BLESSED BE THE PEACEMAKERS

BLESSED BE THE

PEACEMAKERS

CONFLICT, PEACE AND

AIR POWER

John Teager

Air Power Studies Centre Canberra

1996

ii

Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 1996 This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, or review as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry _____________________________________________________________________ Teager, J F N, 1958-. Blessed be the peacemakers : conflict, peace and air power. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 0 642 24453 7. 1. United Nations - Armed Forces. 2. International police. 3. Peaceful change (International relations). 4. Mediation, International. 5. Arbitration, International. 6. Peace. 7. Air power. I. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies Centre. II. Title. (Series : Fellowship paper (Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Air Power Studies Centre) ; no. 12). 358.413570994 _____________________________________________________________________ Designed by Defence Publications. Cover photograph by kind permission of The Editor, Air Clues, The RAF Magazine. Published and distributed by Air Power Studies Centre RAAF Base FAIRBAIRN Canberra, ACT, 2600 Australia Tel: (06) 267 6458 Fax: (06) 267 6382

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THE AIR POWER STUDIES CENTRE

The Air Power Studies Centre was established by the Royal Australian Air Force at its Fairbairn Base in August 1989 at the direction of the Chief of the Air Staff. Its function is to promote a greater understanding of the proper application of air power within the Australian Defence Force and in the wider community. This is being achieved through a variety of methods including development and revision of indigenous doctrine, the incorporation of that doctrine into all levels of RAAF training, and by increasing the level of air power awareness across the broadest possible spectrum. Comment on this publication or enquiry on any air power related topic is welcome and should be forwarded to:

The Director Air Power Studies Centre RAAF Base Fairbairn, ACT, 2600 Australia Tel: (06) 267 6458 Fax: (06) 267 6382

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Wing Commander John Teager joined the RAF in 1977 as a navigator and after four years on Vulcan bombers transferred to the F-4 Phantom. Except for a two year posting as an instructor at the Phantom Conversion Unit and five months in command of the RAF Phantom detachment in the Falkland Islands, his next eight years were spent flying in the overland low level air defence role with the Wildenrath Phantom Wing in Germany. He has accumulated some 3,000 flying hours. During 1992/93, he served as an Electronic Warfare Trials Officer with the RAF Central Tactics and Trials Organisation at Boscombe Down where he was responsible for development in the tactical use of aircraft and helicopter expendable countermeasures. In 1994, he graduated from the RAAF Command and Staff Course (CSC) and was promoted to Wing Commander in July of that year. Following completion of CSC, he joined the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre for 12 months as an international visiting fellow. He returned to the United Kingdom in January 1996 to take up the appointment of Staff Officer to the Director of Public Relations (RAF).

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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, the Royal Air Force, the British Government, the Australian Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This document is approved for public release.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am most grateful to all those who have given up their time to assist in the production of this work. Firstly, my thanks to all the staff at the Air Power Studies Centre. To Group Captains Gary Waters and John Harvey, for promoting and supporting the first ever RAF fellowship undertaken at the Centre. To Wing Commander Mark Lax, Squadron Leader Jim Walker, and Squadron Leader Herb Keightley RNZAF for sharing their thoughts, discussing ideas and commenting on numerous drafts. To Miss Joanna Bayliss for the considerable time spent proof-reading and editing. To Dr John Mordike for editing the final draft. To Mrs Sandra Di Guglielmo, Mrs Sandi Seignarack and Ms Joyce Graham for the administrative support and their cheerful approach. In particular to Wing Commander Ric Casagrande for sharing his knowledge on the United Nations, the law of armed conflict, and many other aspects of peace operations. Most especially, to my mentor for the year, Dr Alan Stephens, for offering valuable guidance and encouragement throughout and for always finding the time to discuss ideas. If through this experience I have inherited a modicum of Alan’s writing prowess, I shall be grateful. My thanks also to the staff of the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre at Williamtown, in particular Lieutenant Colonel Tony Miles, Major Derek Taylor, Squadron Leader Mike O’Brien and Lieutenant Commander Ian Allan, and also to the staff of the RAAF College at Point Cook, for providing forums in which to discuss my ideas. To all the library staff at the H N Wrigley Centre, but especially to Sergeant Judith Leahy and Leading Aircraftwoman Vanessa Gurling to whom I owe a considerable debt of thanks. Never too busy, always willing to help and invariably cheerful, their contribution has been greatly appreciated. Finally, to my wife Cathy for her patience, constant support and encouragement, and to my children Matthew and Sophie whose innocent concepts of war and peace often caused me to stop and reconsider. If only life could be so simple.

John F N Teager Canberra December 1995

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................v

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................ix

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ......................................................................xi

PART ONE CONFLICT......................................................................................1

CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................... 3 THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT ........................................................................... 3

Introduction ................................................................................................ 3 The Evolution of the State............................................................................ 4 Destabilisation of the State ........................................................................ 10

Influences on Societal Composition ........................................................ 11 Decolonisation ................................................................................... 11 External Authorities ........................................................................... 13 Migration ........................................................................................... 14 Nationalism........................................................................................ 14 Refugees ............................................................................................ 15

Economics ............................................................................................. 17

CHAPTER TWO......................................................................................................... 21 UNSTABLE STATES AND THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION ............................ 21

Options for Government............................................................................. 21 Government Control............................................................................... 21 No Government Control.......................................................................... 23

The Case for Intervention........................................................................... 24

PART TWO PEACE.........................................................................................29

CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................... 31 AN INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS ............................................... 31

Introduction .............................................................................................. 31 Characteristics of Peace Operations During the Cold War .......................... 33 The Changing Nature of Peace Operations.................................................. 37

CHAPTER TWO......................................................................................................... 47 PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE MILITARY..................................................... 47

Introduction .............................................................................................. 47 The Peace Process...................................................................................... 48

A Clear Mandate .................................................................................... 49 Elements of Peace and the Role of the Military ....................................... 52 Dispute.................................................................................................. 54 Agreement ............................................................................................. 55 Dissent .................................................................................................. 57 Conflict .................................................................................................. 57 Peace Enforcement................................................................................. 58

Action under Chapter VII.................................................................... 60 Non-military measures ....................................................................... 61 Military measures .............................................................................. 63

After the Storm - The Continuing Process............................................... 68 Implications for the Future ........................................................................ 71

CHAPTER THREE..................................................................................................... 73 EXPOUNDING VICTORY................................................................................ 73

The Notion of Victory ................................................................................. 74 Employing Military Force ........................................................................... 79

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Enforcement Strategies .......................................................................... 80 Enabling Strategies ................................................................................ 84

Toward the Future ..................................................................................... 86

PART THREE AIR POWER............................................................................. 89

CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................... 91 WHEREFORE AIR POWER ? .......................................................................... 91

Introduction............................................................................................... 91 The Characteristics of Air Power................................................................. 92

Positive Characteristics ...................................................................... 92 Limitations ......................................................................................... 95 Other Characteristics ......................................................................... 98

The Employment of Air Power .................................................................. 101

CHAPTER TWO.......................................................................................................106 ROUND PEGS, ROUND HOLES.................................................................... 106

Preventive Deployment............................................................................. 108 The Use of Offensive Air Power ................................................................. 110

Reacting to Violations of National Sovereignty ...................................... 111 The Gulf Campaign........................................................................... 112 The Falklands Campaign .................................................................. 116 The Lessons ..................................................................................... 119

Reacting to Intrastate Internecine Conflict ............................................ 121 The Balkan Imbroglio ....................................................................... 125 The Lessons ..................................................................................... 129

Supporting the Humanitarian Cause .................................................... 132 Repression of Iraqi Civilians ............................................................. 134 The Bosnians ................................................................................... 137 Somalia - the problem child.............................................................. 144

Supporting Peacekeeping ..................................................................... 145 A Closing Thought ............................................................................ 148

CHAPTER THREE...................................................................................................150 IF ONLY IT WERE SO SIMPLE ..................................................................... 150

The Seemliness of Strategic Paralysis ....................................................... 150 The Challenge for the UN ......................................................................... 154 The Nemesis ............................................................................................ 157

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................... 171

INDEX ......................................................................................................... 175

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR Air-to-air Refuelling AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System (aircraft) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CTF Combined Task Force DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the

Dominican Republic ECM Electronic Countermeasures GNP Gross National Product ICFY International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia IGO International Governmental Organisation IRA Irish Republican Army MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MNC Multinational Corporation MSC Military Staff Committee NGO Non-governmental Organisation ONUC UN Operation in the Congo ONUCA UN Mission Observer Group in Central America ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador PGM Precision-guided Munition ROE Rules of Engagement SAM Surface-to-air Missile SCR UN Security Council Resolution UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations UNAMIC UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAVEM I UN Angola Verification Mission I UNAVEM II UN Angola Verification Mission II UNCRO UN Confidence Restoration Operation UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force UN DPI UN Department of Public Information UNEF I First UN Emergency Force UNEF II Second UN Emergency Force UNESCO United Nations Economic and Social Council UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNGOMAP UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon UNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission UNIMOG UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group UNIPOM UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission UNITAF Unified Task Force UNMIH UN Mission in Haiti UNMLOY UN Mission of Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UNMOT UN Observer Mission in Tjakistan UNOGIL UN Observer Group in Lebanon UNOMIG UN Mission Observer Mission in Georgia UNOMIL UN Observer Mission in Liberia UNOMUR UN Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda UNOSOM I First UN Operation in Somalia UNOSOM II Second UN Operation in Somalia UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment Force

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UNPROFOR UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia UNSF UN Security Force in West New Guinea UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia UNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group UNTSO UN Truce Supervisory Organisation UNYOM UN Yemen Observer Mission

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES Figure 1 Evolution of the State.(p.7) Figure 2 Destabilisation of the State.(p.22) Figure 3 The Peace Process.(p.53) Figure 4 The Failure of Deterrence.(p.78) Figure 5 The Uses of Military Force.(p.81) Figure 6 Warden’s Rings.(p.115) Figure 7 The Road to Peace.(p.123) Figure 8 No-Fly Zones Over Iraq.(p.138) Figure 9 Boyd’s OODA Loop.(p.154)

TABLES

Table 1 Weinberger’s Criteria for Combat.(p.26) Table 2 UN Operations during the Cold War. (p.35) Table 3 UN Operations after the Cold War. (p.39) Table 4 UN Activities Related to Peace and Security.(p.40) Table 5 Phases and Characteristics of Peace Operations.(pp.42/3) Table 6 Security Council Resolutions of the Gulf War.(p.50) Table 7 Meilinger’s Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power.(p.102) Table 8 Applications of Air Power.(p.104) Table 9 NATO air attacks, April 1994 - May 1995.(p.129) Table 10 Percentage of Targeted Assistance Delivered to Areas of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, January - April 1995.(p.140) Table 11 Key Questions Before the Mission.(p.160)

PART ONE

CONFLICT

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

The worth of a state in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it.

John Stuart Mill

During the period of the Cold War, the risk of global nuclear confrontation posed the most significant threat to international security. Not surprisingly, analysis and discussion tended to focus around the potential catalysts for major interstate conflict. Whilst nuclear proliferation remains a matter for concern, there has since the end of the Cold War emerged a number of new and more pressing threats to international peace.1 Moreover, the focus has changed somewhat from interstate issues to those of an intrastate nature. Accordingly, this chapter will concentrate on intrastate disputes and discuss their potential effect on international peace and security. More recent media attention has tended to focus on the post-communist European environment, the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the ethnic unrest in the central African republics; however, conflict is far from limited to these areas. On 15 December 1994, 26 conflicts were occurring on four of the seven continents.2 The cause of conflict may often be readily apparent; nevertheless, supposed recognition of the cause has, in many cases, done little to alleviate the suffering. Rather, the influential western nations have often found themselves faced with situations alien to them, and to which their response has been uncertain and sometimes inappropriate. For example, during the Somalian crisis, 200 people were killed when a US helicopter fired on a crowd comprising mainly women and children.3 The reasons behind inappropriate military action could be that neither the security problems within domestic states nor the management of

1 Some analysts consider that the chance of nuclear war is now greater than

ever. Nevertheless, the possibility of nuclear conflict is outside the scope of this work and will not be addressed.

2 ‘Global Update-Flashpoints and Conflicts’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 1995, p.24.

3 Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.40, Reference Supplement, Harlow, March 1994.

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4

the interrelationships between states are as well understood as they should be. This criticism is equally applicable to political and military commander alike. The changing nature of military operations commensurate with the increased commitment to UN activities now requires that military commanders be well versed in ethnicity, history, and cultural factors. This chapter lays out a framework for analysis of the origins of conflict. It deals first with the evolution of the state and the issues of self-determination and sovereignty. It goes on to argue that there are a number of interrelated external and internal factors that demand the attention of government. All of these factors have the potential to destabilise the central regime. Should instability occur, the ability of the government to resolve the issues will determine the likelihood of conflict. An assertion is made that changes to the structure of the state as a result of conflict directly affect sovereignty and thus recognition by the United Nations. Finally, the areas of potential instability are re-examined to determine those which lie within the domestic jurisdiction of the state against those of an interstate nature, either of which may attract intervention by a supra-national organisation.1

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe. The dominance of the Roman Catholic Church and the political authority of the Pope finally gave way to a new system of geographically fixed self-ruling political entities. The Westphalian system, which for the first time allowed states to control their own destinies, was characterised by the concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty and duty. Legitimacy meant that the state had a right to exist; sovereignty, that no authority higher than the state existed; and duty, which demanded of sovereign states adherence to a number of rules of behaviour. Since that time the state has been the prime constituent of the international system. To understand the factors that can destabilise a state and thus bring about internal or international conflict, one must first understand the process by which a state is formed. Although human beings are all individuals, they have tended throughout time to identify with some or other form of group. The integrity of the group is dependant on the commonality of individual needs. If strong commonality exists, then group needs reflect individual needs and the community inherits a certain durability.

1 Exactly what comprises a threat to international peace and security, thereby

justifying external intervention, is a matter of much debate. On this topic, unless otherwise stated, the opinions expressed are solely those of the author.

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Consequently, although individual needs remain important, it is the force and desires of the collective that become the focus of attention. Figure 1 provides the basis for the following discussion and shows the process by which a collective becomes a self-governing state. There are fundamental differences between the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ although they are frequently used interchangeably. The establishment of both, however, is derived from one or a number of human categories, the members of which display certain similarities. An ethnic community, or ethnie, is a named human population with a myth1 of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with a historic territory and a measure of solidarity.2 Each of these six factors plays an important part in the formation of an ethnic community. A name is significant because it implies collective identity and commonality of individual ideals. The belief in common ancestry is fundamental, as it bonds the group together and provides a sense of belonging, although establishing distinct lines of heritage is not necessary. For example, English, Welsh and Scots may have diverse lines of heritage but all could be considered British. Shared memories, otherwise known as legends, provide moral inspiration. Cultural elements can be many and varied, however, language and religion are by far the most common shared. That said, commonality of either is no basis for assuming common ethnic origins. A ‘link’ to ‘territory’ need not necessarily imply possession; it is the feeling of attachment to land, historically associated with the ethnie, that is crucial. Finally, there is the factor of ownership, the individual sense of belonging, which in certain ethnie is determined by the status of the individual; whereas in others it is participated in by all.3 Using the above criteria, one can distinguish between ethnic categories - culturally similar but with little collective identity - and ethnic communities, which have a strong sense of unity and cohesion, even when dispersed. An understanding of this distinction is fundamental to understanding ethno-nationalism, as ‘one of the self-appointed tasks of nationalists is to turn ethnic categories into ethnic communities, and ethnic communities into ethnic nations’.4 Thus, ethno-nationalism could be considered to be derived from, among other factors, the process of becoming an ethnic community and, moreover, the effect of nationalist ideology on that community.5 1 In this context, a myth is an idea that forms part of the beliefs of a group or

class but is not founded on fact. 2 Smith, A., ‘ The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism’ in Brown, M.(ed), Ethnic

Conflict and International Security, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1993, pp.28-29.

3 This discussion is based on ibid., pp.28-30. 4 ibid., p.31. 5 ibid., p.37.


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If this is to lead to the next logical step, that being a quest for self-determination, one further facet is vital; that is, active promotion of the ideology through a vibrant, determined leadership. So what of the right of self-determination and the criteria by which it is exercised? Self-determination is that process whereby a group determines its own form of government. The dilemma as to who has a right of self-determination is not easily resolved. As Gastil points out:

Many an autocrat has come to power through his appeal as a defender or advocate of his group’s right to self-determination. This has been a major part of the appeal of Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Castro to their respective peoples. Yet, as the history of Haiti has shown repetitively, national independence has little to do with individual or even group freedom.1

For an ethnic nation to have durability, it would be essential for it to pursue rights under international law and, by this process, take the first steps towards statehood. But what is meant by statehood? The Montevideo Convention of 1933 attempted to answer this question by setting out some basic guide-lines. According to the Convention’s Article 1 on the Rights and Duties of States 1933:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.

In addition, the prospective state should be recognised by other states. Exactly what constitutes recognition remains ambiguous and a number of theories have been proposed on this issue.2 Nevertheless, once statehood has been achieved, through whatever process, international law bestows sovereignty on the head of the new state.

1 Gastil, R., ‘ The Past, Present and Future of Democracy’, Journal of

International Affairs, Vol.38, No.2, Winter 1985, pp.161-2. 2 For more on the major theories of recognition and Statehood, see: Papp, D.,

Contemporary International Relations - Frameworks for Understanding, 4th edition, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1994, pp.499-500.

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Figure 1 - Evolution of the State


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Sovereignty simply means being independent and possessing supreme power, although post-Cold War diplomatic history would perhaps prompt a redefinition of the nature and functions of sovereignty. Issues of sovereignty as potential destabilising factors to government will be discussed later; for now the simple meaning will suffice. Sovereignty promises many benefits for states, such as independence of action, jurisdiction over internal matters, freedom from external interference, and equality of legal standing.1 Thus, if the state is the means by which a group receives international recognition and therefore sovereignty, then it is logical that government will attempt to keep its group, or nation(s), within defined state boundaries. A state is defined as ‘an organised community under one government or forming part of a federal republic’, whereas a nation is ‘a large community of people of mainly common descent, usually inhabiting a particular territory and under one government’.2 At first, these definitions could imply that a nation is simply an integral part of a state; however, the link, particularly in security terms, is complex. Barry Buzan offers four models of possible nation-state links. The models represent ideals and, as such, few examples fit exactly into each as, in reality, most states contain elements of one of more models. Nevertheless, in most cases, the characteristics of one model will appear predominant. The four models are: the ‘nation state’, the ‘state-nation’, the ‘part nation-state’, and the ‘multination-state’.3 A ‘nation-state’ is one where the nation precedes the state and plays a fundamental role in its origin. The nation provides a strong international identity as well as a solid base of domestic law and order. In turn, the state’s purpose is to protect and represent the nation. As a rule, territorial boundaries will be unambiguous although, in reality, ambiguities may exist around the periphery. Italy and Japan exemplify the ‘nation-state’. The ‘state-nation’, on the other hand, is where the state plays the key role in the establishment of the nation. In present times, this concept is rare as it is most easily performed when people have been transported to form communities in sparsely-populated, or weakly-held, territory. Australia and the United States provide good illustrations of this model. The state generates the culture which, over a period of time, is adopted by the people resulting in a national identity. Ultimately, the people recognise their loyalty to the state and, in all respects except ancient history and legend, the model is

1 ibid., p.498. 2 The Oxford Paperback Dictionary, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press,

Oxford, 1988, pp.541 & 798. 3 The discussion that follows is based on: Buzan, B., People, States and Fear,

2nd edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991, pp.72-82.

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similar to that of the ‘nation-state’. Although within the state some elements may retain links with an original culture, this is not necessarily incompatible with the new national identity. Where a nation is divided among two or more states and the population of each state consists largely of people from that nation, it is known as a ‘part nation-state’. The former states of East and West Germany, and North and South Korea offer good examples. The Kurds and the Palestinians, however, who are nations split among several states but in each of which they are non-dominant, would not be included in this model. Frequently the division represents ideological differences and, consequently, each part will endeavour to undermine the other’s legitimacy, often by adopting an intense ‘state-nation’ process. In this model, the concept of national security is somewhat of a paradox as it is the nation itself that may compromise state security. Thus, part nation-states represent a severe threat to both national and international peace. The final model is the ‘multination-state’, which is defined as a state that contains two or more substantially complete nations within its boundaries. This category can be further divided into federative states and imperial states. Within a federative state, such as Canada or, to some extent, Great Britain, the component nations may be too small to generate effective nation-states under their particular geo-political circumstances. Significantly though, no attempt is made to impose an artificial ‘state-nation’ over them. This lack of underlying unity makes federative states particularly vulnerable to partition, separatism and political interference. The former Yugoslavia offers a perfect example of the insecurity and conflict that can result from nationality and ethnic issues within a federative state. Imperial states differ from federative states such that one of the nations is dominant and uses this fact to its advantage. Suppression of the minority groups, by violent or peaceful means, may take place as the stability of the state is dependant on the ability of the dominant nation to retain control. Religion or an ideology may often be used as a means of transcending the national issue to preserve the status quo. Islam in the Middle East, and Communism in China and the former Soviet Union illustrate this point. Nevertheless, as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is presently experiencing, imperial states remain vulnerable to political threats targeted at their national divisions. Despite the difficulties alluded to earlier that these models represent ideals and, as such, few real examples fit exactly into each, they nevertheless provide a framework in which to consider the interrelation between state and nation. World events since the demise of the Soviet Union have shown that even in the democratic, economically secure and developed elements of society, the power of


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ethno-nationalism should not be underrated. The concern being expressed by a number of European nations with regard to a federal Europe should dispel any opinion that nationalism can be easily superseded by a supra-national identity. Although it may be hard at present to visualise physical rather than diplomatic conflict in the developed world, events in the former Yugoslavia show that due regard should be given to Buzan’s summation:

If the idea of the state is weakly held, or strongly contested, then a lapse in institutional strength might well bring the whole structure crashing down in revolution, civil war, or the disintegration of the state as a political unit.1

And therein lies the rub.

DESTABILISATION OF THE STATE

The foundation stone is and must remain the state. If every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali2

There have been many answers to the question ‘What causes war?’. Daniel Papp has suggested that almost all of the answers may be grouped into five broadly defined categories: (1) the nature of human beings; (2) perceptual limitations of humans; (3) poverty and disparities in wealth; (4) the internal structures of states; and (5) the international system itself.3 Studies have shown that between 1900 and 1941, over 80 per cent of wars were interstate. Conversely, between 1945 and 1976, over 85 per cent were of either an ‘internal anti-regime’ or ‘internal tribal’ nature.4 These statistics, when viewed alongside events of the last five years, would suggest that the threat to a state is now more likely to be from internal than external sources. There are a number of interrelated external and internal factors that can destabilise a state. Extreme instability within a state can lead to internal conflict. In turn, external interest in the outcome of the

1 ibid., p.82. 2 Boutros-Ghali, B., An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General,

New York, 1992, para.17. 3 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, pp.569-573. 4 ibid., p.578.

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internal conflict can add an international dimension. The United Nations Charter emphasises that nothing in the Charter shall authorise intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.1 Nevertheless, recent history has shown a growing involvement by supra-national organisations into the internal affairs of states. Before the case for intervention is discussed, an examination of a number of the factors, their interrelation, and their potential to destabilise the central regime is appropriate. For ease of understanding, the factors will be discussed under the two broad headings of ‘Influences on Societal Composition’ and ‘Economics’.

Influences on Societal Composition

Decolonisation

In some instances, especially in the Third World, state borders are a legacy of past colonial rule. The end of World War II brought the beginning of the gradual demise of European empires as mother nations granted or were forced to grant independence to their former colonial territories. This was reflected in the total number of independent states which grew from 54 in 1945 to 170 in 1985.2 Some former colonies continued their association with the mother nation, but many rejected them. Thus, it was not uncommon for descendants of original settlers to find themselves discriminated against or, in the extreme, exiled or massacred. Another consequence of colonialism was the displacement or persecution of indigenous peoples. The Aborigines, for example, had been in Australia more than 50,000 years before the arrival of the white settlers. Similarly, in Africa, and both North and South America, European explorers found their ‘discovered’ lands to be already populated by local tribes or clans. Many of these indigenous peoples are now seeking to reassert their separate identities, exercise their land rights, control their affairs, and remove the economic and social disadvantages placed upon them during the colonial era.3

1 Charter of the UN and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department

of Public Information, UN, New York, Article 2. 2 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, p.42. 3 Native Canadian Indians, the ‘Inuit’, have already been endowed with a vast

stretch of north-east Canada. Quebecois, and assorted Indian tribes , are demanding some degree of cultural and political autonomy. The Maoris in New Zealand are exercising territorial claims under the Treaty of Waitangi. Bell, C., ‘ The Post-Soviet World : Geopolitics & Crises’, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.98, Australian National University, 1992, chap.5, p.61.


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Often in the colonial establishment of new states, many multi-national and multi-ethnic societies were formed. New borders appeared to pay little heed to the religious, ethnic or cultural composition of the state. Groups who had previously been in the majority instead found themselves in the minority, and unable to influence policy decisions. Often, disputes turned to conflict and continued over a period of many years. However, it is only recently, and due mainly to near real-time media coverage, that these issues have appeared on the world stage. Rwanda provided a vivid example. Unlike many of the artificially created African states, Rwanda and Burundi were both established kingdoms before being absorbed by German East Africa in 1899. In 1916, Rwanda came under Belgian rule and was known as the Belgian Congo. The isolation of Rwanda and its limited value to the mother country prompted first the Germans, and later the Belgians, to adopt a policy of ‘indirect rule’. Consequently, the traditional domination of the minority Tutsi over the majority Hutu continued. Notwithstanding ‘indirect rule’, the Belgians modernised the political, legal and administrative systems. The Tutsi-Hutu distinction was primarily one of class and often a change in family economic circumstance promoted a move from one caste to the other. Reform of the educational system to include Hutus generated a Hutu elite who subsequently led the fight against traditional Hutu subservience. Belgium sympathised with the Hutu cause and, following a Hutu rebellion in 1959, accelerated the process of decolonisation. 1 In 1962, firmly under Hutu control, Rwanda gained independence. Guerrilla warfare by refugee rebels operating from Burundi and Uganda continued until 1973 when Juvénal Habyarimana seized control. By instigating a degree of Tutsi-Hutu reconciliation, a relative peace was maintained until 1990. The fighting, which continued for over four years, was primarily a consequence of environmental factors. Nevertheless, the underlying ancient hatred between Hutu and Tutsi did much to exacerbate the situation. Many Rwandan intellectuals blamed Belgian colonial policy for transforming class distinctions into more intractable ethnic ones.2 In 1900, the majority of Africa and Asia was divided among seven European states. The USA and Japan also made imperialist moves to dominate international affairs. Colonialism was the order of the day. Unfortunately, the passing of colonial rule produced not only a proliferation of states but, more significantly, a cauldron of potentially explosive situations as nations began to defy their pre-determined

1 For a detailed account, see: Metz, S., Disaster and Intervention in Sub-

Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1994, pp.2-9.

2 Charles Onyango-Obbo quoted in ibid., p.4.

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boundaries. Many potential scenarios were kept in check by the fear of East-West conflict which encouraged an acceptance by nationalist groups of the state structure in which they found themselves.1 Rather disturbingly, the end of the Cold War removed this controlling mechanism.

External Authorities

The emergence of only five new independent states during the 1980s prompted a belief by the international community in 1990 that a total of 170 states represented a relatively stable maximum. Few analysts would have predicted that by early 1993, 21 new states were to be carved from the territories of what two years earlier had been only three states.2 A state could be considered a geographically bounded entity governed by a central authority that can make laws, rules and decisions, and enforce them within its boundaries.3 Many of these new states, formerly constrained by oppressive external authorities, successfully challenged the legitimacy of that authority. Already, 14 republics of the former Soviet Union have seceded successfully from Moscow. At least another six are pressing for autonomy.4 However, recent events in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya are a vivid reminder of the conflict that fragmentation can provoke. Despite this tendency towards fragmentation, there has been, in many cases, a desire to integrate with other states for both economic and security benefit. The aspirations of Poland, Hungary, and the Slovak and Czech Republics to join both NATO and the European Community illustrate this. Although the transition to smaller states has in some instances been peaceful and has demonstrated a level of political maturity, the process of evolution is unlikely to be free of conflict. In 1993, thirty-five possible sources of conflict were identified within the territories of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact.5 Yet why should fragmentation necessarily result in conflict ? Regrettably, dissolution of a central authority is merely the catalyst for societal change. From societal change flows the issue of national survival and thence, the emergence of ethno-nationalism and the possibility of ethnic cleansing. The plight of internally displaced persons and refugees is but one more wave rocking the boat of societal stability.

1 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, p.42. 2 ibid., pp.41-43. 3 Papp, D., Contemporary International Relations, 2nd edition, Macmillan

Publishing Company, New York, 1991, p.18. 4 Brown, M., ‘Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict’ in Brown, Ethnic

Conflict and International Security, p.19. 5 Dick, C., Dunn, J., Lough, J., ‘Pandora’s Box’, International Defence Review,

3/93, p.204.


14

Migration

Migration by those seeking a better life or closer proximity to their ethnic group has posed a number of challenges to both new and established states. The removal of the ‘Iron Curtain’ brought about a peaceful though massive and uncontrolled migration of eastern Europeans to other countries of the European Community. This migration, together with an influx of Yugoslavian refugees, led to an unavoidable raising of tension in many countries of western Europe. There was a need to introduce barriers and exercise controls, but this very process highlighted differences of status and race. In 1992, Germany received 438,191 asylum applications, an increase of 71.1 per cent over the 1991 total. Of these applications, 122,666 came from former Yugoslavia, 103,787 from Romania, 31,540 from Bulgaria and 28,327 from Turkey. Significantly, within Germany, there were 2,285 extremist right wing attacks recorded, 54 per cent more than in 1991. Ninety per cent of these attacks were on foreign citizens.1 As Buzan explains, ‘the treatment of migrants as a kind of criminal class creates easy ground for antagonism between the societies on both sides’.2 One would hope that within a structured, disciplined state such as Germany, the imposition of migrants would result in only minimal internal instability; two world wars may have one believe otherwise. In essence, the issue is one of sovereignty. Sovereignty allows a state jurisdiction over internal matters and freedom from external interference. Closely aligned to the issue of sovereignty is that of nationalism.

Nationalism

A nation is a group of people who consider themselves bound together by some common interest. Snyder expands on this definition and argues that nationality may be defined by either ethnic or civic criteria.3 Ethnic nationality is primarily cultural and not necessarily geographically bounded. Civic nationality, on the other hand, is of a particular territory and system of government. In Snyder’s opinion, intense nationalism is caused when a state fails to meet societal, military and economic threats and, moreover, fails to develop the infrastructure for effective political participation. As a consequence, the people, or at least a group thereof, rebel and attempt to invoke their right to self-determination. The process may be 1 Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.39, Reference Supplement, Harlow,

March 1993. 2 Buzan, B., ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’,

International Affairs, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991, p.448. 3 Snyder, J., ‘Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State’ in Brown,

Ethnic Conflict and International Security, p.81-95.

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peaceful as was evidenced in the former Czechoslovakia; however, ethno-nationalism is powerful and unpredictable and the potential for conflict is considerable. The first concern of a group, if it is to have any chance of survival, is security. Thus, during the establishment phase, conflict rather than co-operation is more likely. It is somewhat ironic that states frequently use the term ‘national security’ implying that the recipient of the security is the nation. This would be understandable if the nation and the state were co-incident; often this is not the case. David Welsh draws an interesting comparison between the current situation and that prior to World War I when, following the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian, Romanov and Ottoman Empires, ethnic groups attempted to force acceptance of their claims for national self-determination.1 The transformation that has taken place in eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, together with the ineffectiveness of the UN to resolve the problems of the latter, may well have provided the catalyst for a wide resurgence of ethno-nationalism.

Once the principle of self-determination has been accepted as the standard of justice in international politics, the way lies open for smaller and smaller states to claim it as their right.2

Refugees

Refugees are the product of war, persecution and natural disaster. World-wide, the total number of refugees has grown dramatically from eight million at the end of the 1970s to 18 million in 1993 and then to 26 million by the end of 1994.3 The number of internally displaced persons has increased even more dramatically.4 There are four types of conflict broadly precipitated by societal issues from which refugees emanate.5 The first relates to ruling minorities who attempt to exploit privilege. The resulting conflict is often revolutionary in nature and focuses on the elimination of the ruling minority group, normally through foul means. For the oppressed rulers, rapid migration may provide the

1 Welsh, D., ‘Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflicts’ in Brown, Ethnic Conflict

and International Security, p.43. 2 Bell, ‘ The Post-Soviet World’, p.59. 3 Newland, K., ‘Ethnic Conflict and Refugees’ in Brown, Ethnic Conflict and

International Security, p.143. 4 Report of the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly, UN Document

No.A/50/60 dated 3 January 1995, para.12. 5 Zolberg, A., Suhrke, A. and Aguayo, S., Escape from Violence: Conflict and the

Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.236-245.


16

only refuge. South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda could be cited as examples of this category. The second category concerns minority ethnic communities seen by the ruling authority to be incapable of full national integration. The Jews in Nazi Germany, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, Palestinians in Israel, ethnic Turks in Germany and, to some extent, indigenous peoples, all provide illustrations of denial of citizenship. Third is the category best represented by the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where communal conflict requires mediation by a central government. If the central authority is too weak or simply unwilling to resolve the problems then ‘ethnic cleansing’ may result. A mass exodus by those likely to be affected is an obvious consequence. Finally, there is the case of secessionist wars in which armed conflict is often a part. Refugees could comprise those merely escaping the war or, in the event of a failed attempt at secession, the independence movement who may have subsequently become a target minority. The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’. All refugees share a common goal - to escape their current predicament and seek temporary or permanent refuge elsewhere. However, refugees rarely leave their country voluntarily. In attempting to regain original status, they can do much to sustain conflict through cross-border activity while at the same time drum up support for their cause within the receiving country. On the other hand, those who do not wish to return may well cause an ethnic imbalance in the country in which they seek asylum. Immigration can bring about major changes of ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic patterns and such influence on societal composition could generate considerable internal instability. Undoubtedly, the demise of totalitarian regimes and the onset of democratisation has unleashed numerous social, cultural and political factors, all of which may contribute to unstable and ultimately fragmented societies. Of these factors, perhaps the most misunderstood by the western powers are those of a religious and ethnic nature. Furthermore, the potential for ethno-nationalism in one state to act as a detonator for conflict in another is considerable.1

1 Ryan, S., Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Dartmouth, Aldershot,

1990, pp.xv-xvii.

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However, societal composition represents but one side of the coin. As former President Gorbachev admitted in 1986, the Soviet Union was ‘surrounded not by invincible armies but by superior economies’.1 It had been the power of economics that had precipitated the downfall of the USSR and it is the quest for a better standard of living that fuels much of the current unrest. By the 1990s, most aspiring nations had come to recognise that economic strength was, and more importantly would continue to be, a significant constituent of national power.

Economics

The future of international economic relations raises far more questions than can be answered here. This analysis will focus on those economic factors most likely to cause a challenge to sovereignty. Some of the issues are applicable to all states irrespective of international standing. During the first 25 years or so following World War II, international economics assumed a second or even third-order priority in the eyes of most western governments. Although there were post-war economic concerns, these were perceived as less urgent than the need for a strong military capability. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the recognition of economics as a major constituent of power began to emerge. Rather than being attributable to a single event, this ongoing change was a consequence of a number of trends including, but not limited to:2

• an increased awareness of dependence on foreign sources of energy,

• the burgeoning debt of the Developing World, • Japan’s rise to economic prominence, • the US move from greatest creditor nation to greatest

debtor, • the economic collapse of the Soviet Union, • the emergence of the western Pacific as the focus of world

economic growth, • the creation of a single European market, • a lack of economic growth in the Developed World, and

1 Quotation included in Doder, D. & Branson, L., Gorbachev: Heretic in the

Kremlin, Viking, New York, 1990, p.207. 2 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, p.5.


18

• the birth of a single financial market brought on by

electronic banking technology.

Economic strength allows a degree of control over others. In a Newsweek/Gallup poll of September 1989, 52 per cent of those Americans interviewed thought the economic power of Japan was a greater threat to the United States than the military power of the Soviet Union.1 Barry Buzan believes that if the national economy is going to provide the wherewithal for the state to rise to great power status, two conditions must first be met.2 First, the state must be able to ensure its own survival, that is, be able to sustain its population and essential industries. Second, the state must be capable of adapting rapidly to changing economic circumstances. Economic growth plays a major role in determining the power of states in the international system and thus is a key element in national security concerns.3 Of particular interest is the future role of international governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs).4 IGOs were created as a means to confront political, economic, social and military problems that transcend national boundaries. However, the ceding of national decision-making to an IGO challenges the primacy of the state. If government policy supports membership of the IGO then dissatisfied nationalists may well present a threat to the integrity of the state. Furthermore, when individual MNCs can generate more annual income than all but a few nation-states and exert considerable influence over national policy, the time has come for a re-examination of the nature and function of sovereignty. The rapid rise in world trade between 1985 and 1990 fostered an economic interdependence which, whether for good or bad, cannot be denied. States came to recognise that past policies of economic self-sufficiency were not in their best interest. External trade relations allowed goods and services to be obtained cheaper than if they were provided nationally. Economic interdependence has grown to such an

1 ‘ The Perceived Threat : A Newsweek Poll’, Newsweek, 9 October 1989, p.64. 2 The subject of economic security is covered in considerable detail in Buzan,

People, States and Fear, chap.6. 3 Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and

Military Conflict from 1500-2000, Fontana, London, 1989, p.xvii. 4 IGOs are organisations created by 2 or more sovereign states (eg the UN,

NATO and ASEAN). NGOs vary in international status, but generally are professional organisations that seek to influence international opinion or further the interests of their members (eg the Red Cross, Committee for Nuclear Disarmament [CND] and Greenpeace). An MNC is a corporation that has its headquarters in one country but operations in more than one country (eg General Motors, IBM and British Petroleum).

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extent that, to support national industry, national GNP is now heavily dependent on both imports and exports. Japan and the United States provide good examples of countries whose success is heavily dependent on external trade relations. However, the implications of economic interdependence have included some security concerns. To ensure their survival, states will naturally protect their own economies and manufacturing base. This could lead to additional import tariffs that could prove a precursor to a full blown trade war. Economic interdependence also causes states to focus on the sources of their critical economic needs. Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was over economic concerns. Kuwait had been artificially deflating the price of oil by exceeding its quota and Saddam Hussein, needing to protect his own economy, had threatened decisive action. Although long-standing historical disputes over territory could also be cited as causes for the invasion, the possession by Kuwait of 2.6 per cent of the world’s oil supplies made her a most attractive target. For the invasion not to act as a catalyst for other ‘take-over’ bids, the Iraqi presence in Kuwait had to be removed. The implications for the West of invasion of the other smaller oil-rich states by more powerful local belligerents were too severe to ignore. Naturally, the Coalition action was also in response to the flagrant disregard that Iraq had shown to Kuwait sovereignty. Significantly, international action may have done little to solve the underlying dispute, which is now dormant but stands ready to re-emerge. The emergence of a number of free trade areas around the world also has its good and bad points. Although economic benefits, increased employment and lower prices can be foreseen, critics argue that the world will be divided into competing trade areas which will increase the likelihood of both trade and military wars.1 Resentment against both Europeans and Japanese for their alleged or real failures to play fair in economic competition generated considerable debate within the Bush administration. Furthermore, the February 1995 tit-for-tat trade war over software piracy between the US and China was described by a US trade representative as ‘the largest retaliation in US history’.2 Counter-sanctions were considered necessary by the Chinese to safeguard their sovereignty and dignity. Conversely, within some trade areas, such as Europe, relaxed border controls have been introduced and a single operating currency has been proposed. Some would say this process offers a severe threat to individual state sovereignty.

1 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, p.6. 2 The Australian Financial Review, 6 February 1995, p.1.


20

Realisation of the international market place will continue to provide opportunities to increase national prosperity in the Developed World. However, in those areas where the lucrative global market has yet to have an effect on the standard of living, there exists much potential for conflict. A number of conflicting theories have been proposed as to how, or indeed if, the industrialised countries should resolve the disparities in wealth between poor and rich states.1 Not surprisingly, the Developed World countries consider that given a degree of economic aid, the under-developed countries should employ hard work and sound market-oriented policies to resolve their predicament. Whilst not disagreeing with this sentiment, many developing states believe that the present economic gap is a consequence of past exploitation, and more radical changes to remove present inequities and prevent future ones are required. Proposals include direct transfers of wealth, debt relief or forgiveness, repayment delay, and recognition of underwater resources as a common heritage of humankind that should be shared by all. Unfortunately, economic aid is often only extended in anticipation of self-benefit and, despite agreement to increase foreign aid to developing countries, actual contributions by the industrialised nations have declined.2 Yet again, national concerns have taken priority over humanitarian ones and, as long as this continues, economic development and the global distribution of wealth will remain an issue. National wealth, or rather a lack of it, can severely undermine government policy, fracture the integrity of the state, and have wider implications for the international community. Be it on a national or international scale, uneven distribution of wealth will provoke political and economic tension between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. From a national viewpoint, disenchantment and dissatisfaction may cause instability within the government. Internationally, states or factions within states may take it upon themselves to form resource cartels or, in the extreme, revert to terrorism to bring attention to the issues. Ultimately, the power of economics will prove crucial in ensuring peace both within and between states should some of the concepts of nationalism and regionalism explained earlier begin to emerge.

1 See Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, pp.547-549. 2 OECD states agreed to contribute 0.7 per cent of GDP to foreign aid. In

1960, the contribution was 0.51 per cent; in 1990, it had fallen to 0.36 per cent. ibid., p.548.

CHAPTER TWO

UNSTABLE STATES AND THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION

Thus far, the nature of the state and some of the factors that could destabilise the state have been examined. In the event of instability within the governing regime, there exist a number of available options to quell the disquiet. Figure 2 shows a number of courses of action that a government may choose, or be forced to take. The term ‘government’ is used here in the broadest sense to mean the group or individual responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the state. The success of the government in countering instability is dependent solely on the level of control that it exercises over the populace.

OPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT

Government Control

If the government of a state is able to exercise control, then three broad options are available to counter instability. Democratic Election. Many states have a government elected through democratic process. If instability occurs during the government’s term of office and a change in policy fails to address it, the people may choose to replace the government at the next election. Generally, change is accepted peacefully and due regard is shown to the agreed process. If the issues that bring about an election are those of nationhood, as was the situation in the former Czechoslovakia, then state fragmentation may well result. This process may be completed peacefully; however, it is likely that a redefinition of national sovereignty will result. Following establishment, the new community will seek international recognition in addition to satisfying the other requirements demanded for statehood. Suppression. Certain states that favour communist or autocratic style doctrines exercise considerable control over their citizens and severely restrict the right of free speech. Moreover, the introduction of democratic process is actively discouraged. In such instances, dissidents may be suppressed by either overt or covert means. Through its denial of basic human rights the government is often subject to international condemnation and humanitarian issues feature frequently on the international political agenda.


22

Figure 2 - Destabilisation of the State

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Expansionism. The Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands is one of the best examples of expansionism being used to divert public attention away from domestic instability. Prior to the invasion, the Argentinian economy was in a dire state. Inflation stood at 130 per cent, one and a half million of a population of 23 million were unemployed, foreign debt was a massive 34 billion dollars and the value of the peso was extremely unstable, on one day losing 13 per cent of its value against the US dollar. The military junta was convinced that by raising the patriotic issue of possession and sovereignty of the Falklands, thus highlighting a national cause, the attention of the discontented population would be distracted away from domestic issues. Had their quest been successful, the choice may well have been a good one. Nations judge their interests subjectively; consequently expansionist policies, believed by government to be in the national interest, may not accord with international opinion and, hence, interstate conflict may arise. For example, in 1940 the US threatened Japan with an oil embargo to curb her ambitions. Japan’s response was a colossal military expansion that placed her in possession of enormous stocks of oil and other vital materials. Subjective analysis is also particularly prevalent in the Middle East where the interests of outside powers, those of regional nations, and the interaction of the two, provide a historic cauldron of disagreement.

No Government Control

Rejection of government policy arising within a state where there is an absence of a universally recognised democratic government, or where government authority has ceased to be effective, may promote civil unrest which, in extremis, could progress through civil war to revolution. Conflict fought on civic criteria may well remain geographically bounded, as in the American Civil War and more recently in Somalia, where all belligerents were of the same ethnic grouping. Ethnic nationality, however, is not necessarily limited to recognised borders. Cultural, social, political, economic, or territorial disagreements may well acquire an international flavour, the former Yugoslavia being the most obvious example. Thus, conflict arising as a result of nationalism could challenge either the geographical boundaries of the state, or the central authority that makes and attempts to enforce laws, or indeed both. Such a challenge could pose a severe threat to international peace. If the state itself is unable to resolve the situation, then somebody else must shoulder the responsibility.


24

THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION

Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles and by opposing end them?

Hamlet, Prince of Denmark

During the Cold War, intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states was popularly recognised to be the near-prerogative of the superpowers or their proxies. Notably, in the early 1980s a number of prominent Americans questioned the relevance of supra-national organisations:

On war and peace, whether in Afghanistan, Nicaragua or the Persian Gulf, the United Nations is irrelevant ... Dominated by its automatic Soviet bloc-Third World majority, the United Nations is one of the most important instruments of anti-Western diplomacy.1

Since the end of the Cold War, however, attitudes have changed considerably. Some critics argue that the loss of stability provided by a bi-polar balance of power has made regional conflict more likely. This point is debatable, but what is clear is that some organisation, some process, some system has to assume the responsibility for international peace and security. In the words of Richard Connaughton, ‘ The time for a new military strategy of peace for the world based on the UN in general and the Security Council in particular has never been more propitious’.2 The UN was established in the aftermath of World War II to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.3 However, the Cold War prevented the UN from ever fulfilling its charter, but recently, Boutros-Ghali considered that a conviction had grown among member states that:

An opportunity [had] been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights, and of promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.4

The concept of peace is reasonably easy to grasp but the issue of international security is more complex. In the event of interstate

1 Charles Krauthammer quoted in Metz, S., ‘ The Air Force Role in United

Nations Peacekeeping’, Air Power Journal, Winter 1993, p.69. 2 Richard Connaughton quoted in ibid., p.69. 3 Charter of the UN, Opening Declaration. 4 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, introduction.

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conflict, such as the Gulf War of 1990, a threat to international security may be readily apparent. Yet, conflict within states is becoming more prevalent and the threat it poses to international peace is less clear. Moreover, the development of UN strategies to resolve intrastate conflict is in its infancy. Traditional peacekeeping undertaken by the UN during the Cold War years was primarily the domain of civilian and military ground forces. More often than not, operations were conducted in a low risk environment with the consent of the parties involved. If Boutros-Ghali’s vision is to be realised, the operating environment of the future is likely to be very different. Nevertheless, keeping the peace will still account for many of the UN’s activities, so it is vital that the established principles for peacekeeping remain extant. When a peace operation calls for enforced intervention a number of these principles fall by the wayside. To intervene means to ‘enter a dispute in order to change its course or resolve it’. Traditional peacekeeping , as we know it, is not intervention. The conduct of a peacekeeping operation is governed by consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. To keep the peace is to deter, monitor and report, to assist in the rebuilding of war-ravaged societies and, together with the relief agencies, to attempt to alleviate human suffering. Force is antithetical to peacekeeping. Significantly, for the United Nations, its new role of peace enforcement is one in which it has little experience. In developing future strategies, it may be prudent to look to the past. The Suez crisis of 1956 illustrated when not to intervene militarily in domestic affairs. From the experience emerged a number of guide-lines for successful military intervention, the general thrust of which remains appropriate to today’s unstable environment:1

1. there should be a strong domestic and international moral base for the action;

2. the intervening state should have its action legitimised by

invitation from the sovereign power or by international legal obligation;

3. if intervention is undertaken then military capabilities

must be adequate and used as quickly as possible; 4. the approval and co-operation, or at least absence of

opposition, of the United States is essential; and (perhaps most importantly),

1 Wyllie, J., The Influence of British Arms, George Allen & Unwin, London,

1984, p.27.


26

5. a clear realistic and realisable political objective - the

fundamental maxim of the use of force - is essential, and once it has been achieved, military forces should be withdrawn quickly.

The requirement for the approval and co-operation of the United States is significant. For, if such a requirement is considered necessary, we are obliged to examine in addition the conditions under which American forces would be committed to combat.

Table 1

In late 1984, four years after the Reagan administration entered office, the then US Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, announced the fundamental reasoning behind America’s radically revised basic strategic concepts. Within these concepts, which became known as the ‘Weinberger Doctrine’, were six conditions which had to be met

1 As defined in Weinberger, C.W., ‘ The Uses of Military Power’ in Defense,

January 1985, pp.2-10.

Weinberger’s Criteria for Combat1 1. US forces should only be employed if America’s vital

interests are at stake. 2. The aim must be to win, and the government must

be prepared to commit sufficient forces and resources to achieve this aim.

3. The operation must have clearly defined political

and military objectives. 4. The force must be sized to meet the objective and

this relationship continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

5. There must be reasonable assurance that the action

taken will have the support of the American people. 6. Military forces should be committed to combat

solely as a last resort.

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before the use of US military force would be sanctioned. Notwithstanding the election of a Democrat president in 1992, the Weinberger Doctrine remains extant and continues to form the basis of US strategy on military involvement. One could consider that the Weinberger Doctrine represents no more than common sense and, appropriately modified, probably reflects the strategy of a number of countries. More important, however, is the potential adaptability of this doctrine to UN operations that may include the use of offensive force. At present, the UN rarely sanctions the use of force in any circumstance other than in self-defence. Yet in the future, if the UN is to survive the burden of responsibility now being thrust upon it, the use of offensive force may prove a necessary requirement. Many nations have contributed to UN activities in the past in which their national interests were not at stake, but neither were the lives of their personnel. The mission required troops to act and, more importantly, be recognised as peacekeepers. In the majority of circumstances where the peacekeeping mandate could not be realised, the forces were simply withdrawn. However, when the UN chooses to make use of offensive force to assist in the achievement of its aim, a fundamental threshold is crossed. Signatories to the UN Charter ‘undertake to make available to the Security Council ... armed forces ... for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security’.1 Yet, many nations express a not unnatural caution in committing forces to offensive operations for such a cause. No sensible government is going to commit its forces to combat without a significant degree of national public support. Although the legality of UN military intervention may be internationally accepted, the Security Council nevertheless must possess a clear strategy defining the use of offensive force. A strategy that must endear the populations of member nations not only to the ideals of the UN, but to the methods by which they will be pursued. Without the support of the populace, the UN’s aspiration to be the facilitator of world peace is beyond fulfilment. Before identifying and deliberating over appropriate strategies, it is necessary to understand the nature of past, present and future peace operations. Exactly what constitutes a threat to international security must be discussed. The conditions under which the UN Security Council may consider intervention must also be explored. Once these principles are clear, the why, when and how pertaining to the use of military power, and that of offensive air power in particular, can be addressed.

1 UN Charter, Article 43.


28

PART TWO

PEACE


30

CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION TO PEACE OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Contemplating all conflict with a war-fighting ethos can be dangerously counter-productive. Past actions taken in the event of crisis by a supra-national organisation, such as the UN, have frequently been described under the all-embracing term, ‘peacekeeping operations’. For reasons that will become evident later, these operations have rarely been considered as war-fighting and have tended to be low risk. However, there is a new facet to peace operations which is fundamentally different to those of the past. As the boundaries of consent and impartiality are crossed and UN involvement in intrastate conflict increases, we must determine the limitations of our traditional war-fighting doctrine. Peace operations occur in the grey area between war and peace where, more than ever, the use of military force is directly influenced by the sequence of diplomatic events. The Charter of the UN was signed in June 1945 and came into force in October 1945. The fundamental purpose of the UN was, and remains, to maintain international peace and security. Primarily, the UN has endeavoured to prevent or remove threats to international security through peaceful means. Chapter VI of the Charter identifies the processes available to aid the pacific settlement of disputes. Nevertheless, the UN anticipated that measures under Chapter VI may prove inadequate under certain circumstances and thus, under Chapter VII, additional measures were identified that could, if necessary, include the use of military force. Although Article 39 of Chapter VII uses the expression ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’, it is likely that resolution of conflict rather than ‘peacekeeping’ per se was the anticipated activity. No mention of ‘peacekeeping’ is made in the Charter. Furthermore, nothing contained in the Charter authorises UN intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, although this principle should not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Notwithstanding the measures identified in Chapter VII, the non-use of force remained a tenet of UN operations for many years. Consequently, early operations involving a military contribution were frequently referred to as ‘Chapter VI and a half’ activities as their basis for existence fell rather ambiguously between Chapters VI and VII. UN activities were underwritten by the three fundamental principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence.


32

As long as these principles were adhered to, it really mattered not which chapter of the Charter was the basis for intervention. Events of the last five years have had a major impact on international peace and security. If one thing is certain, it is that the diplomatic situation will remain uncertain. Clear political objectives manifesting similar military objectives will likely be the exception rather than the norm. To recommend credible and appropriate military action, planners and field commanders must understand the political and diplomatic situation. This demands extensive cultural and political sensitivity and familiarity with ethnic and historical factors - attributes that must be acquired well in advance of deployment. American sources admit that the US response to African disasters has been clumsy, and that future policy must be based on an understanding of the peculiar historic, economic, social and political context.1 Little has changed since the days of Clausewitz:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.2

The core business of a military force is to fight and thus it must understand the likely form and characteristic of future conflict. This process allows the appropriateness of current doctrine to be challenged which assures that doctrine remains alive and vibrant. Part One asserted that nationalist conflict will dominate the future. No longer will a major war in Europe be the primary threat. More likely will be the need for military involvement in peace operations and crisis management, whilst retaining the capability to respond to larger military action. The changing balance of power, uncertainty over regional security responsibilities and the resurgence of world-wide conflict have forced the UN to re-examine its role and responsibilities. More importantly, the UN has had to re-address the principles which determine how it performs its business. If the international community is to resolve conflict, be it under UN or regional alliance auspices, common agreement on the principles of peace operations is vital. Many nations agree that they have a role to play in international security. The first step in crafting effective procedures, plans, and doctrine for peace operations is understanding the nature and 1 Metz, S., Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa : Learning from

Rwanda, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1994, p.1.

2 Clausewitz, C. Von, On War, Howard, M. and Paret, P.(ed & trans), Princeton University Press, 1984, p.119.

PEACE

33

associated problems of these operations. This chapter will address this requirement by answering two questions:

1. What were the characteristics of UN peace operations during the Cold War?

2. How has the nature of UN peace operations changed since

the end of the Cold War and what are the implications of this change?

CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

International security during the Cold War was determined by the balance of power between two undisputed superpowers. The UN, formed as a security organisation so nations could ‘practise tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbours’ 1, was effectively powerless to enforce its mandate. The global issue was that of a clash of ideology and the superpowers used nuclear deterrence as the means to avert major interstate conflict. Invasions in the traditional sense were almost non-existent. However, the superpowers did engage in the practice of military intervention into the affairs of other sovereign states as a means of gaining influence in the non-aligned world. There was little the UN could achieve towards the goal of collective security as both superpowers were permanent members of the UN Security Council and each had the power of veto. Global strategic stability was governed by the existence of nuclear weapons, the use of which remained outside the control of the UN. Regional conflict was frequent and as the war in Vietnam and that between Iran and Iraq showed, the UN could do little to influence events. Unilateral military intervention was used either to maintain or rectify the balance of power such as by the Soviets in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and by the US in Lebanon in 1958.2 In 1965, US President Johnson declared, ‘History and our own achievements have thrust upon us the principal responsibility for the protection of freedom on earth’.3 The UN at this stage would appear to have had a very minor role to play in collective security. Nevertheless, the UN did play a vital part in world affairs despite its inability to intervene directly in the resolution of East-West conflict. Many regional conflicts arose as a result of European decolonisation 1 Charter of the UN, Opening Declaration. 2 Wyllie, The Influence of British Arms, p.19. 3 Address of President Johnson, 12 February 1965, reported in ‘ The New York

Times, 13 February 1965, quoted in Barnet, R., Intervention and Revolution, Paladin, London, 1972, p.16.


34

and the UN task became primarily one of monitoring borders and enforcing cease-fires, interposing where necessary between the belligerents. Table 2 lists the 13 UN peacekeeping operations that were initiated during the Cold War, of which five were ongoing as of October 1995.1 Of these early operations, one in particular is worthy of note. In June 1960, independence was granted to the former Belgian Congo.2 Not surprisingly, Belgian administration had done little to prepare for the change. A rapid disintegration of state institutions within the new republic followed and anarchy abounded. The USSR saw an opportunity to intervene in the name of anti-colonialism, whereas Belgium wished to maintain its valuable economic and strategic interests through mining of mineral resources in the Province of Katanga. A UN Peacekeeping Force was deployed in July 1960 under a loosely-worded mandate ‘to provide ... such military assistance as may be necessary’.3 When Katanga refused to be integrated into the proposed ‘all-Congo’ government, civil war loomed. The UN Force found itself taking on a task for which it had never been intended and for which it was poorly equipped. In January 1961, decisive UN military action finally brought Katangan secession to an end, but at a price.4 The attempted coup d’etat by UN forces exercised four months earlier cost many lives including that of Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, killed in a plane crash while en-route to cease-fire talks in Katanga. Notwithstanding the demise of organised resistance, indiscriminate disorder and bloodshed remained widespread and the UN Force remained in being pending the training of a Congolese national army. Finally, in June 1964, the UN Force withdrew. The mission had been successful and, until Somalia

1 Peacekeeping Operations as of October 1995, UN DPI. 2 For a detailed explanation of the Congo crisis of 1960-64 see: Nicholas, H.G.,

The United Nations as a Political Institution, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, pp.184-194.

3 UN Document S/4387 dated 14 July 1960. Quoted in Durch, W.J., ‘ The UN Operation in the Congo’, in Durch, W.J.(ed), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1993, p.326.

4 The Congo operation is covered in more detail on p.68.

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OPERATION DATE ABBREV. DESCRIPTION 1 UN Truce Supervisory

Organisation 1948-

present UNTSO Monitor cease-fires along Israeli

borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

2 UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

1949-present

UNMOGIP Monitor cease-fire in Kashmir.

3 First UN Emergency Force

1956-67 UNEF I Separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.

4 UN Observer Group in Lebanon

1958 UNOGIL Monitor infiltration of arms and troops into Lebanon from Syria.

5 UN Operation in the Congo

1960-64 ONUC Assist in restoration of order and supervise withdrawal of Belgian troops.

6 UN Security Force in West New Guinea

1962-63 UNSF Supervise transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control.

7 UN Yemen Observer Mission

1963 UNYOM Monitor disengagement of Saudi and Egyptian forces from Yemeni civil war.

8 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

1964-present

UNFICYP Act as buffer force between Greek/Turk Cypriots, provide impartial law enforcement.

9 Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic

1965-66 DOMREP Monitor security situation.

10 UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission

1965-66 UNIPOM Assist UNMOGIP in supervising cease-fire and withdrawal of forces after 1965 India-Pakistan war.

11 Second UN Emergency Force

1973-79 UNEF II Separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai

12 UN Disengagement Observer Force

1974-present

UNDOF Monitor separation of Syrian and Israeli forces on Golan Heights

13 UN Interim Force in Lebanon

1978-present

UNIFIL Establish buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon

Note: Entries in bold type represent ongoing operations as of October 1995.

Table 2 - UN Operations during the Cold War in 1993, the only example of a UN peacekeeping force transitioning to one of peace-enforcement.1 Significantly, all peacekeeping operations up to 1988, with the possible exception of those in Cyprus and the Congo, came about as a result of interstate conflict. Furthermore, only in the Congo had a nation-state disintegrated to the point that the international community considered intervention essential. The 13 operations established during the Cold War fostered the gradual evolution of a body of principles, procedures and practices, on the basis of which Goulding offered a definition of peacekeeping:

Field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between

1 Goulding, M., ‘ The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, International Affairs,

Vol.69, No.3, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.453.


36

them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.1

The need for peacekeeping forces to act impartially did have some effect on the composition of the force. Generally, the UN avoided using neighbouring forces to the area of conflict as well as those of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This practice assisted in maintaining the basic principles; however, it often resulted in the force lacking authority and strength.2 Although many of the Cold War operations were successful, in-place UN forces could not prevent conflict in Cyprus in 1974, in Lebanon in 1982, or indeed their own expulsion from Egypt in 1967. Nevertheless, although modest, the achievements of UN peacekeeping missions were real:

they included the effective freezing (although not resolution) of certain conflicts; some reduction of the risk, or extent, of competitive interventions by neighbouring or major powers; and the isolation of some local conflicts from the East-West struggle, so that the local conflicts did not exacerbate the Cold War.3

On the whole peacekeeping missions succeeded well at a time when the Cold War made it difficult for the Security Council to implement effective action. However, peacekeeping succeeded primarily because on most occasions the belligerents wanted it to succeed and supported the UN’s intervention. After 1988, the role of the UN began to change. As bi-polarity faded, previous peacekeeping success promoted a demand on the UN to develop a global strategy for peace. Accordingly, UN peace and security activities increased markedly. Nevertheless, the ability to conduct wider activities within the original definition of ‘peacekeeping’ was to receive close scrutiny.

1 ibid., p 455. Emphasis added. 2 Roberts, A., ‘ The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol.36, No.3, 1994,

p.95. 3 ibid.

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THE CHANGING NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Examination of the UN’s less successful operations since 1988 has confirmed that successful peacekeeping is dependent on adherence to 5 fundamental principles.

1. Peacekeeping operations are United Nations operations. 2. Peacekeeping operations require the consent of the parties

to the conflict in question. 3. Peacekeepers are impartial. 4. Personnel and equipment required for peacekeeping

operations are provided by member states on a voluntary basis.

5. Only minimum force is used and normally only in

self-defence.1

One point of note is the wide definition given to self-defence. As Goulding explains:

Since 1973, self-defence (has) been deemed to include situations in which peacekeepers (are) prevented by armed persons from fulfilling their mandate. In practice, commanders in the field have only very rarely taken advantage of this authority. This reluctance (is) based on sound calculations related to impartiality, to their reliance on the continued co-operation of the parties and to the fact that their force’s level of armament (is) based on the assumption that the parties (will) comply with their commitments.2

Minimum use of force has been a fundamental though not absolute tenet of all peacekeeping operations; it remains the subject of considerable debate. After 1988, meetings of the UN Security Council having been overshadowed by Soviet-American summit meetings for so long, began to emerge as the determinant of international security affairs. Moreover, as a result of the changing nature of conflict, the focus of Security Council resolutions gradually became the settlement of intrastate rather than interstate conflict. This change of emphasis

1 Goulding, ‘ The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, pp.453-455. 2 ibid., p.455.


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was reflected in the nature of subsequent UN missions as shown in Table 3. In response to the new challenges facing the UN and the need to redefine the nature of peacekeeping, the first UN Security Council Summit was convened in January 1992. Boutros-Ghali newly appointed Secretary-General, was asked to report on ways to strengthen the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali’s response was articulated in a report titled An Agenda for Peace which went beyond traditional peacekeeping and attempted to address the wider issues of international security.1 Boutros-Ghali the aims of UN peace operations as follows:

1. to identify sources of conflict at the earliest opportunity and remove them before violence results; (Preventive Diplomacy)

2. where conflict erupts, to resolve the issues; (Peacemaking) 3. where fighting has halted, to preserve peace;

(Peacekeeping) 4. to prevent conflict recurrence by rebuilding institutions

and infrastructures; (Peacebuilding), and 5. to address the deepest sources of conflict. (Peace

Development)

An Agenda for Peace received much international support and, as shown in Table 4, this was reflected by a significant increase in UN activities.

1 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.15.

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OPERATION DATE ABBREV. DESCRIPTION

14 UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan

1988-90 UNGOMAP Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

15 UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group

1988-91 UNIMOG Monitor cease-fire after Iran-Iraq war.

16 UN Angola Verification Mission I

1989-91 UNAVEM I Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

17 UN Transition Assistance Group

1989-90 UNTAG Supervise Namibia’s transition to independence.

18 UN Mission Observer Group in Central America

1989-92 ONUCA Monitor compliance with peace accords.

19 UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

1991-present

UNIKOM Monitor post-war buffer zone.

20 UN Angola Verification Mission II

1991-present

UNAVEM II Monitor cease-fire and creation of new army.

21 UN Observer Mission in El Salvador

1991-present

ONUSAL Monitor human rights elections, national reconciliation.

22 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

1991-present

MINURSO Conduct referendum on independence from Morocco.

23 UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia

1991-92 UNAMIC Act as precursor to UNTAC.

24 UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

1992-93 UNTAC Supervise cease-fire and general election in Cambodia.

25 UN Mission of Liaison Officers in Yugoslavia UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia

1992

1992-present

UNMLOY

UNPROFOR

Separate warring factions, monitor cease-fires, escort humanitarian relief units.

26 First UN Operation in Somalia Second UN Operation in Somalia

1992-93

1993-95

UNOSOM I

UNOSOM II

Protect delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstitute Somalia as functioning entity. UN Force to enforce secure conditions for humanitarian operations.

27 UN Operation in Mozambique

1992-1994

ONUMOZ Implement peace settlement in civil war.

28 UN Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda

1993-1994

UNOMUR Monitor Uganda/Rwanda border to verify no mil assistance to Rwanda

29 UN Mission Observer Mission in Georgia

1993-present

UNOMIG Verify cease-fire compliance in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia

30 UN Observer Mission in Liberia

1993-present

UNOMIL Monitor cease-fire violations and compliance with peace agreement

31 UN Mission in Haiti 1993-present

UNMIH Restore law and order.

32 UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda

1993-present

UNAMIR Monitor cease-fire agreement. Assist with humanitarian mission

33 UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group

1994

34 UN Observer Mission in Tjakistan

1994-present

UNMOT Monitor implementation of cease-fire agreement

Table 3 - UN Operations after the Cold War1

1 In this context, the end of the Cold War is considered to be in 1988 when the

US and the Soviet Union showed a willingness to work together in the resolution of regional conflict. Entries in bold type represent ongoing operations as of October 1995.


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1988 1992 1994

Security Council resolutions adopted in the preceding 12 months

15

53

78

Disputes in which the UN was actively involved in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months

11

13

28

Peacekeeping operations deployed

5

11

17

Personnel Deployed: Military Civilian Police International civilian personnel

9,570 35 1,516

11,495 115 2,206

73,393 2,130 2,206

Countries contributing military and police personnel

26

56

76

UN budget for peace operations (Million US $ per annum)

230

1,690

3,610

Countries in which UN conducted electoral activities in preceding 12 months

0

6

21

Sanctions imposed by Security Council

1

2

7

Table 4 - UN Activities Related to Peace and Security1 An Agenda for Peace offered a basic logic to peace operations and defined the interrelationship between the various phases. Although related integrally, certain fundamental characteristics set each phase apart. Table 5 defines the various phases from preventive diplomacy through to peacebuilding and highlights the critical characteristics of each phase. Understanding the differences between each phase is essential when evaluating the potential contribution of military power. An Agenda for Peace presents a building block approach towards international peace and security. Table 5 may appear somewhat rigid in defining this approach; however, it provides a basic foundation for discussion of the grey areas between each phase as well as the underlying issues.

1 UN DPI.

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In the first instance, the UN attempts to identify actual or potential disputes and then take measures to prevent tension turning into conflict. For this the UN requires an efficient early warning network and data analysis capability. This process of preventive diplomacy is generally carried out by UN envoys, politicians and diplomats although it may include the pre-emptive deployment of military forces. Importantly, preventive diplomacy is conducted at the request of the government or all parties concerned, or with their consent. In the event of internal crisis, humanitarian assistance could be of critical importance. At this stage however, before conflict has occurred, the UN must still respect the sovereignty of the state.

Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality; the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully recognised ... humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country.1

Failure of preventive diplomacy will most likely result in an outbreak of conflict. The Security Council may then investigate the dispute to determine if its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The purpose of peacemaking is to bring hostile parties to an agreement, ideally through such peaceful means as those listed in Chapter VI of the Charter. Success relies wholly on the subject parties agreeing to intervention and member states being willing to implement resolutions. Should this procedure fail, the UN retains the right under Articles 39, 41 and 42 of Chapter VII to use force to achieve an agreement. The purpose of this action is to restore international peace and security and bring about conditions in which political negotiation can proceed.



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ACTUAL/ POTENTIAL DISPUTE

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY CONFLICT

PURPOSE To prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur, while, at all times, respecting the sovereignty of the state.

OCCASION 1. At the request of government in event of national crisis.

2. When two or more countries feel that a UN border presence on both sides can discourage hostilities.

3. Single border presence requested by a country that feels threatened.

1. Lack, or failure of, Preventive Diplomacy.

2. One or more parties fail to comply fully with obligations under the agreed settlement.

DEGREE OF CONSENT

Required from the subject states.

MISSION Confidence building. Conflict prevention.

OPTIONS 1. Exchange of military missions. 2. Formation of regional/sub-regional risk

reduction centres. 3. Arrangements for free flow of information. 4. Monitoring of regional arms agreements. 5. Use of UN Special Envoys and/or Fact-finding

Missions. 6. Demilitarised zones. 7. Unarmed/lightly armed military observer

groups.

REQUIRE-MENTS

1. Intelligence of economic and social trends as well as political developments.

2. Willingness of the state to provide information needed for effective preventive diplomacy.

3. Early warning network including data analysis capability.

UNDERLYING ISSUES

Rogue Factions Humanitarian Operations

Table 5 - Phases and Characteristics of Peace Operations

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PEACEMAKING PEACEKEEPING PEACEBUILDING VI VII P U R P O S E

To bring hostile parties to agreement, through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

To bring hostile parties to agreement, through measures that may or may not involve the use of armed force.

With the consent of all the concerned parties, help to implement settlements that have come about through the peacemaking process.

To identify and support structures that will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.

O C C A S I O N

When the Security Council determines that continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

When the Security Council determines that measures taken under Chapter VI have failed to be effective in maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

When the Security Council wishes to implement a settlement negotiated by the peacemakers and continuation of the dispute is possible and likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

When the Security Council determines that the institutions of state have largely collapsed and some external agency is required to put it together again.

C O N S E N T

1. Agreement to intervention required from the subject states.

2. States should accept the general jurisdiction of the ICJ without reservation.

Action likely to be taken without the consent of all parties.

Action taken with the consent of all the concerned parties. However, reversion to the peacemaking process may be necessary should one or more parties fail to comply fully with obligations under the agreed settlement.

M I S S I O N

1. Pacific settlement. 2. To bring about

conditions in which political negotiation can proceed.

1. Countering acts of aggression.

2. To bring about conditions in which political negotiation can proceed.

1. To sustain conditions in which political negotiation can proceed.

2. Restoration and /or maintenance of cease-fires.

Sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems.

O P T I O N S

1. Negotiation. 2. Enquiry. 3. Mediation. 4. Conciliation. 5. Arbitration. 6. Judicial settlement. 7. Resort to regional

agencies or arrangements.

8. Other peaceful means of the subject’s choice.

9. Use of inter-agency system.

1. Sanctions. 2. Action by military

force under UN command under Articles 42/43.

3. Authorisation for member states to take action on behalf of the UN.

1. Demilitarised zones. 2. Monitoring cease-fires. 3. Protection of human

rights. 4. Disarming previously

warring parties. 5. Restoration of order. 6. Custody and possible

destruction of weapons. 7. Action by military force

under UN command under Article 40 (Peace Enforcement Units).

1. Repatriation of refugees. 2. Advisory and training

support for security personnel.

3. Monitoring /conducting elections.

4. Reformation or strengthening of governmental institutions.

5. Promotion of political participation.

R E Q U I R E M E N T S

1. Legal disputes should be referred to the ICJ.

2. Mechanism for mobilising inter-agency resources.

1. Clearly defined strategy with termination options.

2. Continuing support for the operation by the Security Council and the international public.

3. Detailed integration within an overall campaign plan.

4. Adequate offensive forces, and adequate financial and logistic support.

1. Clear and practicable mandate.

2. Co-operation of the parties in implementing that mandate.

3. Continuing support for the operation by the Security Council.

4. Contributions of military, police and civilian personnel by member states.

5. Effective UN command. 6. Adequate financial and

logistic support.

Rogue Factions Humanitarian Operations


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Military action foreseen by Article 42 of Chapter VII has rarely been applied, as neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General has the capacity to deploy, direct, command or control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale. To be successful, collective security must rest on the certainty of response from the world community to an act of aggression anywhere by any power.1 When interstate conflict has arisen, the Council has chosen to authorise member states to take military action on its behalf such as in Korea in 1950 and the Gulf in 1991. Such collective security action is designed specifically to counter interstate conflict and its conduct is contrary to the principles that govern peacekeeping. Significantly, military action may have achieved the short term objectives of the UN mandate, but in neither Korea nor the Gulf were the underlying problems resolved. Resolution will only ever be achieved through negotiation. The options available under Chapters VI and VII should be seen as exactly that, and not as adjacent points on a continuum. What the UN requires are enabling strategies that encourage and promote the negotiation process. The use of force to facilitate and protect humanitarian operations is also authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, unlike the military action foreseen by Article 42, the humanitarian mandate is for limited and local purposes only. It does not endeavour to bring about an agreement between the warring factions or to impose a cessation of hostilities. The intention of the force is to bring solace to innocent civilians whilst remaining neutral and impartial. The purpose of peacekeeping is to help, with the consent of all concerned parties, the implementation of settlements that have come about through the peacemaking process. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali re-defined peacekeeping as ‘the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned ... ’.2 The use of ‘hitherto’ generated two areas of concern among states. First, the fundamental principles of peacekeeping were being challenged and second, peacekeeping was assuming a mantle of interventionism.3 In later documents, there was a reversion to a definition of peacekeeping that assumed the consent of the parties.4 Peacekeeping operations, although conducted with the consent of all parties, are rarely free from incident. A failure of one or more parties to comply fully with the obligations under an agreed settlement can

1 Thakur, R., ‘From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement’, Journal of Modern

African Studies, Vol.32, No.3, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.390. 2 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.20. 3 Roberts, ‘ The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, p.100. 4 Improving the Capacity of the UN for Peacekeeping, UN Document S/26450

and A/48/403, 14 March 1994, p.2.

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quickly lead to a resurgence of conflict. Additionally, rogue factions who oppose the settlement, but are outside the control of either party, can undermine the peacekeeping operation. The dilemma for the UN lies in determining when and if a transition to peacemaking measures involving the use of force is necessary. If the transition does occur and a peacekeeping force is already in place then the force should, for its own safety, be withdrawn or re-inforced. In reality, nothing is more dangerous than to ask the peacekeepers to use force when existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny them the capacity to do so.1 In sum, six fundamental requirements exist to conduct peacekeeping operations:

1. A clear and practicable mandate. 2. Co-operation of the parties in implementing that mandate. 3. The continuing support for the operation by the Security

Council. 4. Contributions of military, police and civilian personnel by

member states. 5. Effective UN command. 6. Adequate financial and logistic support.

As, in the next chapter, the interrelationship between peace operations and the military will be discussed, it is extremely important to realise that if any of the six conditions listed above cannot be met, then the force on the ground or in the air is no longer a peacekeeping one.

1 Report on the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly, UN Document

A/50/60, 3 January 1995, para.35.


46

CHAPTER TWO

PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE MILITARY

INTRODUCTION

I believe that we delude ourselves if we think that humanity is becoming ever more civilised, ever more sophisticated and ever more reasonable. It is simply not the case. And the Armed Forces are our main insurance policy.

Prince Charles1

Historically, the power of the UN to exercise its charter has been extremely limited and UN forces have rarely done little more than ‘keep the peace’. Accordingly, the all-encompassing term of ‘peacekeeping’ has been adequate and unambiguous. However, with the demise of bi-polarity, responsibility for international peace and security has shifted from the superpowers to the Security Council of the UN. As a result, the extent of UN involvement in national and international affairs, and the breadth of its activities have increased markedly. The diversity of these activities must be reflected in clear unambiguous terms that leave no doubt as to the aim and purpose of a particular undertaking. Present UN peacekeeping, albeit now somewhat wider in application, remains similar in principle to past peacekeeping operations. However, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations during time of conflict represent a new experience. Although the concept is not new, actual enforcement action has been rare. Consequently, strategies to realise this concept remain in their infancy. The principles that underpin peacekeeping operations contain fundamental differences to those underpinning enforcement action. Any attempt to blur the distinction will inhibit the development of the most appropriate strategies for peace enforcement. The use of military force is but one of many options open to the UN in pursuing its goals. If the Security Council is to make the correct decision concerning the use of force, and air power in particular, it must be aware of the potential contribution of military power across the whole spectrum of peace operations.

1 Hardman, R., Report of an interview with Prince Charles conducted by

Mr Jonathan Dimbleby for ITV in The Weekly Telegraph, 6 July 1994, London, p.1.


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This chapter explores the characteristics of each element of the peace process and emphasises the significant differences that exist between them. In addition, the role of military forces in each phase is discussed.

THE PEACE PROCESS

UNPROFOR must remain impartial if it is to continue achieving its prime objectives.

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose

former Commander UNPROFOR1

We are not preparing the battlefield, we are destroying it.

Lt Col David Deptula USAF2 Gulf Air Campaign Planner

The multi-faceted peace process is a continual one in which military forces have many and varied tasks to perform. Primarily, military personnel and equipment are tools for use by national governments in support or defence of national interests. The UN Security Council, however, has often called on member states to make their armed forces available in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and many have willingly done so. Defining a threat to the national interest is usually fairly straightforward. Determining what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, however, poses somewhat more of a dilemma. At present, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to ascertain the risk to international peace of a particular circumstance, and then decide on the case for or against intervention. In most international disputes, such as that between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990/91, the potential or actual threat to international peace may be readily apparent. 3 In the event of intrastate disputes or civil wars, however, the whole issue becomes somewhat clouded.

1 As quoted in ‘General Rose reports from the Bosnian Front’, Defense &

Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 31 March 1995, p.24. 2 As quoted in Hallion, R., Storm Over Iraq, Smithsonian Institution,

Washington, 1992, plate 9. 3 In UN Resolution 3314 of December 1974, the UN General Assembly defined

aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in a manner inconsistent with the Charter’.

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Article 2 of the Charter states that the UN will not authorise intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Nonetheless, the Security Council recognises widespread violations of international humanitarian law as a threat to international peace and thereby acknowledges an obligation of intervention.1 Fulfilment of this obligation resulted in a UN deployment to Somalia and strengthened the need for continued deployment of UN troops in the former Yugoslavia. In both locations, UN troops were subjected to a highly volatile environment in which opposing factions were still actively engaged in conflict. One could consider that blue helmets and white vehicles were hardly appropriate in a situation where intervention was neither fully with, nor fully without, consent.

A Clear Mandate

Mandate: n. authority given to someone to perform a certain task or apply certain policies.

The Oxford Dictionary

For any proposed or actual UN operation, the need to appreciate the international and domestic situation is absolutely critical if there is to be any hope of achieving the political aim. Successful military intervention rests upon the clear definition of a task and the capabilities of the assigned military assets to achieve that task.2 Capabilities in this instance refers not only to personnel and equipment but also to the planning and organisation of their use, including, most importantly, command and control arrangements. The wording of the UN mandate is critical for this provides political guidance. It is the sentiment of the mandate that determines the essence of the rules of engagement (ROE), the appropriateness of which are crucial to the success of any operation. Any civilian or military intervention under UN auspices will be mandated by a UN Security Council Resolution. The resolution, irrespective of which phase of the overall peace process it is intended to support, should have two common characteristics. It should contain firstly, clearly-stated and achievable objectives, and secondly, and of equal importance, the desired endstate. During the Gulf conflict of 1990/91, the Security Council issued a number of resolutions as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. These resolutions followed a logical progression that reflected the Security

1 For example, see UN Security Council Resolution 771(1992). 2 Wyllie, The Influence of British Arms, p.33.


50

Council’s intention of using all available measures to restore peace under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, before invoking military action under Chapter VII. Table 6 shows how the Security Council resolutions, which reflected the political objectives, transposed into clear, unambiguous and, most importantly, achievable military objectives. The ultimate military operation, authorised by Resolution 678, was quite clearly the final resort of the peacemaking process - peace enforcement.

Political Objectives Complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government. Protection of foreign nationals abroad.

Promoting the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. UN Resolution

660 Called for Iraq’s immediate, unconditional withdrawal. 661 Imposed embargo on trade with Iraq and Kuwait. 662 Declared Iraqi annexation of Kuwait illegal. 664 Demanded Iraq release all hostages. 665 Authorised ‘such measures as may be necessary’ to enforce

trade embargo. 667 Demanded release of hostages and respect for diplomatic

immunity. 670 Imposed air embargo on Iraq. 678 Authorised use of all necessary means to uphold and

implement Resolution 660. Additional Political Constraints

Minimise Coalition casualties and collateral damage. Discourage Israeli military involvement.

Military Objectives Derived from Resolution 678

Attack Iraq’s leadership and C3

Gain and maintain control of the air Cut Iraqi supply lines

Destroy Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities Destroy Republican Guard Forces in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations

Liberate Kuwait City with Arab forces

Table 6 - Security Council Resolutions of the Gulf War1

Two weeks before the Iraqi invasion, Saddam Hussein made a televised public speech threatening strong action against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although the UAE requested and received a degree of American support, many observers considered Hussein’s words an exercise in rhetoric. Consequently, very little, if any, pre-emptive action was taken by either the UN, the US or neighbouring Arab nations.

1 Adapted from: The Gulf War, An Airman’s Perspective, SDS International,

Arlington, VA, 1993, p.13.

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In some ways, the offensive action taken by Iraq across an internationally recognised border made the job of the Security Council a little easier. The belligerent was easily identifiable and the endstate for the military operation was clearly the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government. It was evident at an early stage that diplomacy and peaceful negotiation were unlikely to bring about a withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The initiative lay very much with Saddam Hussein. The role of the Coalition forces was to wrest the initiative from the Iraqi leader and take whatever action necessary to bring about a settlement. This was duly done; the sovereignty of the annexed state was restored and no permanent change to international borders occurred. The role of the UN in resolving conflict within, rather than between states is more complex. Intrastate disputes may take any form from peaceful demonstration to full-blown civil war. Irrespective of the circumstances, the case for external intervention on international security or humanitarian grounds, especially when involving the use of force, is extremely tenuous. The legitimacy of the decisions taken by the UN Security Council and, hence, the legitimacy (paramount to its success) of the ensuing UN operation is a subject of considerable international concern. Such concern has encouraged a number of states to challenge the composition and veto powers of the UN Security Council.1 As with interstate conflict, the use of military force to enforce negotiation is unlikely to resolve any underlying problem. In certain circumstances it could even exacerbate the situation. Moreover, due to the nature of intrastate conflict, defining clear military objectives and an achievable short-term endstate is difficult but, nevertheless, crucial if the use of military force is to be effective and receive continued public support. The UN is primarily a political institution which favours the pacific settlement of disputes and reversion to force only as a last resort. Prolonged military presence is undesirable; however, if a mandate is suitably vague, disengagement may be harder than anticipated. To that end, every mandate supporting military intervention, be it in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement situation, must have a declared, unambiguous cessation point.

1 Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans,

considers ‘the composition of the Security Council no longer represents the make-up of the international community, as it was designed to do in 1945 ... The principle of limited expansion of the Security Council ... is now generally accepted, but questions of “who and how many” are the subject of intensive negotiation.’ See Evans G., Co-operating for Peace, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993, p.180.


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Furthermore, to reflect a well-conceived exit strategy, a number of review points at timely intervals should be included. If, upon reaching a review point, it becomes clear that the military is unable to satisfy the immediate objectives of the Security Council, the force can be withdrawn with dignity and UN credibility maintained. Regrettably, it has sometimes been the case that the UN has been forced to withdraw from an operation with its credibility in tatters. The experience of the first UN Emergency Force in Egypt (UNEF) in 1967, and the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) between 1992 and 1995 provide good examples. If military intervention is to be successful then the importance of a clear and achievable mandate cannot be over-emphasised.

An ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make a straightforward mission difficult, or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world cannot make an impossible mission more feasible. It merely paints the impossible task in high-contrast colors (sic).1

Elements of Peace and the Role of the Military

The Security Council ... may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

UN Charter

Chapter VII, Article 42. A graphical representation of the peace process is at Figure 3. Although the various actions it represents are closely related, the diagram nevertheless establishes a clear distinction between activities to support conflict resolution (ie designed to bring about conditions in which political negotiation can proceed), and those conducted in support of the humanitarian mission. As peacekeeping forces are inappropriate to the peace enforcement mission, so too may they be to the humanitarian mission. The rules of engagement that govern the conduct of a ‘blue-helmeted’ force could be totally inadequate should the task be to deter, protect or punish.

1 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1993,

p.26.

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Figure 3 - The Peace Process


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In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali made recommendations on strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping. Although these terms were defined in the document and amplified subsequently, continuing confusion arises over their use by military and political decision-makers. Exact definitions will probably continue to be a source of much discussion; however, it is not the words themselves but the relative position of each particular activity in the peace process and the implications of its enactment that are most important. Figure 3 shows a logical breakdown of the process, and each phase - including potential roles for the military - is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Dispute

In an ideal world, some supra-national organisation would have the resources, foresight and diplomatic prowess to be able to anticipate disputes and resolve them far in advance of reversion to violence by any participating party. Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world. The UN came into existence in 1945 to achieve, inter alia, ‘international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character’.1 Frequently, it has been the breakdown of such co-operation that has lead to conflict between states. The importance of preventive diplomacy as a technique for the maintenance of international peace and security is well recognised; however, its realisation is not always as easy as one would expect. Successful implementation of preventive diplomacy requires timely and accurate intelligence, a capability to analyse the received intelligence data and, most importantly, the consent of the subject state(s).2 Preventive diplomacy is about developing mutual confidence and can take many forms. Often, UN measures, such as exchange of missions, formation of risk reduction centres, and use of special envoys, are complementary to existing peacetime activities such as civil and military liaison, military exchanges and joint exercises. All of these

1 Charter of the UN, Article.1, para.3. 2 Senator Gareth Evans considers a strategy of ‘in-country pre-conflict peace

building’ as a forerunner to preventive diplomacy. ‘Pre-conflict peace building’ refers to longer term non-military, economic, social and political measures which can help states deal with emerging threats and disputes. Such peace building strategies, whilst an important part of the overall peace process, are outside the scope of this work. See Evans, Co-operating for Peace, pp.52-54.

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activities serve to reduce the likelihood of hostilities between states. Should, however, the UN believe a risk of escalation exists, then preventive deployment of military forces, under UN auspices and at the state’s request, remains an option. In the event that preventive diplomacy fails and escalation occurs, the Security Council must then judge if the situation represents a threat to international peace and security. If so, it must take appropriate action. In the first instance the UN will encourage the parties to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Agreement

This initial round of peacemaking under Chapter VI of the UN Charter would hopefully result in a proposed resolution with which the parties would either agree or dissent. In the event of agreement, it may be appropriate for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to oversee a peaceful return to normalisation and adherence to the agreed resolution. The nature of peacekeeping has evolved considerably over recent years, so much so that the term ‘wider peacekeeping’ has lately come into being. Accordingly, much time and effort has been expended on establishing doctrine and producing field manuals to guide commanders in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The spectrum of possible military tasks is broad and the likelihood of peacekeeping forces finding themselves in a dangerous and unstable environment is growing. Nonetheless, the basic conditions for successful peacekeeping, of which impartiality, consent, and the use of force only in self-defence are the most significant, remain unchanged. Peacekeepers have a distinct basic purpose which is, with the consent of all concerned parties, to help realise settlements that have come about through the peacemaking process. Peacekeepers can also contribute greatly to peace building and peace development, but this they must do without recourse to violent means. Should it prove impossible to fulfil the peacekeeping mandate without the use of force, the Security Council must then determine if it should take measures to enforce the mandate. Enforcement action will breach the basic principles of peacekeeping and so has far-reaching implications for the deployed peacekeepers. The required strategy becomes one of a coercive nature which clearly lies outside the scope of the peacekeeping mission. There may, however, be occasions when the use of limited force during a peacekeeping mission is appropriate. Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda


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for Peace alludes to this use of force when he discusses formation of the unfortunately termed ‘Peace Enforcement Units’.1 These units would be constituted under Article 40 of the Charter and would operate in clearly defined circumstances under terms of reference specified in advance.2 The mission would appear to be one of restoring or maintaining ceasefires which have been agreed but lack compliance. Boutros-Ghali stresses that ‘peace enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted to deal with acts of aggression’. However, whether the action of peace enforcement units crosses the boundaries of consent and impartiality is ambiguous and remains the source of much debate. Even when operating under strict rules of engagement, a definite risk of ‘mission creep’ exists. The line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement must be clear. Recent events, especially those in Bosnia, have shown that peacekeeping and peace enforcement cannot be conducted simultaneously in the same area. Except in self-defence, there is no place for force in a peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General’s own words on the situation in Bosnia lend credence to this argument:

UNPROFOR remains deployed in a war situation where, after more than three years, there is still no peace to keep. Its position is further complicated by the fact that its original peacekeeping mandate, which cannot be implemented without the cooperation of the parties, has gradually been enlarged to include elements of enforcement, which cause it to be seen as a party to the conflict.3

Alternative approaches to coercive strategies, and the means by which pressure could be best applied to non-compliant factions must be developed.

1 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.44. 2 Article 40 states that ‘in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the

Security Council may, before ... deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such measures as it deems necessary. The Security Council will duly take account of failure to comply with such measures’.

3 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982(1995) and 987(1995), UN document S/95/444 dated 30 May 1995, para.68.

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Dissent

It could happen that one or more of the belligerent parties may not agree to the initial proposed resolution and, therefore, without general consent, the deployment of a peacekeeping force would not be appropriate. From this point the dispute can go one of two ways. Either the parties will return to the negotiating table and attempt to resolve their differences pacifically, or one or more of the parties will use violence to bring about the result it ultimately desires. It is entirely feasible that initial compliance with a proposed resolution is subsequently rebuffed by one or more of the interested parties. A peacekeeping force, deployed in good faith and operating under a peacekeeping mandate, may now find itself embroiled in conflict, its presence resented, its mandate unachievable, its composition inadequate, and its very security threatened. By virtue of its nature, the UN will favour initially an attempt at diplomatic resolution which almost invariably will be a slow and lengthy process. Ultimately, intervention by military force may well be sanctioned, but in the interim, the peacekeeping force’s position is compromised and its security should be a prime consideration. UN efforts to resolve the dispute would at this stage appear to have failed. Any use of military force, pending a cessation of hostilities, would likely be to support a peace enforcement strategy, a humanitarian mission, or an extraction of UN personnel. The consent of the parties to any of these options could be questionable at best. Hence, at this juncture and until the fighting stops, use of a ‘peacekeeping’ force would be inappropriate.

Conflict

Following the outbreak of conflict, and assuming the Security Council considers the situation a threat to international peace and security, the UN will endeavour to take measures to bring the hostile parties to agreement under the authority of Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. In putting forward proposals under Chapter VI, the UN will endeavour to remain impartial. Nevertheless, the imposition of diplomatic process may not necessarily meet the consent of all the parties and, consequently, could be treated with contempt. It is somewhat utopian to imagine that nationalist objectives driven by the fervour of nationalist sentiment could be achieved by other than violent means. Understanding the potential power of nationalism requires thorough study of a nation’s history. Nevertheless, the following episode provides a powerful, brief example.


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In April 1995, Croatian forces launched a successful blitzkrieg on Western Slavonija, a UN protected Croatian Serb area.

The area included the 92 sq.mi. site of the Jasenovac concentration camp where more than 700,000 Serbs, Jews and Gypsies were murdered by Croatian Ustaše in the early 1940s. Croatian forces immediately demolished the few remaining memorials to the victims of Jasenovac. On the same day, Dinko Sakic, a declared war criminal and former commandant of the Jasenovac concentration camp, returned to Zagreb after spending the past 50 years abroad.1

Whether the member nations of the UN should choose the option of enforced military intervention, thereby risking commitment to any number of endless internal struggles around the world, or elect to uphold the principles of consent and impartiality, thus to some extent condoning genocide, will undoubtedly remain under constant review. Irrespective of the member states’ decision, however, human conscience will rarely allow internecine intrastate conflict to be ignored. Thus, continued consideration must be given to the feasibility of conducting peace enforcement through military means, in case it is once more called upon as an option.

Peace Enforcement

The beginning of wisdom is calling things by their right names.

Confucius. The purpose of action taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is to bring hostile parties to agreement. Chapter VII measures are taken without the consent of the warring parties and may or may not involve the use of armed force. There are three occasions when the UN may consider such intervention, and these are:

1. in response to violations of national sovereignty; 2. in circumstances of intrastate conflict resulting in the

state effectively ceasing to function; and 3. in circumstances of intrastate conflict resulting in

unacceptable levels of human suffering.

1 ‘Croatia Hits UN Serb Areas’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy,

Vol.XXIII, No.4, London, 30 April 1995, editorial.

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Naturally, the UN would also intervene should the security of its personnel be threatened during the conduct of a mission. The exact nature of the enforcement mission is situation dependent, but in essence, there are two possible scenarios, each of which produces political objectives diametrically opposed to that of the other. The first is the interstate case, ie conflict between states, and the second, the intrastate case, ie conflict within a state. War between states generally occurs when one state wishes to violate the sovereignty of another by taking possession of its territory. The targeted nation would normally do all in its power to defend itself, but may in addition call on the assistance of allies and/or the UN should it prove necessary. Whatever the means used for defence, the aggrieved state would, as a rule, look to the UN Security Council to legitimise its retaliatory action. At the end of the day, the beleaguered party is seeking a return to the status quo. A reversion to pre-conflict arrangements represents the primary political objective. Naturally, there may be secondary objectives identified by the UN that will ensure regional peace is maintained and further aggression is deterred. Invariably, in interstate conflict, there is a readily identifiable belligerent - an enemy against whom retaliatory action can be focussed. War within a state is brought about by dissatisfaction with the status quo, so enforcing a return to it is unlikely to resolve the underlying problem. If the security situation is such that the warring parties can see no means of achieving resolution except by violent means, and from the UN’s perspective the conflict constitutes a threat to international peace, then the UN must intervene. The purpose of the intervention is twofold: firstly, to stop the fighting, and secondly, to coerce the belligerents to participate in negotiations while desisting further acts of aggression. Of course, human suffering is an invariable consequence of intrastate conflict, so there may be three additional objectives to be fulfilled:

1. protect the civilian population from forced movement, genocide or other crimes against humanity;

2. ensure the delivery and distribution of adequate food,

water and medical supplies; and 3. take the necessary action to deter, or if applicable, punish

those who carry out grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and its protocols.

Too often, the humanitarian mission is seen only in terms of delivering aid. When all aspects of the mission are considered, it is easy to


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realise that certain aspects not only fall outside the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, but more importantly are beyond the capabilities of lightly-armed peacekeepers. In intrastate conflict, there are in the UN’s eyes no enemies, only antagonists. Conflict will result from an imbalance between the warring factions. If one faction persists with aggression, the UN must seek to re-establish a balance of power through enforcement action. Such action must be equally and fairly applied to any party that defies the measures demanded by the relevant UN resolution(s). Although individual offensive military acts by the UN constitute an act of war, if applied evenly to all factions which employ aggression, the UN’s overall strategy could be considered impartial. It is important to realise that peace enforcement is a subset of the peacemaking process and a significant and potent instrument in the peacemaker’s inventory. It has nothing to do with peacekeeping. It is also important to realise that peace enforcement can take many forms. Military action is but one of a whole raft of options available to the peacemakers, and even within military action there are a number of alternatives. The underlying purpose of peace enforcement in both the interstate and intrastate scenarios is to convince the belligerent(s) that the cost of violent action will outweigh the potential gain. The futility of reverting to violence must be clear, and it is the job of peace enforcement to make it so.

Action under Chapter VII

The UN Charter makes provision under Chapter VII for a number of measures with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Such measures are taken in accordance with Articles 39, 40, 41 or 42 of the Charter. Each of the punitive options available to the UN is likely to elicit a different response depending on the nature of the principle actors and the characteristics of the subject state. Thus, rather than be considered on a continuum, each option should be examined for its potential effectiveness given the prevailing circumstances.

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Non-military measures

UN Charter, Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions ... These

may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Having unsuccessfully attempted to persuade a party to comply with the provisional measures it has deemed necessary (Article 40), the UN may next choose to impose sanctions against the belligerent(s) in an attempt to deny external support. There have been seven instances of sanctions in the UN’s history, five since 1990.1 The one sanction common to all has been the imposition of an arms embargo. Although such action may go some way to reducing actual hostilities, it has also been seen as a measure which favours the oppressor by denying the oppressed the means to defend themselves.2 Economic sanctions, particularly oil embargoes, have also been favoured tools of the UN. Generally, however, the burden of sanctions on a state has brought about mixed results. The potential effectiveness of the punitive action has too often been undermined by an inability to rigorously enforce the restrictions, and a lack of clearly defined and achievable objectives. Although Article 25 of the Charter states that ‘members ... agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council’,

1 UN sanctions have been imposed against the former Rhodesia (1966), South

Africa (1977, 1984 & 1986), Iraq (1990), the former Yugoslavia/Serbia & Montenegro (1991-95), Somalia (1992), Libya (1992) and Haiti (1993).

2 UN Security Council Resolution 713(1991) imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia including the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By its Resolutions 47/121(December 1992), 48/88(December 1993) and 49/10 (November 1994) the General Assembly urged the Security Council to exempt Bosnia Herzegovina from the arms embargo with the sole purpose of enabling that Republic, as a sovereign independent state and a member of the UN, to exercise its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Believing an exemption would fuel an already volatile situation, the Security Council chose not to adopt a resolution. The matter was latterly discussed by the Security Council in November 1994, but no decision was taken. In 1995, the US Senate considered a unilateral lifting of the embargo as there appeared little prospect of peace and humanitarian atrocities continued. This option was not favoured by the President who would have required use of his veto should the significant progress toward peace made in October 1995 not have occurred.


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numerous examples of ‘sanction-busting’ are evident in all instances. When contemplating the potential effect of sanctions, a number of factors should be considered1:

1. sanctions can take a long time to be effective; 2. sanctions require clearly defined objectives and endstates,

and must not be seen as a ‘do something’ response to international pressure;

3. rigorous adherence by all relevant states and parties is

essential. Unilateral sanctions can often be circumvented;

4. economic sanctions must be severe enough to generate a

change of policy and be universally applied; 5. sanctions can generate adverse economic effects on

innocent third parties; 6. sanctions can provide a focus for internal popular

resentment, potentially adding strength to the targeted regime;

7. sanctions can provoke international humanitarian

concern about their impact on health and welfare; 8. use of sanctions should send a clear signal to the

international community as to what constitutes unacceptable behaviour;

9. suitable penalties against the violator are required to

discourage ‘sanction-busting’; and, 10. on most occasions, monitoring or enforcing sanctions will

require military support.

In sum, sanctions are a means of isolating a state from the things that allow it to flourish. Although in sentiment a non-military measure, sanctions can only be effective if rigorously enforced and herein lies the role for the military.

[I]f the UN wishes to use sanctions as an effective weapon they need to be accompanied from the start by a blockade, by land,

1 The following list is derived from Evans, Co-operating for Peace, pp.133-142.

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sea and air, and by a sophisticated range of controls over commercial, financial and trading mechanisms.1

Notwithstanding the availability of military force, enforcing sanctions may not be as simple as was originally perceived. Numerous UN resolutions had imposed sanctions on Serbia as a consequence of its involvement in the Balkan crisis. Although access through the Adriatic was effectively denied, embargoed goods from Russia destined for Serbia continued to flow along the River Danube through Romania and Bulgaria. The main channel of the Danube was an international waterway and, thus, Romanian and Bulgarian river police were empowered simply to enforce customs laws and not to impede traffic.2 United States and European Community ambassadors considered that the relevant UN resolution overruled the international status of the Danube.3 However, to Bulgaria and Romania it seemed they were ‘being dragged into a confrontation by countries who would not be there to face the consequences’.4 This unsatisfactory situation served to illustrate how the UN and the major western nations could negligently overlook the wider security implications of their policies. More importantly, this example demonstrated a significant limitation on the effective use of sanctions.

Military measures

UN Charter, Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may

take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or

land forces ... Article 42 of the Charter clearly states that when all other measures have failed, the use of military force to enforce the Security Council’s decisions remains an option. Military intervention in Korea, the Congo, Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia represent the UN’s only instances of enforcement action. None of the five has been without criticism. In the case of

1 Statement by the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee as

quoted in ibid., p.140. 2 Carlson, A., ‘No Balm in Gilead:The Employment of Military Force in the War

in Former Yugoslavia and Prospects for a Lasting Peace’, in Blank, S.(ed), Yugoslavia’s Wars:The Problem from Hell’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1994, p.102.

3 ibid., p.103. 4 ibid.


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Korea and the Congo, the Security Council never explicitly invoked Chapter VII measures; however, it based its response upon them. In Iraq and Somalia (UNITAF), Chapter VII was cited in support of a US-led coalition of forces. In the creation of UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, Chapter VII mandates were assigned to what were fundamentally peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Whilst issues of command and control, size of troop deployments, cost, risk, et al remain at the forefront of discussion, and are without doubt important, the fundamental reason for the use of military force in peace enforcement is often given less consideration. As Malcolm Rifkind once wrote:

We should not commit military forces in circumstances where there is no military solution, but only a clamour for ‘something to be done’. It is our servicemen who have to bear the risk, not those who call for their deployment. 1

Most military practitioners are well aware that war is ‘not only a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means’.2 If war is political, then military enforcement action authorised by a supra-national body of diplomats is, if it is possible, even more so. Diplomatic process is usually reactionary, sometimes unpredictable, and its outcomes often vague. In circumstances of what one may call traditional interstate warfare, the transposition of political objective into military objective may be readily achievable. However, as the UN spreads its mantle of responsibility over intrastate conflict, political objective becomes uncertain and it is the military, together on most occasions with an innocent civilian population, that must bear the consequences of indecision. If the use of military force is to be contemplated, four questions must be answered:

1. what is the political outcome the UN wishes to achieve; 2. are measures of last resort the only remaining option; if

so, 3. what type of military force is appropriate; and, most

importantly, 4. will the use of military force achieve the aim at acceptable

levels of risk ?

1 Rifkind, The Rt Hon M., UK Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Peacekeeping or

Peacemaking?’, RUSI Journal, Vol.138, No.2, London 1993, pp.5-6. 2 Clausewitz, C. von, ‘On War’, 1832: I.i.

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Many people have commented that the Coalition forces’ action in the Gulf War of 1990/91 did not go far enough, in that it allowed the Hussein regime to survive. Others have argued that military power, and particularly air power, caused needless deaths and unnecessary destruction. The debate could, and probably will, go on ad infinitum. The crux of the matter, however, lies in determining if the military action achieved the political aim declared at the time. This issue should not be clouded by the subsequent ‘what ifs’ and ‘if onlys’ that hindsight invariably produces. The primary political aim of the UN was the complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Secondary aims included restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government, protection of foreign nationals abroad, and promotion of the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. The story of the Gulf War is well documented and the operation is generally acknowledged as a success. Coalition air forces quickly achieved control of the air by neutralising the Iraqi air defence system. A systematic destruction from the air of Iraq’s command and control structure and primary lines of communication then followed. Finally, once air power had wreaked havoc on the Iraqi army, a brief and overwhelming ground offensive brought about the capitulation of a thoroughly demoralised enemy. The political aim was achieved and few would contend that following considerable diplomatic activity to resolve the dispute, the military option was all that remained. The number of fatalities on both sides was remarkably few; less than 500 allied servicemen and 10,000 Iraqis. By comparison, 4½ million were killed in Korea, over 2 million in Vietnam, and in the earlier Iran-Iraq War at least 500,000.1 Having achieved the aim with minimal casualties, one could conclude that the use and type of force was appropriate and the strategy sound. That is not to say, however, that strategy in comparative conflicts was not sound, although this may well have been the case. Let us examine briefly the war in Korea, the occasion when the UN first undertook enforcement action. On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Although it is still not certain where the initiative for the invasion lay, China, the Soviet Union and North Korea all stood to benefit from the absorption of the southern Republic into a unified communist-led Korea, especially if the invasion was not strongly opposed. However, this turned out not to be the case. On 26 June, the Security Council resolved that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the

1 The official list of US casualties presented to the US Congress in April 1992

numbered 390. In addition, there were approximately 192 non-US casualties. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, US Department of Defense, April 1992, pp.A-3/A-11.


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North Korean forces.1 One day later, a further resolution requested members of the UN to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the attack and restore peace and security to the area. Response by Australia, Britain and the United States was swift and, on 7 July, the Security Council recommended that all military assistance provided should be made available to a Unified Command under United States authority operating under the UN flag. The political aim of the operation was clear and the role of the military was also clear. General MacArthur, having been given authorisation to conduct operations north of the 38th parallel in September 1950, was confident in November 1950 that the war would be over within a month. However, the Chinese, who had entered the war that October after US forces had crossed the 38th parallel, had completed only one phase of what would ultimately be a five-phase offensive. When, in November, President Truman referred publicly to the possible use of atomic weapons in Korea, it became clear that this was not merely a regional dispute. It could be said that the UN was working under US authority rather than the converse. The decision to continue the war and enforce the Resolution, which ultimately was achieved, lay entirely with the Americans. It was the US that assessed the risk, the US that gauged public opinion, and the US that controlled (some would say commandeered) the operation. In analysing recent peace enforcement operations and the role of the United States, one may well question if anything has changed. The role of the military in both Korea and the Gulf was primarily the defeat or destruction of enemy occupying forces - a concept that rests easily with the traditional military strategist. In both cases, the Americans became involved because to do so was in the general American interest. In the resolution of future conflict, however, the US may not always be active participants. Denied such degree of military might, the UN, if forced to resolve a dispute by military intervention, and particularly one of an intrastate nature, must be receptive to more subtle methods of coercion by the military. Consequently, the means used to fulfil the military role must be given lateral and considered thought. If an example is required of a UN force deployed on a whim, with little advance planning or appreciation of what may follow, one need look no further than the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. In 1959, Belgium came under considerable pressure to relinquish its colonial dominance of the former Belgian Congo. Although agreeing to a programme of independence in 1960, the Belgiques remained keen to preserve their economic interests in the country. Resentment against the continued Belgian presence resulted in rioting and a

1 UN Security Council Resolution 82.

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breakdown of public order. Belgian military intervention to protect both their citizens and the Belgian national interest followed shortly thereafter. The strategic importance of the African continent generated a vested interest in the potential confrontation, in the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France. In essence, the purpose of the initial UN intervention, requested by the Congolese government, was twofold. First, the UN deployment strove to create a stable environment in which the Congolese could resolve their domestic differences. Second, it attempted by its presence to deter direct intervention by the superpowers. Considering the parties involved, the Security Council resolution was, not surprisingly, somewhat vague and non-committal:

...take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide ... such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government ... the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to fully meet their tasks.1

The mission may have been easier had a recognised central government existed. However, differences of opinion between the Congolese political leaders produced, at times, up to four ‘governments’ all opposing each other. Katanga, the southern province of the Congo which generated 80 per cent of the country’s export revenue and a half of its total income, had continually attempted secession. Unfortunately, the inadequacy of the initial mandate placed the deployed UN forces in an impossible position in which they were:

... reluctant to withdraw, for the sake of the civilian populace; reluctant to take sides, to preserve a semblance of impartiality; and unable to take significant military initiatives, because the mandate was interpreted to forbid such actions ...2

After an increase in attacks on UN personnel, the mandate was strengthened and the force transitioned from one of peacekeeping to one of peace enforcement, authorised to:

... take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;3

1 UN Document S/4387 dated 14 July 1960. Quoted in Durch, ‘ The UN

Operation in the Congo’, in Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p.326. 2 ibid., p.327. 3 ibid., pp.327-8.


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Finally, when Katanga continued to repudiate the authority of the central government, the superpowers agreed that ending the attempt at secession would be in the best interests of all concerned. Accordingly, the UN force was authorised to ‘take “vigorous action” to expel foreign mercenaries from the Congo, and prevent their return or the influx of arms to support Katanga’s revolt’.1 Ultimately, the UN operation in the Congo was a success in that it kept the country as one, but the cost was high. Until late in the operation, the role of the military was ill-conceived and supported by an inadequate, vague and ambiguous mandate. There were many lessons to be learnt yet few were heeded.

... in the aftermath of the Congo operation, the Secretariat and member states were more interested in forgetting than in learning, more interested in avoiding future ONUCs than in doing them better ... Not until the late 1980s was the UN confronted with the need to do things any differently ... thus, until then, it didn’t.2

The dispute emerged originally as a consequence of mishandled decolonisation; however, what it became and the way in which the forces of the UN found themselves enmeshed in the crisis, bears disturbing similarity to past events in Somalia and the ongoing situation in the former Yugoslavia. The difference today, however, is that contributing nations have shown increasing unwillingness to accept the risks that accompany the deployment of large numbers of ground troops in support of any mission save that of traditional peacekeeping. Alternative strategies must be considered. History has much to teach us, especially about what not to do.

After the Storm - The Continuing Process

A successful peace enforcement action that brings about a cessation of hostilities and a re-opening of negotiations is undoubtedly a satisfying outcome, at least for the UN. However, the peace process is yet far from complete. Much work remains for the diplomats as they strive to achieve a long term mutually-acceptable settlement. In keeping with the sentiment of the UN Charter and in the interests of all concerned, considerable effort should be given to re-integrating the offending states, nations or parties into the international community as soon as possible. Of course, the ease or otherwise of the re-integration process will depend heavily on the degree of enforcement action that was taken

1 ibid., p.328. 2 ibid., p.349.

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against the belligerent, and by how much the societal, political, economic and environmental structure of the state was affected. It is important that when enforcement action of any kind is contemplated, the likely long term consequences are addressed, or at least considered, before the action takes place. It is desirable that the transition from military intervention to diplomatic negotiation, thence to peacebuilding and peace development, is as smooth and as rapid as possible. If the UN is to be successful, then throughout the process it must retain its credibility. For that to occur, any military intervention must have been generally recognised among the member states as a necessary last resort. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, enforcement action needs to be appropriate, proportionate and limited to precise and clearly defined objectives. Furthermore, once the enforcement action is complete, the military forces employed should be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity. It may, however, prove necessary for a monitoring force to remain in place to deter a further outbreak of conflict and alleviate human suffering whilst negotiations proceed. This new mission should be established under a separate and appropriate mandate supported by forces befitting the task. Further, it should be emphasised that UN personnel are only a means to an end and should remain in place only as long as is necessary. Extended peacekeeping operations are costly, deny manpower to higher priority tasks, and do little to spur the negotiators towards finding a long-term solution. Sometimes, the presence of the interim force will be accepted only grudgingly by the host nation. Should hostilities reoccur, the peacekeeping and humanitarian mandate must be broken down into its constituent parts, the objectives of each mission defined and the feasibility of continuing each mission assessed individually. The experience of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is a salient reminder of the need to combine peacekeeping with a continued quest for an abiding political settlement. UNMOGIP was established in 1949 as a result of the Kashmir dispute. Forty-six years later, Kashmir remains disputed territory and the UN presence continues. Similarly in Cyprus, the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) has remained in situ for over 30 years. Since 1974, UNFICYP has successfully deterred further aggression between the Greeks and the Turks; however, this particular UN mission could prove to be a victim of its own success. Both Greek and Turkish communities enjoy ‘normal’ day-to-day life and accept, to some degree, the division of their island. As a result, there has been little progress towards a permanent settlement. Indeed, presence of


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the ‘thin blue line’ has, in the past, actively discouraged political dialogue. 1 Traditional peacekeeping activities are primarily concerned with monitoring compliance; however, more recent activities have been wider-reaching. Peacekeeping forces now fulfil an essential support role in internal reconciliation and nation rebuilding. Nonetheless, the UN commitment should not be open-ended. If the aim of the operation is to progress a state towards peaceful self-government, then a defined end-point for UN assistance, or at least a number of milestones, should be identified before the operation begins. Closely-monitored, harmonious development would allow a dignified and timely withdrawal of the supporting UN personnel. Whilst the UN can never guarantee successful reconciliation, it can ensure that it does not receive the blame for failure. In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali refers to the ‘chasm (that) has developed between the tasks entrusted to [the UN] and the financial means provided to it’.2 Interestingly, the suggested proposals to remedy the problem include merely a number of means of raising finance. Perhaps a renewed focus on preventive diplomacy and peace development would be more seemly. Not only would this approach allow the possible withdrawal or reduction in strength of peacekeeping forces, it might also prompt a move towards long-term settlement of dormant disputes. The role the military plays in the peacebuilding process is not one for which servicemen and women are generally trained, and it may be more suited to police forces, IGOs or NGOs. It may well be that if enforcement action is taken to bring about a cessation of conflict, a continued military presence on the ground could antagonise the parties and counteract the reconciliation process. Whatever the situation, the essential principle is that military personnel should work under the auspices of a UN resolution that is clearly defined and achievable within a defined timescale. Once the mandate is fulfilled, or its goals prove unattainable, the force should be withdrawn.

1 On 27 July 1994, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council his

belief that unless they (the Turk and Greek Cypriots) provided evidence, through concrete actions, of their commitment to a negotiated settlement, he would have to recommend that his mission of good offices be suspended, while maintaining the presence of UNFICYP on the ground. For further details, see: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, UN document A/49/1 dated 2 September 1994.


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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate.1

The UN has repeatedly displayed an ability to conduct successful peacekeeping operations. Less successful however, have been its attempts to enforce peace without recourse to a nation, or alliance-led coalition force, taking action on its behalf. UN forces employed in situations where the belligerents have never been or are no longer willing to co-operate with a peacekeeping mission may find themselves targets of attack from rival factions. Intervention under these circumstances is fraught with danger and the wisdom of deploying or leaving in place a peacekeeping force constrained by fundamental peacekeeping principles is brought into question. Nations contributing to UN forces are unwilling to accept the risk of large numbers of casualties. Unnecessary enemy casualties and excessive collateral damage have become equally unacceptable, as well as unlawful. Thus, in this high risk area of operations due regard should be given to the positive attributes of air power. The advent of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and non-lethal weapon technology together with the desire to avoid large numbers of casualties on both sides warrants a re-examination of the contribution and perhaps even primacy of air power in the prevention and resolution of conflict. Furthermore, the means of selecting appropriate targets, the destruction of which could assist in achieving the political aim, also requires detailed scrutiny. The UN is stepping on new ground and some recent peace operations have forfeited the consent of the parties, shown partiality, and made use of offensive force. Boutros-Ghali has recognised three aspects of the respective mandates that may have led to this change:

1. the protection of humanitarian operations during continuing warfare,

2. the protection of civilian populations in designated safe

areas, and

1 Report on the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly, para.35.


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3. coercion of the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept.1

Peacemaking under Chapter VI of the Charter, and also to some degree those operations mandated under the so-called ‘Chapter VI and a half’, can be carried out within the established peacekeeping principles. Further, the success of traditional peacekeeping encourages its continued employment. Peace enforcement under Chapter VII and those operations listed above, however, fall outside the basic peacekeeping tenets, albeit still within the bounds of the UN Charter, and therefore must be afforded separate consideration. The interpretation of what constitutes a danger to international peace is a point of much debate and will undoubtedly continue to be so. The Secretary-General has asserted that whatever the limitations of the UN, it has a moral obligation to react to crises. Furthermore, he believes the world is moving towards the recognition that ‘genocide is a common threat to humanity’. This alone should encourage countries to be more active in peace operations even if there is no immediate strategic threat.2 Achieving national reconciliation at the earliest opportunity is in everyone’s interest but it is invariably a long process involving patient diplomacy. The temptation to use military force to accelerate reconciliation should normally be resisted. Nevertheless, if humanitarian atrocities abound, international opinion is likely to demand timely intervention to bring about an end to hostilities. The UN seeks to help nations to help themselves. Although political and military action may bring about a desire for negotiation, only diplomacy can solve the underlying problem. To promote this diplomatic process, the UN requires enabling strategies that are applicable to a high threat, high risk and high profile environment. These strategies will demand military forces that can achieve quick results. Such forces must be rapidly deployable, ubiquitous, flexible, and capable of accurate targeting with minimal collateral damage.

1 ibid., para.34. 2 Quoted in ‘UN Chief Chides Security Council on Military Missions’, The New

York Times, 6 January 1995.

CHAPTER THREE

EXPOUNDING VICTORY

The strategist is he who always keeps the objective of war in sight and the objective of war is never military but is always political.

Alfred Thayer Mahan

The UN Charter was conceived as a means by which to prevent the scourge of world war. Thus, not surprisingly the early exponents of air, sea and land power theories generally contemplated the use of force to resolve conflict between, rather than within states. The issue was one of sovereignty, and victory in battle was the means by which to restore what had been unlawfully seized. The aim of victory was, in essence, reasonably clear. Yet, there remains another category of armed struggle where the nature of victory is not so easily stated, that of civil war. Moreover, the notion of victory must be considered from the standpoint of the belligerent, that of the aggrieved and also, should there be one, that of the intervening organisation. In the Cold War years, intrastate wars without direct or indirect external intervention were an unusual occurrence. Intervention was generally partial and on most occasions proffered by the superpowers in defence of the greater cause of either capitalism or communism. Victory was a matter of ideological supremacy. Yet, the superpower contest is no more and the UN, which has by default assumed the responsibility for world peace, has no ideological drum to beat. Victory for the UN is simply the attainment and sustainment of international peace and security. Whilst the Secretary-General foresees greater involvement by UN sponsored military forces in the resolution of future intrastate disputes1, the issue of military purpose requires urgent attention. What is the UN ultimately trying to achieve through its efforts of mediation in interstate and intrastate disputes? What is its concept of victory, and what strategy is best employed to achieve it? Ultimately, how is military force best utilised? To answer these questions let us first examine the notion of victory.

1 ‘But armed conflicts today, as they have throughout history, continue to

bring fear and horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end.’, Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.13.


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THE NOTION OF VICTORY

You ask ‘What is our aim ?’ I can answer in one word: ‘Victory !’ Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.

Sir Winston Churchill1

Victory is defined as ‘success in a battle or contest achieved by gaining mastery over one’s opponents’. Mastery is defined as ‘complete control’.2 In 1940, Sir Winston Churchill made it clear to the British people that without victory Britain would not survive. The political aim was clear, but it could only be achieved through successful and comprehensive military action. Moreover, sustained military operations would require the support of the entire nation, a nation which comprised people who would grow to accept massive destruction of their cities and high numbers of civilian casualties because their very survival was at stake. Ultimately, after many years of intense war-fighting in both Europe and the Far East, allied victory was achieved through the continued pursuit of enforcement strategies, ie those that either denied or destroyed the enemy from the outset; coercive strategies had long since failed. The Vietnam War is well documented and needs no amplification here. In essence, the United States lost the war because it failed to gain complete control over the North Vietnamese. The reasons for its failure still provide for many hours of discussion, but the relevant point here is that as the war went on and American casualties increased, so public support for the national strategy waned. The national survival of the United States was not threatened, a presence in Vietnam was not seen as being in the national interest, and every American body bag raised a new protest. As President Johnson was to discover to his chagrin, the acceptable side of warfare was changing; enforcement strategies of denial and destruction were soon to become a thing of the past. By the time of the Gulf War in 1990/91, a number of lessons from previous conflicts had emerged. The politicians had learnt that military intervention required clear political directives from which military objectives could be formulated. More importantly, governments had recognised the necessity for their interest and participation to remain firmly at the grand strategic level. Finally,

1 Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, 13 May 1940 in Wintle, J.(ed),

The Dictionary of War Quotations, The Free Press, New York, 1989, p.330. 2 The Oxford Paperback Dictionary, pp.910 & 502.

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although a politico-military interface was still vital, national leaders realised that military commanders deserved the trust to successfully complete the military mission without undue political interference at the operational and tactical levels. The military had also heeded the lessons of past campaigns, especially the changing nature of acceptable warfare. War is and always will be inextricably linked to politics. After Vietnam, casualties on both sides and the degree of collateral damage caused by aerial bombardment became critical political factors that greatly influenced the conduct of future warfare. Accordingly, theories evolved which questioned the traditional ways of achieving military victory.1 To attain victory, it had been recognised throughout history that it was necessary to target an enemy’s ability to wage war. Whilst tactical encounters could be important, eventually the battle would only be won at the strategic level. In earlier times, with no ability to strike at strategic targets, access to a nation’s inner core, where most of the strategic targets tend to be located, was only achieved through prolonged frontal wars of attrition. The evolution of air power, however, allowed commanders to fight at the strategic level of war from the outset. There are always exceptions to the rule. One could argue, for example, that as the Argentinian and British mainlands remained inviolate, the Falklands War was fought and won at the tactical level. By the same token, however, one could be quite justified in assessing the British aircraft carriers as strategic targets for their loss would have affected significantly both the Task Force’s ability to wage war and the degree of British public support for the operation. Significantly, only Argentinian air power was capable of attacking such strategic targets. Whatever one’s viewpoint, the fact remains that air power on both sides played a critical part and, at any instant air action had the potential to change the nature of the conflict. Air campaigns have taken many and varied forms and have had numerous target sets at their focus. However, prior to the introduction of PGMs, destruction of any category of target frequently required many missions and the dropping of large amounts of ordnance. The consequence was high levels of collateral damage and large numbers of casualties, evidenced notably in the allied bombing of Germany in 1943/44 and the American ‘Rolling Thunder’ campaign in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. Nonetheless, some considered the strategic ‘carpet bombing’ of Vietnam an acceptable strategy:

1 Over the 140 months of the Vietnam War, 6,162,000 tons of bombs were

dropped equating to 44,014 tons per month. In the Gulf War, 60,624 tons were dropped with an average of 40,416 tons per month. Despite the figures for the Gulf ranking significantly lower than those for Vietnam, the bombing campaign was considerably more decisive overall in what it achieved. ‘What made it decisive was what the strategic air campaign managed to accomplish’, Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, p.190.


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My solution to the problem would be to tell (the Viet Cong) they’ve got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we’re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age. 1

However, by 1967, American policy-makers were beginning to realise that the whole concept of air power as a tool to achieve political victory had to change:

There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring one thousand non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.2

At the end of the day, one must question what the politicians were hoping to achieve through the use of air power. In Vietnam, President Johnson used ‘Rolling Thunder’ not as a reprisal campaign but as a means of coercing Hanoi to negotiate for peace. However, Johnson was ‘always convinced that the bombing was less important to a successful outcome than what was done militarily on the ground’.3 The purpose of the air campaign, in that it represented a coercive strategy, may have been sound but it was widely criticised. Regrettably, political interference had denied air power the opportunity to realise its full potential.4 If the purpose of using force is to achieve victory, then we must be clear as to exactly what constitutes victory. Is there a difference, for example, between military victory and political victory? Is victory perceived in the same terms by all parties to a conflict? When is victory finally achieved? The importance of defining victory is well illustrated by Stanley Karnow:

1 General Curtis E. LeMay, ‘Mission with LeMay’, 1965 in Wintle, The

Dictionary of War Quotations, p.360. 2 Robert McNamara, White House memo, 1967, from ‘ The Pentagon Papers’ in

ibid., p.361. 3 Johnson, L.B., The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969,

Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1971, p.240. 4 ‘ There is a considerable body of evidence to support the contention that

misunderstanding and lack of resolve at the political level did much to squander the military effort devoted to Vietnam. That there was a degree of political control exercised over the detailed conduct of operations also seems unquestionable. On the air side ... the selection of bombing targets (was) made by President Johnson or ... McNamara, rather than the military commanders responsible at the front.’, Coulthard-Clark, C.D., ‘ The Air War in Vietnam: Re-evaluating Failure’ in Stephens, A.(ed), The War in the Air, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p.172.

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‘You know,’ [Colonel] Summers told a North Vietnamese Colonel after the war, ‘you never defeated us on the battlefield.’ To which his Communist counterpart replied, ‘ That may be so, but it is also irrelevant’.1

This work focuses specifically on UN military intervention as a third party to a conflict. Let us consider, therefore, the theory of victory from the perspective of each party. While doing so, it is important to draw the line between interstate and intrastate conflict. By way of illustrating the interstate case, the Gulf War offers the most recent and pertinent example. Victory from an Iraqi perspective was total, unchallenged control over the territory and people it had chosen to invade.2 From Kuwait’s perspective, victory was a matter of national survival, albeit the country had already been overrun. For the United Nations Security Council, victory was restoration of international peace and security in the area of interest. To achieve its aim, the UN initially explored all avenues of diplomatic process; however, when this approach failed, military force was required. Nonetheless, this represented only one step in the peace restoration process. Undoubtedly, the military objectives of the Gulf campaign were met, but could one conclude that a political victory was achieved? Saddam Hussein remained in power, Iraq continued to redevelop its war-making potential which included nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, and the Kurds in the north and Shi’a in the south remained the target of internal persecution and suppression. Furthermore, it was necessary for considerable numbers of US, NATO and UN forces to maintain a presence in the Gulf States and Turkey to act as a deterrent against further Iraqi aggression. Most importantly, if the comments of defectors are to be believed, Hussein and his regime still represent a considerable threat to peace in the area. The UN mission is far from complete. The question arises, however, as to what degree of military force, and air power in particular, the UN Security Council is willing to endorse in pursuit of ultimate political victory. The intrastate case is even more complex. Deep-seated tribal, national or ethnic disputes can be of such intensity that victory in the

1 Stanley Karnow, ‘Vietnam: A History’, 1983, in Wintle, The Dictionary of War

Quotations, p.367. 2 We now know that victory over Kuwait would likely have been a first step in

Iraq’s pursuit of dominance over other oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. In August 1995, the comments of an Iraqi defector added reinforcement to US concerns over ‘unusual’ Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwaiti border. Mr Hussein Kamel Hassan, a senior Iraqi official who defected to Jordan, said that Iraq had set 31 August 1995 as the date for an invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, The Australian, 28 August 1995, p.6.


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eyes of each party may be perceived only through territorial gain or ethnic dominance in its particular favour. Third party intervention in such a situation may be a contentious issue and, to complicate matters, there may be numerous parties to the conflict, each of which claims to be the victim and not the belligerent. Moreover, the survival of certain ethnic communities may be threatened. Under these circumstances, does the UN really have the divine right to determine right and wrong and exact retribution accordingly ? If we assume that it does, which the international community seems to indicate is presently the case, through what means does it most effectively achieve victory, ie the restoration of international peace and security.

Figure 4 - The Failure of Deterrence

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In the first instance, the UN desire will be to deter an outbreak of hostilities. However, should deterrence fail, the Security Council must adopt a strategy by which to fulfil its aims. If deterrence is to work in the future, and the UN is to retain its credibility, only one of the three options shown in Figure 4 is feasible. If punitive measures have been threatened and a violation subsequently occurs, the threat must be carried through. It is, however, not the punitive action itself but the nature of the action that is the key to success or failure. There are a number of ways in which military force can be used to pursue a political objective. Circumstances will dictate which is most effective, but significantly, strategies of the past may no longer be appropriate to conflicts of the future.

EMPLOYING MILITARY FORCE

Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that we have to erect the ramparts of peace.

UNESCO charter

As we examine the nature of military action, it is worth reiterating its purpose. The UN seeks to resolve disputes through negotiation. When negotiations stall, military action is the option of last resort by which to force a recommencement of the diplomatic process. The use of military force will not directly bring about peace. It could, however, serve to remove the obstacles that are hampering progress. In essence, the application of force is one tool in the peacemaking inventory. Such use of force must not be confused with the mission of other deployed forces who conduct their operations under the principles of impartiality and consent, and whose purposes are to maintain conditions that will enable the peacemakers to negotiate an overall settlement and assist in the provision of humanitarian aid. To illustrate this point, let us examine the purpose of the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia:

UNPROFOR is not deployed to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is a task for the peacemakers. It is a mission deployed to fulfil three purposes: to alleviate the consequences of the war, to contain the conflict, and to promote the prospects for peace.1

1 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions

982(1995) and 987(1995), para.66.


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Contrast the above with the mission of the Coalition forces in the Gulf War which was to implement Resolution 660, the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Although allied military action in the Gulf could be considered a rather briskly implemented graduated military response, it was nevertheless part of a progressive political process. Similarly, in cases of civil or nationalist war where the only solution not involving massive loss of life will be one pursued around a negotiating table, a well-conceived graduated response is also appropriate. Nevertheless, if force is to be used, it must be effective; for it to be effective, it must fulfil its purpose. Thus, military purpose, which is a political facet, must, in the first instance, be enunciated by the politicians. Vague, chimerical, or inconsistent political decisions are the imprecation of the military ethos and provide an unwelcome challenge to the military commander. Strategies to employ military force take two broad forms. Enforcement strategies are predominantly physical from the outset and aim to achieve victory through enemy capitulation. Enabling strategies, on the other hand, may make use of physical measures but are predominantly psychological, their purpose being to bring about negotiation through graduated response. Essentially, enforcement strategies are absolute and are largely pursued by a belligerent. Conversely, enabling strategies are proactive or reactive and offer an option against aggression.

Enforcement Strategies

At the core of enforcement strategies are denial and destruction and it is important to differentiate between the two. The Soviet blockade of Berlin provides a good illustration of a denial strategy. Following the end of World War II, Germany was divided into a number of zones. Berlin, being the former capital city, was divided into four allied sectors even though it was located wholly in the Soviet zone. Although the western allies had access to Berlin by road, rail and air, only the air access was formalised with the Soviets. In June 1948, the Soviets denied surface access to Berlin hoping to force withdrawal of the western allies, thereby establishing Soviet control of the entire city. Adoption of a destructive approach, whereby the western allies would be forcibly evicted from Berlin, was unacceptable in Soviet eyes as it would likely have led to a serious outbreak of international conflict. With nuclear weapons emerging, the Russians had no desire to risk a physical exchange with the US and its allies. After all, Soviet victory would be forthcoming if the western allies surrendered to the pressure of the blockade.

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The Uses of Military Force

Figure 5


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The other facet of the enforcement strategy is destruction. The strategic focus of such a strategy is complete annihilation of the opposing regime. Negotiation has no role to play and the enemy is allowed no course of action save capitulation. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the invasion of South Korea by the people of the north, and the similar occurrence in Vietnam are all illustrations of destructive strategies. To a certain degree, the terrorist activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against the British authorities in Northern Ireland and on the UK mainland also constituted a strategy of destruction. Furthermore, the genocide and materiel destruction that each party wreaked upon each other during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated that total victory was the only truly acceptable outcome and destructive strategies were the only means by which it would be achieved. Acts of unprovoked aggression are often characterised by the use, from the outset, of a destructive enforcement strategy. Accordingly, the fulfilment of national objectives by such means has generally proved unacceptable to the international community. Consequently, on most occasions, such action has provoked an international response which has frequently included the use of military power. The option of ‘fighting fire with fire’ might appear at first to be a logical one. The belligerent state or nation which has taken the initiative through the use of offensive action would have it wrested immediately from its grasp through total destruction of its vital assets and no let-up would occur until capitulation was forthcoming. Terms for peace following the cessation of hostilities would be dictated solely by the vanquishers, be they one state, a coalition of states or a supra-national organisation. Such strong and timely military action could resolve a problem quickly before international opinions waver or the belligerent nation has time to strengthen its position. The Suez crisis of 1956, however, demonstrated considerable limitations in the use of one enforcement strategy to counter another. Moreover, many would argue that had total destruction of the Hussein regime occurred in 1991 it would have produced a greater problem than that which the UN had set out to resolve. The UN Charter is forthright in expressing that all UN members should refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations unless it be in self-defence. Thus, in the eyes of the international community, intervention action taken against Egypt by the British and French in Suez was illegal and brought into question the legitimacy of the operation. That the operation failed was due primarily to a lack of international support, especially that of one or other of the superpowers. However, the success of any military intervention is reliant upon an effective military process, and the Suez crisis revealed glaring weaknesses in Britain’s military capabilities.

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Nevertheless, failure in Suez should not be attributed solely to the military. The fault really lay with the British politicians who failed to appreciate the optimum use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. In the words of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, ‘it was the uncertainty about the political object of (the British) leaders which bedevilled the Suez operation from the beginning’.1 Britain learnt much from the Suez crisis, not least being the need to relate force to political objective. This included not only the decision to intervene militarily in the first place, but also the strategic conduct of the military operation. The chemical weapon debate of the 1991 Gulf War perhaps illustrates this point more clearly. The threatened use of chemical and biological weapons by the Iraqis was ever-present during the conflict, however, Hussein chose not to make use of them. The reasons for Hussein’s decision remain a matter of speculation, but of more significance was the nature of the Coalition’s response should a chemical attack have occurred. Allied retaliatory options ranged from nuclear attack to ambiguous public threats. Certainly, the higher-level conflict option was not favoured by the politicians. Allied forces were well equipped and well trained to operate in a chemically hostile environment and the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis seemed unlikely to pose any threat to the overall war plan. Moreover, most significantly, an ‘overzealous retaliation would morally corrupt the Coalition and bring disastrous political consequences’.2 Recent conflicts such as Vietnam, the Falklands and the Gulf War have shown that the voting public consider use of an enforcement strategy by a belligerent to be abhorrent and unacceptable. Nonetheless, an immediate response of a similar nature by the wronged is also unacceptable. In response to aggression, military force should only be used as the last resort of a strategy of graduated response whose purpose is to realise a negotiated settlement. If the argument for intervention is clearly justified, then a strong domestic and international base for military action based on an enabling strategy will probably be forthcoming.

1 As quoted in Wyllie, The Influence of British Arms, p.40. 2 For a fuller discussion of the nuclear, chemical and biological issues, see

Atkinson, R., Crusade, Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1993, pp 81-93.


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Enabling Strategies

An enabling strategy contemplates the use of military force and thus assumes that negotiation alone has failed to meet the political objective. Action by a belligerent nation has already taken place, or is about to take place, and deterrence therefore has failed. In effect, this enabling strategy is the last resort of the peacemakers, the final verse of Chapter VII of the Charter. Pre-emptive action, the first step, can take a number of forms, some of which could be considered to fulfil a deterrent function. For example, the deployment of third party military power to a state may serve to deter an outbreak of aggression by internal or external factions. However, the type of pre-emptive action envisaged in Figure 5 is not concerned solely with deterrence. This form of pre-emptive action is that which serves primarily to prevent a threat to peace whilst acting as a deterrent. The importance of accurate intelligence information to the success of this mission cannot be overstated. The surprise Israeli air attack in June 1981 on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor located near Baghdad severely hindered Iraq in their quest for a nuclear weapon capability (ie prevention) and also served to deter them from attempting further nuclear development. Israel justified its attack on the grounds that the reactor was about to become operational and could be used for the manufacture of atomic weapons for possible use against Israel.1 Because the UN favours the use of pacific measures to bring about conflict resolution, a pre-emptive strike is unlikely to receive support from the Security Council or the General Assembly of the UN. Indeed, the Osirak attack received widespread international condemnation including that of the French Government, who was a major sponsor of the project, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, the UN adopted unanimously a resolution that condemned the Israeli attack as a ‘clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conflict’.2 Such condemnation, however, may not necessarily deter individual states from taking pre-emptive military action should they consider it to be an act of self-defence. Significantly, though, the UN will only condone action in self-defence once ‘an armed attack occurs’ and not simply when the threat of attack exists.3 Thus, pre-emptive military action, although a part of the enabling strategy shown in Figure 5, is unlikely to be used in a UN context.

1 Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.29, Harlow, January 1983, p.31908. 2 ibid., p.31909. 3 See Charter of the UN, Article 51.

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The most frequently invoked element of an enabling strategy is that which threatens the use of military action. A threat is an expression of one’s intention to punish or hurt a person or thing and is usually conditional. Furthermore, it is because of its conditional nature that the threat must be justifiable, credible, proportionate and capable of being enacted in a timely manner. Most importantly, the consequences of carrying out the threat must receive the utmost consideration before the threat is issued. For, should the threat of action fail to achieve the desired result, there remains only compellence. If the actual use of force is the only means by which the United Nations can seize the initiative then it must make use of it, as without the initiative, the UN has little hope of successfully pursuing its political goals. Significantly though, a critical line is crossed at the first use of offensive force not taken in self-defence, be it delivered from the air, land or sea. That is the line of principles that underpin peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. If the belligerent is capable of physical retaliation, it is likely to be swift and impassioned. As the enabling strategy aims to bring about negotiation through graduated response, it is highly likely that only exemplary damages would have been inflicted. Thus, the belligerent will likely retain a degree of offensive capability even after attack. It is for this reason that the nature of the UN retribution and the ability to foresee the consequences become crucial factors to the success of the peacemaking process. If at any time the aim, objectives and conduct of military action become divorced from the overall peacemaking strategy, then such action may be seen to have lost its purpose. If this occurs, not only will the military forces be seen as ineffective and incredible, but the viability of the UN to broker peace either between or within states will be justifiably open to challenge. There is a very fine line of acceptability between the use of force in an enabling strategy and that used in an enforcement strategy. As enactment of enforcement strategies is likely to produce a rapid decline in public support, and perhaps even increase sympathy for the belligerent, it is vital that the UN remain on the right side of the line. Although it might seem ‘old hat’, ensuring public support for offensive action is most easily achieved by strict adherence to three of the principles of war, namely, selection and maintenance of the aim, concentration of force, and economy of effort. Achieving compellence, however, does not necessarily require the direct application of force against the antagonist and thus the UN must ensure that its consideration of options is not subject to too narrow a focus. The Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948 provides an excellent example of the use of indirect action in a circumstance where direct action by any of the parties involved was inconceivable.


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The blockade brought about an intense series of diplomatic negotiations concerning the future control of the city. Although the allies attempted to force the pace of negotiations, the fact remained that the lifeline to Berlin and its two and a half million inhabitants had been severed and it was slowly bleeding to death. For the allies, there were three choices: force the surface blockade, withdraw or sustain the city by air. The outcome is history, but it is noteworthy that the operation, which neither allied nor Soviet leaders expected to succeed, managed through indirect action to force the antagonist back to the negotiating table. Moreover, an outcome favouring the victim was ultimately achieved.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

Since its inception, the UN has always assumed a responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is only in the last five or so years, however, that its members have had to develop and implement strategies to fulfil the organisation’s wider aims. There have been a number of strategies employed and each has received a justifiable degree of adverse criticism. With the exception of its most recent encounters and that undertaken in the Congo, UN military activities have assumed a more conciliatory than truly interventionist nature. Moreover, force composition has been largely dominated by ground forces with naval and air forces performing largely a supporting role. Due to the unquestioned success of the UN in peacekeeping over the years, an unsurprising corollary has emerged that ground forces are uniquely qualified to provide the most appropriate form of military force in the pursuit of conflict resolution. ‘Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it’ is a well-known catchphrase and history is replete with illustrations to support it. But the United Nations is now playing a different ball game and, as the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have both shown, there are a number of military options that must be considered. Prior to ‘Desert Storm’, mention of warfare would most likely evoke among politicians and the general public, images of land or sea conflicts. However, war in the air, or from the air, has now assumed a new mantle of significance which some believe it has always had. Air power projection is not merely to support land power projection nor, indeed, is an air force subservient to an army. At a time when the United Nations is being called upon to resolve innumerable conflicts of both an inter and intrastate nature, the optimum use of its financial and materiel resources must be carefully considered. It is not so much a time for change as one for innovative thinking. Its Charter dictates that the UN follow an enabling strategy with regards to conflict resolution. Pacific settlement remains the aim, but the use of

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force in the last resort remains an option. Peacekeeping has its place, but peacemaking is not about keeping the peace, it is about resolving war. The message from Colonel John Warden is clear:

War is the last argument of kings ... (it) demands ... the coldest calculation, the most rational thought. Leaders lacking the ability to think clearly and precisely under war’s enormous pressures pay dearly - often with their lives, always with the present and future of their followers. Methods of war change, but the principles of war - the essence of war - have not changed.1

1 Warden, Col J.A. III, The Air Campaign, National Defense University Press,

Washington DC, 1988, p.172.


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PART THREE

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CHAPTER ONE

WHEREFORE AIR POWER ?

INTRODUCTION

The outcome of the Gulf War held little surprise for airmen. What was surprising was the degree to which people who should have known better were surprised.

Richard Hallion

USAF Historian1

If all avenues for exercising peace enforcement through military means are to be explored then the strengths and weaknesses of air, sea and land power must be fully documented and discussed. The Gulf War vividly illustrated the effectiveness of air power. There is little doubt that the air campaign was instrumental in shortening the conflict and reducing significantly the risk of allied casualties. However, although dominant and decisive during the early stages, air power alone was unlikely to satisfy the overall political aim. Air power was but one vital component of a joint operation. Other operations in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia have further illustrated the necessity for joint and/or combined operations. Indeed, joint and combined operations are well recognised as the way of the future. Nevertheless, it remains the responsibility of each individual arm of a nation’s military forces to promote the utility and appropriateness of its particular function within this integrated approach. This chapter is about air power. For the correct emphasis to be placed on the contribution of air assets to the peace process, the versatility as well as the limitations of air power must be made known. Air power can meet many tasks and fulfil many roles; however, this chapter will address specifically the potential of air power as coercer and deterrent. For those who specialise in other aspects of warfare and are less versed in the utility of air power, it is perhaps fitting to address firstly air power’s accepted traditional characteristics.

1 Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, p.268. Emphasis in original.


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THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER1

Nowadays, anyone considering land and sea operations of any importance must of necessity remember that above the land and the sea is the air.

Giulio Douhet

Air power is imbued with a number of fundamental characteristics of which the ability to operate in the third dimension, although not unique to air power, provides the greatest advantage over land and naval forces. In addition to the positive characteristics of air power there are, as with any form of military power, a number of limitations. Furthermore, other characteristics exist whose influence on air power may be positive, or otherwise, depending on the situation.

Positive Characteristics

Height/Perspective

The ability to operate at height gives to air power the advantages of increased perspective, speed and freedom of movement. This characteristic allows air power to observe and dominate activities that might otherwise be inaccessible to land and naval forces. The result is flexibility of employment, and inter alia through the ability to manoeuvre in three dimensions, increased survivability. In essence, the ability to exploit the third dimension gives a commander greater perceptiveness allowing insight and understanding.

Speed

The speed of air platforms allows a rapid projection of force providing potential for rapid response. High speed operations can reduce the time required to complete a mission thereby allowing more missions to be completed in a given time. In a hostile environment, be it ground-to-air or air-to-air, speed enhances the chances of survival by reducing threat exposure time.

Reach

The air environment has no natural lateral boundaries and, thus, air power can project its presence in any direction, in three dimensions,

1 For more on the characteristics of air power, see: Air Force Manual 1-1,

Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, HQ US Air Force, Washington DC, March 1992, pp 5-8; RAF AP3000, Air Power Doctrine, 2nd Edition, HMSO, 1993, pp 13-17; RAAF DI(AF) AAP1000, The Air Power Manual, 2nd Edition, AGPS, 1994, pp 31-41; and, Mackenzie, S., Strategic Air Power Doctrine for Small Air Forces, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, pp 17-21.

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unimpeded by surface features. In addition, reach can be greatly enhanced by the use of air-to-air refuelling (AAR).1 Speed and height combined give air power a reach far in excess of that achievable by surface or naval forces in the same timescale.

Flexibility

Aircraft can fulfil many roles and perform many tasks. Multi-roling, which is largely recognised as the way ahead, allows an individual aircraft platform to perform more than one role during a single mission and to be re-tasked in the air if necessary. For example, a strike aircraft may be capable of conducting tactical reconnaissance in addition to carrying out attacks against surface forces, whilst all the time being adequately equipped to take action in self-defence against hostile aircraft or surface-to-air missile systems. Similarly, large transport aircraft could perform a secondary role such as AAR, whilst simultaneously carrying out an air transport, surveillance or intelligence gathering task.

Ubiquity

Given adequate resources, air power is ubiquitous. Height, speed and reach allow it to go in any direction, anywhere, at any time. In essence, it is pervasive.

Versatility

Height, speed and reach, combined with the flexible and ubiquitous nature of air power, make it the most versatile component of military power. Concentrated force can be applied rapidly and simultaneously against any number or type of enemy target sets in support of national, joint, combined or coalition objectives. In changing or uncertain circumstances, unity of command allows air power to be employed, or rapidly re-employed, against any level of objective from strategic through to tactical.

Shock

The shock of the sudden application of military power can have a damaging psychological as well as physical effect on an enemy. Discriminating between these two components is difficult but suffice to say that increasing the degree of physical damage is likely to produce a corresponding psychological effect. Air, land and naval forces can all achieve high levels of destruction through the concentration of force, but one should not confuse destruction with

1 AAR was critical in extending the reach of RAF air power during the

Falklands crisis of 1982. As a further example, UK-based US forces conducting Operation ‘El Dorado Canyon’ against Libya in 1986, having been denied overflight rights by Spain and France, were totally dependent on AAR support to improve their reach.


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effectiveness. Shock is most effective when combined with an element of surprise, and surprise is best achieved by exploiting the fourth dimension - time. The versatility of air power allows it to control the time domain and target those elements of an enemy’s war machine least expecting attack. Such attacks can generate a disproportionate psychological fear of vulnerability within enemy ranks. It is through the ability to control the time dimension that air power achieves its considerable advantage over surface forces.

Minimisation of Casualties

Significant technological advancements in modern air-launched weaponry has greatly improved targeting accuracy. Precision bombing provides high density (ie mass per unit volume), and neutralisation of a target may be possible at the first attempt. Consequently, air warfare using precision weapons can produce much lower levels of combatant and non-combatant casualties than when constrained to the use of unguided ordnance. Significantly though, now that precision has been achieved, it will be expected and, in many cases, demanded.1

Political Responsiveness

All of the above characteristics of air power make it eminently suitable as a tool of political response. Air power can convey a number of political messages over considerable distances at very short notice. Be it used in a supportive, coercive, deterrent or offensive role it carries with it an impersonal and remote quality most attractive to political use.

1 During the Gulf War of 1990/91, ‘approximately 9,300 laser-guided bombs

(LGBs) were dropped. LGBs were the weapon of choice when accuracy was required. Although there where some instances of weapons failing to guide; overall, LGBs were responsible for minimising collateral damage’. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, p.T-182.

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Limitations

I have mathematical certainty that the future will confirm my assertion that aerial warfare will be the most important element in future wars.

Giulio Douhet

Airmen do not like to talk about limitations when considering the application of air power. Air power is a unique and progressive force that, since its inception, has fundamentally changed the conduct of warfare. Unfortunately, to promote their cause, early air power theorists often promised more than the air power technology of the time could deliver. Overstating air power’s attributes whilst making light of its limitations was a deliberate ploy by the theorists to promote the formation of a separate service. Not surprisingly, a converse stance was adopted by the other Services in order to reassert their dominance. The debate continued for decades and, as a consequence theories on the employment of air power were conflictory, diverse and heavily influenced by the colour of the theorist’s uniform. However, whether the air force should be a separate service or air power should be controlled by or within the other services is not the issue. Air power is here to stay and during the Gulf War its decisive influence was clearly demonstrated. If air power is ever to realise its true potential, however, parochialism must be put to one side. Ultimately, the political and military aim, the nature of the enemy and the geographic and strategic circumstances must dictate the means of military power best suited to achieve the task. The limitations of air power, underplayed by the early theorists, still exist. Nonetheless, recent technological developments have significantly changed the influence of these limitations on mission success. Although all three arms of the military benefit from advancing technology, air power has a synergistic relationship not shared with surface forces. The speed and complexity of advances in both air platforms and air-delivered weapons have necessitated a re-appreciation of the potency of air power. Air power truly came of age in 1991 and although some sceptics consider the Desert Storm air campaign an aberration, few can deny that Iraqi capitulation was due in large part to the systematic, relentless application of air power. Undoubtedly, air power has finally reached maturity. Nevertheless, an assessment on the potential contribution of air power must be balanced and current air power doctrine identifies a number of limitations with regards the employment of air power.1 1 AP 3000, the RAF manual of air power doctrine identifies impermanence,

limited payloads and fragility as limitations. AAP 1000, the RAAF air power


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Impermanence

Limited fuel, limited weaponry, aircraft servicing requirements, weather and crew fatigue have, in the past, all contributed to the impermanence of air power. Although the introduction of AAR and all-weather systems have enhanced the endurance and capabilities of aircraft, a degree of impermanence remains. Nonetheless, advances in weapons and airframe technology have reduced the number of aircraft required to fulfil a particular objective whilst at the same time improving the chances of mission success. A comprehensive intelligence collection capability together with vastly improved air, land and sea-based surveillance platforms can allow fighter aircraft with rapid reaction times to be held on ground alert instead of on permanent airborne patrol. From an offensive viewpoint, precision weapons which offer accuracy and density can reduce the number of offensive assets required to achieve an objective and obviate the need to revisit the target in the short term. In essence, air power has become more efficient and, in certain circumstances, the threatened use of air power may be all that is required to achieve the political objective. Moreover, threatened action rather than permanent presence could, certainly in a UN context, be more politically acceptable to all concerned. Unquestionably, aircraft cannot have indefinite physical presence; however, if the enemy is of the belief that its every move is being watched and that air power may be present, then that in itself could be sufficient.

Limited Payloads

Without doubt, the size of the payload that can be delivered by air is limited. But, one must question if this factor is relevant. The matter of critical import is whether air power can achieve the desired objective within the required timescale. From a transportation perspective, land vehicles and ships can carry far greater payloads than aircraft. However, a small payload delivered quickly could be of equal, if not greater value than a large one delivered later. In humanitarian operations, for example, the very survival of the afflicted may depend on the interim supply by air of a minimum quantity of aid pending the arrival of a ground or sea convoy. By example of a conflict situation, the number of fighter aircraft deployed with minimum support to Saudi Arabia following

manual considers base dependence, cost, vulnerability, impermanent effect and political restraint. Interestingly, AFM 1-1, the manual of USAF aerospace doctrine adopts a different approach and simply highlights those factors essential to sustained aerospace operations rather than identifying limitations per se.

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Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was critical in deterring Iraqi aggression against other neighbouring countries. A failure to contain the conflict could have resulted in a significantly different outcome.1 However, deterrence was simply the first step. Winning the war, achieving the political and military objectives, required more than just air power - each military arm had its part to play. The lesson, and perhaps the key to future success, lies in appreciating the complementary nature of the air, land and sea power contributions. From an offensive viewpoint, payload is directly related to objective, and attainment of the objective relies on correct weapon to target matching and delivery systems with an accuracy appropriate to the task. One could consider that a single bomb dropped from a single aircraft effectively concluded the Second World War. On the other hand, eight million tons of bombs dropped by the US in Indochina between 1962 and 1973 failed to gain the required result. Limited payload need rarely be a limitation provided the correct thought process is given to the application of air power. The US experience in Vietnam provides a graphic illustration of mental ill-preparedness:

The Air Force, winging its way into Southeast Asia on a doctrine devised for bombing Nazi Germany, was not alone in its nostalgia for fighting WWII nor in its determination to envisage the enemy’s capabilities as mirroring its own ... The (military) generals could not devise one appropriate (strategy) ... the Air Force along with the other services was rarely outfought, ... but often outthought.2

Fragility

It is important not to confuse fragility with vulnerability, and vulnerability in itself has two sides. A number of factors, of which air power is one, will determine a nation’s ability to wage war and each will display varying degrees of vulnerability to attack. As the Egyptians discovered in 1967, air power, if attacked on the ground, can be rendered virtually useless in a very short period of time. The situation is exacerbated if the targeted nation has little depth of supply and no means of rapid production, as was the Egyptian case. Furthermore, the Iraqi experience in the Gulf War demonstrated that even when protected by hardened shelters, air power still remains 1 ‘Lest there be any doubt about Saddam’s intention to invade Saudi Arabia

and other Gulf States, an extract from a 1975 conference quotes him as saying “We don’t look on this piece of land here in Iraq as the ultimate limit of our struggle. It is part of a larger area and broader aims: the area of the Arab homeland and the aims of the Arab struggle”.’ Waters, G., Gulf Lesson One - The Value of Air Power, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1992, p.23.

2 Tilford, E.J., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1991, p.293, as quoted in Coulthard-Clark, ‘ The Air War in Vietnam: Re-evaluating Failure’, pp.173-174, emphasis in original.


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vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, air power is not necessarily more vulnerable to attack than any other element of national power. All have their critical nodes. Simply put, air power is one of the most essential parts of a nation’s war-making or war-preventing capability and, thus, is usually considered a lucrative target. Once in the air, aircraft are also vulnerable. However, modern technology has done much to reduce this vulnerability. Many aircraft can now choose to operate in inclement weather at night, thereby reducing the risk of visual detection. Moreover, electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems, in addition to expendable decoys, minimise the possibility of electronic detection. And, of course, low-observable technology has given aircraft the ability to penetrate airspace almost undetected.1 Aircraft are however, by their very nature, fragile. Agility and speed demand light and highly stressed materials. As such, air platforms rarely carry any form of armoured protection. If an air vehicle is successfully engaged then the result is likely to be catastrophic. Although fragility is likely to remain a limitation in aircraft design, its limiting effect on operations can be largely overcome by reducing the chance of detection and/or nullifying the enemy’s threat systems. Comparison of combat air loss rates since WWII clearly demonstrate this point.2 ECM, low-observable design, tactics and the ability to exploit height and speed all serve to achieve the desired cloak of invisibility.

Other Characteristics

In addition to those characteristics listed above, there are a number of other factors which, although not representing either positive attribute or limitation, should, nevertheless, be considered when contemplating the utility of air power.

1 ‘Over the course of the (Gulf) War, the deployed F-117s flew approximately

two per cent of the total attack sorties, yet struck about 40 per cent of the strategic targets attacked ... The F-117 flew into the highest threat areas and was exposed to these threats for a relatively long time ... Typically, F-117 sorties used little or no direct electronic combat or fighter support ... No F-117s were lost or damaged due to air defenses, an outcome which strongly suggests stealth technology was effective’. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, p.T-74.

2 ‘ The combat air loss rate for US forces during WWII was 9.7 per cent; during Korea, 2 per cent; and during Vietnam, 0.4 per cent. Israeli losses during the Yom Kippur War were one per cent. In the Falklands, British losses were less than 2 per cent, while Argentina’s loss rate was 6 per cent.’ In the Gulf War, the total allied air loss rate, including US forces, was only 0.035 per cent. Waters, Gulf Lesson One, p.143.

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Base Dependence

Air power is not made up of airplanes alone. Air power is a composite of air planes, air crews, maintenance crews, air bases, air supply, and sufficient replacements in both planes and crews to maintain a constant fighting strength, regardless of what losses may be inflicted by the enemy.1

The above quotation could be suitably adapted for army or navy purposes as, in truth, all forms of modern military power depend on support. Air power, however, has a unique requirement for an operating surface. For helicopters, VSTOL2 and carrier-based aircraft, and other air platforms such as cruise missiles, a traditional runway is not necessary. Similarly, transport aircraft such as the Hercules can operate from field strips. Conventional land-based combat aircraft, however, require solid runways. Thus, air bases represent a focussed point of vulnerability, a centre of gravity in the eyes of the enemy. Base dependency, however, does not necessarily constitute a limitation. In the first instance, an air base may be hard to find and hard to attack. Furthermore, to permanently deny a runway requires a considerable number of assets over a prolonged period.3 Secondly, should operations from a particular base prove unsustainable, commanders might, by exploiting the fundamental characteristics of air power such as speed and reach, be able to utilise an alternative airfield remote from the threat and thereby maintain the air campaign.

Cost

Modern, single-role combat aircraft cost more than tanks. Multi-role combat aircraft cost more than single-role aircraft. A squadron of multi-role aircraft costs almost double that of a frigate. Combat pilots cost around £3 million each to train. In sum, modern air power is expensive. Cost, nevertheless can be both a strength and a weakness, not necessarily of air power per se, but of national power in its entirety. Countries with buoyant economies will be able to afford the latest that technology has to offer (on the assumption, of course, that the manufacturing nation is willing to provide), whereas poorer nations

1 Arnold, General H., Global Mission, Harper & Row, New York, 1949, p.291, as

quoted in Air Force Manual 1-1, Vol. 1, p.88. 2 Vertical, short take-off and landing. 3 During the Gulf War, in order to deny the Iraqis the use of their airfields ‘the

attack aircraft averaged three sorties every 24 hours. Attacks were made against 16 primary and 28 dispersal airfields. Thirty-eight of them were attacked at least four times and nine were irreparably damaged’. Waters, Gulf Lesson One, p.126.


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will be forced to rely on larger numbers of less capable aircraft. In some cases, a less capable force may be all that a nation requires given its strategic circumstances. Thus, to be truly representative, cost must be balanced against cost-effectiveness and this can only be measured in light of a nation’s geographic, strategic, political, social and economic circumstances.

Visibility

Air power is a highly visible form of military power. Its speed of response and versatility make it a much valued means of demonstrating political intent. When used as an offensive tool, results are often dramatic and, as such, attract considerable media attention, more so, perhaps, than the use of ground troops or ships. In truth, if offensive action is to be taken, then the use of air power in the first instance offers a rapid, relatively low risk, highly effective option and, thus, is often favoured by government. Media coverage of such events does not always present a balanced picture and politicians and diplomats are frequently called to justify the employment of air power. As with any issue that is politically sensitive, temptation exists on the part of the government to directly control air operations. The role of air power in the Gulf War was reasonably well understood by each of the Services as well as by the general public. The political aim was clear, military direction, although argued vociferously from each corner, was well defined and, perhaps most importantly, the task was achievable. As such, the Gulf War may have been the exception to the rule. History is replete with illustrations of how potentially effective military operations have been stymied by political leaders unwilling to promote or support cogent, realistic and achievable military objectives.1 Air power, or any other military power for that matter, should not be used on a whim. If the employment of force serves merely to satisfy national public opinion or mollify international criticism and is lacking in clear military objective, it stands to cause untold damage to the credibility of military power as a coercive tool. The experience of Vietnam has much to teach us and should not be confined to history simply because recent campaigns have been more successful:

1 The US experience in Vietnam provides perhaps the best illustration: ‘In late

1964, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff presented proposals for a hard-hitting, 16-day air campaign against 94 strategic targets considered critical to the DRV’s ability to wage war. This program was rejected by Johnson and McNamara, who decided that the option of bombing should only supplement pacification efforts focussed within the RVN. Thus the “Rolling Thunder” program initially implemented by the US amounted to a tactical rather than strategic air offensive, one aimed at sending signals of political will rather than achieving decisive military objectives.’ Coulthard-Clark, ‘ The Air War in Vietnam: Re-evaluating Failure’, p.174.

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I think the missing ingredient was clearly stated strategic objectives. The objectives for the air campaign weren’t clearly enunciated, and neither was an air campaign plan. But at the tactical level we thought we were doing a great job.1 The people who should learn from Vietnam are not the military but the politicians. Military power is only as effective as the guts of the politicians who use it, and I suggest that if we’d had LBJ and McNamara at the time of the Gulf war, we’d still be there and the casualties would be mounting.2

THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

Air Power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, or even to express in precise terms.

Sir Winston Churchill3

Theories on the most appropriate employment of air power have evolved through the works of a number of reputable air power theorists such as Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, de Seversky, Wrigley, Wever and, in more modern times, Boyd and Warden. Although some of their theories differ in concept, there emerges from their study many common fundamentals from which Colonel Meilinger of the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies has derived 10 modern-day propositions as shown in Table 7. A number of these propositions are particularly apposite to the employment of air power in support of UN peace operations. Their importance will become apparent as air power capabilities are discussed in this chapter, and the use of military force in the next.

1 Air Vice-Marshal Gary Beck RAAF commenting on his experience as a pilot in

Vietnam in Stephens (ed), The War in the Air, p.178. 2 Air Marshal David Evans RAAF commenting on his experience as CO No 2

(Canberra) Sqn in Vietnam, ibid. 3 As quoted in AP3000, p.13.

MEILINGER’S TEN PROPOSITIONS REGARDING AIRPOWER

1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.

2. Air Power is an inherently strategic force.

3. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon.

4. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.

5. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension - time.


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Table 7 - Meilinger’s Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power1

Lt Gen Sir Michael Rose, a former commander of UNPROFOR, once said, ‘it simply is not militarily possible to secure safe areas or enforce the passage of convoys by the use of air power alone’.2 Few air power proponents would challenge that statement; however, they might assert that nor could land or sea power achieve the task alone. The fundamental requirement is a combined approach, the success of which will only come to fruition if each military arm understands the capabilities of the other and is prepared, at the appropriate time, to argue for their use. Significantly, in the same article from which the opening statement came, General Rose admits that ‘without the support of NATO (air power), it (was) quite clear (to him) that the UN mission in Bosnia would have failed’.3 Having discussed the positive characteristics and limitations of air power, and before we consider its application in peace operations, an examination of air power’s capabilities is appropriate. Chapter Two will address specifically the employment of offensive air power in the peace process. However, air power makes a significant contribution across the entire spectrum of combat operations and discussion of such capabilities should not be excluded from this appraisal. AP 3000, the manual of RAF air power doctrine, details a number of applications of air power pertinent to various situations and includes a list of example measures. These applications, shown in Table 8, illustrate the contribution that air power can make across the entire spectrum of combat operations. It has often been surmised that the fundamental role of air power is to support surface forces. Whilst support is an important facet of air operations, recent conflicts demonstrate that air power can play the leading role. Under the auspices of the UN, the international diplomatic fraternity frequently seeks selective military action that has the potential to influence rapidly and directly the course of diplomatic events. Air power, being an inherently strategic force, is the best instrument for this purpose.

1 Meilinger, Col P., Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power, Air Force History and

Museums Program 1995, reprinted as APSC Paper No.36, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1995. In this paper, which makes for compulsive reading, Meilinger explores in detail each of his propositions regarding air power.

2 Rose, Lt Gen Sir M., ‘A Year in Bosnia: What Has Been Achieved’, RUSI Journal, London, June 1995, p.24.

3 ibid.

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That air power is vital to peace operations is borne out by the way in which, in 1995, every RAF air power role was employed in such operations. Nonetheless, as an aside, one must be careful not to consider air power the sole prerogative of an air force. Army and naval aviation play an equally important part. However, it is not ownership that is important. The true capability of air power lies in its ability to perform parallel operations at all levels of war simultaneously and this capability will only be realised if it is centrally controlled.

Situation Applications Example Measures Peace Promoting International

Relations Disaster Relief

Providing Reassurance Observation Crisis Warning Observation and Reporting

Signalling Demonstration Flights Providing Support Resupply and Redeployment Rescue Evacuation Injecting Stability Force Insertion Implicit Deterrence Redeployment, Surveillance Explicit Deterrence Increased Readiness, Overt

Demonstration Flights Non-Lethal Coercion Implicit and Explicit Threats Punishment Selective Attacks

War Observation Reconnaissance Destruction Attacks to Destroy Lethal Coercion Attacks to Coerce Denial or Containment Holding Actions Dislocation Consequential Effect Delay Consequential Effect Diversion Consequential Effect Demoralisation

Table 8 - Applications of Air Power1

Historically, the role of air power in peace operations has been the provision of air transport and logistic support. Undoubtedly, the strategic airlift of troops assigned to UN duties and their equipment is important and requires little amplification here. However, at the tactical level, mobility for ground forces (ie the ability to manoeuvre) is essential. Manoeuvre is the land element’s foremost means of applying the principles of concentration of force, economy of effort and surprise. In Somalia, Cambodia and Bosnia, to mention but a few examples, freedom of movement for UN ground forces has been restricted either by local factions or by physical objects such as mines and roadblocks. Without freedom of movement, the ability of UN ground forces to implement their mandate is severely hampered. Air

1 Table reproduced from AP3000, p.25.


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power can overcome such obstacles by providing the required mobility and, more importantly, the desired rate of manoeuvre. The transportation task has also frequently included the delivery of humanitarian aid and/or disaster relief. Humanitarian operations are generally sustained in the long term by ground forces. However, by their very nature humanitarian emergencies often require a rapid response. Air power can provide such a response and, moreover, can overcome the problems of inaccessibility or an unfavourable security situation. For example, the survival of the Kurds in northern Iraq and many of the innocents caught up in the Bosnian crisis was due entirely to the sustained delivery by air of food and essential supplies. In March 1993, the US Air Force alone air-dropped up to 78 tons of cargo daily to those regions in the former Yugoslavia unable to receive supplies by road.1 For offensive operations, meticulous targeting is the key to success. The key to meticulous targeting is timely, accurate, detailed and relevant intelligence. Air platforms, both manned and unmanned, provide invaluable information to the intelligence community. Some modern air platforms, by utilising sensor-fusion can analyse and distribute vital intelligence data in real time. Moreover, technological advances in the field of electronic sensing has ensured that little can escape the ‘eye in the sky’. Surveillance and reconnaissance, both natural roles for air power, can produce invaluable ammunition for the diplomats at the negotiating table. Ultimately, though, it is in the selection of targets and analysis of action taken against them that the success of last-resort peacemaking lies. The contribution of air power in assisting the targeting process is crucial. On occasion, the UN will be obliged to resort to the use of force to ensure compliance with the measures the Security Council has deemed necessary or desirable. Such employment of force may encroach upon or more likely cross the line of impartiality and consent. The most appropriate military instrument for enforcement action should be given careful consideration as such action will undoubtedly impinge on any related peacekeeping or humanitarian operations underway at the time. Nevertheless, the UN Charter is explicit in considering air forces the most appropriate weapons of first resort against potential aggressors, but it has little experience in their employment.2 Air power can be decisive as both deterrent, creator and counter. A doctrine to promote its utility in this new environment is well overdue.

1 Bash, Maj B.L., The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping, Air

University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1994, p.25. 2 Grove, E., ‘UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee’, International

Security Vol.17, No.4, 1993, p.173.

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CHAPTER TWO

ROUND PEGS, ROUND HOLES

We must not lose sight of three interconnected objectives which represent the very essence of the United Nations: the quest for peace, the protection of human life and the rejection of a culture of death. These objectives will take time to attain and they will be attained only through the successful use of non-military methods.


To say the issue of the use of force in peace operations is contentious is really to state the obvious. Yet there are, of course, no easy answers, no panacea to the vagaries of human nature. As long as man exists on this planet, there will be war. Of that, we can be certain. Boutros-Ghali’s vision of absolute peace achieved through non-military methods is utterly commendable even though, in reality, it is more akin to Plato’s republic which, of course, exists only in heaven. War is a conflict-resolving mechanism that now is considered immoral. Yet in times past, war has not only resolved conflict but also has encouraged social progress and better standards of life. The American Civil War, in which a policy of attrition by the stronger side ultimately wore out the weaker, was once described as:

... the only war in modern times as to which we can be sure, first, that no skill and patience of diplomacy could have avoided it, and second, that preservation of the American union and abolition of negro slavery were two vast triumphs of good by which even the inferno of war was justified.2

How the nature of warfare repeats itself. The serious fighting that began in Croatia in 1991 was the direct result of that republic declaring independence. Moreover, attrition warfare once again was dominant. The American Civil War lasted four years as, by June 1995, had the war in the former Yugoslavia. Admittedly, the social chemistry of the Balkans in the 1990s is considerably more complex than that of America in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the fundamental reason for conflict remains the same. Where the situations differ, however, is in the public acceptability of attrition warfare (or more appropriately the knowledge that it is happening), and the nature of the options available to bring about a resolution to the conflict. In 1 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions

982(1995) and 987(1995), para.80. 2 Lord Morley, quoted in J.T. Winterich’s Introduction (1951) to Stephen

Crane’s ‘Red Badge of Courage’ in Wintle, The Dictionary of War Quotations, p.107.

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1860, air power (in the form of balloons) played a supporting role. Today, air power dominates warfare. Air power provides vital support to surface and naval forces, but most importantly it provides the peacemakers with an offensive weapon that is discriminatory, decisive, and eminently well-suited to act as a catalyst to diplomatic negotiation. It is, however, the effectiveness of air power in this role that is the greatest bone of contention. Few would question the contribution made by those air power roles which do not involve the use or threatened use of offensive weapons. Such roles include airlift, air drop, surveillance, reconnaissance, AEW&C, search and rescue, communications, intelligence gathering, logistic resupply, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation. However, there is a school of thought that believes the employment of air power to fulfil the deterrent and compellence functions of an enabling strategy is inappropriate and wasteful.1 Such comment is aimed particularly at instances of low-intensity, urban conflict. If air power is to absolve itself of such criticism, it must be seen in appropriate circumstances as the most effective instrument available to meet the political objective. There are a number of circumstances in which the UN Security Council may authorise the use of force other than in self-defence. In determining if offensive air power has a role to play, we must examine each of these various circumstances. This analysis will not provide solutions. Its purpose is to fuel the debate on UN peace operations by providing credible alternative strategies. There is no panacea with regards to conflict. Every strategy for peace involving the use of force will have its inherent problems. As was stated earlier, there are three situations in which the UN Security Council may consider enforcement action appropriate. These are: one, in response to violations of national sovereignty; two, in circumstances of intrastate conflict resulting in the state effectively ceasing to function; and three, in circumstances of intrastate conflict resulting in unacceptable levels of human suffering. In each of the above situations, the use of force is usually reactive. However, in his Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali promotes numerous proactive measures. The purpose of such measures is primarily to create confidence thereby easing tensions and avoiding an outbreak of conflict. Measures may be predominantly diplomatic in nature but could also include preventive deployment of military forces or imposition of demilitarised zones. If it is to be effective, military force

1 For an interesting view on offensive air operations in Bosnia and their effect

on the local community see, Hinton, Sqn Ldr P.N., ‘An Air War Without Front Lines’, Air Clues, DDTP(RAF), June 1995, pp.208-211. Allegations of ‘unnecessary destruction’ in the Gulf War of 1991 can be found in Normand, R., ‘ The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War’, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.35/2, Spring 1994.


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employed in such a manner must carry with it a threat of consequential action.

PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT

With one recent exception, UN forces have invariably been deployed as a consequence of conflict rather than as a deterrent to it. The new strategy of preventive deployment envisaged by Boutros-Ghali in Agenda for Peace was first enacted in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during November 1992. Concerned about the possible impact that fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia might have on its security, Macedonia, through its President, had requested deployment of a UN deterrent force. The force, which remains in being and is presently known as UNPREDEP, comprised initially some 1,000 troops and around 100 civilian personnel. Members of the deployment were mandated to ‘monitor and report any developments ... (that might) undermine confidence ... in Macedonia and threaten its territory’.1 Notwithstanding that, in the Macedonian example, forces were deployed on only one side of the border, there was nothing to preclude deployment on both sides should consent have been forthcoming. Notably, the ‘border’ need not necessarily be a recognised interstate border; it may, in reality, be simply a boundary line between two or more disputing factions. To date UNPREDEP has fulfilled its mandate and has successfully mediated several tense border encounters. Moreover, it has enjoyed an excellent co-operative relationship with the host government. How effective the force has been as a deterrent however, and, if indeed an actual threat to Macedonia’s security presently exists are issues both open to debate. The presence of UN soldiers in other parts of the former Yugoslavia has certainly done little to deter continued aggression, even though it may have saved many lives. Preventive deployment is symbolic in that it demonstrates a UN interest in the prevailing situation, but if it is to carry a message of deterrence it must be seen as the initial step of a graduated response. To deter is to discourage action through fear of the consequences. In a national security scenario, deterrence may be provided through the existence of large and credible standing forces. However, in a UN context where the threat to peace may be through a sudden perhaps unforeseen outbreak or resumption of hostilities, a rapid show of force is required. Air Power is pervasive and can dominate the fourth dimension - time. Thus, air power, in certain circumstances, has distinct advantages over the deterrent potential of land and sea forces. Moreover, air

1 UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev.4 effective 30 April 1995.

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power can provide occasional and temporary presence which reassures the local community without disrupting its societal composition and thereby reduces the possibility of resentment. The potential of aircraft to fulfil this role is well illustrated by Philip Towle in his study of aircraft in unconventional warfare.1 In Aden and Iraq during the 1920s and India during the 1930s, the British authorities employed a policy of ‘air policing’ to exercise control over the local tribesmen. An aircraft presence served to deter aggression and outbreaks of conflict much more effectively than could be achieved by ground forces:

... tribal people could never allow themselves to confess that mere soldiers, even by the thousand, could overawe ... But tanks and above all an aeroplane pushed up the stakes. They were like a nuclear threat.2

There was a school of thought, however, that argued ‘air power only worked because it was novel and the novelty would soon wear off’.3 Maybe the tribesmen were getting the measure of air power. However, the second step of the graduated response normally achieved the aim and once more it was the aeroplane that was best suited to provide it:

Before the enemy became accustomed to aeroplanes, the mere sight of a machine in the distance was sufficient to send them scurrying for cover, but later they would move about in the open and would only disperse when bombed and machine-gunned.4

The nature of the response should a belligerent choose to flout UN measures must be quick and decisive. A ground offensive would struggle to meet this requirement. Moreover, ground combat operations would be unlikely to receive any degree of international support as the risk to life would probably outweigh the importance of implementing the mandate. If punitive action is required, it would be best undertaken by a third party such as air power. Not only does air power have the ability for rapid, cross-border strategic strike with surgical precision, it is comparatively low-risk. Furthermore, it allows the ground forces, to a certain extent, to remain disinterested. Obviously, should punitive air strikes be required then deterrence has failed. Nevertheless, the suggestion is that preventive deployment will only be a credible deterrent if it is part of an overall strategy that takes

1 For a detailed appraisal of Britain’s ‘air policing’ policy in the 1920s and

1930s, see Towle, P.A., Pilots and Rebels, Brassey’s, London, 1989, pp.9-55. 2 Allfree, P.S., ‘Hawks of the Hadhramaut’, Robert Hall, London, 1967 in ibid.,

p.34. 3 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, p.53. 4 AIR/9/11, ‘India 1919-1937’, in ibid., p.53.


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account, before the deployment takes place, of possible subsequent actions. Although a number of similarities emerge here between the activities of preventive forces and those of peacekeeping forces, the fundamental differences lie in the mandates that underpin each type of operation. Preventive forces, in the case of Macedonia authorised under Chapter VIII, are concerned with confidence building and prevention, their aim being to deter aggression before it occurs whilst at all times respecting the sovereignty of the host state. The purpose of the latter’s activities, primarily authorised under Chapter VI, are to keep and build the peace following cessation of an outbreak of conflict whilst mutual trust is re-established.

THE USE OF OFFENSIVE AIR POWER

While (military ) action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.


All facets of the peace process are inextricably linked and, regrettably for those debating the employment of offensive air power, herein lies a problem. An air campaign could be defined as a series of co-ordinated, interrelated air operations whose purpose is to attain a specific strategic result, normally in a finite period of time. It is generally accepted that there are three air campaigns and history has shown them to be interactive and, on most occasions, prosecuted concurrently.2 The three campaigns should be thought of as complementary, dovetailing in with land and sea operations in pursuit of a common joint objective. Rarely, might one imagine, would circumstances arise in which the aim and objectives of the ground forces and the air assets supporting them were antithetical to other elements of air power operating in the same geographical area. Unfortunately, the diversity of peace operations frequently generates just such circumstances. Here, one must pay heed to the overall objective. Accordingly, the optimum means by which to achieve this objective must be determined, before due consideration is given to the contributory factors that may preclude its use. Logically, if the optimum is untenable, alternative options must then be pursued.

1 As stated in Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.43. 2 RAF AP 3000 defines the three air campaigns as Counter-Air (Control of the

Air), Strategic Air Offensive (Air Strike) and Anti-Surface-Force (Air Support). The definitions in RAAF AAP 1000, which are generally though not directly similar, are shown in brackets.

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All the lessons of recent peace operations indicate that the UN must adopt a cohesive disposition if it is to fulfil the aim of its Charter. Thus, there exists the requirement for a campaign plan which ensures close co-ordination between diplomatic, security and humanitarian action. Peace operations are broad in definition, complex in nature, and forever producing challenges to the international community. The traditional all-embracing term of ‘peacekeeping’ has been replaced by ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘wider peacekeeping’, ‘peace enforcement’, ‘peacebuilding’, and numerous other terms liberally adopted by all who research the subject of peace operations. Exact definitions are not important, except that each phase of the peace process generates a number of political, diplomatic and military roles. If each of these is represented by a round hole, then our quest must be to ensure that the hole is filled with a round peg. It was proffered earlier that three situations exist in which the UN Security Council might consider enforcement action to be appropriate. The optimum instrument of enforcement should be considered in each case. As the need for close co-ordination has been identified, it would be remiss not to address at the same time the potential effect that employing one particular aspect of military power might have on the overall campaign objective.

Reacting to Violations of National Sovereignty

The primary purpose of the United Nations as given in Article 1 of the UN Charter is ‘to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of (international) peace’. Furthermore, Article 39 allows for the Security Council to determine the existence of a threat to the peace and the necessary responsive measures. The use of military force to counter a violation of national sovereignty is, thus, probably the easiest of all its uses to justify. Nonetheless, examples of UN forces undertaking such an enforcement role are rare. One instance occurred during the Cold War, namely in Korea, and the only other occurrence was following the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. Of course, there have been other challenges to national sovereignty, such as the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979 and the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. On both of these last occasions, however, responsive military action was a national affair. Naturally, every state has an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. Whether defending forces are operating under a UN or a national flag is immaterial. In either event, the aim of the operation is the restoration of sovereignty.


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Although justification for interventionary military action may be easily understood, the means by which the political objective is achieved deserves closer analysis. To address the contribution that air power can make to the political process, two examples are examined to assess the pertinence of the lessons learnt to future scenarios. Although all aspects of the use of air power will be considered, the focus of the analysis is on the use of offensive air power as an instrument of enforcement.

The Gulf Campaign

The Air Force did deliver on its promise to make any ground offensive a walkover.1

The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and the successful enforcement action that ensued is a well documented event. The chronological details of Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Sabre need no reiteration. However, the part that air power played as an instrument of enforcement has been a matter of continued, heated debate. It is important to study the wording of the UN Resolution that ultimately authorised the Coalition action:

(Resolution 678) authorises Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements (Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions), to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 ... and to restore international peace and security in the area.2

The aim was thus twofold, contravening the first principle of war which holds that the overall aim should be clear, concise and singular. Resolution 678 called for Iraq’s immediate, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Military leaders were closely involved and had direct influence in discussions concerning the nature of necessary action to secure the first objective. However, the optimum method by which the second and wider objective was to be achieved was subject to considerable political constraint. To some degree, the two objectives were complementary in that military action carried out to achieve the former was most probably assisting in attainment of the latter. Nonetheless, once Iraq capitulated and the sovereignty of Kuwait was re-established, international support for continued

1 From Gordon, M.R. and Trainor, Gen B.E., The Generals’ War, Little, Brown

& Company, Boston, 1995, p.474. 2 UN Security Council Resolution 678 dated 29 November 1990, emphasis

added.

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military action waned, leaving diplomatic measures the only means by which to achieve the wider objective. What then, of the contribution of air power ? Following the invasion of Kuwait, the immediate concern of the Americans, the Saudis and the UN Security Council was that Iraq would continue its aggression southwards in an attempt to gain control of other Gulf states. Thus, the forces that were rapidly deployed under Desert Shield were intended to deter and, if necessary, challenge any further expansionism by Iraq. Only air power could provide such an immediate deterrent and this was reflected by the arrival in theatre of some 200 fighter aircraft within eight days of the invasion. In fact, the first fighters arrived and were flying combat air patrols after only six days, but more significantly, only 34 hours after the order was given to deploy.1 Brigades of the US 82nd Airborne Division also deployed within the week as an additional deterrent. Realistically, these immediate reaction forces would have been unable to counter a determined Iraqi advance; however, their deployment demonstrated Coalition resolve and caused Hussein to think that Saudi Arabia was well defended. A primary objective of the Coalition in the immediate days following the invasion was to achieve control of the air. Few commanders would be foolish enough to contemplate an offensive without it and, as such, its rapid achievement by the allies was probably a major deterrent.2 The problem still remained, however, of how to expel the Iraqis from Kuwaiti territory. Discussions, debates and arguments over the optimum strategy are well documented and, without doubt, there were major differences of opinion. An immediate ground offensive was not feasible due to the limited number of troops in theatre. Even later, the prospect of an all-out ground war at the commencement of the offensive was, due to the number of likely casualties, both militarily and politically unattractive. The air plan was conceived initially as a series of retaliatory measures that could be taken should Hussein continue his aggression or choose to make use of chemical or even nuclear weapons. In the event, it matured into the critical first step on the way to winning the war. Strategy for the air campaign was influenced greatly in its initial stages by the fundamental concepts espoused by Colonel John Warden. Warden’s philosophy was that air power, carefully targeted against an enemy’s ability to wage war, could compel that enemy to co-operate. Prosecution of this philosophy placed the main emphasis on incapacitation of the enemy, ie denying the ability of the head to

1 Waters, Gulf Lesson One, p.26. 2 ‘Within five weeks (of the invasion) the Iraqi air force was outnumbered and

(by) 17 January 1991 the Coalition’s fixed-wing air assets (had) virtually doubled. ibid.


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control the fighting body. Consequently, only key military capabilities required physical destruction. Warden’s targeting concept revolved around five nodes, each representing a series of generic targets. Destruction of any node would have an effect on the enemy’s ability to wage war, but some nodes were more critical than others. To illustrate the relative importance of each node, Warden laid them out in the form of five concentric circles as shown in Figure 6.1 Enemy command, being in the centre, represented the most important element.

It is probable that Warden believed air power alone could win the Gulf War.2 Certainly, only air power could realise the strategic attack plan that had been conceived and approved. Furthermore, only air power, by virtue of its characteristics, could attack the four inner rings by circumventing the outer. 1 Diagrammatic illustration of Warden’s theory as explained in Warden, Col

J.A., ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century’, in Schultz, R.H. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1992, pp.64-65.

2 ibid., pp.81-82.

WARDEN’S RINGS

Figure 6

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Whether air power won the war is a contentious issue and, until the Iraqis release the truth behind their decisions, it is likely to remain so. There is some evidence to suggest that Iraqi ground forces were preparing to withdraw before the allied offensive began, but that evidence remains circumstantial.1 That air power played a critical role is beyond question. Moreover, without the initial use of air power, it is likely that the primary objective would never have been achieved. With regard to the wider objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, one must look at the ultimate political goal and public acceptability of using the military instrument to achieve it. It would not be unjust to suggest that the politicians had thought little about how to manage the peace that, hopefully, would follow the war. By allowing Hussein to salvage key elements of his military machine the allies ensured that he could remain in power. Total destruction of Iraq’s military might possibly have given rise to a subsequent break-up of the country and even civil war. Certainly, a political vacuum could have resulted which either a democratically elected Iraqi candidate or an interim UN-nominated authority would have had to fill. In the cauldron of the Middle East, the existence of a political vacuum would have been extremely dangerous. On the other hand, few probably envisaged the internal suppression that the surviving Iraqi regime would inflict on its insurgent minorities. Nor indeed, was it likely that the UN foresaw the significant numbers of deterrent forces that would be required after the conflict to maintain the peace and defend human rights. In retrospect, the war probably was terminated too swiftly and the Iraqi military left stronger than had been originally intended. When the Iraqis were routed in Kuwait, air power could have prevented or at least deterred the retreating forces from re-entering Iraq thus giving the ground forces ample opportunity to deprive them of their materiel without further bloodshed. Furthermore, air strikes against the remaining critical targets in Baghdad, which had stopped after the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker2, could have compelled Hussein into a more submissive position. By maintaining the upper hand and keeping the initiative, the allies might have ensured fuller compliance with the demands of the relevant UN resolutions. Ultimately, the coercive nature of air power, which had been demonstrated so clearly throughout the campaign, could have brought about the downfall of the Hussein regime. Politics and international pressure, however, denied air power this opportunity.

1 See Mason, AVM R.A., Air Power, A Centennial Appraisal, Brassey’s, London,

1994, p.139. 2 The Al Firdos bunker was destroyed after intelligence suggested it was a C3

facility being used to direct the war. Post-war analysis refuted this claim. Hundreds of civilians were killed in the raid.


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The Gulf War graphically illustrated the immense potency of air power both as deterrent and counter. However, in that particular scenario, air power had many things to its advantage. An incredible number of modern, sophisticated air platforms capable of fulfilling almost every conceivable role were made available. These platforms were equipped with some of the most advanced weapons and technology in the world enabling accurate delivery and minimal collateral damage. Allied aircrews were amongst the most highly trained in combat operations. Finally, allied air power achieved superiority of numbers after only five weeks and opposition in the air, for whatever reason, was minimal. Air power was supported by an effective, comprehensive infrastructure which included large numbers of modern, well-equipped airfields in a variety of allied countries.1 Logistic supply, albeit a mammoth operation undoubtedly generating a plethora of problems, was allowed to proceed unhindered by the enemy. Similarly, the air bases, all of which could have been targeted, received few significant attacks. Accurate, timely intelligence was generally available even though obtaining battle damage assessment was problematic. Nonetheless, it had been possible to establish an extensive initial target plan. Significantly, the proximity of suitable air bases allowed attacks to be conducted against any of the centres of gravity identified in Warden’s rings. Finally, at least up until the Al Firdos incident, military leaders were free to develop the air campaign plan without political interference. Obviously, the plan was subject to Presidential approval as had been that for Vietnam twenty years earlier. However, in 1991, the politicians kept their decision-making at the strategic level, leaving the operational and tactical levels to the experts. If air power could not live up to its expectations when so much was in its favour, then it never would.

The Falklands Campaign

On 2 April 1982, Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands.2 In its Resolution 502, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion which called for an immediate withdrawal of Argentinian forces and a pacific settlement to the dispute. Despite considerable diplomatic effort and clear evidence of Britain’s willingness to resort to military means should it become necessary, Argentina declined to accept the

1 ‘(there was access to) airbases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE,

Turkey and Egypt ... twenty-one principal airfields and several secondary bases were used by the Coalition’, Mason, Air Power, A Centennial Appraisal, p.142.

2 Much of the factual content of this section is drawn from The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, HMSO, London, 1982.

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measures called for by the UN. Accordingly, British forces prepared to retake the islands by force. The military operation was exclusively a British one, however, as Margaret Thatcher made clear, its authority came from within the words of the UN Charter:

It is Argentina that has flagrantly failed to comply (with Resolution 502), and it is because of that failure that we must now be free to exercise our right to self-defence under Article 51.1

The Falkland Islands are British sovereign territory situated 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom mainland but only 400 miles from the coast of Argentina. Ascension Island, although still some 3,500 miles from the Falklands, provided the closest available airfield from which air operations could be conducted. Significantly, the Falklands were well outside the unrefuelled radius of any RAF aircraft operating from Ascension. The geographical situation and British force capabilities imposed considerable restrictions on the employment of air power. Although future UN operations are unlikely to be conducted over such vast distances, the problems of a remote and inhospitable operating area, precarious international and domestic support, incomplete intelligence, urban targets, poor weather, lack of suitable airbases and limited availability of advanced technology systems could, nevertheless, all be encountered. The principle objective of the British Government was to see the Islands ‘freed from occupation and returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment’.2 To achieve the political objective a ground force was required. Thus, a land campaign was conceived. A naval force capable of launching and supporting amphibious operations was also essential. Furthermore, conduct of the land campaign would be made considerably easier if the Argentinian forces on the Islands could be isolated from the mainland, and then subsequently attacked from the land, sea and air. Thus emerged a sea and an air campaign. The maritime anti-surface campaign was particularly successful. After the sinking of the General Belgrano, the Argentinian surface fleet effectively took no further part in the conflict. Argentinian submarines, which did pose a severe threat to the task force, were similarly neutralised by an intense anti-submarine campaign. Control of the air was vital to the success of the overall campaign. Argentinian ground troops were largely resupplied by air, the Islands 1 The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons,

2 April-15 June 1982, HMSO, London, 1982, p.137. 2 As stated by Prime Minister Thatcher during the first parliamentary debate

on 3 April 1982, Dobson, Miller & Payne, The Falklands Conflict, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1982, p.55.


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possessed a number of minor airfields from which light combat aircraft such as Pucaras could mount attacks, and the operations area was well within the reach of combat aircraft operating from mainland Argentina. Land/air operations, including such roles as air interdiction, offensive air support and reconnaissance would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the British land campaign, but more importantly, tactical air transport would be crucial to its success. The air campaign was an important element of the conflict. Yet, certain aspects precluded air power becoming dominant even though it had the potential to significantly change the course of events. Neither air supremacy nor air superiority was achieved by the British during the conflict. Fortunately, neither were they achieved by the Argentinians. Nonetheless, it was more by luck than judgement that surface forces were, on occasion, able to operate in a favourable air situation.1 Intelligence was scarce, no suitable land operating bases were available, the numbers of fighters on board the Royal Navy carriers was limited and neither carrier could support airborne early warning aircraft. Surprise is a most powerful influence in war and the Argentinian Air Force exploited it to the full. Offensive counter-air operations designed to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy air power were attempted by both sides but resulted in only limited success. British attacks against air bases on the Argentinian mainland could have been carried out by Vulcan bombers; however, enemy air defences together with the inadequacy of the 1,000 lb bomb as an airfield-denial weapon would have rendered such attacks futile. Attempts were made to nullify air operations on the Islands themselves. The SAS were successful in destroying a number of aircraft on the ground, but Harrier and Vulcan attacks were unable to close the primary airfield at Port Stanley for any more than a short period and Argentinian air resupply continued for most of the conflict. Additional Vulcan missions were flown to suppress enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but once again, they resulted in only temporary success. Defensive counter-air operations on the other hand produced a more favourable outcome. Excluding those destroyed on the ground, 72 confirmed and 14 probable kills were achieved, yet, only 27 per cent of these were attributable to the fighters. Land/air operations exposed a number of weaknesses. Close air support missions were hampered by the inadequacies of traditional forward air control methods and, consequently, PGMs were not used until late in the conflict. No dedicated overland air reconnaissance capability was available and, thus, intelligence data essential to land 1 Degrees of air control are defined in RAF AP 3000 as follows: Air Supremacy

- enemy air force incapable of effective interference; Air Superiority - allows conduct of friendly operations at a given time and place without prohibitive enemy interference; Favourable Air Situation - enemy air effort is insufficient to prejudice friendly success.

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operations was sadly lacking. Nonetheless, Harrier operations, even though restricted by limited aircraft endurance and weapon carrying capacity, were still considered a success and a significant contribution to the land battle.1 Despite this assessment, the fact remains that the use of air power as an instrument of enforcement was severely constrained. At the end of the day, the battle for the Falklands was won but the price had been high. Six ships were destroyed, 34 aircraft including helicopters were lost, and at least 200 men paid the ultimate price. Also significant was the financial burden. Ten years after the conflict, it was estimated that the total expenditure on the War, on the new military facilities, and on economic aid extended to the Islands since 1982, was at least £ 4.5 billion. And, of course, the commitment continues. It is easy to ponder that it all could have been so very different. If the Royal Navy had still operated conventional carriers equipped with Phantom, Buccaneer and Gannet aircraft; if effective strikes against targets on the Argentinian mainland had been possible; if PGMs had been effective throughout; if a nearby suitable airfield had been available; if the Harriers had not been outnumbered six to one; if a UN-sponsored coalition force had been forthcoming. Yes, if. Yet, air power was probably employed in the best manner possible given the constraints placed upon it.

The Lessons

The Falklands experience may be rapidly fading into history especially for those who are not British or Argentinian. Nevertheless, the campaign advanced a number of important lessons. Being an entirely national affair, the forces available were limited in both number and capability. As the operating area was remote and inhospitable, it offered little or nothing in the way of supporting infrastructure. Furthermore, the Islands’ remoteness determined that air strikes were possible against only the outer of Warden’s rings, thus making a ground offensive unavoidable. With the benefit of only the minimum of close air support from the limited air assets in theatre, the ground offensive was conducted at considerable risk. Perhaps it was a hint of British arrogance which fuelled the opinion that victory was never in doubt. Yet, in truth, the Task Force was dangerously under-strength.

1 The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, p.19, para.222.


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Engaged in a military adventure rather than a carefully rehearsed military campaign, the margin between its victory or defeat was almost irresponsibly thin.1

The United Nations cannot accept the risk of defeat nor can it afford to be seen as irresponsible. In responding to violations of national sovereignty, a number of factors must be considered if military action is contemplated:

1. air power possesses the ability to deter and coerce without the support of land or sea power;

2. a ground, amphibious or naval offensive without the

support of air power could involve considerable risk;2 3. political objectives may be achieved rapidly by actual or

threatened strike against key strategic targets, but only air power can prosecute this strategy;

4. air power can conduct minimum casualty warfare; 5. peace operations are expensive and the UN is critically

short of funds; a joint, combined coalition approach employing the most appropriate military instruments for the task should be the foremost planning consideration;

6. any enforcement operation, if it is to be successful, is

likely to require large numbers of technologically advanced, well-equipped and well-trained military forces. The approval and co-operation, or at least absence of opposition, of the United States is essential.3

1 Dillon, G.M., The Falklands, Politics and War, Macmillan Press, London,

1989, p.223. 2 The politicians who determine that a battle will be fought with limited or no

use of air power must be prepared to accept that risk and justify the consequences.

3 Interestingly, this final conclusion emerged as one of a number of guidelines for successful intervention following the 1956 British experience in Suez. See Wyllie, The Influence of British Arms, p.27.

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Reacting to Intrastate Internecine Conflict

The political use of military forces in a crisis is a very complex matter, as it must not exacerbate the crisis, but actually bring down the level of tension.1

A usual consequence of intrastate internecine conflict is suffering by innocents. The threat to life is often immediate and the world media ensure the message is spread rapidly far and wide. While politicians and diplomats vacillate over conflict resolution, the caring international community demands a humanitarian response. On most occasions, a rapid response is forthcoming and almost invariably involves the deployment of military forces. Subsequently, when diplomatic measures fail and the UN endorses offensive action, it is not unnatural to look to the already deployed force to provide it. But the purpose of military involvement in each case is fundamentally different, thus although related, each must be addressed independently. The aim of the military mission flows directly from the political objective. Political objectives may be manifold, thus appropriate prioritisation is vital. Liken the problem, if you will, to water flowing from a tap into a basin. The outflow of water through the plug hole represents innocent human suffering and the flow of water from the tap the conflict itself. The use of a plug could alleviate the suffering temporarily, but the basin will ultimately overflow. It is the flow from the tap that must be stopped. Addressing the source of conflict rather than the consequences must be the priority. Warden’s theories, discussed earlier, are easy to apply to instances of cross-border aggression. In that case, there is a single belligerent and the enabling strategy progresses, if necessary, beyond exemplary damage to partial or total destruction. In intrastate conflict, however, serious consequences would unfold if the strategy were allowed to progress that far. The intent is to create a change in the nature of the state, not to destroy it. Military action attempts to enforce the absence of war, not bring about the presence of peace. The military aim remains the same - apply pressure against the enemy’s command structure - but the characteristics of intrastate disputes demand a different methodology to that for interstate warfare. Pressure exerted against any of Warden’s outer rings affects the stability of the innermost ring. The difference in intrastate conflict is that some of the rings are unidentifiable, non-existent or irrelevant.

1 Sauerwein, B., ‘Interview: “Our New Strategy is one of Crisis Response”

General John Galvin, SACEUR’, International Defence Review, Vol.4, 1992, pp.319-321.


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If the UN is to broker a peace arrangement, it must at all times retain its credibility. In intrastate conflict, the UN identifies no enemies, merely antagonists to its ideals. The Security Council may sanction military action against those who persist with conflict, which is acceptable if it is seen as fair by the international community. Yet, the UN must guard against seriously weakening one side to the advantage of the other. That said, offensive action must be decisive and effective. It must serve to stop the aggression and force the leadership back to the negotiating table. To that end, enforcement should be in the form of a proportionate, short, sharp shock allowing the antagonist ample leeway to surrender the initiative to the mediators. In trying to resolve intrastate disputes, the UN is not at war. Offensive action is the antithesis of mutual confidence and good faith yet, by its use, that is what the UN is striving to achieve. Unlike in the Gulf Campaign where massive force was used, the UN’s will must now be pursued with minimum force. To abate crimes against humanity and systematic destruction, the UN must ensure compliance with its measures by the faction leaders. Compliance will not be achieved by merely addressing the consequences of conflict. The faction leadership itself must be the focus of action. Figure 7 illustrates the process.

Figure 7 - The Road to Peace

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The path to peace requires negotiation and a cessation of hostilities. The consequences of conflict are many in number and abhorrent in nature - ultimately, they must be addressed. However, as Figure 7 shows, effective help can only be given with consent, and when a cease-fire, albeit perhaps a fragile one, is in place. Naturally, deployed UN forces will endeavour to render assistance whenever they can, but if under fire, the urgency of the task must be carefully weighed against the level of risk. The rebuilding of a community and the infrastructure to support it can only happen if the parties to the conflict allow it. The parties must agree to a cease-fire over the negotiating table. Should one of the parties continue fighting and decline to negotiate, then appropriate enforcement action must be taken. Without consent, and in an ever hostile environment, the ability of UN ground forces and civilian organisations to alleviate the suffering and destruction is severely compromised. The difficulty, of course, lies in identifying the most effective focus for enforcement action. If we examine each of Warden’s target sets in turn, a number of important factors come to light. Irrespective of the source of conflict, if an opposition movement is to be effective it must be subjected to some degree of command and control. Even in anarchic circumstances the same applies, simply more ‘leaders’ exist. It is this leadership that provides the focus for both diplomatic and military action. Nevertheless, it is essential that pressure on the leadership is likely to effect a change in the security situation. If too many factions, and thus too many leaders exist, it may prove impossible to achieve mutual agreement on all sides. In this case, until one or two factions dominate and each can be controlled by their leaders, the UN can do little to resolve the situation. How the leadership is targeted is critical. Leaders are essential to the negotiating process and their demise will adversely affect the pursuit of peace. Either a dead leader will be replaced, which means diplomatic relationships must be re-established, or the faction will break up into smaller but still potentially volatile units. In either case, conflict is likely to ensue. Dislocation of the leadership from its supporters may have similar consequences. Thus, the leadership must be targeted in such a way that it will convince its followers that nothing further will be gained by fighting. In the 1920s, in response to nationalist uprisings in its colonies, Britain tried to do exactly that. The British strategy employed in India and the Middle East in the inter-war period was one of ‘air policing’. The tribal rebellion in Iraq in 1924, and the nationalist Kurdish revolt in 1930 were both suppressed by the use of air power. In each case, the strategy used was one of graduated response similar to that explained in Part Two. Deterrence through presence was followed by threats, and ultimately


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by destruction resulting in the leader’s loss of prestige. Surrender followed shortly thereafter. The purpose of the air action was to re-establish either imperial control, or that of the British-installed head of state. Nationalist movements were allowed no voice and the policy, supported by overwhelming superiority of force, smacked of imperial arrogance. Today, many former colonies now enjoy independence and the UN has assumed the responsibility for peace and security.1 Moreover, nationalist movements cannot just be suppressed out of hand. UN strategies for peace must be receptive to change whilst ensuring a minimum of human suffering. Nonetheless, the British policy of the 1920s was mostly successful, primarily because the tribespeople had no means of retaliation. The military goal was to achieve victory by persuading without violence. Force, if required, served to disrupt rather than destroy or kill. In attempting to resolve intrastate disputes, this way of thinking is once again gaining prominence.2 Intrastate conflicts may not immediately be affected by a loss of essential industries or key production facilities, as such warfare is often typified by the use of artillery and myriads of small arms.3 Furthermore, with little requirement for extended lines of supply, the warring faction may be impervious to attacks on the transportation system. In nationalist conflict, the fourth and fifth of Warden’s rings blend almost as one. The fighting force often comprises a mix of civilians, paramilitaries and regular soldiers. Even though many of the population who support the nationalist cause may not wish to fight, they are, nevertheless, in the crudest of attrition wars regarded as a target by opposing factions. However, UN sponsored attacks on the population or its food supply are not only difficult, but are morally unacceptable. Furthermore, in an urban setting, as the RAF discovered in Palestine in 1929 and the British Army more recently in Northern Ireland, an inability to identify rioter from peaceful citizen severely restricts the application of military force. Warden’s fifth ring, nevertheless, also includes fielded military equipment, and its destruction may well persuade the leadership to agree to concessions. Each specific conflict will produce a number of unique targets that fall within the ‘command’ ring and their threatened or actual destruction

1 As discussed in Part One, the UN has a responsibility of intervention only in

cases where internal unrest is likely to affect international peace and security.

2 See: Gagnon, Maj G.R., Air Control Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, pp.11-25.

3 For example, during the Cold War, the US and the USSR both attempted to buy Somalia’s allegiance through provision of military aid. By 1991, the country was awash with weapons.

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will have a major effect on the mind of the leadership. Similar treatment of certain targets within the outer ring may produce equal effects. However, as Warden explains:

The important thing to keep in mind is that many ways are available for attaining an objective, and that the most obvious one ... is quite likely to be the worst choice. Circumstances will vary with each conflict, but the thing to look for is the place where an investment in attack will yield the greatest return. In some cases a panacea target may actually exist.1

Accurate and timely intelligence enabling correct target selection is critical. Unnecessary destruction or killing will not only diminish public support, it will undermine UN credibility and may threaten the success of the entire peace process. There is no generic intrastate internecine conflict scenario. However, not unnaturally, as the United Nations operation in the former Yugoslavia is the largest in its history, the emerging experiences and lessons are many. Nonetheless, it is essential to adopt a broad perspective and ensure that experience from one theatre of operations is not allowed to totally dominate the future concepts of UN operations.

The Balkan Imbroglio

On 21 February 1992, the Security Council established UNPROFOR2 to ‘create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis’.3 In recommending establishment of the force, the Secretary-General stressed that, in his view, ‘the danger that the operation would fail was less grievous than the danger of a new conflagration’.4 Three and a half years, 35 broken cease-fires and at least 22,000 deaths later, UNPROFOR remained deployed in a war situation where there was no peace to keep and no prospect of it on the horizon. UN credibility reached an all-time low. On 30 August 1995, NATO, under UN authorisation, initiated an air strike campaign which two weeks later brought the parties back to the negotiating table realising that their

1 Warden, The Air Campaign, p.44. 2 On 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR was restructured and replaced by three

separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations. The mandate and name of UNPROFOR was retained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) was established in Croatia, and UNPROFOR within Macedonia became the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). The joint headquarters (UNPF-HQ) was established in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.

3 UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev4, background. 4 ibid.


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ultimate dreams would not be fulfilled by violent means. In mid-October 1995, a cease-fire came into effect and negotiations which carried a genuine prospect of peace began. It is too early to say if a lasting peace will be realised. Nevertheless, air power achieved something that the ground forces and the diplomats had thus far been unable to achieve. Why was air power so decisive? The answer was quite simple. Air power, when correctly applied, represented the most effective use of force in the peacemaking inventory, it provided the most serious demonstration of intent, and it effectively targeted centres of gravity. Moreover, it kept collateral damage and casualties on both sides to a politically-acceptable minimum. The result was a significant weakening of the Bosnian Serb leadership which consequently relinquished the initiative. If there is one lesson from Bosnia, it is that aggression must be met with force. Naturally, a graduated response is always appropriate. However, if human suffering is to be minimised, the time factor is of considerable import. In October 1992, considering that a ‘ban on military flights constituted an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities’, the Security Council implemented a ‘No-Fly Zone’ over the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The ban was monitored by NATO AWACS2 aircraft supported by UNPROFOR observers. In March 1993, following the bombing of villages in Bosnia, the ban was extended and authority given to ‘take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban’.3 As a result, NATO fighters were deployed under Operation ‘Deny Flight’. By April 1993, the Bosnian Serbs had refused to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel. In June 1993, the Security Council asserted that a lasting solution to the conflict must be based on the following principles:4

1. immediate and complete cessation of hostilities; 2. withdrawal from territories seized by the use of force; 3. the right of refugees to return to their homes; and, 4. respect for sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1 Operation ‘Sky Monitor’, see UN Security Council Resolution 781(1992). 2 Airborne Warning and Control System (aircraft). 3 See UN Security Council Resolution 816(1993). 4 See UN Security Council Resolution 836(1993).

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The same resolution authorised the taking of ‘all necessary measures, through the use of air power’ to support the mandate. In pursuit of an end to hostilities, the UN had, by this time, exhausted the non-military options available to it under Chapter VII of the Charter. Nevertheless, the Security Council emphasised that it would ‘keep open other options for new and tougher measures’ none of which would be ‘prejudged or excluded from consideration’.1 In February 1994, NATO fighters shot down four of six combat aircraft that had ignored warnings and defied the no-fly ban. In the three years since the establishment of the ban, there had been nearly 5,000 violations. Operation ‘Deny Flight’ went some way to dissuading the use of force, but it alone was not enough. Regrettably, since June 1993, the measures invoked have addressed merely the consequences of the conflict not the source. The UN would appear to have lost sight of the primary principle mentioned above. That principle could only be upheld if the parties recognised the need to negotiate in good faith, and that continued hostilities were to the detriment of all concerned and would be punished accordingly. It took over three and a half years of conflict and human suffering for the potency of offensive air power to be recognised. On 18 September 1995, following two weeks of intensive air action, the Secretary-General was at last able to comment that ‘today there may be credible prospects for a viable and lasting peace’.2 Through the decisive use of air power, the parties may finally have been persuaded to forego the military option. Much of the criticism over the use of air power in Bosnia has been levelled not at the conduct of the air mission but at the consequences of it. In May 1995, the Secretary-General noted that some governments initially favouring the use of air power ‘now express serious reservations’.3 Table 9 details the NATO air attacks from their first use in April 1994 until May 1995. Some of these initial air strikes were successful in achieving limited objectives such as temporary cease-fires and temporary withdrawal of heavy weapons. Occasionally, they resulted in fresh negotiations. However, such employment of air power was not decisive because inadequate prior consideration was given to the possible consequences.

1 ibid. 2 UN document S/1995/804, letter from the Secretary-General to the

President of the Security Council. 3 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions

982(1995) and 987(1995), para.59.


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Date Target Reason for Attack Consequences

10/11 Apr 94 Serb Command Post by Gorazde.

Continued attacks against Gorazde.

150 UN troops taken hostage.

5 Aug 94 Serb emplacements within Sarajevo Exclusion Zone.

Removal of weapons from UN weapon collection point.

Continued shelling of Sarajevo. Deliberate attacks on UN personnel.

22 Sep 94 As above. Attack on UN armoured car.

Continued shelling of Sarajevo.

21/23 Nov 94 Udbina airfield. SAM sites.

Source of air attacks against Bihac. Constituted a threat to NATO aircraft.

400 UN troops taken hostage.

25/26 May 95 Ammunition dump near Pale.

Failure to respect heavy weapons agreement.

Weapon collection points surrounded. ‘Safe areas’ shelled. UN observation post seized. 199 UN personnel detained. 224 UN personnel denied access and movement.

Table 9 - NATO air attacks, April 1994 - May 1995

Having issued a strong ultimatum to the Serbs in May 1995, the UN recognised that non-compliance would require a strong response (air attacks) from which a significant risk to exposed UNPROFOR personnel would result. Nevertheless, it was considered impractical to withdraw personnel because of ‘the overriding requirement to maintain observation and liaison’:

It would have made little sense to conduct air strikes to achieve the return of a few heavy weapons if the UN had no personnel ... to monitor their return; nor would it have made sense to abandon the hundreds of weapons in other sites.1

The anticipated retaliation, of course, did result. A few years earlier during a conflict still fresh in the mind, Saddam Hussein had taken hostages and boasted of a ‘human shield’ to deter air attack - such was the potency of the air threat. The nature of the Serbian retaliatory action, therefore, should not have come as a surprise to the Security Council. After all, the imposition of the ‘No-Fly Zone’, had made any retaliation from the air extremely unlikely. The effective implementation of UNPROFOR’s mandate required either enforcement or the consent of all parties. Unfortunately, UNPROFOR 1 ibid., para.11.

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had neither the means nor the mandate for enforcement action, and the co-operation of the parties was elusive. Moreover, UNPROFOR was poorly equipped to defend itself. The air attacks may well have brought temporary respite; however, it soon became apparent that UN forces in Croatia and Bosnia were more vulnerable to the Serbs than the Serbs were to the UN. Only if this situation was reversed would air power be able to bring about the result that the UN desired.

The Lessons

From a UN perspective, offensive air power should be considered impartial. It aims to favour neither side, but simply preserve a delicate balance of power. In intrastate conflict, a peace settlement is only likely to be achieved if all factions are negotiating from a similar position, be it one of strength or weakness. Effectively, a demilitarised zone between the parties must be enforced and a balance of power established. Through a policy of exemplary damage, Operation ‘Deliberate Force’1 demonstrated air power’s ability to achieve this objective rapidly and effectively. Its effectiveness was enhanced because of Serb realisation that retaliation was not only difficult but would wreak further destruction upon them. At last, air power had provided substance to the previously hollow UN threats and the initiative was regained. Air power may not be effective against sniper or other small-arms fire; however, by targeting centres of gravity it can severely curtail a belligerent’s attempts to continue the war. Moreover, only air power can strike quickly and effectively against both strategic and tactical targets. Only air power has unlimited freedom of movement. Naturally, UN ground forces too, can target nearby artillery pieces or even seize and hold strategic locations albeit at a considerably higher risk. However, for reasons that will become apparent, a ground force that can remain disinterested is to the benefit of all concerned. When consent and co-operation are not forthcoming, only limited measures remain. In recent years, the role of UN troops in peace operations has expanded considerably beyond traditional peacekeeping. Peacekeepers may well be deployed into highly volatile environments. Nonetheless, they continue to operate within the bounds of their fundamental tenets and only with the consent of all parties. Enforcement action, from the ground or the air, crosses the bridge of consent. If the purpose of using offensive air power is to reduce tension and further the peace process, the potential response to it

1 The integrated air operation initiated on 30 August 1995 comprised an air

strike campaign, known as ‘Operation Deliberate Force’, supported by ‘Operation Deny Flight’.


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must be carefully considered. Air strike, if used, must carry with it a message that retaliation is futile and that little is to be gained by continuing the conflict. This will never be achieved if rapid retaliatory action can be taken against exposed forces who have no means to resist. In an ideal world, the UN would wish its personnel and those of NGOs to operate in a zero-risk environment. Rapid conflict resolution by pacific means would be achieved before humanitarian aid was provided and peacekeepers deployed. Of course, the ideal rarely occurs. Non-pacific measures are often required when diplomatic measures fail to abate the conflict and, consequently, the line of consent is crossed. If UN members bow to international pressure, and deploy peacekeeping forces into a hostile environment, they must be prepared to accept the inherent risks. Offensive action is not conducive to supporting a peacekeeping or humanitarian mandate which is based on consent and impartiality; such action is likely to exacerbate the situation, not resolve it. Thus, the UN Security Council must be unequivocal in its approach to intrastate conflicts. In the opening quotation to this chapter, Boutros-Ghali ‘the protection of human life’ as an objective that will only be attained ‘through the successful use of non-military methods’. However, suppression and annihilation of minorities in Cambodia, Uganda, Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia would challenge the feasibility of this quest. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General also considers ‘the option of taking (military action) is essential to the credibility of the UN’. Clearly, the use of offensive military force in the peace process has yet to be resolved:

Our hero is a man of peace, Preparedness he implores;

His sword within his scabbard sleeps, But mercy, how it snores ! 1

The UN must come to terms with intrastate conflict and enunciate its policy. Irrespective of the catalyst which initiates intervention into the internal affairs of a state, the primary UN objective must be to resolve the conflict. Only by resolving the conflict will the consequences be addressed. If a cessation of hostilities is not rapidly achieved through diplomatic means, military action remains the only option. The cost of a large ground force and the threat to its security make a land power enforcement option politically unacceptable. Moreover, land power has a more important role to play. Carrying out offensive action will

1 Mclandburgh Wilson, ‘A Man of Peace’, on Theodore Roosevelt, The Dictionary

of War Quotations, p.454.

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merely compromise its ability to assist later in the peacebuilding process.

The credibility of the United Nations is of the utmost importance and must be safeguarded at all times. Few things damage it more than to give ... peacekeepers tasks that cannot be established in prevailing circumstances. And the damage is not only to peacekeeping. Loss of United Nations credibility there will affect endeavours for development, for the environment, for human rights and for every other important objective.1

Given the appropriate circumstances, air power can reinitiate the negotiation process by weakening the belligerent’s centres of gravity at an acceptable level of risk . Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter authorise such action if there is a threat to international peace and security. Yet, air power’s use has been sadly constrained by a blurring of the UN’s objectives. The Security Council must be clear in its priorities. If air power is to be a tool in the peacemaker’s inventory, and an extremely effective one at that, its role must be given priority and divorced from that of the land forces. Meanwhile, as long as the Security Council continues to sanction intervention with consent into areas of open conflict, air power will have a further role to play. UN ground forces make a significant contribution to the rebuilding of war-devastated communities, but a Chapter VII mandate is incompatible with their activities. Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be considered as ‘alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other’.2 Accordingly, humanitarian and peacekeeping mandates will be unlikely to provide for the necessary personnel, equipment or authority to guarantee the force’s security. Whilst the initiative remains with a belligerent intent on further conflict, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions will be undertaken at considerable risk to those involved. It is air power, under a separate mandate and from a different organisation, that must underwrite their insurance policy.


982(1995) and 987(1995), para.82. 2 ibid., para.62.


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Supporting the Humanitarian Cause

To preserve you is no benefit, to destroy you is no loss.

Khmer Rouge slogan.1 Human suffering can be brought about through many circumstances both natural and unnatural. It is, however, an invariable consequence of conflict. The Hague and Geneva Conventions, which draw on the experiences and lessons of both World Wars, represent considerable effort by the international community to provide ‘a code of conduct’ for those ‘legitimately’ engaged in warring activities. Specifically, the Geneva Convention of 1949 focuses on the principle of disinterested aid to all victims of war without discrimination. Its writing was ‘inspired by “the eternal principles of that Law which is the foundation and the safe-guard of civilisation”, and was designed to “ensure the respect of human personality and dignity by putting beyond reach of attack those rights and liberties which are the essence of its existence”’.2 Considering the time at which it was written, the Geneva Convention was designed appropriately to accommodate future situations of international conflict, or war between states. Subsequently, and as a result of increased intrastate disputes, two additional protocols to the Convention were negotiated at a diplomatic conference in Geneva between 1974 and 1977. In December 1977, the new protocols were adopted. Additional Protocol 1 addresses situations in which peoples are:

fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter.3

Additional Protocol 2, meanwhile, applies to:

all armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces ... which ... exercise such control over a part of its

1 Wintle, The Dictionary of War Quotations, p.380. 2 The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Geneva 1983, introductory

remarks, p 19. 3 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, US Army Pamphlet

27-1-1, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, 1979, p.4.

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territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.1

Unfortunately, despite the continued efforts of the International Red Cross in promoting greater protection of the individual against the consequences of conflict, atrocities still abound. Those military forces which are signatories to the Convention are expected to abide by its rules. However, more recently, UN forces have had to enforce compliance with the Convention and intervention has not been without controversy. Enforced humanitarian intervention represents an entirely new aspect of military operations. The significant contribution made by military forces, and air forces in particular, towards the collection, delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief aid is well recognised. In many cases, provision of relief is welcomed by the host nation and, courtesy of the international media, can often generate considerable prestige for the governments of the contributing nation(s). In addition, military personnel derive a high level of satisfaction from the opportunity to help those less fortunate than themselves. Of these missions, which perpetuate goodwill amongst states, many countries are enthusiastically willing to be a part. When there is a need for force in the humanitarian mission, however, it is a somewhat different story. As the risk factor increases, governments of participating nations may be unable or unwilling to justify to their electorate that intervention remains in the national interest. In the early stages of dispute, the provision of aid will often continue unhindered; however, military escort may sometimes be provided if looting occurs. Once conflict erupts, food can become a scarce resource, and aid convoys targets of opportunity. Consent for the provision of aid is likely to be still forthcoming from one or even all of the belligerents, but there is little or no guarantee that it will either reach its intended destination or, indeed, be immune from attack. In humanitarian operations, the aim of the intervening forces is to ensure that non-combatants at risk are afforded the protection of ‘the principle of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’.2 Future conflicts will, most probably, be complicated by humanitarian issues. At one end of the spectrum of humanitarian aid provision is the nation struck by natural disaster. At the other end are the warring factions of an intrastate conflict who view aid convoys as a potential logistics supply that must be denied to the enemy. These factions, who do not baulk at the use of genocide as a weapon, show little respect for the lives of impartial aid workers. In these conflicts of

1 ibid., p.90. 2 ibid., p.89.


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considerable violence and cruelty, civilians are the main casualties and often the main targets. By bringing humanitarian issues directly into the home in real-time, the media have fostered a ‘do something’ mentality among the international community. This has often resulted in the provision of considerable humanitarian relief at short notice. The dilemma, however, is that administering that relief to those in need, rather than supplementing the belligerents, requires some degree of armed military protection. Under these circumstances, the potential for a contributing nation to be drawn in to the intrastate conflict is considerable. Few would deny that the presence on the ground of IGO, NGO and military personnel is essential to the successful provision of humanitarian aid during times of tension. However, there should be a clear distinction between those who provide and those who protect. It is highly desirable that any humanitarian relief effort is seen as disinterested and without discrimination. Whilst the right of self-defence should never be denied and ROE should reflect this, the role of deterrent or punitive action may be better assumed by a force remote from the humanitarian mission. The nature of humanitarian missions differs greatly with circumstance, as does the level of military support they require and the effectiveness of that support. Examination of three recent humanitarian missions, all of which were supported by the use, or threatened use of offensive air power, may allow a number of lessons to be drawn.

Repression of Iraqi Civilians

On 5 April 1991, the Security Council, through its Resolution 688, expressed grave concern over the ‘repression of the Iraqi civilian population ... and the magnitude of the human suffering involved’. As a result, on 9 April 1991, Operation ‘Provide Comfort’ began to bring relief to the Kurds in the north. Three months later, having successfully completed the mission, the western ground troops withdrew. Whilst in no way diminishing the magnificent effort of those who delivered the aid, the success of the operation was ensured by the threat of punitive action should Iraqi forces dare to interfere. The nub of this deterrent was the threat of offensive air strikes. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, a number of Iraqi opposition guerrilla groups began insurgency campaigns in an attempt to overthrow the Hussein government. Two major separate uprisings occurred, one in the predominantly Shi’a southern provinces and the other in the Kurdish north. The revolt by Iraq’s majority Shi’a

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community was met by a brutal military counteroffensive resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the international community refused rebel demands for military assistance on the premise that interference in Iraq’s internal affairs would be inappropriate. However, in citing interim cease-fire agreements that prohibited Iraqi use of fixed-wing military aircraft, the US attempted to remove the air threat to the rebels by shooting down violators of the extant UN measure. Despite this assistance, the rebellion was effectively quelled by the end of March 1991. After their suppression of the Shi’as in the south, Iraqi government forces turned their attention to the Kurdish problem in the north. In an obvious attempt to remove the threat permanently, a savage campaign was conducted in which hundreds of thousands of Kurds were reported killed. To escape from further genocide, around three million remaining Kurds began a mass migration into the mountains bordering Turkey. Despite appeals by Kurdish leaders for international intervention, the UN did little more than express ‘grave concern’. Political leaders in the UK and US eschewed intervention fearing it would ‘set a precedent for Security Council involvement in internal controversies’.1 However, after continual lobbying by France, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688 and the relief effort began. On 10 April 1991, the US issued an injunction against Iraq to ‘cease all military activity north of the 36th parallel’ and warned that ‘ any military interference in the international relief effort would be met with force’.2 Six weeks after the operation commenced, the life threatening situation had been stabilised. Allied efforts were redirected to establish a security area in the north of Iraq to which the Kurds could return, first to organised camps, and ultimately to their own homes. By mid-June, when most of the refugees had returned, a new combined task force evolved to guarantee continued success of the humanitarian aid effort, and to ensure Iraqi compliance with the appropriate Security Council Resolutions. This new US-led reaction force code-named Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort II was established in Turkey. The CTF comprised a 2,500-strong ground element supported by 70 helicopters, and an air component of some 26 land-based strike aircraft supplemented by 86 carrier-based combat aircraft. AWACS and AAR aircraft were also deployed. In October 1991, the ground element was withdrawn; however, the air element was strengthened by the deployment of F-111s and EF-111s to replace the A-10s originally assigned.3

1 Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for April 1991, p 38127. 2 ibid. 3 Ripley, T., ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, International Defense Review,

10/1991.


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One year later, in August 1992, repression in the southern marshlands re-emerged. The UN’s special human rights rapporteur on Iraq reported that ‘there was documentary evidence of a systematic policy by the Iraqi government to destroy the lives and culture of the Shi’a Marsh Arab population’.1 Iraq was charged with massive human rights violations and a failure to comply with Resolution 688. As a result, an air exclusion zone was established in which flights by Iraqi helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft south of the 32nd parallel were banned. The purpose of the zone was to afford some protection to the Shi’a population. However, whilst enforcement of the ban was effective2, it could not prevent an intensification of hostilities by government ground forces. What emerged from the Iraq experience, was that grave humanitarian crises will place considerable pressure on the international community to intervene. As well as providing and distributing aid, there is also likely to be an inherent obligation to protect the afflicted whilst addressing the source of their repression. A proposal to establish Kurdish ‘safe havens’ within Iraqi territory backed by UN troops was given a cautious response by the UN especially when access to carry out relief work was granted by Iraqi officials. Consequently, in response to the Iraqi government’s counter-insurgency campaign, the western allies established two ‘no-fly’ zones to reduce the threat to those on the ground. Neither of these zones was the subject of a specific UN resolution although they were perceived as providing a safer environment for reconnaissance aircraft to monitor Iraqi compliance with Resolution 688. From the Kurd’s perspective, the ‘no-fly’ zone secured them an unprecedented degree of autonomy, for it neutralised the major advantage that Iraq had had during the initial suppression - airpower. Many Arab nations expressed reservations about the legality of the ‘no-fly’ zones in that they compromised Iraq’s sovereignty and were contrary to Article 2 of the UN Charter.3 President Bush was particularly sensitive to this opinion which accounted for his initial non-intervention policy. On 5 April 1991, Bush had stressed that ‘it was not an objective of the Coalition or the US to overthrow Saddam

1 Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for August 1992, p 39068. 2 On 27 December 1992, an Iraqi Mig-27 in violation of the zone was shot

down by the pilot of a US F-16. The Mig was one of four; two turned away when challenged and the other escaped engagement. The Iraqi action was seen as a deliberate attempt to test allied resolve. Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for December 1992, p 39247.

3 Article 2, para 7 states: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ...’ Furthermore, the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation declares that ‘every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’.

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Hussein’.1 Nevertheless, it was the duty of the UN to ensure that its relevant resolutions were complied with and this was manifested in the Combined Task Force’s mission.

Figure 8 - No-Fly Zones Over Iraq

Exactly how this mission translated into specific rules of engagement were never enunciated. However, for fear of becoming enmeshed in internal wranglings, enforced intervention by ground forces appeared extremely unlikely. Yet, the threats could not be hollow. The enforcement of air exclusion zones and the threat of punitive air attacks represented the only credible strategy. If international opinion was to demand that the principles of humanitarian law were to be upheld, then air power alone could provide the internationally acceptable means by which to do so.

The Bosnians

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina differed from that in Iraq on a number of counts. Firstly, Iraq faced insurgency whereas Bosnia was in the grip of full-blown civil war. Secondly, humanitarian atrocities 1 Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for April 1991, p 38128.


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in Bosnia were being committed by all of the parties to the conflict. Thirdly, the presence in Bosnia of UN troops and humanitarian aid workers had at least partial consent, and fourthly, in contrast to the procedure in Iraq, all missions to support the humanitarian cause in Bosnia were sanctioned by the Security Council. Many of the Iraqi Kurds fled across the border into Turkey and it was there that humanitarian aid was initially provided. Although the geographic environment hindered the delivery of aid, the conditions were otherwise benign. Similarly, for those left in Iraq, air power attempted to secure a favourable situation. In Bosnia, those in need of aid were not refugees, but persons displaced within the borders of their own country who were continually subjected to human rights violations and the consequences of ongoing conflict. Moreover, the problem was not a small one. In March 1993, it was assessed that 2.28 million people, or half of the original population, were directly affected by the crisis and were in need of emergency humanitarian assistance.1 Humanitarian operations in Bosnia were consistently seriously obstructed. Not only was access frequently denied to those in need, but the security of both UN and aid agency personnel was threatened. The deteriorating situation presented the UN Security Council with the dilemma of whether or not to enforce the mandate. Although the flow of aid was often interrupted, employing military force to ensure the delivery of assistance stood to compromise the task and possibly lead to situations where the use of force in self-defence might become necessary. Whilst military escort served primarily to deter random or unorganised attacks, it could not substitute for the consent and co-operation of the parties. A more productive approach involving concerted negotiation whilst making best use of every means of aid delivery was a more sensible option.2 As Table 10 shows, such an approach was reasonably successful in fulfilling the aim of the humanitarian mission which was to deliver the greatest good to the greatest number of people in need.

1 UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev 4. 2 Since 1993, humanitarian relief to inaccessible areas in Bosnia and

Herzegovina has been provided by air. At the end of April 1995, 12,320 sorties had been flown, for the delivery of 153,412 metric tons of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo, over a period surpassing 1,000 days, the longest such operation in aviation history. UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev4.

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Jan Feb Mar Apr Safe Areas Sarajevo 32 119 71 64 Bihac 15 47 29 10 Tuzla 126 72 85 43 Gorazde 90 82 80 82 Srebenica 87 71 71 81 Zepa 87 50 47 63 Bosnian Serb controlled areas

Eastern Bosnia 88 98 103 104

Banja Luka Region

89 82 93 90

Federation controlled areas

Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina

94 72 86 89

Zenica Region 114 52 92 65 Orasje Region 95 69 96 100

Table 10 - Percentage of Targeted Assistance Delivered to Areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, January - April 19951

Yet in Bosnia, as in any circumstance of ongoing civil war, delivery of humanitarian aid represented but one facet of the humanitarian mandate. In essence, three fundamental requirements have to be addressed:

1. protect the civilian population from forced movement,

genocide or other crimes against humanity; 2. ensure the delivery and distribution of adequate food,

water and medical supplies; and 3. take the necessary action to deter or, if applicable, punish

those who threaten or carry out grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and its protocols.

It was in attempting to satisfy the first and third of these that the UN demonstrated an unwillingness to take decisive action. For many, and particularly those innocents suffering the consequences of conflict, indecision and a lack of conviction brought into question the entire credibility of the UN. Words and promises were many but appropriate action was sadly absent.


982(1995) and 987(1995), para.28.


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Six months after the beginning of the Balkan crisis in June 1991, the Security Council recognised the need to take ‘urgent practical steps to tackle the critical (humanitarian) needs of the people of Yugoslavia’.1 In February 1992, UNPROFOR was established. By May 1992, existence of the repugnant practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was recognised - Resolution 752 called upon:

... all parties to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population ... cease immediately.

Despite numerous subsequent condemnations by the Security Council of all the parties, violations of all the relevant UN measures continued. On 13 August 1992, through its Resolution 771, the Security Council expressed:

... grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law ... including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies ... and wanton devastation and destruction of poverty.

The Resolution went on to condemn the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and to demand that all parties ‘comply with their obligations under humanitarian law’. Should the parties fail to comply with the provisions of the Resolution, the Security Council would ‘need to take further measures under the Charter’. In November 1992, after it was clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights were continuing, the Security Council once again affirmed that the taking of territory by force and the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ were unlawful and unacceptable.2 However, little was advocated by way of punitive action. A further expression of ‘grave alarm’ in February 1993 resulted in the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, but little else. Finally, in April 1993, the Security Council acknowledged that:

... a tragic humanitarian emergency had already developed in Srebenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the brutal actions of the Bosnian Serbs.3

1 UN Security Council Resolution 724(1991). 2 UN Security Council Resolution 787(1992). 3 UN Security Council Resolution 819(1993).

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Srebenica was declared a ‘safe area’ which should be ‘free from any armed attack or any other hostile attack’. The words were strong but the force to impose the mandate was not. The affirmation that ‘those who commit (crimes against humanity) will be held individually responsible’ did little to deter the Bosnian Serbs. In view of the threat to the urgent security and humanitarian needs of the afflicted, the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were also declared as ‘safe areas’.1 Resolution 824 also recognised that further steps to achieve the security of the ‘safe areas’ needed to be taken. Accordingly, in June 1993, the Security Council authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures’ including air power to ‘support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate’. Significantly, UNPROFOR’s mandate was ‘to deter attacks against the safe areas’, and yet the use of force in self-defence was authorised ‘in reply to bombardment against ... or armed incursion into them’.2 Did self-defence in this instance include defence of the mandate as well as the individual and, if so, should not the word ‘deter’ have been replaced with ‘defend against’ or something similar? During their infantry and artillery offensive against the UN safe area of Gorazde in March 1994, the Bosnian Serbs defied the UN and NATO for two weeks showing they had no fear of the international community. The towns of Srebenica and Zepa were overrun by the Bosnian Serbs in July and August 1995 respectively, with the attendant UN forces powerless to intervene. The Serbs were issued with numerous ultimatums, but the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Dr Karadzic rejected them because ‘giving in would only lead to more’. General Ratko Mladic was more forthright in his reply: ‘we Serbs have never accepted any ultimatum - and we never will.’3 Under its current policy, the ability of the UN to protect the civilian population from forced movement, genocide or other crimes against humanity, and to punish those who threaten or carry out grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and its protocols is questionable. In May 1995, the Secretary-General made clear that although the Security Council acted under Chapter VII with regard to the ‘safe area’ resolutions4, it was done so in relation only to the security of UNPROFOR personnel. There was no enforcement component to the safe area concept at its inception.5 Accordingly, when the consent

1 UN Security Council Resolution 824(1993). 2 UN Security Council Resolution 836(1993). 3 From The Death of Yugoslavia, a televised documentary broadcast by the

Australian Broadcasting Corporation on 18 October 1995. 4 UN Security Council Resolutions 819(1993) and 824(1993). 5 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions

982(1995) and 987(1995), para.33.


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and the co-operation of the parties was not forthcoming, the concept of a ‘safe area’ was seriously flawed. Purporting to offer protection and then failing to do so brought charges of betrayal against the UN and demonstrated to the belligerent the hollowness of its ultimatums. Continued attacks on the ‘safe areas’ brought increasing pressure on the UN to use air power to protect them. NATO air power was used on 19 November 1994 after the Krajina Serbs had launched air attacks against targets within the Bihac safe area. However, the consequence of this punitive action was the taking into Serb custody of 400 UN troops. Whenever offensive force was employed, the impartiality of the UN force was open to question and, through the eyes of some, the UN became a party to the conflict. Nevertheless, air power did have considerable psychological as well as physical effects on the belligerents. In Sarajevo in February 1994, and again in Gorazde in March 1994, the actual and threatened use of air power brought about compliance with troop withdrawal agreements and weapon exclusion zones. That the use of air power initiated retaliatory action was simply because the outcome of the air strikes was perceived to favour one of the parties. Many of the towns nominated as ‘safe areas’ contained Bosnian government military headquarters and factories with the capability to produce ammunition, chemicals and other products for military use. The intention of ‘safe areas’ was primarily to protect people. However, if ‘safe areas’ were perceived as places of refuge and recuperation for fighting forces, or areas in which to store, maintain or even operate offensive armament, they would undoubtedly be subject to attack. UN ground forces were neither structured nor equipped for combat; their security was largely dependent on air power. If protective air power was to avoid being perceived as a partial and destabilising factor, the ‘safe areas’ had to be demilitarised. Moreover, the areas had also to represent merely an interim arrangement whilst the wider objective of neutralising the impediments to an overall political solution was addressed. The Secretary-General considered the only effective way to make the ‘safe areas’ truly safe was ‘to define a regime acceptable to both parties and to promote mutual respect for the arrangements to which they have agreed’.1 In this event, air power would need to do no more than fulfil an impartial deterrent role in defence of a purely humanitarian objective. Whilst the above concept was admirable, its realisation in an environment of ongoing conflict driven by ethnic hatred was somewhat fanciful. Members of UNPROFOR and NATO together with the humanitarian aid agencies did everything within their power and the

1 ibid., para.41.

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limitations of their mandate to alleviate the suffering in Bosnia. Often the depth of their compassion resulted in their actions taking them beyond the limits of the humanitarian mission and making them a party to the conflict. However, on other occasions, the UN was accused of standing by and watching whilst atrocities took place. What was lacking during the first three and a half years of the Balkan crisis was a commitment by the Security Council to take the necessary action to arrest the humanitarian tragedy. This lack of commitment placed the UN and NATO forces in the unenviable position of trying to prevent crimes against humanity when they were powerless to do so, and to keep peace in an environment where there was no peace to keep. The UN and the international community have a stark choice to make. A negotiated settlement is without question the only means by which a lasting peace will be achieved. However, is it acceptable for crimes against humanity to continue over an indeterminate period of negotiations, whilst meanwhile addressing merely the consequences of such human suffering? Or is there a moral and humanitarian obligation to take appropriate action at the earliest opportunity, not to bring about a resolution to the dispute, not simply to act in self-defence, but to actively stop the physical conflict and the perpetration of war crimes? There are no easy answers, but should the choice be the latter, then it is air power that is best suited to the task. As long ago as September 1992, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) had, in its talks with the parties concerned, an objective to ‘stop the conflict and prevent it from spreading, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’.1 Air power may well be unable to take or hold ground, but it has a psychological power far in excess of other military options. Its inherent strengths and its ability to remain remote from, yet directly influence events on the ground greatly enhance its viability. Nevertheless, if air power is to be employed, a number of critical conditions must be met. Firstly, in response to non-compliance with UN resolutions, air power must be the primary military response and employed at an early stage. Secondly, it must be recognised that the presence, in an area of ongoing conflict, of a large peacekeeping force whose primary role is to deter, monitor and report, is not only inappropriate, but will also greatly influence the consequences of the offensive action. Thirdly, the objective of the air action must be clearly enunciated and represent the ultimate element of a demand/threaten/action strategy

1 UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev4.


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intended to halt conflict and initiate negotiation. Fourthly, the offensive action must be decisive and seen by the international community as not only impartial, but fair and appropriate. Fifthly, the correct mix of advanced-technology aircraft and weapons must be available. Finally, it must be possible to identify and target the factional leadership and their centres of gravity. Moreover, and more importantly, achieving the desired course of action by the factional leadership must actually bring about an effective change in the overall security situation. As the UN’s participation in Somalia bears sad testament, if the leadership cannot be effectively targeted, for whatever reason, enforced intervention is unlikely to succeed.

Somalia - the problem child

The situation in Somalia between January 1992 and April 1995 was one of total anarchy characterised by urban guerrilla warfare between faction leaders who exercised only token control over their followers. The hostilities brought about considerable human suffering and generated a desperate need for urgent humanitarian aid. Over half the estimated Somali population of four and a half million faced death by starvation or associated diseases. In addition to recognising the alarming humanitarian situation, the Security Council considered the deteriorating security situation constituted a threat to peace and stability in the region.1 The UN-initiated provision of humanitarian assistance on 23 January 1992 (UNOSOM I). However, during the next three years the volatile security situation was to cause the UN on occasion to temporarily withdraw its personnel, and ultimately to abandon the mission. During the period of UN intervention, numerous cease-fires were agreed between the warring factions, but all went unheeded by one or more of the parties. In December 1992, the Security Council acknowledged the situation required an ‘immediate and exceptional response’.2 A Unified Task Force (UNITAF) under American command was established and, operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, successfully established a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.3 However, after a phased hand-over to an expanded UN operation (UNOSOM II), the security situation rapidly deteriorated.

1 UN Security Council Resolution 733(1992). 2 UN Security Council Resolution 794(1992). 3 UNITAF’s principal goal was to establish a secure environment for urgent

humanitarian assistance. Once accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the UN. In the meantime UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance. UN Reference Paper: The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia.

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The warring parties implemented unprovoked armed attacks against UN personnel and continually intimidated the mission from carrying out its mandate. Following the death of a number of UN peacekeepers, the Security Council authorised the taking of ‘all necessary measures’ against those responsible. However, the Security Council eschewed a commitment to enforce a peace settlement, or even to force a return to the negotiating table of the antagonists. Even if the UN had desired to realise this objective through force and thus alleviate the human suffering, the dire security situation made attainment of it extremely unlikely. The ‘forces’ of both parties to the conflict comprised largely of:

teenaged gunmen high on [narcotics] who roved the city in land cruisers armed with anti-aircraft canon or recoilless rifles, which they fired at anything that moved and most things that didn’t.1

Although some of the fighting elements declared an alliance with one or other of the warring factions, many did not. Of the 20,000 fighters roaming the capital Mogadishu, ‘perhaps only one in five was under the nominal control of either leader’.2 The UN did resort to the use of force, both ground and air, on numerous occasions with mixed success. However, against a number of widely dispersed factions and movements which unashamedly used women and children as human shields to perpetrate their attacks, offensive action in any form was untenable. Moreover, in light of a press release issued by the Somali National Alliance following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, the desired political endstate of the UN would always have remained beyond reach:

The Somali people need neither the United Nations nor any other foreigners to mediate between them in their reconciliation process; they are capable of sorting out their political differences and achieving their own reconciliation and will not accept any further interference in their own political affairs.3

Supporting Peacekeeping

In addition to the three circumstances already identified, there is a further situation in which offensive military force may be used and that is when peacekeepers come under attack. 1 Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, p.472. 2 ibid. 3 Extract from a press release by the Somali National Alliance dated 11 April

1995. UN Department of Public Information.


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Peacekeeping is an activity conducted with the consent of all parties, with the objective of maintaining peace once it has been achieved. Wider peacekeeping is peacekeeping in an environment that may be highly volatile.1 Peacekeeping should not be confused with the humanitarian mission. Peacekeepers seek to deter a further outbreak of conflict between belligerents - if conflict occurs, deterrence has failed. Protect, deny and defend, unless used in self-defence, are not words that feature in the peacekeepers vocabulary. The humanitarian mission, on the other hand, is concerned with addressing the humanitarian needs of the conflict affected population. It is not unusual to see UN troops in the company of humanitarian convoys or assisting in the peacebuilding process. However, it is important to recognise that in these circumstances their role is not one of peacekeeping. Due to the nature of their mandate and desire to promote mutual confidence and good faith, peacekeeping forces are usually lightly armed and operate under highly restrictive rules of engagement. Consequently, they are extremely vulnerable to determined attack. Similarly, they are poorly placed to ensure compliance with their mandate. The use of force in each circumstance requires separate consideration. From the UN’s conception in 1948 until July 1995, over 720,000 military personnel had served with the UN of whom 1,194 had lost their lives. Operations in the former Yugoslavia account for over ten per cent of these fatalities.2 The nature of future conflict is likely to result in peacekeepers being subjected to even greater risks and their security, therefore, must be of paramount concern. Should peacekeepers come under direct attack, rapid decisions have to be made. The UN Security Council has little time to consider options or to debate an appropriate response. Therefore, standing procedures for the use of force in self-defence must be in place from the start. Assuming they are unable to withdraw, personnel under attack have two options; either defend themselves, or call in air power to neutralise the threat. As peacekeepers are often inferior in both numbers and equipment to the aggressor, their ability to defend themselves against concerted attack is questionable. Moreover, experience has demonstrated that the presence of a UN operation has not always been sufficient to deter hostile action.3

1 British Army Field Manual entitled Wider Peacekeeping, 3rd draft, undated. 2 As of July 1995, UNPROFOR (inc UNCRO and UNPREDEP) had suffered 131

fatalities, UN sources. 3 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para.66.

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Air power can support the ground forces by providing a rapid effective response. Nevertheless, for two reasons, retaliatory action must be seen as an interim measure only and be limited to the source of attack. First, only direct action will remove the immediate risk, and second, punitive action against unrelated targets must only be considered in light of the UN’s wider objectives. An ill-conceived ‘knee-jerk’ reaction is far more likely to exacerbate the crisis than resolve it. There will be times when air power is not immediately available, or other factors, such as weather, preclude its use. Moreover, retaliatory action may be inappropriate. For example, an air strike called for after UN troops came under fire near Gorazde was subsequently cancelled after the UN troops admitted being in the wrong place.1 Factors such as these should be major considerations when assessing the risk of deploying peacekeepers and the use of air power to assure their security. That UN forces actually come under attack indicates a flagrant disregard for their mandate by the belligerent and questions if consent for the UN presence is still forthcoming. Since 1973, self-defence has been deemed to include situations in which peacekeepers are prevented by armed persons from fulfilling their mandate. Here, the UN is on dangerous ground. Enforcing a mandate under the guise of self-defence takes the peacekeepers neatly across the line of consent and compromises their impartiality. When a lack of co-operation by the Bosnian Serbs placed UNPROFOR in this predicament, Boutros-Ghali offered four options to the Security Council:2

1. withdraw the force; 2. maintain the status quo; 3. allow greater use of force; or 4. revise the mandate in line with realistically achievable

peacekeeping tasks. Withdrawal of the force was considered ‘tantamount to abandonment of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and, in Boutros-Ghali’s view, should only have been contemplated as an option of last resort. Discussion of option two acknowledged the inability of the force to fulfil its mandate and the inevitability of withdrawal should it be pursued. Option three involved transition from a peacekeeping

1 From The Death of Yugoslavia, a televised documentary broadcast by the

Australian Broadcast Corporation on 18 October 1995. 2 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions

982(1995) and 987(1995), para.72.


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mission to one of enforcement. Although the UN has no standing force and is unable to mount or sustain a large ground combat operation, such an action would threaten the consent required for vital post-settlement peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Option four, which was the Secretary-General’s preferred, would give UNPROFOR:

...a realistic mandate that would enable it to help to contain the situation ... without creating expectations that it could either enforce an end to the war or join it to fight on the side of one of the parties.1

The Secretary-General’s recommendation was a clear indication that peacekeeping forces can offer little except interim assistance when belligerents are intent on continued conflict. To ensure consent and co-operation in the fulfilment of their mission, UN ground forces must retain their inviolability. Thus, there is no place for enforcement in the peacekeeping mandate. More importantly, there is no place for peacekeepers when the UN’s last resort is invoked.

A Closing Thought

The plight of innocent human beings afflicted by the consequences of nationalist, tribal or sectarian conflict is an emotive issue. The determination and ability of the media to alert the world to circumstances of human suffering has caused the UN Security Council to acknowledge a moral obligation to intervene. Intervention by consent is welcomed by all; however in recent instances of humanitarian deployments into areas of ongoing conflict, the humanitarian mission unintentionally became enmeshed in the conflict itself. As a result, there arose a need firstly, to protect the aid providers and secondly, if the mission was to be successful, to take steps to enforce the mandate. Offensive action is the antithesis of the humanitarian mission. Whilst the use of force in direct support of the humanitarian mandate has, on occasion, been successful, it represents only a short term solution. As Edmund Burke once said: ‘the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again’. A durable political settlement is an indispensable prerequisite for the effective provision and distribution of humanitarian aid, for the re-establishment of infrastructure, for re-integration into the international community, and for a return to normal life. Such a settlement will be achieved only through negotiation. In this, however, the UN faces a dilemma.

1 ibid., para.79.

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For how long will the international community accept the horrors of genocide and other crimes against humanity? What level of human suffering brought about through forced starvation and ensuing diseases will world opinion tolerate? How many people must be allowed to die before the UN Security Council, having recognised its obligations, sanctions appropriate military force to stop the conflict and bring the warring parties to negotiation? There are no black and white answers, no easy solutions. In some circumstances, there are no solutions. However, if there is one lesson to emerge from the UN’s peace operations to date, it is this. In conflicts characterised by inordinate levels of violence together with an utter disregard by the warring parties for UN resolutions, temporary cease-fire arrangements, the well-being of the civilian population and the inviolability of the humanitarian mission, keeping the peace is an impossible venture. Conflict situations demand early and decisive peace enforcement action. Yet, this presents the UN with a dilemma, for some believe ‘that a major peace enforcement operation is beyond the grasp of the United Nations’.1 If this is so, then who will enforce the peace?

1 Sarah Sewell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Peacekeeping and

Peace Enforcement Policy, quoted in Goodman, G.W. Jr., ‘Creating a Peace to Keep’, in Armed Forces Journal, November 1995, p.19.

CHAPTER THREE

IF ONLY IT WERE SO SIMPLE

Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans. That’s where the battles are won.

Colonel John Boyd1

After the events of the Gulf War, it would be all too easy for air power proponents to suppose that offensive air power could provide the answer to all future conflicts. Indeed, even supporters of land and sea power would not deny that air power was central to ultimate victory. However, more important than apportioning credit to one or other of the arms of military power, is an examination of the method by which victory was achieved.

THE SEEMLINESS OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS

Many of yesterday’s air power strategists proffered that war could, and should be won by targeting the enemy’s ability to wage war, and that this was best achieved by persistent attacks on the industrial base.2 Modern theory, while still recognising that targeting a nation’s ability to wage war is key, advocates that attacks against the nation’s command and control system represent a more appropriate and effective focus.3 This latter methodology, which was largely employed in the Gulf War, became known as ‘command and control warfare’ and is gradually evolving into ‘information warfare’. The purpose of such warfare is to induce in an enemy a condition that has its origins in history4, but in today’s parlance is known as ‘strategic paralysis’.

1 John Boyd is an American modern-day air power theorist whose military

career with the USAF spanned nearly thirty years. 2 Trenchard, Douhet, Mitchell and de Seversky all advanced theories that

embraced the concept of strategic bombing, ie destroying a nation’s means of waging war by attacking centres of production, transport systems, ports, agriculture etc.

3 For an excellent appraisal and critique of the modern-day theories of USAF Colonels John Warden and John Boyd, see: Fadok, Maj D.S., Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1995.

4 Sun Tzu said: ‘the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it. Of supreme

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Strategic paralysis is a military option with physical, mental and moral dimensions which intends to disable rather than destroy the enemy ... It (is) ... directed against an adversary’s physical and mental capability to sustain and control its war effort to diminish its moral will to resist.1

There is little doubt that in 1991 Iraq was ‘strategically paralysed’ and it is not unreasonable to suggest that this paralysis was largely responsible for ultimate Iraqi capitulation. Achieving paralysis demands that warfare be conducted at the strategic level. Without risking large numbers of casualties and to some extent sacrificing the element of surprise, only air power possesses the attributes to conduct modern-day, politically-acceptable strategic warfare. As discussed in the previous chapter, Coalition air strategy for the Gulf War was founded largely on the modern-day five-ring theory of Colonel John Warden. The primary centre of gravity was identified not so much as Saddam Hussein himself, but the command and control system that served him. The aim was to disrupt the leadership system by physically attacking and destroying its various nodes. Ultimately, neutralisation of the innermost ring produced the desired ‘strategic paralysis’. Nevertheless, successful attacks on the outer rings were equally important, for they produced ‘(only) partial physical paralysis, but unbearable psychological pressure upon the leadership’.2 The nature of the Iraqi reaction, or rather the lack of it, has encouraged a disregard for the traditional action-reaction activity cycle. Moreover, Warden considers that in future warfare the concept of action-reaction could be irrelevant. The Gulf War demonstrated ‘the awesome power of the air offensive - and the near impossibility of defending against it’.3 It showed ‘unequivocally how defenceless a state becomes when it loses control of the air over its territories and forces’.4 Warden’s prophecy may well be true in theory, yet it is unlikely that future interstate war will emulate exactly that of the Gulf scenario. In Fadok’s opinion, as long as war is unpredictable and its actors a mix of the rational and irrational, it is hard to conceive ‘real war that would be reaction-less and friction-free’.5

importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.’ Griffith, S.(trans), Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963, p.77.

1 Fadok, Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, p.10. 2 ibid., p.25. Emphasis in original. 3 Warden, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century’, p.81. 4 ibid. 5 Fadok, Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, p.29.

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An analysis of any of the numerous intrastate conflicts under way at present would lend credence to Fadok’s note of caution. In essence, victory in war falls to he who controls the enemy. Warden’s argument is that after control is gained, it is never lost. In war between states, when there is a clearly identifiable enemy, this notion of total dominance is easy to grasp. When the challenge to sovereignty is from without, the matter is one of state survival and conflict resolution comes about only through a return to the status quo. Third party intervention, if it occurs, is almost invariably partial. Intrastate conflict arises because of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Thus, it is not a return, but only a change to the situation which will bring about peace. United Nations intervention is only appropriate when there is a threat to international peace and security. The UN does not seek to determine the nature of the settlement between the parties, but simply to ensure the settlement occurs and the fighting stops. Each of the warring parties will undoubtedly seek to dominate the other(s) and conduct their operations from a position of strength. The UN’s role is to create and sustain a conflict-free environment, establishing a balance of power, yet favouring no particular side. The UN must seek not to dominate, but to control - the fundamental principle behind effective leadership. In this context, Warden’s theory of total dominance is inappropriate. Nonetheless, should the UN be forced to resort to coercion, it is each of the factional leadership’s cost-benefit analysis that must be the focus of military action and, in this respect, Warden’s targeting concept has a part to play. For, although stopping the fighting is important, tipping the leaders psychologically toward the negotiating table is more so. Whereas Warden’s theory favours attaining control of the enemy command structure through attacking its most essential elements, that of John Boyd leans more towards a psychological assault. The two theories are, nevertheless, complementary. Boyd favours a form of manoeuvre warfare in which success relies on staying mentally one step ahead of the opponent(s). Achieving this may require physical destruction, but such destruction is a means to an end and not an end in itself. The nub of Boyd’s strategy is timing. The aim is to deny an opponent the time to mentally cope with rapidly changing strategic circumstances. In so doing, ‘a highly fluid and menacing state of affairs’ is created, and the opponent’s ability to adapt to such an environment is either disrupted or incapacitated.1 The focus of Boyd’s theory is on exploiting and attacking processes, ie the decision loop through which an enemy differentiates between what is perceived and

1 ibid., p.14.

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what is real. If an opponent is unable to complete the decision-making process, his capacity to ‘properly identify and address those events which are most threatening’ will gradually diminish.1 Consequently, his actions will be ill-suited to the prevailing situation. Ultimately, ‘by steadily reducing an opponent’s physical and mental capability to resist, one [will crush eventually] his moral will to resist as well’.2 Boyd’s theory is reliant upon rational behaviour, for he contends that all rational actors process their decisions and actions through a continual cycle of observation, orientation, decision and action. Boyd referred to this cycle as the ‘OODA loop’.

Unfolding Environmental Feedback Interaction

Feedback

Figure 9 - Boyd’s OODA Loop3

The most critical node of the OODA loop is ‘orientation’. By denying an opponent the ability to reorient himself, or cause him to orient inaccurately, renders him unable to differentiate between delusion and reality. Yet, no belligerent is going to willingly allow his OODA loop to be exploited. The key to success lies in the loop cycle time. The aim is to keep the adversary in a state of reaction and by varying the nature of the applied pressure induce confusion and disorientation. Pressure can take many forms and is not limited to purely military action. As stated earlier, the focus is the belligerent’s cost-benefit analysis. The purpose of any measure taken is to bring about a change in behaviour through a realisation that the cost of continued conflict is greater than any potential gain.

1 ibid., p.15. 2 ibid. 3 Adapted from ibid., p.16.

OBSERVATION

ORIENTATION

DECISION

ACTION


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Boyd’s theory is particularly pertinent to the resolution of intrastate disputes where the function of the intervening authority (the UN) is to exercise impartial control over a number of interested parties. However, Boyd’s theory offers little in the way of practical detail. Whilst somewhat vexing, it is, in fact, a deliberate ploy by Boyd to encourage a realisation that flexibility of response is the key to success.1 No form of conflict is more varied than that of an intrastate nature. Ethnic, religious, cultural, geographic, historic and economic factors all combine to produce unique situations that demand unique responses. Adopting one generic solution, or consistently favouring one particular path makes for predictability which, ultimately, can lead to vulnerability. The UN can learn much from its past activities, but caution must be exercised not to allow one operation to totally dominate future concepts. A profusion of potential responses is what must be acquired.

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE UN

The UN faces challenging times and the organisation itself is far from perfect. Yet, the Secretary-General still yearns for a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security. If his desire is to be fulfilled, the Security Council must continue to address the numerous internal conflicts that plague our society. The Security Council may shun intervention by invoking its pledge of non-interference in internal affairs of state. However, when ‘roughly a third (of UN member states) are threatened by significant rebel movements, dissidents or governments-in-exile’2, the problem is almost too large to ignore, and it is unlikely to go away. Studies have shown that, since 1945, ‘state authority has been challenged more often from inside the state than from outside it’3. When nationalist and ethnic issues transcend state boundaries, the whole concept of sovereignty and the nature of the state is brought into question. In such unpredictable times, the UN Security Council may not relish its obligations, but it is morally bound to fulfil them. Whilst many other actors have a part to play in creating international peace, the UN is undoubtedly the key organisation from which ideas must emanate. If the UN is to be successful in its quest for world peace, urgent reform is needed within the organisation. The management of allocated resources must be more efficient, more effective and more accountable. Only when this is achieved are member states likely to

1 ibid., p.18. 2 Toffler, A. & H., War and Anti-War, Warner Books, London, 1995, p.297. 3 Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 4th edition, p.578.

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honour the obligation to bear the organisation’s expenses. Notwithstanding improvements in efficiency, the UN budget will undoubtedly remain under considerable strain as demands for assistance or intervention continue to increase. Peace operations, especially those that involve extensive deployments of personnel and equipment, are expensive both to establish and to sustain. If the organisation is to serve effectively the peoples in whose name it was established, member states must search earnestly for the most effective means by which to bring about an early resolution to conflict. In pursuing this goal, a number of fundamental issues must be addressed. The Security Council must determine its obligation of intervention and then enunciate its position. As stated earlier, only by addressing the source of conflict will long term solutions be found. The international community can do much to alleviate the consequences of hostilities within a state, but only action that results in negotiation will provide the essential first step towards peace. The human tragedies in Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia all emphasise the need for prompt, decisive action. Political prevarication and vacillation do little more than exacerbate an already tragic situation. Conflicts that give rise to disproportionate levels of innocent human suffering are more likely than most to generate a public clamour for intervention.1 However, a reactionary humanitarian response alone, may be more likely to prolong the conflict than subdue it. It may be that the aggrieved population would be better served by the UN taking additional positive action to halt the conflict and, by so doing, rapidly bring about negotiations between the warring parties. Yet, is the UN capable of such positive action? The UN has no standing forces and it relies on member nations to contribute personnel and equipment for each and every mission. The variation in the support offered to states which endure similar circumstances raises a number of questions. Why, for instance, was a peace enforcement operation set up in Somalia, but not in Rwanda? Why did UNOSOM II consume US$ 942.4 million per annum when UNAMIR absorbed a relatively paltry US$ 193.5 million?2 Why did the US alone spend over US$ 800 million in support of the Iraqi Kurds in Operation ‘Provide Comfort’? Regrettably, the answer lies in the relationship between the particular situation and the national security

1 “Media pressure played a major role in reversing the initial US decision to

withdraw from northern Iraq in June 1991. The accusation that western leaders were again leaving the Kurds to their fate ... is particularly emotive to public opinion, and one that few politicians facing re-election would ignore, even if professional military advice [was] to withdraw the troops”. ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, International Defense Review, 10/1991, p.1057.

2 Peacekeeping Operations as of October 1995, UN DPI.


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and political interests of the primary contributing countries.1 Many states express vocal support for UN operations wherever they may occur. However, few will ask their taxpayers to fund them, or their military forces to risk their lives for them, unless participation is in the national interest. Unfortunately, this predicament leads to an inconsistency of response by the Security Council. As a result, some nations consider the Security Council to be no more than a mouthpiece, through which the permanent members can cultivate their national security policies. Reformation of the Security Council to reflect the international community of 1995, rather than 1945, might go some way to redressing the current imbalance. However, there is no ignoring the fact that the large quantities of highly trained personnel and latest technology equipment, so essential for effective peace operations, are owned and controlled by a mere handful of countries. As UNOSOM I found to its cost, any attempt to conduct an operation in an area of conflict, with less than adequate support, is fraught with danger. So the UN Security Council faces a dilemma. Either it strives for consistency of response and, by so doing, is forced to shun involvement in certain situations, or it attempts to address each and every concern, recognising that the necessary military support may not be forthcoming. Should the Council adopt the former policy, the UN would soon become a body of inaction. Having no standing forces of its own2, the UN must do its best with what it is offered.3 The high risks and uncertain consequences associated with enforcement action must not be transposed into an alibi for inaction. Moreover, the principle of non-intervention in matters of state ‘[should] not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (of the Charter)’.4 In its search for peace, the Security Council must not baulk from invoking the powers of last resort afforded to it under Article 42.

Peace enforcement should not necessarily be opposed; it simply requires different forces and a completely different concept. An

1 “High-level US policy makers admit that television pictures of the plight of

Kurdish refugees, combined with footage of George Bush and John Major washing their hands of the Kurdish revolt, were instrumental in forcing the leaders to change course and intervene militarily in northern Iraq.” ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, International Defense Review, 10/1991, p.1057.

2 The concept of UN standing forces, air, land or sea, is generally dismissed as impractical.

3 For an interesting insight into the military considerations of collective peacekeeping and intervention, see Connaughton, R.M., Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, Occasional Paper No.3, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Surrey, England, 1992.

4 Charter of the UN, Article 2, para.7.

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intention to deter and enforce requires forces which are as frightening as possible.1

Enforcement action carried out as a result of cross-border aggression will be likely to have a clear objective, ie the return of rightful sovereignty. In an intrastate situation, however, the political goal of restoration of peace through mutual agreement, provides insufficient guidance from which to derive specific military objectives. As in Boyd’s OODA loop, the unfolding environmental interaction is critical in determining the orientation and nature of follow-on action. Such action must be well-defined, ensuring that it is ‘appropriate, proportionate, meets the objectives, and maintains the widest possible national, regional and international support’.2 As has been stated earlier, the political aim, and thus the military enforcement mission, in situations of intrastate conflict is twofold; one, effect a cessation of hostilities, and two, coerce the belligerent(s) to participate in negotiations whilst desisting further acts of aggression. The two parts of the mission are complementary and execution of one may well encourage voluntary compliance with the other. In the selection of the most appropriate military instrument to fulfil these objectives, the Security Council has three choices: land power, air power, or a combination of the two.3

THE NEMESIS

Throughout the entire peace process, from preventive diplomacy to peace development, land forces have an essential role to play. Conflict within a state is often sporadic, and whilst conflict abounds in one region, land forces may be involved in peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations in another. Success of the peacekeeping mission is totally dependent on the consent and co-operation of the interested parties. Any use of force by troops, other than in self-defence, stands to compromise their impartiality and place their security in jeopardy. Moreover, consent for a UN presence on the ground is likely to be

1 Hägglund, Lt Gen G., ‘Peacekeeping in a Modern War Zone’, Survival,

Vol.XXXII, No.3, p.240, quoted in Connaughton, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, p.7.

2 Evans, Co-operating for Peace, p.146. 3 There is no intention here to diminish the importance of sea power. In the

Gulf War, naval assets unquestionably played an essential part. Moreover, for the effective enforcement of sanctions, a naval presence may prove essential. Nevertheless, for the type of enforcement mission specified here, geographical constraints could severely limit the naval surface contribution. As a platform for the launching of air power, however, aircraft carriers could overcome any lack of suitable air bases. In addition, sea transportation may provide the optimum means by which to move troops and equipment to an area of operations.


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rapidly withdrawn if the deployed troops become a party to the conflict. Fulfilling the objectives of the peace enforcement mission through land power alone would, in most circumstances, require a major ground offensive. Intrastate conflict is typified by urban guerrilla-style warfare and fighting forces often comprise regular soldiers, paramilitaries and even civilians. The fundamental tenets of UN operations would be called into question if the public perceived UN troops to be using excessive force especially against civilians. Moreover, a situation in which UN troops effectively became an army of occupation would hardly be conducive to achieving a long-term political solution which, ultimately, must endure after the UN withdraws. In addition, the imperious nature of an occupying force may be resented by all concerned and, thus, bring upon its personnel continual harassment or attack. Adverse weather, unfavourable topography and the need for a secure logistics chain could all increase the vulnerability of the force. Flexibility to operate at all three levels of war is the key to effective peace enforcement action, but without a significant offensive, armies are constrained, in the most part, to operate at the tactical level. UN soldiers have, through diplomatic mediation, often achieved the implementation and maintenance of local cease-fires, thereby averting an outbreak of further conflict. However, UN presence on the ground is no guarantee of successful deterrence as the death of 25 Pakistani soldiers in Somalia has borne testament.1 For UN ground troops to continue the essential tasks they currently undertake, their impartiality must be ensured. For this reason, peacekeeping forces or any other ground force bearing UN colours or operating under its authority, must not become directly involved in peace enforcement action. Therefore, through default, the enforcement role would appear to fall to air power. However, between planning the mission and flying the mission lie a number of key questions which must first be answered.

1 On 5 June 1993, in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against

UNOSOM II troops by Somali militiamen throughout south Mogadishu, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading treatment. The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia, UN DPI.

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Table 11 - Key Questions Before the Mission In considering the suitability of land power for the enforcement mission, the political objective has already been discussed. Nonetheless, there are three aspects of political intent which encourage the use of air power over other forms of military power. First, air power allows for rapid response. Second, air power represents a vigorous demonstration of intent and produces high profile results. The threat of repeated offensive air action is, indeed, a strong deterrent. And last, the law of armed conflict prohibits making non-combatants the object of attack. In intrastate warfare, distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant may be extremely difficult. The ubiquity of air power allows for a wide choice of tactical and strategic targets that would yield a low probability of collateral damage. As the purpose of the overall mission is twofold, it may be necessary to identify a number of vulnerable critical points. Yet, what matters most, is finding the true centre of gravity, for it is action against this

PLAN THE MISSION

1. What is the political aim? 2. What is the military objective? 3. What is the optimum weapon? 4. What is the most appropriate means of weapon

delivery? 5. Is air power available? 6. What are the possible gains? 7. What are the risks? 8. What is the probability of success? 9. What are the likely consequences? 10. Who will control the operation? 11. Will the mission achieve the objective?

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focal point that will break the will of the people. By so doing, insufferable psychological pressure will be inflicted on the leadership, the result being a halt to the conflict and a return to the negotiating table. Should no centre of gravity be apparent, or the targeting of it prove impossible, offensive military action would cease to be a viable option. Identifying the key centre of gravity is hard enough, yet determining politically-correct weapon-to-target matching provides for an equal, if not greater challenge. Accurate delivery of weapons is now, not only demanded, but expected. Precision guidance has, undoubtedly, improved weapon effectiveness and, in the case of bombs, redefined the concept of mass. Unfortunately, however, despite their considerable success in the Gulf conflict, PGMs have yet to realise their full potential. The risk of collateral damage from precision weapons, though significantly lower than that from unguided ordnance, remains large enough to constitute an important planning consideration.1 Furthermore, government leaders, cognisant of the political damage that can result from destruction of the wrong target, demand visual acquisition prior to weapon release. Even if accuracy of weapon delivery can be assured, the limitations imposed by inclement weather have yet to be fully overcome. It will likely be some considerable time before advances in technology remove the ‘if we can’t see, we can’t drop’ dilemma. Yet, notwithstanding that poor weather may preclude certain missions being flown, and certain targets from being attacked, the pervasiveness of air power allows alternative options to be pursued. What may further advance the flexibility of air power, is the potential offered by emerging non-lethal weapon technology. The operational use of non-lethal weapons is currently in its infancy, but as enforcement action of the future is compelled to satisfy the demands of political correctness, this category of weapon will become ever more germane. Contemplating the air strike mission, however, assumes that air power, in its appropriate form, is readily available. Few would question that the ability of the UN Security Council to implement effective enforcement action through any military means under Chapter VII, is largely dependent on the attitude and co-operation of the United States. The European NATO nations (including France) could put together a highly trained, reasonably equipped and, thus, potentially effective air contingent of some size. However, few other regional alliances or individual countries, except for the US, could do likewise. Some consider that it is only the

1 For a selective introduction to defence technologies of the post-Vietnam era,

see Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, Appendices A to G, pp.273-317.

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Americans who can ‘look towards the next century with any confidence of being able to apply air power across the entire spectrum of warfare’.1 A similar assessment could be made when considering land or naval power. Many countries possess state-of-the-art aircraft and weapons, many expend considerable funds on defence budgets and capital equipment programmes; yet, neither of these guarantees effectiveness. More significantly, however, even if a viable offensive force could be formed without US assistance, its use would be unlikely to receive UN approval if American support within the Security Council was lacking. As Americans express growing concern over their own domestic issues, there appears to be considerable pressure on the US administration to adopt a more isolationist approach. The implications of this for both international peace and security, and the credibility of the UN as a peacemaking organisation, are portentous.

What, for example, shall the rest of the world do when America refuses to act or pursue a parochial interest? It was one thing to look to America for leadership when the nation was self-confident and public spirited; it may be quite another if America feels beleaguered, under siege economically, and too poor to act.2

The denial to the UN of effective air power would be made even more poignant due to the possible gains its employment could produce. In essence, in an intrastate conflict situation, the threatened or actual use of offensive air power represents the only viable military instrument capable of enforcing negotiations. Yet, it is accompanied by no guarantee of success. Some of the factors that may adversely affect the mission in a benign situation have already been alluded to. Naturally, in a combat environment, air defences exacerbate the chances of success as well as dramatically increasing the risk to the aircrews involved. Thus, defence suppression becomes a necessary component of the overall offensive mission. All of the above considerations must be taken into account when assessing the probability of successfully achieving the mission. Even if success is likely, more important are the likely consequences that the offensive action may produce. The effect on international public support is of equal importance to that on the targeted leadership, for, without public support, sustaining the necessary threat of further action may prove impossible.

1 Mason, Air Power, A Centennial Appraisal, p.197. 2 Gergen, D., American Perspectives after the Gulf War, Report of the Meeting of

the Trilateral Commission, Tokyo, 20-22 April 1991, p.43, quoted in Connaughton, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, p.7.


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The use of hostages as human shields against air attack by both Saddam Hussein and the Bosnian Serbs aptly demonstrates the potency of offensive air power. It also demonstrates that the costs to the UN could be greater than the benefits unless due consideration is given to the consequences of offensive air action before the event. National political will, especially that of the troop contributing countries, would be greatly swayed against participation, if the potential consequences were to place their personnel at an unacceptably high level of risk. It is in the planning stage that measures must be taken to ensure such a situation does not evolve. The UN can be reactive rather than proactive, as is its wont1, yet, through careful and detailed analysis of the belligerents’ likely course of action, it can still remain one step ahead in the OODA loop. Frequent reference is made to the ‘grey’ nature of peace operations and the blurred line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The more indistinct this line is allowed to become, the more the prevailing situation will favour the belligerent, and the longer the conflict and the suffering will continue. The UN must determine the ‘black and white’ of right and wrong, and enunciate what is, and what is not, acceptable in the eyes of international law. There must be no doubt in the mind of the belligerent that, if UN intervention has a foundation in law, the peacemakers will use all available measures, including the use of force, to ensure compliance. Peacekeepers must recognise that they can only do their job effectively once compliance has been achieved. Peacekeeping has traditionally been an army activity. Although combat support air operations have been generally recognised as essential to peace operations, the use of offensive air power has frequently provoked strong criticism. There could be a number of reasons for this but two appear prominent. First, there has been a significant lack of public debate on the potential contribution of offensive air power to the peace process. And second, there is a not unnatural reluctance by soldiers to recognise the potential primacy of air power in conflict resolution. Offensive air power is a peacemaking tool for use by the diplomats - its use has immediate political consequences. Peacekeeping fulfils a quite separate function. Nonetheless, both activities are mandated by Security Council resolutions and, thus, require centralised political control. Command and control of peace operations is a subject worthy of an entire study in its own right. However, the issues most relevant to offensive air operations must be considered. 1 ‘[The UN] only react[s] to violence from one of the warring factions; and when

the violence stops, our actions also stop.’ From a personal interview with a member of the UN Liaison Office in Craigie, J., Air Operations Over Bosnia, review draft, November 1994, p.28.

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The Secretary-General distinguishes three levels of authority with regard to the command and control of peace operations1:

1. overall political direction, which belongs to the Security Council;

2. executive direction and command, for which the

Secretary-General is responsible; and 3. command in the field, which is entrusted by the

Secretary-General to the chief of mission. To avoid confusion of functions and responsibilities, it is important that the distinctions between each level are understood. Occasionally, the command chain is complicated somewhat by force-contributing governments who, in concern for the safety of their own personnel, choose to give directly to their contingents, guidance or orders on operational matters. To ensure respect of the principle of unity of command, which is essential to multi-national operations, the UN must endeavour to meet the concerns of all the relevant governments. The three-tier system of command and control works well in situations of traditional peacekeeping. Moreover, it worked well during the Gulf conflict when political direction, executive direction and command in the field were performed by Bush, Powell and Schwarzkopf respectively. However, when different force elements are attempting to fulfil different objectives in the same geographical area, numerous problems can arise. Bosnia provides the obvious example. The Security Council attempts to facilitate the making of peace, the commander in the field attempts to maintain it. Air power, in one form or another, is crucial to both endeavours. Air power assets may be based at locations remote from the nominated field commander and be tasked to fly missions in support of either the peacemaking, or the peacekeeping process. For the former, command and control must be vested in the force element group implementing the enforcement mandate. Naturally, offensive operations will have implications for both the peacekeeping force and the non-military units involved in the humanitarian mission. Thus, the field commander responsible for peacekeeping must be privy, and able to contribute, to the overall campaign plan. As to who determines the overall campaign plan, which could include all facets of the peace process, is at present a matter of some considerable debate. One of the primary strengths of air power is its potential for rapid and flexible response. A convoluted command and control chain slows

1 Report of the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly, UN Document

No.A/50/60 dated 3 January 1995, para.38.


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down the OODA loop and cedes the initiative to the belligerent. The UN can legislate, but it possesses no offensive air assets, nor does it have the ability to direct military operations. As such, operational control of enforcement action, as it was during the Gulf War, is best vested in a national, coalition or alliance commander. Moreover, a degree of autonomy whilst the UN-nominated objectives are pursued, allows for operational flexibility. Naturally, should the political objectives change as a result of offensive action, they must be formally re-defined by the Security Council, but this process should not be construed as a hindrance to, or micro-management of, the enforcement operation. The United States does not permit its forces to serve under UN command.1 Yet, as we have seen, should the option of air strike be considered, the contribution of assets by the US is essential. Thus, it follows that any offensive air action must be commanded by the Americans, albeit under the political guidance and control of the UN Security Council. Yet, even though Article 2 calls for member states to ‘give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter’, what happens if the US feels unable to contribute to a particular operation? The US aversion to UN command is not entirely unjustified. The risks involved in enforcement operations are considerably greater than those associated with peacekeeping. Accordingly, few countries are willing to let their forces come under the strategic direction of the UN Military Staff Committee (MSC), a body specifically established to advise the Security Council on all its military activities. Consequently, the MSC has suffered from a paucity of professional support staff and has become largely extraneous. Thus, it would appear that to be effective, enforcement action legally sanctioned by the UN must be executed by a single-nation or coalition force. Although NATO is well served by an efficient and fully manned headquarters, elsewhere in the world there is no regional equivalent. Only the US possesses the necessary assets to establish a viable combined force headquarters outside the NATO area. If the US chooses not to participate in a particular operation, the UN faces a dilemma; for the UN is denied not only a command and control infrastructure to support enforcement action, but also the effective use of offensive air power - its most valuable instrument of last resort. This dilemma is one that must be addressed by all member states of the UN. Regional organisations and alliances must begin to shoulder the responsibility for their own security and put in place mechanisms by which their collective air power could be put to good effect in the

1 In June 1993, in support of UNPROFOR’s presence in the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, the US, for the only time ever, allowed some 300 of its personnel to serve under UN command.

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event of regional instability. This is no easy task. Some states may be unwilling to form security alliances and, indeed, some may not actually possess air power assets. However, it is somewhat idealistic to imagine that the US or the members of NATO will be willing to commit forces to combat when it is in support, not of their national interest, but of the greater ideals espoused in the UN Charter. Intrastate conflict, especially that which may transcend international borders, can be ruinous to regional stability. It is in every nation’s interest to ensure measures that may be authorised by the UN to bring about a rapid cessation of conflict can actually be effected. So, having taken stock of the considerations, one must now determine if the use of offensive air power, assuming it is available, will achieve the desired political aim. It was stated earlier that peace enforcement requires forces that are ‘as frightening as possible’. Although the destruction of material assets may bring some degree of military success, it is the degree to which the belligerent’s will to fight is being subdued that will be the true measure of effectiveness. Air power’s pervading nature, the shock effects it can produce and its ability to use the fourth dimension to its advantage, give airmen the power to instil in an opponent uncertainty and panic. The ecstatic joy that is frequently evident whenever an attacking aircraft is successfully engaged is acknowledgement of the leverage that air power commands. Air power’s strength lies in its ability to deter. Through demonstrating an ability to destroy the critical elements of a people’s ability to wage war without actually doing so, the UN can effectively control without dominating. Air power’s further strength lies in its ability to carry out the threat of destruction should it prove necessary. Air power is ideally suited to a strategy that demands, then threatens, then compels through exemplary damage. Too often, in the recent past, the Security Council has failed to capitalise on the potential of air power to enforce its demands and, thus, its threats have become hollow. An ensuing lack of respect for the UN as an organisation capable of restoring peace and facilitating conflict resolution has hardly been surprising. Naturally, determining the critical centre of gravity is vital. However, air strike should not be dismissed out of hand simply if a focus for attack cannot be readily identified. As Boyd’s theory shows, persistence in penetrating an opponent’s OODA loop will ultimately allow manipulation of the will of the people. Only air power can provide the rapidity of response, across a spectrum of targets, that may be necessary to achieve this. Wanton destruction of their environment will likely fortify the resolve of a warring party; but, selective air strikes across the breadth of Warden’s rings may raise doubts over the efficacy of their leadership. Doubt leads to a lack of


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confidence which, ultimately, may lead to a realisation by the fighters of the futility of their aggression. It may be that analysis of a particular situation shows no form of military instrument to be appropriate to the peacemaking mission. Yet, it must be realised that once a state of conflict is reached, one must go through the peacemaking process (which may involve peace enforcement) before one can begin, or revert to, effective peacekeeping. As one cannot keep peace where there is no peace to keep, the peacemaking mission must be approached with some urgency. The international community has no wish to see human tragedy on the scale of Bosnia ever again. Admittedly, intrastate problems cannot be solved quickly. If the UN is forced to intervene, it is invariably because resolution has been beyond the ability of others. Disputes often extend back through many generations, and establishing long-term solutions requires the building of mutual trust through a patient, diplomatic process. It would be wrong, and probably damaging to this process, to use military power to attempt to accelerate the progress of negotiations. Yet, it is not unreasonable for the UN to use all available measures, including the use of military force, to stop the fighting and the suffering. In truth, it has a moral obligation to do so. Ideally, enforcement action would never be required, or if it were, then required only once. Nevertheless, the peace enforcement mission has a number of objectives to fulfil. Events in Bosnia have finally shown that, in certain circumstances, force and only force will achieve those objectives. The primary aims of peace enforcement are to stop the fighting and force a return to negotiations, but the task is, of course, much greater than this. For, once these aims are met, there still exists the need to ensure a continual conflict-free environment and an equal balance of power between the belligerents. Until genuine prospects of peace are evident and the risk of further aggression has diminished to an acceptable level, the imposition of demilitarised zones remains firmly within the peace enforcement mission. But, who will be the enforcers? Certainly Boutros-Ghali has recognised the limitations of a ‘blue-helmeted’ force and the need to ‘contract out’ peace enforcement operations to ‘regional organisations or multinational forces led by major powers with special interests in the disputes’.1 Yet, what country would want to send its military forces into a combat environment when their own national security is not directly threatened? That decision will rest very firmly on the degree of national public support that a particular conflict situation commands. Fortunately, the nation whose contribution is most

1 Goodman, ‘Creating a Peace to Keep’, p.20.

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critical to peace enforcement operations, recognises, at least at present, the importance of the role it has to play:

In this new era of peace and hope, there are times when America, and America alone, can and should make a difference.1

The willingness of the US to commit combat forces to Bosnia should offer solace to those thus far frustrated by the inadequacies of the UN’s peacemaking machinery. Significantly though, the principles that underpin the rules of engagement for the Bosnia peace enforcement mission are far removed from those traditionally associated with UN activities:

America protects its own. Anyone - anyone - who takes on our troops will suffer the consequences. We will fight fire with fire, and then some.2

Diplomatic solutions to the world’s problems are always preferable, but the consequences of vacillation and inaction must be considered in terms of human suffering. It took three and a half years for the UN to act decisively with offensive air action in the former Yugoslavia. Peace may not result directly from the negotiations that ensue, but at least in the interim, there is a likelihood of a temporary respite in the conflict. The UN may, indeed, choose not to use force to prevent conflict; however, the international public may clamour for humanitarian intervention. The consequences of shunning the use of force, yet persisting in pursuit of an unattainable mandate could rest heavily upon the Security Council. The UN must recognise that in the peace process, peacemaking must come before peacekeeping. Effective intervention demands clear and achievable mandates, a forthright determination to uphold international law, and a steady hand to guide the enforcement operation to its desired conclusion. Once this has been achieved, then peacekeeping can play its rightful part. The priority for the UN, that is all the member nations of the UN, is to determine the optimum means by which to coerce a belligerent to do its will. A temporary halt to the fighting may be reasonably easy to achieve; the real challenge lies in the psychological battle. How, with what, and to whom are the questions to which the international community must find the answers if protracted intrastate, internecine conflict is to be avoided in the future.

1 President Clinton commenting on the imminent deployment to Bosnia of a

US peace enforcement contingent, The Australian, 29 November 1995, p.1. 2 ibid.


168

Air power is not a panacea and should not be considered as such. It is just one very effective tool in the peacemaker’s inventory. Yet, air power has acquired an unfavourable reputation due to its misemployment by an organisation bent more on addressing the consequences of conflict than the source. Certainly, offensive air power is not appropriate to every situation, but perhaps when the optimum nature of its employment is fully understood, and its utility is promoted by all who believe in it, those who have suffered through protracted periods of conflict might feel that their suffering has not been in vain. At the end of the day, the crux of the matter is the nature of the state. Sovereignty derives from statehood. And sovereignty is the ability to determine economic policy, and to make laws and enforce them. As the world slides towards the formation of regional economic trade areas, economic interdependence, and a new emphasis on co-operative security, the very nature of the state is under threat. As the likelihood of global war has diminished, so a new dark and more menacing peril has materialised. Coping with this emerging danger will demand much of the UN. If it is to fulfil its charter to ‘maintain international peace’ and ‘develop friendly relations among nations’, its members must have a firm appreciation of the nature of conflict. Every dispute must be approached with an awareness of the peculiar, inherent cultural, religious, ethnic, political and economic factors. Such understanding can only be gleaned through a comprehensive intelligence-gathering network. The UN must appreciate each and every potential conflict situation and enunciate its position. When, and if, the Security Council chooses to intervene, it must be clear in purpose and decisive in action. Air power is decisive, but if the UN does not aspire to decisive action, then a decisive force is irrelevant.

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Newspaper Articles Hardman, R., report of an interview with Prince Charles conducted by Mr Jonathan Dimbleby for ITV in The Weekly Telegraph, 6 July 1994, London. ‘UN Chief Chides Security Council on Military Missions’, The New York Times, 6 January 1995. Essays/Journal Articles/Monographs/Papers/Theses Arnold, General H., Global Mission, Harper & Row, New York, 1949. Bash, Maj B.L., The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1994. Bell, C., ‘ The Post-Soviet World : Geopolitics & Crises’, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.98, Australian National University, 1992. Buzan, B., ‘New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991. Connaughton, R.M., Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, Occasional Paper No.3, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Surrey, England, 1992. Craigie, J., Air Operations Over Bosnia, review draft, November 1994, p.28. ‘Croatia Hits UN Serb Areas’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Vol.XXIII, No.4, London, 30 April 1995. Dick, C., Dunn, J., Lough, J., ‘Pandora’s Box’, International Defence Review, 3/93. Fadok, Maj D.S., Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1995. Gagnon, Maj G.R., Air Control Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Gaillard, T.L. Jr., ‘Giving the UN Some Teeth’, Armed Forces Journal International, November 1995. Gastil, R., ‘ The Past, Present and Future of Democracy’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.38, No.2, Winter 1985. ‘General Rose reports from the Bosnian Front’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 31 March 1995. Gergen, D., American Perspectives after the Gulf War, Report of the Meeting of the Trilateral Commission, Tokyo, 20-22 April 1991. ‘Global Update-Flashpoints and Conflicts’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 1995. Goodman, G.W. Jr, ‘Creating a Peace to Keep’, Armed Forces Journal International, November 1995. Goulding, M., ‘ The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping’, International Affairs, Vol.69, No.3, Cambridge University Press, 1993.


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Graydon, Air Chief Marshal Sir M., ‘Roles and Changing Priorities’, RUSI Journal August 1992. Grove, E., ‘UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee’, International Security Vol.17, No.4, 1993. Hägglund, Lt Gen G., ‘Peacekeeping in a Modern War Zone’, Survival, Vol.XXXII, No.3, p.240. Hinton, Sqn Ldr P.N., ‘An Air War Without Front Lines’, Air Clues, DDTP(RAF), June 1995. Mackenzie, S., Strategic Air Power Doctrine for Small Air Forces, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994. Meilinger, Col P., Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power, United States Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995. Metz, S., ‘The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping’, Air Power Journal, Winter 1993. Metz, S., Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning from Rwanda, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1994. Normand, R., ‘The Legitimization of Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War’, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.35/2, Spring 1994. ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, International Defense Review, 10/1991. Rifkind, The Rt Hon M., UK Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Peacekeeping or Peacemaking ?’, RUSI Journal, Vol.138, No.2, London 1993. Ripley, T., ‘Operation Provide Comfort II’, International Defense Review, 10/1991. Roberts, A., ‘ The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol.36, No.3, 1994. Rose, Lt Gen Sir M., ‘A Year in Bosnia: What Has Been Achieved’, RUSI Journal, London, June 1995. Sauerwein, B., ‘Interview: “Our New Strategy is one of Crisis Response” General John Galvin, SACEUR’, International Defence Review Vol.4, 1992. Thakur, R., ‘From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.32, No.3, Cambridge University Press, 1994. ‘The Gulf War, An Airman’s Perspective’, SDS International, Arlington, VA, 1993. ‘The Perceived Threat : A Newsweek Poll’, Newsweek, 9 October 1989. Tilford, E.J., Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1993. Warden, Col J.A., ‘Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century’, in Schultz, R.H. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1992. Weinberger, C.W., ‘The Uses of Military Power’ in Defense, January 1985.

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Reference Documents Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.29, Harlow, January 1983, p.31908. Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for April 1991. Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for August 1992. Keesing’s Record of World Events, News Digest for December 1992. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.39, Reference Supplement, Harlow, March 1993. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Vol.40, Reference Supplement, Harlow, March 1994. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Geneva 1983. United Nations Documents Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, DPI. The United Nations and the Situation in Angola dated 27 April 1995, DPKO. The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, UN Reference Paper DPI/1312/Rev 4 effective 30 April 1994. The United Nations and the Situation in Georgia dated 27 April 1995, DPKO. The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti dated 27 April 1995, DPKO. The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda dated 27 April 1995, DPKO. The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia dated 27 April 1995, DPKO. Peacekeeping Operations as of October 1995, UN DPI. UN Document No.S/4387 dated 14 July 1960. UN Document No.A/47/277 and S/24111 dated 17 June 1992, An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General. UN Document No.S/26450 and No.A/48/403, 14 March 1994, Improving the Capacity of the UN for Peacekeeping. UN Document No.A/49/1 dated 2 September 1994, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation. UN Document No.A/50/60 dated 3 January 1995, Report of the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly - Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. UN Document No.S/95/444 dated 30 May 1995, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982(1995) and 987(1995). UN Document No.S/1995/804 dated 18 September 1995, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council.

INDEX

Afghanistan, 112 Agenda for Peace, 38, 40, 44, 54, 56,

70, 108


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as a building block, 41 Air Power

air campaigns, 111 air policing in the 1920s, 110, 124 and minimum casualty warfare, 121 and non-lethal weapons, 161 and political interference, 76 and the fourth dimension, 94, 110 and the humanitarian mission, 103,

105, 138 and the targeting process, 105 applications of, 103 as a catalyst to diplomacy, 108 as a deterrent, 97, 114, 121 as a political tool, 76, 94, 100, 160 as a strategic asset, 75, 115, 121, 130,

151, 152, 160, 166 as an impartial instrument, 130 as coercer, 116, 128, 130, 132, 162,

163 as compeller, 114 availability of, 161 cost of, 100 criticism of, 163 dominance of the US, 162 in peace enforcement

key questions, 159 in support of UNPROFOR, 103 in the defence of peacekeepers, 147,

148 in the Falklands War, 75, 118 in the former Yugoslavia, 127, 142, 143

criticism of, 128 offensive use of, 128 protection of safe areas, 143 reservations on the use of, 128

in the Gulf War, 65, 91, 95, 100, 113, 114, 116, 151

in the UN Charter, 105 in Vietnam, 75, 97 limitations of, 95 non-offensive roles, 108 offensive use of, 163 other characteristics of, 99 positive characteristics of, 92 propositions regarding, 101 psychological effect of, 143 regional use of, 166 role in peace operations, 103, 104 role of, 103 surveillance and reconnaissance, 105 theorists, 101 threatened use of, 96 unfavourable reputation of, 169 versatility of, 104 vulnerability on the ground, 97

Armenia, 13 Azerbaijan, 13 Belgian Congo

secession by Katanga, 68 Bosnia and Herzegovina

delivery of humanitarian aid, 140 displaced persons in, 139 humanitarian mission

recognition by Security Council, 141, 144

lessons from the conflict, 56, 127 no-fly zone over, 127 role of UNPROFOR, 79

use of force in self-defence, 139 safe areas in, 142

attacks by Bosnian Serbs on, 143 security of UN personnel, 142, 143 UN resolutions concerning, 142

Serbian air attacks in, 127 situation in, 138 type of conflict, 16 UN mission in, 103, 139, 140

ineffectiveness of, 144 obstructions to, 139 withdrawal of, 149

UN troops in, 139 US commitment to, 168 use of NATO air power in, 128, 143 vulnerability of UN forces in, 130

Bosnian Serbs attacks by Croats, 58 effect of NATO air strikes on, 130, 143

Boyd, Colonel John, 101, 151, 153, 155 OODA loop, 154

Chechnya, 13 Clausewitz, Carl von, 32 Croatia

attack on Serbian forces, 58 fighting in, 107

Cyprus UNFICYP, 69

Czechoslovakia, 15, 21 Decolonisation, 11 Disputes

as a threat to peace, 48 Economics, 17 Ethnie, 5 External Authorities, 13 Falkland Islands

counter-air operations, 119 invasion by Argentina, 23, 112, 117 lessons from the conflict, 120 location, 118 right of self-defence, 118

Geneva Convention, 59, 133, 142 Additional Protocols, 133

Goulding, Marrack, 35, 37 Humanitarian

assistance consent to, 41 importance of, 41

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in Bosnia, 127, 139 law

violations of as a threat to peace, 49 mission

and its relation to peacekeeping, 60, 147

and the use of force, 57, 134, 135, 149

as part of the peace process, 52 implications of peace enforcement,

164 in Somalia, 145 objectives of, 59, 140, 147

operations during conflict, 47, 149 under Chapter VII, 44

IGOs role of, 18

Intervention and Article 2, 157 and the national interest, 134 choice for the UN, 58 during the Cold War, 24 for humanitarian reasons, 72, 134 guide-lines for, 25 in conflict between states, 153 in Cyprus, 36 in Czechoslovakia, 33 in intrastate disputes, 11, 31, 33, 35,

51, 66, 73, 78, 122, 153 purpose of, 59 UN objectives, 131 without consent, 132

in Iraq, 63, 137 in Korea, 63 in Lebanon, 33, 36 in Somalia, 63, 145 in Suez, 25 in support of the Kurds, 136 in the Belgian Congo, 34, 63, 66

UN SCRs, 67 in the former Yugoslavia, 63 in Vietnam, 74

need for clear objectives, 101 Rolling Thunder, 75

legality of, 27, 51, 82 lessons from the past, 74 mandate pertaining to, 49 need for clear mandate, 52 occasions for, 21, 48, 58 public demand for, 156, 168 purpose of, 25 requirements for success, 49, 145 support for, 36 transition to negotiation, 69 UN authorisation of, 49 unilateral, 33 United States,co-operation of, 26

Iraq, 91

annexation of Kuwait, 19, 51, 113 attack by Israel, 84 no-fly zones over, 137, 138 safe havens in, 136 suppression of Shi’a Marsh Arabs, 137 US injunction against, 136

Katanga secession from Belgian Congo, 34, 67

Korea as a part nation-state, 9

Kurds after the Gulf War, 77, 135 as a split nation, 9 denial of citizenship, 16, 136 enforced intervention by ground forces,

138 safe havens for, 136 support from the US, 137, 156

Kuwait immediate concerns following invasion,

114 invasion by Iraq, 19, 50, 113

Mandate definition, 49 need for termination point, 51

Media effect on the Security Council, 149

Migration, 14 MNCs

role of, 18 Nationalism, 14 NATO

air power capabilities, 161 air strikes in former Yugoslavia, 128,

143 aspirations to join, 13 in support of UNPROFOR, 103

‘Deny Flight’, 127 operations out of area, 166

NGOs role of, 18

Osirak Israeli attack on, 84

PGMs, 71, 75, 161 Provide Comfort, Operation, 135

combined task force, 136 Refugees, 15

definition of, 16 in secession wars, 16 numbers of, 15

Rifkind, Malcolm, 64 Rose, Lt Gen Sir Michael, 48, 103 Rwanda, 32

as an independent state, 12 as Belgian Congo, 12 history of, 12 Hutu, 12 Tutsi, 12 type of conflict, 16


178

UN mission in, 156 Self-defence

definition of, 37 in peacekeeping, 56, 147 of the UN mandate, 148 right of, 112, 135 use of force in, 27, 37, 84, 142

Self-determination, 6, 15, 133 Somalia, 145, 159

attacks on peacekeepers, 146 civil conflict in, 23, 145

as a threat to international peace, 145 failure of UN mission, 52, 145 peace enforcement in, 156 UN casualties in, 159 UN deployment to, 49 US involvement in, 145

Sovereignty, 8 as the central pivot, 169 benefits of, 8, 14 violations of, 112

State destabilisation of, 10, 21 evolution of, 4 multination-state, 8, 9 nation-state, 8 part nation-state, 8, 9 state-nation, 8, 9 Westphalian System, 4

Statehood, 6, 10, 21, 169 Strategic paralysis, 151

of Iraq, 152 Strategies

coercive, 55, 56, 74 destructive, 82 enabling, 44, 72, 80, 84 enforcement, 57, 74, 80, 82 when deterrence fails, 79

Suez Crisis British weaknesses in, 82 lessons from, 25, 82

Thatcher, Margaret, 118 United Nations

Charter of, 33 availability of armed forces, 27, 48 Chapter I

Article 2, 49, 137, 165 Chapter V

Article 25, 61 Chapter VI, 31

Chapter VI½, 32 Chapter VII, 31

Article 39, 31, 41, 60, 112, 132 Article 40, 56, 60, 132 Article 41, 41, 60, 61 Article 42, 41, 44, 52, 60, 63, 157 Article 51, 118 measures under, 58, 60

objectives of, 24 origin of, 31

purpose of, 73 command and control, 164 influence on Iraq/Iran war, 33 influence on Vietnam war, 33 Military Staff Committee, 165 need for reform, 155, 157 peace building

after enforcement action, 68 peace development

purpose of, 38 peace enforcement, 58

acceptance of risk, 68, 157 against Iraq, 113 and demilitarised zones, 167 and non-lethal weapons, 161 and safe areas, 142 as a part of peacekeeping, 60, 149 as a political instrument, 64 as a subset of peacemaking, 60, 167 as last resort, 50 as part of the peace process, 52 by land forces, 132, 159 capability of the UN for, 150 command and control of, 164, 165 consequences of, 69 contracting out, 167 examples of, 112 identifying the centre of gravity, 124,

126 in Bosnia

authority to use air power, 142 in Korea, 65 most appropriate military instrument

for, 105 nature of, 59, 60, 69, 123 occasions for, 58, 108 on behalf of the UN, 44 purpose of, 60, 158, 167 requirements for success, 121, 158,

159 role of air power, 110, 131

critical conditions for use of, 144 role of the military, 64, 66 role of the US, 66, 161, 168 sanctions

use of, 27 simultaneous with peacekeeping, 56,

164 strategies, 80 the public view of, 83 UN experience of, 25, 47, 63 US support for, 162 use of force, 85 within Article 2, 31

peace operations after the Cold War, 39, 71 aims of, 38 characteristics of, 42 during the Cold War, 33, 34

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related activities, 40 the peace process, 52, 124

peacebuilding purpose of, 38

peacekeeping after the Cold War, 36 and air power, 111 and the use of force, 25, 55, 131, 158 as a deterrent, 109 as a result of interstate conflict, 35 as part of the peace process, 52 choice of forces, 36 command and control of, 164 definition of, 35 deployment of mission, 55 development of doctrine, 55 difference to peace prevention, 111 during conflict, 57, 71, 131, 149, 150 during the Cold War, 25 effect of rogue factions, 45 extended operations, 69, 130 failure to realise mandate, 27, 55, 69,

132 in Agenda for Peace, 38 in the Charter, 31 limitations on freedom of movement,

104 mandates, 132 nature of, 55, 147 need for consent, 57 peace enforcement units, 56 principles of, 25, 32, 37, 44 purpose of, 38, 44, 70 redefinition of, 38, 44 requirements for, 45 simultaneous with peace enforcement,

56, 71 success of, 36 transition to enforcement, 34, 44, 45,

67, 149, 159 wider peacekeeping, 147

peacemaking non-military methods

as means to protect minorities, 131 purpose of, 38, 41 under Chapter VI, 55 use of air power in, 132

preventive diplomacy preventive deployment, 109

in Macedonia, 109 purpose of, 38

primary purpose of, 112 resolutions

SCR 688, Iraq, 136, 137 sanctions

economic, 61 effects of, 61, 62 instances of, 61 limitations of, 63

on Serbia, 63 the role of the military, 62 use of, 61

Secretaries-General Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 10, 24, 44,

55, 70, 71, 107, 108, 109, 111, 148

Hammarskjöld, Dag, 34 Security Council, 107, 140, 165

against pre-emptive action, 84 as authority for retaliatory action, 59 challenge to composition of, 51 command and control, 44, 164 consistency of response, 157 decision to use force, 47, 105, 108,

157 determining threat to peace, 41, 48,

55, 112, 156 first summit, 38 involvement in intrastate disputes,

136, 155 managing the budget, 156 meetings of, 37 need for decisive action, 156 need to redefine objectives, 165 resolutions

focus of, post 1988, 37 SCR 3314, definition of aggression, 48 SCR 502, Falklands, 117 SCR 660, Iraq, 50, 80, 113 SCR 661, Iraq, 50 SCR 662, Iraq, 50 SCR 664, Iraq, 50 SCR 665, Iraq, 50 SCR 667, Iraq, 50 SCR 670, Iraq, 50 SCR 678, Iraq, 50, 113 SCR 688, Iraq, 135 SCR 713, former Yugoslavia, 61 SCR 724, former Yugoslavia, 141 SCR 733, Somalia, 145 SCR 752, former Yugoslavia, 141 SCR 771, former Yugoslavia, 141 SCR 771, Somalia, 49 SCR 781, former Yugoslavia, 127 SCR 787, former Yugoslavia, 141 SCR 794, Somalia, 145 SCR 816, former Yugoslavia, 127 SCR 819, former Yugoslavia, 141, 142 SCR 82, Korea, 65, 66 SCR 824, former Yugoslavia, 142 SCR 836, former Yugoslavia, 127, 142

responsibilities post Cold War, 47 support for peacekeeping, 45 use of force

military, 52 strategy for, 27, 55

United States, 105 as a state-nation, 8 economic threat to, 18 forces under UN command, 165

War


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causes of, 10 Cold War, 3, 8, 13

demise of, 24 effect of UN operations on, 36 effect on UN Charter, 24 international security during, 33 peacekeeping during, 25

Gulf 1990/91 'Al Firdos' incident, 116 aims of, 65 concept of victory, 77 critical role of air power, 116 SCRs pertaining to, 50

Iran/Iraq casualties in, 65

Korean casualties in, 65 threat of atomic weapons, 66 US response to, 66

Vietnam casualties in, 65

Warden, Colonel John, 87, 101, 114, 115, 126, 152 target rings, 115

Weinberger Doctrine, 26, 27

Yugoslavia, former as a federative state, 9 as a fractured state, 10 as an international conflict, 23 ethno-nationalism in, 15 international conference on, 144 NATO

air strikes in, 126 Bosnian Serbs response to, 129

need for UN presence, 49 refugees, 14 UN casualties in, 147 UNPROFOR

air power support for, 142 establishment of, 126, 141 in a war situation, 56 mandates under Chapter VII, 64 need for impartiality, 48 purpose of, 79 requirements to fulfil the mandate,

130 revision of mandate, 148 risk to personnel, 129 vulnerability of forces, 130

The nature of conflict is changing. The role of the United Nations in the resolution of conflict is also changing. What is the United Nations’ future role? Should the United Nations intervene in internal conflict? Is the use of offensive military force appropriate? What type of military force should be considered? Who are the real peacemakers? This book, written during 1995 at the RAAF Air Power Studies Centre as part of a Royal Air Force service fellowship, addresses these issues and seeks to develop an understanding of the role of offensive air power in United Nations peace operations. Written in three parts, it first lays out a framework for analysis of the origins of conflict and examines the case for external intervention. Part Two describes the peace process using past and present UN operations, and discusses the changes that have occurred. Each element of the peace process is explored, emphasising the significant differences that exist between them. Consideration of various strategies for peace leads on to Part Three which concentrates on air power and peace enforcement. The concept of peace enforcement remains a subject of continuous debate in the United Nations. This book aims to contribute to this important debate.

BLESSED BE THE PEACEMAKERS

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