Black Swans, the Sub-prime Crisis and Systemic Risk
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Transcript of Black Swans, the Sub-prime Crisis and Systemic Risk
Page 1
Actuarial Society of Greater New York
James W. Macdonald, ARMJW Macdonald Associates, LLC
November 10, 2008
“Black Swans”, the “Sub-primeCrisis” and Systemic Risk:
One underwriter’s Perspective
Page 2
Presentation Overview
• How did we get here?
• Who is to blame?
• What have we learned?
Page 3
How did we get here?
Financial Risk Policies: Not new to insurance…
• Surety Bonds (predate industrial revolution)
• Municipal Bond Insurance (1971 – Present)
• Credit Insurance
• Title Insurance
• Warranty Insurance
• Other expense related covers (e.g., products recall
insurance)
Page 4
Financial Risk Insurance:Underwriting Challenges
• “Business Risk” – “Insurable Interest”?
• Moral Hazard / Adverse Selection
• “Transaction Value” – Is a Zero Loss Ratio assumption
Valid?
• Collateral - Liquid, fungible?
• Recourse - Unlimited?
• Pricing – Credible, equitable?
• Coverage: Non-standardized, complicated - understood?
Source: Insurance Information Institute
Financial risk Insurance ProductsAccelerated growth in soft markets
Domestic P&C Market Cycle -Growth in Net Written Premium: 1970 - 1984
1980-1984: Newgeneration of financial
insurance products1971 AMBAC
1973: MBIA
1975: NYC FinancialCrisis
1983: WPPS!
1980-90: S&L Crisis
Page 6
WPPS and S&L CrisisResulted in full limits losses to D&O and E&O Insurers
• WPPS Bond Default (1983)
• $2.25 billion municipal (revenue) bond default
• Largest municipal default in USA history
• In litigation almost ten years
• Losses included D&O of 30 municipalities with “take-or-pay”
obligations, A&E, Accountants, Lawyers
• S&L Crisis (1980-1990)
• Over 2,400 savings and loan association failures
• Estimated losses of $560 billion - $320 B paid by US Government
• Major D&O losses sustained by F&D, MGIC and others
Page 7
Early Eighties Soft Market (1980-1984):New Financial Insurance Products “to the rescue”?
• MGM Grand Fire Retroactive Liability Insurance
• Residual Value Insurance
• Limited Partnership Surety Bonds
• Homeowner’s Warranty Insurance Company (first RRG)
• Systems Performance insurance
• “Career Guard” Insurance
• NYIE: Baseball Strike Insurance
• Excess SIPC Insurance
Page 8
MGM Grand Fire Retroactive Liability Insurance
• In early 1981, thirty insurers agreed to multi-layered placement of
$120 M limits insured for
• Approximate $40 M premium
• Arguably the first, high profile “finite” deal
• Resulted in detailed industry debate over risk elements to permit
“insurability” (including payout timing, and investment income)
• Fronting insurer went into liquidation in March 1995
• Several years later, MGM settled out-of-court for $87.5 million,
shortly after jury selection.
Page 9
Residual Value Insurance
• Typically characterized, like municipal bond insurance, as low-risk
credit enhancements to otherwise solid transactions,
• Normally related to asset-based financing, with sale / leasebacks;
• Recourse to insurer / guarantors was normally limited to taking
ownership of underlying assets;
• Assets varied widely – included trains, planes, buildings, and even
movies.
• Extremely complicated multi-party contracts with numerous possible
events of default.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
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00
Current $ Real $
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
Financial Insurance 1986 -2007:Key developments…
1995-2000: Extensive use of finitereinsurance
Domestic P&C Market Cycle -Growth in Net Written Premium: 1986 -2007
1989: New York Article 69 – requires FGIsto be “mono-line”
1988: Centre Re
1986: Federal Tax Reform Act
2000: Reliance offersEarnings Insurance
1992: FASB 113
19995-1998: PLSRA enacted, D&O insurersgive full allocation, entity coverage
Page 11
Limited Partnership Surety Bonds:Another “Black Swan” event?
• Guaranteed General Partners full payment of scheduled 5 year
investments by high net worth individuals. No collateral but full recourse
was required;
• Partnerships highly leveraged with gross deductions permitted by early
eighties tax code;
• Tax reforms were expected but almost everyone thought the risk to
existing deals was zero
• 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated gross deductibility; no “grandfathering”;
• Wealthy investors defied expectations: refused to make future payments;
• Huge initial losses paid by Surety insurers were eventually recouped.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%2
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0
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Current $ Real $
Sources: Insurance Information Institute, Fortune Magazine (10/08)
2000-2008“Black Swans” (Extreme Events), Market Softening, and the“Panic of 2007”
Domestic P&C Market Cycle -Growth in Net Written Premium: 2000 -2007
2003: Hurricane Spitzer –Mutual Fund Timing Scandal 2004: Hurricane Eliot – Bid-
Rigging, Finite Reinsurance
Katrina, Wilma,Rita: New Capital
Flows to P&C
01-02: Corporate Scandals,SOX
“Panic of 2007”
2001-2005: Fed Funds Rate 1%,negative real cost of capital to banks
9/11/01 Attacks
Page 13
Presentation Overview
• How did we get here?
• Who is to blame?
Page 14
Who is to blame?
“It is hard for us, without being flippant, to even see
a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that
would see us losing one dollar in any of those
transactions.”
Joseph J. Cassano, a former A.I.G. executive, August
2007
Page 15
Who is to blame?
• “Perfect Storm” (Everyone, ergo: No One?)
• Greed (i.e., human nature?)
• Late nineties legislative pressure on GSEs?
• “NINJA” and “Alt A”loans – What possible
justification?
• Ideological faith in deregulation?
• “Market Conduct” Regulatory Failures (e.g., Is any
cost to consumers - be it premiums or mortgages -
too cheap?)
Page 16
Who is to blame?
• Unprecedented Gross Leverage
• No Originator Risk-Taking (“Fronting”/ “Pass the Trash”)
• Synthetic Financial Instruments?
• Financial rating agencies?
• Flawed mathematical models (i.e., empirical data
suggested “all Swans are White”)?
• CPA auditor failures
• Fed Funds Rate, 2001-2005, too low, too long.
• Post-Enron, Mark-to-Market Accounting
• GLB, Sarbox: Bring back Glass Steagle?
Page 17
Presentation Overview
• How did we get here?
• Who is to blame?
• What have we learned?
Page 18
What have we learned?
• Financial insurance product growth is pervasive in
soft market cycles.
• Regulatory response has been consistently slow,
generally ineffective.
• Paradigm shift is occurring: Need alternatives to
reliance on private sector self-regulation, e.g.,
NAIC is currently discussing forming new
financial rating agency.
Page 19
Financial & Insurance Underwriting:Back to the Future?…Many lessons learned
• “Business Risk” – “Insurable Interest”?
• Moral Hazard / Adverse Selection
• “Transaction Value” – Is a “Zero Loss Ratio” assumption
Valid?
• Collateral- Liquid, fungible?
• Recourse - Limited?
• Pricing – Credible, equitable?
• Coverage: Non-standardized, complicated - understood?
Page 20
Financial & Insurance Underwriting:Some positive examples under discussion…
• Real Estate / Recourse: Require the lender to have
full recourse in the event of default, not just rights to
given real property (similar to surety bonds – limits
moral hazard).
• Originator: Require some financial risk retention –
“skin in the game” – recalls “fronting” and “MGA”
legislation in response to insurer insolvencies, e.g.
Failed Promises – 1990 Dingell report.
Page 21
Financial & Insurance Underwriting:Some positive examples under discussion…
• Require some underlying “insurable interest” in
short selling or CDS transactions – classic difference
between “insurance” and “gambling”.
• Introduce new modeling approaches such as
terrorism risk “deterministic” scenarios to better
anticipate tomorrows “Black Swan” events, e.g.
Nassim Taleb’s “counterfactual reasoning”.
Page 22
Bibliography
• Charles R. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown: Easy Money, High
Rollers and the Great Crash, Public Affairs, March 2008
• Bruner & Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lesson’s Learned from the Market’s
Perfect Storm, Wiley & Sons, 2007
• Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, NBER Working Paper 14398,
Available at: http://www.nber.org/tmp/1063-w14398.pdf
• Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly
Improbable, Random House 2007
• Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Failed Promises:
Insurance Company Insolvencies, February 1990, US Government
printing Office
Page 23
Q&A
Contact Information
Jim Macdonald is an independent consultant based in Philadelphia.Macdonald has 35 years of experience as an insurer, reinsurer, andconsultant with market-leading companies such as AIG, ACE-INA,
C.N.A., Munich Re, Conning & Company, Navigant Consulting, andGeneral Re . His consulting services include expert witness services inarbitrations and litigations, as well as strategic assessment services forinvestment bankers and the public sector. Macdonald is also a Senior
Fellow with the RAND Corporation.
This presentation does not express or imply any opinion on the subjectby RAND and offers solely the personal opinions of the author.
Phone: 215-925-2188
Email: [email protected]
Web: http://www.jwmacdonald.net