Blaming Active Volcanoes or ActiveVolcanic Blame? Volcanic CrisisCommunication and BlameManagement in the Cameroon

Lee Miles, Richard Gordon and Henry Bang

AbstractThis chapter examines the key role of blame management and avoidancein crisis communication with particular reference to developing countriesand areas that frequently experience volcanic episodes and disasters. Inthese contexts, the chapter explores a key paradox prevalent within crisiscommunication and blame management concepts that has been rarelytested in empirical terms (see De Vries 2004; Brändström 2016a). Inparticular, the chapter examines, what it calls, the ‘paradox of frequency’where frequency of disasters leads to twin dispositions for crisis framed aseither: (i) policy failure (active about volcanic blame on others), whereissues of blame for internal incompetency takes centre stage, and blamemanagement becomes a focus of disaster managers, and/or: (ii) as eventfailure (in this case, the blaming of lack of external capacity on activevolcanoes and thereby the blame avoidance of disaster managers). Putsimply, the authors investigate whether perceptions of frequency itself is amajor determinant shaping the existence, operation, and even perceivedsuccess of crisis communication in developing regions, and countriesexperiencing regular disaster episodes. The authors argue frequency isimportant in shaping the behaviour of disaster managers and ratherironically as part of crisis communication can shape expectations ofcommunity resilience and (non)-compliance. In order to explore theimplications of the ‘paradox of frequency’ further, the chapter examinesthe case of the Cameroon, where volcanic activity and events have beenregular, paying particular attention to the major disasters in 1986(Lake Nyos Disaster - LND) and 1999 (Mount Cameroon volcaniceruption - MCE).

L. Miles (&) � R. Gordon � H. BangBournemouth University, Dorset House, Poole,Dorset, UKe-mail: lmiles@bournemouth.ac.uk

Advs in VolcanologyDOI: 10.1007/11157_2017_2© The Author(s) 2017

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KeywordsBlame games � Blame management � Paradox � Frequency of disasters �Cameroon � Volcano

1 Introduction

Many parts of the world today suffer from acombination of high vulnerability to, and fre-quency of, natural hazards. In some instances,this is because geological factors, such as theexistence of tectonic plate lines, result in repeatedoccurrence of earthquakes, tremors, or volcaniceruptions. In the Philippines, for example, thecomplexity of geographical and geological fac-tors prompts a ‘diversity of hazards’ fromearthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, to typhoonsand flash flooding. Yet, any frequency of recur-ring natural hazards does not automatically leadto efficient and successful emergency planning ordisaster management. Even the experienced canbe caught out by the unexpected, leading topublic and media blame, and accusations of ‘in-competency’, amidst government claims ofinsufficient capacity or ‘incapacity’ (Woosteret al. 2005). Within this mix, developing effec-tive crisis communication remains a constantchallenge, especially in the management ofexpectations, and the avoidance of blame(Brandström 2016a, b). Indeed, debates aboutincompetency and/or incapacity are often heardin economically developing countries, and thuswere resilience capacity is still evolving (Cutteret al. 2008).

The chapter examines three aspects. First, itexplores the key relationship between crisiscommunication and blame avoidance and man-agement in the context of volcanoes withindeveloping countries and regions. Second, itintroduces the concept of a ‘Paradox of Fre-quency’. Thirdly, it discusses the case study ofCameroon where a major geological volcanicline, characterized by active and comparativelyregular volcanic and gas activity has clearlyevidenced issues of crisis communication, blamemanagement and the ‘Paradox of Frequency’.

2 Crisis Communication and BlameManagement: Balancing MeaningMaking, Framing and BlameGames

2.1 Meaning-Making

As Boin et al. (2005: 82) argues, meaning mak-ing in crisis and disasters ‘is not just a matter offollowing existing contingency plans or imple-menting strategic choices at the outset of a crisis.It entails intuitive and improvised public com-munication by leaders who are suddenly cast intothe hectic pace of crisis reporting’. Disastermanagers and their political masters mustdevelop integrated ‘framing’ of crisis communi-cation that successfully embodies, on the onehand, response and recovery imperatives with astrategy for the restoration and continuity ofeconomic activity, and on the other hand, busi-ness and national interests.

A frame is then a shared construction ofreality, and likewise, framing activity covers boththe use and the impact of frames. As Boin et al.(2005: 88) highlights, framing represents ‘theproduction of facts, images and spectacles aimedat manipulating the perception and reaction to acrisis’, and typically involves selective exploita-tion of data and arguments. In addition, framingseeks to build (public) confidence in ‘more orless standardised sequences’ and processes sothat participants feel part of disaster planningworking towards their own key interests (Boinet al. 2005).

Meaning making can also, however, involve‘masking’ where disaster managers concealand/or downplay aspects of a disaster (to reducethe long term impacts) during and after crises.Above all, the outcome of successful meaningmaking should be avoidance, limitation, andcontrol of ‘blame games’ representing the

2 L. Miles et al.

‘struggle between protagonists inside and outsidegovernment about the allocation of responsibilityfor negative events’ (Brändström et al. 2008:114).

2.2 Blame-Gaming

Blame management is often seen as being aboutblame avoidance or at least managing and con-trolling blame-gaming. Blame games can be seenas situations where leaders (but could be exten-ded to entities) protect their own self-interests byprojecting negative aspects of the crisis ontoother actors. The attribution of blame can be amajor occupation of disaster managers and theirpolicy leaders during a disaster, seeking to avoidor shape future accountability. Boin et al. (2010:706) argues ‘something or somebody must beblamed—for causing the crisis, failing to preventit, or inadequately responding to it’, pointing tothe fact that the ‘tragedy’ of disaster as an ‘Act ofGod’ or ‘beyond management’ is no longer seenas a publically or socially acceptable explanationfor a crisis. There has to be allocation of blame(Brändström and Kuipers 2003: 291).

For disaster managers, the incentive to inflateor diminish blame could be incentivized by aperceived threat of future demotion or dismissalor even by future progression and promotion(Boin et al. 2009: 99; Hood 2001: 8). This can beparticularly true in developing countries, wheredisaster management frameworks may not be thatwell developed or resourced, and the pressureupon individuals may even be more intense.

According to Brändström (2016a: 34), blam-ing theory assumes that the blaming behavior ofdisaster managers and policy leaders is oftendetermined by three factors—namely (i) thewider institutional and political conditions underwhich blame games occur, (ii) the blame man-agement strategies that actors employ and,(iii) the skills used to apply these strategies in thepublic arena. In developing countries, the con-ditions affecting disaster management are quitechallenging—with finite resources, immatureinstitutional arrangements, unstable politicalconditions, and intense competition between

governmental priorities. In other words, disposi-tion towards blaming can be heightened princi-pally because of the very institutional andpolitical conditions that pertain in developingcountries.

Moreover, the skills of disaster managers canalso be influential, not least because a disasterprovides opportunities to bring out the worst inpeople who seek to identify scapegoats in orderto allocate blame (Ewart and McLean 2015:169). It may also bring out the best in people andtheir entrepreneurial skills at times of crisis (seeMiles and Petridou 2015; Miles 2016). Certainly,within the realms of crisis communication, dis-aster managers and policy leaders will be skillfulat arming themselves with plentiful explanationsto avoid blame (McGraw 1990: 119). Ewart andMacLean (2015: 168), for instance, catalogue sixforms of identifiable explanations, from blaminglack of resources; the event itself; previousadministration(s); the number of people andagencies involved; the delegated agency; orclaiming ignorance to unforeseen consequences.

2.3 Framing

A critical feature within crisis communication isthus for disaster managers ‘to position themselvesin relation to what caused the event’ (Brändström2016a: 118) and distinguishing between framingcausality as caused by internal (policy/political)or external (operational or other) factors. Often anexternal frame requires arguing ‘credibly that theevents may or may not have been foreseeable’and also challenge certainty that events werepreventable or controllable once they had occur-red. In particular, events affecting vulnerabledisaster zones in developing countries can beportrayed as ‘forces of nature’—where disastermanagers argue that they ‘cannot prevent themfrom happening and rarely are able to controlthem when they do’ (Brändström 2016a: 118).Equally, opponents and critics will attempt to linkoperations to the internal workings of disasterplanning, policy and politics.

While there are numerous models for under-standing blaming behavior and impacts

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 3

(Brändström and Kuipers 2003; Brändström2016a) certain aspects seem especially relevantfor this chapter. First, there is political/policyfailure (highlighting internal causes, and exam-ples of individual or multiple mistakes or missedsignals) which can be broadly equated with ‘in-competency’. Second, there is systemic failure inrelation to external factors—where the disastermanagement system cannot cope with the mag-nitude of the external event and thus there is‘incapacity’ or ‘incapability’ to act effectivelyagainst such ‘forces of nature’ (adapted fromBrändström 2016a). In this way, blame andaccountability are either internalized or exter-nalized. Frames indicating whether the eventswere foreseeable and controllable internalizeaccountability, meaning the blame is allocated toidentifiable individuals and their policies.Whereas frames externalising accountabilityallow for disaster managers and policy makers toavoid blame and policies remain unchanged(Boin et al. 2009).

Balancing meaning making, framing, andblame gaming are therefore important forunderstanding crisis communication and dealingwith the question of frequency of disasters also.In addition, managers framing the implications ofthe frequency of disasters in specific ways maylead to delegation to local actors in developingcountries. Rather ironically, blame managementmay, directly or indirectly, facilitate narrative(s)of resilience in developing countries, where thereis a bigger role for local communities and indi-viduals doing more when confronted with inef-fective or reluctant governmental action. In thisway, the pressures of meaning making, framingand blame management facilitate official, andoften unofficial, delegation of disaster manage-ment to others.

3 Paradox of Frequency: PolicyFailure as ‘Incompetency’and Event Failure as ‘Incapacity’

The ‘paradox of frequency’ highlights how fre-quency can be framed within crisis communica-tion, and in particular, as a paradoxical situation

where frequency of disasters facilitates twindispositions for crisis framing.

First, there is the frame where the frequencyof disaster leads to a stress and expectation onlearning and competence building. Disastermanagers, faced with a regularity of events,should be able to learn and hone their compe-tencies in handling such events to a high level.They can internalise this competency within theiremergency planning and policies, and evenincrease their own accountability in terms ofblame management. Conversely, when things gowrong, the focus will be on blame managementof ‘incompetency’. Blame will often focus on notmeeting expectations of competency and thuspolicy failure being strongly associated andframed as ‘incompetency’. Thus, policy failure involcanic crisis communication could be seen asbeing active about volcanic blame on disastersmanagers and others responsible for communityresilience. Ironically, the existence of learningleads to assumptions that subsequent inadequacyto respond equates to incompetence (in not get-ting on top of problems) which build on rising,and at times unrealistic, expectations that suc-cessive disaster experiences internally and pro-portionately enhance resilience. In this case, thefrequency of disaster events leads to ever moreactive volcanic blame management.

Second, there is the frame where the fre-quency of disasters leads to a stress on themagnitude, size and regularity of the event andon blame avoidance on the grounds of ‘inca-pacity’. In this context, the ramifications of thedisasters are so regular and/or so large that theyrequire society and individuals to treat resiliencetowards disasters as part of their normal activitiesand as ‘business as usual’. They need to do thebest they can at these often frequent, but chal-lenging times, resulting in limited expectationson government, and beliefs that recovery timesmay be long given the frequency of successiveevents. Expectations on government, agenciesand disaster managers should therefore be con-strained since there is only so much capacity (orincapacity) that can be provided in handling suchfrequent external occurrence. The dominantframe then is constructed around blaming the

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active volcanoes and not the disaster managers orpolicy leaders or even system. Hence, whenthings go wrong, it can be framed as simply‘system failure’ where the frequency and size ofdisaster as an external event overwhelms thecapacity of the disaster management system inplace. In simple terms, an event based failurewhere there is blame avoidance on the groundsof ‘incapacity’. Given this line of reasoning, thefrequency of events means that disaster managersemphasise the importance of blame avoidance onthem since, in operational terms, dispositions arefirmly centred on blaming the frequent activity ofthe respective volcano.

This paradox is all the more important since interms of crisis communication, disaster managersface a key challenge before, during and afterdisasters. There is, for example, a tendency forgovernment agencies to want to both ‘own themessage’ and ‘be the messenger’, especially asdisasters, by definition, exceed the capacity ofaffected communities and thus the public willlook to national or regional leadership for assis-tance. There is therefore a high propensity forsuch agencies—by adopting this approach—tobe open to both blames on grounds of incom-petence and incapacity simultaneously.

4 Communication Challengesin the Context of Volcanic CrisisManagement

In theory, disaster managers should do their bestwork at crisis communicating in the periodbefore a disaster, particularly when focusing oninforming, educating and concentrating onthemes such as risk reduction and disaster pre-vention. Campaigns often use printed leaflets(Bird et al. 2010), village elder gatherings (Cro-nin et al. 2004) and radio broadcasts and typi-cally include schools’ disaster awareness (Ronanet al. 2010), elderly or disabled social outreach,and early warning systems (Garcia and Fearnley2012). Nevertheless, despite such public aware-ness campaigns, communities often remainreluctant to engage with government communi-cation agendas. This may be a result of mistrust

from previous inadequate government actions orreactions to earlier disasters leading to an abidingcynicism and uncooperative attitude to subse-quent public communication strategies (Hayneset al. 2008). As a result, future disaster relatedcommunications are perceived simply as gov-ernment propaganda to protect reputation. It isarguable then whether governments shouldalways be the sole owner of ‘the message’. Crisiscommunication officers are thus faced with thetwin challenges of not only having the rightmessage but also employing the right messenger(McGuire et al. 2009); it may be necessary tothink about incompetence and incapacitydynamics both in terms of messaging and interms of the messenger when it comes to blame.

Crisis communication in volcanic crisis man-agement is particularly challenging because vol-canoes are highly complex scenariosscientifically, socially and politically withpotential dire consequences to human, financial,social, physical and natural capital if not handledproperly. This is critical for volcanic crisesmanagement in developing countries becauseaction is required in uncertain circumstanceswhere several gaps prevent efficient volcanic riskmanagement. These include lack of adequatehuman resources and weak response structures;lack of understanding of the vulnerability ofexposed elements; lack of assessment of vulner-ability and community resilience or the capacityto recover after a catastrophe; lack of under-standing of the vulnerability of exposed elementsand generally weak disaster risk managementframeworks (Bang 2014; MIAVITA 2012).

This complexity in communication (Fig. 1) isnot made any easier by the fact that undertakingvolcanic risk, hazard and vulnerability assess-ment ideally requires engagement of scientificagencies with diverse expertise (Brändström2016a; Smale 2016; MIAVITA 2012; UN 1995),as well as the integration of information flowsfrom stakeholders at the local, regional andnational levels. Significant gaps remain in com-munication and information flows in volcaniccrisis management in many parts of the world,including the Cameroon, which are prone tovolcanic hazard risks. One commonly

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 5

identifiable problem remains the transmissionand translation of scientific early warning andmonitoring, whereby: (i) scientific monitoring isregular, providing not only constant informationabout the hazard to disaster managers ordecision-makers, but: (ii) critical assessment thatalso feeds into key public communications,warnings and/or instructions on the level andkinds of actions to be taken (Volcano Observa-tory 2016; Smale 2016). Arguably, the former iswell developed for a few hundred of the world’sactive volcanoes (Simkin and Siebert 1994; UN1995), while the latter is often poorly developedor absent, inadequate and/or ineffective (San-derson 1998; Clay et al. 1999; Kokelar 2002).

5 Volcanic Hazardsin the Cameroon

Cameroon is prone to natural hazards mainly dueto a geologic/topographic feature in the countryknown as the Cameroon Volcanic Line(CVL) (Fig. 2). For this chapter, the 1600 km longCVL also fits the criteria offrequency, with regular

occurrence of landslides, floods, earth tremors,toxic gas emissions (as happened in 1984 and 1986in LakeMonoum andLakeNyos respectively) andfrequent volcanic eruptions. Located on the CVL,is Mt. Cameroon/Fako, the largest, most active

Fig. 1 Methodological framework with related information flows for managing volcanic events. Source MIAVITA(2012: 17)

Fig. 2 The Cameroon Volcanic Line (dashed yellowline). Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)

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volcano in West and Central Africa (Kling et al.1987; Duruelle et al. 1987; Fitton 1987; Freeth andKay 1987;Bang 2012, 2013), having erupted eighttimes in the 20th century andmost recently in 2012(Global Volcanism Program 2012). The historicalrecord of Mt. Cameroon shows an average periodof 17 years (Njome et al. 2010) between succes-sive eruptions. Moreover, Mt. Cameroon is alsonotable due to its size as an elliptical volcano,straddling the continental margin at the bottom ofthe Gulf of Guinea in the South West Region(SWR) of Cameroon (Fig. 3), and with a height of4095 m above sea level and an area of about3000 km2.

Generally, Mt. Cameroon is characterised bythree types of eruptions: explosive types, mod-erately explosive types (that have built the cindercones) and effusive types, which are responsiblefor lava flows (Tchoua 1971; Tsafack et al. 2009).Voluminous lava flow, rather than pyroclasticmaterials is the greatest threat from Mt. Camer-oon, often from summit and flank eruptions (Pyle1999). Recent studies, mapping the risk of lavaflow inundation (Fig. 4) and other hazards aroundMt. Cameroon (Bonne et al. 2008; Thierry et al.2008; Favalli et al. 2012; Wantim et al. 2013),

highlight the notable vulnerability of the twobiggest towns, and largest population centres inthe region. Buea town (90,000 people)—capitalof the SWR and administrative headquarters, andLimbe town (85,000 people)—the main touristtown situated along the Atlantic coast, and othervillages closer to the Volcano are susceptible toinundation by lava flow. Crisis communication isvery important given that there is significant riskto strategic and critical buildings essential todisaster management located in Buea, the capitaland regional headquarters of the SWR, andlocated at the foot of Mt. Cameroon. It shouldalso be noted that such vulnerability also appliesto earthquakes and landslides since both felt andinstrumentally recorded earthquakes have beendocumented with the vast majority along or closeto the CVL, and largely concentrated in the Mt.Cameroon region (Ateba and Tabod 2009). Vol-canic eruptions are usually preceded/or accom-panied by volcanic and tectonic earthquakes,indicating that earthquake monitoring remainsvery important for predicting MCEs.

In terms of crisis communication in theCameroon, several aspects are also important.First, although the area was seismically activeprior to the 1999 eruption, there was no extensivepre-warning or early warning system in place to

Fig. 3 Map showing Lava flows produced during erup-tions of Mt. Cameroon in the 20th century (red areas),and towns and villages in the region (crosshatched areas).Source Favalli et al. (2012: 424)

Fig. 4 Lava flow hazard map around Mt. Cameroonvolcano. Source Favalli et al. (2012: 432)

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 7

warn the population of the threat—severelyreducing crisis communication. Secondly, thefrequency of volcanic eruptions and the impor-tance of earthquake monitoring have led to somedevelopments in the Cameroon. In the Mt.Cameroon region, for example, the first networkof six permanent seismic stations was setup in1984. Thirdly, the extensiveness of the moni-toring has varied at differing points in time. Afterthe Lake Nyos Disaster (LND) in 1986, seismicmonitoring of Mt. Cameroon was extended to theregion on the Oku Volcanic field where LakeNyos is situated. However, prior to the 1999 and2000 eruptions, all but one of the sensors wasworking, due to lack of maintenance (Ateba et al.2009). The number of seismic stations wasincreased after the 1999, and 2000 eruptions,culminating in 32 broadband stations beinginstalled (2005–07) over the CVL and the CongoCraton. All the stations, however, were disman-tled in 2007 because they were not operational,except for two, one in Ekona at the foot of Mt.Cameroon and the other in Yaounde (Ateba andTabod 2009). The volcano is now monitoredusing a network of six telemeter seismic broad-band stations that detect the magnitude andlocation of earthquakes, and data is processed ata monitoring centre, located at Ekona not farfrom Buea (Lenhardt and Oppenheimer 2014).

Fourthly, the crisis management framework ofthe Cameroon is relatively new, with most of thesignificant developments after the 1999/2000volcanic eruptions. Clear institutional structures,including communications have been attempted,with volcanic crisis management falling underthe remit of civil protection. The governmentretains the primary responsibility, and has insti-tuted a national policy on crises management thatrecognises a multi-agency, interdisciplinary andinter-cooperation. The nodal coordinating agencyfor civil protection is the Department/Directorateof Civil Protection (DCP) in the powerfulMinistry of Territorial Administration andDecentralisation (MTAD). Most notably, amulti-agency and multi-disciplinary approach tonatural and other hazards has been operationalonly since 2005. This is supported by govern-mental legislation setting out a general national

strategy for risk reduction and disaster manage-ment that includes a National Risk Observatory,and emphases three phases of pre-crisis, disasterresponse and recovery/rehabilitation—all ofwhich stress the importance of information flowsand crisis communication (Bang 2012, 2014).There is also a National Disaster Prevention andManagement Programme, which ideally, shouldliaise with the DCP in coordinating all the local,regional, national and international stakeholdersin disaster management, and envisages a decen-tralised structure where authority lies with chiefgovernment administrators in these administra-tive divisions, who double as the maincrisis/disaster managers (Bang 2014). Yet asBang (2014) notes, these policies are only asgood as they appear since most have not beenimplemented in volcanic crisis situations inrecent decades.

6 Crisis Communication: The Caseof the 1999 Eruption of Mt.Cameroon

The 28 March–22 April 1999 eruption of Mt.Cameroon is well documented. Although theCameroon’s scientists and authorities were awarethat the volcano was indeed active, the actualeruption took everyone by surprise. In terms ofcrisis communication when the eruption started,the local community was informed through theofficial government run regional state radio inBuea (CRTV Buea). The eruption, however, wasnot forecast in advance and the population wasnot pre-warned of any impending eruption,highlighting the lack of an early warning systemand in tandem, effective crisis communicationstrategies.

This was very surprising since reports ofseismic activities leading up to the eruption wereavailable, and painted a picture of an impendingeruption. The eruption, which started on 28March, was explosive, emitting gases and pyro-clastic lava flow. On 30 March, a second ventopened, releasing huge quantities of lava thatflowed for about 14 km south-southwest towardsthe village of Bakingili (Suh et al. 2003). In

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2000, a brief fissure eruption at the summit pro-duced a lava flow that spread mostly southeastwards and stopped 4 km from the outskirts ofBuea (Favalli et al. 2012). Fortunately, the lavaflow rate was slow, providing sufficient time forany ‘at risk’ population on its flow path to beevacuated.

The effects of the 1999 MCE were reasonablyprofound. Fortunately, there were no humancasualties and the damage was mainly restrictedto infrastructure and economic activity. Themagnitude 4 earthquake damaged houses inBuea, leaving some people homeless. Mostnotably the lava flow that moved towards thecoast, particularly the village of Bakingili,affected over 1000 people including 600 inhabi-tants of Bakingili village who were subsequentlyevacuated; the first time ever in the history ofMCEs (Atanga et al. 2010). Luckily, the 10–12 m thick lava flow narrowly missed Bakingilivillage, whose population had been evacuatedjust a few days earlier, but severely damagedinfrastructure, and affected the local economyand tourism resorts of the West Coast. Volcanicash affected the coastal villages of Batoke,Debundsha, Bakingili and Idenau, causing eyeand respiratory problems (Afane et al. 2001). Gasand ash emissions also polluted drinking waterfor about 2600 residents in the area (Atanga et al.2010). Although there was no human casualty,the eruption caused a total economic loss esti-mated at about US$790,000 (Lenhardt andOppenheimer 2014).

6.1 Flaws in Crisis Communication

Three observations can be readily made in termsof the 1999 MCE. Firstly, crisis communicationand early warning was found lacking. In takingeverybody by surprise, the 1999 MCE exposedflaws in Cameroon’s disaster management sys-tem, including both scientific and governmentallack of preparedness, despite frequency of erup-tions on Mt. Cameroon. Although various sci-entific studies had been carried out prior to 1999,

the Cameroonian authorities had no clear idea ofthe level of risks associated with the volcano(Thierry et al. 2008). In addition, there was nowarning system in place to alert the population.Although, and following the 1986 LND, a carbondioxide detection system was adopted to alert thepopulation (Bang 2012), a more extensive earlywarning system had not been introduced in otherhazard prone regions of the country. Indeed, thiswas only put in place on Mt. Cameroon after the1999 MCE (Thierry et al. 2008). Hence, theculture of disaster management was reactive, anddid not place sufficient emphasis on preparednessfor natural hazards that the government, scien-tists and the public recognised were frequent inthe Cameroon. In short, there were ready-madegrounds for claims of incompetency in terms ofblame management. Second, even when emer-gency management effectively began as part ofthe response phase (Fig. 5), the practical realitywas that disaster response was widely dispersedproviding multiple points of confusion and ten-sion on crisis communication.

From the perspective of crisis communication,the structure centred on the scientific committee,which provided feedback of its monitoringactivities to the governor of the SWR duringdaily meetings as the eruption continued. Themeetings were open, attended by members of thepublic and the press, who received updates fromthe scientists/government and gave interviews toheads of the committees/chairpersons who con-sequently updated the public. Although this wasan opportunity to eliminate false rumours orwrong information (Ateba and Tabod 2009), themanagement of the eruption revealed a plethoraof problems. In practice, and as shown in Fig. 5,a complex array of actors participated in thedisaster management contributing to multipleinformation flows and communication. Reportsalso suggested a striking lack of coordination interms of sharing results and information eveninside the committee, resulting in significantconfusion (Ateba and Tabod 2009).

Third, the 1999 experience highlighted thatthere were major deficiencies in how crisis

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 9

communication fed into and shaped keydecision-making. A good example of this relatesto the specific case of the evacuation of 600people from Bakingili Village, which occurredcomparatively late, and was marred by poorpreparations, and revealed many communicationproblems. Although the lava flow had beenapproaching the village for weeks, evacuationwas not considered a priority, regardless of thefact that scientists monitoring the eruption hadwarned of the threat to the local population in thearea. If the lava flow speed was faster, it wouldhave reached Bakingili village before the evac-uation. The authorities were divided about whe-ther to inform people living on the SW flank ofthe Mountain that lava flow was a threat to theirsettlements because of fear of panic, which nei-ther the national nor regional authorities weresufficiently prepared to handle. Simultaneously,there were radio, TV and media announcements,reassuring the villagers that any dangers wereminimal and urging the population to ‘stay vig-ilant’, directly contradicting messages from

scientists monitoring the eruption who hadidentified that the village was along the flow pathof the lava, and there was no sign of the eruptionstopping soon. Moreover, field scientists close toBakingili were warning the villagers of the dan-ger, resulting in an overall picture where the localresidents were getting different messages andmixed signals from various media. When thedecision was finally taken to evacuate the resi-dents of Bakingili village due to fear of a pos-sible inundation by the lava flow, the confusionand delay meant that the temporary camps hastilybuilt in Tiko, some 40 km away, lacked basicprovision and/or facilities for emergency reliefoperations. This prompted anger amongst therelocated villagers, who subsequently blamed thegovernment for lack of readiness, inadequateresourcing, and/or an unwillingness to ade-quately cater for their needs in the camps. Theconsequence was mistrust and miscommunica-tion between the communities, local scientistsand emergency managers (Atanga et al. 2010;Njome et al. 2010).

KEY

PRIME MINISTER

Ministry of Territorial Administration Decentralisation

MINRESIMinistry of

HigherEducation

Ministry of PublicHealth

Ministry of SocialAffairs

Ministry of Communication

Ministry of Defense MIMITDDCP

Governor of South West

RegionTV, RadioState & Private

News PapersIRGM

National Risk

Observatory

Universities

Relevant Faculties

Relevant Department

Preventive and Clinical

Medicine Section

Directorate of Geology

Local Crisis Management

Commitee

DCP= Directorate of Civil Protection—Central Agency Responsible for Coordinating Civil Protection in Cameroon MIMITD= Ministry of Industry, Mines and Technological DevelopmentMINRESI=Ministry of Scientific Research and InnovationIRGM=Institute of Geologic and Mining Research—Geophysical and Volcanological Unit Direction of Power Structure Different channels of Risk Communication

DCP= Directorate of Civil Protection—Central Agency Responsible for Coordinating Civil Protection in Cameroon MIMITD= Ministry of Industry, Mines and Technological DevelopmentMINRESI=Ministry of Scientific Research and InnovationIRGM=Institute of Geologic and Mining Research—Geophysical and Volcanological Unit Direction of Power Structure Different channels of Risk Communication

Technical/Scientific AspectsTechnical/Scientific AspectsSocial/Cultural AspectsSocial/Cultural Aspects

Fig. 5 Organisational structure for the management of the 1999 Mt. Cameroon eruption. Source Authors, adapted fromAteba and Tabod (2009: 45)

10 L. Miles et al.

6.2 Blame Gaming and BlameAvoidance

From the blame perspective, several aspects wereevident. First, blame in terms of ‘incompetency’was directed at the authorities and identified thelack of preparedness including any emergencyplan to evacuate people. This was largely framedas apportioning blame for internal policy failureand incompetence given the threat posed by lavaflow in the region was already known fromprevious eruptions. The blame associated withsuch internal incompetency and policy failure faroutstripped the ability of disaster managers to useblame avoidance strategies based on incapacityand system failure due to the magnitude ofexternal events. In addition, communication onthe rate of the advancing flows was not regardedas essential by the authorities, who stressed thatprior eruptions had not threatened a settlement inthe region before. Although the lava flow ratetowards the SW coast was being regularly com-municated by scientists to the authorities, nothingwas forecast or reported for the ash fall, whichcaused health hazards affecting many communi-ties. Above all, even as the eruption unfolded, thepopulation in the region was not warned at anystage that this health hazard existed. Hence, theframing and blaming of incompetency was alsoassociated with very poor communication man-agement by the authorities with the local indi-genes (Atanga et al. 2010). Compounding thiswas the setting up of temporary evacuationcamps to host the displaced population thatlacked basic facilities. Finally, the delay in thefinal decision to evacuate ‘at risk’ populations,and its then slow transmission to the local pop-ulation is indicative of incompetence. Here, theauthorities were blamed for ineptdecision-making, incompetent policy implemen-tation and poor communication framed as policyrather than event failure, particularly in relationto the delay in the evacuation of Bakingiliresidents.

Framing and blaming of ‘incompetency’compounded, what Atanga et al. (2010) hasidentified as a culture of limited ornon-compliance among the Cameroonian

villages and settlements. Since the villagers hadnever been informed of scientific studies aboutrisks on Mt. Cameroon, there was a reluctance toaccept evacuation orders from the governmentnotwithstanding the strong community supportfor enhanced crisis communication. Villagersstrongly viewed effective crisis communicationas the best way to enhance further and optimalco-operation with the government, includingexecuting strategies, which would strengthencommunity resilience. Above all, the 1999eruption also highlighted the need to integrateemergency planning with respect for local cus-toms in order to avoid conflicts, which hadbearing on attitudes towards compliance. Herecrisis communication was also deemed to play akey role; principally in providing feedback ongovernmental planning and implementation.Following this line of reasoning, modern infor-mation dissemination methods need to beaccompanied by and integrated withlocal/traditional methods to facilitate crisis com-munication; for example, use of the village’straditional announcement system—‘the gong’,1

to facilitate information flow in the event of anemergency.

7 Discussion and Conclusions:Cameroon and the Paradoxof Frequency

The experience of the 1999 Mt. Camerooneruption leaves us with several important obser-vations regarding the ‘paradox of frequency’.First, the lack of contingency emergency plan fora frequent event like an eruption reinforcesblames framing centred on incompetency ratherthan incapacity. Second, the 1999 eruptionhighlights the importance of factoring in thecultural perception of MCEs. The local tribesaround the mountain, for instance, believe erup-tions are caused by the mountain God (EpasaMoto). Consequently, when he is angry, their

1The gong is s traditional instrument, which when playedor sounded; everyone is alerted and comes out to get amessage.

Blaming Active Volcanoes or Active Volcanic Blame? … 11

tribal chief offers sacrifices to appease ‘EpasaMoto’ to prevent the destruction of their villages(Atanga et al. 2010; Njome et al. 2010). Volcaniceruptions on Mt. Cameroon thus forms part ofthe cultural fabric of the communities, affectingthe perception of volcanic hazard amongindigenous populations and thus the role ofgovernment in mitigating, preparing andresponding to it. It is also appropriate to factorsuch narratives into crisis communication inorder to contextualise messaging, facilitatecompliance and develop community resilienceand orderly volcanic hazard response amongcommunities around the mountain.

Third, the experience of the 1999/2000 vol-canic eruptions showed how little has been learntand embedded from the previous experience ofthe LND of the 1980s. Functions were duplicatedand financial and material destined for the dis-aster survivors were embezzled (Bang 2012).There were problems with inadequate needsassessments of the disaster survivors. Similarly,in 1999, no staff from the Ministry of Health saton the crisis committee to provide advice onhealth risks from the eruption thereby demon-strating deficiencies in learning about the role ofscientific advice in shaping crisiscommunication.

According to Bang (2012), part of the reasonfor this lack of learning—in spite of the fre-quency of disasters—was that there was a nota-ble lack of follow-up projects on the socialaspects of the LND. Disaster managers failed tolearn from internal policy failure and therebyhow to turn incompetency into practical com-petency via lessons learned or at least counteraccusation of incompetency via more sophisti-cated communication strategies. In fact, gov-ernment officials used framing strategiesemphasising the external nature and magnitudeof the LND and the later MCE events in a quick,but largely futile, attempt to shift criticisms aboutpolicy failures in the management of the crisisfrom themselves. They highlighted a ‘systemic

failure’ narrative, where they attempted blameavoidance by highlighting the poor financial stateof the country, combined with the magnitude ofexternal natural events.

Other factors can be explained by concepts ofblame management. Field observations by Bangreveal also that the political context is important inthe Cameroon case. Government authorities andofficials appointed to manage the various admin-istrative units of the country—who also double asdisaster managers—usually behaved toprotect/defend their jobs/positions rather thanacceptingmistakes. Equally, they were resistant todelegating to others more knowledgeable in crisismanagement to take control, because they mightbe sympathisers of opposition parties and maytake credit for any good job done (Bang 2012).

As a conclusion, there is empirical evidencethat demonstrates that frequency of events is nota guarantee of effective learning and enhancedpreparedness for the future. Later blame andblame gaming will continue especially sinceissues of competency remains at the fore eventoday in the Cameroon. Issues, such as, lack ofpolitical resolve or will, and inadequacy ofhuman and financial resources (Bang 2014)remain as relevant today—suggesting that fre-quency of occurrence is not necessarily the mainfactor determining levels of preparedness andresilience. At the very least there needs to becontinuous commitment and political will as partof the ‘bouncing forwards’ that embodies a questfor change, improvement and innovation (Miles2016). Learning and review of experience musttherefore accompany frequency of events. Sim-ply experiencing frequent events will not auto-matically lead to effectiveness in handling thoseevents. Only by incorporating more sophisticatedideas of crisis communication can any resistanceto learning from previous disasters be addressedwithin Cameroon’s disaster management system.There is no time to waste. One thing the paradoxof frequency tells us—is that time will not waituntil the next disaster is upon the Cameroon.

12 L. Miles et al.

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