BLIND & THUMM - Interrelation Between Patenting and Standardisation Strategies Empirical Evidence...

Research Policy 33 (2004) 1583–1598

Interrelation between patenting and standardisation strategies:empirical evidence and policy implications

Knut Blinda,b,∗, Nikolaus Thummc,1

a Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Breslauer Strasse 48, D-76139 Karlsruhe, Germanyb University of Kassel, Germany

c Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, Einsteinstrasse 2, CH-3003 Bern, Switzerland

Received 22 October 2003; received in revised form 10 August 2004; accepted 24 August 2004Available online 30 November 2004

Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship between strategies to protect intellectual property rights and their impact on the likelihoodof joining formal standardisation processes. It is based on a small sample of European companies. On the one hand, theory suggeststhat the stronger the protection of own technological know-how, the higher the likelihood to join formal standardisation processesin order to leverage the value of the technological portfolio. On the other hand, companies at the leading edge are often in sucha strong position that they do not need the support of standards to market their products successfully. The results of the Probitmodels to explain the likelihood to join standardisation processes support the latter theoretical hypothesis: the higher the patenti©

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ntensities of companies, the lower is their tendency to join standardisation processes.2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

eywords:Protection strategies; R&D; IPR; Patent intensity; Standardisation

. Introduction

Over the last decade, both the number of patentpplications submitted to national and internationalatent offices and the number of standards releasedy standardisation bodies have risen tremendously. In

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 721 6809 212;ax: +49 721 6809 260.

E-mail addresses:[email protected] (K. Blind),[email protected] (N. Thumm).1 Tel.: +41 31 323 20 35; fax: +41 31 325 25 26.

patenting, a ‘pro-patent era’ began in the mid-1981

At the European level, the extension of standardisaactivities was accompanied by the establishmentcoherent legal European framework, introducingnational and European legislation for different techlogical fields. Standardisation processes, measurtheir output (i.e., the number of formal standards)increased, especially in Europe. One indication of

1 For a comprehensive analysis of the recent surge in patein the U.S., seeKortum and Lerner (1999).

048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.08.007

1584 K. Blind, N. Thumm / Research Policy 33 (2004) 1583–1598

trend was the creation of new standardisation bodiessuch as the ETSI, the European TelecommunicationStandards Institute.

The ambivalence of intellectual property rights andformal standards, developed by standards developmentorganisations, for technological development is trig-gered by two different economic mechanisms. Intel-lectual property rights provide knowledge-producerswith the temporary right of exclusive exploitation ofthe benefits deriving from the new knowledge. In thisway, intellectual property rights provide knowledge-producers with the publicly desirable incentive to in-vest in research and development. They provide hold-ers with a temporary monopoly position, but at thesame time limit the free implementation of technologi-cal knowledge. Potential users can either not get accessto required knowledge or have to pay for it (licensing).2

Some intellectual property rights, like patents, includea positive element of diffusion via the publication ofthe protected specifications (e.g.Ordover, 1991). Onlypatents are taken into consideration for the followinganalysis.

In contrast to intellectual property rights, standardsreleased by standards development organisations – thefocus of our analysis – are decisive for the diffusion ofnew technologies. They make information about newtechnologies available to everyone, for a small fee, andcome near to being a classical public good. Innovationresearchers until now have concentrated primarily onthe analysis of mechanisms which foster the generationo theb rdsa

tantr harec ent-i ech-n n-g tiallyd ech-n nteeo ca-t rder

tan-d tentsa o them

to provide common ground for the future developmentof new technologies. This common ground consists ofnot only standards to reduce the variety of possibletechnological trajectories to a minimum, but also ofcompatibility standards which allow the exploitationof network externalities and of quality standards forincreasing consumer acceptance.3

The influence of the openness or closeness, i.e. pro-tection by intellectual property rights, of standards ondynamic standards competition has been already anal-ysed, e.g. byKatz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell (1989)and Farrell and Katz (1998). The main result is thatopenness leads to price and quality competition withina common standard, whereas proprietary standardsmake competition between different specifications andtherefore a fragmentation of the market more likely.EspeciallyFarrell (1989)points out the critical role ofintellectual property rights for interface standards. Ingeneral, the economics literature concentrates on therole of intellectual property rights for the competitionmostly between compatibility standards, without ex-plicitly taking into account the role of intellectual prop-erty rights for the development of formal and thereforeopen standards. Recently,van Wegberg (2004)devel-oped a conceptual model to explain the influence of in-tellectual property rights on the decision to join formalstandardisation processes or informal industry consor-tia, from which he derives propositions closely relatedto our central hypotheses.

The analyses on the recent surge in patenting are atfi dis-a tent-i wnp e.g.C l-la -d n.S d byt dis-c fort osek ntso ac-t hin

tso

f new technological knowledge. However, onlyroad diffusion of technology triggered by standand technical rules can foster economic growth.

Both patents and standardisation play imporoles in the technical innovation process. They sertain similarities as institutions: for example, patng and standardisation essentially serve to codify tical information into non-dubious, replicable lauage. At the same time, their roles are essenifferent. A patent describes the parameters of a tology (product or process) over which the patewns limited rights, while formal standard specifiions are elaborated by diverse interest groups in o

2 De facto industry standards, e.g. the IBM or Microsoft sards, are just an extension of intellectual property rights, like pand copyrights, which have been successfully introduced intarket.

rst glance not directly linked to the issue of standartion. However, the investigations focus also on pa

ng triggered by the strategic motive to improve the oosition in co-operations with other companies (ohen et al., 2002), but focus especially on R&D co

aborations. Recent empirical studies (e.g.Cassimannd Veugelers, 2002) include the appropriability conitions to explain participation in R&D collaboratioince involvement in collaborations is accompanie

he danger that the other participants could use thelosed and unprotected technological knowledgeheir own purposes, R&D-intensive companies whnowledge is either insufficiently protected by pater extremely valuable may be reluctant to join such

ivities. However, both formal standardisation wit

3 SeeSwann (2000)for a recent overview of the different effecf standards.

K. Blind, N. Thumm / Research Policy 33 (2004) 1583–1598 1585

standardisation development organisations and withinindustry consortia are also a form of co-operation.Therefore, we can rely on these new insights for ouranalysis, but shift the focus from collaboration in R&Dto participation in formal standardisation.

At the case study level, we find several studies ofconflicts within a formal standardisation process due tointerests of patent-holders, especially in the telecom-munication sector (for the GSM standard, seeGood,1992; Iversen, 1999; Bekkers et al., 2002).4 The tradi-tional point of conflict between patents and formal stan-dardisation occurs when the implementation of a stan-dard, by its essence, necessitates the application of pro-prietary technology. Both processes bring together thecreation of variety and its following reduction throughselection. These two processes should be kept in bal-ance in the long term in order to secure the adaptabilityof the whole system (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1999).

In this context, one has to highlight that technicalstandards serve different functions. Besides the com-patibility and interface function,Swann (2000), follow-ing previous typologies, distinguishes three other typesof functions. Standards define minimum safety or qual-ity requirements, reduce variety and therefore allow theexploitation of economies of scale or provide informa-tion or serve measurement purposes. Most standardsintegrate all these functions in their specifications, butweighted differently. However, the role of patents instandardisation processes is most crucial if one triesto define interfaces (seeFarrell, 1989) or has to de-c s ors diesm spe-c any,w rente olesp pplyt everys s at

hnicalc ith-o tentp lems.T costsr tions.T lderst

the same time and the general participation in standard-isation covers a variety of standards. On the other hand,the value of the patent portfolio of a company can ei-ther be increased or decreased by this engagement inthe same way as in R&D co-operations. Nevertheless,it has to be noted that the positive leverage effect onthe own patent portfolio is especially high in the spe-cial case of compatibility standards, which are relevantfor large networks.5

Based on the background of the work done in theeconomic theory of standards, empirical studies onR&D collaborations and case studies, we try to go onestep further. The focus of this article is to look on the onehand at the underlying reasons, strategies and motivesto patent. On the other hand, it looks in greater detailat the role of patenting and the motives for it (alongwith other factors) in the decision to participate in thestandardisation process.6 We focus the investigation inour analysis on the following central hypotheses:

• The higher the patent intensity, the higher the likeli-hood of joining formal standardisation processes inorder to increase value of the patent portfolio due topositive diffusion effects triggered by formal stan-dards.

• Alternatively, the higher the patent intensity, thestronger the technological advantage of a companyfor market success without relying on formal stan-dardisation.

Both hypotheses have to take into consideration thatp orep ighert dert rketp s top

de-r andI ate

ges d warw

tec-t isa-t ents,t ardi-s stan-d

ide among a broad variety of possible technologiepecifications. This is also reflected by the case stuentioned above. However, as we focus not on a

ific case, but on the general behaviour of a compe are not able to distinguish between the diffeconomic functions of standards and the various ratents can play. Nevertheless, it is adequate to a

his company-based approach. On the one hand,ingle standard serves different economic function

4 Since patents tend to concentrate in the areas of greater tecomplexity, it becomes virtually impossible to adopt a standard wut incorporating proprietary material. We like to mention that paools are one potential measure to overcome this kind of probhey are an organisational model designed to save transaction

egarding licensing of patents compared to multilateral negotiahey are also able to resolve conflicts both among patent-ho

hemselves and between patent-holders and standards-users.

atenting is mainly driven by strategic goals. The matenting is used as a strategic instrument, the h

he likelihood of joining standardisation bodies in oro raise licensing revenues or to improve the maosition. We therefore dedicate the various motiveatent a special emphasis in the analysis.

The survey data we use in the following analysisive from the study ‘Interaction of Standardisationntellectual Property Rights’, funded by the Director

5 Windrum (2004)shows how Microsoft was able to leverauccessfully its proprietary Windows standards to the standarith Netscape in the browser competition.

6 A further aspect is that the mode of intellectual property proion may have an influence on the likelihood of joining standardion processes: the more formal/informal the protection instrumhe lower/higher the likelihood of unintended spillovers in standation processes and the higher/lower the probability of joiningardisation processes.


General Research of the European Commission (seeBlind et al., 2004).7 Hand-selected R&D managers,IPR managers and standardisation experts in the wholeEuropean Union from different data sources8 were con-tacted. Finally the empirical analysis was carried outwith a small sample of 149 European companies, morethan half of which were from the UK, Germany andFrance – due to the size of these countries – covering awide range of industries, with a certain focus on R&D-intensive branches as well as manufacturing of chem-icals, reflecting the distribution of the sample of 800companies described in Footnote 8. The sample coversan equal distribution of small, medium and large com-panies. Half of the companies have less than 250 em-ployees, but one third also more than 1000. However,this distribution is not representative for the real dis-tribution of the number of companies in the EuropeanUnion, which is dominated by small and medium-sizedcompanies. Our sample in this respect shows a bias to-wards large companies.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.Firstly, patenting strategies will be analysed, differentways of intellectual property protection will be dis-cussed and we will look at the patenting strategies of thecompanies in our sample. The descriptive statistics ofthe use of different protection strategies, patenting mo-tives and standardisation engagement and motives areoutlined. Based on the set of possible protection strate-gies, factor analyses are performed in order to identifysignificant patterns of protection strategies. With theh or-t n top ularp andp een

d inB

dard-i tifiedf CEN.T UK).D of thefi datas thes (204)w atap withint

research, respectively innovation and standardisation,will close the analysis.

2. Protection strategies and motives to patent

Patents are supposed to be an important incentivefor research and development and they are held to be anecessary precondition for science and technology toprogress. A patent on an invention grants certain rightsto the applicant for the use of that invention. There isa trade-off between the disclosure of detailed informa-tion by the inventor against the guarantee of a limitedmonopoly awarded by the state.9 The patent systemis designed as an incentive mechanism for the cre-ation of new, economically valuable knowledge and asa knowledge-dissemination mechanism to spread thisinformation.

The economic argument for patents is that there is amarket failure in the case of technological knowledge.The non-excludability characteristic of technologicalknowledge together with the non-rivalry characteristiclead under free-market conditions to a reduced incen-tive for investment in innovation (R&D investments)and to inefficient diffusion by following secrecy strate-gies. This is usually the argument for a government in-tervention, in the form of a patent system. “Patents aredesigned to create a market for knowledge by assigningpropriety property rights to innovators which enablethem to overcome the problem of non-excludabilityw umd -q hichi1

t in-c leart eya fp ingt or-t ance.

s owl-e

ex-p

elp of a regression analysis we will look at the impance of different factors that determine the decisioarticipate in the standardisation process, in particatent protection. Finally, a summary of the resultsolicy conclusions concerning the interface betw

7 Some descriptive results of this survey can also be founlind and Thumm (2004).

8 The 800 experts (R&D managers, IPR managers and stansation experts) to whom the questionnaire was sent were idenrom different data sources. Some 203 experts are members ofhis data was provided by the National Physical Laboratories (G Research delivered some 293 data samples of participantsfth Research Framework Programme. IPTS contributed 100amples from a previous survey with IPR experts, mainly fromector of biotechnology and chemistry. The rest of data samplesere retrieved from the KOMPASS DATABASE, a commercial drovider. A representative cross-sector sample was selected

his database.

hile, at the same time, encouraging the maximiffusion of knowledge by making it public”.10 Conseuently, patents are only a second best solution, w

s the price to be paid for innovative activity (Deardorff,992, p. 38).

Although it is clear that patents are an importanentive for research and development, it is also chat, in addition to their initial purpose to protect, thre used in many other ways.11 The original concept oatents with the intention of protecting and foster

he distribution of inventions, is becoming less impant as many secondary uses increase in import

9 CompareScherer and Ross (1990), p. 623.10 Geroski (1995), p. 97. Analogously,Ordover (1991)prefers a

trong patent regime, which facilitates (a broad diffusion of kndge) in co-ordination with an efficient licensing system.11 A number of motives for the biotechnology industry arelained inThumm (2001).


Fig. 1. Importance of protection strategies (very low = 1 to veryhigh = 5).

Not all economically useful inventions are patented oreven patentable, and often secrecy is considered a moreappropriate tool for protection, especially where prod-uct life cycles are relatively short.12 To protect tech-nology from imitation is the motive closest to the orig-inal intention for patents. More and more companies,e.g., in the pharmaceutical industry, actively searchpatent portfolios of competitors in order to prohibittheir patenting activities in the market.13 Sometimes,firms try to patent the entire production process by ap-plying for as many patents as possible for one prod-uct. Competitors have to approach the respective firmand apply for licenses whenever they want to producesomething in the area. Large pharmaceutical compa-nies often file for as many patents as possible in onetechnological field. The intention is to block the en-tire field, whether or not all of the patents are interest-ing individually (i.e., a “blocking scenario”). In many

12 Various surveys demonstrate that manufacturing firms estimatesecrecy more highly than appropriation methods (Arundel et al.,1995; Arundel, 2001; Harabi, 1995).

13 So-called patent portfolio races, see e.g.Hall and Ziedonis(2001) for the semiconductor industry andHeller and Eisenberg(1998)for the biotechnology industry.

cases, this strategy comes from an economic need: ifit is not done by the inventor, then some other com-petitor can take the initiative and place a patent in thetechnological niche. Firms can respond to patent block-ing by either trying to invalidate patents, invent aroundthem or simply ignore them and risk an infringementsuit (Grandstrand, 1999, p. 219). More co-operatively,companies can try to obtain foreign technology throughacquisitions and mergers, establishing a joint ventureor license the necessary technology. Patents can alsobe used as a basis for alliances that aim at moving thepatent holder into a better negotiating position againstcompetitors (cf.Thumm, 2000, Chapter 6.3.6).

Many of the patenting motives mentioned can beused in a defensive way as well as in an offensive way,aiming more at hindering competitors than protectingone’s own inventions. This depends very much on thecoherency of the patenting strategy.14 In a way, smallcompanies depend more on patenting than larger ones.Often their patent portfolio is the only economic assetthey have, while offensive uses of patenting normally

14 For a systematic overview of various patenting strategies, seeGrandstrand (1999), p. 232.


try to exclude competitors from making use of a tech-nology. The defensive use of patenting is more faithfulto the protective element of patenting. Broad patentportfolios make sure that technologies can be used inthe future. A patent portfolio in a specific technologycan be a strong asset for negotiating cross-licensingagreements and the mere existence of a broad portfoliocan intimidate a negotiating company.

The survey participants answered the question towhat extent a number of measures were important tothem to protect their innovations developed in the en-terprise during the period 1998–2000.Fig. 1 presentsthe ranking of the importance of the various protectionstrategies. Secrecy and other more informal measuressuch as customer relation management, lead-time ad-vantages and complex product design turned out to bethe most important protection strategies. This finding isconsistent with the results of other investigations whichshowed that secrecy is generally valued more highlyfor firms independent of their size (Arundel, 2001,p. 614). In contrast to other surveys, like the Com-munity Innovation Survey, where patents have a lowlevel of importance in comparison with other means ofprotection, patents reach an above-average score in oursample.Cohen et al. (2002)presents a similar rankingbased on a survey among Japanese companies, wherealso other formal protection measures such as trade-marks and copyrights are less important, like for oursample.15

The importance of patenting and complex productd im-p cy tob ,h tent-is va-t tiont pa-

p man-u entss

antf to bei moref ntlyf ith thefi

Table 1Results of the factor analysis regarding the use of different protectionstrategiesa

Factor 1(FacInf)

Factor 2(FacFor)

Factor 3(FacTec)

Patents 0.36 0.67 −0.18Trademarks 0.10 0.81 0.03Copyrights −0.06 0.74 0.46Secrecy 0.55 0.24 0.07Labour contracts 0.74 0.06 0.17Lead-time advantages 0.68 0.14 −0.04Customer relation management 0.67 −0.09 0.31Exclusive contracts – suppliers 0.60 0.13 0.28Complex product designs 0.40 −0.13 0.67Embodying intangibles 0.14 0.17 0.81

a The KMO-value of 0.7 is satisfactory.

nies and/or for R&D-intensive companies in order tosecure their lead-time advantage.

We use factor analysis to find out hidden patternsof protection strategies in the sample and to reduce thevarious protection instruments to a smaller number ofvariables for possible regression analyses. There arethree types of companies clearly distinguished by thestandard set of technology protection tools they apply(seeTable 1). The first type of company prefers infor-mal measures of protection such as secrecy, labour con-tracts, lead-time advantages, customer relation man-agement and exclusive contracts suppliers (FacInf).The second type relies on the classical intellectual prop-erty rights (FacFor), whereas the third company typeprefers to protect their products via the complex prod-uct design or the embodiment of intangibles in theirproducts (FacTec).

The companies in the sample were asked about theirpreferences among a number of motives as to why theymake use of patenting. Firms indicated that protect-ing technology from imitation has the highest impor-tance as a motive for patenting (compareFig. 2), andthat this is particularly true for those companies us-ing the patenting system intensively. This correspondswith the classical (defensive) use of patents but alsowith the economic reasoning behind patenting, the so-called ‘innovation effect’ of patents (Mazzoleni andNelson, 1998). Competitors are excluded from com-mercialising the patented technology. The results ofthe survey show that the value of the company and im-p alsoi s of

esign increases with firm size, but so does theortance of secrecy. Other surveys showed secree an effective alternative to patenting.16 Our sampleowever, shows a positive correlation between pa

ng and secrecy at the same time.Rammer (2002)findsimilar results based on German Community Innoion Survey data. Obviously, secrecy, as a protecool, is more important for patenting-intensive com

15 In a survey among U.S. companies,Cohen et al. (2000)find thatatents are very important in the chemical sector, whereas in thefacturing industry, in electrical machinery and medical instrumecrecy is the most important protection measure.16 Cf.Arundel (2001), p. 622. Secrecy in general is more import

or process innovation, where its level of importance turns outndependent of the firm size. Bigger companies tend to beamiliar with formal appropriation methodologies and consequeor product innovations the importance of secrecy decreases wrm size.

roving the technology image of the company aremportant patenting motives. More aggressive use


Fig. 2. Importance of patent motives (very low = 1 to veryhigh = 5).

patenting are considered to be of lower importance thandefensive ones, because impeding competitors’ patent-ing and application activities was scored very highly.The relevance of this motive to patent is positively cor-related with the firm size.Aggressive patentingis ob-viously more an issue with larger companies that havethe relevant capacities. The business-related aspects ofpatenting, such as the generation of licensing incomeand the acquisition of venture capital, are of low im-portance. This is astonishing since, classically, industryuses patents as an instrument to make money by li-censing and to achieve highest economic returns, eventhough only a rather small fraction of patents turns outto have high economic value. To prevent competitorsfrom integrating their own technology in a formal stan-dard is of low importance as a motive for patenting. Thesame is true for gaining a better bargaining position instandard-setting.

Again, we use factor analysis to work out differentgroups of companies regarding the motives for usingpatents (seeTable 2). One group consists of motivesin the classical sense, that is, to protect own technol-ogy and to impede the patenting of competitors (PAT-TRAD). Another group of motives is the collection ofstrategic reasons to patent (PATSTRAT).

Table 2Results of the factor analysis regarding different patent motivesa

Factor 1(PATSTRAT)

Factor 2(PATTRAD)

Protect own technology 0.39 0.72Impede competitors

patenting0.47 0.71

Increase company’svalue

0.67 0.19

Generation of licensingincome

0.63 −0.45

Better bargainingposition

0.74 −0.13

Prevent competitorsfrom integrating

0.75 −0.06

R&D co-operation 0.72 −0.24Inter-firm negotiations 0.54 −0.47Prevent patent

infringement suits0.49 −0.04

Improve technologicalimage

0.66 0.21

Venture capital 0.71 0.02

a In this factor analysis, only companies are included which placeat least a medium importance on patents as a protection instrument.The KMO-value is above 0.78.


3. Explaining participation in standardisation

3.1. Theoretical considerations

The decision to join a formal standardisation pro-cess, as well as the allocation of resources for R&D and,therefore, the commitment of resources, is made on thefirm level (seeWakelin, 1998for the latter). In contrastto the benefits of innovations which primarily the firmcan appropriate through reduced production costs, pen-etrating new markets and exploiting monopoly rents,new standards published and distributed by standarddevelopment organisations are, at first glance, a publicgood.17 In reality, however, although the general possi-bility for everybody to buy a formal BSI, DIN, AFNORor CEN standard at a reasonable price is given, onlya core of companies which have the relevant techno-logical know-how can use the new technical specifica-tion effectively and efficiently.18 Therefore, the partic-ipants in formal standardisation processes may havealso advantages compared to outsiders, due to theirearly involvement in the development of the standardand the accompanying process of knowledge exchangeand creation.Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987)under-line this argument, in that the establishment of prod-uct standards may be a strategy by which firms coulddisadvantage rivals by raising their costs. In addition,only the companies which are in the same branch orare using the same technology may benefit in gen-eral from a new formal standard. Therefore, the singlec es-p eenR ex-p us-t tmf anyc an-d ento

bec s in

y net-w iallyi

sess

R&D and the impact on formal standardisation. Firstly,and obviously, the standardisation process is a continu-ation of the development phase of internal R&D. There-fore, companies actively involved in R&D are morelikely to participate also in formal standardisation pro-cesses in order to continue their previous activities andto reach marketable products or process technologiescompatible with those of other companies (Farrell andSaloner, 1985). However, involvement in a formal stan-dardisation process is accompanied by the danger thatother participants could use the disclosed and unpro-tected technological knowledge for their own purposes.Therefore, R&D-intensive companies may be more re-luctant to join standardisation processes and, instead,try to market their products alone without relying onstandardised input technologies, common interfaces tocomplementary products of other competitors or evenuniform product designs. On the other hand, companieswith minimal R&D can compensate this lack by en-tering formal standardisation clubs of R&D-intensivefirms to benefit from the technology transfer, especiallysince the specifications of standards can be integratedwithout any significant R&D capacity. An analysis byLove and Roper (1999)of the substitute relationshipbetween own R&D and technology transfer supportsthis view. In general, company R&D intensity is an am-bivalent influencing factor for the likelihood of joiningformal standardisation processes.

In order to explain the likelihood to join activelyformal standardisation processes, two different ap-p atorsr tions e ont um-b totalt

for-m the-s , theh vec causet thes

om-p onglys onp

ompany is also an appropriate unit of analysis,ecially when considering the relationships betw&D, patenting and standardisation despite thelicit technological spillovers of standards, which j

ify an analysis at sector (seeBlind, 2002) or even aacroeconomic level (Jungmittag et al., 1999). In the

ollowing, we discuss the influence of several compharacteristics on the likelihood of joining formal stardisation activities at standardisation developmrganisations.

There are two contradictory trends which shouldonsidered when looking at the performance of firm

17 In the case of privately owned de facto standards caused bork externalities, the R&D decision will change towards a soc

neffective speed-up of R&D. Cf.Kristiansen (1998).18 Therefore,Antonelli (1994)goes even further and characteri

tandards as non-pure private goods.

roaches are possible, concerning the use of indicepresenting the importance and intensity of protectrategies. A first approach could simply concentrathe patent intensity, calculated as the ratio of the ner of patents applied in the last 3 years divided by

urnover.With respect to patents and their involvement in

al standardisation processes, the following hypoes can be derived. The higher the patent intensityigher the likelihood is especially of R&D-intensiompanies to join standardisation processes, beheir know-how which may be disclosed duringtandardisation process is sufficiently protected.19 On

19 Patent intensity is only a rough proxy for the value of a cany’s knowledge stock, since the values of patents are strkewed (seeHarhoff et al., 2003) and for a specific standardisatirocess only single patents are essential.


the other hand, it may be argued that a high patent in-tensity represents a very valuable stock of knowledgewhich the company possesses. In addition, patent pro-tection may be not sufficient,20 since besides the dis-closure of the company’s knowledge in the patent doc-ument, during the discussions among the participantsof the standardisation process additional informationmay leak out to the potential competitors. Therefore,a high patent intensity may also lead to a lower likeli-hood of joining formal standardisation processes. Veryoften especially large companies possessing large mar-ket shares try to establish proprietary de facto industrystandards based on broad and sophisticated patent port-folios, which allow them to defend their leading posi-tion for a longer period and to reappropriate their in-vestments spent for establishing the standard. And sucha strategy excludes automatically the support of a for-mal standardisation process.21 Therefore, the counter-hypothesis assumes a negative relationship between thepatent intensity of a company and its likelihood to joinstandardisation processes. In general, the companies’patent intensity, maybe therefore have in total a neg-ative impact on the likelihood of joining formal stan-dardisation processes.

A second approach could include all the differentprotection strategies by using the factor values of thefirst factor analysis (seeTable 1).22 However, regres-sion analyses following this approach did not producesignificant results, therefore, we integrated the self-assessment of the importance patents and lead-time ad-v s ori be-c ble tod einga tenedb er-t ersw

ro-t ance.

encet hichm cts.

ve ar er toi alysisp pa-t

When discussing the role of the export activities,a two-way causality has to be considered. On the onehand, due to the institutional paradigms of most na-tional standardisation development bodies, the partic-ipation in standardisation processes at a national levelalso influences the standardisation at the European orinternational levels. Therefore, exporting companieswhich try to influence supranational standards in orderto secure market shares in foreign markets are morelikely to participate in standardisation at the nationaland international levels. However, the influence of asingle company on the standardisation processes de-creases as the territorial responsibility of the standardscommittee becomes broader. This fact reduces the mo-tivation of exporters to join standardisation at suprana-tional level. Nevertheless, companies actively involvedin exporting their goods and services are more con-fronted with foreign formal standards which increasethe inclination to influence the outcome of formal stan-dardisation processes.

On the other hand, although standardisation is cer-tainly a strategy to shape foreign markets accordingto the specifications of one’s own products or tech-nologies, the advantage has to be shared by all otherparticipants, including – although with a certain timelag – the companies implementing the standards. For-mal standardisation constrains competition for a veryshort time by giving the participants a leading position,which is only temporary, since the codification of thetechnical specifications allows the other competitors toc iallyp ad oft po-s tedb oinf

ro-c ghlyq thesec izedc isa-t causet s af-t arem itivee allerc xtentf nal-

antage have for the protection of their inventionnnovations. The latter mode of protection is usedause of the hypotheses that this variable may be aifferentiate the sample of companies into those bt the leading edge not depending and more threay formal standardisation activities and into follow

ypes benefiting from possible knowledge spillovithin formal standardisation processes.

20 See above Section2, since secrecy is the most important pection strategy, whereas patenting is only of secondary import

21 However, there are examples where companies tried to influhe formal standardisation process into such specifications way increase the market shares of their technologies or produ22 Since the standardisation-related patenting motives ha

ather small importance for the companies, we do not considntegrate the factor variables derived from the second factor anerformed (seeTable 2) in a regression analysis to explain partici

ion in standardisation processes.

atch up, at least by the time the standard is officublished. Companies wanting a market lead ahe

he competitors, which results in a monopolisticition with high market shares world-wide (indicay very high export shares), will be reluctant to j

ormal standardisation processes.The participation in formal standardisation p

esses incurs significant costs, for example for hiualified employees, travel expenses, etc. Sinceosts have a fixed-cost effect, small and medium-sompanies are less likely to join formal standardion process and behave more as free-riders, behey are able to use and implement the standarder their publication. In addition, larger companiesore able to internalise some of the generated pos

xternalities of formal standards compared to smompanies, because they benefit to a larger erom economies of scale or positive network exter


ities simply through a positive size effect. Therefore,standardisation is less favourable for smaller compa-nies, not only because of costs, but also because ofbenefits.

Finally, we have taken into account sector differ-ences, since we have sectors, like the telecommu-nication and IT sectors, implementing technologieswith high direct based on physical networks and in-direct complementarity based network effects, whichcan only be exploited if a set of efficient standards isjointly elaborated. On the other hand, traditional stand-alone technologies, like chemistry, show a strong incli-nation towards patenting. In all regression analyses,sector dummies are included taking companies activein R&D services as base. Regional dummies are notincluded, because they did not contribute to the ex-planatory power of the different models.

3.2. Regression analysis23

The regression analysis tries to explain the like-lihood of companies to participate actively in for-mal standardisation processes on the national, Euro-pean and international level. The explanatory vari-ables reflect the theoretical considerations explainedabove.

The definitions of the main company-specific quan-titative variables in the data set are the following (whereX stands for exports inD , TT for total turnover inD ,R&D for expenditure inD . The subscripti is for thefi

pre-s a-t for-m ed ana en-e oth

ed inB

ploy-e ns.

Table 3Descriptive statistics: means (standard deviations)

Standardisers(n = 86)

Non-standardisers(n = 63)

Export intensity* 45.77 (26.70) 56.77 (30.44)R&D intensity 17.30 (21.88) 21.16 (24.89)Patent intensity* 4.83 (9.20) 9.61 (18.14)Size 2.66 (1.26) 2.32 (0.99)

∗ Indicates a significant difference at a 5% level of a one-tailedt-test.

sub-groups are very high. Furthermore, there are sev-eral obvious differences between the two classes. Afterthe theoretical considerations it was not expected to findstandardisers with a lower export intensity. The expla-nation for this sample feature can probably be foundin the explanation above, which postulates that compa-nies seeking incontestable competitive advantage avoidformal standardisation processes in order to obtain sig-nificant market shares abroad based on the uniquenessof their products.

The explanation for the lower – but not on a sig-nificant level – R&D intensity of companies joiningthe standardisation process supports again the train ofthought which assumes a substitutive relationship be-tween own R&D effort and the participation in stan-dardisation processes and the reluctance of R&D-intensive companies to disclose their knowledge instandardisation processes. Finally, the patent intensityof the companies joining the standardisation processis just half of the value of the non-standardisers. Thisclearly makes obvious that companies with a strongpatent portfolio are nevertheless reluctant to join stan-dardisation processes and probably try to be successfulin the market without using standardised componentsor designs of final products. This finding is remarkablein so far as theoretical considerations would point indifferent directions. IPR are an essential asset in thestandardisation war between companies. Firms with astrong copyright, e.g. on software, and patent portfo-lio possess an explicit advantage over their competitors( )e singM

dif-f ores( t-i f the

rm andj for the sector:24

Export intensity: Expij = (100× Xij )/TTij ;R&D intensity: R&Dij = (100× R&D ij )/TTij ;Patent intensity: Patij = (100× Patentsij )/Employeesij ;Size: Sizeij = log Employeesij .

Some descriptive statistics for the variables areented below inTable 3for the two separate classificions of standardisers and non-standardisers. Theer are defined as those companies which indicatctive participation in formal standardisation. In gral, the export intensity and the R&D intensity of b

23 This section draws on the methodological approach applilind (2004).24 The number of patents is normalised by the number of emes, since the employees are the source of patentable inventio

Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p. 295). Windrum (2004xplains this phenomenon by describing and analyicrosoft’s browser war with Netscape.Regarding the second approach to consider the

erent protection strategies, the use of the factor scseeTable 1) did not yield significant results. After tesng alternative models also based on the results o


factor analyses, we finally select and present a modelwhich includes the importance of patents and lead-timeadvantage as important formal and informal protectionmodes.

In order to identify the distinct variables which ex-plain the active participation in formal standardisationin general, at national, European, and international lev-els, eight Probit models are tested. Besides the R&Dintensity, the company size and the export intensity,the patent intensity is included as an explanatory vari-able in a first equation.25 In a second equation we in-clude the importance values of the protection strategiespatenting (ImPat) and lead-time advantage (ImLead).A sector dummy with the rest of sectors as base is in-cluded to control for sectoral influences. The regressionequations are defined as follows:

Stdij = a0 + a1R&DIntij + a2PatIntij + a3Sizeij

+ a4ExpIntij + a5Sectorj + εij (1)

Stdij = a0 + a1R&DIntij + a2aImPatij

+ a2bImLeadij + a3Sizeij + a4ExpIntij

+ a5Sectorj + εij (2)

The results of the Probit estimate are presented inTable 4. The eight models are able to explain a signif-icant share of the companies’ likelihood to join stan-d n thes actorf thec r thel n-d nnela ard-i ctivei en-t

t int dis-c e has

eratea dif-f encet ntingb Ta

ble

4R

egre

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sults

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test

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ions

toex

plai

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inst

anda

rdis

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xpla

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ble:

colla

bora

tion

inth

est

anda

rdis

atio

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oces

s

Gen

eral

Nat

iona

lE

urop

ean

Inte

rnat

iona

l

Coe

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ent

z-va

lue

Coe

ffici

ent

z-va

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Coe

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ent

z-va

lue

Coe

ffici

ent

z-va

lue

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ent

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lue

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ent

z-va

lue

Coe

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z-va

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R&

Din

tens

ity−0

.00

−0.2

7−0

.00

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80.

000.

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.00

−0.2

5−0

.00

−0.2

60.

011.

020.

011.

16P

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tint

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ty−1

.95**

−2.0

5−3

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3−1

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5**−2

.48

Pat

entp

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n0.1

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.22

−0.0

4−0

.51

−0.0

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3−1

.56

Lead

-tim

ead

vant

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−0.1

7−1

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5−1

.49

−0.1

9*−1

.81

−0.2

9***

−2.7

6C

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ze0.2

6**2.

190.

32**

*2.

750.

32**

2.56

0.35

***

3.08

0.21

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900.

23**

2.08

0.33

***

2.64

0.42

***

3.36

Exp

orti

nten

sity

−0.0

2***

−3.0

0−0

.01**

−2.5

2−0

.01**

*−2

.86

−0.0

1**−2

.29

−0.0

1**−2

.07

−0.0

1*−1

.83

−0.0

1*−1

.89

−0.0

1−1

.41

Mac

hine

ry0.0

20.

050.

100.

31−0

.12

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.03

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10.

020.

050.

070.

230.

040.

120.

230.

70C

hem

istr

y−0

.03

−0.0

80.

040.

10−0

.43

−1.0

6−0

.45

−1.1

1−0

.41

−1.0

4−0

.36

−0.8

9−0

.07

−0.1

60.

110.

25E

lect

rical

engi

neer

ing

0.08

0.22

0.20

0.55

−0.1

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.41

−0.0

6−0

.17

−0.0

9−0

.24

0.03

0.09

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0.47

1.25

Con

stan

t0.4

91.

300.

85*

1.70

0.06

0.14

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01.

ardisation processes. As in the analysis based oample of German companies, the most decisive for participation in the standardisation process isompany size. The larger a company is, the greateikelihood that it will participate actively in the staardisation process. The endowment with persond financial resources is crucial for joining stand

sation processes. In addition, the benefits of an anvolvement in standardisation are higher for largerities.

Although the sector dummies are not significanhe regression analysis, we have to analyse anduss in more depth the sector dimension, since on

25 Since the correlation between these two variables is modnd models including the variables separately do not lead to

erent results, we assume that multicollinearity does not influhe estimation results. The relationship between R&D and pateehaviour is discussed byJanz et al. (2001).


to assume that sectors vary strongly in patenting andstandardisation. More precisely, the result of the re-gression analysis may be biased by sectoral patterns,especially sinceBlind (2002)finds in an analysis basedon sectoral data both of Germany and a set of OECDcountries, an inverse U-shaped relationship betweenpatent applications and the stock of standards, whichcan be interpreted that patents are fostering the growthof the stock of standards up to a certain threshold, af-ter which too many patents inhibit the development ofnew formal standards. Nevertheless, the differentiationof our sample by sector makes obvious that we find nei-ther large differences in patent intensities,26 also not inthe assessment of patents as protection instrument, norsignificant differences in the propensity to standardise.Unfortunately, separate regression analyses are not fea-sible to the rather small number of observations per sec-tor. The latter result is confirmed byBlum et al. (2000)for Germany, which find only a significant differencebetween the low participation in the pharmaceuticalindustry and the high engagement in the aerospace in-dustry, whereasMeeus et al. (2002)do not control forsector dummies in their analysis.

The R&D intensity of the companies has no signif-icant impact on their likelihood to join standardisationprocesses. This result confirms also the analysis basedon a sample of German companies (Blind, 2004).27 Incontrast to the German model, we have included a fur-ther company-specific innovation variable, the patentintensity. With the exception of the model explain-i pro-c pacto isa-t tentp owl-e asest ro-c por-t ting( s iss sly

dingR hoseo

ipb pro-c

an indicator of the value of the companies’ stock ofknowledge and their competitive strength, which en-ables them to abstain from standardisation and to besuccessful without influencing specifications of formalstandards or even to establish proprietary de facto stan-dards. This results confirms the theoretical considera-tions ofvan Wegberg (2004).

The significant negative impact of the patent inten-sity, as an indicator of competitiveness, is confirmed bythe negative coefficient of the export intensity, whichrepresents the strength of the company in foreign mar-kets. Obviously, very competitive companies with highexport shares do not have to rely on influencing thespecifications of formal standards, but are able eitherto cope with the specifications set by others or to gettheir company-specific product design accepted by thecustomers. Just these idiosyncrasies make them so suc-cessful in foreign markets. This result corresponds tothe findings based on the sample of German compa-nies which makes evident that companies with a limitedsuccess in foreign markets are more likely to join stan-dardisation processes, whereas companies with veryhigh export shares do not have to rely on influencingstandardisation as a measure to support their other mar-keting activities. For their success, it is even favourableto abstain from standardisation in order to preserve theidiosyncrasies of their products compared to those ofthe competitors.

The results of the second regression equation withthe importance of patenting and lead-time advantages ncet isa-t coef-fi ievel ithj uro-p s oft withp an-d f thep inest ductc al-r om-p s im-p itiveb ionp con-

ng the participation at European standardisationesses, the patent intensity has a strong negative imn the probability to participate actively in standard

ion. Consequently, the hypothesis that sufficient parotection decreases the danger of unintended kndge spillovers to competitors and therefore incre

he likelihood of companies to join standardisation pesses must be rejected and reflects also the low imance of standardisation-related motives for patenseeFig. 2). On the contrary, the counter-hypothesitrongly confirmed. The patent intensity is obviou

26 Only the companies active in the chemical industry or provi&D services have significantly higher patent intensities than tf the machinery industry.27 Meeus et al. (2002)also do not find a significant relationshetween R&D intensity and the involvement in standardisationesses for Dutch companies.

how that companies which attribute a high importao those strategies are less likely to join standardion processes. Regarding patenting the negativecients are not significant, whereas trying to achead-time advantage is obviously in contradiction woining formal standardisation processes at the Eean or international level. Together with the result

he first equation, it becomes clear that companiesatenting activities are reluctant to join formal stardisation processes. The negative coefficient orotection strategy “lead-time advantage” underl

hat companies at the leading edge are in the proycle too far away from more mature stages whicheady require standardisation activities, whereas canies not able to consider lead-time advantage aortant protection strategy have obviously a posenefit–cost ratio from joining formal standardisatrocesses. The consistency of the both models is


firmed, because the coefficients of the other variablesare almost identical to the results of the first equation.Concluding backward, the patent intensity reflects alsothe lead-time advantage of a company, which is de-cisive for the decision to join formal standardisationprocesses.

Summarising the findings of our regression analy-ses, we find results contradicting the theoretical con-siderations. The R&D intensity has no impact on thelikelihood to join formal standardisation processes. Ifwe perform regression analyses relying on the “hard”protection indicator, patent intensity, it turns out thatas patenting increases, the likelihood of a companyjoining standardisation processes decreases. This re-sult together with the confirmed contradiction betweentrying to achieve a lead-time advantage and joiningformal standardisation processes indicates that com-panies at the leading edge abstain from standardisa-tion and do not need the diffusion-promoting effectof standards, but try rather to protect their competi-tive advantage and try to introduce their new technolo-gies or products in the market successfully as early aspossible.

In addition to the explanation above, one has to takeinto account that in formal standardisation processesthe technology users are in the majority and not thetechnology-developers. The former group of compa-nies and organisations need standards to support theirproduct development, to increase the efficiency in theirproduction and to foster the marketing.

thec &Di thep isa-t con-s s re-q eirr ons,t mec liosa ro-c in-s e oft Onef rmals hooset arem ed

parties. Consequently, companies with strong patentportfolios have alternatives with lower opportunitycosts to promote the diffusion and marketing of theirtechnologies.

4. Conclusions and policy implications

This paper presents an attempt at explicitlyanalysing the relationship between strategies to protectpatents and their impact on the likelihood of joiningformal standardisation processes. It is based on a smallsample of companies from different European Unioncountries. On the one hand, theory suggests that thestronger the protection of the technological know-how,the higher the likelihood is to join formal standardisa-tion processes in order to leverage the value of the owntechnological portfolio. Behind this hypothesis is theassumption that companies should try to achieve both acombination of standards and patents and a strong linkbetween the two. This would create an even strongermarket position. A strong patent portfolio is an essen-tial weapon within a standards war when companiestry to achieve a de facto standard position in the market(Shapiro and Varian, 1999, p. 295). On the other hand,companies at the leading edge are often in such a strongposition that they do not need the support of standardsto market their products successfully. The results ofthe Probit models explaining the likelihood of joiningstandardisation processes support the latter theoreticalh of ac ard-i s nota sultd ntryl2 re-l ins

pa-n roms stan-d ead-i s ar willn m-i nali join

However, there is an explanation missing forontradiction between the insignificance of the R

ntensity and the significantly negative impact ofatent intensity on the likelihood to join standard

ion processes. Regarding this aspect one has toider that most standard development organisationuire that patent-holders are willing to license thights at reasonable and non-discriminatory conditihe so called RAND condition. Consequently, soompanies with broad and valuable patent portfore more reluctant to join formal standardisation pesses, whereas for the R&D intensity itself theignificance can be explained by the ambivalenche complementary and substitutive relationship.urther dimension has to be mentioned. Besides fotandardisation processes, companies can also co join informal standardisation processes, whichore flexible regarding patent rights of the involv

ypothesis. The more intense the patent activityompany is, the lower is the tendency to join standsation processes. Although the small sample doellow us to claim general representativity, this reoes not contradict insights from surveys on cou

evel (Meeus et al., 2002for the Netherlands andBlind,004for Germany), which find at least no positive

ationship between R&D intensity and participationtandardisation.

What does this mean for policy-makers? If comies with a strong technological base stay away ftandardisation processes, both the quality of theards released may fall behind the technological l

ng edge, and broad diffusion may be inhibited. Aesult, the positive economic effects of standardsot be fully exploited. In order to solve this shortco

ng, solutions have to be found which create additioncentives for technologically strong companies to


standardisation processes and simultaneously reducethe threat that they suffer from unintentional spilloversof technological know-how to other participants of thestandardisation processes.

The following recommendations are addressed tostandards development organisations, which couldmodify their guidelines regarding patents according tothe suggestions made. The existing ISO/IEC directivesrelated to patents, which are implemented by most stan-dard development organisations have proved effectiveand efficient in most circumstances. These proposals,however, are mostly directed to general strategic stan-dardisation policies, especially licensing rules.28

One general strategic policy approach regarding theselection of new areas for standardisation is evidentfrom the life cycle of a technology. In the very early,pre-competitive stage of a technology life cycle, themain actors, i.e. the companies at the leading edge, areaware that they need to form alliances, not only withtheir customers and suppliers, but also with their com-petitors. This constellation causes pressure on thesecompanies to converge their interests early on. How-ever, with progress in the technology life cycle, thispressure decreases and the likelihood of single actionsincreases. Thus, standardisation development organi-sations would be better off identifying promising newtechnologies in their very early stages and starting toexplore the potential of new standardisation processesat the early stage of the take-off of broad diffusioninstead of waiting for them to mature in the senseo s ins ualc roadp tivea heses itia-t e tor tent-h tablec

uldb D-i join

)ent

o pointf es.

standardisation processes. Especially companies withlarge patent portfolios stay away from standardisationactivities. This is the reason, why we concentrate espe-cially on licensing schemes regarding patents relevantfor the specification of standards, since they have a ma-jor impact on the value of patent portfolios.

It is up to the standardisation bodies to set guidelinesfor determining the licensing fees after the standard hasbeen determined. The typical policy mandating that aroyalty be “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”gives little guidance for royalty determination be-cause “reasonable” can be interpreted differently bya technology-owner compared to a technology-buyer.The extent to which a royalty is ‘reasonable‘may beassessed in terms of the division of gains from licens-ing between licensor and licensees. While there is nosingle answer, it is possible to rule out as unreasonableroyalties that leave the patent-owner worse off than hewould have been had he not joined the standardisationprocess and royalties that absorb all of the gains fromstandardisation. The threshold for what is reasonablewill depend on the nature of the invention that is chosenas the standard. In order to avoid licensing fees whichare too high, “reasonable” should mean the royaltiesthat the patent-holder could obtain in open, up-frontcompetition with other technologies, and not the roy-alties that he could extract once other participants areeffectively locked into the technology covered by thepatent.

Patent pools may represent a solution for reduc-i n ofpa tenth (e.g.,G ef-fi an-t van-t s –h entsa lacet orm ech-n tan-d emsb and

ntp

f already stagnating adoption rates and lock-inpecific and often proprietary technologies. Individompanies do have strong incentives to build up batent portfolios, which in turn reduces their incennd pressure to join standardisation processes. Ttrong patent portfolios may even prevent the inion of new standardisation processes, if they havely on patent-protected technologies and the paolders do not agree to give away licenses at acceponditions.29

The framework conditions of standardisation shoe changed in such a way that innovative R&

ntensive companies have stronger incentives to

28 Some of the suggestions can be found inRapp and Stiroh (2002.29 Bekkers et al. (2002)discuss the IPR issues for the developmf the GSM standard, which represents an important starting

or the discussion of IPR issues within standardisation process

ng the transaction costs caused by the integratioatent-protected technologies into standards.30 Theyre in particular useful since not only a single paas to be considered for integration into a standardSM). However, to establish and run patent pools

ciently and to promote their general welfare advages, some conflict potentials and potential disadages – like their misuse as price fixing mechanismave to be taken into account. The pooling of patnd consequently of interests should not take p

oo late, in order to avoid a constellation of twoore pools driven by different interests and even tologies which cannot be integrated in a hybrid sard. However, here we face co-ordination probletween the various known and unknown actors

30 Cf. Merges (1999)andShapiro (2001)for a discussion of pateools.


insufficient incentives from companies to join pools atan early stage. Therefore, public non-profit research in-stitutions may act as key gravitational force for creatingpatent pools, since they may provide the necessary in-formation and a platform for co-ordination activities.In addition, they can more easily balance the often con-flicting interest of companies involved, compared withthose companies trying to promote commercial inter-ests at the cost of other participants. Despite the attrac-tiveness of a pool solution, it has to be considered thatthe standardisation of a technology which is based ona pool of patents does not automatically mean that thetechnologically and even economically superior solu-tion will succeed. Because of strong common interestsand the economic power of patent pool members, thetechnologically superior solution of an outsider who iseither not able or not willing to join the patent poolmay not be considered as a standard specification andmay therefore cause the development of products andprocesses of inferior quality or at higher costs. Hence,even if wide-ranging patent pools covering all majorkey players may solve conflicts between patent hold-ers, they have to be carefully monitored because theymay overrule better solutions of individuals or smallerconsortia with weaker patents or economic power.

Clearly, there is a need for coordinated action in or-der to improve the relationship between standardisationand IPR, which takes research and competition policyaspects into account.31 A first step towards coordinatedaction is to convoke the responsible authorities and en-c r un-d olicya

A

eanC ect“ tualP 0-0 ASw d oft elfti ts of

mpe-t

the anonymous referees. Remaining shortcomings arein the sole responsibility of the authors.

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