtoanUNSandthereforetheHejlikUUNSremainedactive:“Morethan2yearslater,onJuly16,2007,theformerDeputyCommandingGeneralissuedamemorandumtotheDirector,MarineCorpsPublicAffairs,statingthatthe2005decisiontofieldM1114up-armoredHMMWVswasthecorrectMarineCorpsdecisioninresponsetothethreatin2005.TheformerDeputyCommandingGeneraltoldtheauditteamthatheissuedthememorandumtoclarifythathisintentinsigningtheUUNSwasfortheMarineCorpstoacquireandfieldtheMRAPwithin2to5years,asstatedearlier.However,asshowninAppendixC,theUUNSclearlyindicatedthattherequirementforMRAP-typevehicleswaspriority1andurgentlyneeded–notacapabilitydesiredin2to5years.”(DODIG,p11)
THEDCG,BGenHejlik,statedthatthedecisiontoanswertheUUNSwithm1114swasan
acceptabledecisionforhisUUNS.TheDODIGdisputesthisassertionandthestatementoftheDCG.Theintenttofieldacapabilityin2to5yearsisconsistentwithanUNS,notaUUNS.OncetheUUNSwasansweredwiththeM1114,itwaschangedintoanUNSbyMARFORPAC.ThischangeisevidencedintheIMEFprioritizedUUNSlistswheretheMRAPUUNSisspecificallychangedtoanUNS.Subsequentdecisionsreflectingthereductionareevidencedelsewhere.TherewasanabundanceofprovablefactsupportingthereductiontoanUNS.
TheDODIGfurtherstated:“RepresentativesfromMCCDCstatedthattheybelieved
thatMarineCorpsForcesPacificdowngradedtheMRAPUUNStoauniversalneedstatement.WecontactedrepresentativesfromMarineCorpsForcesPacific,includingtheuniversalneedstatementcoordinatorassignedtotheMRAPUUNS,whodidnothaveanydocumentationregardingchangingtheMRAPUUNStoauniversalneedstatement.Inaddition,therepresentativesstatedthattheydidnotbelieveMarineCorpsForcesPacifichadtheauthoritytodowngradeanUUNSthattheyhadsenttotheMCCDC.”(DODIG,p13)
TheDODIGfailedinitsinvestigationinthattheyfailedtoclassifytheHejlikUUNSasdowngradedtoanUNSdespitetheevidenceshowingthedowngrade.
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TheMCCDCrepresentativeswerecorrectandtheMARFORPACrepresentativeswere
incorrectintheir“belief”.MARFORPACdiddowngradetheUUNStoanUNS(2-5yearwindow).TheDODIGdidnotfindanyevidenceofthisdowngrade.TheyfailedtocheckwiththeoriginatoroftheUUNS,IMEF.TheDODIGmakesasecondflawinplacingcredenceontheopinionoftheMARFORPACrepresentativevsfindingthefacts.MARADMIN045/06states:
UUNSPRESENTEDTOTHEMROCWILLBEREPRESENTEDASMARINE
COMPONENTCOMMANDERWARFIGHTINGREQUIREMENTS,VICEMEFORMSCREQUIREMENTS.(MARADMIN045/06) MARADMIN045/06wasissuedinJanof2006,theperiodoftimeforwhichtheMarineCorpssupposedlywasignoringtheUUNS.TheMARADMINmerelycapturestheowneroftheUUNSasthecomponentcommanderandnotasubordinateorganization.TheownershipoftheUUNSwasneverstatedasMCCDC,anAdvocate,oranyothersupportingorganization.InJan2006MARFORPACwas,byMARADMIN,responsible.Theywereactuallyresponsiblebeforethenaswell,despitetheconfusionoftheMARFORPACactionofficer(s). Insum,MARFORPACdowngradedtheUUNStoanUNSanditwastheirauthoritytodoso.Theydidsobecausethem1114responsewasdeemedsatisfactoryatthetime.ThedowngradewasconsistentwithBGenHejlik’sstatementsanda2-5yearplan.TheDODIGhadtoreachseveralerroneousconclusionsabouttheHejlikUUNSinordertoarriveattheirconclusions.TheyalsohadtoviewthestatementsofBGenHejlikasfalse.TheseDODIGerrors,ifcorrectedatthetime,wouldhavepresentedatotallydifferentsetofconclusionsthatwouldhaveexoneratedtheMarineCorpsofmanyofthescurrilousMRAPcharges.
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11I-THEREASONHEJLIKUUNSPROCESSINGSTOPPED
OneoftheunheardpositionsontheHejlikUUNSwasthatitwasfulfilled.Aspreviously
described,theUUNSwasnolongeractivewellbeforetheJERRVsubmissioninMay2006.OneofthereasonsitwasnolongeractivewasthattherewasasolutionthatwasacceptedbytheleadershipoftheMarineCorps,thesubmittingunit(IMEF),andMARFORPAC.Thisauthorisnotpresentingthepositionthatthedecisionsmadewerecorrectorincorrect.Thefactisthat,rightorwrong,adecisionwasmade.
Gaylstates:“TheMAKarmorkitsandtheM1114shouldneverhavebeenconsideredaspotentialmaterialsolutions.”(Gayl,p66)Gaylstatedagain:“Therefore,neithertheMAKarmorkitsnortheM1114shouldhavebeenconsideredaspotentialmaterialsolutions,fortheFeb2005MRAPUUNS,byMCCDCortheMarineCorpsleadership.”(Gayl,p67)Rightorwrong,Gaylacknowledgesthatthem1114wasconsideredasasolutionforthe2005HejlikUUNS.Thisacknowledgementallowsforthecriticismofthearrivedatsolution.Italsoacknowledgesthatthederivedsolutionwasthem1114.Iftherewasasolution,nomatterthequalityofit,thentheprocessofsubmittinganUUNSprovidingamaterialsolutionwasfulfilled.TheentireargumentthattheUUNSwasburied,slow-rolled,mishandled(etc.)fallsflatinthefaceofthisverysimpleargument:Asolutionwasprovided.
“CMC’s“additionalinformation”onMRAPcontinued:“ThedecisiontopursuetheM1114wasmadebytheMarineCorpsleadershipbecauseofitsprovencapabilitytoprotect,itstacticalutility,thedemandbytheMarinesintheater,anditsavailability.”(Gayl,p70)CMCfurtherdescribesandjustifiesthem1114solution.Onceagain,thisauthorisnottryingtojustifythem1114decision.Thisauthorissimplypointingoutthatadecisionwasmade.
“IMEF(Fwd)hadalreadyexperiencedsuperiorsupportfromtheJRACwiththeJERRVJUONS,inlightofMCCDC’sshelvingoftheMRAPUUNSin05.”(Gayl,p94)Gayl’spoint,oftenquotedandcertainlywrong,wasthattheMRAPUUNSwasshelved.CMCandGaylbothstatethatthem1114wasthedeliveredsolution.TheUUNScannotbesimultaneouslyshelvedandfulfilled.
“TheGCEAdvocate,whohadbeenassignedtoaSupportingAdvocaterole,formallyrecommendedthatanMRAPProgramofRecord(POR)beestablished,andtheUUNSfulfilled(Referencep.8.).”(Gayl,pix)Theprovisionofthem1114solutionalsoexplainsthetotalabsenceofanyactionbytheAdvocates.AresponsefromtheAdvocateCommand(PP&O)mayhaveofferedadifferentsolution.TheAdvocates,however,didn’tadvocateforanydifferentsolutionafterthem1114solution.ThenextMRAPactionwasafterIMEFdeployedin2006.IftheUUNSremainedactive,theAdvocateswouldhavebeennegligentinnotsupporting/advocatingfortheHejlikUUNS.TheUUNS,however,wasresolved.
ProcessingoftheHejlikUUNSwasceasedbecauseasolutionwasdelivered.
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11J-ALWAYSSOMEONESAYINGNO
OneofthetechniquesGaylusesistopointoutaslidewhereanopinionisofferedbyan
actionofficerandthentopresentitasafinaldecision.ThemajorityofbriefsinGayl’sstudyareopinionbriefs.MCCDCpersonnelaretaskedwithwargaminganUUNSandstatingpotentialdownsides.AnactionofficermaybeastrongsupporterofanUUNSandyetspeakcriticallyofitintheirassignedslides.Thisallowsforconsiderationofproblemareasbutdoesnotreflectthepositionofthebriefer.Gaylstates:“CDTSentriespointtomidlevelprocessmanagersquestioningMRAPbecauseitwouldcompeteagainstfavoredprogramsandfuturisticexpeditionarywarfightingconceptsforfunding.”(Gayl,p18)Somemid-levelprocessmanagerswereagainstMRAP.Otherswerenot.Theslidestellverylittleaboutthepositionofthemid-levelmanagers.
Forexample,Gaylstates:“CMC’scommentthatMRAPandJLTVarenotlinkedrepresentedadecisivedeparturefromtheperspectiveofMCCDCinthespringof2005.TheCDIBbriefingoftheMRAPUUNSshowedadirectlinkbetweenthetwointhatMCCDCstafferswereconcernedthatdevelopmentalprogramslikeJLTVmighthavetohelppayforCOTSMRAPs.”(Gayl,p53)ThisauthorwasintheCDIBbriefingandfondlyrememberstheoccurrencewhenaMCCDCstafferbroughtupJLTVinthecontextofMRAP.TheMCCDCstafferwasbarelyfinishedbeforeseveralotherMCCDCstaffersclamoredtorespond.MrBlasiolcuttheJLTVAdvocateoffandsaidhispointwasnotappropriate.TheCDIBcontinuedonwithoutanyotherJLTVconsideration.Unfortunately,theJLTVAdvocatedidspeakandhedidquestiontheeffectofMRAPonJLTV.ThisgaveGayltheammunitionneededtosmeartheentireboard.
TheopinionsofthosewhodidnotfavoraMRAPbuywerenotonlyfocusedonthe
impactofprogrammatics,therewasalsoalegitimatedebateabouttheworthinessofMRAPs.ThisauthorwasaproponentfortheincreaseduseofMRAP-typevehiclesinIraq,however,thereweremanylegitimateargumentsagainstMRAP.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheargumentsagainstheldmoresway.Itsimplymeansthattherewereconsiderationsthathadtobeportrayedbecausetheymattered.Oftentimesthosewhodidtheirdutytopresentallsidesofthedecisionwereportrayedasanti-MRAP.Gaylinaccuratelypresentsdifferentindividualsandorganizationsasanti-MRAPbasedonindividualslidesorbriefsthatwereonlypartialrepresentations.
Therewereindividuals,however,whowereanti-MRAPforvariouslegitimatereasons.
SomeoftheidentifiedproblemswithMRAPwere:VulnerabilitytoEFPVulnerabilitytoRPGReliability
GaylusedselectquotesandslidestoportrayaninaccuratepictureofMCCDCMRAPpositions.TherewerelegitimatereasonstoquestionalargeMRAPbuy,andtheyweredebated.Thedebatewasnotthedecision.
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HigherfuelrequirementsCostLaginavailabilityNoquickexitsLessManeuverableespeciallyinbuiltupareasLessvisibilityRequiredtacticalunitreconfigurationatthesmallunitlevelTheaterspecificCOINspecificAlloftheaboveissuesarelegitimatedebateissuesandconscientiousofficersshould
haveraisedthemanddidso.SomedisagreedwithatransitiontoMRAPbasedononeoracombinationoftheabove.IntheMarineCorpsthereisoftenopportunityforrobustdebate.PractitionersoftheMarineCorpsPlanningProcess(MCPP)understandthis.EveryMCPPsteprequiresrobustinputandseveralstepsactuallyrequiredebate.Oncethedebateiscomplete,thentheleadershipmakesthedecisionandallhandscometothetablereadytoexecutethedecision.Quotingcomponentsofthedebateinsteadofthefinaldecisionisamisleadingtechnique.
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11K-WHOKNEWANDWHOWAS“RESPONSIBLE”
InorderfortheaccusationsofMCCDCdelayingorburyingthe2005HejlikUUNStobe
truetherewouldhavehadtobeaconspiracyacrosstheMarineCorps.ThisconspiracywouldhavehadtoincludethosewhoweretaskedwithUUNSresponsibilitiesaswellasthosewhohadavestedinterestintheUUNS.ThosewhohadspecificHejlikUUNSresponsibilitiesandwhowouldhavebeenapartofthissupposedconspiracyincludes:
• CMCGeneralHagee(decidedonm1114COAandbriefedattheEOSwithfullknowledgeofMRAP)
• ACMCGeneralNylandandGeneralMagnus(AttendedEOSandpresidedover
theMROC.GeneralNylandwasbriefedintheMROCandsignedtheMROCDMupdatingMRAP.)
• Attendeesofthe2005EOS(AllLieutenantGeneralsoftheMarineCorpswere
briefedonvehiclesolutionsattheEOS)
• TheMROC(ReceivedthefinalHejlikUUNSupdateinAug2005andtooknofurtheractionsthroughmid-2006(listedbelow))
(Daschemaildtd10/20/2005)
• MROCReviewBoard(MRB)(ThereviewboardforallMROCactivitiesconsisting
ofgeneralofficersortheirrepresentativesforeachMROCmember)
• DC,P&R(LtGenMagnusthenLtGenGardner)andstaff(ReceivedallUUNSfromMARFORs,MROCReviewBoardChairman,EOSattendee,MROCattendee,DWG/CDIBattendee)(PotentialBillionDollarUUNS)
• DC,PP&O(LtGenHuly)andstafftoincludeGayl(AdvocatefortheGCE,MROC
attendee,MRBmember,EOSattendee,DWG/CDIBmember,supportingAdvocateforHejlikUUNS)
ThefollowinglistofoverthirtySeniorGeneralOfficersandStaffsshowsresponsibilityforthedispositionoftheHejlikUUNS.
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• DCI&L(LtGenKellythenLtGenKramlich)andstaff(AdvocatefortheCSSE,Hejlik
UUNSprimaryAdvocate,EOSattendee,MROCAttendee,MRBmember,DWG/CDIBmember,creatorofm1114solution)
• DCMCCDC(LtGenMattis)andstaff(CEAdvocate,HejlikUUNSadministrator,
EOSattendee,MROCAttendee,MRBmember,DWG/CDIBhost)
• CGMARFORPAC(LtGenGregsonthenLtGenSattler)andstaff(UUNSsubmitterandowner)
• CGMARCENT(LtGenSattler)andstaff(UUNSowneraftersplitwith
MARFORPAC,LtGenSattlerwastheCommanderofIMEF(Fwd)andauthorizedtheoriginalHejlikUUNSthenwaspromotedtothecomponentcommandersupervisingtheUUNS)
• CGIMEF(LtGenSattler)andstaff(CommandelementforIMEF(Fwd))
• CGIIMEF(LtGenAmos)andstaff(CommandelementforIIMEF(Fwd))
• CGIMEF(Fwd)(LtGenSattler)andstaff2005(MarineCommandorganizationin
IraqsubmittingtheHejlikUUNS)
• CGIIMEF(Fwd)(MajGenJohnson)andstaff2005-2006(MarineCommandorganizationinIraq)
• CGIMEF(Fwd)(MajGenZilmer)andstaff2006-2007(MarineCommand
organizationinIraqthatsubmittedthe185JERRVjointrequestinMay2006,Gayleventuallyjoinedthisunit)
• MCSC(BGenCatto)andstaff(MROCAttendee,ReceivedHejlikUUNS,DWG/CDIB
member,solutionperformerform1114)
OfparticularinterestisthattheoriginalsigneroftheUUNS(BGenHejlik)andtheCGofIMEF(LtGenSattler)werebothpromotedtomoreseniorbilletswithintheUUNSsubmissionchainofcommand.Inthesebilletstheydidnothingwiththe2005HejlikUUNSafterAug2005.LtGenSattlerwastheCGMARCENTwhenthenextJERRVUUNSwassubmitted.HeadvocatedfortheJERRVUUNSbutnottheHejlikUUNS.Onceagain,thereasonwasthattheHejlikUUNSwasconcluded.
IfGaylweretobebelieved,andheisnot,theabovecommandswerenegligentintheiradministrationofthe2005HejlikUUNS.EachcommandandindividualhadaspecificrolebyMarineCorpsorderanddirective.IfGaylweretobebelieved,theCommandant,Assistant
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Commandant,MROCmembers,Advocates,MarineComponentsandbothIraqMEFsallfailedintheirUUNSresponsibilitiesinthefaceofthedesiresofmid-levelbureaucratsatQuantico…
InadditiontotheresponsibleorganizationsperMarineCorpsOrdersandDirectives,theExecutiveSafetyBoardattendeeshadavestedinterestintheMarineCorpsVehiclefleet.TheywouldhavealsobeennegligentifGaylwascorrect.TheattendeesattheESBwerecapturedinALMAR019/05.Theyincluded:THEACMCLTGENGREGSONCOMMARFORPACLTGENBERNDTCOMMARFORLANTLTGENBLACKMANCG,IIIMEFLTGENAMOSCG,IIMEFLTGENMATTISCG,MCCDCMS.DEWITTEDASN(S)MAJGENBICEIGMCMAJGENJONESCG,TECOMRADMBROOKSCOMMANDER,NAVALSAFETYCENTERMAJGENDONOVANCG,MCBCAMPPENDLETONMAJGENDICKERSONCG,MCBCAMPLEJEUNEBGENGASKINCG,MCRCBGENWILLIAMSREPRESENTING,DC,I&LBGENHEJLIKREPRESENTINGCG,IMEFBGENFLOCKCG,MCBCAMPBUTLER,OKINAWABGENJENSENCOMCABWESTBGENPAYNECG,LOGCOMBGENPAPAKREPRESENTINGCOMMARFORRESCOLROTENREPRESENTINGCG,MCBHAWAIICOLBULANDREPRESENTINGCOMCABEASTSGTMAJESTRADASMMCMR.RIDEOUTREPRESENTINGCG,MARCORSYSCOM
AccordingtoGayl,theresponsibleorganizations(perorderanddirective)listedontheprevioustwopagesandtheESBwereallcowedbythemid-levelbureaucratsatQuanticobecausetheydidnot,asindividualsorasanorganization,followuponthestatusoftheUUNS.ThepowerandauthorityoftheMCCDCbureaucratsovertheabovelistis,intruth,none.Theseindividuals/organizationswerenotcowedbythebureaucratsatQuantico.
Thereisanotherconclusionthatmakesmoresensethantheassertionthatthemid-levelbureaucratsatQuanticoheldswayovertheabovelist.TheUUNSwassatisfiedwiththem1114andconvertedtoalongtermrequirement(UNS)whicharedevelopedoveryears.
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12-GAYLSTUDYFLAWS Asshowninthisstudy,GaylonlystartedtoparticipateinMRAPoncetheMarineCorpswaswellonitswaytoprocurement.Gayl’smaincomplaintsfromhisDDR&Ebrieflayelsewhere.TheDDR&EpresentationonlyhadtwoofthirtyoneslidesfocusingonMRAPandarmor.Theother29focusedonavarietyofequipment,thegreatestnumberwereISRrelated.GaylstatesoftheeventualsuccessesinAnbar:“ThisisduetoacombinationofinnerprovincialIraqire-alliancesandthedramaticbenefitsofpersistenttacticalISR,andlater,cementedwithMRAPsandadditionaltroops.HadISRandothertoolsofCINbeenfieldedpromptlyinpastyearsbycombatdeveloperstheIEDemergencyandurgentneedforMRAPsmayneverhavematerialized.”(Gayl,p54)Gayldidnotstartoutasa“MRAPwhistleblower”.Hewasageneralpurposewhistleblowerwho,aftercoordinationwithpressandpoliticians,determinedthatMRAPhadhighervisibility.HisstudyreflectstheabsenceofrealMRAPknowledge.ThischapterwilldiscusstheflawsinthewritingofGayl’sstudyandthesubstanceofGayl’sstudy.
194
12A-FLAWEDWRITINGTECHNIQUES
Gayl’stechniquesforwritinghisstudywereflawedandledtocriticalerrorsinhisconclusions.
12A1-WRONGORDERSARETHEBASISFORGAYL’SSTUDY
ManyoftheflawsinGayl’scasestudycanbeattributedtothefailuretouserelevant
ordersanddirectives.Compoundingtheproblemoftheabsenceofcorrectorders/directivesisGayl’suseofmarginallyrelevantorders/directives.LineoneofGayl’sPurposeintheExecutiveSummaryreads:“a.Purpose.ThestudyusesarecentexampleofaGroundCombatElement(GCE)-requestedcapabilitythatencounteredcombatdevelopmentchallengesinordertoilluminatesomeofthesystemicproblemsinherentandendemictotheExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem(EFDS)atMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC).”(Gayl,pvi)
Gayl’sfocusistheEFDSatMCCDC,yethedoesnotusetheordersanddirectivesrelevanttotheexampleoftheMRAP.Themostrelevantorders/directivesareoutlinedinChapters4-6inthisstudy.Theorders/directivesinthisstudyarealsoreferencedintheMRAPDODIG.TheDODIGdidnotuseGayl’sorders/directivesinthecommissionoftheirinvestigation.Withoutacorrectunderstandingoftherelevantordersanddirectives,anyportrayaloftheeventssurroundingtheMRAPUNS/UUNSwouldbefundamentallyflawed.
Gayl,inarareexampleofaccuratewriting,decidedtomakeonlyminimaluseofhis
referencedorders.Hisorders/directivesareusedintheintroductionandtheconclusion.Therestofhisstudyremainedunclutteredbytheseorders.Nevertheless,hisreferencedordersremainthebaselineforhisconclusions,sotheymustbeaddressed.GaylpointstotheseordersinhisExecutiveSummaryConclusionssection(quotedinitsentirety):“4.Conclusions.TheMRAPcasesstudyhasdemonstratedthatMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentorganizationsarenotoptimizedtoprovideresponsive,flexible,andrelevantsolutionstocommandersinthefield.Also,severalMarineCorpsOrdersmayberelevantforanyfutureanalysisorinvestigationofUSMCcombatdeveloperactionsrelatedtoMRAP.ThoseordersareReferenceso.1.,o.2.,o.3.,o.4.,o.5.,ando.6.Otherspecificconclusionsarelistedattheendofthestudybody.”(Gayl,pxv)
Theuseoftheseordersprovidesminimalornocapabilitytoproviderelevantanalysisorinvestigation.NordotheysupportrelevantMRAPstudyconclusions.Gayl’sordersthatformthebasisforhisstudyareasfollows(Gayl,p3):
• o.1.Order-MCO3500.27BOperationalRiskManagement(ORM)
Gaylusesseveralordersasthebasisforhisstudy.TheyarethewrongordersifoneisstudyingMRAPevents.Theflawedbasedocuments(orders)causeGayl’sstudytobefundamentallyflawed.
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• o.2.Order-MCO5100.8OccupationalSafetyandHealth(OSH)Policy• o.3.Order-MCO5100.29ASafetyProgram• o.4.Order-MCO7510.5AFWAOversight,Awareness,Preventionand
Remedies• o.5.Order-MCO5800.13AInvestigationsofAllegationsAgainstSeniorOfficials• o.6.Order-MCWP5-1MarineCorpsPlanningProcess(MCPP)
MCWP5-1isnotanorderordirective.Itismislabeledandmischaracterized.MCWP5-1
isMarineCorpsdoctrine,notMarineCorpsorder.
Gayluseshisorderstolevelthechargeofmismanagement:“GrossmismanagementoftheMRAPmayhavecreatedasignificantadverseimpactontheGCE’sabilitytoaccomplishitsmission,withmeasurableoperationalconsequences,andseveralMarineCorpsOrders(MCOs)maybeapplicable.”(Gayl,p123)Onewouldthinkthatsuchaweightychargewouldbesupportedwithordersthatareapplicablevsthosethat“maybe”applicable.
GaylusesOperationalRiskManagementashisfirstOrder:“(29)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO3500.27B,OperationalRiskManagement(ORM).ThisMCOstatesinpart:“ORMisanintegralpartofthedecisionmakingprocessforbothMarineCorpsmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelinalloperationalandnon-operationalactivities,”and“TheprimaryobjectiveofORMistoavoidunnecessaryrisk.SuccessfulimplementationoftheORMprocesswillincreasemissioneffectivenesswhileminimizingunnecessarylossofassets,bothpersonnelandmateriel.”(Gayl,p123)ORMisapplicabletoriskandriskappreciationisakeytenetoftacticalandoperationalplanning.ORM,however,appliesonanevenbroaderscale.ORMappliestosuchthingsasproperspeedlimits,watercleanliness,sleeprequirementsforpilots,andshelterfromindirectfireetc.Itisabroadcatch-alltypeterm.
HadGaylreadfurtherintheORMorderhewouldhaveabetterunderstandingoftheMarineCorpsapproachtotacticalandoperationalrisk:“Riskisinherentinwarandisinvolvedineverymission.Riskisalsorelatedtogain;normallygreaterpotentialgainrequiresgreaterrisk.”OurMarineCorpstraditionisbuiltuponprinciplesofseizingtheinitiativeandtakingdecisiveaction.ThegoalofORMisnottoeliminaterisk,buttomanagetherisksothemissioncanbeaccomplishedwiththeminimumamountofloss.”(MCO3500.27b,p4)Commandersassessriskandmakedecisionsfortheircommands.ORMforthedeployedMEFswastheprimaryresponsibilityoftheMEFCommanders,notMCCDCorMCSCpersonnel.MCCDCandMCSC,however,doconsiderORMbutrelyonthedeployedCommanderforhisunitassessmentofMRAPORM-typedecisions.
Gayl’ssecondorderisfocusedonOccupationalSafetyandHealth:“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5100.8,MarineCorpsOccupationalSafetyandHealth(OSH)Policy.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“Commanders/commandingofficersshallimplementthisOrder...ThisOrderpromulgatesMarineCorpsOccupationalSafetyandHealth(OSH)policytoeliminateorminimizetheprobabilityofmishapsoccurringintraining,
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industrial,U.S.Governmentandtacticalvehicle,otheroperational,andoff-dutyenvironments...”(Gayl,p123)MCO5100.8referencesthefederalOSHActandencompassesmanyofthesametopicssuchasworkplacestress,repetitivemotioninjuries,furnitureergonomics,andmanyotherworkplacestandards.Forexample,MCO5100.8specificallytasksInstallationCommandersto:“ProvideinspectionsoftheMCCSoperatedchildren,youthandteenprogramsandfacilitiesasrequiredbyreferences(i)and(j).ThisinspectionreportshallincludereviewofthemonthlyinspectionsconductedbysafetytrainedMCCSpersonnel.TheinspectionsconductedbytheinstallationsafetyofficeofspacesforchildcareshallincludeallOccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministrationsafetyrequirementsaswellastherequirementsofreferences(i)and(j).”(MCO5100.8,p4-5)ThisorderalsohaslittleapplicationwhenaddressingMRAPeffortsinAnbar,Iraq.
Gayl’sthirdorderdealswiththeMarineCorpsSafetyProgram:“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5100.29A,MarineCorpsSafetyProgram.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“CommandersatalllevelsareresponsibleforensuringthattheMarineCorpsTotalForceismaintainedatthehighestlevelofreadinesspossiblebyincorporatingoperationalriskmanagement(ORM)inalloperationsassuringcontrolsareinplaceforanyhazardthatcannotbeeliminatedandprovidingappropriatesafeandhealthfulfacilitiesforalltheirpersonnel,”and“ThisorderisapplicabletoallMarineCorpspersonnel,toinclude…militarypersonnelandcivilianMarines,”and“ThisorderappliestoallMarineCorpsfacilities,equipment,trainingfacilitiesandmateriel;andisineffectashore,onoroffMarineCorpsinstallations,orwhileembarkedinaircraftofvessels.”(Gayl,p123)ThisorderdealswithsafetyinasimilarwaytoMCO3500.27B.Bothoftheseorderscoverbroadconceptsandareill-suitedforMRAPUUNSanalysis.MCO5100.29Aalsodealswiththeinherentsafetyassociatedwithanyindividualpieceofequipment.Forexample,alaserdazzlerthatdoesnotmeetsafetystandardsisprohibitedfrombeingusedbythisorder.ThisisrelevantinthediscussionoftheLaserDazzler.ItisnotasrelevantintheMRAPdiscussionasMRAP-typevehicles,m1114sandallHMMWVsweresafetycertified.
Gayl’sordernumber4alsoappliestotheLaserDazzler,buthaslittleapplicationtoMRAP.“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO7510.5A,MarineCorpsFraud,Waste,andAbuse(FWA)Oversight,Awareness,PreventionandRemedies.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“TheMarineCorpsiscommittedtoanaggressiveprogramofoversight,awareness,prevention,andremediesofFWA.Ourgoalistoprecludeeventheslightestimpressionofimproprietyinthehandlingofourmanpower,material,andmoney,”andCommandingGeneralsareresponsiblefor“Requiringeconomywithintheircommandsandstrictcompliancewithregulationsgoverningthereceipt,accountingandexpenditureofmanpower,moneyandmaterials.”(Gayl,p123)Waste,fraudandabuseusuallyrequiressomesortofaction.Gayl’sargumentscenteraroundMCCDC’ssupposed“failuretoact”.Thisorderthereforehaslimitedapplicability.TheareaswhereGaylassertsthattherewaswaste,fraudand/orabuseareexplainedinthisstudy.TheDODIGforMRAPdidnotfindwaste,fraudorabuse.
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Gayl’sfinalOrderonceagainassumessomesortofguiltbyseniorofficials.“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5800.13AInvestigationsofAllegationsAgainstSeniorOfficials.Thefactthattheseactsoccurredatleastinpartduetoprioritiesconnectedtoprogrammaticagendasandrigidprocessconformanceforitsownsake,andthefactthatGeneralOfficerdecisionmakerswereimpacted,mayalsomakeMCO5800.13Aapplicablehere.”(Gayl,p123)OnceagainGaylassumescorruptionwherenoneoccurred.SeniorOfficialsinvolvedwithprogrammaticdecisionsareverylimited.AspecificallegationagainstaspecificindividualwouldbeeasiertoaddressthanthespeciousaccusationsGaylemploys.Inaddition,thisreferencedoesnotaddtotheunderstandingofeventssurroundingtheMRAPUNS/UUNS.Itsimplydemandsaccountability.Insum,Gayl’sreferencedOrdersencompass:
• OnepieceofDoctrinethatisnotanOrder.• TwoOrdersdealingwiththeprosecutionofwrongdoingwhiledoingnothingtoestablish
factssurroundingtheMRAPUNS/UUNS/JUONS.• ThreeOrdersthataretoobroadforMRAPunderstandingastheyapplytotheentirety
oftheMarineCorpsandoftenapplytociviliansandfamilymembersaswell.• NoOrdersorDirectivesreferencedintheDODIGMRAPInvestigation.• NoOrdersthatwerequotedanywhereinGayl’sstudyapartfromtheconclusion.• NoOrdersusefulforunderstandingeventssurroundingtheMRAPUNS/UUNS/JUONS.
Gayl’sfailuretogroundhispointsinactualordersanddirectivesreflectspooranalysisthat
isevidentthroughouthisstudy.
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12A2-MCCDCCRITICISMINCLUDEDNOINTERVIEWSWITHMCCDCPERSONEL
OnemayaskhowitisthatGaylwassowrongonsomanyissues.Thatanswerstarts
withthepurposeofhisstudy.ThepurposeofGayl’sstudy:“inordertoilluminatesomeofthesystemicproblemsinherentandendemictotheExpeditionaryForceDevelopmentSystem(EFDS)atMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)”(Gaylpagevi).GaylhadexperienceatQuanticointestingandtraining,buthadlittleexperienceinMCCDCEFDS.Onemighthavethoughtthathewouldthereforerelyheavilyoncombatdevelopmentordersanddirectives.Asseenintheprevioussection,hedidnot.AsafallbackonemayhavethoughtthatheconductedmanyinterviewswithMCCDCpersonnel.Hedidnot.Gayl’sconstraintfromthefirstpageofhisIntroductionstates,“…thisstudydidnotincludeinterviewsorwrittenqueriesofanyemployeesorinstitutionscomingunderthecommandoroversightofthelargerMarineCorpscombatdevelopmentcommunity.TheseareunderstoodtoincludeMCCDC,theEFDC,MarineCorpsSystemsCommand(MCSC),theMarineCorpsWarfightingLaboratory(MCWL),theJointNon-LethalWeaponsDirectorate(JNLWD),andtheUSMCS&TProgramattheOfficeofNavalResearch(ONR)”(Gayl,pvi).Insum,GaylhadnorelevantexperienceinMCCDC,interviewednoMCCDCpersonnel,didnotuseEFDSrelevantorders/directives,hadfewemails,andyetfeltcomfortabledrawingconclusionsabouttheactionsofMCCDC.
“Aquestionworthaskingis:who‘balances’theseissues?Isitaccomplishedbyoperationallyandtechnologically-savvy(i.e.bilingual),programmaticallyneutralgovernmentpersonnelwithrelevantphysics,engineering,orcomputerscienceinsight?Isitaccomplishedbyneutralgovernmentpersonnelwhohaveatrueinsightintothestateofthecommercialartandindustrycapacity?”(Gayl,p61)Thesearelegitimatequestionsforwhichthereareanswers.TheproblemisthatGayldidnotseekouttheanswers.HewasconfinedtohisownfiniteexperiencesandcontributionsfromselectpersonnelatIMEFandMARCENT.AnassessmentofMCCDCprocessesandproceduresisnotpossiblewiththelimitedinsightGaylpossessed.AsGaylquotedabove,hedidnotinterviewMCCDC,MCSC,JNLWD,orONR.TheMarineCorpsreachintootherLabswasalsoignored.MCCDCregularlycoordinatedwithArmyLabs,NavyLabs,AirForceLabs,DARPA,JointLabs,JIEDDO,Industryandothers.GaylwouldhaveseentheMCCDCtechnologyreachhadhisresearchbeenthorough.
Fromhisadmittedpositionofignorance,Gaylthentransitionstobaseaccusation:“Orisitoverwhelminglyaccomplishedbyacquisitionandprocessspecialistswithinthesupportestablishmentwhohavetangibleprogrammaticinterestsintheoutcomeofdecisions.ThesespecialistswhomanageUSMCcombatdevelopmentincludenon-promotabletwilighttourofficers,retiredMarinesworkingascivilservantsatMCCDC,MCWL,MCSC,andONR,andfamiliarcontractorswhoalsohavealargestakeintheoutcomesofdecisions.”(Gayl,p61)TherearenospecificallegationsprovidedbyGaylofMarinesorGovernmentOfficialswho
GaylfailedtointerviewMCCDC,EFDC,andJNLWpersonnelinhisresearch.Combinedwiththelackofdocumentation,thisflawconfirmsGayl’slackofknowledgeaboutthesubjectofhisstudy.
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madedecisionsbasedonpersonalinterests.Industryrepresentatives/contractorsmakemanydecisionsbasedontheirowninterestssotheyareomittedfromtheMCCDCdecisionmakingforums.EveryCommandhastwilighttourofficers(toincludeIMEFandPP&O).EverymajorcommandintheMarineCorpshasretiredMarinesworkingascivilservants/contractors.GaylhimselfcompletedhistwilighttouratPP&O,thenbecamearetiredMarineworkinginthesameplace.
GaylhadafundamentallackofunderstandingaboutMCCDC,MCSCandtheelementsoftheEFDS.Insteadofacknowledginghislackofunderstandingandaccessibilitytotheseorganizations,hemadeaccusationsfromapositionofignorance.TherewereflawsinMCCDC,MCSCandEFDS,however,Gayldidnotprovidecredibleresearchonthem.HislackofcredibleresearchonMCCDC,MCSCandtheEFDScreatedincorrectconclusions.TheincorrectconclusionscouldhavebeenaddressedhadheactuallyinterviewedMCCDCpersonnel.
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12A3-USEOFPARTIALEMAIL
ThefailureofGayltopublishhissourceemaildeprivesthereadersofthecontextoftheemails.TheemailquotesthatGaylprovidesaremisleading.ThisauthorwasintheemailchainforseveraloftheseemailsandisthereforeabletoprovideexamplesofhowGaylshadesthetruthwithhalfemails.Severalexamplesfollow:
“ItquicklycametotheattentionofMARCENTwarplannersthattherewasasignificantdiscrepancybetweenwhatIMEF(Fwd)wasrequestingin2006(185eachofaspecificMRAPvariant)andwhathadbeenrequestedin2005(afamilyof1,169MRAPs)(Referencee.2.).On16Jun06ColThomasCarikerwrote:“Gents,IwillsendyouabriefonSiprthatcallforCIEDvehiclesandsomerequestedhelpfromusbyMarcent.TheareaskingforustoseeifwecanfindanoldUUNSsignedbyGenHejliksometimeagoreferencingMineResistantAmbushProtectionVehicle(MRAP).Chiefs/Staff,TheyarealsoaskingifwecanassignaCIEDgroundwheeledvehicleadvocateforcurrentthreatvehicleadvocacy(notnextgenerationHummerreplacement).”(Gayl,p49)MissingfromthisemailisthefactthatColCarikerwastheChiefofStaffofIIMEF(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006).ThisisimportantastheChiefofStafffortherecentlydeployedIIMEF(ColCariker)ishimselfaskingtheIIMEFstafffortheoldHejlikUUNS.ThisabsenceofknowledgeaboutabilliondollarUUNS(bytheIIMEFCOS)reflectsadiscrepancybetweenthenumberofvehiclesGaylstatesIIMEFexpected(1,169)andthenumbertheyreallyexpected(zero).TheCOSlackofknowledgeabouttheHejlikUUNSisanotherverificationofthelackofdemandforMRAP-typevehicles.
ThesameemailreflectedoneofthemoreglaringomissionspreviouslyaddressedinChapter10.Gaylwrites:“However,on20Jun06IMEF(Fwd)staffwrotetoMARCENTstafftocorrectthatimpression,inspiteofMARCENT’sconcernsforthesmallerIMEF(Fwd)JERRVrequirement:“...ColMilburn[IMEF(Fwd)CoS]...willtakethissubjectuponFridaywithColSupnick[MARCENTCoS]whenhearriveshereatCampFallujah.Wearestickingwiththerequirementfor185JEERVvehicles...”(Gayl,p50)Gaylcutofftherestoftheemail:“Wedon'twanttoconfuseanyoneaboutourrequirement,let'sputthisdiscussiononholduntilafterIhearfromColMilburnonFriday.Marty”(Lapierreemaildtd6/20/2006).Thisiscriticalinformationrequiredtounderstandthattherewasnorequirementaboveandbeyond185,yetitwasomitted.TheinclusionoftherestofthisemailwouldcontradictGayl’sassertions.Gaylstatesthattherewasaconstantrequirementfor1,169MRAPs.Iftherequirementwasonly185,thenGayl’smainargumentisprovenincorrect.OnemaylegitimatelyaskiftheremainderofGayl’squotesfromemailsandothersourcesprovideadequatecontext.
Gayl’spartialemailsaremisleading.
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12A4-NOPROCESSDISCUSSION
Gayl’sassertionswouldhavemorecredibilityiftheywerebasedonsomesortof
recognizableprocessorresponsibility.Manyofhisassertionsarebasedoninnuendoandassumptions.Anunderstandingoftheprocesscombinedwithasmallamountofreflectionwouldshowthataspectsofhisargumentsareirrelevant.Severalexamplesfollow.
Gaylgoesbackto2003inhiscriticismofMarineeffortsforNon-LethalWeapons(NLW):
“ItcanbearguedthatifUSMCcombatdevelopershadactedassertivelyonNLWneedsthatwereknowntothemin2003MarinesinOIFwouldhavehadavailabletothemhumane,non-kineticoptionstocontrolviolencewithoutcausingpermanentharmtoinnocents.”(Gayl,p103)ThecasualreadermaynotunderstandthatGaylhimselfwasaUSMCcombatdeveloper.HecitesseveraloftheUUNSthathesubmittedasaUSMCcombatdeveloper(Gayl,piii)butcitesnoNLWsuccessoreffortthatwouldhavebeenabletosolvetheNLWproblemstatedabove.Hisuseofthethirdpersonplacesthe“blame”onothersbutasimpleunderstandingofthecombatdevelopmentprocesswouldchangetheabovepronounfrom“them”to“us”.Gayl,accordingtotheprocess,wasasresponsibleasthosehecriticizes.
Gaylstates:“ThislooseassociationoftheCougar,Buffalo,Casspir,andRG-31withthe
termMRAPismisleading.AllofthosevehiclesareandwerespecificallyknownasMRAPs.Basedonall“MRAP”literature,fromCaptSinclair’sawardwinningarticle,toMajMcGriff’sSAWthesis,,the1stMRAPUUNS,the2005SafetyConferencebriefing,theJERRVJUONS,theMRAPJUONS,andthe2ndMRAPUUNS,allcombatdevelopersandleadersknewandknowthattheallegedly“MRAP-like”vehiclespurchasedforEODwereMRAPsinfact.”(Gayl,p68)Thearticle,schoolpapers,thefirstMRAPUUNSandthe2005safetyconferencealloccurred.Gayl,however,givesnoprocessormethodduringwhichalloftheseeventswouldberequiredtobeknownbyallcombatdevelopers.Thereisnoprocesstyingtogetheranarticleina1996periodical,apaperbyastudentinQuantico,aconcludedUUNSandabriefataconference.Thereisnoreasonableexpectationthatcombatdeveloperswouldknowofthesedisparateeventsatthetimeofthe2006JERRVJUONSsubmission.Gaylsimplylumpsthesedisparateeventstogetherwithoutaddressinghowanycombatdeveloper(letaloneallcombatdevelopers)wouldhaveknownofthem.
Gaylcontinues:“Casspirs,Buffalos,andCougarswerementionedbynameinthe1stMRAPUUNS.Inthe2ndMRAPUUNSRG-31sandCougarswerepicturedasmembersofthefamilyofMRAPsolutions.ThiswasalsothecasefortheMRAPJUONS.TheJERRVJUONSpicturedtheCougar.InMajMcGriff’spresentationtoUSMCleadersin05acostslidepicturedthe4-wheeledCougarvariant(seeFigure7earlier).TheconfusionofthesewordsaboveintroducesthereadertoamisleadinglyvaguedefinitionofMRAP,inspiteoftheabundantandcompellingdocumentationthatmeticulouslyandunambiguouslydefinedanMRAP.”
GaylcritiquestheactionsofMCCDCbasedonhisunderstandingofcombatdevelopmentprocesses.His“combatdevelopmentprocess”isnotprovidedorreferenced.
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(Gayl,p68)ThenomenclatureisaddressedinChapter8ofthisstudy,butonceagainGaylexpectsthatallcombatdevelopersshouldhavebeenawareofMcGriff’spresentationatthe2005SafetyConference.IstheexpectationthatallcombatdevelopersknowthecontentofallbriefsgivenattheSafetyConference?IsthereanexpectationthatallarticlespublishedintheGazetteduringthelastdecadeareknowntoallcombatdevelopers?Isthereanexpectationthatallschoolpapersarereadbyallcombatdevelopers?EveryMarineOfficerhasthepotentialtobeassignedtoabilletintheEFDSasacombatdeveloper.DoesthatmeanthatallMarineOfficersshouldbefamiliarwithallofthearticlespublished,paperswritten,andUNS/UUNS/JUONSsubmitted?Gaylprovidesnorationalmethodforarrivingatanaffirmativeresponsetotheabovequestions.
Gayl’sfailuretoaddressprocesspromptsstatementssuchasthefollowing:“ItisclearthattheMCCDCstaffwassuccessfulatkeepingtherealreasonsforshelvingtheMRAPurgentneedconcealedfromtheviewofGenHageein05,andnowGeneralConwayin07and08.”(Gayl,p73)Thepresenceofeighteenflagofficersfromdifferentcommands(16ofwhichwerenotMCCDC)atthesafetyconferencemakestheabovestatementunreasonable.ThepresenceoftheACMCandseveralDeputyCommandantsmakesthisstatementevenmoreunreasonable.If Gayl had described how (process) the MCCDC staff muzzled the ACMC and DeputyCommandants, then his point would have some credibility. As it stands, this statement is ahollowaccusationabsentanyevidence.
The below slide originates fromGayl’sDDR&Ebrief.Once again, assertions aremade
withoutanyfactsorprocess.
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Figure48.Competitionforresourcesathome,notwarfightingneedsdeterminetheoutcomes.(Gayl,p118) Gayldoesnotexplaintheprocessinwhichtheseprogramscompeted.Somewereexperimental.Somewerejoint.SomeweredifferentServiceefforts.SomeofthecomparisonswerebothrequestedbyMNF-W(Iand/orIIMEF).ThereisnodiscussionofthefinancialsourcesorhowMNF-Wneedsfailedinthecompetitionforfunding.Thereissimplyallegationwithoutfacts.Severalexamplesforwhichthisauthorhasfirst-handknowledge:
• AngelFirewasanAirForceeffort(mostlyR&D)supportedbyMarines.ConstantHawkwasanArmyledprogram.Theywerefundedthroughdifferentchannels.AngelFirewasdevelopedbyMCCDCandtheAirForcetoapointwherefundingwassolicitedforadeployment(Johnstonemaildtd7/26/2006).TwomonthslaterIMEFsubmittedaJUONSforAngelFirewhichwasfollowedbyanUUNS.Insum,MCCDCdevelopedthecapabilityandthenhadIMEFrequestit.
• GBOSSandC-RAMcapabilitieswerebothrequestedbyIMEF(BGenNeller)(Clarkemaildtd12/9/2005)
• RAIDwasanelementofGBOSS.• MRAPandup-armorprogramswerebothrequestedbyIMEF.• C-RAMhadcapabilitiesthatGBOSSdidnot(McDonnoughemaildtd2/24/2006)
Theabsenceofprocessdescribingwheretheseprogramscompetedwasnotprovided.Simplysayingthattheycompeteddoesnotmakeitso.C-RAM C-RAMcoordinationisagoodexampleofaprocessofwhichGaylwasunaware.TheprocessstartedwithadevelopedcapabilitybytheArmyknownasCounterRocketArtilleryMortarorC-RAM.TheArmywasfieldingthissystemofsystemsthroughoutIraqwhereindirectfirewasaregularthreat.TheMarineCorpstookadvantageofthisArmyeffortbyemplacingC-RAMinseveralMNF-Wbases.DifferentbasesreceiveddifferentC-RAMelementsofthesystemofsystems.NoMNF-Wbasereceivedthefullsuite.OneoftheproblemswastheinabilityofMarinestotrainwiththisequipmentbeforearrivingintheater.TrainingbeforedeploymentwasaServiceresponsibilityandtheaterequipmentwasbeingprovidedbyjointandArmyfunds.MarinesneededtoincorporateC-RAMintotrainingbeforedeploying.Inaddition,MarinesneededtobeabletointegrateexistingequipmentintoC-RAMandviceversa.InordertodothiscombatdevelopmentanUUNSwasneeded.ThisauthorandaMCCDCactionofficercraftedtheUUNSandGeneralNellersignedit(Watsonemaildtd1/27/2006).ItwasrenamedtheESSBDUUNSinordertodifferentiatefromtheArmyC-RAMprogrambuttheelementswerethesame(outlinedinClarkemaildtd12/9/2005). TheESSBDUUNSallowedtheMarineCorpstocommitefforttowardsESSBDandC-RAM.MCWLestablisheddemonstrationsofthecapabilityinQuantico.ThesedemonstrationsincludedsystemsthateventuallybecameG-BOSSincludingRAIDtowersandDopplerradars.
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TheRAIDprogramwasnotstrictlyanelementofC-RAM,butitwasoneofthesystemstiedintothesystemofsystems.TheC-RAMsystemthatwasdemonstratedcontainedthemajorelementsofwhatwouldbecomeGBOSS(RAID,WSTI,M-StarDoppler)(McDonnoughemaildtd2/24/2006).LtGenMattissawthesystemanddirectedasuitebeestablishedat29Palmsfortraining.TheauthoritytoactwaseasedastherewasanESSBDUUNSthathadbeenapprovedthroughtheprocess.MostMarinessimplyreferredtothesystem,however,asC-RAM. WithanapprovedUUNSanddirectionfromLtGenMattis,theinstallationat29Palms(thesiteofmostMarineCorpspre-deploymenttraining)wasinitiated.TheESSBDUUNShelpedcoordinateandworkthroughthetrainingestablishment(Baczkowskiemaildtd3/20/2006).EventuallyIMEFsubmittedaG-BOSSUUNSinJuneof2006.BythetimetheGBOSSUUNSwasapprovedandsomeonestartedthinkingabouttraining,MCWLhadalreadyestablishedatrainingsuitethatcontainedthesurveillanceequipmentIMEFwasrequestingandthetrainingequipmentthattheprogramwouldeventuallyuse(seeGBOSSchapter). Gayl’slinefromtheaboveslidereads,“MNF-Wneedscompetedagainstfundedprograms”withasub-elementof“G-BOSSvsC-RAM/RAID”.C-RAM/RAID,unbeknownsttoGayl,wastheGBOSSprecursorandC-RAM/RAIDestablishedGBOSStrainingevenbeforeGBOSSexisted.ItwasfundedthroughtheArmyC-RAMoffice.TheGBOSS/C-RAMfundingandtrainingeffortsweremutuallysupporting.TheequipmentsuiteforthisportionofC-RAMandGBOSSwerealmostidentical(seeGBOSSChapter).ThemutualsupportfromtheArmyprogramwasnotedbymanyMarines(andmanyArmyOfficersaswell)asC-RAMreceivednoMarinefunding.
TheabsenceofanyprocessdiscussionbyGaylmakesreadersofhisstudyacceptorrejecthisassertionswithoutsufficientanalysis.ThisismanifestedinGayl’sfabricationofmanyofhisequipmentcomparisons.Oftentimesthesesystems“incompetition”weredevelopedsimultaneously.Thosethatwerenotdevelopedtogetherbenefittedthemilitaryinthattherewasacompetitionbetweenvendorswiththemilitarychoosingthebestsystem.
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12A5-GAYLLATETOISSUEANDRELIANTONOTHERS
GayldeployedtoIraqinSeptemberof2006.HereturnedinFebruary/Marchof2007.BySeptemberof2006theMarineCorpshadalreadyembracedthepurchaseoflargenumbersofMRAP-typevehicles.TheMarineCorpswasalreadyleadingthewayonalargeMRAPbuy.GaylwasnotinvolvedwiththemaindecisionstobuyMRAP.Hethereforehadtorelyoninformationprovidedbyalimitednumberofparticipantsintheprocess.
Gayl’sfirstpublicizedMRAPoccurrencecenteredonhisdraftbrieftoDDR&EinMarch
of2007.ByMarchof2007theMarineCorpsalreadyhadfundingidentifiedforover800MRAPs.TestimonywasaregularoccurrenceinthepressandinCongressforseniorMarines.TestingwasongoingatAberdeenandindustrywasrampingupproductionlinesandprovidingtestvehicles.Then,aftertheMarineCorpsfullycommittedtoMRAP,Gaylenteredthepictureandsweptupcredit.Hecontinuestodosotoday.ThefactsshowthatGaylwaslatetotheMRAPissue,buthewasearlyintalkingabouttheMRAP“scandal”.ThebelowdirectiveindicatesthematurityoftheMRAPissuebyFebruary2007:
(Allesemaildtd2/9/2007)TheabovememorandumfromUSDAT&LcoordinatedwiththeServiceSecretarieson
elevatingMRAPtoACATIDafullmonthbeforeGaylpresentshisfirstbrief.ThislevelofcoordinationandendorsementiswellbeyondanythingportrayedbyGayl’sadvocatesandthe
NeitherGaylnorhisacolyteswereinvolvedintheprocessingoftheHejlikUUNS.GaylwasnotinvolvedintheMarineprocessingoftheMay-July2006JERRVandMRAPUUNS/JUONS.
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press.EitherwidespreadignoranceordeliberatemisguidanceallowedGayltoclaimcreditforthedevelopmentofaMRAPprogram.
Gayl’slateentrytotheprocesscausedhimtorelyonothersforhis“facts”.Hesimply
hadverylittlefirst-handknowledgeorparticipationinthesequencethatledtotheMarineCorpscommitmenttoMRAP.HisabsencefromtheprocesscausedhimtorelyonothersoronspeculationforhisMRAPstudy.CompoundingtheproblemsofhisownpersonalabsencewashisinabilitytodiscussMRAPwithmanyindividualswhowereparticipantsinthedecisionmakingprocess.HistwoorganizationalsourceswereMARCENTandIMEF(G9).
OneofGayl’sacolytes,LtColJankowski,hadbeenactivatedinapproximatelyJuneof
2006.JankowskiappearstobeasourceformuchofGayl’sMARCENTinformation.Hewashard-copyingemailsatMARCENTandwasanaddresseeonmanyoftheprovidedemailsinGayl’sstudy.JankowskiwasalsoalatearrivaltotheMRAPissue.HewasaparticipantandsourceformanyoftheeventsduringandafterJune2006(relativelylateinGayl’sMRAPstudy).
Gayl’sotherprimarysourcewastheIMEF(G9).Gaylspenttimedeployedwiththisstaff
andcontributedtothecontentiousrelationshipsbetweentheIMEF(G9)shopandsupportingorganizations.TheIMEF(G9)wasnotsignificantlyinvolvedwiththeprocessingoftheHejlikUUNSastheIMEF(G9)shopof2005turnedoveraftertheUUNSwassubmitted.TheIMEF(G9),however,wasresponsiblefordesignatingthe2005HejlikUUNScompleteandthesubmissionsofthe2006UUNS/JUONS.
Insum:
• GaylandmanyofhisprimarysourceswerenotinvolvedintheprocessingoftheHejlikUUNS• Jankowskiwasnotinvolveduntilwellintotheprocessforthe2006submission• TheIMEF(G9)turnedoverpersonnelafterthe2005HejlikUUNS• GaylwasdirectednottointerviewordiscussMRAPeventswithmanyothercombatdeveloperswhichrestrictedhisunderstandingandaccesstoknowledgeableMarines
GaylandhismainsourceswerelatetotheMRAPissue.Hisinformationcredibility
sufferedaccordingly.
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12A6-UNPROFESSIONALCRITICISMOFFELLOWMARINES
InordertoseparateMarinesintosupportandwarfighterGaylengagesinad-hominem
attacksagainsttheMarinesservinginQuanticoandontheCDB.Asstatedbefore,theMRAPstorygetsalotmoreinterestingifthereissomesortofcorruption.Gaylfabricatesthis“corruption”inQuantico.
HequestionsthedecisionmakingprocessinQuanticobyattackingthosewhoworkin
Quantico:“Orisitoverwhelminglyaccomplishedbyacquisitionandprocessspecialistswithinthesupportestablishmentwhohavetangibleprogrammaticinterestsintheoutcomeofdecisions.ThesespecialistswhomanageUSMCcombatdevelopmentincludenon-promotabletwilighttourofficers,retiredMarinesworkingascivilservantsatMCCDC,MCWL,MCSC,andONR,andfamiliarcontractorswhoalsohavealargestakeintheoutcomesofdecisions.”(Gayl,p61)TheMarinesinQuanticodidhavetangibleprogrammaticinterest,butnotasGaylinfers.MarinesinQuanticorotatedintotheater.MarinesinQuanticohadchildrenintheMarineCorpsrotatingintocombat.MarinesinQuanticohaddeployedandhadtheprobabilityofdeployingagain.MarinesinQuanticohadfriendsandneighborsincombat.MarinesinQuanticohadfriendswhowerekilledandwounded.Insum,theMarinesinQuanticowereasinvestedandhadlargestakesintheoutcomesofequipmentdecisions…justlikeanyotherMarines.
Gaylcontinues:“Thebalancehasbeenwrong,andshortoffundamental,verifiableinstitutionalchangeitwillremainwrong.Instead,thebalanceisclearlyinfavorofUSMCsupportestablishmentstaffvisionofprogrammaticexigencyandMCCDC-drivenpriorities,asopposedtowarfighter-drivenpriorities.”(Gayl,p61)MCCDCdidnotsetpriorities.Theoperatingforcewastasked(byorder)toassignprioritiesandtheMROCestablishedpriorities.MCCDCexecutedthosepriorities.
“Also,theciviliansintheCDIB,SYSCOM,MCWL,andJNLWDwhoaredependeduponforcontinuityandsubjectmatterexpertise,arenotoperationallycurrentortechnologicallyproficient.Similarly,manyifnotmostoftheCDIB,SYSCOM,MCWL,andJNLWDactivedutyofficershavebeenonextended‘homesteading’twilighttoursatQuanticoandcannotbeconsideredwarfighters.”(Gayl,p61)TheMarinesinQuanticorotateinandoutoftheoperatingforcesasdotherestoftheMarineCorps.Therotationasayoungerofficerisgenerallythreeyearsintheoperatingforcesandthreeina“B”billetsuchasQuantico,ParisIsland,PP&Oetc.Moreseniorofficersrotateintoandoutoftheoperatingforcesinalessstructuredmanner.OftentimesOfficerswereassignedtofillgapsinunitsdeployingtoIraq.BetweendeploymentstoIraq,thisauthorwastheDirectorofOperationsatMCWL.Atalltimesafter2005therewasamajorityofofficersintheoperationssectionwhohaddeployedtoIraqorAfghanistan.Somehadmultipledeployments.Therewereonly1or2officersoutofa
GaylpossessedneitherthestandingnorthefactsrequiredtomakehispointedcriticismsofMCCDCpersonnel.
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sectionfifteen(by2008)whohadnotdeployed.ThisauthorcannotcommentonthenumberofofficersthroughoutMCWLorMCCDCwhodeployedordidnotdeploy,butby2008thenumbersofpreviouslydeployedOfficerscomfortablyoutnumberedthenumbersofthosewhohadnot.OfnoteisthattheCDIBvotingmemberfromPP&O(Gayl’sowncommand)during2005wasColonelEddieRay,NavyCrosswinnerandMarineleaderinthe2003attacktoBaghdad.
Inaddition,thisauthorwasamemberoftheCDIBandcanrecallthatmostCDIBshadat
leasttwofutureflagofficersasvotingmembers.ThenormalselectionratetoBrigadierGeneralintheMarineCorpshoversatapproximately3%.TherewereformerCommandersandseniorstaffrepresentedontheCDIB.Gayl’sevaluation,ataminimum,reflectsignorance.
“ThesetenuredUSMCmiddlemanagementandjuniorSMEindividuals,havingrepeatedlyexhibitedvaluesets,incentivization,andconceptsof“urgency”divorcedfromthebestinterestsofbothwarfightersandthefutureoftheCorps,havearecordofprovidingbadadvicetoMarineCorpsGeneralOfficerleadership.Thisbadadvicehasdonereal,measurabledamagetoboththeCorps’andthecountry’snationalsecurityobjectives.”(Gayl,p61)The“tenuredmiddlemanagement”doesnotexist.GovernmentbilletsserveatthediscretionoftheuniformedMarines.ThereisnocivilianchainofcommandthatdoesnothaveactivedutyMarinesincharge(inQuantico).Manyciviliansarecontractorsandcanbeeasilyfired.ManyoftheciviliansareretiredMarinesorhaveservedintheMarineCorps.ThesecivilianMarinessharethesamedevotions(deployingchildren,friends,andneighbors)asactivedutyMarines.Theyalsodeployasneeded.
UnfortunatelythepresspickeduponGayl’scharacterizationofcombatdevelopers:“On25Mayanarticletitled“MarinesFailtoGetGeartoTroops”authoredbyRichardLardnerappearedontheAssociatedPresswire.Itcaptureswellthescopeandconcernoftheunfulfilledurgentneedsdocumentedabove,includingMRAP.ThisarticlecameontheheelsofpressrevelationsthattheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSof17Feb05hadnotbeenfulfilled(Referencea.12.).Thearticlestatedinpart:“ThesystemfordeliveringbadlyneededgeartoMarinesinIraqhasfailedtomeetmanyurgentrequestsforequipmentfromtroopsinthefield,accordingtoaninternaldocumentobtainedbyTheAssociatedPress.Ofmorethan100requestsfromdeployedMarineunitsbetweenFebruary2006andFebruary2007,lessthan10percenthavebeenfulfilled…Itblamedthebureaucracyanda‘risk-averse’approachbyacquisitionofficials.Amongtheitemsheldupwereamineresistantvehicleandahandheldlasersystem.‘Processworshipcripplesoperatingforces,’accordingtothedocument.‘Civilianmiddlemanagementlackstechnicalandoperationalcurrency.’…Thedocument'sclaimsruncountertothepublicdescriptionofaprocessintendedtocutthroughthelayersofredtapethatfrequentlyslowthemilitary'sprocurementprocess…”Thisdraftbriefaccuratelyreflectedthelackoffaith,andoftentrust,thattheoperatingforcesfeltwithregardstoUSMCcombatdevelopers.”(Gayl,p115)ThisisGaylquotingareporterwhoisquotingGayl.ThereportershouldhaverecognizedthatGaylwasa“combatdeveloper”byorderandaction.Gaylseemsignorantofthefactthathewasacombatdeveloperandanimportantoneatthat.Onceagain,theignoranceofthewriterscontributestoanarrativethatisnotfactual.
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ThepresscanbeignorantaboutMCCDCpersonnel,butGayl,asaformerofficer,shouldhavehadabasicunderstandingofmanpowerpolicyatMCCDC.
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12A7-NODOCUMENTSANDSPECULATION
Gaylfailstousecredibledocumentsinsupportofmanyofhispoints.Theemailsthat
wereavailabletohimwerelimited.Thedocumentsassociatedwithdifferentdecisionmakingbodieswerenotavailabletohim.TheIMEFandMARCENTupdatesrequiredbyordersanddirectiveswerenotutilizedbyhim.Theordersanddirectives,however,wereavailabletohim(addressedinChapter4-6).Giventhelackofevidenceandsupportingdocuments,manyofGayl’spointsandconclusionsarepoorlyresearchedandsuspect.Gaylstates:“Inadditiontothecontradictions,thereasonsbeingemployedtopubliclyjustifytheUSMCshelvingofthe05MRAPUUNSlackeddocumentedauthenticity.”(Gayl,p59)Thislackof“documentedauthenticity”attributedtoothersappliestoGayl.Severalexamplesfollow.
“Thiswasadirectreflectionofthepsychologicaleffectofrepeatedcombatdeveloperrefusalstoproviderequestedequipment.TheMEFassumedthatiftheJERRVrequestwasmodest(eventhoughtheyneededmanymoreMRAPs)thatitwouldbereceivedmorefavorably.”(Gayl,p49)TherewasnopsychologicalstudyconductedontheIMEFstafftodeterminethepsychologicaleffectofanyMCCDCaction.MCCDC,asdiscussedearlier,actuallywantedIMEFtorequestmoreMRAPs.
“TheappearanceoftheseparticularDOTMLPFissues,irrelevantfortherequestedvehicles,revealstheconcernofthebrieferthatthereal,battlefieldchallengesinOIFwouldupsetanestablishedprogrammaticwayahead.OnecanconcludefromthisMRAPcasethatPORscannotbeforcedtoadjusttotheexigenciesofwarintheEFDSwithoutmuchstrongerwarfighterinfluence.”(Gayl,p26-27)AbrieferpresentedseveralpointsinaPPTpresentationandGaylconcludesPORscan’tbeforcedtoadjustwithoutwarfighterinfluence.ThebrieferwasnotaskedtoexplainhispointsbyGayl.ThepurposeoftheslideorbriefwasnotstudiedbyGayl.Theconclusionsofthebodybeingbriefedwerenotdetermined.TheadjustmentsofPORstoeventsinIraqwasnotstudied.Toomanyun-researchedassumptionsarerequiredtoarriveatGayl’sfaultyconclusion.PORsareadjustedregularly.
“ThisthinkingsupposesthatMCCDCstaffknewbestthemindofCongressintermsofthepoliticalviabilityoffundingcurrenturgentvehicleneedsandlong-termcapabilityplans.ItiscleartodaythatMCCDCwasunqualifiedtoventureaguessonthatthinkingattheactionlevel,eventhoughtheactionlevelperspectivescarriedthedayinanon-transparentprocess.”(Gayl,p25)GaylfailstoprovidethenamesorbilletsoftheMCCDCofficialswhostatedthatthey“knewbestthemindofCongress”.Onceagain,absentintervieworemails,Gaylassertsthatathoughtprocessoccurredforwhichhehadnofacts.Theconclusionthatthoseatthe“actionlevel”carriedthedayhasalreadybeendisproven.
“Again,thereasonthattheMRAPprogramhasgrowninscopeisbecauseMCCDCignoredcommonsenseCOINrequirements,aswellasthegrowingIEDemergencyinMNF-
SeveralexamplesofGayl’spoorresearchareprovidedbelow.
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W.”(Gayl,p86)Theassumptionhereisthattheinsurgencygrew,causingmorecasualties,becauseMCCDCignoredcommonsenseCOINrequirements.TheroleofMCCDCinAnbar,inthisassertion,isover-stated.TheroleofMCCDCineachpieceofequipmentwasnotaccuratelyexaminedorprovidedbyGayl.
“Alackofanyreasonableabilitytopredictfutureconsequencesfromcurrentandpastdecisionsisimpliedinthesayingthat“hindsightisalways20/20.”However,asperthemanyreferences,USMCcombatdevelopershadampleknowledgeofthreatprojections,leadtime,andhadevenreceivedEFDCprocess-compliantandspecificGOdirectiontoprepareneededCOINenablingcapabilitiesforknownthreatsandpossiblecontingencies.”(Gayl,pxii)The“manyreferences”arenotmanyatall.Theywerenotsufficientinnumbertocausetheadvocatetoact.TheEFDCelementsarenotdiscussednoristheirreactiontotheCOINenablingcapabilities.TheassumptionbyGaylisthattheEFDCrejectedCOINenablingcapabilities.GaylstatestheserejectionswereinviolationofGeneralOfficerordersbutoffersnoexamples.Gayl,asacombatdeveloper,shouldbeabletoprovideconcreteexamplesifhisaccusationsweretrue.
“TheCDTScontainstheonlyknowndocumentedreasonfornon-fulfillmentoftheMRAPUUNSremainsbudgetaryandlong-termdoctrinalconcerns.ThedocumentsalsospecifythattheconcernsthatfundingMRAPwoulddecrementthebudgetsofPORsandfuturisticconceptsinwhichcombatdevelopersalreadyhadavestedinterest.”(Gayl,p22)PoorresearchyieldedfewdocumentsforGayltoanalyze.AbsentfromGayl’sanalysisweredocumentsfromtheEOS,theMROC,andIMEF.ManyofhisconclusionsrestononebriefatMCCDCandtheprojectedmindsetofthosewhowerebriefed.ThereisnomentionofthosewhohadCDTSauthoritiesandtheprogramsinwhichtheyhadavestedinterest.Gaylcontinues:“TheactualreasonsfortheMRAP’sdismissalin2005arecontainedinthispresentation.ThePOMIssuesslideisbelow:”
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Figure17.POMIssuesslide.(Gayl,p29)
WhilethisactionofficerslidemayhavequestionedMRAP-typevehiclesin2005,Gaylpresentsnodocumentsthatanyseniorofficerconsideredthesepointsthemostrelevant,orrelevantatall.Thelackoffollow-throughandanalysisoftheeventsallowinganyconclusiontobedrawnaboutMCCDCorMarineCorpsactionisagainlacking.
“ItisclearthattheMCCDCstaffwassuccessfulatkeepingtherealreasonsforshelvingtheMRAPurgentneedconcealedfromtheviewofGenHageein05,andnowGeneralConwayin07and08.”(Gayl,p73)Thisstatementassumesoneoftwothings;theCMCdidnotknowabouttheUUNSortheMCCDCdecisiontrumpedanydecisionthatwouldhavebeenmadebytheCMCwhoknewabouttheUUNS.TheUUNSprocesschapterdisprovesassumptionone.ThesecondpointrequirestheCMCtobowtothewilloftheMCCDCstaffifhehasadivergentopinion.Itisasillyassumption.NomatterwhattheopinionoftheMCCDCstaff,reasonedorunreasoned,theCMChasthewherewithaltoformhisownopinion.AsimpleCMCstatement,“IhearwhatyouatMCCDCaresaying,IlikeMRAPanyway”wouldhavesenttheMCCDCstaffintoexecutionofMRAPbuying.BothCMCswerefullyinformedandmadetheirowndecisions.BothwereadvisedbytheirGeneralOfficers(asseeninemailsforGeneralConway),nottheMCCDCstaff.Gayldoesnotprovidethe“realreasons”,orthefakereasons,orthebriefsinwhichtheywereconveyed.Hesimplyfabricatesthisconclusion.
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ISRwillbeaddressedinafuturechapterbutthisparagraphcontainedsomany
assumptionsthatitisnoteworthyforitslackofdocumentationandspeculation.“MEPOPwasimmediatelyconsideredasapotentialsolution,buttheimmaturityofaradiocontrolledhighaltitudeplatformattributabletoMCCDCneglectwassoonclear.InasearchforalternativestheAirForceAngelFiremannedplatformwasembraced.ComparedtoevenanominalMEPOPsolutionAngelFirelackedplatformonstationpersistence(hoursversusamonth)andlacked‘unblinking’sensorstingcapabilities(targetorbit[periodicrevisitation]versusgeostationary[truepersistentstare]).MostsignificantlyAngelFireisamannedaircraftoperatingatrisk,eveninCOINasMANPADScapabilitiesimprove.”(Gayl,p101)MEPOPwasaproposedsurveillanceassetbutwasneverconsideredthe“answer”forpersistentsurveillance.MEPOPrequireddevelopmentandDARPAandONRwereworkingonit.AngelFirewasnotanalternativeforMEPOP.In2005ImetthenLtColChudobaatan“AngelFire”boothduringatechnologydemonstration.Ihadarrivedtherethroughmyinvolvementwith“ConstantHawk”(formerlyknownasthe“Sonoma”project).NeitheroneofuswaspursuingaMEPOPalternative.BothofourshopsmaintainedinterestinAngelFireandeventuallywesettledonLtColChudoba(MCCDCIntel)takingthelead.Oncethetechnologywassufficientlymature,IMEFwasbroughtintotheloopandtheysubmittedaJUONS.ThiscontinuedapatternofMCCDCdevelopmentfollowedbyaIMEFUUNS/JUONS. AngelFirewasawideareapersistentcapability,itcouldviewapproximately4kilometersby4kilometersanddownloadtoagroundstationimmediately.IthadcapabilitythatConstantHawkdidnot.AngelFireachievedpersistencethroughtheuseofmultipleplatforms.Insum,AngelFirewasnotdevelopedwithanyregardtoMEPOP,itwasinadifferentcapabilitysetthanMEPOP,theconsiderationsGaylbringsupwerenotthemainvaluedAngelFirecapabilities,andfinally,IMEFrecognizedtheAngelFireworthandrequesteditinaJUONS.AngelfirebecameaprioritizedIMEFcapabilitywhileMEPOPdidnot.OnedoesnotderivethesefactsfromGayl’sparagraph. Gayl’sstudyhasthousandsofpoorlyresearcheddeclarations.Thisstudyonlyfocusedonseveralhundred.Gayl’scorrectpointsarealsopoorlyresearchedanddocumented.Hisstudyshouldhavebeendismissedforthepoorqualityofresearchaswellastheincorrectconclusions.
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12A8-IRRELEVANTSOURCES
ManyofGayl’ssourcesaremildlyrelevantorirrelevant.Thelackofemailsthatreflectactualactionsandthoughtsofparticipantswouldhavemadeupforthefailuretodiscusstheseeventswiththeparticipants.PresentationsfromtheEOSortheMROCcouldhaveshedlightonseniorexecutiveactions.TheordersGaylusedwasamajorflawinhisstudyandhasalreadybeendiscussed.Gayl’ssourceswereinadequateforanunderstandingofthefactssurroundingMRAP.
ThefifteenbooksGaylcitesinhisMRAPstudyarethesamebooks,exactly,thatheusesinhislaserstudy.MostaddnothingtotheMRAPdiscussionandarenotcitedapartfromageneraldiscussionofwarfare.
Gaylcitesveryfewemails.Thisisbecausehedidnothaveaccesstotheconversations
surroundingmanyoftheeventshediscusses.Hisacolyteswerealsolimitedintheemailsthatwereavailabletothem.CompoundingthelackofaccesstorelevantemailwasthegapintimebetweentheraisingoftheissueandtheoccurrencesGaylcitesascausingtheMRAPissue.Thistimegapresultedinthedeletionofoldemails.
Gayl’sordershavealreadybeendiscussed,butthepresscouldhavebenefitedfrom
understandingrelevantordersanddirectives.Thepresscouldhaveusedordersinordertoknowwhoandwhattoquestion.Instead,thepressparrotedGaylandwasawestruckbyhis“facts”.ManyofthearticlesGaylcitesuseGaylastheirmainsource.
Gayl’spresentationsdonotcomewithspeakernotesorinformationonthediscussion
thattheslidesprompt.Thereisnocontextfortheslides.Forexample,theESBhadnineteenbriefsintwodays.ItwasnotaMRAPESB.GaylprovidednoESBconversationbeyondthetwoorthreesentencespresentedasremembrancesbyoneoftheactionofficers.ThereisnoconversationassociatedwiththereferencedCDIBslides.ThereisnoconversationfromtheEOS,MROC,MRB,seniorofficers(etc.)thatcouldhaveassistedindeterminingtherealfactssurroundingMRAP.
ThereareveryfewspecificsourcesreferencedinGayl’sstudy.Hedoes,however,
referencetheMROCsecretariat:“This10June05EFDCinfopaperaboveisthelastknown(i.e.knowntothiscasestudyauthor)formalcommunicationthattheMRAPUUNShadbeendelayedorcancelledatMCCDC.ThishasalsobeenconfirmedbytheMROCSecretariat.TheMRAPUUNSwasallegedlyhandledanddecideduponoutsideofthestandardprocess,inthatitwasneverproperlybroughtbeforetheMROCforaformaldecisionforsubsequentrecordinginanMROCDecisionMemorandum.”(Gayl,p38)ThisisoneofthefewtimeswhereGaylcitesasourceforaconclusion.InthiscasetheMROCSecretariatiswrongorGayl
ThesourcesGaylusesareoftentimesirrelevant.
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fabricatedtheinformation.Itisclear(DODIGandMROCDMverified)thattheMROCconsideredtheHejlikUUNSinAugust2005.
ManyofGayl’ssourcesareirrelevantandhefailstoutilizesourcesthatcouldhave
changedhisconclusions.
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12B-GAYL’SFLAWEDPERCEPTIONS TheflawsinGayl’seffortsextendtohisportrayalofthetacticsoftheMarinesinAnbaraswellashisperceptionsofhowcombatdevelopmentoccurs.
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12B1-EXAMPLESOFTACTICALERROR
Gayl’sfailuresintacticalanalysismayhavebeenthecauseofhispoorequipment
solutions.Simpletacticalmisstatementswereacceptedasfactbyunwittingreaders.ThereisadrumbeatoftacticalerrorinGayl’sstudy.Severalexamplesfollow.
“TheissuewasnotmerelyJERRV’sforengineers,butratherMRAPsforallmembersof
theMEF(Fwd)engagedinlong-haultacticalmovement.”(Gayl,p48)Gayl’sfocusonlong-haultacticalmovementwastacticallyinaccurate.Thelong-haultacticalmovementrouteswerenotprimarilywhereIEDattackswereoccurring.FiftypercentofallIEDhotspotattacksoccurredwithin5kilometersofaFOB.Thesewerethemorelocalroads.MRAPwasprimarilyintendedtodefeatunderbodyattackswhichweremoredifficulttoemplaceonasphaltlong-haulroadsandeasiertoemplaceonlocalroads.ThelocalnatureofmuchoftheIEDfightpointedtowardssolutionsthatwouldhelplocalcommanders.OnesuchsolutionwasG-BOSS.
“TheG-BOSS,asanAOR-widecapabilitywasfocusedonthevastexpansesofmacro
terrainthatcontaintheMainServiceRoutes(MSRs)alongwhichinsurgentsplantedIEDsandemplacedSAFambushes.Thesewerethelong-haultacticalmovementroutesforwhichtheMRAPwasprimarilyintended.”(Gayl,p90)G-BOSSwasneverrealizedasanAOR-widecapability.TheG-BOSSsystemswerenevernetworkedintoanAOR-widecapabilitybecauseIIMEFdecidedthattheydidnotdesirethatcapability.TheyvaluedthecapabilityofGBOSSwhereatowerhadlocalvisibilityandcouldbenetworkedwithotherlocaltowers.TheGBOSScapabilitythatwasvaluedwasthelocalISRforthelocalCommander,notaMNF-Wwidenetworkedsystem.
AGBOSStowergenerallyhadthecapabilityto“see”the5kilometercircumference
aroundFOBs.Oftentimestheycouldseefurtherdependingonterrainandweather.AlmosteveryGBOSStowerhadblindspotswherebuildingsorterrainobstructedthefieldofview.TheFOBsprovidedlocalsecurityforthetowersandthetowersprovidedsecurityintheheaviestIEDareasaroundtheFOBs.GBOSSwasusedawayfromtheFOBsaswellandoftencoveredtheMSRs.MSRsecurity,however,wasnottheprimaryfocusofGBOSS.NeitherwasittheprimaryareawhereMRAPwasintendedforuse. Gayl’scontinuedfailuretoappreciatethetacticalISRcapabilitiesofRAIDandC-RAMarediscussedintheG-BOSSChapter.
InadditiontoGBOSS,Gaylfailedtoappreciatethetacticalsignificanceoffieldinganunsafedazzleroncivilians.Gayl’sfailuretoappreciatethedangerofhisrecommendedlaserdazzlersolutionisaddressedinthelaserdazzlerchapter.Gayl’sDDR&Ebriefdemonstratedseveraltechnicalsolutionsthatwouldhavehadtobemodifiedinordertoworktacticallysuch
Gayl’spoortacticalanalysiscoloredthediscussionabouthowmaterialsolutionsansweredMarinetacticalneeds.
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asoff-leashattackdogs(insufficientcontrolaroundcivilians),remotecontrolledtrucks(insufficientabilitytocontrolontwisting/roughroads),andlasers(airspacecontrol).AllwerecitedbyGaylaspartofthesuiteofsystemsthattheMEFwasdeniedduetocombatdevelopers.Someofthesystemsweretechnicallyunsound,butothersrequired“tacticaldevelopment”beforebeingfielded.
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12B2-MARINECORPSEFPEFFORTS
GaylmakesseveralincorrectconclusionsabouttheEFPthreatinMNF-Wandthe
MCCDCresponsetothisthreat.TheseconclusionsreflectabasicmisunderstandingofjointwarfareandthejointnatureoftheC-IEDfight.TheArmorChapteraddressesthedifferenttypesofthreatsandthevehiclescapableofdefeatingthem.ThissectionaddressestheMCCDCresponsetoEFP.
GaylincorrectlystatesinseverallocationsthattheEFPthreatwasdestinedforusein
MNF-W:• “Specifically,MRAPswereurgentlyneededtomitigateunder-bellyIEDsthathad
alreadyappearedinMNF-WaswellaspreparefortheappearanceofEFPs.”(Gayl,pviii)
• “Theknownthreatsin05havebeendocumentedearlierinthiscasestudy.Theyincludedboththeunderbelly,centerlinethreatfromburiedIEDsaswellastheexistenceofanprobableproliferationofEFPsthroughouttheITO.”(Gayl,p116)
• “TherequestedsolutionsetincludedanurgentrequestforprotectionagainstExplosivelyFormedPenetrators(EFP)(Referencesr.2.).”(Gayl,pvii)
• “MRAPwasintendedtorespondtoagrowingIEDemergencyandtheappearanceofmorelethalthreatssuchasdeeplyburiedcenterlinedevicesandEFPs.”(Gayl,p29)
• “TheemploymentofExplosivelyFormedProjectiles(EFP)elsewhereintheIraqiTheaterofOperations(ITO)wasknowntoIMEF(Fwd)andtheirappearanceinMNF-Wwaspredicted(Referencesr.5.,c.1.,a.15,anda.16.).”(Gayl,pviii)
Gaylcannotdemonstratethatthepredictedthreatevermaterialized.TherewereseveralerroneousnewsreportsofEFPsusedagainstMarines,butGaylfailedtoproduceconcreteevidencethatEFPsmaterializedasthepredictedthreathecites.TheEFPattackswereasignificantthreatfortheArmyandmanynewsreportsandDODstatementstracedEFPcapabilitiesbacktoIran.Asstatedinthepress,thisexplainsEFPuseinpredominantlyShiiteareascontrolledbytheArmy.
MRAPcapabilityinrelationtoEFPwassooncommenteduponinthepress:“Newmilitary
vehiclesthataresupposedtobetterprotecttroopsfromroadsideexplosionsinIraqaren'tstrongenoughtowithstandthelatesttypeofbombsusedbyinsurgents,accordingtoPentagondocumentsandmilitaryofficials.Asaresult,thevehiclesneedmorearmoraddedtothem,accordingtoaJanuaryMarineCorpsdocumentprovidedtoUSATODAY.”(VandenBrook,p1)VandenBrookstatesthatMRAPswerenotsufficienttowithstandEFPattackswithoutadd-onarmor.
GaylfailedtoestablishacoherentMRAPEFPargument,nevertheless,continuedtocriticizeMCCDCforthelackofanEFPsolution.Inreality,andunbeknownsttoGayl,MCCDCwasinvolvedwiththewholeofDODinestablishingEFPsolutions.
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Gayl’srepeatedstatementofrequirementforananti-EFPcapabilitydoesnotmatchhisofferedsolutionoftheMRAP.EveryvarietyofMRAPwasvulnerabletoEFP.ThisacknowledgedfactwaslargelyignoredbyGaylandthepress(despiteVandenBrook’sarticle).
Eventhe2005HejlikUUNSacknowledgedthefailureofMRAP-typevehiclesagainstthe
requirementtodefeatEFP.Gaylquotesthe2005HejlikUUNSneedforaugmentationtoMRAP-typevehiclesasstated:
• “capableofhavingadditionalarmor/standoffscreensattachedtoincreasetheprotectiontopredestinateanddefeattheprimarykillmechanismsofEFPs...”(Gayl.p119)
• “2KnownthreatsinFebruary2005includedEFPswhichwerespecificallydiscussedintheUUNS,i.e.MRAPvehicles:“...mustbecapableofhavingarmor/stand-offscreensattachedtoincreasetheprotectiontopredestinateanddefeattheprimarykillmechanismsofexplosivelyformedpenetrators…”(Gayl,p63)
GaylframestheHejlikUUNSasfollows:“InordertomitigatetheIEDthreatIMEF(Fwd)
submittedasolution-specificneedforaCommercial-Off-The-Shelf(COTS)4thgenerationarmorMRAPcapability.TherequestedsolutionsetincludedanurgentrequestforprotectionagainstExplosivelyFormedPenetrators(EFP)(Referencesr.2.).Inspiteoftheall-aroundsuperiorprotectionofCOTSMRAP(Referencesp.1.andp.2.)combatdevelopersdidnotfulfilltheIMEF(Fwd)UUNS.”(Gayl,pvii)Gayliscorrectinstatingthatthecapabilitytodefeat“theprimarykillmechanismofEFPs”wasspecificallyrequested.Gaylalsostates:“5TheMRAPUUNScalledforaspecificCOTSvehiclewithadesignandMRAPname-associationthatwaswellknowntoMarineCorpsleadershipinearly2005.TheBuffalo,Cougar,andRG-31alreadyfieldedinIraqbytheMarinesforengineersatthattimewereunambiguouslyknownasMRAPsandwerethespecificmaterialsolutionsoughtintheUUNS,asverifiedbyLtColRoyMcGriff,theauthorofthedocumentinterviewedinUSATODAY16July2007.”(Gayl,p64)Gayl’ssolutiondidnotfulfilltheHejlikUUNSrequirements.Thesevehiclesdidnothavethecapabilitytodefeat“theprimarykillmechanismofEFPs”yetGaylclearlyoffersthemasthesolutiontotheUUNS.Theytoodidnot“fulfilltheIMEF(Fwd)UUNS”.Theylackedthe“EFPdefeatcapability”thatrequireddevelopment.Gayl’ssolutionofBuffalo,CougarandRG-31didnotaddresstheneedheidentifies:EFPdefeat.M1114didnotdefeatEFP,butneitherdidMRAP-typevehicles.
GaylthencontinuesthiscontradictionbycritiquingthelackofdevelopmentofthepredetonationscreensrequiredtodefeatsomeEFP:
• “Mostsignificantly,thisprocessdeviationpreventedtheinitiationofthedevelopmentofEFPpredestinationstand-offscreensspecificallyrequestedintheUUNS.”(Gayl,px)
• “Asanexampleoflackingurgency,2006e-mailcorrespondencebetweenIMEF(Fwd),MARCENT,andMCWLrevealedthattheCDIBdidnotforwardtheunfulfilledMRAPUUNStoMCWLfortechnologicalconsideration(Referencee.2.).Thishadsignificantimplicationsin2007,asnoUSMCinvestmentwasinitiatedbyMCWL,ONR,orSYSCOMtofindatotaldefeatsolutionfortheexplosivelyformedpenetrator(EFP)threatthatBGenHejlikhadspecificallyhighlightedinhis17Feb05UUNS.USMCdid
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notseriouslybegintoinvestinanMRAPEFPsolutionuntilafterUSATODAY’spublicationofMRAP’svulnerability,eventhoughinsurgentswereawareofthisvulnerability(Referencep.11.,a.13.andotherreferences).AsadirectconsequencelargenumbersofMRAPsarebeingfieldedtoIraqin2007withoutEFPprotectionbecauseamaterialsolutionforthatthreathasnotyetbeensufficientlymaturedduetoanewstartdelayofwellovertwoyears.”(Gayl,p31)
• “Asonepieceofclearevidence,noUSMCEFPprotectioninitiativeswerebegunintheUSMCS&TProgramoratMCWLasaresultoftheUUNS.”(Gayl,p73)
WhileGaylcontradictshimself,thefactremainedthattherewasaneedforEFPdefeat
shouldthatthreatmaterializeinMNF-W.TheMarineCorpswastheleadintheprocurementoftheMRAPasaresponsetounderbodyattacks.TheunderbodyattackdevelopedasthemainthreatinMNF-WwhiletheEFPattackdevelopedasaseriousthreatelsewhereinIraq.Assuch,theArmywastheServicemostimpactedbytheEFP.Inaddition,theJointforceandcoalitionwereimpactedbyEFP. TheArmyandbyextension,theJointForcerequiredasolutiontoEFP.TheresponsewasadedicatedS&TefforttoaddressEFP.Army,JIEDDO,DARPA,IndustryandotherswereallworkingtoestablishanEFPsolution.Theseorganizationshadbilliondollarbudgetsandexpertsinthefield.TheyweredevotingthetimeandeffortneededtodeveloptheaforementionedcapabilitygapinEFP.CommonsensedictatesthatasArmySoldiersbecamecasualtiesfromEFPandtheDOD/Joint/Industryresponded,theMarineCorpswouldtakeadvantageoftheirefforts.MCWLwasworkingwiththeseorganizationswhohadvastlysuperiorbudgetsandcapabilitycomparedtoMCWLwhosebudgetwasinthemillionsrange.MCWLsatonboardsandliaisedwiththemainDODcounter-EFPefforts.MCWLdidnotknowabouttheEFPrequirementinthe2005HejlikUUNS,yetremainedinvolvedintheEFPsolution.MCWLrealizedthatEFPhadthepotentialtomigratetoMNF-WsoMCWLandtheMarineCorpsremainedhighlyengagedwhilestilldeferringtotheArmywhowaslosingSoldierstoEFPs.ThisauthorforwardedGayl’sattemptedsolutiontotheseorganizations(itwasrejectedastechnicallyunfeasible). Gaylmisleads:“Itisequallysignificantthat,independentofthebasicvehiclearmorsolutionissue,thereisnoevidencethatanyconcurrentanalysisorS&TnewstartinitiativeswerecommissionedbyMCCDCtoaddresstheEFPthreat.EFPprotectionwasspecificallyrequestedintheMRAPUUNSasitwasaknownthreatatthetime.”(Gayl,p74)“Concurrentanalysis”and“S&T”wasaconstantfocusforEFPdefeatatMCWL.TheywereorganizedthroughtheArmy,DARPA,JIEDDO,Industryandothers.Gaylcontinuestomislead:“LtGenMattisalsospokeoftheevolvingnatureofIEDattackswhenhewasinterviewedbytheNewsHouronMRAP.LtGenMattisservedasDC,CDIin2005.Thequestiononecannowposeis:sinceDC,CDIwasawareoftheevolvingthreatwhywastherenoimmediateinvestmentinthedefeatofEFPsasrequestedintheMRAPUUNS?TheEFPthreatwasknown,andasarmorimprovedEFPemploymentwouldreasonablybeexpectedtoincreasebasedonknowninsurgentpatterns.”(Gayl,p74)Thisstatementisnotonlymisleadingbutalsonottrue.There
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wassignificantinvestmentinEFPdefeatandtheMarineCorpsoftenhadavoteinthedisbursementofthesefunds.
Gayl’sfailuretoappreciatetheJoint,DOD,andindustrialeffortsassociatedwithEFPdefeatpromptedthisfalsehood:“MRAPs,thougharrivingyearslate,aresavinglivestodayduetoSECDEFandCongressionalinsistenceonspeed.EFPprotectioncanbespiraledinwhenmature,asperthecurrentMRAPProgramplan.ButtheMarineCorpscombatdevelopersneedtoanswerforthisEFPprotectiondevelopmentshortfall,aswellastheMRAPUUNSshelving.EFPprotectionshouldbe3yearsmorematurethanitistoday,basedonMRAPUUNSdevelopmentinitiation.EFPprotectionwouldbenefitallvehicles,whetherMRAP,MTVR,LAV,AAV,LVS,MAK-UAH,orM1114,andforallServicesintheITO.Unfortunately,aswithMRAPvehicles,EFPanalysisanddevelopmentbyUSMChasbecomeanotheremergency,andoneeffectivelyoutofsynchwiththefieldingofMRAP.”(Gayl,p74)GayliscorrectinthatEFPprotectioncanbespiraledinwhenmature.Aseventswouldshow,thiswasthecorrectapproachfortheMarineCorpswhichhad“athreat”fromEFPsthatdidnotmaterialize.ThefalsehoodisthattherewasnoEFPdevelopmentforthreeyears.EFPdevelopmentwasongoingduringthesethreeyearsandbecameaprioritywhenEFPuseincreased.Gayl,astheAdvocateS&TOfficer,shouldhavebeenawareofEFPdevelopment.
Finally,Gayl’sEFPanalyticfailureiscompoundedbyhisfailure,astheAdvocateS&TOfficer,tooffersolutionsduringthetimeframewherehecriticizestherestoftheMarineCorps.Gaylrecommends:“IftheIGMCweretoreviewthisMRAPcasestudy,morediscoveryconcerningMCCDC’sanalysisandhandlingoftheEFPthreatwouldprobablyyieldusefulinformationregardingcombatdevelopmentchallengesasawhole.”(Gayl,p74)MCCDC’shandlingoftheEFPthreatwastoparticipateinandfullysupportandengagewiththevastDODEFPeffort.IfEFPhadmaterializedinMNF-WinthewaythatithadinotherareasoftheITO,thentheMarineCorpscouldspiralinavailableEFPsolutions.Gayl’smyopicviewofcombatdevelopmentcombinedwiththelimitedresearchheconductedforhisstudycausedhimtofailatseverallevelsinhisEFPanalysis.
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12B3-MAKANDM1114
TheMAKandthem1114wererequestedbyIMEF,IIMEFandMARCENT.Bothofthese
effortswerecoordinatedatthehighestlevelsoftheMarineCorps.TheywerecoordinatedwithintheDODandtheywerebriefedtoCongressonmultipleoccasions.
LtGenAmos,anattendeeatthe2005EOS,briefedCMC:“…butIcantellyouthatthe
decisiontobuy1114'sbytheCMCwaswellthoughtoutanddiscussedthoroughlyatanEOSinmid05.ThisUNNSwassentininFeb05...laterthatspring/summerGenHageeagreedatanEOSthathewouldreplace100%ofalltheaterMAK'dHMMWVswithwhathecalled"theGoldStandard,"...theM1114.”Hecontinued:“Welookedatthethreatin05anddeterminedthatthe1114'sweretheanswer...asthethreatratchededupin06wechangedourtackandagreedthattheMRAPswerethewaytogo.”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2006)BGenKellyconfirmed:“Idon'tknowanythingabouttheallegedMajGenHejlikUUNSrequest,butdoknowthatalltheearlyrequestsfromIMEF(MajGenZilmerandNeller)forMRAPwerepurelyforthebigvehiclesforuseinEOD/sideoftheroadIEDclearing.Westillhadnotseenanyrealnumberofunderbodyattacksuntilthe1114sbeganarrivingintheaterinlargequantities,andmytheoryisthebadguysnoticedtheeffectivenessof1114sanddecidedtolookforanotherwaytogetatthevehicle'soccupants.”(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2006)BGenKellycorrectlynotedthem1114capabilitywaspurchasedforsideblastattackswhichweretheprimarytypeofattackatthetime.Thepurchaseofthem1114wasareasoneddecisionbytheleadershipoftheMarineCorps.
ThepurchaseofMAKandm1114swasbriefedtoCongressbyACMC:“Wehave
determinedthattheM1114/M1116Up-ArmoredHMMWV(UAH)isthebestavailable,mostsurvivableassetthatmeetsourevolvingvehicleunderbodyprotectionrequirements.”(Nyland,p1)ThisbriefoccurredinJune2005,wellafterthesubmissionoftheFebruary2005HejlikUUNS.Itwasalsoafterthe2005EOS.ItwasadecisionthoroughlycoordinatedwithbothIandIIMEFandCongress.
Gaylattemptstolayblameonup-armorPORAdvocateson-siteinQuantico:“Thiswasa
toppriorityPORatQuantico–SYSCOMhadapparentlypurchasedhugequantitiesofsteelforthiseffortandcontractshadalreadybeenlet–reprogramminginordertofundtheCOTSMRAPsrequestedintheUUNSwouldhaveguttedandperhapscancelledthisandothervehicleprograms–theneedforCOTSMRAPoftheoperatorslocatedthousandsofmilesfromQuanticohadnochanceofwinningoutagainstthesurvivalinstinctsoftheup-armorPORAdvocateson-siteinQuantico.”(Gayl,p37)ThePORadvocatesweresimplycarryingouttheordersoftheseniorleveloftheMarineCorps.Thepurchaseofthem1114andMAKwerecoordinatedacrosstheMarineCorps.
GaylfailstodiscussthattheMAKandm1114werepriorityUUNSrequestsfrombothIandIIMEF.TheIandIIMEFrequestsforthesesystemsweresupportedacrosstheExecutivelevelintheMarineCorps.
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Gaylalsoimpliedthatfundsweremisused:“Thisstatement[MAKupdatetoCongress]
confirmedthattheFY05SupplementalhadindeedbeenreceivedbytheUSMC,butthatitwasnotemployedforthepurposethatthewarfightershadexpresslyrequested,namelythepurchaseof4thgenerationCOTSMRAPs.”(Gayl,p39)Thewarfightersspecificallyrequested,coordinatedanddesiredbothMAKandm1114.Theplantopurchasem1114wasspecificallybriefedtoCongress(Nyland).
Thesevehiclesremainedvulnerabletounderbodyblast,butthatwasnotthemaintype
ofattackatthetime.“(2)CG,IMEF(Fwd)wasawarethattheM1114andMAKup-armoredHMMWVsremainedvulnerabletotheknownunderbellyIEDthreat,aswellastoEFPs.”(Gayl,p119)TheawarenessofvulnerabilitytounderbodyandEFPattackwascommonplace.TheunderbodythreatmaterializedforMNF-WbuttheEFPthreatdidnot.Atthetime,however,themaintypeofIEDattackwasasideattackagainstwhichthem1114wasveryeffective.IandIIMEFsupportedthebuyofMAKandm1114becauseofitssideattackdefeatcapabilities.IMEFthenshiftedtosupportMRAPoncetheunderbodythreatgrew.
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12B4-PROOFOF“PUSHBACK”
Pushbackisagenerictermoftenusedbythosewhocannotmakeaconcreteaccusation.Gaylmakesuseofthisgenerictermonseveraloccasions:
“Itisnoteworthythatduringtheconductofhis2002-2003thesisresearchMajMcGriffcontinuouslyencounteredpush-backfromoperatorsatalllevels,bothenlistedandofficer,whenpresentedwiththeMRAPidea.Asifconditionedwithasenseoffutility,hisaudiencessharedacommonfirstresponsethat1)theMRAPideawasunrealisticbecausetheMarineCorpswouldnotnorcouldnotafforditand2)theacquisitionsystemwouldcertainlyrejectMRAPsbecauseitwassomethingnewthatdifferedfrom/wasoutsideofestablishedProgramsofRecord(PORs).ThissamesenseofprocurementandprocessfutilitypersistedevenwhiletheirwarfighteraudiencesagreedthattheMRAPmadeoperationalcommonsense.”(Gayl,p5)MajMcGriffsubmittednoUUNS.AsastudentinaschoolhewaspartoftheyearlyinfluxofOfficersintoQuanticotoattendvariousclasses.Hispaper,whilepotentiallycorrect,existedinaforumthatdidnotmakedecisions.Furthermore,Quanticocouldnotmakeadecisiontocommenceabilliondollarprogrambasedonapaperfromastudentinschool.Inthiscase“pushback”isappliedtoastudentinschool.
“BasedonthedateddocumentsfromwithintheMCCDCneedsanalysisandrecommendationprocessesnotedabove,itisclearthattherewasaconcurrentanddeterminedpushbackfromMCCDCmiddlemanagementandSMEsinvolvedintheUUNSevaluationprocess.”(Gayl,p41)GaylmakesthisobservationbasedonMCCDCactionafterJune2005.ThisobservationrelatestotheHejlikUUNSsubmittedinFebruary2005.ThepushbackGaylreferencesthereforeoccurredbetweenFebandJune2005.
PriortoJuneof2005,thefollowingnon-“MCCDCmiddlemanagement”eventsoccurred
(accordingtoGayl):• ACMCtestimony• MCCDCstaffingcommentsontheUUNS• IGMCreport• The2005ESB• AdvocatecommentsontheUUNS.
Inaddition,theExecutiveoff-siteandstaffingexternaltoMCCDCoccurred.AccordingtoGayl,the“MCCDCmiddlemanagerpushback”hadthecapabilitytotrumptheopinionsoftherestoftheseorganizationswhichalsoconsideredMRAP.
Gayl’sover-useoftheterm“pushback”givestheimpressionthattherearefactssupportinghisallegations.Therearenot.Inmanycases“pushback”isattributedtoanamelesspersonorun-citedopinion.Thefailuretoprovideinformationsurroundingthe“pushback”reflectspoorlyresearchedopinionsbeingmanifestedasfact.
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“JimHampton,nowaretiredcolonel,questionswhythePentagonandCongressdidn'tdomoretokeepthetroopssafe."Ihavecolleagueswhosaypeopleneedtogotojailoverthis,andinmymindtheydo…"Thiswell-researchedUSATODAYarticlerevealedahistoryofwiderDoDawarenessofandpushbackonMRAPthatwasoccurringconcurrentlywiththeMarineCorps’ownMRAPexperience.”(Gayl,p58)TheUSATODAYarticlewaspoorlyresearched.ItreliedonGaylinformationandwasoneofmany“GaylquotingthepressquotingGayl”events.Thisaccusationofpushback,andtheopinionthatthosepushingbackwereagainsttroopsafetyandshouldgotojailisirresponsibleopiniondeliveredfromapointofignorance.
“ItisinterestingthatArmyfollowedUSMC’sleadonallaspectsofMRAP,fromearlypush-backtolaterparticipationintheMCSC-ledJointProgram.”(Gayl,p58)ThisuseofthetermpushbackexpandsitsparameterstobeyondtheMarineCorpsbyincorporatingtheArmy.Onceagain,thetermpushbackisnotdefinedforitsapplicationbytheArmy.
ScanEagle(SE)isaUAV.Gaylstates:“WhentheJRACoffertofundaUSMC-executedexpansionoftheSEcapabilitydefinedintheJUONS,combatdeveloperspushedback,inspiteofthewarfighterurgentneed.”(Gayl,p94)Thisdefinitionofpushback,onceagainundefinedappliestoadifferentsystem.Thisundefinedpushbackbyundefinedcombatdevelopersisalsoportrayedasagainstthebestinterestofthewarfighters.
“(13)BetweenMarandJun05,MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperspushedbackontheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNStoavoidreprogrammingresourcesfromfavoredSTOM,MV-22/CH-53transportable,andlegacyHMMWV/MAKvehicleprograms.”(Gayl,p120)Gayl’sconclusionpointnumber13supposesthattherewaspushbacktoavoidreprogramming.ReprogrammingtosupportabilliondollarshiftinfundswouldhavetobeapprovedattheMROCifnotbytheCMC.MROCmemberswerebriefedonMRAP.Inthisuseofthetermpushback,MCCDCandMCSCcombatdevelopersaresupposedtohavebeenabletodeterminetheapprovalandeventualsourcesforfundingapotentialreprogramming.ThisuseofthetermpushbackisappliedtothethoughtprocessofMCCDCandMCSCcombatdevelopersabsentanyinterviewsoremailsofsaiddevelopers.
Gayl’suseoftheterm“pushback”leadsthereaderinmanydirections.“Pushback”appearstomeananundefinedandunsubstantiatedopinionofGaylonthepositionofvariousun-interviewedMCCDCofficials.Gaylidentifiesbynameofficialsinportionsofhisstudy,however,“pushback”officialsremainnameless.
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12B5-NOTINVENTEDHERE-THEREAL“DIRTYLAUNDRY”
The“notinventedhere”(NIH)mindsetpreventsthebesttechnicalsolutionsfrombeingadvancedinfavoroflessersolutionsinventedbythosewhoareinapositiontodecidewhichsolutiontouse.Itisamindsetthatisdetrimentaltothecombateffectivenessoftheoperatingforcesandleadstocasualties.TheNIHmindsetwasnotafactorintheMarineCorpsdecisionstoequipwithMRAP.FranzGaylwasnotafactorintheMarineCorpsdecisiontoequipwithMRAP.TheNIHmindset,however,wasthekeyissuecreatingdiscordbetweenGayl,IMEFG9andMCCDC.ThecontinuedillwillestablishedwhileGaylwasincountryisthereasonthathecontinuedhisanti-MCCDCtiradewhenhereturnedtoCONUS.ThecombinationofGayl’sNIHmindsetcombinedwiththeIMEFG9NIHmindsetcreatedthehostilitybehindGayl’scriticismoftheMarineCorps’combatdevelopment.MRAPwassimplyanopportunitytocomplainthatpresenteditselftoGayl.
Gaylpointsout:“Afterall,iftheurgentneedssubmittedbyoperationalforcesaretoleadtoeffectiveandrealisticsolutionstheymustbethoroughlyresearchedbySME’sfamiliarwithboththeoperationalchallengesandmaterialtrade-space.McGriffandDeWetbothhelpedtobalancethoseprerequisites,astheyhadsufficientseparationfromthefighttodeliberatelyanalyzethestrengthsandweaknessesofalloptionsinclosecoordinationwiththeMarinesinthefight.Atthesametime,thedraftUUNSwasextensivelystaffedthroughoutIMEF(Fwd)toinsurethatitwasacollaborativeeffortandvalidatedatalllevelsoftechnicalandoperationalinsight.ThistranscontinentalteameffortatUUNSandJUONSformulationhasbeenstandardpracticeinOIFandOEFtosynthesizethemostcurrenttechnicalknowledgewiththemostcurrentoperationalexperienceinordertoinitiatethemostusefulmaterialsolutionsforthefight:”(Gayl,p10-11)OneofGayl’sthemesisthatthesupportingestablishmentignoredtheforcesincombat.Hearguesagainstthatthemeinthisparagraphashenotesthecombinationofoperationalneedwiththeknowledgeofthematerialtradespacepossessedbythosewhohad“separationfromthefight”.Itisacorrectdynamicinthatthoseincombatarefocusedonthefightanddonothavethewherewithal,time,orknowledgetoresearchmaterialissues.TheremaybesomeresidualexpertiseinadeployedMEF,butthematerialexpertiseoutsidethedeployedMEFdwarfsthematerialexpertisewithinthedeployedMEF.OncethedeployedMEFstartsdevelopingmaterialsolutionsforitsownneedsandcoordinating/contractingwithindustryforthedeliveryofsaidsystems,thepotentialforconflictarises.ThedeployedMEFisnotcapableoffulfillingitsownneedsinacompetentfashion.ThatiswhythesupportingestablishmentsofeveryServicehaveorganizationsthathave“sufficientseparationfromthefighttodeliberatelyanalyzethestrengthsandweaknessesofalloptionsinclosecoordinationwiththeMarines(Soldiers/Sailors/Airmen)inthefight.”(Gayl,p10)IMEFG9failedtoadheretothisseparationandstartedactingastheirownprocuremententity.ThiscausedIMEFtodeveloptheirownmaterialsolutionsand
GaylwasnotinvolvedinMRAPuntilaftertheentireMarineCorps,toincludetheCMC,decidedtopursueMRAPs.HisrealcomplaintwasthattherestoftheMarineCorpsandJointcommandsdidnotsupporthiswidevarietyofmaterialsolutions.
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advocateforthembasedontheirownverylimitedcapabilities.OnceIMEFofferedasolution,bettersolutionswereviewedascontradictingtheneedsofthewarfighter.TheNIHmentalitydevelopedwithIMEFinsistingonitsownsolutionsforitsstatedneeds.
Gayldrawsanaiveconclusioninstating:“Whatwillbeseenisthatthedireneedfor
MRAPs,howevernon-optimaltheymaybeforallfutureoperations,wastheresultofanemergencycreatedbycombatdevelopersinthattheyhadlikewiserefusedoperatorrequestsforthetoolsofCOIN.”(Gayl,p46)The“toolsofCOIN”requestsfromtheoperatorsnumberedinthethousands,ifnotinthetensofthousands.Newequipment,experimentalequipment,modificationstoequipment,increasesinnumbersofequipmentwereallrequestedonaregularbasis.Intruth,Gaylisnotcomplainingabout“operatorrequests”writlarge.HeislargelycomplainingabouttheS&T“Gaylrequests”.
Forexample,theUUNStrackersentbyColOuztson5/9/2006containedoverfour
hundredentriesfromboththeArmyandMarineforcesinAnbar.Eachonerequiredresolution.Thislistofover400wasnotthefulllistrequiredtoprovide“thetoolsofCOIN”.ThevastmajorityofthetoolsofCOINdon’tevenappearonthislist.Ammunition,firstaidequipment,food,concertina,helicoptersandeveryothertoolofCOINhadtobeprovidedtothewarfighter.Eachelementwasunderconstantdevelopmentandrefinement.Theywerealsounderconstantcoordination.TheprovisionofthetoolsofCOINwasafullServiceeffortandwasofascopeunrepresentedbyGayl.Gayl,however,incorrectlyrepresentedhisinterestsasthefullspectrumof“toolsforCOIN”.COINrequiresmuchmorethanthetoolsGayldiscusses.
Gayl’sDDR&EpresentationrepresentedS&Tissueswithwhichhewasinvolved.The
issueswithwhichhewasnotinvolvedarenotrepresented.ThisisarepresentationoftheNIHmindset.OnlyGayl’sissuesmakethecut.
OfGayl’sissues,themajorityareissuesthatwerealreadybeingworkedbutdidnot
incorporateGayl’sselectedequipment.Forexample,theIMEFGBOSStowerconfigurationwasinferiortothealreadyexistingRAIDtower,yetIMEFG9insistedontheirweldedtogethertowereffort.IMEFG9GBOSStowerdeficiencieswerenotedinsidebysidecomparison,sidebysidetesting,vendorcomparisonandusercomparison.IMEFG9continuedtoinsistontheirin-houseconfigurationdespiteavastlysuperiorproductalreadyinexistenceasaprogramofrecord.EvenbeforeGBOSSwasanUUNS,MCCDCwasestablishingaGBOSS-likecapabilityat29Palmsfortraining(Baczkowskiemaildtd3/20/2006).
GaylpresentedIMEFG9ideasastechnicallyfeasibleandoriginal.Manyoftheideas
werealreadybeingworkedbyteamsofphysicistsand/orexpertsinthefield.Gayl,however,remainedcomfortabledemandinghistechnicalsolutionandcriticizingthosealreadyinexistence.Hisbreadthoftechnicalinputincluded:
• LaserInducedPlasmaChannelElectrostaticDischarge• LayersofBallisticFabricandLiquidArmorforEFP• 20kWIncoherentlyPhasedFiberLaser• CombinedFusedStereoscopicEO/IRSuiteWithNeuralNetMachineAssistant
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• SpeciallyTrainedISREquippedAttackDogstoSpoil/InterruptSniperAttacks(GaylDDR&EBrieffromMcCordemaildtd5/30/2007)
Unfortunately,hisbreadthoftechnicalknowledgedidnotextendasfarashisbreadthoftechnicalinput.Rejectionoftechnologicallyunattainablesuggestionsledtohostilityandaccusationsofnon-support.GaylfosteredtheNIHattitudeforequipmentthatwasunderdevelopment.HethoughtthatifhecoulddrawitupinanUUNS,thenIMEFshouldn’thavetowaitforMCCDCtoproduceit.Unfortunatelymanyofhissolutionsweresubstandardorunworkable.
MCWLwasoftentaskedwithdeterminingthetechnicalfeasibilityofthesesolutions.MCWLdidnotalwayshavethetechnicalexpertiseonstafftoanalyzethesesubmissionssoafullDODeffortwasrequired.DARPA,ONR,ArmyLabs,JIEDDOandothersputforthsolidanalysisoneveryUUNS/JUONSMCWLreceived.Manywereongoingresearchprojects.Ofthose,manyfailed.Some(lasercapabilities)arecomingtofruitiontoday(8yearslater).Some(airbornetargeteddirectedenergyinGayl’sPASDEW)haveyettocomeclose.YeteverytechnicalideainventedbyGaylwaspresentedbyIMEFG9asfeasibleorbetterthaneveryotherpotentialsolution.Gayl’sMobileAcousticShooterDetectionandNeutralizationSystem(MASDANS)andCognitionBasedElectromagneticPatternAnalysisSystemaregoodexamplesofhisNIHmentality.
“TheHMMWV-basedCounterSniperVehicle(CSV)developedbyMCWLwithoutinput
fromtheMEFwasdeterminedtobenon-survivable,andIMEF(Fwd)requestedthatMCWLnotdeploytheCSV(Referencer.16.andr.24.).IntheendtheC-BEMPASandMASDANSbothweresubmittedasUUNSsandJUONSs,andneitherwasdeliveredordeveloped.Ontheotherhand,theIEDvulnerableandunder-armedMCWLCSVwasdelivered,yetithadnooperationalneedbasisinanUUNS,JUONSorUNS.”(Gayl,p102)Gayl’scritiqueoftheMCWLexperimentalCSVdemonstratestheNIHmindset.Gaylwasincorrectinthat:
• TheCSVwasdeployedtoMNF-Wanddidsurvive.• S&Torganizationsregularlydeployassetsintocombatasafinaltest.MCWLalways
coordinatedeverydeploymentwiththeMEFcommandelement.• SomeofthesameequipmentwasusedinboththeMCWLeffortandtheMASDANS/C-
BEMPASeffort.Othercomponentsweresimilar.• TheoperationalneedwasestablishedinanUUNS/JUONS/UNS.Theoperationalneed
forCSVwasestablishedinanynumberofcountersnipertechnologyneedstoincludeMASDANS/C-BEMPAS.
• Gayl’spreferredsolutionwasproblematic.AfellowColonelfromMNF-Wlaterwrote“IdidanonsiteassessmentinCaliforniaofthetechnologyassociatedwithC-BEMPAS.Thepatternrecognitiontechnologycentraltothesystemisatbest5to10yearsawayfrommilitarytesting,muchlessemploymentinacombatenvironment(OIF12or13?).Itdoesworkwellinagrocerystorethough...maybeweshouldalerttheCommissarySystem.Additionally,40oftheopticsystemstheIMEF(Fwd)G-9selectedforC-BEMPASweredeliveredtoIIMEF(Fwd)recentlyandfoundtobeutterlyuselessfor
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anyapplicationonamovingvehicle.ThereisnostabilizationsystemfortheopticstheyconvincedtheMEFtospendhugedollarson.AccordingtoIIMEF(Fwd),theopticsystemscan'tevenbeusedforforceprotectionatECP'sastheylacktherange/opticalclaritytobeusedinafixedbasecapacity.IaskedtheG-9onnumerousoccasionsastohowheenvisionedmountingtheopticsystemontheHMMWV.Bottomlineisthattherewasabsolutelynoplanforintegrationbeyond,andIquote,"oh,theSEABEESwillbuildusamount."Bytheway,thissamephilosophyonthepartoftheG-9drovemuchoftheG-BOSSdeployment.C-BEMPASopticswerechosenovertheAT-FPchoiceforthermalopticsfromFLIR-RECON.AtleastthatthermalopticsystemhadbeenintegratedandtestedinFallujahbyaCplfrom1/25(evenifitwasjustducttapeandtieties).”(Bareemaildtd5/30/2007)ThisauthordeployedtoMNF-WseveralmonthslaterandwasabletoconfirmtheIMEFstaffmember’sobservations.Gayl’sdescriptioncreatestheimpressionthatMCCDCestablisheditsownneedsand
developedprogramsindependentofthedeployedMEF:“Thebalancehasbeenwrong,andshortoffundamental,verifiableinstitutionalchangeitwillremainwrong.Instead,thebalanceisclearlyinfavorofUSMCsupportestablishmentstaffvisionofprogrammaticexigencyandMCCDC-drivenpriorities,asopposedtowarfighter-drivenpriorities.”(Gayl,p61)Thisperceivedlackof“balance”wasindeedthesourceofthefrictionbetweenIMEFandthesupportingestablishment.PriortoGaylandtheassociatedMEFG9,balancewasachievedbytheMEFestablishingtheneedandMCCDCprovidingthematerialsolution(similarlytoGayl’sdescriptionofMcGriffinthesecondparagraphofthissection).MCSCdidnothavetheauthoritytocreateitsownneeds.MCCDCdidnothavetheabilitytocreateitsownneeds.Theprioritieswerecreatedbythewarfighter.TheonlyexceptionwasforresearchorS&T.Eventhen,MCCDCorganizationssuchasMCWLconductedexperimentationbasedonwarfighterpriorities.SeveralofGayl’sprojectsoutlinedinhisDDR&EpresentationwereMCWLexperimentsthatmaturedtoapointwheretheycouldbeturnedintoUUNSanddeployed.TheMEFthencreatedtheneedstatementandaskedforthealreadydevelopedproject.
Gayl’sproblemwithMCCDCwasthatMCCDCdidnotautomaticallyselectthematerial
solutionthatGaylwantedbasedonhisphonecallsandinternetresearch.Ifadifferentandbettertechnologysolutionwasavailabletoansweraneed,MCCDCselectedit.TheGBOSSandDazzlerchapterswillhighlightthemainpointsofcontentionwiththeIMEFG9NIHapproachtoequippingtheforce.TheseweretwoexamplesofbettertechnologicalsolutionsthatwerevehementlyopposedbyGaylandtheIMEFG9.
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12B6-MARCENTNOTNEGLIGENT
MARCENThadServiceComponentresponsibilitiesforthe2005HejlikUUNS.TheMARCENTCommanderwasinitiallytheCommanderMARFORPAC(LtGenGregson).UponthefullestablishmentofMARCENT,theCommanderofMARCENTbecameLtGenSattler.LtGenSattlerwastheCommandingOfficerofIMEFwhenhissubordinate,BGenHejlik,signedthe2005HejlikUUNS.LtGenSattler,inhisbilletasMARCENT,wasdirectlyresponsibletotheCommandantoftheMarineCorps.
Jankowski,aMARCENTstaffmemberwrote:“MARCENTfirstattemptedalargeMRAPprograminFeb2005undertheeffortsofLtColMcGriffandLtGenWallace“Chip”Gregson.McGriffwasaWarPlannerintheG-4(LogisticsBranch)andGregsonwastheMARCENTCommandingGeneralatthetime.Avarietyofspeciousargumentsandbureaucraticmaneuvers,completewithretroactiveexcuses,wereusedtodrownthe2005MRAPrequirement.”(Jankowski,p1)Whiletheterm“drown”meanslittle,onecansafelyassumethatitimpliessomesortoffinaldisposition.
Astheservicecomponentwithdefinedrolesandresponsibilities(byorderanddirective
MARCENThadHejlikUUNSrolesandresponsibilities),MARCENTwaseithernegligentinitsresponsibilitiestowardsthe2005HejlikUUNSorthe2005HejlikUUNSwasresolved.
Asseeninotherchapters,the2005HejlikUUNSwasindeedresolved.Jankowski,along
withGayl,makesseveralotherargumentsarguingthatthe2005HejlikUUNSremainedactive.Indoingso,Jankowskiunwittinglyimpliesthathisowncommand(MARCENT)wasnegligent.JankowskiwaslatetotheMRAPsequencesohisperceptionsofMARCENTactionsvsMCCDCactionsisskewed.
GaylandJankowskibothseemtoagreethattherewassomefunctionthatMARCENT
assumedfortheMRAPsequence.Gaylstates:“Realizingtheneedforhigherleveladvocacy,MARCENTquicklybecametheIMEF(Fwd)’soperationalchampionandtookthecauseofMRAPagain.”(Gayl,p46)MARCENTwasalwaysresponsibleforhigherleveladvocacyforallOIFforces.Thatincludedtheforcesin2005andin2006.In2005,thatadvocacywasexpandedasMARCENTbecameastand-aloneServiceComponent.Jankowski’sself-proclaimedheroicsinhisSmallWarsJournalarticlewassimplyMARCENTperformingtheirmission.Hewrote:“WhenMajGenJacksonreturnedfromAfghanistan,heorderedtheMARCENTstafftostudyMRAPs.Wesensedtheintensityinhisvoiceandknewwewereontosomethingveryspecial.WehadasensethatthisMRAPeffortwouldnotberoutine.Fromthatpointon,MARCENTofficersworkingonMRAPrequirementsforthewarfightersinIraqhadfireintheireyes.Thatmaysoundmelodramatic,butwecouldseetheimpactonthewareffortthesevehiclescouldhave.WewoulddefeattheobstructionistPentagonEstablishment.Wehad
IfGaylistobebelieved,andheisnot,thenMARCENTwasnegligentinitshandlingoftheHejlikUUNS.MARCENT,however,performedtheirmissionaccordingtoorderanddirectives.
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to.”(Jankowski,p1).IftheHejlikUUNSwasstillactive,thenwhywastheresomuch“new”energy.
Jankowskialsowrote:“InlateMay,atMajGenJackson’sdirection,Aldersonpresented
afullbriefonMRAPstoLtGenSattlerandMajGenJackson.”(Jankowski,p1)BythetimeofthisbriefMCCDCwasalreadyfullyinsupportofthedraftcopyoftheUUNSandwasworkingtomakeitjoint.MARCENThadyettogetasigneddraftoftheUUNS.TheHirschemaildated5/18/2006showsMCCDCperformingtheirmission.MARCENTwasalsoperformingtheirmission.ThedifferenceisthatJankowski’sportrayalofeventsmakesMCCDCofficialsouttobeobstructionistwhileMARCENTofficialsperformedwith“fireintheireyes”.Thestoryteller(Jankowski)getstoembellish,butthestudentofhistoryneedstobemorewedtofacts.
Thefactsare:• MARCENTperformedtheirmissioncorrectly• InorderforMARCENTtohaveperformedtheirmissioncorrectly,the2005Hejlik
UUNSwouldhavehadtohavebeenresolved.• The2005HejlikUUNSwasresolved• MARCENTthenperformeditsmissionwiththe2006MRAP-typevehiclerequests• MCCDCwasfullyinvolvedandsupportiveevenbeforeMARCENThadasigned
MRAP-typevehicleUUNSin2006
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12B7-IMEFG9NOTSUPPORTIVEOFJUONS
ThesubmissionofaJUONSvsanUUNShasbeenusedasanindicatorofdistrustof
MCCDCbyIMEF.Thisisanotherfalsehood.Gaylstates:“MARCENTcapabilitywarplannersstudiedMCCDC’s2005handlingoftheMRAPUUNSandrealizedthatMRAPwouldmostlikelynotbefavorablyreceivedatMCCDCifitwereagainsubmittedasaUSMCUUNS.CoordinationbetweenwarplannersandMCSCwasalsominimized,givenknowninstitutionaloppositiontoalargeurgentMRAPpurchase.Consequently,MARCENTwarplannerssupportedtheIMEF(Fwd)decisiontosubmitthefullMRAPcapabilitythroughtheJointchainintheformofanMNF-W-generatedJointUrgentOperationalNeedsStatement(JUONS).”(Gayl,p47)ContrarytoGayl’sopinion,MCCDChadbeenadvocatingforalargerroleforjointeffortsforoverayear.TheHirschemaildtd5/18/2006showsthatIMEForiginallysubmittedanUUNS(servicerequirement)and,ontherecommendationofMCCDC,changedittoaJUONS(jointrequirement).ThisemailshowsthatGayl’sassertionistotallyfalse.Gaylrepeatshisfabrication:“ItisnoteworthythattheCommander,MCSC(MajGenCatto)wasalreadyworkingonprocuringthe185JERRVsforIMEF(Fwd)usingJRAC(i.e.Joint/CIED)fundingasaresultofJRACJERRVJUONSapproval.MCCDCwashardlyaware,ifatallawareofMCSCactionswhichturnedouttobebeneficialforMARCENTandtheMEF(Fwd).TheworkaroundtoavoidMCCDCinvolvementinfieldingMRAPbyemployingthemoreresponsiveJUONS-JRACconnectionhadbeensuccessful.”(Gayl,p50)TheentiretyoftheMCCDCstaffwasworkingaspectsoftheJERRVrequestinbothaServicecapacityandajointliaisoncapacity.Awarenesswaswidespread.TheaddresseesontheHirschemailshowthedepthoftheinvolvementofMCCDC.ThecoordinationbetweenIMEFDCGandMCCDCisalsodemonstrated.ThisauthorandthestaffofMCWLanticipatedpotentialinvolvementwithJIEDDOandwerepreparingappropriately.
MARCENTalsoadvocatedforthejointprocessandColButter(MARCENT)indicatedthat
itwasactuallyMARCENTthatchangedtheUUNStoaJUONS:“Gentlemen,MARCENTconvertedtheMNF-WUUNSfor185JERRVstoaJUONS,whichwassubsequentlyvalidatedbyMNF-I.ItiscurrentlyatCENTCOMforapproval.”(ColButteremaildtd6/27/2006)BothMARCENTandMCCDChadworkedtogettheMRAP-typevehiclesubmittedthroughthejointprocess.
IMEFdidnotprefertheuseofJUONs.Forexample,theIMEFG9sentthefollowing
emailtoColOltmanatMCCDCandinfocopiedMARCENTandstaffmembersatbothMCCDCandIMEF:“Jeff,Iamgladwespokeonthephonetonight.MyleadershipdoesnotwanttogototheJUONSprocesswithG-BOSS.Wehaveyettoreceiveanymaterialsolutionfromthatvenue,ourfirstJUONSwentin10FEB2006.DespitewhatLtColChillmentioneditismorecomplicatedandtakesmoretime,theprocessisnotstackedinourfavor.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006)TheMEFG9confirmedinthisemailstringthattheCGIMEF(Fwd)didnotwantto
ContrarytoGayl’sstatements,IMEFpreferredworkingwithUUNSthroughQuanticomorethanusingJUONSthroughthejointsystem.
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usethejointprocessforGBOSS.IMEFhadtobecoaxedtousetheJUONsprocess.ThisemailoccurredinAug2006,onemonthafterthesecondMRAP-typevehiclerequest.TheIMEFreluctancetousethejointprocesswasconsistentthroughthesubmissionsofbothMRAP-typevehiclerequestsinMayandJuly.ThatreluctancecontinuedpastthisAugustemail.MCCDCadvocacyforthejointprocess,IMEFG9rejectionofthejointprocess,andMARCENTuseofthejointprocessallshowGayl’sstatementstobeutterfabrications.
Gaylcontinued:“CMCimmediatelyauthorizedalargeprocurementofMRAPs.Thus
empowered,IMEF(Fwd)immediatelysubmitteda2ndMRAPJUONSrequestfortheentirewarfighterneedatthattimeforallforcesoperatingunderMNF-Wcommand—Soldiers,Sailors,andMarines.”(Gayl,p47)ThefirstUUNSwasaJERRVUUNSthateventuallyturnedintoaJERRVJUONS.ThetermMRAPwasrediscoveredbetweentherequestfor185andtherequestfor1,000vehicles.CMCdidnothavetheauthoritytoauthorizealargeprocurementofMRAPsthroughtheJUONSprocess.TheCMChasnoJUONSauthorityasthisisajointprocess.
ThejointprocesswaspoorlyunderstoodbymanyintheMarineCorps.Thoseworking
withJIEDDOwereconstantlyattemptingtoeducatetheforceandusethejointsysteminordertogetjointfunding.MajMoore(MCCDC-MCWL)wasincontactwithMARCENTandadvocatingfortheuseofthejointprocesses.ThesediscussionsresonatedwithMARCENT,IMEFandIIMEFpersonnel.GaylquotesaIIMEFstaffmemberaddressingaMCWLliaison:“IbelievethiseffortistiedinwiththetalkswehadyesterdayaboutallthePurplemoneyavailableforCIED.”(Gayl,p50)TheMCWLliaisonwasreferringtoJIEDDOfundsforwhichMCWLwastheMarineCorpslead.MCWLwasattemptingtogetIMEFtousethejointprocessdespitetheirreluctance.Thesubjectofjointfundingwillbediscussedinalaterchapter,butthepreviousstatementsinGayl’sstudyabouttheJERRVandMRAPJUONSarefabricated.
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12B8GAYL’SMRAPNUMBERSDON’TADDUP
ThechangingnumberofMRAPsrequiredtellsthestoryofadevelopmentalrequirement
foranewtypeofequipment.Chapter10providesamoredetailedexplanationofthechangingrequirementforMRAP-typevehiclesleadinguptothe2006requirementof1,185vehicles.Thatsequencecontinuedfrom2006into2007.OneoftheclaimsGaylmakeswasthatthe2006MRAPrequirementwasverycloseinnumberstothe2005requirement.“Thetotalrequirementatthattimewas1,185vehicles,remarkablysimilartothe1,169vehiclecountfrom2005(Referencesr.8.andr.11.).”(Gayl,p47)Thereisnothingremarkableaboutthesimilarityinnumbers.
InFeb2005theHejlikUUNSwassubmittedwitharequirementfor1,169vehicles.The
UUNSwassatisfiedwithm1114sandtheUUNSrequirementwentbackdowntozero.Thenextrequestwasfor185vehicles.AfterdiscussionamongstMCCDC,MARCENT,IMEFandIIMEF,anotherJUONSwassubmittedforaneven1,000vehicles.Theanalysisbehindaddinganeven1,000vehicleswasunknown.Therequestfor185wassigned21May2006.Therequestfor1,000wassigned10July2006.Thetotalwasthen1,185andinnowaytiedtothe1,169requestfrom2005.Therequirementcontinuedtogrowthrough2006.
BGenAlles(MCWLCG)incongressionaltestimonystated,“TheapprovedUSMC
requirementis1022withanewrequestfromtheforcecommanderinIraqformore,uptotriplethecurrentrequirement,whichtheMarineCorpsiscurrentlyvalidating.”(Beyleremaildtd1/18/2007)Therequirementhadroughlytripledinapproximatelysixmonthsto3,700inJan2007.Hadtherebeenacontinuingrequirement,thenthenumberrequestedwouldhaveremained1,169orthenumber1,169wouldhaveshoweduponsomecalculusofMarinerequirements.Itdidnot.
Thenumber1,185wasnotlinkedto1,169.While1,185isanumberthatiscloseto
1,169,thecalculustoarriveat1,185innowayincluded1,169.Nordidthenumber1,169figureintoanycalculusintherequirementof3,700.TheHejlikUUNSrequestednumberwasirrelevant(aswastheHejlikUUNS)intheefforttoget185or1,185oranysubsequentnumberofMRAPs.
SimplemathshowsthattheHejlikUUNSwasnotafactorintheMRAP-typeneedsestablishedbyIMEFin2006.TherequestednumbershadnolinktotheHejlikUUNSnumberof1,169.
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12B9-BATTLEBUREAUCRACYATQUANTICO
WhiletherewascontentionbetweenIMEFG9andMCCDCoverseveralsystems,there
wasnocontentionoverMRAP.MCCDCwasevenmoreenthusiasticthanIMEFincreatingalargerdemandforMRAPdespiteGayl’sincorrectportrayals:“BasedonthedateddocumentsfromwithintheMCCDCneedsanalysisandrecommendationprocessesnotedabove,itisclearthattherewasaconcurrentanddeterminedpushbackfromMCCDCmiddlemanagementandSMEsinvolvedintheUUNSevaluationprocess.”(Gayl,p41)Gayl’sanalysisofthe2005documentsaswellashisconclusionareflawed.
Gaylalsomisleadswhileaddressingthe2006MRAPneed.“IMEF(Fwd)wasawareofthefactthatMCCDChaddisapprovedtheMRAPUUNSthatithadsubmittedearlyin2005.InsteadofbattlingwiththebureaucracyatQuantico,IMEF(Fwd)decidedtotrytheJointresourcingroute.”(Gayl,p49)ThebattlewiththebureaucracyforMRAPswasnonexistentforMRAP.MCCDCendorsedthenewMRAP-typevehicleUUNSwithenthusiasm.AsseenintheHirschemaildtd5/18/2006,itwasMCCDCthatstressedthejointresourcingroute.The“battle”wasdisagreementaboutothersystemssuchasGBOSS.GBOSSisdiscussedindepthinChapter15butthefollowingexampleillustrates“thebattlewiththebureaucracy”.
ThecamerathatIMEFwantedtomountonGBOSStowerswasthet3000.TheGBOSSsectionwillprovidemoredetail,butthenatureofthe“battle”canbecapturedinthefollowingexcerpt:“Asyoumayalreadybeaware,therearemanyatQuanticoandelsewherethatinsistourT3000swillbeunstablizedandthereforeareunsuitedtoG-BOSS.TheseotherfolkswouldratherinsistthattheStarSaphireiswhatisneededforG-BOSSduetogyrostabilization….IfthevoicesatQuanticocontinuetodoubttheunstablizedT3000ourabilitytobuyouradditionalcamerasisinjeopardy….Furtherdoubtswillbringevenfurtherdelays,andifIMEFFwdturnsoverbeforethisisresolved,itisingreatjeopardyofnothappeningatall.”(Allesemaildtd11/10/2006)Thisemailwasprovidedbythevendor.Thet3000wasunstabilized.AlsointhisemailwasaseriesofquestionsandanswersbetweenthevendorandIMEFG9.IMEFG9askedaboutgyro-stabilization“Didweorderthatinourbuy?”Theanswerwas“No”(thefactthatIMEFG9hadtoaskthisquestioninthefirstplacewillbediscussedintheGBOSSchapter).MCCDCwasfullyawareofthesystemsthatIMEFwantedtobuyandknewthattheyweren’tstabilizedandprovidedalessercapabilitytotheMarines.Thevendorsknewthattheyweren’tstabilizedandthereforelesscapable.DespitethepoorIMEFG9design,MCCDCwasanenthusiasticsupporteroftoweredcameraswellbeforeIMEFsubmittedaGBOSSneed(seeGBOSSchapter).IMEFremainedwedtothet3000cameraandMCCDCeventuallybowedtotheIMEFdesirefort3000s.
TherewasonlyoneMEFdeploymentwhereamajorstaffsectionthoughttherewasabattlewithMCCDCforsupportofthewarfighter.ThatMEFsectionwastheIMEFG9forthe2006deployment.Inreality,therewasnobattlewiththebureaucracyoutsideofthatstaffsectionforthatdeployment.
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MCCDC,despitethedisagreement,advocatedfort3000sinthejointfundingforums(JIEDDO).Thejointcommandsdisagreed.TheysawthedeficienciesoftheIMEFG9designandinsistedonthemorecapablecameras.GBOSSwasneverinjeopardyof“nothappening”.Gayl’shyperboledid,however,reflectthenatureofthe“battlewiththebureaucracy”.Anydisagreementonamaterialsolutionwasreflectedasnon-supportforthewarfighter.Gayl’sstudyindicatesacontentiousMRAPrelationship.WhiletherewascontentionforGBOSS,laserdazzlerandothersystems,therewasnocontentionoverMRAP.MCCDChabituallydefaultedtothebestsolutionforthewarfighter.Therewereequipmentdisagreements,butoncetheIMEFG9redeployed,thosedisagreementslessened/ended.
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12B10-BIZARRECLAIMTHATHEJLIKUUNSINTENTIONALLYKEPTFROMMROC
GaylimpliesthattheMROCdidnotknowabouttheMRAPUUNSashedidnothaveany
proofthattherewasaMROCDecisionMemorandum.Onceagain,hisassumptionsareincorrectandthereforehisconclusioniswrong.TheMROChadfullknowledgeoftheMRAPUUNS,andtheMRAPUUNSwasinaMROCDecisionMemorandum.“Theperceptionisthatadvicewasgiven(includingtheIGMCvisitresults)anddecisionsultimatelymade“behindcloseddoors.”ThereisnoknownMROCDecisionMemorandumonthisUUNS(wehavecheckedwiththeMROCSecretariat),inspiteofthefactthatithadanear-termresourceimplicationthatequaledorevenexceededUSMC’sothertoptierprogramssuchasEFVandevenOsprey.Intheendnohistoricaltrailotherthanafewpresentations,processdocuments,andaMCCDCinfopaperareknowntoexist.”(Gayl,p38)Gaylbelievedthatthiswasanimportantpoint.IftheleadershipoftheMarineCorpswasnotmakingthedecisionsonMRAP,thenthedecisionmakersmusthavebeenelsewhere.Gaylstatesthatthe“behindcloseddoors”decisionmakerswereco-conspiratorswiththeIGMCinkeepingtheMROCinthedark.Gayl’sallegationsareeasytoprovefalse.
TheDaschemailonMROCdtd10/20/2005containsMRAPintwoplaces.Onewaspart
oftheslidepresentation.BothwerepartoftheMROCDM.ItisunknownwhytheMROCSecretariatdidnotpointthisouttoGayl.
TheMROCwasbriefedasrequired.IfalloftheMROCmemberswerealreadybriefedon
MRAP,thenitisdoubtfulthatafullbriefwouldhavebeenpresentedattheMROC.TwoofthemembersoftheMROCwereattheESBwhereMRAP-typevehicleswerebriefed.AlloftheMROCmembersattendedtheEOSwhereMRAP-typevehicleswerebriefed.TheMarineCorpsleadershipunderstoodtheissueanddidnotneedafullbriefintheMROC.Nevertheless,everymemberoftheMROCwasprovidedwiththisMROCDMandthepresentation.AnyMROCmembercouldhaveimmediatelystoppedtheMROCtoaskaboutanyaspectofMRAP.
SomeofthecommentaryGaylusesisdeceptivesuchasthefollowing:“MuchofthehistoryoftheFeb05MRAPUUNSwasunknownatthattime,astheUUNShadapparentlynotbeenpresentedtotheMROCbyMCCDCandDC,CDIforaformaldecision.”(Gayl,p46)ItmaybetruethatMCCDCdidnotpresenttheUUNSwithastand-upbrieferpresentingpowerpointslidesattheMROCmeeting.TheUUNSwaspresentedtoMROCmembersindifferentforums.ItmaybetruethatDC,CDIdidnotpresenttheUUNS.THEDC,CDIdoesnotdothepresentation.TheMROC,however,madethedecisionreflectedintheMROCDM.TheDODIGresultsportrayedasimilardeceptiveconclusionthatwillbediscussedintheDODIGsection.
GaylalsomistakesthefunctionsoftheCMCwiththoseoftheMROC:“EffectivelycircumventingMCCDCstaff,CMCwasdirectlygivenacompellingbriefinginJuly2006that
TheMROCwaswellawareoftheHejlikUUNS.MROCmembersmadeseveraldecisionsontheHejlikUUNS.
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analyzedcasualtyratesby-vehicle.”(Gayl,p47)ThecomponentcommandscanpresenttotheCMConanytopic.TheimpressionthatMCCDCwascircumventedisonlytrueifMCCDCretainsallauthoritytopresentinformationdirectlytotheCMC.MCCDCdoesnot.IfthiscircumventionwerereallyacircumventionforsomeactiononMRAP,thentheMROCwasalsocircumventedastheyhadreviewedtheHejlikUUNS.Theabovestatementissimplyinconsistentwithanunderstandingofthechainofcommand.
TheMROCmemberswerebriefedontheHejlikUUNS.MROCmembersmadedecisions
aboutwhichvehiclewouldsatisfytheUUNS.TheCMCmadethefinaldecision.GaylisincorrectinstatingthattherewasnoMROCDM.TherewasandtheMROCknewit.
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12B11-185SUBMISSIONWORKEDWITHALACRITY
Gayl’sperceptionofMCSCwasalsoskewedandinthecasebelowhedirectly
contradictshimself.GaylprovidesageneralizedstatementreflectinghisopinionthatMCSCwaswedto
establishedprogramsandhostiletoMRAPs:“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsremainedfocusedonexpeditionaryvehicleconceptsthatweresuitedtoMV-22internalandCH-53Xexternaltransport,inadditiontoMaritimePrepositionedShipping(MPF)compatibility.COTSMRAPs,whilecombatproven,werelarge,heavy,andincompatiblewithMPFships.InspiteoftheneartermneedtohaveMRAPsincludedintheUSMCcombinedarmstoolkit,anyvehicleconceptthatdidnotfitthefutureexpeditionaryvisionwasdismissedbyMCCDCandMCSC.”(Gayl,pviii)TheMarineCorps,asaworldwideforceinreadiness,requiredanamphibiousandMPFvehiclecapability.Programmanagerscorrectlycontinueddevelopingthesecapabilities.MRAPsdidnot(andstilldon’t)sufficeforMarineCorpsexpeditionaryliftneeds.MCCDCandMCSCgraspedthisbasictactical/programmaticpointimmediately.
TheopinionabovewasaugmentedbyGayl’sspecificopinionaboutinstitutional
resistancetoaMRAPUUNS:“MARCENTcapabilitywarplannersstudiedMCCDC’s2005handlingoftheMRAPUUNSandrealizedthatMRAPwouldmostlikelynotbefavorablyreceivedatMCCDCifitwereagainsubmittedasaUSMCUUNS.CoordinationbetweenwarplannersandMCSCwasalsominimized,givenknowninstitutionaloppositiontoalargeurgentMRAPpurchase.”(Gayl,p47)Gayl,althoughnotpresentatthetime,statesthatMRAPcoordinationwithMCSCwasminimizedduetotheperceivedinstitutionaloppositiontoalargeMRAPrequirement.
TheperceivedinstitutionaloppositionofMCCDCandMCSCwasincorrect.Gaylhimself
recognizesMCSCactioninsupportoftheIMEFJERRVJUONS:“ItisnoteworthythattheCommander,MCSC(MajGenCatto)wasalreadyworkingonprocuringthe185JERRVsforIMEF(Fwd)usingJRAC(i.e.Joint/CIED)fundingasaresultofJRACJERRVJUONSapproval.MCCDCwashardlyaware,ifatallawareofMCSCactionswhichturnedouttobebeneficialforMARCENTandtheMEF(Fwd).”(Gayl,p50)MCCDCawarenesswaswidespread.MCSCaggressiveactionstopursueJRACfundingdemonstratedsomethingotherthan“opposition”.MCSCandMCCDCwereinfactsupportersofalargeMRAPbuyasshowninMajGenCatto’seffortsandtheHirschemaildtd5/18/2006.NotonlywereMCSCandMCCDCsupporters,buttheywereenthusiasticsupporters.
MCCDCandMCSCdidnotworkagainstMRAP.MCCDCandMCSCworkeddiligentlytogetMRAP,oftenleadingtheeffort.
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12B12-GENERALS/GENERALISTS
GaylmakesmuchoftheideathatGeneralOfficersareoftenincapableofunderstanding
technology:“Generalsare“generalists”bydesignandeffectivelylesspivotalintheneedsfulfillmentequation.AndtheweakerthebackgroundofthegeneralswithregardstotechnologyandopportunitiesthemoretheybecomethetoolsoftheSMEs.”(Gayl,p61)GaylthenfocussesthediscussionaboutGeneralOfficerinabilityonMCCDC:“Generalsare“generalists”bydesignandeffectivelylesspivotalintheneedsfulfillmentequation.AndtheweakerthebackgroundofthegeneralswithregardstotechnologyandopportunitiesthemoretheybecomesusceptibletoinadequatetechnologicalanalysisfromMCCDCSMEs.ThesetenuredUSMCmiddlemanagementandjuniorSMEindividuals,havingrepeatedlyexhibitedvaluesetsandconceptsof“urgency”divorcedfromthebestinterestsofbothwarfightersandthefutureoftheCorps.”(Gayl,p62)MCCDCGeneralsactuallyimmersedthemselvesintechnology.
TosomeextentGeneralsarereliantontheactionsoftheirstaff.SeveraloftheGeneral
OfficersatQuantico,however,weredirectlyresponsiblefortechnologyandequipment.Theyhadthetimeandwherewithaltoreceivebriefs,visitproductionfacilities,seedemonstrations,etc.TheMCCDCGenerals,especiallythoseinvolvedwithequipment,hadtheopportunityandthemissiontobetechnicallyadept.Gayl,however,wasworkingforGeneralOfficerswhowerefightinginsurgentsinAnbarIraq.Gayl’sobservationsweretruefortheIMEFGenerals.Theyhadtorelyontheirstafffortechnologyadviceastheywereinthemiddleofthefight.InthecaseofGayl,thattechnologicaladvicewasoftenflawed.OneliaisonofficerreportedastaffmeetingforadevelopmentalpieceoftechnologywithMGenNeller:“Sir,Belowarecommunicationsbetween(IMEFG9)andRobinCromwell,CIV,NAVSURFWARCENDIVCrane,Code606,PMJIN.MGenNelleraskedthismorning,"Ifthiswasgoingtoblowupinhisfacelikethelaserdazzlerissue?"BGenNellervoicedconcernabout"collateraldamage"i.e.arewegoingtohurtingsomebody.”(Allesemaildtd12/27/2006)TheGeneralOfficersubjectedtotheIMEFG9andGayl’srecommendationswasvoicinghisconcerninrelyingontheinformationhewasreceivingfromhisstaff.
NotonlywasGayl’stechnologicaladviceflawed,buthislackofunderstandingofMCCDC
compoundedtheflawsofhisadvice.“Beingcomposedofuniformedgeneralists,theleadershipwasbeholdentotheparochialinterestsofSMEsresidentatQuantico,andlikelyMCWLandONRaswellasanyorganizationhavingabigstakeinthesuccessoftheJLTV.TheadviceoriginatedwithfullyinformedofficersandcivilianSMEsatQuanticowhowerepresumablyawareoftheconsequencesoftheiradvice.”(Gayl,p72)MCWLandONRdidnothavebigstakesinJLTV.GaylprovidesnoexampleoftheMCWL/ONRstakeinJLTVbecausetherewasnone.
MCCDCGeneralsweredeeplyinvolvedintechnologyissues.IMEFGenerals,ontheotherhand,hadtorelyontheirstaffastheywerefightinganinsurgencyanddidnothavethetimetospendontechnologyissues.
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TheGeneralOfficersinthefighthadtorelyontheirstaffsmorethantheGeneral
OfficersinQuantico.Anystaffmakesmistakes,buttheassessmentbyGaylonstafffunctioninginrelationshiptoGeneralOfficerdecisionmakingisflawed.
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12B13-JLTVFACTS
Gaylstates:“Asnotedabove,whatcanbemade“immediatelyavailable”intheworld
ofCOTSisentirelyaMarineCorpscommitmentdecision.Also,althoughitappearslateintheletter,atleastCMCdidmentionthiskeyJLTVprogrambyname,arguablythemainseedofallMRAPdelaysandtheUUNS’eventualrejection.”(Gayl,p73)GaylandothersbelievedthatJLTVwasthereasonforthelackofMRAPs.TheJLTVwasnotthecauseofanMRAPdelay.Asseeninearlierchapters,thecauseofthedelaywasabsenceofdemandandrejectionofMRAPbyIMEF.MRAPadvocatesunderstoodearlyonthatMRAPcouldneverreplaceJLTV.TheamphibiousrequirementsaloneeliminatedMRAPasareplacementforJLTV.ThetacticalcompetitionwithJLTVwascreatedbythosewhodidnotunderstandthedifferentcapabilitiesofthevehicles.TheprogrammaticfactorsalsodisproveGayl’sassertion.
The2005HejlikUUNSwassubmittedinFebruary2005.TheJLTVprogramwasnot
approvedatthattime.TheESB,EOS,andMROCwereallbriefedonMRAPduringthefollowingmonths.TheJLTVprogramstillwasnotapproved.Thelastknownconsiderationofthe2005HejlikUUNS,during2005,occurredinAugust2005.TheJLTVprogramwasnotapproved.IMEFdeployedanddemandednoMRAP-typevehiclesthroughMay2006.TheyaddedaMRAPJUONSinJuly2006.TheJLTVprogramstillwasnotapproved.TheMarineCorpsbriefedCongressandformalizedtheneedforMRAPsasanewUUNSwassubmittedfor805MRAPsinSeptember2006.TheJLTVprogramwasnotyetapproved.InNovember2006,thefirstcontractswereestablishedforMRAPsinassociationwiththe2006IMEFUUNS/JUONS.InNov2006,theJLTVprogramwasapproved(Feickert,p2).
“OnDecember22,2007,theUnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,Technology,
andLogisticsUSD(AT&L)signedanAcquisitionDecisionMemorandum(ADM)directingtheJLTVProgramtomovefromtheConceptRefinementPhaseintotheTechnologyDevelopment(TD)PhaseoftheDODSystemAcquisitionProcess.”(Feickert,p2)TheMarineCorpshadalreadyfullyembracedMRAPandwasawardingcontractsbythetimeJLTVcameoutofconceptrefinement.ThreeJLTVTechnologyDevelopmentcontractswereawardedinOctober2008foratotalof166milliondollars(Feickert,p2).InJuly2008,previoustotheawardedJLTVtechnologydemonstrationcontracts,“theJROCapprovedatotalDoDrequirementof15,838MRAP-typevehicles.Ofthese,2,225wereallocatedfortheMarineCorps.”(DODIG,p2)Iftherewasacompetitionbetweenthetwoprograms,theJLTVlosteverystepofthewayanditlostspectacularly.
TherewerethoseinQuanticowhothoughttheJLTVprogrammighthavebeenimpacted
byMRAP.TherewereeventhosewhovoicedtheirconcernintheCDIB.AsamemberoftheCDIB,thisofficerwaspresentwhenthoseconcernswerevoiced.ThereactionattheCDIBwasimmediateandvocal.TheMCSCprogramrepresentativeattheCDIBwaswidelycriticizedby
Gayl’sperceptionthattherewasalegitimatecompetitionbetweenJLTVandMRAPwasmisplaced.
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othermembers.MrBlasioltookchargeofthemeetingandendedthecommentarybytheJLTVprogrammember.Gaylstates:“TheCDIBbriefingoftheMRAPUUNSshowedadirectlinkbetweenthetwointhatMCCDCstafferswereconcernedthatdevelopmentalprogramslikeJLTVmighthavetohelppayforCOTSMRAPs.”(Gayl,p53)ThisauthormadeapointofattendingthisparticularCDIBandwasreadytostronglyadvocateforMRAP.OnceBlasiolendedcommentsbytheMCSCprogramrepresentative,therewasnooneleftto“advocateagainst”MRAP.TheCDIBwasinfavoroftheMRAP.
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12B14-CORRECTROLEOFTHEWARFIGHTER
Thecombatdevelopmentresponsibilitiesofthewarfighteraredifferentthanthoseofthesupportingestablishment.OneofthemainissuescreatingtheMRAPissuewastheIMEFG9andGayl’sinsistenceinchangingthenatureofcombatdevelopment.Thedevelopmentofamaterialsolution,inthecorrectcombatdevelopmentprocess,istheresponsibilityofMCCDC.MCCDCperformsthedevelopmentofDoctrine,Organization,Training,Material,Leadership,PersonnelandFacilities(DOTMLPF)insupportofUrgentNeeds.TheentiretyoftheprocessisthencoordinatedwiththeWarfighter.TheIMEFG9hadlessthantenpersonneltodevelopDOTMLPFforUUNS,MCCDChadthousands.Assimplisticasitsounds,IMEFwasalsothewarfighterandhadtoactuallyfightthewar.IMEF(Fwd)didnotandcouldthereforedevotethetimeandeffortneededforUUNSDOTMLPFissues. Gaylstates:“Inthecaseofurgentneeds,thewillofthewarfightermustprevailinanycasewherethereisasplitinthevotingoutcome.Thisdefaultoutcomewouldalsoappeartomeetthespirit,intent,andoperationalcommitmentofDC,CDI.Asevidence,onthetopicofthefulfillmentofaseparateneed,inane-mailtoCG,IMEF(Fwd)on13Sep06LtGenAmoswrote:“…Iwillnever...repeatNEVERdenyourforcesforwardwhattheyneedtofightthisfightifIcaninanywayprovideitforthem.”(Gayl,p75)ThesplitGaylisreferringtoisthesplitbetweenthesolutionsprovidedbyIMEFG9/GaylandthematerialsolutionsprovidedbyMCCDC.Gayl’sopinionisthatMCCDCshouldhavedefaultedtoIMEFsolutionsinallcases(Gayl,p125recommendation16).IfMCCDCdidnotacceptIMEFG9/Gayl’smaterialsolution,thenMCCDCwasaccusedof“sayingno”.MCCDCalwaysconsidered,withdeference,theIMEFmaterialsolutionrecommendation.Ifitwastooproblematic,othersolutionswouldbepursued.GBOSSandLaserDazzlerwerethetwomainpointsofcontentionwithGaylandIMEFG9.EachhasadedicatedchaptershowingtheIMEFG9advocacyforawellthoughtoutneedcombinedwithanincompetentmaterialrecommendation. TheIMEFG9materialdevelopmenteffortwasrepletewitherror.DespiteincompetentIMEFG9equipmentsolutions,MCCDCcontinuedtoestablisheffortsthatwouldassisttheIMEFG9.Forexample,MCWLcontinuedtoworkwiththeRAIDprogramandotherprogramsthathadalreadycompletedsimilarbuystotheGBOSSbuythatIMEFconducted.EquipmentintegrationwasamajorconcernasIMEFwantedtoassembletheGBOSStowersinAnbar.Thisauthorestablishedanequipmentintegrationeffort.TheinitialresultswereprovidedtoIMEFG9.Theresponserejectedtheeffort:“Steve,Thanksfortheinfo.WhatisthecostunassembledandwithouttheFSR.Thepreviouslystatedandpresentclearintenthereistodotheassemblyouthereandtakecareofitouthere.NOFSRdesiredorrequired.”(Hostetteremaildtd10/10/2006)IMEFG9leadershipandGaylwerecc’d.IMEFnotonlywantedtoassumetheroleofMCCDCinmaterialselection,buttheyalsowantedtoassumetheroleofintegration,assemblyandmaintenance.Theconcernaboutthiscourseofaction
Thewarfighters(inthiscaseIandIIMEF(Fwd))havespecificresponsibilitiesandauthoritiesforcombatdevelopment.Gaylincorrectlyportraystheseresponsibilities.
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increasedastheRIPTOAwithIIMEFapproached.Sensingadisasterinthemaking,theMCWLChiefofStaffwrotetoIMEF“ThedecisiontoconductthesystemintegrationoutinIraqstillneedstobediscussed.Intentistomakesurethisprojectsucceeds.IdealplacetodoitisinCONUS,withavailablesupportfromthecompaniesifneeded.SendingthepartsouttoIraq,attimewhenIMEFispreparingforturnovertoIIMEF,maynotbetherightthingtodo.HasIIMEFagreedtotheideaoftakingthiseffortonfromIMEF?”(Hostetteremaildtd10/10/2006)OnceIIMEFdeployedandRIPTOAoccurred,allassemblyrevertedbacktoCONUS.TheGBOSSchapterwilldiscussthisingreaterdetail.GaylandtheIMEFG9portrayedtheeffortsofMCCDCandotheragenciesasobstructionist.Inreality,GaylandtheIMEFG9wereonceagainexpandingtheirroletointegration,assemblyandmaintenance.ThesewererolesforwhichIMEFG9wasinadequate.OfnoteisthatIIMEFwantednothingtodowiththeIMEFapproach.
MajorproblemsforIMEFG9aroseastheywadedintotheirnewfoundself-establishedrole.Theirmaterialselectionincompetencewasondisplayastheyattemptedtodeterminethespecsofthecamerasystemthattheyorderedfromthevendor(Gary):“Gary,Ijustleftavoicemail.WearelookingatGyroStbilizationinourcameras.Didweorderthatinourbuy?Whatdoesitdo?Whywouldweneedit?Canweaddittoourcameras?Howmuchisit?”(Allesemaildtd11/10/2006)
Thesequestionsarenormallyaskedbeforeabuy,notafter.TheIMEFG9expansionofresponsibilitycouldhavebeenadisasterforwhatwasoneofthemostinfluentialequipmentadvancesinIraq.Whilethewarfighterisnottheoptimalcombatdeveloper,thewarfighterdoeshavecombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.
ThewarfighteridentifiestheUrgentNeedsandsubmitstheUUNS.Itisuptothewarfightertoestablishtheneed.Thewarfighterconsidersthegapsincapabilityandweighstheneedfornewequipmentagainstmissionaccomplishment.Capabilityincreaseswerenotalwayswelcome.Thetimeandeffortrequiredtoestablishanewcapabilityintheaterwasoftenproblematicforunitsalreadyinthefight.Itwasoftenthecasethatwarfightersrejectedallbutthemostsignificantnewequipmentinordertofocusonwarfighting.MCCDCcouldnotforcetheuseofanyequipmentandreliedonthewarfightertoapprovemovementofequipmentintoMNF-W. Gaylnotes:“FollowingRIPTOAinearly2006thenewCG,IMEF(Fwd),MajGenRichardZilmerandhisDCG,BGenRobertNellerbecameimmediatelyawareofthecontinuingurgentneedforMRAPprotectiontocountertheIEDemergency.”(Gayl,p46)ItwastheresponsibilityoftheMEFtoachieveawarenessofmaterialshortfalls.Oncetheywereaware,itwastheresponsibilityofthewarfightertosubmitanUUNS.BothMARCENTandMCCDCoftenvolunteeredtowritetheUUNSandsubmitthemtoIMEFforsignatureafterwhichMARCENT
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andMCCDCwouldreceivethemofficially.TheMEFwouldhavefinalsayinanythingintheUUNSaswellastheauthorityofWHENtosubmitthem.Inthiscase,GaylstatesthattheCGandDCGbecameawareoftheneedforMRAPsinFeb2006.SincetheybecameawareinFebof2006,itisobviousthattheywerenotawarepriortothen(makingithardtoarguethatMRAPswereinconstantdemand).ThefirstIMEFJUONSorUUNSforanyMRAP-typevehiclewassubmittedinMayfollowedbyanotherinJuly.ThetimingwasdeterminedbytheCGandDCG,notMCCDC.InthecaseofMRAP,thewarfighterdrovethetimelines. Theroleofthewarfighterisfocusedonthebattleathand.Thewarfighterdoesnothavethewherewithaltoperformallphasesofcombatdevelopment.Attemptstodosotakeawayfromthewarfightersabilitytofight.
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12B15-UUNSEMPLOYEDASFORCINGFUNCTIONS
GaylpaintstheuseofUUNSasforcingfunctions.Theyareforcingfunctionsbydesign,
notbyIMEFchoice.UUNS/UNSarethedocumentthatstartthecombatdevelopmentprocess.ThisdiscoverybyGaylwaspaintedassomesortofcriticismofMCCDC:“Withfullknowledgeofthecasualtyrates,theywaitedforforcestosubmitrequestsformaturecapabilities(oftenrepeatedly)inareactivemode.TheunmitigatedIEDonslaughtwasevidencethatwehadlostthetechnologicaladvantageagainstourasymmetricfoe.UUNSswereemployedasforcingfunctionstocoercebasicsupportoutofMCCDC,andstilltheresistancetoreprogrammingfromlocalPORprioritiesincreasedratherthansubsided.”(Gayl,p84)MCCDCandMCWLwereconstantlyimprovingexistingequipmentandstartingnewprograms.SeveraloftheUUNSthatGaylciteswereactuallyconceivedinQuanticoandrenamedbyIMEFwhentheysubmittedtheirUUNS.Onceagain,withouttheapprovaloftheoperatingforces,MCCDCwouldnotsendnewequipmentforward.ItwouldfirsthavetobedevelopedandfullyDOTMLPFsupportedbeforesomeoftheMNF-Wcommandswouldsupportitsintroductiontotheater.Thisauthordeployedagainin2007-2008andtheamountofunsolicitedequipmentwasactuallyregardedasaproblembyMNF-W.TheUUNSactsasthedemandsignal,orasGaylputsit,theforcingfunction.
IMEF(Fwd)wastaskedwithsubmittingUUNS(andJUONSasMNF-W).Asthey
submittedUUNStheywouldoftenrequestcapabilitiesthatalreadyfullyexistedorexistedinpart.ThosewhowereinvolvedwithS&TappreciatedthebroadswathofrequestscomingfromIMEF(Fwd).Itallowedforwidedevelopmentandexperimentationofvariouscapabilities.TherewereothercommandswhowerenotreceptivetonewideasanddidnotsubmitmuchinthewayofnewUUNS.TheUUNS/UNSwastheinitiatingeventforthecombatdevelopmentprocesssoIMEF(Fwd)canclaimthatallofthecapabilitiessubmittedinanUUNSwereself-initiated:“WiththeexceptionofIraqire-alliancesandtheremarkabletacticalIEDemplacementturn-aroundresultingfromself-initiatedIMEF(Fwd)andIIMEF(Fwd)ISR,NLW,andIOinitiativesinAlAnbarProvince,therewasnoreliablesignthattheneedforMRAPswoulddiminish.”(Gayl,p45)IMEF(Fwd)didnotdevelopalloftheconceptsormaterialsolutionsthatexistedintheirUUNSs.Oftentimestheyalreadyexistedandweresimplyrenamed.ISRandNLWaretwosuchcapabilitiesthatwillbediscussedinlaterchapters.IMEF(Fwd)however,didsubmittheUUNS.Thatishowtheprocessworks.
GaylportraystheuseofIMEFUUNSasforcingfunctions.Inreality,UUNSwerethesimpledocumentsusedtoinitiateacombatdevelopmenteffort.Allcommands(eventhosenotdeployed)usedthesamedocumentstoinitiatecombatdevelopmentefforts.
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12B16-“MCWLVENDORS”
GaylestablishedaheretoforeunknownauthorityforMCWLtoestablishvendorsfora
programofrecord:“Furthermore,asaprovenplatformofferingsuperiorsurvivabilitybydesign,theKBappearedtoagaincontradicttheMCCDCway-aheadforTierIIUASgenerally,andthefavoredvendorsofMCWLspecifically.”(Gayl,p96)MCWListheMarineCorpsS&Torganizationand,assuch,experimentsinmanydifferentareas.UAVswasoneandTierIIUAVswasasubset.
MCWLhadtheauthoritytoexperimentinallareasofmilitaryendeavor.Ifan
experimentwassuccessful,theresultswouldbepassedtoMCCDCorMCSC.TherewasnoassociateddemandthattheMCWLtechnologybeadopted.ItwasillegalfortheMCWLcapabilitytobeadaptedintoaprogramofrecordasthematerialsolutionwithoutcompetition.MCWL“favoredvendors”wasanirrelevantterm.
GaylonceagaindemonstrateshiscombatdevelopmentignoranceasheassignsauthoritytoMCWLthatitdidnotpossess.
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12B17-IMEFG9SLOWEDPROCESS
GaylstatedinhispresentationtoDDR&Ethattheresistanceofdeveloperstooperatorneedscosttimeand“unnecessarydelayscauseUSfriendlyandinnocentIraqideathsandinjuries”(seeslidebelow)
(GaylpresentationfromMcCordemaildtd5/30/2007)
Gaylreinforcesthisaccusationinhisstudy:“ConcurrentlywithMRAPrequests,from2004throughearly2007advocateandoperatorrequestswererepeatedlysubmittedformobiletacticalpersistentISRcapabilities,includinghighaltitudeairships,armedandunarmedTierIIUnmannedArialVehicles(UAV),mobiletower-mountedcameras,andcovertminiaturesensorsuites.Inallcases,thoseISRcapabilitieswereeitherdelayedordeniedbycombatdevelopersatQuantico.”(Gayl,pxii)Inreality,thedelay/denialwasoftenduetotheinsistencebyGaylandIMEFG9thatonlycertainmaterialsolutionswereacceptable.
TheGBOSSchapterwilldiscussIMEFG9actionsindetail.Gaylstated:“Finally,thevast
expansesofIraqandalimitedMEFfootprintmeantthatSAwouldhavetobeaugmentedwithpersistentISR.MCDDCdidnotinitiateactiontoprepareforthisobviousgapanddelayeditsdevelopmentevenaftertheMEFsfeltcompelledtoaskforit.”(Gayl,p86)TheGBOSSsectionwillshowthatMCCDChaddevelopedstrategiesandbettercapabilitieswell
ThedelaysascribedtoMCCDCwereoftencausedbyGaylandIMEFG9.
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beforetheGBOSSUUNSwasevensubmitted.FundingandfieldingofGBOSSwouldhaveoccurredsoonerhadIMEFG9notslowedtheprocess.
GaylcontinueddiscussingNon-LethalWeapons(NLW),asecondareaofcontention:“ConcernsforNLWEAandprogrammanagementlegalliabilities,whileplacingapremiumonthebureaucraticandprogrammaticinterestsofdeveloperlabscausedtheJNLWPtorepeatedlyhesitateanddelaytransitions.TheconsequencesofU.S.JointForceslackingstateoftheartNLWtoolsinFallujah(Army-2003),Haditha(USMC-2005),Afghanistan(MARSOC-2006),Baghdad(Blackwater-2007),andothersimilarinstanceswhereinnocentswereapparentlykilledneedlessly.”(Gayl,p103)TheNLWsolutioninquestionwasrequested,developed,approvedbytherequestingunit,anddelayedwhenIMEFdecideduponadifferentmaterialsolution.TheIMEFsolutionwasnotprovidedandtheoriginalsolutioneventuallywasfieldedaccomplishingtheoriginalmission.ThedelaywasentirelyduetoIMEFandwillbediscussedintheLaserDazzlerChapter. ThedelayattributedtoMCCDCwastheresultofactionsbyGaylandIMEFG9.MCCDCwasoftendependentonthedeployedMEFforfieldingdecisions.Ifthesedecisionswereproblematic,delaysoccurred.
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12B18-COMPARISONOFIMEFG9ANDQUANTICOSOLUTIONS
Gayl’sDDR&Eslideprovidedalistingof“funded”programsthatsupposedlycompetedagainstMNF-Wneeds:
(GaylpresentationfromMcCordemaildtd5/30/2007) ThenatureofthecompetitionisnotdescribedinGayl’spresentation.AsimpleanalysisshowsthatGayl’slistisflawed.
AngelFireandConstantHawkweretwodifferentwideareapersistentsurveillancecapabilities.TheydidnotcompeteforfundingintheMarineCorps.TheMarineCorpschampionedthedevelopmentofAngelFireduetoitsuniquecapabilities.ThedevelopmentalnatureofAngelFireallowedforMarineCorpsdevelopmentalinput. G-BOSSincorporatedRAID.C-RAMhadadifferentmissionthanGBOSSandcontributedprogrammaticexpertisetoGBOSS.TheIMEFG9materialsolutionforGBOSStowerswasreplacedbythebetterC-RAM/RAIDsolutionallundertheumbrellaofGBOSS.
GaylstatedthatIMEFandMCCDCwereinanequipmentcompetition.ThematerialsolutionsofferedbyIMEFwereoftencompetedwithothersystemsinordertodeterminethebestsolution(asdirectedbylaw),butseveralofGayl’s“competitions”werenon-existent.
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ThePenetradarIRISwasrejectedinthejointprocess.LtColNelsoncitestheJIEDDOreasoning:“TheJointIEDDefeatOrganization(JIEDDO)declinedthisJUONS18January2007citingtheinitiativewas“technologicallychallenged.”(Nelsonemaildtd6/1/2007)ManyofGayl’ssuggestionswere“technologicallychallenged”. MRAPhasbeendiscussedthroughoutthispaperandthereadercanmakeajudgmentonwherethecompetitionoccurred. Acleancompetitionbetweensystemsinordertodeterminethebestsystemforthewarfighterisbeingportrayedasabadthing.Itisreallyagoodthing,especiallywhenmanyoftheIMEFequipmentsolutionshadsomanyflaws.InthisslideandthroughoutGayl’sstudy,competitionoftenmeanthattheIMEFmaterialsolutionwasnotselectedimmediately.TheGBOSSchapterandthelaserdazzlerchapterwillprovidegoodexampleswithdetail.Ifthecompetitionwasabadthing,Gaylfailedtoexplainwhy.IfthecompetitionbetweentheothersystemsresembledtheGBOSSandDazzlercompetition,thenthewarfighterwaswellserved.TheproblemwasthatIMEFG9refusedbetterequipmentinfavorof“theirequipment”.
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CONCLUSION
Gayl’swritingtechniquescreatedthecircumstancesforasubstandardresearcheffort.Hisflawedanalysisfurtherdegradedhisstudy.TheflawsinGayl’sstudyarenotconfinedtothosementionedinthischapter,nordoesthischaptercoverallofGayl’sflaws.Majorflawsarediscussedintheirownchapters.Additionalflawsremainunaddressedintheinterestofbrevity.
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13-ARMOR/EFPANDTHETHREAT ThenatureofthethreatinAnbarandIraqchangedovertime.ThevehiclesthattheMarineCorpsusedalsochangedovertime.Oneoftheflawsinanalyzingequipment,toincludeMRAP,istousethecurrentthreatastheacceptedthreatfortheentiretyofoperationsinIraq.Thethreatchanged.TheinitialgroundwarwasfoughtusingstandardHMMWVsandtrucks.In2004thisauthortravelledonwhatwastobecomethemostIED’droadsinIraq.Thevehicleusedwasabus.Theoccupantswereinstructedtodrawtheshades.Therewasnoammunitionissuedandnotallthepassengershadpersonalprotectiveequipment.Asthethreatmatured,additionalvehicletypeswereaddedtotheinventory.Busseswerenolongerregardedassafetransportation.Atthetime,however,thebuswasadequatetogetfrompointAtopointB.Thischapterwillprovideasummaryofthethreatandthereactiontothatthreat.Itwillalsodescribethematerialsolutionsthatfailagainstthethreat.
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13A-THETHREATSINTHEHEJLIKUUNS
Thethreatin2005wasmaturingbeyondaconventionalweaponsthreat.Thatdoesnotmeanthatconventionalweaponswerenotathreat.Asisoftenthecase,theintroductionofnewvehiclescausedtheenemytochangeattackmethods.In2005theHejlikUUNSfocusedonthreetypesofattacks:IEDs,RocketPropelledGrenades(RPG)andSmallArmsFire(SAF).Ofnoteisthattherewasonlyoneuseoftheterm“explosivelyformedpenetrator”intheHejlikUUNSasthatwasnotacurrentthreat.ThethreatintheHejlikUUNSwasprioritizedtoIED/RPG/SAF.Thefollowingtablereflectsselectvehiclecapabilityversusthe“HejlikUUNSthreats”(greenindicatespotentialthreatdefeat,redindicatespotentialvehicledefeat). IED RPG SAF Under
IEDSideIED
EFP RPG SAF
M1114 CASSPIR RG31 COUGAR (Gayl,p17)(withmodifications)CAVEATS:
• Them1114hadfragkitsthatincreaseditscapabilities• Them1114hadsomeunderbodyprotectionsbuttheywereovermatchedbymanyIEDs• TheRG-31hadsomecapabilitytowithstandSAFasdidCasspir• Anyvehiclecouldsupportsomesortofadd-onpackage.Add-onpackageswere
eventuallycreatedforEFPandRPG.• AnEFP,giventherightconstructandsize,couldpenetratethroughmostarmor.• Mostsuicidevestattackscouldbedefeatedbyallofthesevehicles.• VBIEDattackswouldhavetobeaddressedonacasebycasebasis.• MotorVehicleAccidents(MVA)werereducedacrossallvehiclesbuttheCougarhad
advantagesforMVAreduction.
TheabovetablereflectsthreatsthattheHejlikUUNSpresented.TherewereotherconsiderationsforvehiclesinCOINthatfavoredthem1114andothersfavoringvehiclessuchastheCougar.Hindsightbeing20/20,manywouldpicktheCougar.Thethreatportrayedinthe2005HejlikUUNS,however,doesnotallowsuchaclearcutdecision.
AnotherwaytoviewtheHejlikUUNSisthroughthethreatsthatwereneverrealizedor
wereminimallyrealized.NBCprotection,overheadairburstandEFPwerenotcommonMarine
NovehicledefeatedallofthethreatsintheHejlikUUNS(toincludeanyMRAP-typevehicle).
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occurrences.RPGattacksweresignificantlylesscommonthanIEDs.EveryoneofthesecapabilitieswasrequestedintheHejlikUUNS.
Noneofthevehicleshadanorganicremotelyfiredweaponsystemandfewhadfiringports
onallfoursides.BothofthesecapabilitieswererequestedintheHejlikUUNS. TheHejlikUUNSrequestedvehiclecapabilitiesthatwerenotinexistenceatthetime.
MarineCorpsleadershipwasputinapositionwheretherewasnovehiclethataddressedallofthethreats.
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13B-EFP
TheemergenceoftheEFPintheITOcreatedanewdemandforadditionalcapabilityaboveandbeyondtheorganicMRAP-typevehicle.EverymajorDODorganizationwasawareoftheEFPthreat.ThatthreatmadeheadlinesaroundtheworldwhenSecretaryRumsfeldaccusedIranofinterferinginIraq.ThespecificinterferencewasEFPs.USandcoalitionforcesstruggledtodevelopcounterEFPsolutions.TheimportanceofthiseffortwasunderscoredbytheSECDEFsinvolvementandhisaccusationagainstIran. InthePentagon,theSECDEFwieldsenormousauthority.ShouldtheSECDEFaccuseanothercountryofmeddlinginUSmilitaryoperations,onemaysafelyassumethatthePentagonandtherestoftheDODwouldtakenotice.TheSECDEFwasopenlyaddressingIranduetothelossoflifeassociatedwithEFPs. TheEFPthreatwaskillingtroopsandtheSECDEFwasengagedinsolvingtheproblem.PartofthesolutiontoEFPwasindevelopingcountermeasuresthatwouldminimizetheeffectivenessofEFPs.
“On31May07anarticletitled“MRAPscan'tstopnewestweapon”authoredbyTomVandenBrookappearedinUSAToday(Presentationa.13.).Itstatedinpart:“NewmilitaryvehiclesthataresupposedtobetterprotecttroopsfromroadsideexplosionsinIraqaren'tstrongenoughtowithstandthelatesttypeofbombsusedbyinsurgents,accordingtoPentagondocumentsandmilitaryofficials.Asaresult,thevehiclesneedmorearmoraddedtothem,accordingtoaJanuaryMarineCorps…thearmoronthosevehiclescannotstopthenewestbombtoemerge,knownasanexplosivelyformedpenetrator(EFP).ThePentagonplanstoreplacevirtuallyallHumveeswithMRAPstoprovidebetterprotectionagainstroadsidebombs,responsibleformostcasualtiesinIraq…SinceMRAPsaresomuchsaferagainsttraditionalroadsidebombs,thedocumentsays,Iraqiinsurgents'useofEFPs"canbeexpectedtoincreasesignificantly."Asaresult,theMarinecommandersinIraqwhowrotethestatementaskedformorearmortobeaddedtothenewvehicles…”(Gayl,p56)TheeffectivenessofEFPwasatopicforwidespreadreporting.Thisdeliberateairingofvehiclecapabilitywaspoorlyregardedbymilitarypersonnelwhowereattemptingtokeepmilitarycapabilitiessecret.
TherewasaDOD-wideefforttosolvetheEFPthreat.ThiseffortincludedDARPAandtheDOD,JointCommands,theServices,IndustryandtheWholeofGovernment(WOG).ThebrainpowerandfundingforcounterEFPwassignificant.ThisauthorwasinvolvedinseveralworkinggroupsthatregularlyaddressedEFP.TheDOD/WOGfundingandexpertisededicatedtoEFPswaswellbeyondtheorganiceffortsintheMarineCorps.
TheEFPthreatthatGayldescribednevermaterializedinMNF-W.Despitethisfact,MCCDCorganizationswereheavilyinvolvedincounter-EFPsolutiondevelopment.
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TherewasaconstantvigilanceforanyuseofEFPinAnbar.HomemadeEFPandIranianEFPwereareasofconcernandeachhaddifferentimplications.GaylmakesthefollowingstatementsaboutEFP:
“TherequestedsolutionsetincludedanurgentrequestforprotectionagainstExplosivelyFormedPenetrators(EFP).”(Gayl,pvii)The2005HejlikUUNSdidlittletoaddtotheongoingdevelopmentofcounter-EFPsolutions.TheonelinerequestintheHejlikUUNSwasovershadowedbytheothermorepressingthreatsinMNF-W.
“TheemploymentofExplosivelyFormedProjectiles(EFP)elsewhereintheIraqiTheaterofOperations(ITO)wasknowntoIMEF(Fwd)andtheirappearanceinMNF-WwasPredicted”(Gayl,pviii)TheappearanceofEFPinMNF-Wwasmonitoredforachangefrom“predicted”to“actual”.AsimpleinternetsearchwillshowerroneousreportingonthespreadofEFP.EFPremained“elsewhere”.
“Mostsignificantly,thisprocessdeviationpreventedtheinitiationofthedevelopmentofEFPpredestinationstand-offscreensspecificallyrequestedintheUUNS.”(Gayl,px)TheDODwasalreadyworkingEFPcountermeasures.TheMCCDCprocessfortheMRAPhadlittletodowiththedevelopmentofamaterialsolutionforEFPwhichwasaone-linerintheUUNSandnevermaterializedasthethreatGaylenvisions.
“Asanexampleoflackingurgency,2006e-mailcorrespondencebetweenIMEF(Fwd),MARCENT,andMCWLrevealedthattheCDIBdidnotforwardtheunfulfilledMRAPUUNStoMCWLfortechnologicalconsideration(Referencee.2.).Thishadsignificantimplicationsin2007,asnoUSMCinvestmentwasinitiatedbyMCWL,ONR,orSYSCOMtofindatotaldefeatsolutionfortheexplosivelyformedpenetrator(EFP)threatthatBGenHejlikhadspecificallyhighlightedinhis17Feb05UUNS.USMCdidnotseriouslybegintoinvestinanMRAPEFPsolutionuntilafterUSATODAY’spublicationofMRAP’svulnerability,eventhoughinsurgentswereawareofthisvulnerability(Referencep.11.,a.13.andotherreferences).AsadirectconsequencelargenumbersofMRAPsarebeingfieldedtoIraqin2007withoutEFPprotectionbecauseamaterialsolutionforthatthreathasnotyetbeensufficientlymaturedduetoanewstartdelayofwellovertwoyears.OnlyasecondbiddingonMRAPcontractsinthesummerof2007isrequiringsuchprotection(Referencea.18.).AsisevidentintheDWG/CDIBpresentation,EFPwasnotevendiscussed.Budgetaryconcernsdominatedtheoutcome.”(Gayl,p31)ONRwasalreadyworkingonelementsofanEFPsolution.MCWLremainedengagedinthejointEFPforums.MCWL“investment”wouldhavebeeninsignificantinthelargerandwell-fundedArmy,JointorDODefforts(eachofwhichbroughtresourceswellbeyondthoseoftheMarineCorps).TheMRAPfieldingwithoutEFPprotectionwasinnowayduetothelackofMarineCorpsinvolvement.Itwasduetothelackofamaterialsolution.Gayl’simplieddelayoftwoyearshadnobasisinfact.
“In2004andearly2005,duringtheconductofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)inAlAnbarProvince,IEDswerehavingasignificant,adverseimpactontheabilityofIMEF(Fwd)toaccomplishitsmission.IMEF(Fwd)washeavilydependentonHighMobilityMulti-Purpose
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Vehicles(HMMWVs)fortrooptransportandotherroutinemissionsthroughoutAnbarProvincethatdefinedtheMultinationalForceWest(MNF-W)AreaofOperations(AOR).Thisdependencyincludedbothurbanoperationsandlong-haulconvoytacticalmovementalongtheextensivepavedMainServiceRoutes(MSR)thatlinkedurbanareas.KnownthreatsincludedIEDsthatattackedtheHMMWVsfromtheside,aswellasburiedcenterlineIEDs,a.k.a.underbellyIEDs.TheemploymentofExplosivelyFormedProjectiles(EFP)elsewhereintheIraqiTheaterofOperations(ITO)wasknowntoIMEF(Fwd)andtheirappearanceinMNF-Wwaspredicted(Referencesr.5.,c.1.,a.15.,anda.16.).”(Gayl,p47)EFPhadnoimpactonIMEFoperationsin2004and2005.TherealthreatwasotherformsofIEDs.
“1MCCDCignoresIMEF(Fwd)’srequestforEFPprotection:”(Gayl,p73)EFPwasneverignored.Gayl’slackofinsighttotheMCCDCworkbeingdoneacrosstheDODforEFPdefeatwasduetohislackofparticipation.
“Itisequallysignificantthat,independentofthebasicvehiclearmorsolutionissue,thereisnoevidencethatanyconcurrentanalysisorS&TnewstartinitiativeswerecommissionedbyMCCDCtoaddresstheEFPthreat.”(Gayl,p74)EFPanalysisandinitiativeswereaconstant.NewstartswereconstantlybeingintroducedbyindustryandS&Torganizations.TheMarineCorpswasamemberofthedecisionmakingbodiesformanyoftheseefforts.
“EFPprotectionwasspecificallyrequestedintheMRAPUUNSasitwasaknownthreatatthetime.”(Gayl,p74)Gaylchangeshisperceptionofthethreatfroma“predictedthreat”toa“knownthreat”.EFPprotectionwasprioritizedtothosejointandArmyorganizationswhichactuallyhadanEFPthreat(knownorpredicted).
“Thequestiononecannowposeis:sinceDC,CDIwasawareoftheevolvingthreatwhywastherenoimmediateinvestmentinthedefeatofEFPsasrequestedintheMRAPUUNS?TheEFPthreatwasknown,andasarmorimprovedEFPemploymentwouldreasonablybeexpectedtoincreasebasedonknowninsurgentpatterns.”(Gayl,p74)InvestmentforanEFPsolutionwasaWOGeffort.TheDODsliceofcounter-EFPwassignificantinitsfundingandeffort.MCCDCpersonnel,aswellasmanyotherMarineorganizations,participatedintheseefforts.
“ButtheMarineCorpscombatdevelopersneedtoanswerforthisEFPprotectiondevelopmentshortfall,aswellastheMRAPUUNSshelving.”(Gayl,p74)Asseeninpreviouschapters,theUUNSwasnotshelved.TherewasnodevelopmentalshortfallwithinMCCDC.S&TacrosstheDODinvolvedMCCDC.CounterEFPPolicyinvolvedMCCDC.ArmorsolutionsinvolvedMCCDC.Solutionsweredeveloped.OfnoteisthatGayl,astheGCEScienceAdvisor,hadyearstoofferasolutionforEFP.HealsohadtheopportunitytoidentifytheprobleminanUNSandrequestasolution.AswiththeentireMRAPandcounter-IEDarmoringeffort,GaylsubmittednoUNSorUUNSasanAdvocate.
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“Theknownthreatsin05havebeendocumentedearlierinthiscasestudy.Theyincludedboththeunderbelly,centerlinethreatfromburiedIEDsaswellastheexistenceofanprobableproliferationofEFPsthroughouttheITO.”(Gayl,p116)Gaylchangedhisperceptiononceagainfrom“predictedthreat”to“knownthreat”to“probableproliferation”.Onceagain,GaylcannotpointtomaterializedEFPattacksandcan’tevendefinethethreat. OnceGaylestablishedhimselfinIMEF(Fwd)heofferedamaterialsolutionforEFPdefeatasdepictedintheslidebelow:
22.MRAPEFPTotalDefeatUUNSslidefromthedraftDDR&Epresentation.(Gayl,p55)Gayl’ssolution,withnanotube-armorandsheerthickeningliquidarmor,wasstaffedthroughEFPdefeatstaffsandreturnedasunfeasible.Itwasnotignoredorshelvedordisregarded.Itwasassessedandrejected. GaylpresentsapictureofnegligenceusingcarefullycraftedverbiagethatmakestheMarineCorpscounterEFPeffortseemnon-existent.Inreality,counterEFPwasaDOD-wideproblemwithfullMCCDCinvolvement.EFPusewastrackeddiligently.EFPsolutionsweretrackeddiligently.IfEFPmaterializedinMNF-W,thentheMarineCorpswasreadytoimplementsolutions.Untilthen,realthreatstookpriority.
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14-UUNSVSJUONS
PriortoassumingresponsibilitiesastheDirOPSMCWLIwasinchargeoftheMarine
CorpsportionofCounterRocketArtilleryMortar(C-RAM).C-RAMisanArmyledprogramdesignedtodealwithenemyindirectfireandrockets(similartoIronDome).Ihadtheopportunitypriortomy2005deploymenttotakeashorttriptoIraqandcoordinatewithMulti-NationalHeadquartersIraq(MNCI).ItwasduringthistripthatIrealizedthattheMarineCorpswaspoorlyestablishedtotakeadvantageofjointfundingopportunitiesthatwentthroughMNCI.TheMarineCorpshadnodedicatedliaisonforequipmentatMNCI.ItalkedwithMarineswhowereonstaffandtheirresponsetomyquestionofwhorepresentedtheMarineCorpsforequipmentandfundingwastopointtowardsMultinationalForcesWest(MNF-W).MNF-Wwasdual-hatted(alsoresponsible)astheseniorMarineStaffinIraq.IhadpreviouslybeenresponsibleforensuringtheMarineCorpsreceivedfairsharefundingfromanotherjointpotofmoney.ItwasobvioustothetrainedeyethatthestructureoftheMarineCorpsatMNCIwasnotoptimalfortakingadvantageofnewjointfundingresources. OneoftheareasoftheMRAPissuethatmayhaveactuallyhelpedbenefittheMarineCorpsthroughself-critiqueisintheareaofusageofjointfunding.TheMarineCorpswasslowto take advantage of joint processes that provided access to joint funding. One of the newparadigms for warfare in Iraq/Afghanistan was the new and significant funding availablethrough jointprocesses. JIEDDOwasprimaryamongst thesenewefforts. The JIEDDObudgetforFY05was$1.23BillionandforFY06wasover$3Billion(McKinneyemaildtd7/7/2006).In2007itgrewtoover$4Billion.
MCWLwastheMarineCorpsleadforallJIEDDOefforts.ItwasincumbentonMCWLtobestutilizeJIEDDOeffortsonbehalfoftheMarineCorps. Itwasalso incumbentonMCWLtoeducatetheCorpsonthenewparadigminvolvingbillionsofdollarsofjointfunding.Inordertodo so, this author createda simplebrief andpresentedvariationsof it toMCCDC leadership(LtGen Mattis and Staff)(Butter email dtd 7/17/2006), CDIB leadership (Blasiol email dtd6/21/2006), andMARCENT leadership (Butteremaildtd7/26/2006). Severalof the slidesarepresentedattheendofthischapterforfurtherdiscussion. ThelargersizeoftheArmyallowedthemseveraladvantagesinusingthisfunding.Theywereable tosourcestaffing for the jointorganizationswhichallowedthemto influencehowthe funds were used. They had a robust procurement organization which made them thenaturalrecipientsofprogrammaticfunding.TheyhadthemajorityofAORinIraqandhadthemajority of casualties. These factors combined to steer themajority of funding to theArmy.TheArmybecamesocomfortablewith joint fundingthat theystartedtosubmit theirserviceneedsstatementsandjointneedsstatementsthroughthesamecommand(MNCI)(ONSsection
JointfundingopportunitiesweredevelopedduringOIFandtheMarineCorpsrequiredadjustmenttomaximizetheiruse.
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ofattachmenttoOuztsemaildtd5/2/2006). Inthisatmosphere,theMarineCorpswasoftenleftout. Part of the brief was a “how to” on recommending solutions. The document thatinitiates theurgent joint process is the JUONSwhile thedocument that initiated theMarineCorpsurgentprocesswastheUUNS.Theybothworkedthroughdifferentchains(seediagramsatendofchapter).Inordertomaximizethepotentialforfunding,itwasrecommendedthatallC-IEDneedsbesubmittedasUUNSandJUONSsimultaneously.Theadditionalpaperworkwasminimalandthesupportingestablishment(JointandUSMC)couldcoordinatetoestablishwhowould fund/support the need (Alles email dtd 6/30/2006). The Joint Staff and MCCDCinteracted closely and there was MCCDC awareness and oversight for all “Marine CorpsJUONS”.GaylcitedthetandemapproachinhisDDR&Epresentation:
Caption:“Figure46.WhiletheJUONSprocessissound,theUUNSprocessisbroken.”(Gayl,p117)
Gayl’scommentswillbeaddressedinalatersection,however,hisobservationabouttandemsubmissionswascorrect.AfterthesubmissionofaJUONS,theMarineCorpsproblemcontinuedastheJUONShadtoworkitswaythroughasystemwheretherewerefewMarines.Hisstatementthatthe“UUNSprocessisbroken”isincorrect.
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14A-USMCGETTINGSHORT-CHANGEDATJOINTFUNDING
TheMarineCorpsOfficerCorpsremainsapproximatelyonetenthofthetotalofficercorps.JointbilletsarethereforeprimarilyfilledbyotherServices.MarineCorpsrepresentationonJointStaffsremainsataratiodictatedbythesizeoftheavailablepoolor,fortheMarineCorps,approximatelytenpercent.TheabilityoftheMarineCorpstotakeadvantageofavailablejointeffortsisthereforedecremented.CompoundingtheproblemisthatMarinesaremoreoperationally/tacticallyfocusedandmaynotgravitatetowardsjointprocurementorlogisticsbillets.
The Marine Corps generally used approximately 6% of every DOD dollar andapproximately12%ofevery jointdollar.Thosestatistics remain fairly consistent. JIEDDOwasfundedthroughDODefforts.SimplemathshowsthattheMarineCorps,withaminimaleffort,could receivemaximum benefit through JIEDDOwhile only “contributing” approximately 6%(notional)of theJIEDDObudget.Asmart,coordinatedeffortwasrequiredtousetheprocessestablished for the DOD funded JIEDDO effort. JIEDDO funding was sourced through theoperationalchainsusingjointrequestformatsorJUONS(Forthepurposeofthisstudy,allJointrequestswillbecalledJUONSeventhoughtheJUONSformat/processwasnotestablisheduntillater in 2005). Itwas therefore incumbent on theMarine Corps operational chain to initiateJUONSinordertoutilizeJIEDDOcapability(fundingaswellassupportandanalysis).TheonlyareawhereJIEDDOwouldresponddirectlytoServicerequirementswasintheareaoftrainingwhich was a Service responsibility for deploying units. The Tomczak email dtd 8/22/2006provides a brief from LtGen Amos to CMC regarding JIEDDO decisions to fund USMC C-IEDtraining. On8/17/2006IMEFG9wrote“Iamgladwespokeonthephonetonight.MyleadershipdoesnotwanttogototheJUONSprocesswithG-BOSS.Wehaveyettoreceiveanymaterialsolutionfromthatvenue,ourfirstJUONSwentin10FEB2006.DespitewhatLtColChillmentioneditismorecomplicatedandtakesmoretime,theprocessisnotstackedinourfavor.”On8/18/2006,onedaylater,theIMEFG9wrote“SomehowthisLtColChillofMCWLhasconvincedeveryonethatwearenotusingtheJUONSprocessandweneedtobeshownhow.Wecurrentlyhave14JUONSinthesystemwith3moreontheway.”(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006)ThecontrastbetweenthestatementsreflectstheconfusionatIMEFG9.ThelackofJUONSuseinthefirststatementisfollowedbyacitationof14JUONSsubmittedasademonstrationofJUONSuse.Thereisaninconsistencybetweenthetwoemails. DuringthistimeframetheIMEFCGrecognizedthisprocesschallengedandaskedforadditionalsupportintheformofFranzGayl.“TheCommandingGeneralIMEFForwardrequestedmeby-nametodeployintotheaterinSeptember2006toassistwithtechnicalandprocesschallengesfacinghisMarines,andIvolunteered.”(GaylTestimony,p2)The
ThesizeoftheMarineCorpsprohibitsitfromtakingmaximumadvantageofjointprocurementopportunities.
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CommandingGeneralwascorrect,hehadprocesschallengesbuttheywerenotsolelyhisresponsibility. ThetwostaffsresponsiblefordealingwithMNC-IandMNF-IwereMNF-W(IandIIMEF)andMARCENT(WhichalsodealtwithCENTCOM).Theresults,orlackthereof,ofequipmentrequestsattheMNC-IandMNF-IlevelimpactedtheabilityofMarinestosuccessfullyengageattheJointStaff.OnceMNF-Wstartedtorequestthroughjointchannels,theabsenceofMarinesonstaffadverselyimpactedthemovementofrequeststhroughthesejointcommands.ItalsoadverselyimpactedtheoversightofMNF-Wrequestsintheircontentandformatting.Onceagain,thepreviouslackofjointfundingavailablemadejointfundingprocesseslargelyirrelevant.Sensingthenewfundingparadigm,andthelackofMarinepreparednessforit,theMarineCorpsstartedtoorganize. MARCENTrequestedbriefstogetbetteracquaintedwithjointfundingandjointprocesses.MARCENTconfirmedthattheMarineCorpswasgettingshortchangedatMNCIandhadattemptedseveralJUONSontheirown(Allesemaildtd5/20/2006).IMEFremainedreluctanttosubmitJUONSandMARCENTrecognizedtheabilityto“backwardstaff”needsstatements.BackwardstaffingwouldoccurasMARCENTwouldsubmitJUONSdirectlytoMNCIonbehalfofMNF-W. LtGenMattiswasalsoprovidedabrief(severalslidesofwhichareattheendofthischapter)ontheuseofJUONSandjointfundingwithwhichheconcurred.(Butteremaildtd7/17/2006)GiventhelackofMarinemanpower,LtGenMattisalsocorrectlyfocusedontheresponsibilityofMARCENTtooverseethejointprocessesatMNC-I.(Butteremaildtd7/17/2006) ThefocusofMARCENTandMNF-Wwasthesolutiontothelackofuseofjointfunding,buttheirsolutionwasnotoptimal.TheoptimalsolutiontoinfluenceMNF-WJUONSwastohaveaphysicalpresenceatMNCI.MARCENTwasresponsibletoCENTCOM,notMNCI.TheoversightofMarineissuesatMNCIshouldhavebeentheresponsibilityoftheMarinesontheMNCIstaff.TheArmytookadvantageoftheirnumbersontheMNCIstaffto,ineffect,turnitintoanArmystaffforprocurementpurposes.NowherewasthismoreevidentthanintheJUONSprocess.
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14B-JIEDDO
ThemajorityoffundingforOIF/OEFremainedwiththeServicesbutthemostaccessibleandwell-fundednewjointentitywasJIEDDO(previouslycalledtheJointIEDTaskForce).JIEDDOnotonlyprovidedfundingbutalsoprovidedcounterIEDexpertiseandanalysis.Itwasaforumtoshareenemyanalysis,technologydevelopment(S&T)andcounter-IEDsolutionsacrosstheentiretyoftheDOD.Thisstudy,however,willfocusonfunding. ThefunctionsofJIEDDOdevelopedovertime.InteractionwithJIEDDOalsodevelopedovertime.TheJIEDDOStaffaswellastheJointCommunityandServiceshadtolearnanddevelopmethodsofinteraction.TheMarineCorpswasnodifferent.EarlyontheMarineCorpsestablishedaworkinggroupandsubmitteda$2BillionlistofC-IEDneedstoJIEDDO.(Doyleemaildtd6/29/2006)PerJIEDDOprocesses,onlytrainingissueswerefundedfromtheServicerequest.Thesubmissionincludedthe185JERRVrequest. MCWLwastheinitialliaisonforJIEDDOactions.AsJIEDDOgrew,adiscussionwithinQuanticooccurredinordertodeterminewhowouldleadMarineeffortswithJIEDDO.LtGenMattissettledonMCWL(Allesemaildtd5/20/2006). MCWLrecognizedearlyonthattheremainderoftheMarineCorpshadtobeeducatedontheuseofJIEDDO.ThelackofknowledgeabouthowtouseJIEDDOwasunderstandableastherewasnoprecedentandnoschoolscoveringthisnewfundingparadigm.MARCENTwasquicktoaskforinformation(McKinneyemaildtd7/7/2006).Briefswereprovidedandliaisonwasconducted.(Bakeremaildtd7/20/2006)MarineCorpsleadershipalsorequestedbriefs.ProcessesweredevelopedtomaximizeuseofjointfundingandJIEDDO.DespitethedevelopmentofprocessestoutilizeJIEDDO,IMEFcontinuedunconventionalprocesseswhichcausedfriction:“Concurrently,MNF-WdraftedaJUONSforG-BOSSthatincorporatedtheTCVSforcovertmicroterraininclusionintheV-COP.Thisdocument,whichincludedarequestfor240ScanEagleTierIIUAVs(seediscussionofUAVsbelow),waspresentedtotheDirectorofJIEDDOduringhisvisittoAlAnbarProvincetheResubmissionoftheG-BOSSasaJUONSoutoffrustrationwithMCCDCinactiononanUUNSagainfollowsthefamiliarpatternthathadbeenobservedwithMRAP,TCVSandothercapabilitiestobedescribedbelow.Inanefforttoreinforcetheinitialcapability,CG,IMEF(Fwd)submittedaJUONSinordertogainaccesstomoresubstantialJIEDDOfundingsinceG-BOSShelpedtheC-IEDfightintheITO.”(Gayl,p91)Onceagain,itwasMCCDCandnotIMEFwhowastheprimaryadvocateforjointefforts.Thiscase(discussedindetailinasubsequentsection)demonstratedtheIMEFG9lackofJIEDDOunderstandinginthattheybelievedthattheDirectorofJIEDDOhadtheauthoritytoapproveequipmentrequestswithoutMNCI,CENTCOMandJointStaffapproval.Hedidnot.OnehadtosubmitJUONSthroughthechainofcommand,notvoicearequesttotheDirectorofJIEDDO.Gayl’sunfamiliaritywithjointprocessmirrorshisunfamiliaritywithMarineCorpsprocesswhichoftencausedacrimoniousrelationships(Bareemaildtd5/17/2007).
JIEDDOwasanopportunityfortheMarineCorpsthatwasnotmaximized.
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Inthefinalanalysis,JIEDDOhadthepotentialtobeanexcellentsourceofsupportfortheMarineCorpsifusedcorrectly.ThefirststepincorrectusagewastosubmitaJUONS.
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14C-PROPPERJUONSSUBMISSIONBYMNF-WONLY
TheJUONSistheurgentinitiatingdocumentforthejointneedsprocesswhiletheUUNS
istheinitiatingdocumentfortheMarineCorpsneedsprocess.TheJUONSfollowedthejointcommandpathtothejointstaffand,ifdecided,JIEDDO.TheUUNSfollowedtheServicechainofcommandtoMARCENTandthentoMCCDC(seediagramsatendofchapter).MNF-WwastheCommandauthorizedtosubmitJUONSandIMEFwasthecommandauthorizedtosubmitUUNS.TheywerebothunderthesameCommanderandStaff.The“dual-hatting”(onecommanderwearsdifferenthatsorhasmorethanonesetofresponsibilitiesindifferentchainsofcommand)allowedforexecutionofbothJointandServicefunctionsinonecommand.ItalsoallowedIMEFtosubmitneedsrequeststhroughbothchainsandsourcethedifferentpotsofmoneyandsupport.TherewasnootherMarineCommandauthorizedtodosointheITO.
Aspreviouslydiscussed,MCCDCrecommendedsubmittingbothJUONSandUUNS
simultaneouslyinordertoallowforthefastestsupporttoMarinesinMNF-W.TheMarineCorpsmaintainedawarenessofbothchainsforsubmissionandcoulddeconflictatseveralpointsintheprocess.TheMarineCorpscouldalsoidentifythemostcapableorganization,JointorService,whichcouldsatisfyaneed.InthecaseofMRAP,MCCDCcoordinatedwithIMEFtosubmitaJUONSversusthedraftUUNSthatwasoriginallysubmittedbyIMEF(Hirschemaildtd5/18/2006).MCCDCfeltthatthejointroutewouldbettersupporttheJERRVneed.Gaylfabricatesthefollowingstatement:“InitscapacityasCombinedJointTaskForceHQ,MNF-W,IMEF(Fwd)resubmittedtheMRAPrequestintheformoftwoJointUrgentOperationalNeedsStatements(JUONS).Thistime,theurgentneedsforMRAPswereapprovedbytheCommandersofMNC-I,MNF-I,CENTCOMandtheDirectoroftheJointRapidAcquisitionCell(JRAC).IntheabsenceofcombatdevelopersupportforMRAPs,ServicesupportwasobtaineddirectlyfromtheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsbasedonastatisticallyverifiedcasualtyanalysisatMARCENT.”(Gayl,px)ItwasMCCDCthatsawtheopportunitywithajointeffort.TheJUONShadtobeapprovedthroughthejointchainofcommand:MNC-ItoMNF-ItoCENTCOMandtotheJRACinordertobeapprovedatthejointstafflevel.
Gaylfurtherfabricates:“CG,IMEF(Fwd)’semploymentofJUONStoavoidUSMC
combatdevelopersmirroredhisapproachtoMRAP.”(Gayl,p92)IncontrasttoGayl’sassertion,IMEFdidnotfeelthattheJUONSprocesswasworkingforthemandtheIMEFG9wrote:“Iamgladwespokeonthephonetonight.MyleadershipdoesnotwanttogototheJUONSprocesswithG-BOSS.Wehaveyettoreceiveanymaterialsolutionfromthatvenue,ourfirstJUONSwentin10FEB2006.DespitewhatLtColChillmentioneditismorecomplicatedandtakesmoretime,theprocessisnotstackedinourfavor.”(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006)Inaddition,theIMEFUUNStrackerdated7May2006hadalmost300resolvedUUNSand60activeIMEFUUNS(Garciaemaildtd5/10/2006).ThisisclearevidencethatIMEF
TheJUONSwasrequiredtoestablishneedswithintheJointcommunityandMNF-WwastheonlyUSMCCommandthatcouldsubmitthemforOIF.I-MEF,asMNF-W,wasoftenreluctanttosubmitJUONS.
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preferredtheUUNSprocess.TheindividualatMARCENTresponsiblefortrackingJUONSsubmissionscouldonlyfindthreeJUONSsubmissionsbyIMEFfromFebruarytoMay2006(Johnsonemaildtd5/11/2006).IttooksignificantefforttogetIMEFtousetheJUONSprocess.
TheJERRVJUONSwasoneofMCCDCandMARCENT’sfirstsuccessstoriesusingtheJUONSprocess.Gaylmistakenlystates:“IMEF(Fwd)hadalreadyexperiencedsuperiorsupportfromtheJRACwiththeJERRVJUONS,inlightofMCCDC’sshelvingoftheMRAPUUNSin05.”(Gayl,p94)(aspreviouslyproven,MCCDCdidnotshelvethe2005UUNS).TheJRACprocessfullyinvolvedMCCDCpersonnel.MCSCaswellasMCCDCstaffareresponsibleforadministeringpartsoftheMarineJRACeffort.MCCDCenthusiasmfortheJERRVJUONShelpedittosucceed.GaylalsofabricatesfortheGBOSSeffort:“IMEF(Fwd)hadgonethesuccessfulJUONSrouteinbothcasesasameansofworkingaroundUSMCcombatdeveloperresistance.IntheG-BOSSJUONS,whichwasalsoapprovedbytheJRACresultedintheprovisionofapproximately$100MinC-IEDfundingthroughJIEDDO.”(Gayl,p95)TheGBOSSsectionwillshowindetailhowdistortedthisstatementiswhileshowingacomedyoferrorsinthepursuitofwhatwasoneofthemostimportantequipmentrequestsofthewar. MCWLmaintainedaliaisonatIMEFandoneoftheprioritieswastoensurethathehadthemostupdatedinformationtosharewiththedeployedMEF.TheproblemsassociatedwithMarinesandtheJUONSprocesswerearticulatedinanemailinlateJuly2006(Fisheremaildtd7/19/2006).IMEF,afterhalfoftheirdeployment,hadyettoestablishasolidJUONSeffort.ByAugustof2006,IMEFG9hadreluctantlystartedtorealizethebenefitsoftheJUONSprocessandhadstartedtosubmitJUONS.DuringthistimeframeMCWLestablishedaCIEDcelltoassistIMEFwithCIEDeffortsinAnbarandliaisonwithotherCIEDeffortsintheITOaswellasinCONUS.TheJUONSresponsibilities,however,remainedwithIMEFG9.ThepushfromMCCDCtoutilizethejointsystemeventuallystartedtohaveresults.TheIMEFG9,however,remainedareluctantuserduetothesupposeddifficultyinusingtheJUONSprocess(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006).Gayl,whowassupposedtobeassistingwithprocesschallenges,wasunabletoassuagetheIMEFG9discomfortwithJUONS.ThisdiscomfortwasunderstandableasveryfewunderstoodtheJUONSprocess.TheMRAPDODIG,conductedyearslaterandintheabsenceofanycombatresponsibilities,alsodidnotunderstandtheJUONSprocessandthereforemaderecommendationswhichrequiredrevision.
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14D-DODIGBOTCHEDTHERECOMMENDATION
TheMRAPDODIGarrivedatseveralerroneousconclusions.Somewerefromlackofevidence,however,somewereduetotheilliteracyofDODIGpersonnelintheareaofcommandrelationships.Thisilliteracygavebirthtoflawedrecommendationssuchasthefollowing:“Inresponsetothedraftreport,theDirector,JointStaffrequestedthatbothRecommendations1.and2.bechangedtodirecttheServicerequirementsdeveloperstoforwardurgentrequirementsthatmayhavejoint-Serviceapplicabilitytotheappropriatecombatantcommander,insteadofdirectlytotheJointChiefsofStaff.WeagreewiththeDirector,JointStaff’scommentsandrevisedRecommendations1.and2.todirectServicerequirementsdeveloperstoforwardurgentrequirementsthatmayhavejoint-ServiceapplicabilitytotheappropriatecombatantcommanderforendorsementandthentotheJointStaffforvalidationasJointUrgentOperationalNeeds.”(DODIG,p15) TheServicesandJointCommandshavedifferentresponsibilities.Oftentimestheyoverlap,butanewchainofcommandisnotestablishedeverytimeoverlapoccurs. TheDODIGinitiallyrecommendedthatServicessubmitServicerequirementsdirectlytotheJointStaff.ThiscutouttheCombatantCommander.ItisnothardtoimagineproblemsarisingfromjustoneServicebeingequippedwithMRAPs,surveillanceequipment,jammers(etc.)whiletheotherServicesinthesamefightarenotsimilarlyequipped.COCOMsensurethattheforceisequippedacrosstheentiretyoftheforce.TheDODIGcorrectlysawtheflawintheoriginalrecommendation. Unfortunately,theysettledonanotherrecommendationthatwasalsoflawed.TheServicerequestwouldbesenttotheCOCOMforendorsementandthenbesenttothejointstaff.Theproblemwiththisrecommendationissimilartotheproblemwiththeoriginalrecommendation.TheMNCICommanderwasbeingbypassed(aswastheMNFICommander).InthecaseofMRAP,theDODIGrecommendedaprocesswhereIMEFsubmittedaneedtoMARCENTandthentheServiceHeadquarters.Afterapproval,theServiceHeadquarterswouldthensubmitittotheCOCOMwhowouldthensubmitittotheJointStaff.IMEF’sneedwouldbypasstheirimmediateCommanderatMNCIpresentingthesameproblemenvisionedattheCOCOMlevel.InthecaseofOIF,theCOCOMcouldensurethattheneedwasstaffedtoMNFIandMNCIasawork-aroundtotheDODIGprocess.Thiswasnotaguarantee. ThecorrectdecisionwouldhavebeentohaveIMEF,whichwasdual-hattedasMNF-W,submititsJUONStotheirCommanderatMNCI.MNCIcouldcoordinatefortheneedsoftheforceandsubmitcoordinatedneedsfurthertoMNFIandthentotheCOCOM.TheCOCOMcouldthensubmittotheJointStaff.Thisprocessfollowsthechainofcommand.ThesolutionisnotfortheServicetosubmittotheCOCOM,butfortheServicecomponentsinthejoint
TheinitialDODIGrecommendationignoredthechainofcommandandwasthereforerejected.Theirsecondrecommendationalsoignoredthechainofcommand.
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organizationstosubmitthroughthejointchainofcommand.Thisissimplecommandandcontrol.Thealternative,asrecommendedbytheDODIG,wastohaveforcesintheITObypassMNCIbysubmittingneedsthroughtheirservicechainstotheCOCOM.Thisrecommendationignoresmilitarycommandandcontrol.
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14E-GBOSSSHOULDHAVEBEENJOINT
TheIMEFG9GBOSSeffortisinstructionalinunderstandingtheJUONS/UUNSprocess.TheGBOSSchapterwilladdresstheotherelementsoftheGBOSSissue. InAugust2006MCWLestablishedasurveillanceconferencetobettercoordinateMarineSurveillanceissues.IMEFG9wantedtorepresentthemselvesinthisconferenceandadamantlyrefusedtoentertainsuggestionstouseArmyprograms(IMEFG9emaildtd8/4/2006).TheIMEFG9hadlittleunderstandingoftheArmyprogramsandtheirabilitytosupporttheGBOSSeffort(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006).TheseprogramswouldbeutilizedonceIMEFRIP/TOAoccurredplacingIIMEFincommand.IMEFG9maintainedcontroloftheirownneedsandneitherthejointcommunitynorMCCDCcouldforceIMEFtouseequipment. Compoundingtheissuewasagenerallackofunderstandingaboutequipmentcapabilities.TheIMEFsolutionusedatowerthatstood106feettallandhadtwocamerasonthetop.C-RAMtowersstood106feettallandhadonesuperiorcameraonthetop.C-RAMusedRAIDtowers.ThefarsuperiorcameraontheRAIDtowerwasusedforbasedefense,butitwasalsousedasthecameraonattackhelicopters.TheRAIDtowerandtheIMEFdesignweretoweredcameras.Theirusewasdeterminedbytheusingunit.IMEFincorrectlyassumedthatRAIDtowerscouldonlybeusedforbasedefense.Theyadditionallyassumedthattheaggregationsystemscouldonlybeusedforbasedefense(Jankowskiemaildtd9/1/2006).ThepoorgearanalysismadeIMEFrejectthesuperiorsystemsinfavoroftheirownsystems. IMEFG9wastheMEFgatekeeperforJUONS.TheirestablishedpositionwasagainstRAIDtowerssotherewasnoJUONSforthcoming.Atthesametime,thedemandfromunitsinMNF-Wwasreflectedinthefollowingemail:”Charlie,JustcameoutofIraqonCMCtrip.ResoundingcallformoreJLENS/RAIDtowersfromGenZilmertoeveryBncmdrwesaw.”(Allesemaildtd10/3/2006)Despitethehighdemand,theIMEFG9maintaineditsstanceagainstRAIDtowersandrefusedtosubmitaJUONS. IMEFG9continuedtopreferthesystemthattheywerebuyingandassemblingintheater.Recognizingthisasapotentialdisaster,thesupportingestablishmentcontinuedtoaskIMEFtosubmitaJUONSforequipmentthatwouldcomeassembled.IMEFG9respondedfromtheITO:“Thanksfortheinfo.WhatisthecostunassembledandwithouttheFSR.Thepreviouslystatedandpresentclearintenthereistodotheassemblyouthereandtakecareofitouthere.NOFSRdesiredorrequired.”TheMCWLChiefofStaffresponded:“JT,ThedecisiontoconductthesystemintegrationoutinIraqstillneedstobediscussed.Intentistomakesurethisprojectsucceeds.IdealplacetodoitisinCONUS,withavailablesupportfrom
TheGBOSSeffortwouldhaveproceededfasterifIMEFG9submittedaJUONS.Theyrefusedtodosoformonths.MCCDCcontinuedtoleadGBOSSeffortsinJointcommunitiesdespitethelackofaJUONS.
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thecompaniesifneeded.SendingthepartsouttoIraq,attimewhenIMEFispreparingforturnovertoIIMEF,maynotbetherightthingtodo.”(Hostetteremaildtd10/10/2006)ItwasclearthatIMEFG9wasgoingtoorderthematerial,engineer,assembleandmaintainthesurveillanceequipmentinMNF-W.WithoutthesubmissionofaJUONS,therewasnothingthatthejointcommunitycoulddo. MCCDChopedtogetaJUONSfromIMEFG9andcommencedthebriefingprocessthroughJIEDDOinOctober2006(Johnstonemaildtd10/13/2006).TheprocesswassoonhaltedduetothelackofaJUONS. TheMARCENTandMCCDCCGssawtheproblemandorganizedforacoordinatedeffort.ThecoordinationresponsibilityfortheeffortwasremovedfromIMEFG9andfullyassumedbyMARCENT(Allesemaildtd10/15/2006).TherequirementforaJUONS,however,stillexisted.ItremainedafunctionofIMEFG9,andMARCENThadtocoordinatewithIMEFtosubmittheJUONS(Chillemaildtd12/20/2006). CoordinationcontinuedwithJIEDDOdespitethelackofaJUONS.LtGenAmoswasbriefedthatJIEDDOwouldnotsupporttheeffortunlessaJUONSwassubmitted.OncetheJUONSwassubmitted,JIEDDOwouldbeforthcomingwithfundingbutfortheestablishedRAIDprogram.(Allesemaildtd12/27/2006) TheGBOSSJUONSwaseventuallysubmittedinJanuary,2007andsignedbyMNCIon30January2007.JIEDDOreceivedtheJUONSbyMarch2007andfundswereapprovedthreemonthslater(Donnellyemaildtd8/23/2007).GBOSSeventuallygrewintooneofthemosteffectivesystemsintheITO. IMEFhadsubmittedanUUNSinJune2006.TheJUONSarrivedatJIEDDOinMarchof2007.Theprogramwasthenfunded.Flagofficersthroughthethreestarlevelhadmadetheirdesiresknown.IMEFhadmadeitsdesiresknown.TherewascommonknowledgeaboutGBOSS(withequipmentdisagreements)andyetnothingoccurreduntilIMEFrelentedandsubmittedaJUONS.OnlythendidMarinesreceivethehighdemandGBOSStowers.
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14F-THEJOINTPROCESSSUMMARIZED
Thefollowingthreeslidesarefromapresentationthathadbeenprovidedfrom2006to
2008(Chillemaildtd4/20/2007).TheywerealsodiscussedwiththeDODIG.TheDODIGwasunawareofthepotentialforMarineuseofjointfundingwheninterviewingthisauthor.TheDODIGeventuallyunderstoodthelackofMarineCorpsuse,however,theirsolutionwasincorrect.ThefirstslidedescribesthecorrectJUONSprocessandhowtheMarineCorpswasabletoinfluenceitwhilenotbeingapartofit.MNF-WwastheonlyMarinedual-hattedcommandintheprocess.
Thesecondslidedealswithdistributionofjointlyapprovedequipment.Thejointcommanderhadtheauthoritytodistributejointequipment.EquipmentthatwasrequestedbytheArmywasalsoprovidedtotheMarineCorps.Onoccasion,Army-requestedequipmentwasgiventoMarinesfirstbasedonthetacticalsituation.Marine-requestedequipmentcouldbeprovidedtotheArmy,soahealthyliaisonwasrequiredtoshepherdtheequipmentdistributionprocess.
ThebelowslidesweresufficienttodescribethemajorelementsoftheJUONSprocess.
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ThefinalslidedepictstheMarineCorpsrelationshipwithJIEDDO.MCWLwasthecoordinatingauthorityforJIEDDObutseveralcommandsalsohadrelationshipswithJIEDDO.
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CONCLUSION IMEFwasreluctanttousetheJUONSprocess.TheypreferredtousetheServiceUUNSprocess.Gayl’sstatementsaboutthepreferenceofIMEFtousetheJUONSprocessandworkaroundMCCDCarefabricated.ItisunclearwhetheritwasGaylfabricatingthesestatementsorhissourceswhofedhimfabricatedinformation. OneofthelessonslearnedfromthisstudyoughttobethattheMarineCorpsisinanidealpositiontomaximizeuseofjointfundingthroughtheJUONSprocess.Acoordinatedeffortshouldbeundertakentodoso.
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15-GBOSS-THEIMEFG9DISASTER
ISRcapabilitiesandconceptsgreatlyimprovedoverthetimeperiodsofOIFandOEF.MostrecognizedtheneedforadditionalsurveillanceintheCOINenvironmentsofIraqandAfghanistan.Most,however,didnotunderstandtheavailablecapabilitiesandwhattheycoulddoforUSforces.ISRequipmenthadtobelinkedwitheducationandtactics.Thefailuretounderstandtheequipmentinitiallyresultedinthefailuretooptimizeorevenunderstanditsuse.
TheISRcapabilitiesrequestedbyIMEFwererevolutionary.With“eyeson”theinsurgentsufferedhighercasualtiesandwasrestrictedfromoperations.SimilarlytoMRAP,IMEF’sgraspoftheconceptledthewayintheITO.Unfortunately,severaloftheirattemptsatequipmentsolutionsweredisastrous.NonewasworsethanG-BOSSwhichservesasaperfectlessononwhycommandsincombatshouldnotbeallowedtoprocure.Instead,theyshouldfocusoncombat.
Thissectionisbeingincludedfortworeasons:
• Suggestionsthattheforcesincombatarebestpositionedtodetermineprocurementissueshavebeenmade.Thesesuggestionsareflawedandwillharmforcesincombat.Theymustbedismissed.
• GaylpresentsISRasamajorissuethroughouthisstudy(overonehundredtimes).ItisthecritiquementionedthemostafterMRAP.ThissectionwilldemonstratethetwistedandcontortednatureoftheGaylISRargumentswhichreflectontherestofhisMRAPstudy.
ThetechnologyissuesassociatedwiththeGBOSSeffortexemplifytheflawsintheIMEF(Fwd)approachtoequippingtheforce.TheGBOSSprogram,IIMEFandsubsequentIMEFstaffsjettisonedmanyofIMEFG9technicalrecommendationsafterIMEFG-9rotatedbacktoCONUS.IIMEFestablishedtechnicalrequirementssimilartothoserecommendedbyMCCDCandthesesolutionswereputintoeffectduringthe“AnbarAwakening”aswellasthroughMarinedeploymentstoAfghanistan.AswitheveryotherequipmentissuewheretheIMEFG9technicalsolutionwasnotadopted,Gaylofferedhismisleadingopinions:“ManymonthsofMCCDCmiddlemanagementinactionfollowed.MCCDCcivilianmiddlemanagerswerefullycognizantofthechronicvulnerabilitysufferedbyoperatingforcesduetolackingAORwidepersistentsurveillanceyetchosetoobstructG-BOSSanditsplug-incomplimentaryISRcomponents.”(Gayl,p91)and“TheMNF-Wcostofforceskilledandinjured,especiallyduetounobservedIEDemplacement,duetoMCCDCinactionwasnottrivial.”(Gayl,p91)InthecaseofGBOSS,theMCCDCsolutionwasfarmorebeneficialtotheforcesincombatthanthealmostdisastrousIMEFG9effort.TheMCCDCsolutionwasfieldready.The“inaction”canbeattributedtoGaylandtheIMEFG9.
IMEFG9actionstoestablishGBOSSwereincompetent.GBOSSillustratesthatforcesincombatcanestablishneeds,butareseverelychallengedinotheraspectsofcombatdevelopment.
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Thischapterofthisstudywillinclude“processfoul”aspectsofGBOSS.TheMarine
CorpsagreedonthecapabilitiesneededbutthenhadtowatchasIMEFG9insistedonincompetentequipmentefforts.IttooktimetogettotherightdecisionsastheMarineCorpsledtheway.
TheGBOSSeffortdemonstratedhowcombatdevelopmentworksdespitedeepseated
disagreements.Theemailsandcoordinationwerecontinuousandcontentious.Bywayofcomparison,nosimilarcoordinationwasperformedwithMRAPbetweenAugust2005andMay2006.Thischapteriswhatcombatdevelopmentlookslikewhenthedeployedforcewantsacapability.OnlyafterMayof2006didthesamelevelofcombatdevelopmentstartwithMRAP.Theperiodof“noMRAPcoordination”coincidedwiththeperiodof“noMRAPdemand”.
AsopposedtoMRAPefforts,GaylwasactuallyinvolvedwithISRdevelopmentalefforts.
Thisinvolvement,however,wasdeeplyflawedandhisrecollectionsdepartedfromreality.Persistentsurveillance(oftencalledPISR)wasnewtradespaceandin2004thisauthor,GaylandafellowofficerwerediscussingdevelopingscenariosforPISRtraining.Gaylresponded,“Mike,Nicework-captureswellSteve'searliestvisionofthispossibility,andnowCMC'sinterest(expressedatDARPAlastFriday)aswell.IwillbeworkingonthePersistenceCapabilityUNSsoonest-willsendtoyouguysandJimLasswellwhenitgetsmoving.V/RFranz”(Gaylemaildtd9/16/2004).GaylcorrectlynotedQuantico’svisionin2004.Thisvisionwastheprecursortoequipmentdevelopment.GayllatercritiquedQuanticoforitslackofISRvision.
Gayl’srecollectionofeventswereflawedashewritesinhisstudy:“TheMEF(Fwd)’s
tacticalgapsinSAweresignificant,asinsufficientforceswerecommittedforthegivenmissionandterrain,andcompensatoryISRhadnotbeenprovidedtomakeupthedifference.ThiswasespeciallysowhentheMEFlaterassumedthemissionofMNF-W.Regrettably,MCCDCcombatdevelopersdidnotpushsuchcapabilitiestothewarfighters.”(Gayl,pxi-xii)Thespecificequipmentsuitesthatwerepushedwillbediscussed.GBOSScapabilitieswere“pushed”throughout2005andinto2006beforetheGBOSSUUNSwassubmitted.Operationalcommanderswereinitiallyhesitantinacceptingsystemsthateventuallywereinhighdemand.GBOSSsystemsfitthiscategory.
Gayl,asamemberoftheadvocate,hadresponsibilitiesindevelopingsurveillancecapabilities.Hewrote:“ConcurrentlywithMRAPrequests,from2004throughearly2007AdvocateandoperatorrequestswererepeatedlysubmittedformobiletacticalpersistentISRcapabilities,includinghighaltitudeairships,armedandunarmedTierIIUnmannedArialVehicles(UAV),mobiletower-mountedcameras,andcovertminiaturesensorsuites.Inallcases,thoseISRcapabilitieswereeitherdelayedordeniedbycombatdevelopersatQuantico.”(Gayl.pxii-xiii)Gayl,asanadvocate,onlyofferedaproposalforahighaltitudeairship(2004)thatwasneverinhighdemandduetocapabilityrestraints.Hethencriticizedcombatdevelopers(despitebeingone):“ThisisduetoacombinationofinnerprovincialIraqi
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re-alliancesandthedramaticbenefitsofpersistenttacticalISR,andlater,cementedwithMRAPsandadditionaltroops.HadISRandothertoolsofCINbeenfieldedpromptlyinpastyearsbycombatdeveloperstheIEDemergencyandurgentneedforMRAPsmayneverhavematerialized.”(Gayl,p54)Gayl,astheAdvocateS&TOfficer,wasfocusedonnichecapabilitiesandneversubmittedaviablePISRUNS/UUNS.TheISRtoolsforCOINwerepushedbycombatdevelopersbutwereoftenrejected.OnceUUNS/UNS/JUONSweresubmittedbyIMEFandMNF-W,theaforementionedcapabilitieswereenthusiasticallysupported.
ThischapterwilldemonstratethatcombatdevelopersweretheleadinPISRdevelopmentandencouragedIMEFtoacceptequipmentthattheyeventuallyrequested.“IttookextraordinaryeffortsbyIMEF(Fwd)toforcethefieldingofMNF-W-widethreat-mitigatingISR,buttheIEDemergencygrewtothepointthatatleastinitiallyISRalonewouldnotbeabletostemthecasualties.”(Gayl,p33)Gayl’sstatementiseasilydisproved.Anaccuratestatementwouldbe“IttookextraordinaryeffortstoestablishaPISRcapabilityinMNF-WduetotheextraordinarilyinepteffortsbyGaylandthoselikemindedintheIMEFG-9.”
SeveralofthecriticalelementsoftheMRAPissuecenteraroundtheabsenceofdemand/coordination.Theseabsencesaremoredifficulttoillustrateasthereisalsoanabsenceofemailsandotherdocumentation.GBOSS,ontheotherhand,wasactuallyindemandduringtheperioddiscussedbyGayl.Emails,briefsanddiscussionsrequiredforcoordinatingtheprovisionofequipmentactuallyoccurred.SimilarMRAPemails,briefsanddiscussionsdidnotoccurasMRAPwasnotindemandfortheperiodGaylmentions.Thecontrastbetweenacapabilityindemand(GBOSS)andacapabilitynotindemand(MRAP)isnoteworthy.
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15A-QUANTICOISRACTIONSLEADTHEWAY
MCCDCISReffortswereoftentimesleadingthewayforMarineCorpsandDODISR
efforts.
MCCDCEngagedC-RAMandRAIDprogramstoprovideISRfocusedcapabilityEarlyoninOIFQuanticoorganizationsstartedtoexplorevariousnewsurveillance
systemsassociatedwithCOIN.ElementsofQuanticowerestrongadvocatesforvarioussurveillancesystems,buttherewasnostatedrequirementfromtheoperatingforces.SeveraldemonstrationsofnewcapabilitieswereconductedinordertoeducatetheMarineCorps.TheCounterRocketArtilleryMortar(C-RAM)programhadanadvancedinterestinsurveillancesystems.C-RAMhadanS&TeffortthatdrewequipmentfromacrossthesurveillanceindustryandtheC-RAMprogramconductedseveraldemonstrationsfortheMarineCorpsin2004and2005.
TheC-RAMdemonstrationsincludedeverysurveillancesystemthatwouldbeincluded
onthetowerseventuallyknownasGBOSS.Theyincludedthet2000,t3000,StarSafireIIandIII,andDopplerradars.TheC-RAMsystemwillbediscussedinalatersection.
OneofthesystemsthatC-RAMusedthateventuallybecamethemainGBOSSsystem
wastheRAIDtower.In2005thisauthorhadtheopportunitytowitnessRAIDtowersinactionatseveralFOBsintheITO.TheywerefieldedbothindividuallyandaspartofC-RAM.InallcasestheC-IEDworthinessoftheRAIDtowerwasdemonstrated.EventheC-RAMtowers(focusedonindirectfireattacks)weremorevaluedasC-IEDsystems.ApproximatelyfiftypercentofallIEDattacksoccurredwithinfivekilometersofaFOB.TheRAIDtowerhadtherangetoobservetheseIEDactivities.
In2005,theMarineCorpswasreluctanttouseRAIDsurveillancesystemsdespitetheir
availabilityintheater(inearly2006therewere8aerostatsand26RAIDtowersintheITO(Reedemaildtd2/8/2006)).Severalcommanderssuggestedtothisauthorthatthetowerscouldbeusedasapointofaimforindirectfire,asignificantthreatatthetime.CombatdevelopersremainedconvincedthatthissystemwasextremelyvaluableandinneedofintegrationintotheMarineCorps.
TherewereavailableRAIDsystemsintheITOsosupplywasnottheproblem.The
introductionofanewcapabilitytounitsalreadyincombatwastheproblem.Toweredcameraswouldhavetobeintroducedinthetrainingprocessinordertofamiliarizecombatunitspriortodeployment.
MCCDCwasdevelopingeveryaspectofGBOSSpriortoIMEFG9submissionoftheGBOSSUUNS.
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MCCDCheldademonstrationofelementsoftheC-RAMsystematQuanticoafterwhichMCCDCleadershipcommittedtofurthereffort:“LtGenMattisandMajGenStalderattendedanddemoofthissystemonMondayandhaveprovidedguidancetoproceedwithcoordinationtolookattherequirementsofhavingasystemsenttoMAGTFTCforExForusepotentiallyatFOBWilson.”(Baczkowskiemaildtd3/20/2006)Coordinationoccurredwiththemaintrainingcommandfordeployingforceswhichresponded:“IthinkthereislimitedutilityinsettingitupherebecausetheonlytasksIseebeingtraininedaretheDetectandWarntaskfortheentireexerciseforceandtheSystemIntegrationpiecefortheBnStaff.”(Baczkowskiemaildtd3/20/2006).Thedetectandwarncapabilitiesweresubsequentlyfielded.ByMarch2006MCCDCwascoordinatingthetrainingoftheforceonGBOSSequipmentpriortotheforcesubmittingtheneedforthesameequipment(GBOSS).InApril2006MCCDChadestablishedaprogrammaticrelationshipfortheprovisionofsurveillanceequipmenttoMAGTFTC(McDonnoughemaildtd4/6/2006).
Gayl’sfabrications
MCCDChadestablishedapersistentsurveillancestrategyandpersistentsurveillancetrainingandwasintroducingpersistentsurveillanceequipmentintotheITObeforeIMEFsubmitteditsGBOSSUUNS.MCCDCsawthegapandcommencedeffortstoaddressit.Gayl,astheadvocate,onlyrecommendedanexperimentalhighaltitudeairship(MEPOP)thatnevermadeittoMarinesinMNF-Wandwasnotpushedbyhisowncommand.Therejectionofsurveillanceequipmentwillbediscussedinlatersections.
Gayl,asanelementoftheadvocatestaff,waslargelyabsentfromdiscussionsadvancing
persistentsurveillancebeyondhisexperimentalairship.ThepracticaldevelopmentofPISRwascarriedoutbyMCCDC,yetGaylstates:
• “TheemergencyappearedandcontinuedtogrowinMNF-WbecauseMCCDCcombat
developersdidnotequiptheMEFsforCOINcontingencies,withtacticalISRbeingthemostpressinggap,aswillbediscussedlater.”(Gayl,p29)
• “TheauthorofthiscasestudysuggeststhatinthecaseoftheUSMCthewoundwaslargelyself-inflictedasoperatingforcesweredeniedanadequatemixofISR(bothtroopsandcameras)bycombatdevelopersthatmighthavehelpedpreventtheIEDemergencyaltogether.Inshort,theMRAPwasneededtocompensateforalackofmaterialpreparationforCOINinIraq.”(Gayl,p84)
• “Finally,thevastexpansesofIraqandalimitedMEFfootprintmeantthatSAwouldhavetobeaugmentedwithpersistentISR.MCDDCdidnotinitiateactiontoprepareforthisobviousgapanddelayeditsdevelopmentevenaftertheMEFsfeltcompelledtoaskforit.”(Gayl,p86)
• “IttookextraordinaryeffortsbyIMEF(Fwd)toforcethefieldingofMNF-W-widethreat-mitigatingISR,buttheIEDemergencygrewtothepointthatatleastinitiallyISRalonewouldnotbeabletostemthecasualties.”(Gayl,p86)
• “ItcanbeconvincinglyarguedthatifUSMCcombatdevelopershadactedassertivelyontheinformationthatwasknowntothemin2003withrespecttoISRneedsand
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loomingOIFchallenges,differentconditionswouldhaveexistedinAlAnbarProvince.”(Gayl,p87)
Chapters4-6discusstheactualresponsibilitiesforcombatdevelopment.ThecombatdevelopmentresponsibilitiesoftheAdvocates,ComponentCommanders,MROCandeveryotherelementofthecombatdevelopmentprocessalsoapplyforISRcapabilities.Allwereresponsible,yetGaylonlycreatedfabricationsfocusedonMCCDC.
MCCDCactionsaftertheGBOSSUUNSestablished
OncetheGBOSSneedmanifesteditself,MCCDCpersonnelaccomplishedthefollowing:• SolicitedfundingandestablishedaninitialbuyofRAID(ReedandAllenemailsdtd
9/14/2006)• Attemptedtoorganizejointfunding($190M)forRAIDdespitethelackofaJUONS
(Johnsonemaildtd10/13/2006)• Agreedtosupportthelessercapability(T3000)demandedbyIMEF(Fwd)(see
TechnologyIssuessection)(Charboneauemaildtd11/2/2006)(Allesemaildtd12/7/2006)(Tomczakemaildtd12/19/2006)
• IncorporatedIMEFCamerasystemsintoMAGTFTCtraining(Albrechtemaildtd11/16/2006)(Allesemaildtd3/2/2007)(Albrechtemaildtd3/29/2007)
• ConductedsafetytestsonIMEFequipment(Koenigemaildtd12/19/2006)• IntegratedIMEFequipment(Southerlandemaildtd1/5/2007)• DemonstratedthesystemsfortheMarineCorps(Boveemaildtd6/26/2006)• Conductedtraining(Albrechtemailsdtd8/27/2007and9/14/2007)
Despiteclaimstothecontrary,MCCDCpersonnelfullysupportedthecombatdevelopment
ofIMEF(Fwd)GBOSSeffortsundeterredbythesubstandardIMEFequipmentdecisions.Gaylclaims:“Requestsforspecificmaterialsolutionswerefrequentlyrejectedoutrightwhenevertheneedswerenotunderstood,orviewedascompetitionagainstPORs.”(Gayl,pxiii)Inreality,MCCDCworkeddiligentlyonallrequeststoincludethelesserIMEFGBOSSconfiguration.Thelesserconfigurationwouldeventuallymature.
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15B-ISRASACAPABILITY
ISRcapabilitiesareoneofthefastestmaturingcapabilitiesintheDOD.DuringOIF,theMarineCorpspioneeredISRstrategiesandcapabilitiesinadditiontoISRpiecesofequipment.Atthesametime,theMarineCorpshadagapwithinitsprocurementprocessindefiningequipmentstrategiesregardingoverlappingpiecesofequipment.Forexample,ISRcanbetoweredcameras,Dopplerradars,satellites,C2equipmenttodisplaypictures,aerostats,UAVsetc.ThebreadthofISRequipmentwaswideandgrowing.TheproblemoccuredaseachoneofthesystemswastheproductofasingleUNS/UUNSfocusedonthatspecificneed.InthecaseofISR,theproblemwasmagnifiedassurveillance(ISR)assetsbecameavailabletonon-Intelligence(ISR)communities.Theintegrationofalloftheneedsandthedeterminationofapathforwardforthetradespaceoftendidnotexistinthecombatdevelopmentprocess. InanattempttobroadlydefinethepathforwardforISR,aPISRStrategywasdeveloped.ThePISRStrategywascreatedatMCCDCandstaffedtotheMarineCorpsinordertobroadlydescribewheretheMarineCorpswasheadedforPISRfocusedontheITO.ColonelChudobastaffedthedocumentwiththefollowingsummary:“Theattachmentcontains"APersistentISRStrategyforIEDMitigation,"anoutputoftherecentPersistentISRworkinggrouphostedbyMCWL.ThedocumentrepresentscollaborationamongkeystakeholdersinthePersistentISReffort;intentistousethisstrategytodriveappropriaterequirementsdevelopment,proofofconcept,andexperimentationefforts,withtheobjectiveofrapidlydeployingsufficientlymaturecapabilitiestoouroperatingforces.Wedeliberatelycraftedthestrategytocaptureourspecificviewofthechallenge,whilemirroringthebroaderJIEDDOcontext.Webelievethatthis"nesting"ofpurposewillallowustobettercompeteforresourceswhilemeetingourservice-specificneeds.”(Allesemaildtd4/8/2006).ItwasstaffedtoIMEF(Fwd)andshortlyafterwardsIMEF(Fwd)producedtheGBOSSUUNS. TheGBOSSUUNSwasamanifestationoftheconceptsinthePISRStrategy.TheGBOSSUUNSwassubmittedtwomonthsafterthePISRStrategywasstaffed.ThePISRStrategywasaccompaniedbyadvocacyforequipmentthatwouldfillelementsofthestrategy.Despitetheconceptual,tacticalandequipmentpushfromcombatdevelopers,Gaylfalselystates:“Non-materialsolutionsincludingTTPchangesandincreaseduseofairreflectedthesubstantiallackofoperationalinsightofthemembersoftheCDIB.Additionally,theCDIB’sproposedCOAsomittedthesinglemosteffectiveinnovationofthewar,namelypersistentsurveillancetocompensateforthelackofgroundforcesinMNF-WandelsewhereintheITO.HadtheMCCDCbrieferproposedthefieldingoflong-rangecamerastoachievean“unblinkingeye”alongMSR’stheproposedcoursesofactionwouldhaveappearedtoreflectintelligentandthoroughanalysis.EvenafterrequestsfromIMEF(Fwd)in2006andearly2007foranorder-of-magnitudeincreaseinScanEagleUAVsandothercameras,MCCDCdidnotfulfillthem.”(Gayl,p30).Intruth,theCDIBledthewayindevelopingthe“singlemosteffectiveinnovationofthewar”.Gaylcontinued:“Insteadofpredicting,planning,andpushingcreativeISR
ISRcapabilitiessawexponentialgrowthduringOEF/OIF.
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solutionstotheMEFs,combatdevelopersallowedgapsISRtogrowpromptingthecostlyin-theateremergencythatledtotheMRAPsurge.”(Gayl,p87).Insum,bothMCCDCandIMEFrealizedtheneedforapersistentsurveillancecapabilityincreaseandplannedaccordingly.AllmajorMarineCorpscommandsconcurredwiththeMCCDCstrategy(Gayl’spositionatthetimeisunknownashewasnotaparticipantuntillate2006,wellaftertheGBOSSUUNSandPISRStrategywerepublished). Despitetheuniversalagreementontheconcepts,seriousdisagreementarosewhenIMEF(Fwd)attemptedtoselectandcontractforthematerialsolutionsthatcouldachievethegoalsofthestrategyandGBOSSUUNS.
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15C-IMEFG9FLUBSTHEGBOSSTECHNOLOGY
IMEFG9GBOSStechnicalsolutionswerelackingandprovidedfarlesscapabilitytoMarinesthantheMCCDCsolutions.AfterRIP/TOAwithIIMEF,IMEFG9materialsolutionswerequicklyabandonedbytheoperatingforces.
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IMEFG9GBOSStowerusedtwoT3000camerastoachieve360degreecoverage.Thecamerasdidnothave:
• Stabilization• Laserpointer• Autotracker• Spotterscope
IMEFG9GBOSSTowerwas106feettall(withtrailernotpictured)
JLENSRAIDcameracovered360degreeswithmorerange.
JLENSRAIDtower106/107feettallwithtrailershown.
IMEFG9GBOSSTrailerwasoftennottowableandthereforedifficulttodisplace.
JLENSRAID(asopposedtoIMEFG9variant)camewith:
• JointFunding(noprocurementcosttoUSMC)
• Maintenancefunding• ProgramOfficeSupport• SpareCameras• SparePartsforentiresystem• Gyrostabilization(morerangeand
detail)• FSRs• Intheatersupportstructure• Towabletrailers• Proventrackrecordincombat• IPaddressforC2networking
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TheoutwardsimilaritiesofthetwotoweredsystemsshowthatbothIMEFG9andMCCDCunderstoodthevalueoftoweredgroundbasedobservation.Bothcommandsunderstoodthesametacticalsolutionoftoweredcameras.Thedifferencesarosefromdisputesaboutthebestmaterialtobuildthetoweredsystems.TheMCCDCrecommendationwasfarsuperiortotheIMEFG9solutioninmanyways.IMEFG9however,continuedtoadvocatefortheirmaterialsolution.Thissectioncomparesthetwoapproaches.
IMEFG9“NotInventedHere”(NIH)mindsetOneoftheprimemoversbehindtheIMEFrefusaltoacceptequipmentwastheNIH
mindset.SeveralstaffofficersnotedthisattitudeamongsttheIMEFG9personnelandtheMCWLliaisonnoted,“Theseguysarejustliketheirpredecessors,everyonehasanopinionandNIHisaliveandwell.”(Ouztsemaildtd4/4/2006)TheIMEFG9wasagainsttheuseofArmyequipmentdespitemuchofithavingbeentestedincombatoveryears.InacommentaboutRAID:“TheproblemisthattheMCWLfolksdonothaveenoughoperationalexperienceintheAORandtheydonothavethesystemexperiencerequiredtoavoidthebadtechnologyprogramsthattheArmyIsofferingforouruse,suchasPDTS.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006).OfnoteisthatIMEFusedanArmycontractwithArmyequipmentasthebasisfortheircameracontract(Jankowskiemaildtd11/2/2006).
NotonlydidtheNIHmindsetexistfordeterminingthetypeofgeartopurchase,butitalso
existedforwherethegearwastobeassembled.IMEFwantedtoassembletheirsurveillancetowersinIraqinsteadofinCONUS:“Steve,Thanksfortheinfo.WhatisthecostunassembledandwithouttheFSR.Thepreviouslystatedandpresentclearintenthereistodotheassemblyouthereandtakecareofitouthere.NOFSRdesiredorrequired.”(Hostetteremaildtd10/10/2006).ThisoccurreddespitethecoordinationwithRaytheontoengineerthetoweraccordingtoIMEFspecs(Jankowskiemaildtd10/12/2006).TheinsistenceofIMEFG9to“doityourself”ledtosubsequent“doityourself”baddecisions.Forexample,insteadoforderingacamerawithgyro-stabilization,IMEFG-9determinedthattheycouldsimplytorquedowntheguywiresonthetoweruntilthecamerajitterdisappeared(Lapierreemaildtd11/29/2006).IMEFG9rejectedequipment,engineeringsupportfortheirsystem,assemblyassistancefortheirsystemandFSRsupportfortheirsystemdespitetherebeingnocosttotheMEF. IMEFG9ContractingFailures ThemostdisconcertingexampleofincompetenceduringtheentiretyoftheGBOSSdebatesisthatIMEFdidnotknowwhatitwascontractingfor.TheIMEFG9stated:“IthinkweallagreedthattheT-3000Multi-sensorfromFLIRdoesmeettheI-MEFrequirement.Wearelookingtoseeavehiclemovingattenmilesandhumanandinmotionateightmiles.Wewouldliketobeabletoseeexactlywhatthehumanisholdinganddoingatsixmiles.Idon’tthinkweneedtosayanythingmoreaboutthisissue.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006).Thevehiclerangewaspossible,thehumandetectionrangewashighlydoubtfulandthe“humanholdinganddoing”wasanimpossibility.Thevendorpointedouttherangesasmuchlessforspottinga
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humanletaloneseeingwhathewasholding(Crouseemaildtd11/7/2006).IMEFincludedtherangethattheybelievedwasachievablebytheT3000cameraas20km(Jankowskiemaildtd11/2/2006).ThismisconceptionwasnotcorrectedbyLtColJankowski. Theemaildated11/8/2006fromMrCrouseissufficient,inandofitself,todemonstratewhyunitsincombatshouldnotbeconductingprocurement.TheT3000cameraorderwasdated18Sept2006.TheIMEFG9hadquestionsabouttheirorderwithFLIR.ThesequestionsandanswersoccurredtwomonthsaftertheIMEForder(November2006):Gary,Ijustleftavoicemail.WearelookingatGyroStbilizationinourcameras.Didweorderthatinourbuy?Whatdoesitdo?Whywouldweneedit?Canweaddittoourcameras?Howmuchisit?Thecontractorresponded:Didweorderthatinourbuy?No.Thereisastabilizedpan/tiltavailablefortheT3000butitisexpensive(anadditional$30K+/-).Itonlyworksatabout1Hz,andIamnotcertainitwouldprovideanoperationallysignificantimprovementovertheplannedconfiguration.Whatdoesitdo?Gyrostabilizationtakesthemotionoutoftheimages.Inthecaseofmast-mountedsystems,themotioniscausedbyshakingorjitterinthemast,fromwind,etc.Themotionisbothlowfrequency(sway)andhighfrequency(jitter).Thehighfrequencymotion(upto50-60Hzormore)willmaketheimagelookblurry,andthelowfrequencymotionwillmakeithardtostayontarget.Stabilitynotonlyaffectstheimage(reducingdetection,recognitionandidentificationrangeandmakingithardtostayontarget)butalsoaffectsthelaser.Withoutstabilizationofallpayloads,youcan'tkeepthelaserontarget.Whywouldweneedit?Toprovidemaximumtargetdetection,recognitionandidentificationrange,toallowthesystemtostayontarget(don'twanttolosethetargetinagustofwind),andtokeepthelaserontarget(togetaccuratetargetrangeandlocation).Canweaddittoourcameras?Notreally.Stabilizationhastobedoneatthesystemlevel.Youwantallcamerasandlaserspointingatthesametargetatthesametime(boresightretention),andyouhavetoaccountforallthemassesanddynamicmotions.Togetmaximumperformance,thestabilizationhastobeontheorderof10microradians.Thisisequivalentto1meteratarangeof100,000meters.(Crouseemaildtd11/8/2006)
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ThispostcontractlineofquestioningwasechoedbyGayl.Hetookthefurtherstepof
criticizingQuanticoforpresentingfactsthatdidnotsupporttheIMEFequipmentsuiteinanemailtoMrCrouse:“Asyoumayalreadybeaware,therearemanyatQuanticoandelsewherethatinsistourT3000swillbeunstablizedandthereforeareunsuitedtoG-BOSS.”(Crouseemaildtd11/8/2006).ItwasnotQuanticoinsisting,itwasIMEFG9whodidnotorderstabilizedcameras.Almostasegregiousistheabsenceofknowledgeofwhatexactlywasorderedinthefirstplace.Theincompetencedidnotstopthere.Gaylcontinued:“ThefactisthatifwecouldaffordgyrostabilizationlikethatonStarSaphirewewouldincludeit.Unfortunately,wearestuckwithaspendingcap.”(Crouseemaildtd11/8/2006).TheStarSaphireswereaffordablebutIMEFG9wasadamantlyopposedtobuyingthemthroughtheMarineCorpsorthroughJointprocesses.
IMEFG9continuedtowonderabouttheirorderastheyonceagainaskedtheFLIR
vendor(Hans)whatitcontained:“Hans,Goodtomeetyouifonlybyemail!WehavereceivedthefirsttwoT3000MScameras.
Theydonotcomewiththenetworkcommandandcontroloptions,additionallytheydonothavetheLaserDesignatoronthem.
Wheretheseoptionspartofthecontract,ifsoaretheytobedeliveredseparately?”
(Crouseemaildtd3/6/2015)Onceagain,thefailureoftheIMEFG9tounderstandtheirowncontractreflectedan
inabilitytoconductallelementsofcombatdevelopment.
HighdemandfromCommandersforMCCDCSolutionDuringaCMCtriptoAnbar,itwasnotedthatRAIDwasinhighdemand:“Charlie,Just
cameoutofIraqonCMCtrip.ResoundingcallformoreJLENS/RAIDtowersfromGenZilmertoeveryBncmdrwesaw.WewillworkthiswithJIEDDO.”(Allesemaildtd10/3/2006).CharliewastheSES5DeputyforDCP&R(finances).DespitethedemandbytheCGandBnCmdrs,theIMEFG9continuedtoinsistontheirmodel.TheMCWLliaisonwrote“IfRAID/RAIDliketowerscouldsatisfytherequirementbelievetheywouldhavebeenrequested.”(Chillemaildtd5/1/2008).ThiswasfourdaysaftertheALLESemailabove.IMEFG9continuedtorefuseRAIDtowersdespitethedemandsignalfromBnCmdrsandtheMEFCmdr.Inordertoadvancethelessertechnicalsolution,IMEFG9andGaylfeltitnecessarytocriticizethesystemthatwasactuallyindemandbytheCGIMEFandhiscommanders.Gayl,notknowingthesuccessandfuturesuccessofRAID,continuedtomischaracterizeRAIDinhisstudy:
• “Ontheotherhand,theJointIEDDefeatOrganization(JIEDDO),spentsignificantresourcestorespondtoArmytacticalISRneedsintheater.TheRapidAerostatInitialDeployment(RAID)aerostatandelevatedcameratowerplatformcombinationsweredeployedtoprovideISRinsupportofFOBdefenseandlocalforceprotection.However,RAIDtowersandaerostatswereentirelyfocusedonFOBdefenseandforce
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protection.TheMarinesandSoldiersofMNF-WwerefocusedonconductingoffensiveCOIN.TheydidsoinspiteoftheISRgapinAlAnbarProvinceandpaidaheavycostincasualties,especiallyfromIEDs.”(Gayl,p80)
• “TheArmy’sFOB-defense-orientedRAIDandJLENScapabilitieswerenotcapableoffulfillingtheMEF(Fwd)’sspecificneeds.”(Gayl,p80)
• “Similarly,theJointLandAttackCruiseMissileDefenseElevatedNettedSensor/RapidAerostatInitialDeployment(JLENS/RAID)capabilitiesdidnotsatisfytheG-BOSSrequirement.”(Gayl,p91)IMEFG9believedthattheirmarketresearchwasaccurate.Theystated:“Whenwe
startedwritingtheG-BOSSUUNS,inAprilofthisyear,weweretoldthattheStarSaFireIIIcamerathatisusedontheRAIDtowerswouldnotbeavailableuntilsometimeinlate2008.WewerealsotoldthattheRAIDtowersthemselveswouldnotbeavailableuntil2009.”(Allesemaildtd12/11/2006).TheMEFG9waswrongonbothcountsasdemonstratedbytheRAID/StarSafire(SS)IIIfieldingin2007through2008.TheflawedresearchcontinuedtobehighlightedastheIMEFG9stated:“ThefolksatFLIR,(emailaddressdeleted),toldusthattheyhadanothercamerathatwouldmeetourrequirementforacamerathatcanbecontrolledfromadatanetworkwitha20KMvisualrange,laserdesignator,laserrangefinder,optionalGyrostabilizationanddaylightsensorallinonepackage.TheonlylimitationontheT3000MSascomparedtotheStarSaFireIIIisthatitwasnotmeanttobeputonanAerostatorahelicopter.”(Allesemaildtd12/11/2006).Therewasobviously“miscommunication”asthe20kmrangeandlaserdesignatorwerefantasyandthe“optionalGyrostabilization”wasafarinferiorelectronicstabilization(barelyqualifyingasstabilization).
C-RAMandRAIDnotunderstoodbyGaylandtheIMEFG9IMEFG9wasalsohostiletoC-RAMsupportingtheGBOSSeffort.TheIMEFG9stated:
“C-RAMisnotintendedtobeexpeditionarybecauseitdependsonalargefixeddatacenterateachFOB.”(Lapierreemaildtd1/24/2007).C-RAMwasasystemofsystemsandtherewereelementsthatwerenotabletobeexpeditionary(e.g.-thePhalanxsystemsusedtointerceptincomingprojectileswerenotexpeditionary).TheIMEFG9failedtounderstandthatelementsofC-RAMsuchastheRAIDtower,however,werealreadybeingusedbyIMEFinanexpeditionaryrole.
Gaylcontinuedhisdisplayofequipmentignoranceashestated:“Atthispointitisclear
toallotherparties,includingSYSCOMandMARCENTthatwehavearequirementdifferentfromCRAM,andno,theArmydoesnothaveexperienceinthis.”(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007).EveryactionofficerworkingGBOSSknewthatC-RAMwasadifferentrequirement.EveryactionofficeralsounderstoodtheoverlapandtheopportunitytotakeadvantageoftheC-RAMGBOSSoverlap.C-RAMwasalreadydeployedorbeingdeployedatFallujah,Ramadi,TQ,AlAsadandHit.TheuseoftheC-RAMprogramofficefortheirsurveillancesupport(asopposedtofullC-RAM)capabilitieswasano-brainer.TheC-RAMsectionwilldiscussthisinmoredetail,butaninitialsupportbriefisprovidedintheSoutherlandemaildtd2/14/2007.Theissuesinthebriefwerepartofthe“materialsolution”thatGaylincorrectlyclaimsweresolvedintheGBOSS
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UUNS.OnceIIMEFtookoverforIMEFmanyoftheseissuesbegantobeaddressed(Bakeremaildtd3/19/2007).
ThetowerdecisionThelineofthinkingthatcausedtheconfusionwithC-RAMalsoexistedwithRAID.C-
RAMwasasystemofsystemsthatincludedRAID.Theconceptoftoweredsurveillancecausedconfusionasthematerialsolutionswereoffered.IMEFG2personnelwerealsoconfusedbytheofferedsystems.IMEFG2stated:“IthinkwhatMCCDCandMCSChavebeenoptingforarebaseperimetersystems.Theywouldimprovebasesecuritybutwouldnot:·providepersistentsurveillancealongtheMNF-W’sMSRs/ASRs·wouldnotdisrupttheInsurgency·counterthethreatofIEDs·allowforremoteviewing,storage,manipulation,andtransmissionofdataaroundtheAO.”(Oltmanemaildtd9/1/2006).SurveillancewasatoolthatappliedtobasesecurityaswellasotherCOINapplications.Forexample,asystemlocatedonabasecouldspotIEDemplacement,perimeterbreachesandindirectfirepointsoforigin.Partsofthesystemsweremobileandpartswererestrictedtobase.TheRAIDtowercouldperforminalloftheabovemissionareas. Eventually,theRAIDPMhadtorecusethemselvesfromassistinginthedevelopmentoftheT3000towersastheyhadalreadycompetedandselectedatoweredsystem(Reedemaildtd11/1/2006).EvenwhileworkingtoprovidetheIMEFG9configuration,MCCDCcontinuedtocomparethecapabilitiesofthetwosystems.MrCrouse,theFLIRvendor(forbothsystems)sentacomparisonofthecamerasshowingthevastlysuperiorcapabilityoftheSSIII(Crouseemaildtd11/7/2006).Inaseparateeffort,JIEDDOprovideditsownanalysisandcomparisonofthetwosystemsonceagainfavoringtheSSIII(Brooksemaildtd11/13/2006).EventuallyJIEDDOinsistedthatiftheyweregoingtospendmoneyontoweredcameras,thentheywouldhavetobeRAID(Allesemaildtd11/15/2006).TheMarineCorps,however,continuedtointegratetheIMEFG9configurationaswellastheRAIDpurchases(Southerlandemaildtd12/27/2006).
OneoftheissuesnotcoordinatedwithIMEFwasthefailuretobuytowerswiththecorrectmobility.SometowershavewheelsforlocaladjustmentonlyandarenottowablebyHMMWVorMRAP.IMEFG9,despitethetacticallycorrectneedfortowermobility,orderedtowersthatcouldnotbetowed.Theyhadtouse“low-boys”togetthemfromplacetoplace.(Southerlandemaildtd2/14/2007). Inordertoprovidecapability,Quanticoworked/supportedtheIMEFG9buyeventhoughithadnumeroustechnicalproblems(Choateemaildtd10/24/2006).Quanticocontinuedtolookforopportunitiestopurchaseeithervarietyofsystem(Allesemaildtd11/15/2006).InadditiontothetowerportionofGBOSS,therewasamasterstationrequirement.Quanticocontinuedtoworkoptionstosatisfythatrequirement(Lapierreemaildtd11/28/2006).TheentiretyoftheGBOSSrequirementhadelementsthatwereverysimilar
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toC-RAMeffortsandthatArmyprogramcontinuedtosupportGBOSSdevelopmentdespitetheconstantcriticismfromIMEF(Southerlandemaildtd2/14/2007).ThetechnicalaspectsofGBOSSwereeventuallysettledafterIMEFG9rotated.TheRAIDtowerbecamethebasetowerandhadDopplerandaT3000addedinvariousconfigurations. GBOSSCommunications
Gaylstatedinhisstudypublishedin2008:“Finally,byenablingatruevideoCOP,allauthorizedCFusersintheaterwillhaveaccesstoeveryindividualG-BOSScameraviewaswellaseveryconceivablecollectionofcameraviews.”(Gayl,p89)ThevideoCOPandmasterstationwereill-conceived.AsstatedbyGaylinhisstudy:“Second,itassimilates-intotheV-COPvideostreamsfromTierIIunmannedaerialvehicle(UAV)platformssuchastheScanEagleandSmallUnmannedCombatAirVehicle(SUCAV),aswellasthoseofTaskForce(TF)Odin,AngelFire,andWaspMicroUAV(MUAV)ISRplatforms.Third,G-BOSSassimilatesintotheCOPmicroterrainvideoISRinputsfromsuchgroundsourcesasthestationaryTacticalConcealedVideoSystem(TCVS)andthemobileCognition-BasedElectromagneticPatternAnalysisSystem(C-BEMPAS).”(Gayl,p89)TheV-COPwasdroppedbyIIMEFasarequirement.IMEFdidnotrequestitagain.TheV-COPandvideoaggregationasproposedinGBOSSwereneverrealizedduetoalackofuserneed.
Gaylstates:“TheG-BOSSconceptalreadyincorporatedthesensorinputsfromnetworkedtower-mountedcamerasandthemicroterraininputsofTCVSintheV-COP.Now,IMEF(Fwd)desiredtoincludetheoverheadimageryoftheSE,howeveronalargerandAORwidescale,therebycomplementingG-BOSSthroughoutMNF-W.”(Gayl,p93)Gayl’sG-BOSSCONOPSrequiredmobilenetworkedtowersfeedingintoaVideoCommonOperationalPicture(V-COP).TowerswouldbenetworkedtogetherasseenonGayl’sDDR&Epresentation.SomeoftheoriginaldiscussionsuggestedusingSATCOMandnotdirectlylinkingthetowers(notreflectedintheDDR&Ebrief).ThecommunicationssuiterecommendedbyGaylandIMEFG9wasinsufficientforGBOSSaloneletalonealloftheadditionsproposedintheDDR&Ebrief.TotheexistingcommunicationsdeficiencyGaylproposedadding(perDDR&Ebrief):
• Abiometricsnetwork• TCVS• SLATS• ScanEagle• AngelFire• TFOdinassets• SUCAV
OnesimplyhastolookthroughGayl’sDDR&Eslidestodeterminetheusesforthe
GBOSSnetwork.Thiswouldhavebeenasignificantcommunicationseffortforastaticgroundstationwithmajorcommsassets,letaloneamobiletower.AngelFirealonewouldhaveoverwhelmedthecommunicationsequipmentproposedinGBOSS.AtrainedcommunicatorcouldhavelookedatGayl’sslidesandimmediatelyrecognizedtheproposalascorrectly
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articulated,buttotallytechnicallyinfeasible.Mostreaders,however,arenottrainedcommunicatorsandthereforecannotcriticallyassessGayl’spresentation.
ProcessEarlyonintheprocessMajCharboneau,MCCDCactionofficer,hadaconversationwith
IMEFG9.Onehourafterwardshesentthisemail:
“Gentleman,thelatestonG-BOSS.Ijustcompletedanhourlongdiscussion[viasecurephone]with(IMEFG9)…Iinitiatedtheconnectionat1430today.Iupdated(IMEFG9)onouractivitieshere...andIalsohadaseriesofquestion[prepared]forhimtoanswer…mostimportantly…whoisthemanufactureofG-BOSS.
Hisresponse...wasthatthereisnomanufacture…G-BOSSisaconcept…thatdefines[describes]therequiredneed.Infact,(IMEFG9)statedthatitwashisdesign…[basedoffofhiscivilianbackground]andthattherewasalotofresearchputintotheG-BOSSconcept[UUNS].
Gentleman,Irecommendweimmediatelybeginthemarketresearchtoidentifypotentialsolutionstothisrequiredcapability…anduse"thegroundbasedoperationalsurveillancesystemconcept"asthebaselineapproachgoingintothiseffort.(IMEFG9)wasconcernedwiththisrecommendationandcautionedthatweshouldnotignorehisefforts.
Regardingthespecificrangerequirementsofthecameras…itwasdrivenbythesolution[T-3000]andnotbytherequirement.Thesamegoesfortheheightofthetowers…solutiondriven…notbasedoffofanyanalysis….aswellastheVSWAN…sameresponse.
Andhedidmakeitclearthatthiscapabilitywouldbeemployedinsidethewire…withinCOPs,orFOBs…andthatsecurityofthesesystemswasnotanissue…norwasmanpower.”(Johnsonemaildtd8/3/2006fromJohnstonemaildtd5/1/2008) HadIMEFG9stucktothesameposition,MCCDCandtherestofthesupportingestablishmentcouldhaveestablishedaneffectiveGBOSSprogrammuchfaster.InsteadIMEFG9becameinvolvedwithmaterialsolutions,contractingandtechnicalspecifications.Theensuingdelaysweretheresult.
Gaylpersonallyprovidedhisequipmentperspectiverepletewithinaccuracies.HesharedthesewithIMEFG9whosharedthemwithJankowski.SomeofGayl’serrorsweresimple:“Whenwillothersbegintounderstandthatthesinglemast-mountedT2000isnotaprecursor,itisratheracompletelydifferentcapabilitythantwotandemT3000cameras.”(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007).TheFLIRT2000wasavariantofcamerathatwasthevendormodelpriortotheFLIRT3000.Itwasaprecursor.TheT3000wasthesamegenericshapebuthadadditionalcapability.Gaylcontinued:“Furthermore,thematerialsolutiondoesn'tneedtobe
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developed,ratherithasbeendevelopedandnowneedstobefielded.”(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007).GaylclearlybelievedthatthematerialsolutionwasfullydevelopedbyIMEFG9.Thelessercameracapability,absenceofFSRs,absenceofspareparts,andignoranceofwhatwasactuallyorderedhavealreadybeendiscussedandwereknownbyGaylwhenhewrotethisemail.DespitetheknownflawsbyIMEF(asopposedtotheunknownwhichwereassignificant)Gaylcontinuedwitha“justfieldit”mindset.Communicationsandnetworkingissuesremainedunsolved.
IMEFG9orchestratedaquestionablebuy.Notonlywasitquestionable,butitcould
havebeenbetteraccomplishedbyMCCDC.HadIMEFG9notdecidedtobecomeinvolvedinmaterialsolutions,thenMarineswouldhavehadabettersolutionfasterandlegally.QuanticowassimplyattemptingtopickupthepiecesofadisastrousandineptIMEFG9procurementeffort.
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15D-COMMANDERFORWARDUUNS/JUONSDECISIONS
ManyofGayl’sISRaccusationsarebasedonincorrectperceptionsoftheCGIMEF(Fwd)attitudetowardsthesubmissionofneedstoMCCDCorthroughtheJointProcess.
TheuseofthejointprocesswasassociatedwithjointequipmentandIMEFG9oftenpreferredtheirownequipmentsolutions.GaylcritiquestheIMEFCGJLENSdecision:“ThisbecameevidentwhenCG,IMEFrefusedtoconsidertheemploymentofJLENStetheredblimpsforISRoverFOBsandCOPs,eventhoughArmywasemployingJLENSsuccessfully.AngelFirebecametheonlydefaultnear-termsolutiontoISRsinceCOTSScanEaglerequestsfromin-theatercontinuedtoberefusedbyMCCDC.”(Gaylp101).CGIMEFdidconsiderJLENSaerostats.Adecisionwasmadenottoemploythemduetoairspaceissues.NotonlydidIMEFrejectjointequipment,buttheyalsowerereluctanttousethejointprocess.
IMEFG9reportedthatCGIMEFwasnotinterestedintheJUONSprocessforGBOSS.HisdesirewastostaywiththeUUNSprocessthroughQuantico:“IjustspokewithGenZilmeragainonthisissue,heisnotinterestedintheJUONSprocesswithregardtoG-BOSS.S/F(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006).
TheIMEFG9alsosaidofhisleadership(assumedtheCGand/orDCG):“Jeff,Iamgladwespokeonthephonetonight.MyleadershipdoesnotwanttogototheJUONSprocesswithG-BOSS.Wehaveyettoreceiveanymaterialsolutionfromthatvenue,ourfirstJUONSwentin10FEB2006.”(Chillemaildtd8/18/2006).ThisauthorvolunteeredtowritetheJUONSforIMEF(Fwd)andwasrebuffed.
TheCOSreflectedtheIMEFG9negativeperspectiveonJUONS.HewrotetoIMEFG9:“IunderstandyourfrustrationontheJUONSandlackofmovement.IbelievethatfrustrationhasresultedintherequesttosubmitUUNSandJUONSandforMCCDCtousewhateverwillgettheresultthequickestandthelatitudetoexecute.”(Tomczakemaildtd8/18/2006).
DespitethepushfromMCCDCtosubmitaJUONS,IMEFcontinuedtoresist.InanemailtoBGenAllesthispointwasagainestablished:“Issues:ThereisnoJUONS.EveryresponseatJIEDDOindicatedtheneedforaJUONS.”(Allesemaildtd10/3/2006).ThefailuretosubmitaJUONSreflectedthefailuretousethejointsystemwithitsavailablejointfunding.
DespitetheclearandunambiguousdesiretonotsubmitaJUONS,Gaylfalselystates:“Inanefforttoreinforcetheinitialcapability,CG,IMEF(Fwd)submittedaJUONSinordertogainaccesstomoresubstantialJIEDDOfundingsinceG-BOSShelpedtheC-IEDfightintheITO.DuetoCG,IMEF(Fwd)’spersonalcircumventionofQuanticocombatdevelopers,the
GaylfabricatesthestorythatIMEFpreferredjointrequestsforISRinsteadofworkingthroughtheServicechain.EvenwhenMCCDCencouragedtheuseofJUONS,IMEFrefused.
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initialG-BOSStower,camera,andnetworkedcommunicationscapabilitiesbeganarrivinginMNF-WinDec06.CG,IMEF(Fwd)’semploymentofJUONStoavoidUSMCcombatdevelopersmirroredhisapproachtoMRAP.”(Gayl,p92).ItisdifficulttotellifGaylcreatedthisfabricationonhisownorifhewasfedfalseinformation.QuanticowaspushingfortheIMEFCGtosubmitaJUONS.IMEFrefusedonmultipleoccasionsasreflectedintheemailsabove.ThesimilaritytoMRAPdidexistinthatbothcasesdemonstratedalackofdemandsignalincriticalvenues.
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15E-C-RAMANDITSROLE
OneoftheareaswhereIMEF/MARCENTdidnotseeeyetoeyewasintheinvolvement
ofC-RAMasaprogrammanagerforelementsofGBOSS.Gaylstated:“Specifically,theCounterRocket,Artillery,andMortar(C-RAM)capability
didnotsatisfytheG-BOSSrequirement.G-BOSSisanoffensive,theater-wide,operationallyorientedtool,whileC-RAMwasatacticaldefensivetoolforForwardOperatingBases(FOBs).”(Gayl,p91).C-RAMwasneverenvisionedtobethesamethingasGBOSS.Therewas,however,significantoverlap.Gaylcontinued:“Instead,MCCDCpursuedalong-termbusinesscaseforUSMCincreasingitsstakeintheC-RAMProgramthatwouldnotfilltheG-BOSSneed.”(Gayl,p91).MCCDCdidnothaveastakeinC-RAM.ItwasanArmyprogramthatfieldedtotheentiretyoftheITO.SinceMarinesinAnbarweremorefrequentlytargetedbyindirectfire,C-RAMhadamoresignificantpresence.C-RAMsetupsystemsinFallujah,Ramadi,TQ,AlAsadandHit.TheywereinAnbarandwellestablished.
C-RAMwasanArmyprogram,sotheMarineCorpscreatedanUUNSwhichprovidedan
integrationmechanismbetweenthetwoServices.TheMarineCorpsUUNSwascalled“ExpeditionarySystemofSystemsforBaseDefense”(ESSBD).ThisUUNSusedC-RAMverbiageandwasalsoorganizedsimilarlytoC-RAM(Shape,Sense,Respond,Warn,Intercept,ProtectandC2).ThisUUNSwassignedbyBGenNeller(IMEFDCG)(Watsonemaildtd1/27/2006).BGenNellerunderstoodthatESSBDandC-RAMencompassedthesameefforts(Clarkemaildtd12/9/2005).IMEFhadalreadylistedC-RAMundertheirnumber2priority(Litakeremaildtd10/20/2005).CountertoGayl’sstatements,IMEFclearlydemandedC-RAM.
ThesupportingestablishmenteffectivelycoordinatedC-RAMsystemdeploymentto
Anbar.C-RAMdevelopmentcontinuedandseveralelementswerebroughttoQuanticoanddemonstrated(McDonnoughemaildtd2/24/2006).ThedemonstrationLOIincludedashortparagraphontheSensepillar:“Sense-displayvarioussensorsandtheC2nodesthatintegratethesensorinput.Radarfeedswillbesimulated.
Sensors–(EO/IR–RAID(RapidAerostatInitialDeployment),ScanEagleUAV;MSTAR(Man-portableSurveillanceandTargetAcquisitionRadar);WSTI(Wide-areaSurveillanceThermalImager)”(McDonnoughemaildtd2/24/2006)ItwasclearthatC-RAMhadalreadystartedtheworkoftoweredsensordeployment
andintegration.GeneralMattisdirectedthataC-RAMsurveillancecapabilitybeintroducedto29Palmsforunittraining(Baczkowskiemaildtd3/20/2006).Thesupportingestablishment
C-RAM,indemandbytheIMEFDeputyCommandingGeneral,wasnotsupportedbytheIMEFG9.ThevastlysuperiorequipmentandsupportbyC-RAMwaseventuallyadopted/deployedbytheMarineCorps.
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effortcoincidedwiththedeploymentofC-RAMintotheITO.TheentiretyoftheaboveeffortoccurredpriortotheG-BOSSUUNSsubmission.
ESSBDremainedintheIMEFUUNSlist(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006).Simultaneously,C-
RAMcontinuedtoexpanditscapabilitiesestablishingmoredetailedrelationshipswiththeRAIDoffice(Adomatisemaildtd9/14/2006).ThesurveillanceeffortsofC-RAMcontinuedtoexpandwhichprovidedanopportunitytotheMarineCorps.
ThemajorityofIEDhotspotsoccurredwithinfivekilometersofFOBssotheC-RAMRAID
(over5krange)surveillancecapabilitywasavaluableC-IEDtool.Thecapability,however,wasnotrestrictedtoCOPsandFOBs.RAIDtowerswerealreadybeingusedbyMarinesawayfromCOPs/FOBs.C-RAMcontinuedtodevelopcapabilitiessupportingCOP/FOBuseaswellasmoremobileuses.SurveillanceintegrationandcommunicationsintoavideoCOPwereestablishedonalocalscale(toaCOPorFOBinsteadoftheaterwide).MobilesystemswereintegratedtoincludetheMarineCorpsScanEagle.MostoftheseeffortswereunderwaywhentheGBOSSUUNSwasfirstsubmitted.C-RAMcapabilitiesweredevelopedandwellpositionedtosupportGBOSS.
TheIMEFhostilitytotheuseofC-RAMeffortsinsupportofGBOSShasbeendemonstratedinprevioussections.TherewerealsodetractorsinMARCENT.OneseniorMARCENTstaffmemberwrotetoMCCDCstaffinOctober2006:“Mike,I'dliketounderstandmoreaboutthefollowing:·CoordinateC-RAM/G-BOSSrequirementswithArmyC-RAMProgramOfficeatHuntsville,ALduringOct.CRAMishelping,butitDOESNOTmeetbasedefenserequirementsintheCOINfight.We(theMarineCorps)donotwanttobecommittedtothisprogram.HowisCRAMrelatedtotherequirementforpersistentsurveillance?Standingbyforclarification.”(Burkhardtemaildtd10/10/2006)
ThecoordinationandsupportfromtheC-RAMofficehadbeenongoingforoverayear.
Surveillancesupportwasalreadyoccurring.TheMarineCorpswasgettingC-RAMDOTMLPFsupportatalmostnocostandwithsuperiorequipment.C-RAMwasdeployedintotheITOandwasalreadyexecutingtheircombatmission.C-RAMwasrequestedbyIMEF.OnlyaftertheGBOSSUUNSwassubmittedwastheC-RAMeffortquestioned.
C-RAMwasnotthesameprogramasGBOSSbuttheMarineCorpswasfortunatethat
theGBOSSprogramcouldsourcesupportfromC-RAM.MajCharboneau,taskedwithestablishingtheGBOSSprogram,reliedonC-RAM.AnoutlineoftheMCCDCapproachwasprovidedbyMajCharboneau:
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“TheMOAwiththeC-RAMprogramofficeisbeingdraftedaswespeak...it'shomeworkformetonight...anditwillbebetweenthe"1Stars"hereatMCCDC[CDD]andMCSC[PG12]andtheirArmy"counterparts."IdonotseeadirectrollfortheLabinthisMOA...otherthanthefactthatthat"WE"...[MCWL&MCCDC]areoneinthesame.However...IcanunderstandtheconfusionfromtheWarfightingLabpointofview...thatstemsfromastatementthewasmadeduringtheG-BOSSDecisionmeetinglastweek;i.e.,LTGENAmos...askingBGENAllistolookintotheintegrationpieceoftheG-BOSSway-ahead...Ihearditaswell...anddidnotunderstand.Toclearthingsupinsimpleterms...whatwasproposedandwasacceptedtoLTGENAmoswasthattheC-RAMfolkswouldbebrought"onboard"tonotonlybecomeourcontractingagent...butwouldtakeontheentireresponsibilitiesastheintegratorofG-BOSS.CDDwouldcontinuetodefine/refinetheG-BOSSconcept...toidentifytherequirements...andPG12wouldworkwiththeC-RAMoffice...toensurethatsuitablesolutionareidentified...todelivertheG-BOSScapabilitytothewarfighter.Thiseffort[responsibility]wouldincludetheintegrationeffortofthedifferentlocations...FOB-TO-FOB...COP-TO-COP...FOB/COP-TO-MOBILESTATION.ect.Hencetheconfusion...because...ifIhearyoucorrectly...theLabbelievestheyhavebeentaskedtotakeon"this"integrationeffort.Inmyopinion...theonlyrollthattheLabisontapforis...thedevelopmentoftheMasterstationprototype...and"potentially"anyfollow-onintegrationofthiscapabilityintotheG-BOSSsystemarchitecture...buteventhat"integrationeffort"[ifdesired]couldbecontractedouttotheC-RAMoffice..."inanutshell"...wearehiringontheC-RAMofficetogetusaG-BOSScapabilityASAPintheater...from"soup-to-nuts."And...inregardstotheMasterStation[itself]...inmyopinion...theG-BOSSsystemarchitecturewillprovideeverythingthattheMasterStationwasenvisionedtoprovide...anditsdevelopmentaleffort[itself]...shouldbebroughtbacktothetable...tore-evaluateits"value-added"investment???Specifically,here'swhattheC-RAMOfficewillberequiredtodo...undertheMOA...[initscurrentdraftstate(here'smyfirstdryrun)]:-TakedirectionfromtheUSMConallaspectsoftheG-BOSSeffort-Establishsitesurveyteams-conductsitesurveys-Establishinstallteams-Installthetowersystems-Locallynetworkthetowersystems-Integratethelocallynettedsystemstootherlocations[ifdirected]-Conductinitialtrainingtooperator/maintainers
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-Providefulltimetrainingsupportateachlocation-Providefulltimemaintenancesupportateachlocation-Providefulltimeoperatorsupportateachlocation[ifdesired]-Establishcomprehensivetrainingpackage[KP&I,NET]forCONUSsupport-Establishcomprehensivesustainment/logistics/maintenancepackagesfortheentireG-BOSSsys-Establishthecontractvehiclestosupportthisentireeffort-Bepreparedto/reacttothechanging"requirements"environment-Contractanyfollow-onsystem-of-systemsprocurementeffort[ifdesired]-Integrateanyfollow-onsystem-of-systemsprocurementeffort[ifdesired]”(Charboneauemaildtd12/10/2006)
C-RAMbroughtatrue“turn-key”supportpackagethatwouldcatertotheMarine
Corps.C-RAMwasevenreadytoworkwiththeIMEFG9technicalsolution. IMEFG9continuedtoobjecttothepresenceofC-RAMintheGBOSSeffort.SomeoftheobjectionwasduetoignoranceofthecapabilityofC-RAM.IMEFG9stated:“TheG-BOSSsystemcannotdependonthetypeofinfrastructurethatisfoundatForwardOperationBases(FOB)likeCampFallujah,TQandAlAsad.G-BOSSisintendedtobeexpeditionary.C-RAMisnotintendedtobeexpeditionarybecauseitdependsonalargefixeddatacenterateachFOB.”(Lapierreemaildtd1/24/2007).TheentireC-RAMpackage,withPhalanxsystems,networkedcounterbatteryandresponseoptionsdidrequireafixeddatacenter.TheGBOSSelements,however,wereafractionofthefullC-RAMcapability.C-RAMhadalreadydevelopedfixedbasepackagesaswellasmobileorexpeditionarypackages(bothwithoutphalanx). C-RAMdebatecontinuedasLtColJankowskireportedtheIMEFG9positiononC-RAM(echoedbyothersinIMEFandMARCENT):“FPDhasbeenheadedstronglytowardC-RAMasaG-BOSScomponentsupplier,butIMEFFWDfeelskeyrequirementsintheG-BOSSUUNS(andnowJUON)arenotsupportbytheC-RAMoffice,andarenotbeingaddressedbyMCCDC.IMEFFWD,havingobservedC-RAMincombat,reliteratedGenZilmer'spositionthatC-RAMprogramofrecordcomponentsarenotG-BOSS,specificallywithregardtotowermobility,alsogenerallyforabroaderarrayofveryimportantreasons.ColOltmansaidhehadgottenMROCapprovalofC-RAM-sourcedacquisition.IMEFFWDcounteredwiththelistofG-BOSSrequirementsthatC-RAMofficedoesnotsupport(G-BOSSnetworking,twocameras,Commgearonthetowers,UAV&AngelFireintegration,masterstation,etc).”(Jankowskiemaildtd1/31/2007).NotonlywasIMEF,incombat,developingthematerialsolution(contracts,assembly,engineeringetc.),buttheyalsowerescreeningthesupporteffort.Thiswouldhavebeenbeneficialiftheyunderstoodthesupporteffortbeforecommenting.Infact,C-RAMhaddemonstratedtowermobility,towernetworkingwithcommgearonthetowers,UAVintegration,etc.TheIMEFG9conceptofnetworkingwasnottechnicallyfeasibleandtheGBOSSnetworkingconopswasabandonedamonthlaterwhenIIMEFrotatedintoAnbar.IMEFG9continuedtofabricateobjectionstoC-RAM.
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C-RAMsupportedtheMarineCorpswhentheIMEFG9thought“self-assembly,nopartsandnoFSRs”wasagoodidea.TheC-RAMsupportpackagestartedinearnestafterIMEFrotated.GaylstatedofGBOSS:“ItwasthisCG,IMEF(Fwd)-ledtechnologicalinitiative,combinedwithlocalcooperationandnewalliancesinAlAnbar,thatbegantoturnthetideinMNF-W.”(Gayl,p92).ThatIMEFtechnicalinitiative,GBOSS,wasquicklyfixed,organizedandsupportedbyC-RAMduringthe“AnbarAwakening”.TheMarineCorpssoonestablisheditsownprogramofficeandsupportfunctionsshiftedbacktoMCSC.C-RAMbridgedthegapfortheCorps.
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15F-GBOSSPROCESSFOULS
TheprocessofGBOSScombatdevelopmentwasviolatedmultipletimesandinmultipleways.Thefollowingprocessfoulsarehighlights.Processfoul:GaylstatesthattheGeneralsweresupportivebuttheirstaffswerenot…untrue.
GaylsentthefollowingtoIMEFG9whoshareditwithJankowski:“Allofthistroublesme,buttheVTCwasexcellentindisplayingthecuriousremainingcontrastsforalltosee.TheGeneralOfficersatMCCDCandtheentireSYSCOMhavebeenextraordinarilysupportiveofG-BOSSandtheMEF.Still,therealpoweristheCDIBandactionlevelwhichisexpectedtocarrythisthroughtocompletion,evenafterRIP/TOA.”(Kingemaildtd1/24/2007).TheCDIBwaslargelycomprisedof05/06levelofficerswhoansweredtoGeneralOfficers.MostwereintheDCarea.AnyGeneralOfficeratMCCDC/HQMCcouldhavewalkedintotheCDIBatanytimeandcontrolledthemeeting.AnyCDIBmemberwhopublishedthiskindofemail(questioningGOauthority)wouldhavepromptlybeencounselledand/orrelieved.HadanyCDIBmemberexpressedthiskindofsentiment,theremainderoftheCDIBwouldhaveturnedonhimimmediately.Gayl,asseeninthisquoteandinseveralpreviouschapters,didnotunderstandthechainofcommand.
Processfoul:IMEFshiftedfromneeddevelopmenttomaterialsolutiondevelopment
TheUUNSprocessisdesignedtocapturetheneedfortheoperatingforce.ThematerialsolutionshouldnotbemandatedintheUUNS(itisoftenillegaltomandatetheimplementationofanUUNSsuggestion).IMEFstartedtheGBOSSUUNSprocesscorrectly:“IupdatedColLapierreonouractivitieshere...andIalsohadaseriesofquestion[prepared]forhimtoanswer…mostimportantly…whoisthemanufactureofG-BOSS.Hisresponse...wasthatthereisnomanufacture…G-BOSSisaconcept…thatdefines[describes]therequiredneed.Infact,ColLapierrestatedthatitwashisdesign…[basedoffofhiscivilianbackground]andthattherewasalotofresearchputintotheG-BOSSconcept[UUNS].”(Johnsonemaildtd8/3/2006).TheMCCDCactionofficerthentransitionedtothecorrectsubsequentaction.ThatactionwastotakeIMEFopinionandincorporateitintothedevelopmentprocess:“Gentleman,Irecommendweimmediatelybeginthemarketresearchtoidentifypotentialsolutionstothisrequiredcapability…anduse"thegroundbasedoperationalsurveillancesystemconcept"asthebaselineapproachgoingintothiseffort.ColLapierrewasconcernedwiththisrecommendationandcautionedthatweshouldnotignorehisefforts.
Despiteitsflaws,theUSMCcombatdevelopmentprocesswasdemonstratedasfarsuperiortotheIMEFG9combatdevelopmentprocess.GaylcomplimentsMCCDCGOdecisionsinemailsandlatercondemnsthemintestimony.IMEFstartedwiththecorrectprocesswhentheyidentifiedaneed.SubsequentIMEFG9effortsdisplayedincompetenceinseveralareastoincludeunderstandingtheirowncontractsaftertheyweresigned.MCCDCcontinuedtosupportdespitetheIMEFG9incompetence.
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Regardingthespecificrangerequirementsofthecameras…itwasdrivenbythesolution[T-3000]andnotbytherequirement.Thesamegoesfortheheightofthetowers…solutiondriven…notbasedoffofanyanalysis….aswellastheVSWAN…sameresponse.”(Johnsonemaildtd8/3/2006).ItwasclearinthisexchangethatIMEFG9wasdescribingcapabilityandmaterialsolutiondevelopmentwouldbelefttoMCCDC.Thiswashowtheprocesswassupposedtowork.Unfortunately,IMEFG9changedtheirapproachandstartedtoignoretheirCommandersandMCCDC.Processfoul:IMEFG9(Fwd)ignoredtheirparentcommandsandseniorofficers
Subsequentconferences/meetingswerescheduledtoestablishtheGBOSScapability.IMEF(Fwd)remainedunderthecommandofIMEF.MCCDCpersonnelassumedthatIMEFstaffmaintainedthesamecommandrelationshipforstaffwork.Thiswasanincorrectassumption.IMEFG9(Fwd)wasaskedaboutIMEFparticipationinsimplyprovidinganoverviewbrief:“ColLaPierre:Sir,Ineedtounderstand-youdonotwishLtColScheiernto"SettheScene"onbehalfofIMEF?V/r,MajJ”(Lapierreemaildtd8/4/2006).IMEFG9responded:“No!Wedonot!Wewillrepresentourselvesatthisconference.Wehavetoensurethatthisconferencestaysfocusedonfindingmaterialsolutionstoourrequirements.”(Lapierreemaildtd8/4/2006). InadditiontoignoringtheirparentHQ,IMEFG9ignoredtheirownofficers.FeedbackfromtheIMEF(Fwd)CommandingOfficerandsubordinatecommanderswasignoredbytheIMEFG9.CGMCWLstatedafteratriptoAlAnbar:“JustcameoutofIraqonCMCtrip.ResoundingcallformoreJLENS/RAIDtowersfromGenZilmertoeveryBncmdrwesaw.WewillworkthiswithJIEDDO.”(Allesemaildtd10/3/2006).Despitethelargedemand,GaylandtheIMEFG9continuedtolobbyagainstRAID. IMEFG9continuedtostatethatRAIDandthoseprogramsthatcouldprovideRAID(e.g.C-RAM)wasnotdesired.TheIMEFG9configurationwastheonlytowerconfigurationthatIMEFG9wouldaccept.ThiswasaviolationofcommonsenseaswellasaviolationoftheearlierexpressedopinionofIMEFG9. TheprocessbecamesofouledthatLtGenAmos(MCCDC)andLtGenMattis(nowMARCENT)hadtocallahalttoGBOSSinordertoreestablishanorderlyprocess(Allesemailsdtd10/15/2006).ItwasclearlynottheCDIBcallingtheshots.NorwasittheCDIBmakingthedecisions.ThiswasflagleveldirectionfrombothCGMARCENTandCGMCCDC.Processfoul:MARCENTactionofficerexpectedMCCDCstafftocarryoutMROCfunctions Oncepropercoordinationwasreestablished,thedecisionwasmadetoattempttosupporttheIMEFG9configuration.Jankowski,however,continuedtomakedemandsdemonstratinganignoranceofwhohadwhatauthorities.ToColOltman(FPID):Sir,Thecontractvehicleisprovidedintheattachment.Asdecidedattoday’sCDIB:pleaseauthorizetheimmediate(PMC)purchaseof
1) 58additionalcamerasfor“phase0”towers.(Jankowskiemaildtd11/2/2006).
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ColOltmanhadnoauthoritytoauthorizetheexpenditureofPMCbasedonaCDIBrecommendation.ThesefunctionswereMROCandP&Rfunctions.Onceagain,authoritywasattributedtotheCDIBwhichitdidnothave.
Processfoul:MCCDCbowedtoIMEFG9materialsolutiondemands
MCCDCandColOltmancontinuedtoprocessinformationforalargeT3000buyandabandonedplansforanymoreRAIDpurchases.HewrotetoJankowski:“Currently,ourplanistoprocurethefollowingitems:172additionalFLIRT3000MSCameras57additionalITSMCS-NCSRD8106Trailers57additionalITS15KWGenerators57additional66galfuelcells”(Charboneauemaildtd11/2/2006).
ThiswasafullembraceoftheIMEFG9towerdespiteitsinferiority.Lessthanfivedayslater,IMEFG9wasaskingthevendorwhatexactlytheyhadordered.
Theydidnotknow(Crouseemaildtd11/8/2006).ByacquiescingtotheIMEFG9materialsolution,MCCDChadcommencedinvolvementinoneofthemostineptcontractingeffortsknowntotheMarineCorps.IMEFG9didnotknowwhattheyhadcontractedfor,buttheyweregoingtogetanother172ofthem.ThisprocessfoulcanbeattributedtoMCCDC.MCCDCshouldnothaveallowedIMEFtobecomeinvolvedinmaterialsolutiondevelopment.Processfoul:IMEFG9contractingincompetence
Thefollowingemailisexcerptedin-fullinordertoprovideacrystalclearlessontothosewhobelievetheforcesincombathavethewherewithaltodevelopmaterialsolutions.ThisemailandotherswereknowninMCCDC,yetthefinalsentimentexpressedbyBGenAlles(supportthewarfighter)remainedforemostinMCCDCcombatdevelopers’minds(emailstringchronologystartsatthebottom):Brad,Theydon'tunderstand.Theproblemiseveryoneisviewedasanadversary.SteveChillcangiveyoumore.Bottomlinecontinuetopressforward,doyourverybesttosupportthewarfighteranddon'tgetintofightswiththeMEF(Fwd),bendoverbackwardstoworkwiththem.V/RBGen"Tex"Alles,MCWL,Phone#deleted-----OriginalMessage-----From:StillabowerGS14BradleyRSent:Friday,November10,200609:34To:AllesBGenRandolphD;ChillLtColStephenA;ClubbColTimothyL;PackardLTDeborahE;TomczakColJeffreyP
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Subject:Re:MessagesGeneral,Thankyou,thisisgoodbackgroundforus.ThereseemstobealotofheartacheatIMEFoverwhatthey(Mr.Gayl)MIS-characterizeasa"wind-tunnel"test.Dotheyunderstandthatwewiilinfactbetestingthecamerasontheirtower-mountedconfiguration?V/rBradStillabowerDeputyDirectorMCWLTechDivision--------------------------SentfrommyBlackBerryWirelessHandheld-----OriginalMessage-----From:AllesBGenRandolphDTo:ChillLtColStephenA;ClubbColTimothyL;PackardLTDeborahE;TomczakColJeffreyP;StillabowerGS14BradleyRSent:FriNov1009:24:252006Subject:FW:MessagesSteve,Thanksforthisinfo.Techpleasenote(needtoreadentiree-mailchainandviewattachment),continuetopressforwardwiththesidebyside.V/RBGen"Tex"Alles,MCWL,Phone#deleted-----OriginalMessage-----From:ChillLtColStephenASent:Thursday,November09,200609:18To:AllesBGenRandolphDCc:TomczakColJeffreyPSubject:FW:MessagesSirAttachedistheemailstreamwheretheMEFguyslearnthattheT3000needssomesortofstabilization.RespectfullySubmittedLtColSAChill
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Director,Operations,MCWLEmailaddressdeletedPhone#deleted-----OriginalMessage-----From:Crouse,Gary[Emailaddressdeleted]Sent:Wednesday,November08,200618:04To:ChillLtColStephenASubject:RE:MessagesHeretheyare.Theslidesgowiththee-mailtoMajorCasserly,iftheymakeitthroughNMCI.From:Crouse,GarySent:Tuesday,November07,20069:14PMTo:'CasserlyMajLawrenceA(CEIMEFG3ATFP)'Subject:RE:[U]RE:SSIII/T3KComparisonAttachments:Thermovision3000MS&StarSAFIREIII.LC.ppt;TV3000_DataSheet.pdf;3209560ProdSpecificationStarIII.docMajorCasserly,Sorrythishastakensolong.ThefirstslidehighlightsthesignificantsystemleveldifferencesbetweenaT3000MSintheMEFconfigurationandaStarSAFIREIIIIintheArmyRAIDconfiguration.Thesecondandthirdchartsillustratetheperformance,oroperationalimpactofthosedifferences.Ihavealsoattacheddetailedproductdescriptionsforbothitemsintheeventyouneedmorein-depthinformationregardingeithersystem.Pleaseletmeknowifyouneeddifferentoradditionalinformation.Muchoftheinformationcontainedintheattachmentsisproprietaryandcompetitionsensitive.V/RGaryCrouseFrom:CasserlyMajLawrenceA(CEIMEFG3ATFP)[Emailaddressdeleted]Sent:Tuesday,November07,20063:18PMTo:CasserlyMajLawrenceA(CEIMEFG3ATFP);Crouse,GarySubject:RE:[U]RE:SSIII/T3KComparisonClassification:UNCLASSIFIEDSir,Youhadmentionedthatyoumightbeabletoaidmewithsomeinformationforabrief.IhadnotheardfromyouanditiscomingtimethatIreallycouldusetheinformation.IfyouareunabletohelpmepleaseletmeknowsoIcangoanotherroutetofinishthisprojectoff.
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Anythingyoucoulddowouldbeappreciated.RespectfullyMajorCasserlyMajorL.A.CasserlyAddressdeletedAddressdeletedDSN:Phone#deletedFrom:Crouse,GarySent:Tuesday,November07,20067:39PMTo:IMEFG9Subject:AnswerstoStabQuestionsTom,Herearetheanswerstoyourgyrostabilizationquestions.Didweorderthatinourbuy?No.Thereisastabilizedpan/tiltavailablefortheT3000butitisexpensive(anadditional$30K+/-).Itonlyworksatabout1Hz,andIamnotcertainitwouldprovideanoperationallysignificantimprovementovertheplannedconfiguration.Whatdoesitdo?Gyrostabilizationtakesthemotionoutoftheimages.Inthecaseofmast-mountedsystems,themotioniscausedbyshakingorjitterinthemast,fromwind,etc.Themotionisbothlowfrequency(sway)andhighfrequency(jitter).Thehighfrequencymotion(upto50-60Hzormore)willmaketheimagelookblurry,andthelowfrequencymotionwillmakeithardtostayontarget.Stabilitynotonlyaffectstheimage(reducingdetection,recognitionandidentificationrangeandmakingithardtostayontarget)butalsoaffectsthelaser.Withoutstabilizationofallpayloads,youcan'tkeepthelaserontarget.Whywouldweneedit?Toprovidemaximumtargetdetection,recognitionandidentificationrange,toallowthesystemtostayontarget(don'twanttolosethetargetinagustofwind),andtokeepthelaserontarget(togetaccuratetargetrangeandlocation).Canweaddittoourcameras?Notreally.Stabilizationhastobedoneatthesystemlevel.Youwantallcamerasandlaserspointingatthesametargetatthesametime(boresightretention),andyouhavetoaccountforallthemassesanddynamicmotions.Togetmaximumperformance,thestabilizationhastobeontheorderof10microradians.Thisisequivalentto1meteratarangeof100,000meters.
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Hopethisishelpful;letmeknowifyourequireadditionalinformation.S/FGaryFrom:IMEFFWDG-9Sent:Tuesday,November07,200611:01AMTo:Crouse,GarySubject:[U]FLIRT3000MS?sClassification:UNCLASSIFIED//FOROFFICIALUSEONLYGary,Ijustleftavoicemail.WearelookingatGyroStbilizationinourcameras.Didweorderthatinourbuy?Whatdoesitdo?Whywouldweneedit?Canweaddittoourcameras?Howmuchisit?Asyouknow,wehavefiscalconstraints.IMEFG9From:Crouse,GarySent:Wednesday,November08,20062:02PMTo:'GaylGS-15FranzJ(IMEFFWDScienceAdvisor)'Subject:RE:[U]T3000Franz,IamawareoftheT3000/StarSAFIREIIIissue,halftheMarineCorpsseemstobemixedupinthis,includingCMC.MyunderstandingisthatMCWLisplanningaside-by-sidecomparisonofthetwosystems,mountedontowers,atQuantico.WehavebeenaskedtoprovideaT3000forthecomparison.IbelievetheStarSAFIREIII,intheRAIDconfiguration,iscomingfromtheArmy.Ihavenotbeentoldanythingaboutawindtunneltest,anditisnotcleartomehowwindtunneltestingwouldprovideanymeaningfulorrelevantinformation.IhaveaskedMCWLforawrittenexplanationofwhattheyintendtodowithT3000,buthavenotyetreceivedthat.Idon'tknowifthisishelpful,butpleasedon'thesitatetoletmeknowifIcanprovideanythingfurther.V/R
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GaryFrom:GaylGS-15FranzJ(IMEFFWDScienceAdvisor)[Emailaddressdeleted]Sent:Wednesday,November08,20069:21AMTo:Crouse,GarySubject:[U]T3000Classification:UNCLASSIFIEDGary,Asyoumayalreadybeaware,therearemanyatQuanticoandelsewherethatinsistourT3000swillbeunstablizedandthereforeareunsuitedtoG-BOSS.TheseotherfolkswouldratherinsistthattheStarSaphireiswhatisneededforG-BOSSduetogyrostabilization.ThefactisthatifwecouldaffordgyrostabilizationlikethatonStarSaphirewewouldincludeit.Unfortunately,wearestuckwithaspendingcap.IsawyourresponsetoTomonthelimitedvalueaddedofaddingingyrostabilizationfortheT3000atthispoint.Ialsosawthatitiscostprohibitiveforus,evenatjust$30kpercamera,basedonthecap.Bottomlineis,asyouarealreadyaware,wecannotaffordit.IfthevoicesatQuanticocontinuetodoubttheunstablizedT3000ourabilitytobuyouradditionalcamerasisinjeopardy.Buttheyaredrivingtheirpointhome,andhaveapparentlyscheduledawindtunneltestatDahlgren,VAtocomparetheT3000totheStarSaphireincomingweeks,causingmoredelay.Howrepresentativecansuchatestbe?Clearly,theywillnotbetowermountedduringsuchatestandthatwilleffectallmannerofthingsregardingfrequencies,etc.Pleaseprovidemesometechnologicalinsightonthis.Ifwecouldafford$600k-$900kforeachSSwewouldthrowitdownforspeed,butinthiscase"perfection"istheenemyof"goodenough."Ineedtechnologicalinsightonthis,especiallyWRTthevalue(orlackofvalue)ofwindtunneltesting.Furtherdoubtswillbringevenfurtherdelays,andifIMEFFwdturnsoverbeforethisisresolved,itisingreatjeopardyofnothappeningatall.Thanksinadvanceforprovidingmeinsight,V/RFranz(Allesemaildtd11/10/2006) OncetheprocesswasreestablishedwithIIMEF(afterIMEFRIP/TOA),thecoordinationbecamequicker,Marinesandvendorsunderstoodthecontracts,capabilitywasfielded,andGBOSSsucceeded.
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15G-GBOSSCONCLUSION
AnystudentoftheMRAPeventsquicklyrealizedthatMRAPwasnotacontentiousissuewithIMEF(Fwd).TheinitialMRAPrequestwasresolvedsatisfactorilyfortheIMEFCommanderin2005.OnceIMEFrequestedMRAPin2006,MCCDCandtherestoftheMarineCorpsworkedtogetthemMRAP.GBOSS,ontheotherhand,wasamorecontentioussystem.ItisinstructivetoreviewthecoordinationonMRAPascomparedtothecoordinationforGBOSS.ThisGBOSSchapterreflectsGBOSScombatdevelopment.ThelaserdazzlerchapterwasequallyascontentiousasGBOSS.Therewereothersystemsthatweremorecontentious.ThisauthorwasinvolvedinthedevelopmentoftheIEDDetectorDogs(IDD)whereseniorofficersintheMarineCorpsweretoldthatuseofthesedogswouldactuallycauseMarinecasualties.AswithGBOSSandDazzler,theIDDemailsandbriefswereopinionated,vocal,contentiousandplentiful…notthecasewithMRAP.ThisauthorhashundredsofemailswithGeneralOfficersdiscussingallelementsofGBOSS…notthecasewithMRAPuntilthe185JUONSsubmission.
Thisauthoractuallytaskedastaffmembertofindanydocumentsthatcouldhelp
increasethesizeoftheMRAPbuy.Theactionofficer,despiteMarineCorps-widecoordination,wasnotabletoproduceanything(reflectingthetotalabsenceofcoordination,debateoropinion).ThisGBOSSchapterreflectsthenot-so-cleanaspectsofcombatdevelopmentthatwouldhaveoccurredforMRAPifitwasindemand.ThereisnocorrespondingbodyofworkforMRAPbetweenJuneof2005andJuneof2006.ThisGBOSSChapterallowsforasimpleconclusion:Ifthisiswhatcontentiouscombatdevelopmentlookslike,thenwhereisGayl’sproofofcontentiousMRAPdevelopment?ThereisnonebecauseMRAPwasnotindemand.ThatiswhytherewasonlyMRAPsilenceforoverayear.
G-BOSSdemonstratedtheGaylandIMEFG9approachtocombatdevelopment.One
additionalthingisclearlydemonstrated:Gaylsuccessfullydupedthepressandpoliticianswhobelievedhisstory.GBOSSaloneshouldhavecalledintoquestiontheveracityofhisMRAPstory.
Gaylstated:“Theauthorhasbeentoldthatin2007OSD,Congressional,andpresspressurefinallybegantoyieldthedeliveryofanumberofadditionalCOTSSEsystemstoMNF-WtoassistintheG-BOSS-centricC-IEDfight(Referencer.26.).”(Gayl,p95).Thisisfactuallyincorrect.COTSequipmentwasavoided.C-RAMandtheRAIDprogramsupportedtheMarineCorpswithprogrammanagementuntiltheMarineCorpscouldstandupitsownfullGBOSSprogramoffice.FSRswereused.Sparepartswereorderedandused.MaintenanceandeveryotherformofequipmentsupportwasprovidedfortheMarinesinthefield.AssemblyandengineeringwasaccomplishedinCONUSor,ifneededatlogisticsbasesintheITO.Marinesdidnothavetoweldtheequipmenttogether.Thecommunicationsconceptandequipmentwasrefined.ThiswasthetechnicalsolutionthatmadetheGBOSSprogramsuccessfulinIraqandthenAfghanistan.ItborelittleresemblancetotheIMEFG9materialproposal.
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16-LASERDAZZLER-IMEFG9DISASTERNUMBER2
ISSUEOVERVIEW
IIMEFsubmittedanUUNSforlaserdazzlerswhiledeployedinIraqinJune2005.ByNovember,2005CGIIMEFacceptedtheproposedmaterialsolutionpendingthesafetycertifications.Thesafetycertificationswereperformed,however,RIP/TOAoccurredwithIMEFtakingcommandinAnbar.UndertheauspicesoftheIMEFG9,IMEFdecidedthattheypreferredadifferentuncertifiedsystemandrejectedthesystemthatIIMEFaccepted.Inthisoccasion,MCCDCdidnothavetheauthoritytoviolatethelawandprovidetheIMEFpreferredsystem.IMEFdecidedthatitwouldratherhavenosystemthanhavetheIIMEFsystem.TheIIMEFsystemwaseventuallyprovidedandperformedwellintheITO. ADODIGwasperformedontheabovesequence.ThischapterwilljuxtaposeelementsoftheDODIGandGayl’sstatements.ThistechniquewillbesufficienttodemonstratetheflawedIMEFG9effortbutitwillalsodemonstratehowflawedGayl’sstoryis.Onceagainthemainlessonistonotletthecombatforcesbecomeoverlyinvolvedinmakingbadmaterialsolutiondecisions.Theyshouldfocusoncombat. GaylpointedtothependingDODIGlaserinvestigationduringtestimonytoCongress:“Anotherexamplepertainstoanon-lethallaserknownasthe“dazzler”thatwasrepeatedlyrequestedbyMarinesinIraq.Thecapabilitywasneededtonon-lethallymitigateescalationofforce(EOF)confrontationsatcheckpoints,incidentsthatfrequentlyendedinthetragicinjury,andoftenthedeaths,ofinnocentIraqisduetotheabsenceofnon-lethalalternatives.Thedevicerequestedwassafeandcommerciallyavailable.Insteadofprovidingtherequestedcapabilitypromptly,combatdevelopersatQuanticowaited18months,onlytofieldofdifferentdevicethathadbeenrejectedbytheMarinesintheaterduetoitsmorehazardousconfiguration.AsaresultofthedelaymanyunnecessaryinnocentIraqisinjuredorkilledduringweekonengagement,againunnecessarily.
AswiththatMRAP,IandotherMarinesfirstbroughtthisissuetotheattentionofmychainofcommandinthePentagonwhileIwasstillinIraq.MyconcernswithmanyaspectsofthedazzlerissueaswellasmybroaderconcernswiththeJointNon-LethalWeaponsProgram(JNLWP)haveagainbeenoverwhelminglyvalidatedinthecourseoftheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)auditoftheJNLWPpublishedinApril2009.TheDODIGiscurrentlyconductingaseparateauditofthelaserdazzlerissueinparticular.”(GaylTestimony,p4).GaylcontinuedtoreferencetheDODIG:“WithoutprojectingthefindingsoftheDODIGauditofthelaserdazzlerissue,theGAOreportisasignificantdatapointseemstoconfirmmanyofmyobservations.”(GaylTestimony,p10).TheDODIGwouldrefutemanyofGayl’sfalsehoods.
TheconflictintheselectionofamaterialsolutionforthelaserdazzlerpromptedasecondDODIG.Gayl’sconclusionsandtheconclusionsoftheDazzlerDODIGwereonceagaininconflict.TheDODIGfoundMCCDCatfaultforlisteningtotheIMEFG9materialproposal.
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Gaylalsoreferencedseveralotherirrelevantinvestigationsbyavendor(whodidnotget
thecontract)andhisacolytesinthepress:“Today,middlemanagersandSMEsatMCCDCandJNLWDarethesubjectofaprivateinvestigationbyOracleInternationalInc,inadditiontobeinginvestigatedbyseveraljournalists.”(Gayl,p107).Itisunclearwhatweight,ifany,Gaylattributedtotheseinvestigations.Thisstudywillnotaddresstheinvestigationconductedbythelosingvendor.TheDazzlerDODIG
TheDODIGstated:“AttherequestoftheAssistantCommandantoftheMarineCorps,wereviewedtheMarineCorpsdecisionmakingprocessforrespondingtotheurgentrequestofdeployedMarinesforanonlethallaserdazzlercapability.”(LaserDODIG,Coverletter).ThisinvestigationwasinresponsetoGayl’schargesofcriminalnegligence.Specifically,theAssistantCommandantstatedthat:“allegationssurfacedthattheMarineCorpshadnotactedwithalacrityinrespondingtotheneedsofdeployedunits,andspecificallythatmismanagementonthepartoftheMarineofficialscostMarinelivesbynotacquiringMineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)vehiclesorlaserdazzlersinatimelyfashion.”(LaserDODIG,p1).
TheDODIGcontinued:“WedidnotfindanyevidenceofcriminalnegligenceinMarineCorpsprocessingoftheJuly2005laserdazzlerurgentrequest.However,MarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommanddidnotrespondtotheIIMarineExpeditionaryForce(Forward)urgentrequestforanonlethallaserdazzlercapabilityinatimelymanner.MarineCorpsofficialstook15monthstoprocessthisurgentrequestthatcouldhavebeenfulfilled6monthsearlierhadMarineCorpsleadershipattwocommandsexercisedsufficientoversightandeffectivelymonitoredtheprogressoftheurgentrequest.”(LaserDODIG,pi).Onthesurface,thisfindingwouldappeartocriticizeMCCDC.However,thereasonMCCDCwasnottimely,accordingtotheDODIG,wasthatMCCDCwaslisteningtocomplaintsfromIMEF(Fwd)(representedbytheIMEFG9).MCCDC“failedtoignore”IMEF(Fwd)andfieldtheIIMEFDazzler.TheDODIGstated:“WedeterminedthatMCCDCdidnotrespondtotheIIMEF(Forward)urgentrequestforanonlethallaserdazzlercapabilityinatimelymanner.MCCDCallowedtheIMEF(Forward)insistenceforanunapprovedlaserdazzlerandanineffectiveadministrativeprocessingtodelaythefieldingofthelaserdazzlercapability.”(LaserDODIG,p3).TheineffectiveadministrativeprocesscanalsobetiedtotheIMEFG9insistenceforanunapproveddazzler.
TheDODIGprovidedadditionalspecifics:“WiththerotationofMEFs,progressstalledinfulfillingtheurgentrequestforlaserdazzlers.MCCDCdidnotfollowtheurgentneedsprocessoutlinedbytheMarineAdministrativeMessage(MARADMIN)424/04,“OIFIIIUrgentUniversalNeedStatement(UNS)Process,”September28,2004.MARADMINstatesonceMCCDCidentifiesaproposedsolution,theChairman,CDIB,shouldimmediatelyreviewtheproposedsolutiontodeterminewhetheritisaviableoptionandreadyforMROCapproval.Instead,theChairman,CDIB,deferredtheprocessingoftheurgentrequestanddirectedMCCDC’sNon-LethalWeaponsBranchtoseekIMEF(Forward)agreementoftheGBD-IIIC
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lasersolutionbecausetheIMEF(Forward)replacedtheIIMEF(Forward).However,after4monthsofdeliberation,theIMEF(Forward)didnotagreewithMCCDConthelasersolution.”(LaserDODIG,p5).ThedelayoftheMROCapproved,lasersafetyreviewed,IIMEFapprovedsolutionwasheldupbyIMEF(Fwd).TheDODIGblamedthisdelayonMCCDCforlisteningtoIMEF(Fwd).AccordingtotheDOD,MCCDCshouldnothavedoneso:“Conclusion:MCCDCdidnotrespondtotheIIMEF(Forward)urgentrequestforanonlethallaserdazzlercapabilityinatimelymanner.MCCDCallowedIMEF(Forward)insistenceforanunapprovedlaserdazzlerandinefficientadministrativeprocessingtocauseunnecessarydelays.ThesedelayslefttheMarinesdeployedtoIraqin2006withoutacriticalnonlethalweapontomoreeffectivelyperformsecuritymissionsfornearly6months.TheChairman,CDIB,shouldnothavedelayedtheprocessingoftheGBD-IIIClaserdazzlertoseekagreementfromIMEF(Forward).”(LaserDODIG,p9).
TheDODIGdidnotviewthedelayasthemajorviolationintheirinvestigation.TheentiretyoftheDODIG(pagei)recommendationstated:“WhatWeRecommend:WerecommendthattheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsperformareviewofthecircumstancesthatledtothepurchaseofthe28unapprovedlasersand,ifappropriate,initiateadministrativeaction.”(LaserDODIG,pi).TherecommendationwasnotfocusedonMCCDC,butitinsteadfocusedontheseparateactionsofIMEFinpurchasingunapprovedlasers.Hadtheselasersbeenused,IMEF(forward)wouldhaveviolatedthelaw:“Ininstancesofnonlethalweaponsandlasers,additionalapprovalsareneeded.Legalandtreatyreviewsareneededtoensurethattheproposedsolutionandconceptofemploymentmeetsstatutorylawsandtreaties.TheNavyLaserSafetyReviewBoard(LSRB)evaluatesthepotentialhazardsofusingthelaserandrendersanopiniononitssafetyanduse.”(LaserDODIG,page3).TheMCCDCresponsetotheDODIGstated:
(LaserDODIG,MarineCorpsCommentsaddendum)
Thissafetyissueshouldhavestoppeddebate.Itdidnot.LeftunconsideredwasthepotentialtacticalandevenstrategicimpactofblindedIraqisduetotheIMEFG9buy(USviolationsofUnitedNationsConventionalWeaponsConventionprotocols).TheProcessfordeterminingthematerialsolutionwasalsoincorrectlyportrayedbyGayl.
Gaylstated:“MCCDCandJNLWDmiddlemanagerswerefullycognizantofthesuperiorityoftheCOTSCHPLDsincetheAFRLtestreportof2005.Insteadtheywaited18monthstodeliverthelesssafeGBDIIItooperators.Thiscommonforeknowledgeeliminates
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simplenegligenceasapossibility,andhighlightstheblatancyoftheinactionandmisinformationofMCCDCandJNLWDregardingMEFneeds(Referencer.22.).”(Gayl,p107).Gaylwasnotpresent,norwasheallowedtointerviewthesepersonnel.DespiteGayl’s“lesssafe”fabrication,MCCDCpersonneldidnotbelievethatCHPLDwassuperior,andrightlyso.TheCHPLDdidnotpasslasersafetyreviews.
Gayl,inadditiontoaccusingMCCDCofcriminalnegligence,criticizedDahlgrenandtheLaserSafetyReviewBoard:“Onaseparatefront,independenttestingoftheCHPLDbyLaserComplianceInc.hasdeterminedtheCHPLD’sNOHD(minimumsaferange)tobelessthanhalfthatreportedbyDahlgren,andiscomparabletotheoriginalAFRLreport.TheCHPLDis2X-3XsaferthantheGBD-IIICthathasbeendeployedtoMNF-W.ThisindependenttestinginvalidatesflawedDahlgrentestswhichtheLSRBendorsed.TheCHPLDwasalsothesubjectofaGCEAdvocatecasestudythatwassubmittedtoDC,PP&Opreviously.”(Gayl,p107-108).
TheDODIGcapturedthereviewandselectionprocess.Theinitialtacticalconsiderations
fullyinvolvedMarinesinAnbar:“TheAirForceResearchLaboratorytestresultsindicatedthatboththeCHPLDandtheGBD-IIIClasermetorexceededtheperformanceparametersspecifiedbytheIIMEF(Forward).Inaddition,MARCORSYSCOMconsideredadditionalfactorssuchascost,ruggedization,4productioncapability,andbatterytypetorankthepossiblelaserdazzlersolutions.TheCommander,MARCORSYSCOM,presentedbothlasers,CHPLDandGBD-IIIClaser,aspossiblealternativestotheCommandingGeneral,IIMEF(Forward),butconsideredtheGBD-IIIClaseramoreviableoption.TheCommandingGeneral,IIMEF(Forward),acceptedtheGBD-IIIClaseroption.”(LaserDODIG,p4-5).
MCCDCtheninitiatedthesafetyreviewsfortheIIMEF/MCCDCsolution:“MCCDCand
MARCORSYSCOMthensoughtthenonlethalsystemsandlaserweaponsreviewsfortheGBD-IIIClaser,toensurethattheproposedsolutionandconceptofemploymentmetthestatutorylawsandtreaties.ThesereviewshelpedtoensurethattheMarineswouldemploythelaserdazzlerinawaythatdidnotcauseseriouseyeinjuryorpermanentblindness:
•NavalSurfaceWarfareCenter–DahlgrenDivision(Dahlgren)evaluatedtheGBD-IIIClaserforsafetyandradiationhazard.DahlgrenalsoevaluatedtheGBD-IIIClaserforcompliancewithNavyandMarineCorpslaserpolicy.
•NavalJudgeAdvocateGeneraldeterminedthattheGBD-IIIClasercompliedwithtreatyobligations,Federallaws,andinternationallawsofarmedconflicts.
•TheDirector,NavalTreatyImplementationProgram,determinedthattheGBD-IIIClasercompliedwitharmscontroltreatiesandinternationalagreements.
•TheChairman,NavyLSRB,temporarilyapprovedthesafetyanduseoftheGBD-IIIClaser.
(LaserDODIG,p5).ThesestepsarespelledoutinmoredetailintheDODIG. Despitetheacceptabilityforthemission,theprogressthroughthesafetywickets,andtheconstantcoordinationwiththeMarinesinAnbar,thematerialsolution“became”
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unacceptable.IMEF(forward)wantedsomethingelseandMCCDCworkedtheirpreference:“Concurrently,MCCDCaccommodatedtheIMEF(Forward)preferenceandbeganobtainingtheadditionaltestingneededfortheNavyLSRBapprovaloftheCHPLD.However,theCHPLDdidnotpasstheDahlgrenlaserhazardevaluation,andtheNavyLSRBdidnotapprovethesafetyanduseoftheCHPLD.”(LaserDODIG,p7).TherewerefewcoursesofactionavailabletoMarinesatthispoint,nevertheless,IMEFdecidedtopurchaseamaterialsolutionontheirown.IMEF’sBotchedLaserPurchase Despitethepurchaseoftheacceptedlasers,IMEFdecidedtopurchaseCHPLD:“Further,aftertheapprovedlaserswereprocured,theIMEF(Forward)purchased28unapprovedlasers,costing$323,324,whichwerenotfieldedinIraq.”(LaserDODIG,p4). Gaylcharacterizedthisactionasfollows:“AswithG-BOSSandotherdelayedcapabilities,IMEFFwdfrustrationwithMCCDCmiddlemanagementinactionondeliveryofCHPLDledtotheCG’sauthorizationtoopenpurchaseof28CHPLDsusingO&Mfunds.TheCHPLDsweredeliveredtoIraqoncostandaheadofschedule,andlongbeforethearrivalofeventhefirstGBDIII.InsteadofsupportingIMEFFwd’sinitiative,MCCDCandJNLWDinsuredthattheMEFswereprohibitedfromemployingCHPLDs,aneffectivemiddlemanagementinactionthatdirectlycausedfurtherharmtoIraqisduringEOFincidents.”(Gayl,p107).InthecaseofbothGBOSSandDazzler,MCCDCmiddlemanagementhadtocompensateforIMEF(Fwd)decisions.Inthiscase,however,MCCDCmiddlemanagementandJNLWDdidnotpreventIMEFfromusingtheirillegaldazzlers…MARCENTdid. TheDODIGinterviewedtheDCGIMEF(Fwd):“TheformerDeputyCommandingGeneral,IMEF(Forward),statedthatIMEF(Forward)purchased28CHPLDsbecauseMCCDCtooktoolongtofulfilltheurgentrequestandbelievedthattheCHPLDwasabetterandlessexpensivelaser.InDecember2006,theCommanderofUnitedStateMarineForcesCentralCommandputanimmediatehaltontheuseoftheCHPLDbecauseNavyLSRBhadnotprovidedapositivesafetyrecommendationfortheselasers.BecausetheIMEF(Forward)acquiredtheCHPLDswithoutobtainingthenecessarylegalandsafetyapprovals,theCommandantoftheMarineCorpsshouldreviewthecircumstancesthatledtothepurchaseofthe28CHPLDsand,ifappropriate,initiateadministrativeaction.”(LaserDODIG,p8).ItwasnottheMCCDCmiddlemanagementthatputanimmediatehaltontheuseofCHPLD.ItwastheCommandingGeneralofMARCENT.TheDODIGfurtherrecommendedtotheCMCthatheinvestigatetheseactionsastherewerepotentialactionsworthyof“administrativeactions”.
Inadditiontothesafetyandlegalityissuesofthe28CHPLD,therewerereliabilityissueswiththesystemsthatIMEF(forward)hadpurchased:“Thereportconcludedthat9ofthe28CHPLDswerenotoperableandremovalofthebatterywasdifficult.Inaddition,16ofthe28CHPLDsdidnothaveappropriatehazarddistancelabelsinaccordancewithNavyandMarinelasersafetyrequirements.EngineersfromtheDoDOfficeofInspectorGeneralconfirmedtheprogrammanager’sfindingsintheirAugust2009evaluation.”(LaserDODIG,p8).The
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purchasebyIMEF(forward)providedsubstandardequipment.Onceagain,thisequipmentwasnotforcedonMarinesduetotheinterventionofseniorofficers.
TheMCCDCresponsetotheDODIGsummedupthesafetyissuesandtheirimpact:
(LaserDODIG,MarineCorpsCommentsaddendum)
Gayl’sthirdorderinhisMRAPstudydealswiththeMarineCorpsSafetyProgram:“MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5100.29A,MarineCorpsSafetyProgram.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“CommandersatalllevelsareresponsibleforensuringthattheMarineCorpsTotalForceismaintainedatthehighestlevelofreadinesspossiblebyincorporatingoperationalriskmanagement(ORM)inalloperationsassuringcontrolsareinplaceforanyhazardthatcannotbeeliminatedandprovidingappropriatesafeandhealthfulfacilitiesforalltheirpersonnel,”and“ThisorderisapplicabletoallMarineCorpspersonnel,toinclude…militarypersonnelandcivilianMarines,”and“ThisorderappliestoallMarineCorpsfacilities,equipment,trainingfacilitiesandmateriel;andisineffectashore,onoroffMarineCorpsinstallations,orwhileembarkedinaircraftofvessels.”(Gayl,p123).MCO5100.29Aalsodealswiththeinherentsafetyassociatedwithanyindividualpieceofequipment.Forexample,alaserdazzlerthatdoesnotmeetsafetystandardsisprohibitedfrombeingusedbyorder.ThisisrelevantinthediscussionoftheLaserDazzler.ItisnotasrelevantintheMRAPdiscussionasMRAP-typevehicles,m1114sandallHMMWVsweresafetycertified.ThepurchaseofunapprovedlasersputtheCGandDCGofIMEF(Fwd)atrisk.Fortunately,thedazzlerswerenotused.ConclusionFromtheMarineCorpsresponsetotheDODIG:
(LaserDODIG,MarineCorpsCommentsaddendum).Thefieldedsystemsworkedandmorewererequested.Theyweresafeandaccomplishedthemission.Theywerecoordinatedand
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approvedthroughouttheMarineCorpschainofcommand,jointcommandsandsafety“overwatchers”.Theydidnotviolateinternationaltreatyorcauseinternationalincidents.Onceagain,thelessonisthattheforcesincontactshouldbeseverelycurtailedintheirabilitytoprovidematerialsolutionstoneeds.Thesafetyoftheforcedemandsnoless. BeforetheresultsoftheDODIGwerepublishedGaylstated:“WhilethedazzlerissueisinthehandsoftheDODIGauditorsatthistime,concernshavealsobeendocumentedbyotherorganizations.ItisnoteworthythatmycasestudiesaddressedmyobservedfailingsoftheJointNon-LethalWeaponsProgram(JNLWP)withrespecttoseveralsystemsrequestedbyoperatorsinIraq.TheseexampleswereincludedinboththeMRAPanddazzlercasestudiestoshowevidenceofatrendofmismanagementatQuantico,especiallyinasmuchisitrelateddirectlytothelaserdazzlerissue.”(GaylTestimony,p9).TheDODIGclearlyshowedGaylwrongonsubstanceandcontent,yettheDODIGresultgarneredlittleofthepresscoveragegiventoGayl’sinitialcharges.PerhapsitisbecausetheGaylpressdidnotunderstandthemilitary,orperhapstheGaylpressriskedlosingcredibilitywhentheir“posterchild”wasprovenwrong.AsimplequestionanswersGaylandtheGaylpress,“IfyouweretheCGMNF-W,whichlaserdazzlerwouldyouhaveselected?”
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17-REPORTCARDONPEOPLETAKINGCREDITANDPEOPLEASSIGNEDBLAMEBiden“On28Jun07SenatorBidenandSenatorBondsentSECDEFajointlysignedletterexpressingtheirconcernswithslowprocurementinresponsetourgentoperationalneeds.CMCandCoSArmywerecopiedontheletter(Referencec.6.).”(Gayl,p56)“TheemergencygrewtosuchanextentthatCongressionalandSECDEFoversightwasneededtocompelUSMCfromtheoutsidetofieldan“80%operationallyeffectiveandsuitable”MRAPsolutionenmasse,insupportofmultiplevalidatedneedsforMRAP.”(Gayl,p84)“ThestaffsofSenatorBondandSenatorRockefellerinvitedmetosharemyconcernsaswell.SenatorBidenthenwrotealetterofconcerntoPresidentBush,andhejointlysignedaseparateletterwithSenatorBondtotheSecretaryofDefense.Inaddition,IsharedwiththestaffsofSenatorBiden,SenatorBond,andSenatorRockefellermycasestudiesontheprocurementofMRAP,non-lethallaserdazzler,andamicroterraincamerasurveillancesystem,allcapabilitiesrequestedbywarfightersanddelayedordeniedbyQuantico.”(GaylTestimony,p6) TheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsandmultipleflagofficerstestifiedandmadepublictheMarineCorps’needforMRAPwellbeforeSenatorsBiden,BondandRockefellerdecidedtobecomeinvolved.ThesemendidnotcompeltheMarineCorps.ThetimelineclearlyshowstheentiretyoftheMarineCorpswasbehindMRAPbeforetheseSenatorsgotinvolved.Theirsupportwaswelcome,butlate.TheircriticismoftheMarineCorpswasunwarranted.Gates
“SomecriticshaverecentlystatedincorrectlythattheMarineCorpsandArmyweretherebyforcedtoacceptequipmenttheydidnotwant.Actually,SECDEFandCongressguaranteedthatMarinesandSoldiersinharm’swayreceivedequipmenttheyhadrepeatedlyrequested,i.e.wanted.Similarly,ifMRAPisperceivedascominglateinOIFthisisanindictmentofServicecombatdevelopers,andalsoconstitutesevidenceofconscientiousleadershipbySECDEFandCongress.”(Gayl,pxiii)
SecretaryGateswasnewtothePentagonsoperhapshewastotallyunawareoftheneedforMRAPs.CMC,SECNAVandotherServiceSecretaries,theUnderSecretaryofDefenseforAT&L,andvariousotherhighrankingofficialswereactioningontheMarineCorpsrequestforMRAPs.PerhapstheSECDEFwasunawareoftheMarineCorps’toppriorityforMarinesincombatandhadtorelyonanewsstorytogainsomesituationalawareness.IfGatesfirstlearnedaboutMarineMRAPneedsfromthepress,thenhewasillservedbyhisstaff.GateserroneouslygaveGaylsomecredit.GatesalsopresidedovertheMRAPDODIGwhichwasflawed.Gayl
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“WhileinIraq,myresponsibilityastheMEFForwardScienceAdvisorwastosupporttheCommandingGeneralbyhelpingtoinitiateandacceleratethedeliveryofthoseurgentlyneededcapabilities.”(GaylTestimony,p4)
“Officialsmustbeheldaccountablefortheirpastwillfulblindnesstoknownthreatsthathavecausedtragicconsequences.Similarly,theGeneralOfficerswho1)failedtosupervisethoseofficialsthenand2)continuetodefendtheirpastactionstodayshouldbeheldaccountableaswell.”(Gayl,Testimony,p15)
Gaylwaslargelyuninvolveduntilafterthefact.OnlytheignorantgivehimcreditforprovidingMRAP.Moreimportantly,GaylwasinapositiontodoeverythingthathecriticizedMCCDCfornotdoing.IfhispositionallowedhimtowriteanMRAPstudy,thenhispositionallowedhimtoAdvocateforandsupervisetheHejlikUUNS.Hedidnotdoso.Eitherhisstudyismassivelyflawedorhewassupremelyincompetentinhisjob.AsamemberoftheAdvocate,oneortheothermustbetrue.GeneralMattis(unjustlyassignedblame)
“Inthecaseofurgentneeds,thewillofthewarfightermustprevailinanycasewherethereisasplitinthevotingoutcome.Thisdefaultoutcomewouldalsoappeartomeetthespirit,intent,andoperationalcommitmentofDC,CDI.Asevidence,onthetopicofthefulfillmentofaseparateneed,inane-mailtoCG,IMEF(Fwd)on13Sep06LtGenAmoswrote:“…Iwillnever...repeatNEVERdenyourforcesforwardwhattheyneedtofightthisfightifIcaninanywayprovideitforthem.”Today’sDC,CDIdefaultedtotheurgentneedsoftheCGoftheMEF(Fwd)andhisneedforspeed.MCCDC’sfocusandprioritieswereevidentlydifferentin2005.”(Gayl,p75)
“Asadirectconsequenceofcompetingpriorities,theMRAPUUNSdidnotgaintractionwithMCCDCstaffduringLtGenMattis’tourasDC,CDI.”(Gayl,p32) TheCMCmadethedecisiononthe2005HejlikUUNS.NoLtGenintheMarineCorpshastheauthoritytocontradicttheServiceChiefforthesetypesofdecisions.Thisisasimple“chainofcommand”pointthatanynewMarineshouldknow.LtGenMattiswasinfullsupportofthe185JUONSandsubsequentMRAPJUONSasCGMARCENT.Onceagain,Gaylwaswrong.Bureaucrats/Quantico/MCCDC
“Intheend,itappearsthattheUSMCleadershipdecisionnottocommitresourcestoMRAPearlierwasbasedonsupportestablishmentbudgetarypriorities,notindustry,technical,oroperationalrealities.Beingcomposedofuniformedgeneralists,theleadershipwasbeholdentotheparochialinterestsofSMEsresidentatQuantico,andlikelyMCWLandONRaswellasanyorganizationhavingabigstakeinthesuccessoftheJLTV.TheadviceoriginatedwithfullyinformedofficersandcivilianSMEsatQuanticowhowerepresumablyawareoftheconsequencesoftheiradvice.2Yetmany,ifnotmostofthosemidlevelofficersandciviliansarestillworkingininfluentialpositionstoday,makingparochially-based
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decisionsthathavesimilarnegativeimpactsoncurrentandfuturecombatcapabilities.”(Gayl,p72)
“BasedupontheresearchprovidedinthiscasestudytheauthorsuggestsIMEFUUNSwasnotfulfilledbecauseindividualsthroughouttheEFDSperceivedtheMRAPasathreat,asitwouldcompeteforlimitedfundingagainstotherexistingprogramsandcombatvehicleinitiatives.”(Gayl,pvii)
IndividualsthroughouttheEFDSsawMRAPasaneededcapabilityandencouragedadditionalsubmissionsformore.OncetheMRAPJUONSwassubmittedin2006,everyCommandofficiallysupportedtheeffort.TherewereindividualswhodidnotandGaylmanagedtosearchoutseveral,buttheydidnotspeakfortheircommands.Gaylusedtheageoldtechniqueoffindingtheoneindividualinanorganizationwhodisagreed,thencastigatedtheentireunitforthatoneindividual’sopinion.Onceagain,theMCCDCstaffwasfilledwithveterans,Marinesdecoratedforvalor,parentsofMarinesintheITO,MarinesabouttodeployandfriendsandneighborsofdeployedMarines.Gayl’sperceptionsofMCCDCareerroneouslygivenweightdespitetheirabsurdity.MNCI,MNFIandCENTCOM
“TheydescribethecallforMRAPsashavingoriginatedwith“somemembersofcongressandatleastoneseniorU.S.Commander.”Yet,severalU.S.Commandershaveapprovedthem.ThiscasestudyhasshownthatCommandersofMNF-W,MNC-I,MNF-I,MARCENT,ARCENT,NAVCENT,andCENTCOMhaveallapprovedlargeMRAPrequirements.WhatlackedwasthesupportofServicecombatdeveloperstofulfillthosevalidrequirements.Asaconscientiousboardofdirectors,SECDEFandCongresscametotheassistanceofunderservedwarfighters.Leadingwith“somemembersofcongress”inhispapersuggestedthatCongressisinitiatingtheMRAPrequirement,wheninfactCongressismerelyadvocatingexistingurgentwarfighterneedsforMRAP.”(Gayl,p82)
GaylliststheCommandsthatapprovedtheMarineJUONSsforMRAPsin2006.OfnoteisthewordingGaylusedtomisleadthereaderintobelievingthatthesecommandsallrequestedMRAPsapartfromtheMarinerequest.Theydidnot.Gayl’sstudypointstonorequestsotherthanMarinerequests.TheabovelistedcommandsmerelysignedoffontheMarinerequestpertheirJUONSresponsibility.
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18-THEDUPEDANDCOMPLICITPRESS ThepressfailedinitsdutiestopresentanimpartialMRAPnarrative.IthasalsolargelyfailedtopresentanaccurateMRAPnarrative.Thepressshouldbeimpartial,oratleastequallypartial.InthecaseofMRAP,thestoryhasbeenone-sidedandincorrectandhasbeensoacrossthespectrum.NewsorganizationssuchasFOX,CNN,CBS,NYTimes,WashingtonPost,HuffingtonPost,USAToday,numerousblogsandmanyothershavebeenpresentingGayl’sstorywithlittleinvestigativejournalism.MRAPjournalismhasbeenafailureofthefourthestate.Thefailuresaretoonumeroustocover,however,someofthemostegregiousfailuresareprovidedbelow.
(Wong,p1)
SenatorReidisholdingafrontpageUSATodayarticledescribingtheissuesdisproveninthisstudy.Anexcerptstates:“InFebruary2005,twomonthsafterNadeausolicitedideasforbetterarmorfortheIraqisandwastoldMRAPswereananswer,anurgent-needrequestforthesametypeofvehiclecamefromembattledMarinesinAnbarprovince.Therequest,signedbythen-brigadiergeneralDennisHejlik,saidtheMarines"cannotcontinuetolose…seriousandgravecasualtiestoIEDs…atcurrentrateswhenacommercialoff-the-shelfcapabilityexiststomitigate"them.OfficialsatMarineheadquartersinQuantico,Va.,shelvedtherequestfor1,169vehicles.”(Eisler,P.,Morrison,B.,VandenBrook,T.,p1)NBCnewsarticle2/15/2008
“HundredsofU.S.MarineshavebeenkilledorinjuredbyroadsidebombsinIraqbecauseMarineCorpsbureaucratsrefusedanurgentrequestin2005frombattlefieldcommandersforblast-resistantvehicles,aninternalmilitarystudyconcludes.”(AssociatedPress1,p1)NYTimes2008
“WASHINGTON(AP)—HundredsofUnitedStatesMarinesmayhavebeenkilledorwoundedbyroadsidebombsinIraqbecauseMarineCorpsofficialsrefusedanurgentrequestin2005frombattlefieldcommandersforblast-resistantvehicles,aninternalmilitarystudyconcludes.”(AssociatedPress2,p1)
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CNN2008
“CasualtiescouldhavebeenreducedbyhalfamongMarinesinIraqifspeciallyarmoredvehicleshadbeendeployedmorequicklyinsomecases,areporttothePentagonsays.MarineCorpsspokesmanCol.DavidLapansaidtheDefenseDepartment'sinspectorgeneralwantstoinvestigatethereport'sclaimsthatbureaucraticdelaysunderminedtheprogramtodevelopthearmoredvehicles.”(Starr,p1)HuffingtonPost2008
“HundredsofU.S.MarineshavebeenkilledorinjuredbyroadsidebombsinIraqbecauseMarineCorpsbureaucratsrefusedanurgentrequestin2005frombattlefieldcommandersforblast-resistantvehicles,aninternalmilitarystudyconcludes.”(Lardner,p1)FOXNews2008
“HundredsofU.S.MarineshavebeenkilledorinjuredbyroadsidebombsinIraqbecauseMarineCorpsbureaucratsrefusedanurgentrequestin2005frombattlefieldcommandersforblast-resistantvehicles,aninternalmilitarystudyconcludes.”(Lardner,p1)FOXNews2008
“AnurgentFebruary2005requestforMRAPsgotlostinbureaucracy.Itwassignedbythen-Brig.Gen.DennisHejlik,whoaskedfor1,169ofthevehicles.TheMarinescouldnotcontinuetotake"seriousandgravecasualties"causedbyIEDswhenasolutionwascommerciallyavailable,wroteHejlik,whowasacommanderinwesternIraqfromJune2004toFebruary2005.”(Lardner,p1)CBSNews2008
“TheMarineCorpshasaskedthePentagon'sinspectorgeneraltoexamineallegationsthatanearlytwo-yeardelayinthefieldingofblast-resistantvehiclesledtohundredsofcombatcasualtiesinIraq.”(AssociatedPress3,p1)WashingtonPost2010
“Gaylandsomeformercolleaguessaythatthesechargesweretrumpedup,theculminationofathree-yearpatternofretaliationbytheCorps'leadershipfortheembarrassmentthathecausedandhiscontinuedeffortstoholdofficialsaccountableforignoringanurgentrequestforhelpbysoldiersunderfire.Hisoffense,Gaylsays,iscontinuingtosay"thatMarinesdidnottakecareofMarinesinharm'sway,"asacrilegeinsideaservicethatpridesitselfonprotectingindividualsoldiers.Lastweek,hisconfrontationaccelerated.”(Smith,p1)WashingtonMonthly2011
“NorcouldGaylclaimtobesurprised.“I’dbeenexpectingsomethinglikethisforyears,buttheyfinallyfoundawaytomakeithappen,”hesaid.Theflashdriveisaredherring,hebelieves—anotherinaseriesofreprisalsagainsthimbytheMarinesforrevealingwhathecallsunconscionablemismanagementinthehighcommand.AfterreturningfromatourinIraq,Gayl
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wentpublicwithanaccountofhowPentagondelaysinsendingprotectiveequipmenttheremayhavecosttroopstheirlives.HeappearedonPBS’sNewsHourandtestifiedbeforeCongress,andindoingsocrossedmanypeoplemorepowerfulthanhimself,includingGeneralJamesMattis,nowthechiefofU.S.CentralCommandandoneofthemostimportantmeninthemilitary.”(Verini,p1)SmallWarsJournalSeries2012
“WhenarecalcitrantPentagonEstablishmentcontinuedtorefusetoputsufficientemphasisonMRAPs,GS-15FranzGaylandothersdrovehometheimportanceofrapidlyfieldingtoolsetstosupportthewareffortin2007-2010.ThishelpedexistingMRAPrequirementsgetnoticed,anditthenhelpedfieldavarietyofothertoolsetsusefulforCOIN.EveryonewhoreallyinitiatedMRAPsovertheoppositionoftheEstablishmenthasbeenscrupuloustoavoidattention(withperhapsoneexception).”(Jankowski,p1).MarineCorpsTimes2014
“AMarineCorpscivilianwhowroteascathinginternalreportarguingthattheCorpscouldhavesavedhundredsoflivesbyapprovinga2005requestforMineResistantAmbushProtectedvehiclesinIraqhaswonhiswhistelblowercompliant.”(Schogol,2014)Newsweekarticle2/27/2014
"Earlyon,BidenwrotePresidentGeorgeW.Bushtoexpressconcernaboutthe2005failedresponse,"GaylrecalledrecentlyinDefenseNews,acloselyreadBeltwaypublication."BidenandBondalsowroteGates,citingastudyattributinghundredsofpreventabledeathstothefailedserviceresponsetothatrequest."(Stein,2014)USATODAY2014
“OnethinghaspuzzledmeabouttheMRAPstory:Whynobody,sofarasweknow,hasbeenheldaccountableforthedelaysinhavingthemfielded…Yetasfarasweknow—andit'slikelywewould—noseniorofficialwaseverfiredforfailingtoprovidetroopsincombatwithequipmentproventosavetheirlives.Wedoknowthatalower-levelwhistle-blowerwhocalledattentiontothedelays,MarineCorpsscienceadviserFranzGayl,sufferedforit.TheMarineCorpstriedforyearstohavehimfired.Hestillworksthere.Ultimately,thePentagon—onlybecauseofGates'persistence—embarkedona$40billionprogramtobuild27,000ofthetrucksfortroopsinIraqandAfghanistan.”(VandenBrook,p1)Newsweek2014
“Infact,theMarinesinIraqhadbeenbeggingforthelife-and-limb-savingMRAPssince2005,Gayldiscoveredthere,butbureaucratsatMarinesheadquartersinQuantico,Va.-some,perhaps,withaneyeonfutureemploymentwithcontractorsdevelopingcompetingvehicles-hadburiedtheirrequest.Anditwasn'tGateswhofirstclamberedtorescuethebeleagueredtroops-butnoneotherthanJosephBiden,theDemocraticsenatorfromDelawareatthetime….Procurement?Contractors?Asitturnsout,theMRAPwasdevelopedbySouthAfrica,notoneofthehardyPentagoncontractorswhoconstantlyprovidesoftlandingsforretiring
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generals.AndguesswheretwoofthetopMarinegeneralswhoresistedtheMRAPdeploymentsaretoday?
FormerMarineCorpscommandantJamesT.Conway,whotried(andfailed)tocuttheacquisitionofMRAPSbyoverathirdin2007,nowsitsontheboardofTextron,whichjoinedwithBoeingthatsameyeartodevelopacompetitortotheMRAP.RetiredMarineCorpsGeneralJamesN.Mattis,whocommandedtheMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommandwhenitdeep-sixedthetroops'desperaterequestforMRAPSfor19monthsduring2005and2006,nowsitsontheboardofGeneralDynamics,producerofanothercompetingvehicle.OnecanonlyguesswhereMattis'successorattheMCCDC,Gen.JamesF.Amos,whohasoverseentheGaylcaseasthecurrentMarineCorpsCommandant,willland.(Conwaydidnotrespondtoarequestforcomment;Mattisdeclinedtocomment.)”(Stein,p1)MarineCorpsGazette2014
“DuringOIF/OEFastarkcontrastexistedbetweentheperformancesofMarineCorpscombatunitsandtheSupportingEstablishmentorganizationsthatequipthem.Operatingunitswererightlypraisedforphysicalcourage,adaptability,andforesight,whileseveralveryimportantSupportingEstablishmentdecisionsresultedinrepeated,witheringcriticismformisplacedprioritiesandinertia.RepeatedexcoriationsforlackofmoralcouragealsocamefromthehighestlevelsoftheU.S.Government.ThroughoutOIFwewitnessedseveralhigh-profilecaseswhereMCCDC/MCSCcollectivelyfailedtoadequatelypreparefororrespondtocapabilitygapsinthefield.Forexample,theMarineCorps’foreknowledgethattheup-armoredHMMWVwouldbea“deathtrap”whenencounteringlandminescomestomind.Alertedbyexpertsinthe1990swhoforesawthetragiccarnagethatlandmineswouldcause,MCCDCplannershadnocontingencyplansforthosevehicles.”(Jankowski,p78)GAPWhistleblowerSummit2015
“AttheNationalWhistleblowerAppreciationDayluncheon,hostedbyNationalWhistleblowerCenter,congressionalleaderstranscendedpartylinestohonorwhistleblowing.CongresswomanSpeierkickedofftheeventbyrecognizingTomDrakeandMarinesafetywhistleblowerFranzGaylforpersonifyingtruepublicservants.”(Devine,p1)Wikipedia“IraqWarinAnbarProvince”(6/3/2016)
“On17February,BrigadierGeneralDennisHejlikfiledanurgentrequestwiththeMarineCorpsfor1,200MineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)vehicles,specificallydesignedtowithstandIEDattacks,foruseinAnbarProvince.Inhisrequest,GeneralHejlikadded,"The[Marines]cannotcontinuetolose...seriousandgravecasualtiestoIED[s]."TheMarineCorpsdidnotformallyactontherequestfor21months.HejliklaterclaimedthathewasreferringtoIEDswhich"toreintothesidesofvehicles",andthattheMarineCorpshaddeterminedthatsimplyaddingmorearmoredHumveeswouldprovideadequateprotection.WhistleblowerFranzGayldisagreed,andwroteareportforCongressclaimingthattherequestwasshelvedbecausetheMarineCorpswantedtousethefundstodeveloptheJointLightTacticalVehicle,areplacementfortheHumveenotscheduledtobecomeoperationaluntil2012.SomeArmypersonnelcomplainedthattheMarinestookanalmostcasualattitudetowardsIEDs.OneArmyofficerinRamadicomplainedthat,afterwarningaboutthelarge
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numberofIEDsonaparticularroute,hewastold,"UnlesstherearepeoplemeltinginsideofHumvees,thenit'snotarealproblem."(Wikipedia,2016)CongressionalTestimony2016
“FranzGayl,aMarineCorpscivilianscientist,blewthewhistleaboutdelaysinthemilitary’sprocurementofblast-resistanttrucksknownasMineResistantAmbushProtectedvehicles.Mr.GaylraisedcongressionalawarenessoftheproblematatimewhenU.S.troopswereincreasinglyvulnerabletodeathandinjuryfromimprovisedexplosivedevicesinIraq.Mr.Gaylallegedretaliationforhiswhistleblowing.OSCinvestigatedhisclaims,andMr.GaylandtheMarineCorpssuccessfullyresolvedhiscomplaintsthroughOSC’salternativedisputeresolutionprogram.”(Lerner,p2)Inadditiontothewrittenpress,GaylwasgivenastarringroleintheMovie“WaronWhistleblowers”(availableonAmazonandreviewedbymajornewsorganizations).
SharonWeinbergerqualifiesasoneofthemoreduplicitousmembersofthepress.ShehasbeenGayl’smouthpiecesincetheMRAPbecameacontroversialissue.HerblindsupportforGaylcauseshertoignorebasicresearchrequiredforaccuratereporting.Forexample,Weinberger’scommentaryontheLaserDazzlerisguidedbyGayl’sperspective.Weinbergerstates,“Themilitaryneedlesslydelayedbysixmonthsanurgentlyneeded,nonlethallaserweaponthatcouldhavesavedthelivesofU.S.MarinesandIraqicivilians,accordingtoareportreleasedtodaybythePentagon'sinspectorgeneral.”(Weinberger,p1).WeinbergerthenquotesGaylandhisopinionsabouttheDazzler,“FranzGayl,aMarineCorpsscienceadviserwhoseconcernsaboutthedelayinprocuringthelaserdazzlerpromptedtheinitialinvestigation,criticizedthefinalreportas"weak."Hesaiditfailedtoincludemanykeydetails.”(Weinberger,p1).GaylwasoneoftheparticipantsintheDazzlerdevelopmentprocess(seeDazzlerChapter).WeinbergerfailstounderstandortomentionthatGaylwasamemberoftheIMEFG9whichcausedthedelay.WeinbergerblindlyacceptedGayl’spointofviewwithoutthebasicresearchthatwouldhaveshownGaylwasoneofthecausesofthedelay.TheblindobediencetoGayl’spointofviewisnotuncommonforWeinberger. OneofthefailuresofthepresswasaninabilitytounderstandMarineCorpscombatdevelopment.ThefailureofthepresstoresearchleadtoadefaultacceptanceofGayl’sviewpointswithouteventhesimplestquestions.Unaskedquestions(toGayl)thatshouldhavebeenasked:
• IfyouwereanAdvocate,asseenonyourcoverpageforyourstudy,whydidyoudonothingwiththe2005HejlikUUNSuntil2007?
• IsitarealisticcourseofactionfortheMarineCorpstobuyMRAPsandm1114s
simultaneouslyforthesameforces?
• IfMRAPwassoobvious,whydidyounotexerciseyourresponsibilityasanAdvocateandsubmitanUNSpriorto2005?
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• YousubmittedoneUUNSforafuturisticairship.DidyousubmitanyotherUNSfor
surveillancecapabilities?Wastheairshipintendedtosolvepersistentsurveillance?
• WhydidyouattributealaserdazzlerdelaytoMCCDCwhenMCCDCwasreadytosenddazzlers,butIMEF(Fwd)refusedthem?
• WhydoestheHejlikUUNSnumberof1,169neverfigureintotheIMEFMRAPrequest
numbersof185or1000or1,185or805?
• If,asyousayinyourstudy,IMEF(Fwd)rejectedMRAPs(Gayl,p50),howcanyousaythattherewasconstantdemandforMRAPs?
• WhydidtheMRAPDODIGrecommendationsnotmatchyourrecommendations?
Thislistcouldgoonandon.Simplequestions,notrequiringmilitaryknowledge,werenotasked.SimplequestionsaboutGayl’sstudywerenotasked.SimplequestionsabouttheDODIGswerenotasked.Instead,thepresssimplyacceptedGayl’spoints.GaylasawhistleblowerwasafarmoreattractivestorythanGaylasanMRAPcritic.One,however,didnotcomewithouttheother.Asaresult,thevalueofthewhistleblowerangletrumpedanyflawsinGayl’sMRAPstory.Inordertohavethewhistleblower,onehadtohaveMRAP.ThereforetheMRAPstorywassimplyaccepted.
TherearemembersofthepressthatassistedinorchestratingtheMRAPstory.USATODAY
journalistTomVandenBrookwascontactedbyJoeBiden’sofficespecificallytopromulgatethestory.InconjunctionwithBiden’soffice,USATODAYstartedworkingontheirpreconceivedMRAPwhistleblowerstorywhileBidenwasstillquestioningtheMarineCorps.LaterinterviewsshowedVandenBrook’sexcitementattheavailabilityofawhistleblower.MRAPwasasecondaryissue.Atthetime,GaylwasnotfocusedonMRAP.ThatfocuscameaftertheBiden-Gayl-VandenBrooklinkage(seeChapter8).
InadditiontoUSAToday,thewhistleblowerpressandthegovernmentoversightpress
advocatedforGaylateveryturn.Itwas“Wired:DangerRoom”thatinitiallypublishedGayl’scharges.Yearslater(2010),theycontinuedtoadvocateforGayl:“TheMarineCorpshigher-upsdidn’tlikehowGaylcalled‘emoutfordraggingtheirfeetonhisMRAPrequest.Theydidn’tappreciateGayl’sassessmentthattheir“grossmismanagement”keptnon-lethallaser“dazzlers”fromgettingtoIraqandAfghanistan–riskingbothcivilians’andsoldiers’lives.”(Shachtman,p1).GaylneverrequestedMRAPs.Itwasnot“hisrequest”.ThedazzlerswereapprovedpriortoGayl’sdeploymenttoIraq.TheDODIGspecificallyrejectedGayl’schargesof“grossmismanagement”.ThearticlecallsGaylan“iconoclasticcivilianscientist”.Theadulationisnotbackedbyfact.
OtherorganizationssuchastheGovernmentAccountabilityProject(GAP)andProjectOn
GovernmentOversight(POGO)arecomplicitinspreadingthefalseMRAPnarrative.POGOand
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GAParenotorganizationswithanyexpertiseinMarineCorpscombatdevelopment,MRAP,oranyelementofthesubstanceofGayl’sstudy.GAPandPOGOarefocusedongovernmentoversightandviewGaylasan“oversighthero”.ThefactthatheisblowingthewhistleontheMarineCorpsestablishestheircredentialsforbackinghim.TheMRAPfactsarenotthefocusfortheseorganizations.Aswhistleblowerorganizations,theypublishintheblogosphereandtheirpublishedworksoftencontainfalsecommentsabouttheMarineCorpsandMarineequipment.
Finally,themajorityofthepresshassimplyacceptedGayl’sstatementsasfact.Whena
whistleblowereventoccurs,mainstreammediatrotsoutGayl,mentionsafewlinesabouthimbeingawhistleblower,andthenpromulgatesGayl’sfalsehoods.Forexample,FOXNewspresentedastoryonBenghaziwhistleblowersonnationalTV.Thefirst20secondswasontheBenghaziwhistleblowers,theremainingtwominuteswasonFranzGaylandMRAP(FOXNEWS,video).Gaylcanbeexpectedtomaintainhisposition,butFOXshouldn’tsimplyparrotGayl’saccusations.TheFOXNEWSvideowasusedasitwasthefirstresultonaGooglesearch.TherearethousandsofexamplesofthepressblindlyquotingGayl.Thisstudyisnotfocusedonthepress,butsimplesearcheswillshowthousandsofsimilarexamples.
Inadditiontothewritingsinthepresswritlarge,Gaylreferencespressclippingsinhis
MRAPstudy.ThesepressclippingsfaithfullyreportGayl’sposition.Gayl’sstudyalsoreferences“thepresswhichisreferencingGayl”.Heisquotinghimself.Asaresult,theimage(presentedasfact)reflectsGayl’sposition.Severalexamplesfollow:
“OfficialsatMarineheadquartersinQuantico,Va.,shelvedtherequestfor1,169vehicles.”(Gayl,p57)GaylquotesaUSATODAYarticlethatoccurredbeforeanyinvestigationandiscontrarytotheMarineCorpsposition.ThearticlesimplyparrotsGayl’saccusationwithoutprovidinganyfacts.Unaskedquestionsabouttheaccuseddelayinclude:Whoshelvedit?Wherewasitheld?Isthereanydocumentation?Arethereanyalternativeexplanations?Instead,GaylquotesUSATODAYinhisstudyastheyquotehim.
“JimHampton,nowaretiredcolonel,questionswhythePentagonandCongressdidn'tdomoretokeepthetroopssafe."Ihavecolleagueswhosaypeopleneedtogotojailoverthis,andinmymindtheydo…"Thiswell-researchedUSATODAYarticlerevealedahistoryofwiderDoDawarenessofandpushbackonMRAPthatwasoccurringconcurrentlywiththeMarineCorps’ownMRAPexperience.”(Gayl,p58)Onceagain,USATODAYdoesnotdotheresearch.TheydidnotaskwhatGayl,aPentagonemployee,didaboutMRAPaftertheHejlikUUNSsubmissionin2005.TheydidnotlinkHampton’sexperiencewiththeMarineCorps’requests.ItisportrayedassimplyagiventhatHamptonagreedwithallofGayl’saccusations.Ifthatwasthecase,thentheabsenceofanyresearchbyHampton(Army)ontheMarineCorpsishighlysuspect.
“On25Mayanarticletitled“MarinesFailtoGetGeartoTroops”authoredbyRichardLardnerappearedontheAssociatedPresswire.Itcaptureswellthescopeandconcernoftheunfulfilledurgentneedsdocumentedabove,includingMRAP.Thisarticlecameontheheels
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ofpressrevelationsthattheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSof17Feb05hadnotbeenfulfilled(Referencea.12.).Thearticlestatedinpart:“ThesystemfordeliveringbadlyneededgeartoMarinesinIraqhasfailedtomeetmanyurgentrequestsforequipmentfromtroopsinthefield,accordingtoaninternaldocumentobtainedbyTheAssociatedPress.Ofmorethan100requestsfromdeployedMarineunitsbetweenFebruary2006andFebruary2007,lessthan10percenthavebeenfulfilled…Itblamedthebureaucracyanda‘risk-averse’approachbyacquisitionofficials.Amongtheitemsheldupwereamineresistantvehicleandahandheldlasersystem.‘Processworshipcripplesoperatingforces,’accordingtothedocument.‘Civilianmiddlemanagementlackstechnicalandoperationalcurrency.’…Thedocument'sclaimsruncountertothepublicdescriptionofaprocessintendedtocutthroughthelayersofredtapethatfrequentlyslowthemilitary'sprocurementprocess…”Thisdraftbriefaccuratelyreflectedthelackoffaith,andoftentrust,thattheoperatingforcesfeltwithregardstoUSMCcombatdevelopers.”(Gayl,p115).ThedocumentisGayl’sDDR&Epresentation.Gayldoesnotmentionthatheisquotinghisownbriefasquotedbythereporter.Thecomment“Thisdraftbriefaccuratelyreflectedthelackoffaith,andoftentrust,thattheoperatingforcesfeltwithregardstoUSMCcombatdevelopers.”wasstatedbyGaylaboutGayl’sbriefandGayl’sopinion.LardnerwassimplyaconduitforGayl’sself-quotation. ThepressisnottheonlyorganizationtobedupedbyGayl.Itshouldhave,however,exercisedsomejournalisticresponsibilityanddiscoveredthefacts.
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19-ANEVALUATIONOFTHEMRAPDODIG
TheMarineCorpsreliedontheDODIGtopresentthetruthandtheDODIGfailed.The
DODIGfailedtodiscoverevidencethatwouldhavereshapedtheirconclusions.TheDODIGexpandedthescopeoftheirinvestigationtoencompassissuesoutsideoftheirinvestigativepurview.TheDODIGdidnotcommentonprominentdecisionmakerswhoactuallymadedecisionsorfailedtomakedecisions.TheDODIGusedmisleadinglanguageinordertojustifytheirconclusions.TheDODIGdidnotcommentonGayl’sstudy.TheDODIGhadmanyflawswhichwillbediscussed,butitalsogotafewthingscorrect.Thisportionofthestudywillpointoutflaws(andsomestrengths)intheMRAPDODIG. TheDODIGreportwasissuedDecember8,2008threeyearsandninemonthsafterthesubmissionofthe2005HejlikUUNSwhichtheywereinvestigating.TheDODIGcommencedtheirinvestigationinMarchof2008(DODIG,p19),threeyearsandonemonthafterthesubmissionofthe2005HejlikUUNS.TheDODIGdidnotcaveatthattheinformationthattheywereseekingwasoverthreeyearsold.Generalsandstaffhadchanged.Relevantemailshadbeendeleted.Memorieshadfaded.TheDODIGdidnotcaveatthattheirinvestigationwasseriouslyhobbledbythistimelag.ThefollowingcritiquesoftheDODIGareoffered:DODIGPagei
“AttherequestoftheAssistantCommandantoftheMarineCorps,wereviewedtheMarineCorpsdecisionmakingprocesstodeterminewhetherthedecisionmakersrespondedappropriatelyandtimelytotheFebruary2005UrgentUniversalNeedStatement(UUNS)submittedbyfieldcommandersforMineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)-typevehicles.”
• TheDODIGdidnotmakedeterminationsonallofthedecisionmakersandleftseveralofthecriticaldecisionmakersoutoftheinvestigation.LtGenSattlerwasneverintervieweddespitehispositionasMARCENTandtheoriginalCGfortheUUNS.LtGenGardner(P&R)wasnotintervieweddespitehiscriticalroleintheprocess.OtherGeneralswerenotcitedinthecontextoftheirresponsibilities.Thedecisionmakingprocess,asdescribedinChapter4-6,discussestheprocessyet“theMCCDC”istheonlycommandcited.TheprocessinvolvedAdvocatesandCommandersacrosstheMarineCorpsasdecisionmakers(addressed(byname)inthisstudyinChapters4-11).Their“appropriateandtimely”responsewasnotinvestigated.
• TheDODIG,inafitofself-interest,coinedthetermMRAP-type.Thistermcreateslinkagesthatdidnotexist.TheDODIG,withthecreationofthisterm,couldlinkdisparateevents(thatusedanyform/meaningofthewordMRAP)anddrawconclusionswithouthavingtodetermineifeventsweretrulylinked.Forexample,ifthe2005Hejlik
TheMRAPDODIGdidadisservicetotheMarineCorps.Itsfindingswereskewedanditsinvestigationwasinsufficientinfindingfacts,examiningevidenceanddrawingconclusions.Infairness,theDODIGwaspointedinthewrongdirectionbyseniorleaders.TheDODIG,however,shouldhavefoundtheevidenceofIMEF’scompletionoftheHejlikUUNS.
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UUNSaskedforMRAPsastheyaredepictedinthepicturesintheDODIG(aftertheTOC),thenmanyofthesuiteofvehiclesanalyzedbyMCSCin2005wouldhavebeenirrelevant(e.g.Casspir).Asanotherexample,ifthetermMRAPmeantthesamethingasthevehiclesdepictedintheDODIG,thentherewouldhavebeennoneedtodiscusswhysomanydifferenttermswereused.AlegitimateconclusiontothatdiscussionwasthatthetermsusedreflectedthefactthatMRAPwasacapabilitydescription,notavehiclename.TheDODIGcouldavoidthenamingconfusion(whichalsoincludedHMMWV-likeasadescriptorintheHejlikUUNS)andlinkeventsandrequeststhatwerenotlinked.TheDODIGtookashort-cutandsimplylumpedallvehiclesandvehiclerequestsunderthesamenamingconventionof“MRAP-type”.
“ShortlyaftertheJune2005decisionbytheCommandantoftheMarineCorpstoreplace
allHighMobilityMulti-PurposeWheeledVehicles(HMMWV)intheaterwiththeM1114up-armoredHMMWV,theDeputyCommandantoftheMarineCorpsforInstallationsandLogisticsadvisedMarineCorpsgeneralsthattheM1114up-armoredHMMWVwasthebestavailable,mostsurvivableassettoprotectMarineCorpsforces.”
FourmonthsafterthesubmissionoftheHejlikUUNS,theCommandantdecidedtoreplaceallHMMWVswithm1114s.ThisstatementlinksthatdecisiontotheadviceoftheDCI&L.CMCattendedtheEOSwhichwasattendedbyACMC,DCP&R,DCCD,DCI&L,CGIMEF,CGIIMEF,CGMARFPRPACandDCPP&O.AlloftheseexecutiveswereawareoftheHejlikUUNS.WithfullknowledgeoftheassembledexecutivesoftheMarineCorpsandwithfullknowledgeoftheHejlikrequest,CMCdecidedtoequiptheforcewithm1114s.Intheabovestatement,thenDCI&LrendersanopiniononthealreadyestablishedCMCdecision.TheDODIGfailedtoexplaintherelevanceofDCI&L’sopinionaboutadecisionalreadymadebyCMCwiththeadviceofhisassembledExecutives(Tomczakemaildtd5/23/2007).ThismaterialsolutiondecisionbyCMCrendersmuchoftheremainderoftheMRAPDODIGirrelevantandincorrect.
“Inreaction,theMarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand(MCCDC)stoppedprocessingtheUUNSforMRAP-typevehiclecapabilityinAugust2005.”
• TheCMC,withfullknowledgeofMRAP-typevehicles,madeadecisiontoequiptheentiretyoftheforcewithm1114s.TheDODIGfailedtoexplainalegitimatereasonforMCCDCtocontinueprocessingtheHejlikUUNSinthefaceoftheCMCdecision.Thedecisiononthevehicletypewasmadewhichshouldhavebeen,andwas,theendofthediscussion.TheHejlikUUNShadbeenprocessedtoapointwhereexecutivedecisionwasrequired.Thatdecisioncameintheformofaselectionofthem1114.Hence,MCCDCstoppedprocessingtheHejlikUUNS.Giventheselectionofthem1114,theDODIGfailedtoacknowledgetheresolutionoftheHejlikUUNS.TheDODIGpresentedapicturewheretheHejlikUUNSremainedactive.Forsomereason,thepurchaseof1,169MRAP-typevehicles(HejlikUUNS),simultaneouslywiththepurchaseofthem1114fleet,remainedareasonableoptionintheeyesoftheDODIG.TherationalactordoesnotseethepurchaseoftheMRAPsimultaneouslywiththem1114asapossibility.
• TheprocessingofanUUNSisnotthesoleresponsibilityofMCCDC.TheDODIGfailedtoacknowledgetheprocessrolesof:
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o TheAdvocates(whorepresentedtheGCEandotherelementsoftheMEF)whoownedstepsintheprocess.TheDODIGwouldhaveusbelievethattheAdvocatesdidnotadvocatefortheUUNSeventhoughitwasactive.
o MARFORPACandMARCENTwhosubmittedtheUUNSandownedit.TheDODIGwouldhaveusbelievethattheMARFORsforgotaboutorlostinterestintheir$1BilUUNSandfailedtoaskwhereintheprocessitwas.
o DCP&RwhoreceivedaninitialcopyoftheUUNSandwasresponsibleforthefundingofUUNSs.TheDODIGwouldhaveusbelievethatDCP&Rdidnotqueryanyonewhenhehada“pending”UUNSwithacostofapproximately$1Bil.
o DCCDandMCSCwhowereresponsibleforestablishingprogramsandwerenotifiedearlyonintheprocessinordertostartplanning.TheDODIGIGwouldhaveusbelievethattheremainderofMCCDCnottaskedwiththeUUNSprocessingwouldstoppreparingforaprogramimpactingeverythingfromfueltojammerstoammunition.
o TheMROCandallofitsmemberswhosawMRAPbriefedseveraltimes.TheDODIGwouldhaveusbelievethattheremovalofMRAPfromtheMROCbriefsoccurredwithoutreasonorwithoutMROCnotice.
“Specifically,MCCDCofficialsdidnotdevelopacourseofactionfortheUUNS,attemptto
obtainfundingforit,orpresentittotheMarineCorpsRequirementsOversightCouncilforadecisiononacquiringanMRAP-typevehiclecapability.”
• ThecourseofactionfortheUUNSwasestablishedbytheCommandantoftheMarineCorpsandtheEOS.TheDODIGfailedtoexplainanylegitimatealternativeCOAs.Forexample,hadtheDODIGbeenabletorationalizeaCOAwheretheHejlikUUNSwasfullyfunded(e.g.1,169Cougars)andfieldedsimultaneouslywiththem1114s,thenthiscritiquemayhavesomelegitimacy.ThentheDODIGcouldestablishaconvincingrationale“toobtainfundingforit”.TheCMCm1114decisionmademostotherCOAsirrelevant.
• TheDODIGusescarefullycraftedverbiagewhenitstates“orpresentittotheMarineCorpsRequirementsOversightCouncilforadecisiononacquiringanMRAP-typevehiclecapability.”EverymemberoftheMROCwasawareoftheUUNSandhadreceivedbriefsattheEOSand/ortheESB.MRAPwasbriefedattheMROCinupdateslidesandontheMROCDM.TheDODIGstatedthatMCCDCdidnotpresenttheUUNStotheMROC“foradecision”.TheDODIGdidnotsaythatMROCmemberswereignorantofMRAP(theywerenot).TheDODIGdidnotsaythatMRAPwasnotbriefedtothemembersoftheMROC(whichitwas).TheDODIGdidnotsaythattheMRAPwasnotbriefedintheMROC(itwas).TheysaidMCCDCdidnotbrieftheMROC“foradecision”…whichitdidn’t.TheDODIGmisleadsthereadersintothinkingthatthiswasanimportantissue.TheMROCregularlymadedecisionselectronicallywithouteverreceivinga“presentationfromMCCDC”.Thislawyerlystatementistechnicallycorrect,butmisleading.
• TheAdvocatesdidnotpresenttheUUNSoranyUUNSissuetotheMROC.TheDODIGfailedtonotetheresponsibilityoftheAdvocatesandtheirpresenceontheMROC.
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“Further,theMCCDCdidnot,asitcouldandshouldhaveinJuly2005,requestthattheDeputyCommandingGeneral,IMarineExpeditionaryForce(Forward)takeadvantageofnewJointStaffprocessesavailabletoaddressanimmediateandapparentjointwarfighterneedforanMRAP-typevehiclecapability.”
• ItisnotMCCDCsresponsibilitytorequesttheDCGtotakeadvantageofjointprocesses.AsstatedintheJUONSvsUUNSchapter,theresponsibilityforjointfundingflowsthroughthejointchainofcommand.ItwasincumbentontheJointCommandertounderstandtheprocessanduseit.Evenwhenthejointforcewasawareoftheprocesses,theyoftendecidednottousethem(seeJUONSvsUUNSchapter).MCCDCwasalsolearningaboutthenewjointparadigmandassistedMNF-Woncethejointpicturebecameclear.Responsibilityforjointrequests,however,restedwiththeCommanderMNF-W.
• TheDODIGassumedthattheCommanderMNF-WdidnotrequestMRAPsthroughjointchannelsbecauseMCCDCdidnotrequestCommanderMNF-Wtodoso.Inreality,CommanderMNF-Wdidnotusethejointprocessbecausethe2005requestwassatisfiedthroughServiceChannels.ThereisnolegitimatereasontosubmitarequestthroughjointchannelsifithasbeenaddressedinServicechannels.
“DoDwasawareofthethreatposedbyminesandimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)in
low-intensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistantvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.YetDoDdidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlow-intensityconflictsthatinvolvedminesandIEDs.”
• PreviouschaptersdealwiththeawarenessoftheMarineCorpswhichparalleledtheawarenessoftheDOD.TheDODIGmisleadsthereaderintothinkingthatIEDswereacommontopicbefore2003.Theywerenot.
• TheDODIGwastoreview“theMarineCorpsdecisionmakingprocesstodeterminewhetherthedecisionmakersrespondedappropriatelyandtimelytotheFebruary2005UrgentUniversalNeedStatement(UUNS)submittedbyfieldcommandersforMineResistantAmbushProtected(MRAP)-typevehicles.”TheDODIGwastaskedwithreviewingthe“MarineCorps”,yetdecidedtocommentonthe“DOD”.Thisbreachofinvestigativeauthoritycanbeviewedmanyways.Itisclear,however,thattheDODIGdecidedtocriticizetheDODforsomepurposeotherthanthatforwhichitwascreated(MRAPinvestigation).Thatpurposeremainsunknown.TheresultofthisbreachalsohasadverseimpactontheinvestigationintotheMarineCorps.Thiscriticism,ifappliedonlytotheMarineCorps,wouldhaveshownthattheentiretyoftheMarineCorps,toincludetheAdvocates,didnotdeveloprequirementsforMRAP-typevehicles.ThisincludedGayl,PP&O,MARCENTandIMEFetc.(everymemberofthecombatdevelopmentcommunity).MCCDCwasoneoftheelementsofthisbroadercombatdevelopmentcommunity.
“WhatWeRecommend”
TheDODIGrecommendationwascenteredontheMarineCorps’useofjointresourcing.TheoriginalDODIGrecommendationwasflawedandthenadjustedwithcommentsfromtheJointStaffandtheMarineCorps.TheDODIGrecommendationremainedflaweddespitethe
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adjustment.TheJointStaffrecommendedthatServiceneedsflowthroughtheCOCOMsinsteadofdirectlytotheJointStaff.TheCOCOMscouldthereforeputahalttoparochialServiceintereststhatwerenotAORfocused.TheCOCOMcouldalsosolicitinputfromsubordinateJTFCommanderssuchasMNC-I.Theproblem,however,remainsinthatIMEFcouldsubmitthroughtheMarineCorpschain,thentheMarineCorpswouldsubmitittoCENTCOMwhereitmightbestaffedtoMNCI.ThenitwouldbesenttotheJointStaff.ThealternativeistonotstaffittoMNCIatallinwhichcaseMNCI’ssubordinateunitswouldhavetheauthoritytobypasstheirMNCICommandingOfficer.Eitherway,theDODIGrecommendationwasconvolutedandviolatesthechainofcommand.DODIGPage1
“ThisauditwasinitiatedattherequestoftheAssistantCommandantoftheMarineCorpsinresponsetoallegationsofmismanagementregardingtheidentificationandfulfillmentofarequirementforMRAP-typevehiclesmadeinthe“MineResistantAmbushProtectedVehicle(MRAP)GroundCombatElement(GCE)AdvocateScienceandTechnology(S&T)AdvisorCaseStudy,”January22,2008.”
• TheDODIGnotesthatthepromptfortheinvestigationwasbasedontheGaylstudy,butitwasnotcharteredtocommentontheGaylstudy.TheDODIGdidnotcometothesameconclusionsthatGaylcameto.ItwasnotintheDODIGchartertoexamineallofGayl’sstudy,elsetheDODIGwouldhavebeenoverwhelmed.ThelackofmentionofGayl’sstudyreflectsitslackofcredibilityasasource.TheDODIGdidnotestablishthesamerecommendationsasGayl’sstudydespitehavingampleaccesstoit.NotonlywereGayl’sandtheDODIG’srecommendationsdissimilar,theywerenotevenclose.ThisreflectspositivelyontheDODIG.
“Specifically,theallegationsstatedthattheMarineCorpsdidnotpromptlyrespondto
theneedsofdeployedunits,andthatinactionbyMarineCorpsofficialsonacquiringMRAP-typevehiclescostMarinestheirlives.”
• The“MarineCorpsofficials”appearstoonlycoverMCCDCofficialsdespitetheresponsibilitiesofofficialsacrosstheMarineCorps.TheDODIGfailstoaddressmanyoftheresponsibleofficialsandthereforepresentsmisleadinginformationandconclusions.
DODIGPage2
“OnFebruary17,2005,theDeputyCommandingGeneral,IMarineExpeditionaryForce,throughtheCommandingGeneral,MarineCorpsForces,Pacific,submittedanUUNSfor1,169MRAP-typevehiclestotheMCCDC.”
• TheUUNSwasnotforMRAP-typevehicles.TheUUNSwasforMRAPvehicles.
“OnMay21,2006,theCommandingGeneral,Multi-NationalForce-Westsubmitteda
JointStaffRapidValidationandResourcingRequest1for185MRAP-typevehiclestotheJoint
RequirementsOversightCouncil(JROC).”
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• TheRequestwasnotforMRAP-typevehicles.Itwasfor“JERRVs”.Inusingthesameterm,theDODIGmisleadsreadersintothinkingthattherequestswereconsistent.
“InJuly2006,theCommandingGeneral,Multi-NationalForce-Westsubmittedasecond
JointStaffRapidValidationandResourcingRequestfor1,000MRAP-typevehiclestotheJROC.”
• TheRequestwasnotforMRAP-typevehicles.IMEFdiscoveredtheoldresolvedHejlikUUNSandstartedusingtheoldterm“MRAP”despiteusingthetermJERRVintheinterim.
• TheDODIGneverexplainswhyIMEFwasnotconsistentlyaskingfortheirMRAPsiftheHejlikUUNSremainedineffect.Theobviousconclusionwasthatthenewrequestswereforequipmentthatwasnotalreadyindemand.
DODIGPage3BeforeinsurgentactivitiesbeganinIraqin2003,DoDknewthat:
• theprimarythreattotacticalwheeledvehiclesinlow-intensityconflictsisfrommines;• unarmoredHMMWVs,retrofittedHMMWVs,andthosewitharmorimprovisedinthe
fieldwerevulnerabletominesbecauseofthevehicles’flatbottom,lowweight,lowgroundclearance,andaluminumbody;
• V-hullandmonocoque2V-hullmine-resistantvehicletechnologywasavailablethat
couldgreatlyreduceinjuriescausedbyminesbyasmuchas70percentwhilevirtuallyeliminatingfatalities;and
• Third-andfourth-generationmine-resistantvehicledesignswereavailable.Accordingly,theDepartmenthadtimetodeveloprequirementsfor,fund,andacquireMRAP-typevehiclestobepreparedforpotentiallow-intensityconflictsbeforeinsurgencyactionsbeganinIraqin2003.
• TheDODIGfailedtoidentifywhoorwhatofficefailedto“developrequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehicles”(DODIG,pi).Forexample,didtheDODIG(asaDODentity)failintheirresponsibilitiestoidentifythelackofMRAPsdespitehavingtheabilitytodoso?TheDODIGfailedtoexaminetheirownculpability.TheDODIGhadopportunityandresponsibilitytorecommendthepurchaseofMRAPpriorto“insurgencyactionsbeganinIraqin2003”.Theydidnotdoso.
DODIGPage5
“TheMCCDCdidnotfulfilltherequirementsoftheUUNSprocessortheJointUrgentOperationalNeed(JUON)processindeterminingwhetheranacquisitionprogramshouldbeinitiatedinresponsetotheMRAPUUNSsubmittedonFebruary17,2005.”
• TheMCCDCisnottheonlyorganizationresponsibleforthestepsintheUUNSprocess(seeChapter4-6).TheDODIGfailedtodiscusstheHejlikUUNSresponsibilitiesoutsideofMCCDC.
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• NoJUONSwassubmittedin2005.IftherehadbeenaJUONSsubmitted,MCCDCwouldhavehadabsolutelynoresponsibilityorauthorityforanystepoftheprocess(unlesstheMarineCorpsbecametheprogramofficeaftertheJUONSwasfullyprocessed).
Specifically,theMCCDCdidnot:developacourseofactiondocumentinresponsetothe
FebruaryMRAPUUNSandsubmitittotheMarineCorpsRequirementsOversightCouncil(MROC)todeterminewhethertoinitiateanacquisitionprogram
• TheformalsubmissionprocesstotheMROCwasovercomebyeventsastheentiretyoftheMROCwasbriefedattheEOSincludingthevariousoptionsavailableforhardenedvehicles.TheDODIGfocusedonaformalbriefdespitethewidespreadknowledgethatdecisionsonthevehiclefleetweremadewiththeknowledgeofeveryMROCmember.
Specifically,theMCCDCdidnot:requestthattheCommander,IMarineExpeditionary
Force(Forward)submittheurgentrequirementthroughtheJUONprocess,whichwasestablishedwhiletheMCCDCwasreviewingtheMRAPUUNS,todeterminewhethertoinitiateajointacquisitionprogramtomeettheurgentwarfighterneed.
• ItisnotaMCCDCresponsibilitytorequestCommanderIMEFtosubmitneedsthroughtheJUONSprocess.MCCDCcanonlyrecommend.AsseenwithGBOSS,IMEFG9wasactivelyagainstsubmittingajointrequestsdespiteMCCDCrecommendations.Inthiscase,theUUNSwasresolvedwithintheServicesoajointrequestwasnotnecessary.
“Asaconsequence,theMROCwasnotaffordedtheopportunitytoevaluatetheneedto
acquireMRAPstomitigatetherisktothelivesofMarinesintheater.”• ThisDODIGpointisincorrect.TheMROCwasaffordedtheopportunitytoevaluatethe
needtoacquireMRAPs.TheMROCmemberswerebriefedinseveralforums.TheentiretyoftheMROCwasbriefedintheMROCandreceivedtheMROCDMwhereMRAPwasupdated:MROCDM55-2005(Daschemaildtd10/20/2005).Theabsenceofafullbriefdoesnotobviatethefactthattherewereupdatebriefsonaregularbasis.TheMROCmemberswerecapableofevaluatingtheneedtoacquireMRAP.
DODIGPage6
“TheOrderalsosupportsthecombatrequirement-generatingroleoftheadvocatesandtherequirement-validatingroleofMROC,andenablesthemonitoringofemergingareaslikeexpeditionarymaneuverwarfareandscienceandtechnologydevelopment.”
• TheDODIGwasabletoidentifyordersanddirectivesassociatedwithresponsibilitiesforUUNSprocessing.Despitetheknowledgeoftheseordersanddirectives,theDODIGdidnotattributetheflawsitassignedtoMCCDCtotherestofthe“byorderresponsible”partiesintheUUNSprocess(seeChapter4-6).
DODIGPage7
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“Earlier,theMarineCorpsissuedadministrativemessagesthatestablishedproceduresfortheoperatingforcestousetosubmitandstaffanUUNSanddefinedtherolesandresponsibilitiesateachlevelofthestaffingprocess.”
• TheDODIGfailedtodiscussmanyoftherolesandresponsibilitiesinthesemessages.SeeChapter4-6.
DODIGPage8
“Inaninterviewwiththeauditteam,theformerCommandingGeneral,MarineCorps
ForcesPacific7statedthatin2005,MRAP-typevehiclesneededtobefieldedintheaterin
additiontotheM1114up-armoredHMMWVinsomenumbersforoperationsinhigh-riskareas.Hestatedthathedidnotknowwhatactionwastakenonhisrecommendationforamixed-vehiclefleet.”
• TheDODIGfailedtoprovidethedocumentationforthisrecommendation.The“mixed-vehiclefleet”wasalreadyinexistenceasrouteclearanceteamsweregettingCougarsandBuffalos.Therewasnodiscussionaboutthenumbersinthisoranymix,andtheCGMARFORPACunderstoodthathisrecommendationrequiredaneedstatementtogetaccomplished.AsCGMARFORPACactuallyownedthe2005HejlikUUNS,moredetailshouldhavebeenprovidedaboutMARFORPACactions.
• TheDODIGfailedtofindanddocumenttheMARFORPACdecisiontocompletethe2005HejlikUUNSandchangeitintoanUNS(seeChapters9-11).
“Inaseparateinterviewwiththeauditteam,theformerCommandantoftheMarine
Corps8statedthathediddirectthe100-percentreplacementofHMMWVsintheaterwith
M1114up-armoredHMMWVs.However,hestatedthathisdirectionwasnotintendedtoprecludetheMarineCorpsfromprocuringMRAP-typevehiclesortostopMCCDCfromcompletingtherequirementsoftheUUNSprocessforconsideringtheacquisitionofMRAP-typevehiclesinresponsetotheFebruary17,2005,UUNS.”
• ThisDODIGassertionismisleadinginthattheUUNSwaschangedintoanUNS.OncetheUUNSwaschangedintoanUNS,MCCDCresponsibilitieschanged(asdidtheresponsibilitiesoftherestofthecombatdevelopers).TheIMEFUUNStrackerclearlyindicatesthechangeandcompletionofthe2005HejlikUUNS(Ouztsemaildtd5/2/2006).
DODIGPage9
“TheMarineCorpsalsoprocuredtheG-BOSStoprovideacontinuousground-basedsurveillancecapability.TheMarineCorpsusestheG-BOSStotrackinsurgentmovementsandactivitiesandtodocumentinsurgentcross-borderactivities.ThesystemwasnotfieldeduntilFebruary2007becausetheG-BOSScapabilityhadtobedeveloped.AsofJuly2008,theMarineCorpshadfielded120G-BOSSsintheater.”
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• TheGBOSScapabilitywasneverfullydevelopedasdescribedintheUUNS.ThetechnicalrequestintheUUNSandJUONSwerebeyondthetechnicalcapabilitiesofindustry(seeGBOSSChapter).
• ElementsoftheGBOSScapabilitywerefieldedin2005(seeGBOSSChapter).Ifoneweretoconsiderthetowersas“G-BOSSs”,thentheRAIDtowersandthehomemadeIMEFtowerswerefieldedpriortoFebruary2007.TheDODIGmistakenlyidentifiestheIMEFG9towerdesignastheonlyGBOSStoweravailable.TheRAIDtowerwouldeventuallybethematerialsolutionforGBOSSandthosetowerswereavailableandfieldedin2005.
“InApril2005,theJointIEDTaskForceapprovedthereleaseof$92.14millionfromthe
IraqFreedomFundfortheprocurementof122JointExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalRapidResponseVehicles(JERRVs),thejoint-ServiceversionoftheHardenedEngineerVehicle.Ofthe122JERRVs,38werefortheMarineCorps.ThefirstJERRVwasfieldedinAugust2005.”
• TheDODIGfailstoconformtoitsownnamingconventionintheabovestatement.The“HardenedEngineerVehicle”andthe“JERRV”arenotreferredtoas“MRAP-typevehicles”.
DODIGPage9-10
“OnMarch29,2005,midlevelMarineCorpsofficersbriefedtheMarineCorpsExecutiveSafetyBoardonmine-resistantvehiclesandproposedintroducingMRAP-typevehiclesintheateronalargescale.TheAssistantCommandantoftheMarineCorpschairedtheExecutiveSafetyBoardbriefing,attendedbyseveralMarineCorpsGeneralOfficers,includingtheDeputyCommandantforCombatDevelopmentandIntegration.ThebriefersproposedusingtheMAKandMediumTacticalVehicleReplacementArmorSystemtobridgethegapbetweentheHMMWVandacommercialoff-the-shelfMRAP-typevehicle,withtheMRAP-typevehiclebecomingthestandard.”
• TheDODIGfailedtopursuetheresponsibilitiesofGeneralOfficersattheESBandinsteadfocusedontheactionsofMCCDCofficials.TheattendanceattheESBincludedapproximatelytwentyflagofficerstoincludetheACMC(fulllistinChapter9).Theresponsibilitiesoftheseflagofficersisdiscussedinotherchapters.
• IftheDODIGbelievedtheHejlikUUNSremainedactive:o TheyshouldhavefoundnegligencebyACMC.ACMCpresidedovertheESB,and
itwashisresponsibilitytoensurethathisdirectiveswerecarriedout.TheACMCdirectedareviewand“theMCCDCcouldnotprovideuswithanyevidencethattherequestedreviewwasperformed.”TherewasnosubsequentACMCaction.
o TheactionsoftherestoftheESBGeneralsandCommandRepresentativesshouldhavebeenexamined.Manyhadcombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.TheDODIGfailedtoreportontheiractions.
• ThealternativetonegligencebyACMC,theESBflagofficersandstaffs,isthattheUUNSwasresolvedseveralmonthslaterbythedecisionoftheCMC.Eitherway,theDODIGfailedinthattheirinvestigationdidnotpursuerelevantESBofficials,ortheirconclusionwasmisleading.
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DODIGPage10
“AftertheDeputyCommandingGeneral,IMarineExpeditionaryForce(Forward)submittedtheFebruary17,2005,UUNSfor1,169MRAPtype-vehicles,theMCCDCandtheMCSCbeganprocessingtherequirementandworkingtoidentifyamaterielsolution.”
• TheDODIGfailedtoinvestigatetheCommandingGeneral,IMEFandinsteadfocusedontheDeputyCommandingGeneral.TheDODIGreportshowedthattheCGwasnotintervieweddespitehisownershipofthe2005HejlikUUNS.
DODIGPage11
“Morethan2yearslater,onJuly16,2007,theformerDeputyCommandingGeneralissuedamemorandumtotheDirector,MarineCorpsPublicAffairs,statingthatthe2005decisiontofieldM1114up-armoredHMMWVswasthecorrectMarineCorpsdecisioninresponsetothethreatin2005.TheformerDeputyCommandingGeneraltoldtheauditteamthatheissuedthememorandumtoclarifythathisintentinsigningtheUUNSwasfortheMarineCorpstoacquireandfieldtheMRAPwithin2to5years,asstatedearlier.However,asshowninAppendixC,theUUNSclearlyindicatedthattherequirementforMRAP-typevehicleswaspriority1andurgentlyneeded–notacapabilitydesiredin2to5years.”
• TheDODIGfailedtocorrectlyanalyzetheDCGstatement.Thetimeframe“2to5years”isassociatedwithanUNSnotanUUNS.TheDODIGfailedtoestablishtheUNS/UUNSchangeasseenintheIMEFUUNStrackers.ThechangeisconsistentwiththeDCGstatements.TheimplicationofuntruthonthepartoftheDCGismisplaced,incorrect,andwarrantsretraction.ThispivotalflawintheDODIGMRAPinvestigationrenderstheinvestigationfatallyflawed.Theclearandrestatedfateofthe2005HejlikUUNSwasareductiontoanUNS.ThenotionalUNStimelinewas2-5years.TheDODIGwouldhavecomeoutwithcorrectconclusionshaditconsideredtheIMEFUUNStrackers.
DODIGPage12
“Inaninterviewwiththeauditteam,theformerDeputyCommandant,CombatDevelopmentandIntegration
acknowledgedthathereceivedaninformationpaperand
statedthathedirectedthatworkcontinueonasolutiontotheUUNS.HealsostatedthathedidnotknowwhytheDOTMLPFWorkingGroupdidnotdevelopacourseofactionforMROCreview.”
• Asdiscussed,theEOSwasbriefedonthevehicleoptionsavailabletoequiptheforceintheITO.TheDC,CDIreceivedMRAP-typevehiclebriefsattheESBandtheEOS.TheentireMROCwasbriefedonMRAPandhadMRAPupdatesintheMROCforum.AllMROCmemberswereissuedMROCDMthatcontainedMRAPupdates.TheMROCmemberswerepresentedcoursesofaction,justnotintheMROCroom.TheDODIGselectedandportrayedalargelyirrelevantissue:whetherornottheDC,CDIrememberediftheDWGdevelopedaCOAforMROCreview.
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“TheChairmanDOTMLPFWorkingGroupprovidedstatusbriefsontheMRAPUUNStotheMROConMarch25,2005;June10,2005;andAugust8,2005.”
• TheDODIGinexplicablyrelegatedthiscriticalfacttoafootnote.TheDODIGuncoveredthreeoccasionswheretheMROCwasbriefedbuttheywereupdatebriefs.AnysuggestionofMROCignoranceisthereforetotallyunfounded.TheDODIGmadeseveralmisleadingstatements:
o “Specifically,theMCCDCdidnot:developacourseofactiondocumentinresponsetotheFebruaryMRAPUUNSandsubmitittotheMarineCorpsRequirementsOversightCouncil(MROC)todeterminewhethertoinitiateanacquisitionprogram”(DODIG,p5)
o “Asaconsequence,theMROCwasnotaffordedtheopportunitytoevaluatetheneedtoacquireMRAPstomitigatetherisktothelivesofMarinesintheater.”(DODIG,p5)
o “HealsostatedthathedidnotknowwhytheDOTMLPFWorkingGroupdidnotdevelopacourseofactionforMROCreview.”(DODIG,p12)
TheMROCwaswellawareofMRAPthroughupdatebriefsintheMROC.ExcludingtheEOSandtheESB,theMROCmembershadawealthofMRAPinformationandopportunitiestorenderjudgementwithintheMROCprocess.
DODIGPage13
“TheMCCDCwasunabletoprovidedocumentationshowingthatafterAugust8,2005,DOTMLPFWorkingGroupfulfilledremainingactionsforprocessingtheUUNSasrequiredinMarineCorpsOrder3900.15A.”
• TheDODIGwasunabletoprovideanydocumentationthattheUUNSwaschangedintoanUNSrenderingtheUUNSprocessirrelevant.Thisauthorwasabletoprovidethisdocumentation.
• TheremainingactionsfortheHejlikUUNSwereaddressedinthedecisiontobuym1114s.Oncethem1114decisionwasmade,remainingactionsontheUUNSwereunnecessary.
“TheCombatDevelopmentTrackingSystem,whichcollectsinformationontheprocessing
ofUUNS,didnotincludeanyinformationontheprocessingoftheMRAPUUNSafterMarch22,2005,untilaninformationtechnologyspecialistclosedtheUUNSonNovember7,2006.”
• TheDODIGpresentsthispieceofinformationyetdoesnotdrawtheobviousconclusionfromit.TheobviousconclusionisthattheCDTSfailedtotrackMRAPevents.TheDODIGuncoveredthreeinstancesofMROCbriefsunmentionedintheCDTS.TheCDTSfailedtomentionthereductionoftheUUNStoanUNSdespitethisauthorfindingdocumentationshowingso.TheCDTSfailstonotetheEOSdecision,theJERRVJUONSorthe2006MRAPJUONS.CDTSannotatednothingbetweenMarchof2005andNovemberof2007despiteidentifiableactionsoccurring.TheobviousconclusionisthatCDTSdidnotprovideanaccurateportrayalofUUNSactions.TheDODIGinsteadportrayedthelackofCDTSentriesaslackofactioninsteadofpooradministration.
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“RepresentativesfromMCCDCstatedthattheybelievedthatMarineCorpsForcesPacificdowngradedtheMRAPUUNStoauniversalneedstatement.WecontactedrepresentativesfromMarineCorpsForcesPacific,includingtheuniversalneedstatementcoordinatorassignedtotheMRAPUUNS,whodidnothaveanydocumentationregardingchangingtheMRAPUUNStoauniversalneedstatement.Inaddition,therepresentativesstatedthattheydidnotbelieveMarineCorpsForcesPacifichadtheauthoritytodowngradeanUUNSthattheyhadsenttotheMCCDC.”
• MARFORPACdowngradedtheMRAPUUNStoanUNS.TheDODIGfailedtouncoverdocumentationverifyingthisfact.ThisauthoruncovereddocumentationintheIMEFUUNStracker.TheUUNStrackerwascreatedasanofficialdocumenttaskedinMARADMINs.WhilenotaMARFORPACdocument,thedocumentwasprovidedbyIMEF,thesubmitteroftheMRAPUUNS.OthereventsdiscussedinChapters6-11providevalidationoftheUUNSchangetoUNS.
• TheDODIGpresentsthe“beliefs”ofMCCDCrepresentativesinsteadofconductingtheresearchrequiredtodeterminethefacts.
• Chapter4-6explainsUUNSresponsibilitiesandidentifiesofficialdocumentationstatingthattheAdvocateistheUNSchampionbutdoesnotassumeownership.MARADMINofficiallydesignatestheownerinMARADMIN045/06astheComponentCommander.ThisMARADMINwasissuedwithintheMRAPissuetimeframebutitalsoreflectstheownershipprevioustoMARADMIN045/06.ThequestionpriortoMARADMIN045/06waswhethertheComponentortheMEF/MSCownedtheUUNS.PreorpostMARADMIN,theComponenthadtheauthorityasownerorseniorcommandoftheUUNSsubmitter.
• TheDODIGfailedtoidentifywhomightbetheownerofthe2005HejlikUUNSifitwasnottheComponentorasubordinate.Anyofferanceofadifferentownercouldbeeasilydismissedasincorrect.
DODIGPage14
“Asaconsequence,theMROCwasnotaffordedanopportunitytoevaluatetheneedtoacquireMRAP-typevehicles.Inaddition,becausetheMCCDCdidnotdevelopastatementofneedoraconceptofemployment,submittotheMROCarecommendedcourseofactiononacquiringMRAP-typevehicles,orobtainassuranceofprogramfunding,theMCSCalsodiscontinueditseffortstoimplementanacquisitionstrategyforMRAP-typevehicles.”
• TheDODIGisincorrectwhenitstatestheMROCdidnothavetheopportunitytoevaluatetheneedforMRAPvehicles.TheMROC,bytheDODIG’sownadmission,wasbriefedthreetimesintheMROCandseveraltimesoutsideoftheMROC.Opportunitywasrampant.
• TheMarineCorpsdidnotimplementanacquisitionstrategybecausetheywerenottaskedtodoso.TheywerenottaskedtodosobecausetheCMCdecidedtopurchasem1114s.
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TheDODIGdidaninvestigationthatwouldhavebeenreasonablehadtheirbaselinefactsbeencorrect.Thefacts,however,pointtowardsdifferentconclusions.GaylhadseveralnoteworthyquotesabouttheDODIGinhiscongressionaltestimony:
o “TheDODIGMRAPUUNSauditoverwhelminglyvalidatedmyMRAPcase
study”(GaylTestimony,p9)TheDODIGdidnotoverwhelminglyvalidateGayl’sMRAPstudy.EventheflawedDODIGmadenoneofthesamerecommendationsthatGayloffered.Zero.
o “Itwassignificantthattheauditdidnotrefutemycasestudyfindingthat
“grossmismanagement”oftheMRAPrequirementwasevident,andthatinactionbyMCCDCofficialsonacquiringMRAPvehiclescostmanyMarinestheirlives.”(GaylTestimony,p9)TheDODIGdidnotfind“grossmismanagement”.DODIGwasnotcommentingontheflawsoftheGaylstudysotheydidnotspecificallyrejectGayl’spoints.Thattaskremainedunaddresseduntilthisstudy.
o “DODIGaudittitleMarineCorpsImplementationoftheUrgentUniversal
NeedsProcessforMineResistantAmbushProtectedVehiclespublishedon8December2008foundthatMCCDCstoppedprocessingtheUUNSforMRAP-typevehiclecapabilitiesinAugust2005.Specifically,MCCDCofficialsdidnotdevelopacourseofactionfortheUUNS,obtainfundingforit,orpresentittotheMarineCorpsRrequirementsOversightCouncil(MROC)foradecision.Furthermore,theMarineCorpsandotherswereawareofthethreatposedbyminesandIEDsinlow-intensityconflictsandoftheavailabilityofmine-resistantvehiclesyearsbeforeinsurgentactionsbeganinIraqin2003.Yet,MarinecombatdevelopersatQuanticodidnotdeveloprequirementsfor,fund,oracquireMRAP-typevehiclesforlow-intensityconflicts.Asaresult,theMarinesenteredintooperationsinIraqwithouthavingtakenavailablestepstoacquiretechnologytomitigatetheknownmineandIEDrisk.”(GaylTestimony,p8-9)Theseaccusationsarediscussedthroughoutthisstudyanddisproven.
HadtheDODIGperformedadequately,Gaylwouldnothavebeenabletoquotethe
DODIG’serroneousandmisleadingcomments.Instead,theDODIGfailed,leadingtotheunwarrantedcriticismofmanyMarines.
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20-GAYL’SFLAWEDCONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONSManyofGayl’srecommendationsareOBE(overcomebyevents).
ThischapterwillcommentonGayl’sconclusionswhicharereflectedinthepress.AllofGayl’sconclusionsareboldedandsourcedfrompages118-126ofhisMRAPstudy.
5.Conclusions.Theinformationreliedonforformulatingtheconclusionsbelowwas
limitedtowhatcouldbereliablydocumentedandwasmadeavailabletotheauthorforthechronologyofeventsdiscussedabove.Theremaybemoredocumentedinformationthateitherreinforcesorcontradictstheauthor’sconclusionsbelow.CapturingandincludingsuchadditionalinformationcanonlybeachievedifthescopeofthetotalGCEstudyisexpanded,theMRAPCaseStudyisturnedovertotheIGMC,oracombinationofbothactions.Ingeneral,itcanbeconcludedthatacombinationofflawedactionsandinactionsbycombatdeveloperspertainingtoMRAPgenerallyandtheMEF(Fwd)urgentneedsforMRAPscreatedasignificantadverseimpactontheGCE’sabilitytoaccomplishitsmission.Gayl’sdocumentedinformationwasinsufficientforanadequatestudy.ThisstudypresentsdocumentedinformationthatrendersmostofGayl’sconclusionsinaccurate.ThisstudyamplifiestheGaylstudy,justnotinthewayGaylimagined.Adetailedlistofspecificconclusionsfollows:a.MRAPChronologyConclusions(1)TheunderbellyIEDtechniquehadappearedintheMNF-WAORasaknownthreattoHMMWVsinFebruaryof2005.Thesideattackremainedthemostprevalenttypeofattack.(2)CG,IMEF(Fwd)wasawarethattheM1114andMAKup-armoredHMMWVsremainedvulnerabletotheknownunderbellyIEDthreat,aswellastoEFPs.MRAPtypevehiclesalsoremainedvulnerabletoEFPs.(3)CG,IMEF(Fwd)wasawarein2005thatMRAPcouldprotecttroopsbetterthanM1114andMAKup-armoredHMMWVs.CG,IMEFwasalsoawarethatm1114coulddefeatmostside-attacksaswellasSAF.MRAPwasacapabilityin2005,notadesignatedvehicle.(4)CG,IMEF(Fwd)knowinglysignedtheUUNSthatstatedinparts:“TheMEFcannotcontinuetoloseLevelIIIandIVseriousandgravecasualtiestoIEDandMVAatcurrentrateswhenacommercial-off-the-shelf[COTS]capabilityexiststomitigate…theseparticularthreats...”Them1114alsomitigatedtheprimaryIEDthreatatthetime:sideattacks.(5)CG,IMEF(Fwd)knowinglysignedanUUNSthatstated:“Operatingforcesseefleetingopportunitiestoutilizesupplementalfundingtoreplace1st/2ndgenerationvehiclesbyskippingagenerationandprocuring4thgenerationMRAPvehicles...4thgeneration(designedandbuiltfromthegrounduptowithstandIED/RPG/SAF)MRAPvehicles...representasignificantincreaseintheirsurvivabilitybaselineoverexistingmotorvehicleequipment...UUNSmustbesubmittedimmediately...forconsiderationinthesupplementalfunding
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availableforFY05.”NeithertheMRAPnorthem1114fullydefeatedRPG.BothdefeatedSAF.M1114wasavailablefasterandcoulddefeatthemajorthreatofsideattackIED.(6)CG,IMEF(Fwd)knowinglysignedanUUNSthatstated:“OperationalexperiencedictatescurrentandanticipatedmissionsintheaterarebettersupportedbyafamilyofMRAPvehicles...MRAPvehiclesareinherentlyrobustwithmodernsafetyfeaturesthatincludeNASCARstylemulti-pointseatharnesses,crashworthyseats,ballisticarmorandmonocoquehullsandheavy-dutypartsthataredesignedtowithstandandreacttoIEDs,SAFandRPGsinsuchawaythatreducestraumaticinjurytotheoccupants...avehiclethatenablesustosurvivethefirstblowandthencounterattack...MRAP-designedvehicles[mustinclude]multi-mission...troopcarrying...cargo...,ambulanceandEOD/EngmissionplatformwithBuffalo-like50ftinvestigatingarm...transparentarmorwithriflefiringportsonallfoursides...similartotheCougarorCasspir...integratedV-shapedmonocoquehulldesignedspecificallytodisperseexplosiveblastandfragmentaryeffects...blastprotectionagainstcontact-detonatedanti-personnelandanti-tankmines...360degreerolloverprotection...capableofhavingadditionalarmor/standoffscreensattachedtoincreasetheprotectiontopredestinateanddefeattheprimarykillmechanismsofEFPs...”GaylfirstomitstheIMEFCGdescriptionoftheproposedvehicleafter“familyofMRAPvehicles”inline3ofthisfinding.Theomissionreads“familyofMRAPvehicles:multi-mission(HMMWV-like)”.Inadditionheomitsitagainaftertheterm“multi-mission”isusedagain.Thetermisusedagainonthesummarypageadditionprovidedattheend(byeitherMARFORPACorIMEF).Thepresenceoftheterm“HMMWV-like”clearlyincludestheHMMWVasanoption.
Severalofthese“HMMWV-like”characteristicsareavailableonboththem1114andtheMRAP.(7)CG,IMEF(Fwd)wasawarethatthecandidateCOTSmaterialsolutionssoughtintheUUNSwerespecificallyU.S.MRAPproductsfromForceProtection,fromotherknownforeignCOTSMRAPmanufacturers,andfrompotentialindustrypartnerships.CGIMEFusedthetermMRAPtodescribethecapability,nottheproduct.CGIMEFwasawarethatthespecificmaterialsolutionwouldbedevelopedthroughthecombatdevelopmentprocessasdescribedonthecoverpageoftheUUNSthathesigned.CGIMEFwasalsoawarethatMARADMINdirectedhimnottosubmitspecificmaterialsolutions(Chapter4).CGIMEFwasalsoawarethathecouldnotspecificallydesignateaciviliancompanywithwhichhedesiredtheMarineCorpstodobusinesswith.Gayl’sperceptionofLtGenSattler’s(IMEF(Fwd)CG)desireforForceProtectionvehiclesisunsubstantiated.(8)CG,IMEF(Fwd)wasawarein2005thatanUUNSwastheprerequisitetogaining05supplementalfundingrequiredtoincreaseproductionandacceleratedfieldingofMRAPsfromanyandallmanufacturingsources.TheUUNSwasnottheprerequisitetogainsupplementalfunding.TheapprovalofaneedbytheMROCoraJointCommandwastheprerequisiteforattemptedsupplementalfunding.AJUONScouldalsoinitiateaprocessleadingtowardssupplementalfunding(Chapter14).NeitherthesubmissionofanUUNSnorJUONSguaranteedapproval.
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(9)ServingastheDC,CDIin2005,LtGenMattiswasawarethatthecandidateCOTSmaterialsolutionssoughtintheUUNSwerespecificallyU.S.MRAPproductsfromForceProtection,fromotherknownforeignCOTSMRAPmanufacturers,andfrompotentialindustrypartnerships.LtGenMattiswasbriefedthatthesevehicleswerecandidatevehiclestoanswertheUUNS.Hewasalsobriefedthatthem1114wasacandidatevehicletoanswertheUUNS.(10)AttheMar05SafetyConferenceLtGenMattisasDC,CDIexpressedhisconcurrencewiththeMRAPway-aheadpresentedbyMajRoyMcGriff,whichincludedtheimmediatepurchaseofasmanyCOTSMRAPsaspossible.MajMcGriffpresentedaslidecontainingarecommendationinaforumwhereLtGenMattiswasnottheseniorofficer.ACMCwas.TheACMCAARdidnotechoMcGriff’srecommendation.LtGenMattisknewhedidnothavetheauthoritytounilaterallydecidetopurchaseMRAP.(11)TheIGMCReadinessAssessmentof2005probablydidnotconsidertheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSduringtheconductofitsassessment,asIMEF(Fwd)wasnotintheaterduringtheIGMCvisitandthereisnomentionofMRAPinthereport.TheIGMCdidnotconsideraMRAPUUNSbecauseithadbeen,accordingtoIMEF,completed.TheIGMCwasnotconsideringcompletedUUNS.(12)MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperswereawarethatMRAPprovidedbetterprotectthantheM1114andMAKup-armoredHMMWVsasaresultoftheEFDCVehicleSurvivabilityStudy.TheAdvocatecombatdeveloperswerealsoawareofthesuperiorprotectionofMRAP-typevehiclesagainstunderbodyattacks.(13)BetweenMarandJun05,MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperspushedbackontheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNStoavoidreprogrammingresourcesfromfavoredSTOM,MV-22/CH-53transportable,andlegacyHMMWV/MAKvehicleprograms.MRAPconsiderationswereoutofthehandsoftheMCCDCandMCSCcombatdevelopers.TheESBconsideredMRAPinMar2005withapproximately20FlagOfficers.TheCMCdecidedonthem1114asthevehiclesolutionintheMay2005EOS.TheMROCconsideredMRAP.MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperswereirrelevant.Evenso,MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperswerenotsurveyedfortheiropinions.(14)BetweenMarandJun05,MCCDCandMCSCcombatdeveloperseffectivelyunderminedDC,CDI’sMRAP-procurementintentbyraisingMRAPconcernsthatweretransmittedviaDC,CDItoCMC.TheDCCDIdidnotunderminehisownintent.Thiscommentmayhavebeenmisworded.(15)MCCDCandSYSCOMofficialsdidnotinitiateCommercial-Off-The-ShelfMRAPcombatvehicledevelopmentwhentheUUNSwasreceivedin2005.MCCDCandSYSCOMofficialsinitiatedcombatvehicledevelopmentwithintheUUNSprocess.FurtherdevelopmentandfundingwouldhavetobeapprovedthroughtheMROC.“COTSMRAPcombatvehicledevelopment”uponneedreceptionmakesnosense.Forexample,thereisnofundingidentifiedatthispoint.
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(16)MCCDCandMCWLofficialsdidtoinitiateresearchanddevelopmentofEFPprotectionforMRAPswhentheMRAPUUNSwasreceivedin2005.Thiscommentismisworded.MCCDCandMCWLwereinvolvedinmultipleEFPdevelopmentforums.(17)MCCDCofficialsdidnotfulfillDC,CDI’sintentthathestatedbeforetheSafetyConference,namelytocontinuetofieldtheM1114whilebuyingasmanyMRAPsaspossibleasabridgetoJLTV,andthenphaseouttheHMMWVs.DC,CDIdoesnotmakethesedecisions.HehasavoteontheMROCwherethesedecisionsaremade.(18)MCCDCofficialsfalselyinformedtheCMCthattheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPJUONSfromMay2006wasthe1stUSMCoperatorrequestforMRAPs,asCMCpreparedtosignalettertotheCJCS.MCCDCofficials,andtheMarineCorps,usedthetermMRAPasacapabilityandaproductname.TheDODIGhadtousethetermMRAP-type,notMRAP.OnlylaterwasMRAPwidelyrecognizedasaspecificvehicle.(19)MCCDCofficialskepttheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSoutoftheproperMROCUUNSvettingprocessresultingintheMRAPUUNSnotbeingconsideredbytheMROC.TheMROCwasbriefedonMRAP.MROCmemberswerebriefedontheUUNSattheEOS.(20)USMCofficialsprovidedincorrectandincompleteinformationtoSenateArmedServicesCommitteestafferswithregardstothecontentoftheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNS.Thiscommentlacksdetail.(21)MCCDCofficialsprovidedincompleteandinaccurateinformationtoCMCashepreparedtosignletterstoSen.BidenandSen.BondprovidingtheUSMCpositiononMRAP.Thiscommentlacksdetail.(22)MCCDCmaintainsthatitsdecisionnottofulfilltheIMEF(Fwd)MRAPUUNSin2005wasjustified,eveninthefaceofcontraveninginformationinanapparentefforttodefendprogrammaticdecisionsandminimizeconcernsregardingdelaysandconsequences.TheCMCresolvedthe2005HejlikUUNS,notMCCDC.(23)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsdisregardedMCWP5-1,MarineCorpsPlanningProcess,PCN14300006800,thereplacementMCWP5-1.MCCDCandMCSCdidnotdisregardMCWP5-1.ThecorrectprocessforUNSdevelopmentisoutlinedonthecoverpageoftheUNS.MCWP5-1hasminimalrelevance.(24)Whilethepossibilityofindividualcorruptionremainsundetermined,theexistenceofcorruptedMRAPprocessesislikely,andworthyofIGMCinvestigation.TherewasnoinstanceofcorruptioninMCCDCasdeterminedbytheDODIG.(25)Theissuemightcomedowntolong-termplanningv.shorttermurgency,andwhethertheMCCDCstaffhastheability,ascurrentlystructured,tograntaneffectivehearingto
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wartimeurgentissues,oranalyzinganurgentneedwhenalong-termplanhasbeeninitiated.TheColdWarorientationofspreadingoutsystemsacquisitions,overmultipleyears,seemedtoholdswayastheprimaryoptionofseriousdiscoursefortheMCCDCstaff.TheMCCDCstaffwasnotafinaldecision-makingbodyforUUNS.TheCDIBhadrepresentationfromalloftheAdvocateswhohaddirectaccesstotheCommandant.TheAdvocates,toincludeGayl,weretaskedwithrepresentationduringcombatdevelopment.AneffectivehearingcouldbeachievedatwillbyanAdvocate.UUNSissueswereneverdeliberatelyplannedtobedrawnout.MCCDCstafffocusedonrapiddevelopmentofUUNSsolutions.(26)Ifthe17Feb05UUNSsignedbyCG,IMEF(Fwd)hadbeenapprovedbytheCDIB,DC,CDI,andtheMROCinearly2005itwouldhavequicklyevolvedintoaprogramliketoday’swithasignificantpreventionofIED-relatedcasualties.Correctpendingfunding.(27)ThedelayinthedeliveryoftheurgentlyrequestedMRAPcapabilityhashadmeasurableoperationalconsequences,andhascreatedasignificantadverseimpactontheabilityoftheMEF(Fwd)GCEstoaccomplishtheirmissions.“Delay”impliesthattheUUNSremainedactive.Itdidnot.Thecapabilityasdefinedin2005wasprovided.(28)GrossmismanagementoftheMRAPmayhavecreatedasignificantadverseimpactontheGCE’sabilitytoaccomplishitsmission,withmeasurableoperationalconsequences,andseveralMarineCorpsOrders(MCOs)maybeapplicable.Therewasnogrossmismanagement.IftheGCEcapabilitytoaccomplishitsmissionwasadverselyimpactedbymismanagement,thentheAdvocateandComponentswouldhaveaddressedtheissue.TherewasnoAdvocate/Componentaction.TheUUNShadbeenresolved.(29)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO3500.27B,OperationalRiskManagement(ORM).ThisMCOstatesinpart:“ORMisanintegralpartofthedecisionmakingprocessforbothMarineCorpsmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelinalloperationalandnon-operationalactivities,”and“TheprimaryobjectiveofORMistoavoidunnecessaryrisk.SuccessfulimplementationoftheORMprocesswillincreasemissioneffectivenesswhileminimizingunnecessarylossofassets,bothpersonnelandmateriel.”TherewerenoMCCDCviolationsofMCO3500.27BforMRAP.(30)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5100.8,MarineCorpsOccupationalSafetyandHealth(OSH)Policy.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“Commanders/commandingofficersshallimplementthisOrder...ThisOrderpromulgatesMarineCorpsOccupationalSafetyandHealth(OSH)policytoeliminateorminimizetheprobabilityofmishapsoccurringintraining,industrial,U.S.Governmentandtacticalvehicle,otheroperational,andoff-dutyenvironments...”TherewerenoMCCDCviolationsofMCO5100.8forMRAP.(31)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5100.29A,MarineCorpsSafetyProgram.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“CommandersatalllevelsareresponsibleforensuringthattheMarineCorpsTotalForceismaintainedatthehighestlevelofreadiness
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possiblebyincorporatingoperationalriskmanagement(ORM)inalloperationsassuringcontrolsareinplaceforanyhazardthatcannotbeeliminatedandprovidingappropriatesafeandhealthfulfacilitiesforalltheirpersonnel,”and“ThisorderisapplicabletoallMarineCorpspersonnel,toinclude…militarypersonnelandcivilianMarines,”and“ThisorderappliestoallMarineCorpsfacilities,equipment,trainingfacilities,andmateriel;andisineffectashore,onoroffMarineCorpsinstallations,orwhileembarkedinaircraftofvessels.”TherewerenoMCCDCviolationsofMCO5100.29aforMRAP.(32)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO7510.5A,MarineCorpsFraud,Waste,andAbuse(FWA)Oversight,Awareness,PreventionandRemedies.ThisMCOstatesinpart:“TheMarineCorpsiscommittedtoanaggressiveprogramofoversight,awareness,prevention,andremediesofFWA.Ourgoalistoprecludeeventheslightestimpressionofimproprietyinthehandlingofourmanpower,material,andmoney,”andCommandingGeneralsareresponsiblefor“Requiringeconomywithintheircommandsandstrictcompliancewithregulationsgoverningthereceipt,accountingandexpenditureofmanpower,moneyandmaterials.”TherewerenoMCCDCviolationsofMCO7510.5aforMRAP.(33)MCCDCandMCSCofficialsmayhaveactedinviolationofMCO5800.13AInvestigationsofAllegationsAgainstSeniorOfficials.Thefactthattheseactsoccurredatleastinpartduetoprioritiesconnectedtoprogrammaticagendasandrigidprocessconformanceforitsownsake,andthefactthatGeneralOfficerdecisionmakerswereimpacted,mayalsomakeMCO5800.13Aapplicablehere.TherewerenoMCCDCviolationsofMCO5800.13aforMRAP.5.RecommendationsManyofGayl’srecommendationshavebeenovercomebyevents.Thefollowingrecommendationsmeritcomment.a.ImmediateUSMCchangerecommendations(1)ThatDC,PP&OprovidethiscasestudytotheInspectorGeneraloftheMarineCorps(IGMC)forconsiderationsothatappropriatelessonslearnedcanbegathered.Gayl’scasestudywasprovidedtotheDODIGforinvestigation.FurtherdistributionbyDCPP&Oshouldonlybeasacasestudyofpoorstaffwork.(11)ThatUSMCenforcerapidacquisitionpracticesforurgentneedssignedintheaterbyrequiringthatanoperationallycurrentBGentopresideovereverymeetingoftheCDIB,andthatthiscriticalmeetingpresencecannotbedelegated.ThepresenceofanoperationallycurrentBGenattheCDIBisnotrequired.CDIBbriefsareprovidedtohundredsofstaffofficers.ResultsarebriefedtoatleastadozenBrigadierGenerals.TheycaninterjectthemselvesintotheCDIBatwill.Manpowerrotationensuresthatmanyoftheseofficersareoperationallycurrent.(15)ThatDC,CDIinsurethattheperspectiveoftheoperationalcommandforwardshoulddominatetheCDIBvotinginfluenceoverurgentneeds,with51(+)%ofinfluenceintheoutcomeofanyCDIBdecisiononanyneedsubmittedfromin-theater.TheCDIBmakes
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recommendations,notdecisions.ThereisnoneedfortheoperationalcommandstodictatetheCDIBrecommendations.TheoperationalcommandcanbeassumedtobeinfavorofthesubmittedUUNSastheysigneditinthefirstplace.TheoperationalcommandderivesitsinfluencethroughthesubmissionofUUNSinthefirstplace.TheoperationalcommandsarethenrepresentedbyAdvocates.Therestofthecombatdevelopmentprocessisbasedontheoperationalcommand’ssubmissionofUUNS.Itisthemostimportantstepintheprocess.TheMROCisthefinaldecisionmakingbody. (16)Extend51(+)%warfightervotinginfluencetoallurgentneedssubmittedbypredecessorMEF(Fwd)s.TheAdvocateexercised100%votinginfluenceduringportionsoftheUUNSprocess.ThewarfighterexercisedinfluencebysubmittingtheUUNSinthefirstplace,thenthroughtheAdvocate,andfinallythroughtheuseoftheequipment.Oftentimesthewarfighterisintimatelyinvolvedintheprocess(SeeGBOSSandDazzlerChapters).Thewarfighteris,bydefinition,engagedincombatoperations.Competentcombatdevelopmentwhileincombatisaskingtoomuchofthewarfighter.TheunderstandingofMRAP,GBOSSandDazzlerbythewarfighterintheGaylstudydemonstratesalackoftechnicalunderstanding,processunderstandingandlegalunderstanding.ThewarfighterinfluencedemonstratedbyIMEFG9shouldhavebeenminimized,notincreased.OfnoteistherejectionbyIIMEFofmanyoftheIMEFUUNSideas.(17)Extend51(+)%warfightervotinginfluencetoauthorizethecuttingoffofallfurtheranalysis,testing,etc.ifsuchactivitiesslowfulfillment,andthewarfighterispreparedtoaccepttherisk.ThewarfighterisabletoinfluencethespeedofdevelopmentthroughtheAdvocateorthroughdirectcoordination.Onceagain,thewarfightershouldneverhave51%authority(see#16).(18)Requireamixofgraduate-levelphysics,engineering,andCSMSqualifiedciviliansasvotingCDIBmembers–USMCexperienceisdesired,butnotrequired.AMaster’sDegreeshouldnotbetheguidingqualificationtoevaluateMarineequipment.Oftentimestechnologyfocusedindividualsaredisassociatedfromrealisticsolutions.TheCDIB,andQuantico,rotatealluniformedpersonnelbackandforthtotheoperatingforces.ThisrotationensuresthattheCDIBremainsgroundedincombatreality.Thisrecommendationcontradictsearlierdemandsforoperationalcurrency.(19)RequireamixofNavalPostgraduateSchoolMSqualifiedphysics,engineering,andCSMSqualifiedinphysics,engineeringandCSuniformedCDIBmembers.Inseveralcases,NavalPostgraduateSchoolMSqualifiedpersonnelhavedemonstratedextremeincompetenceincombatdevelopment.Itwouldbeamistaketoexcessivelyvaluethesequalifications.23)TerminatetransientMCCDCLNOsintheMEFs;ratherrequirefull-lengthtourassignmentsofMCCDCpersonnelwithMEFHQrotationsFulllengthtoursmaketheLNOapartofthestaffandnolongeraliaison.TherotationofLNOsprovidesfreshperspectivetothewarfighteraswellasthecommandfromwhichtheyoriginated.
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(24)ReducethecivilianheadcountatMCCDCtominimizemanagementbycommittee,suchaswithintheCDD.Therewasnomanagementbycommittee.Civiliansarehiredbasedonexperienceandavailabilityofuniformedpersonnel.(25)ThatDC,PP&OapprovethehiringofaqualifiedContractortoassistwiththeexecutionofanexpandedGCEAdvocatestudyandtoparticipateinthewritingofthenewUUNSMCOundertheleadofMCCDC.b.ConcurrentDoDchangerecommendations(1)EliminateallService-specificneedsstatements,i.e.UNS,UUNS,ONS,etc.ThisrecommendationreflectsalackofunderstandingofcombatdevelopmentandisinsyncwithGayl’sprevious“MasterofScience”recommendations.Serviceshavespecificneeds.Ajointapproachforallneedsplacesdecisionmakingauthorityinthehandsofunexperiencedcombatdevelopers.Ajointstaffapproachhaslimits.Oftentimes,elementsofthestaffarenotcapableofevenenteringcertainequipmentdiscussions.Forexample,fewtonoMarinescandiscussNavysubmarinepropulsion(thereforethereisnoadequatecontributionbyMarinestosubmarinepropulsionneeds).Scientistsareevenmorerestrictedintheirbreadthofknowledge.c.Proposedsupportinglegislation(2)Permitcommanderstobalanceenemythreatsagainstsystemmaturity,testing,cost,etc.,insteadofCONUSofficials.Raisefundingcaponwarfighterprocurementfrom$250kpersystem(currently)to$1Mormorepersystem.ThisisaCongressionalrestriction.Thereissomemeritinthisrecommendation,however,theIMEFGBOSSeffortshouldgivepausetoanyonesuggestingmoreauthorityfortheWarfighter.Oftentimes,thecombatmissionofthewarfighterprohibitscompetentcombatdevelopment.(3)Inconjunctionwithanincreaseindiscretionarywarfighterspendingauthority,authorizecorrespondingrapidprototypingandoperationalexperimentationin-theater.Note:ThetechnicalexpertisewithintheMEF(Fwd)CE,Seabee,Communications,andEngineerunitsisconsistentlyhigh.Giventhisin-houseexpertisetheMEF(Fwd)shavecreated‘MonsterGarage’conceptsthatprovidein-theaterdevelopmentalcapabilitiesforthelimitedscaleproductionofsomeurgentlyneededcapabilities.Therehavebeenmanydocumentedmaterialsuccesses,includingbutnotlimitedtominerollers,G-BOSSISRIOC,andTCVSpower-lifeextensionimprovements.Thisshouldbeinstitutionalizedandprovidedsignificantresourcesundercontrolofthewarfighter,includingS&T.Rapidprototypingformaterialeffortslikethemine-rollerwereverysuccessful.GBOSSandTCVSweredisasters.Onceagain,theforcesincombatshouldbefocusedoncombatmissions.
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21-CONCLUSIONS
Thefollowingrecommendationsfromthisauthorareprovided:
• Gayl’sstudyshouldberemovedfromtheCongressionalRecordasaflaweddocumentnotmeetingstandardsforaccuracy.
• TheMRAP“story”shouldbeusedasanexampleoforganizationalcrisesresponse.Therearetwolessons:
o TheMarineCorpsrespondedwellinthatnoonewasincorrectlypunishedo TheMarineCorpsrespondedpoorlyinthatMRAPwas(andis)poorly
portrayedinthepressandCongress• OneoftheMarineCorps’firststepsincrisesresponseshouldbetodetermine
applicableordersanddirectives.• TheMarineCorpsshouldnotsolelyrelyontheDODIGtoinvestigateMarineCorps
issues.SomeissuesrequirespecificknowledgethattheDODIGdoesnotpossess.• CombatdevelopmentdocumentationwasflawedduringtheprocessingoftheHejlik
UUNS.ThisincludesMCCDC,MARCENT,MARFORPAC,MARFORLANT,IMEF,IIMEF,theMROCanditsmembercommands,theAdvocatesandothers.TheUUNStrackingsystemhasbeenimproved,andshouldcontinuetotakeadvantageofnewtechnologies.
• Theinabilityofforcesincombattoperformmostcombatdevelopmentfunctionsshouldguidetheassignmentofcombatdevelopmentresponsibilities.MarineCommandsincombatshouldbelimitedintheirassumptionoftheseresponsibilities.
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