nd SecurityStu

dies

of Manitoba, Canada

While Canadian troops are fightingand dying in severe battle conditionsin Kandahar, Afghanistan, there areemerging ‘peacekeeping’ opportuni-ties for Canadian forces in the eventof an established border betweenIsrael and the Palestinian territories,and between Israel and Lebanon.Indeed, the conditions may be ripefor movement in this direction onboth fronts. Historically, thePalestinians have long called for thirdparty intervention as a means to legit-imize itself as a state and to providesecurity from Israeli intervention.Israel has long opposed interventionfor obvious reasons relative toPalestinian interests, and perceptionsof the likely pro-Palestinian bias ofany force, especially under any formof United Nations leadership.

Today, however, with the outbreak ofhostilities along its northern borderand campaign to disarm Hezbollah insouthern Lebanon, Israel has begunto accept possibilities of third partyintervention. For Israel, the deploy-ment of peacekeepers in Palestinianareas and southern Lebanon isincreasingly perceived as a positivetool for enhancing national security.The enlistment of external forces canfacilitate state-building within thePalestinian Authority (PA), and theextension of Lebanese sovereignty insouthern Lebanon.

Thus, the conditions may be ripe fora third party initiative that wouldmarry Palestinian interests for atraditional peacekeeping force andIsraeli interests in a state-building

peace force. As such, Canada hasmuch to contribute to conflictresolution efforts between Israel anda newly established Palestinian state.

Third Party Involvement in theArab-Israeli Conflict:A Role for Canada

Tami Amanda Jacoby

Executive Summary

BISONAugust 2006

Centre for Defence and Security Studies • The University of Manitoba ISSN 1705-4834

This report is drawn from thesecond of a three stage project co-sponsored by the Arthur V. MauroCentre for Peace and Justice, theUniversity of Manitoba, theCentre for Defence and SecurityStudies, the University ofManitoba, and the Harry S.Truman Institute for theAdvancement of Peace, HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem. Theviews are the author’s and do notnecessarily represent those of theparticipants in the second stageworkshop.

Defence & Security Report

Then and NowCanada has long held a covetedposition in third party involvementin the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since theoccasion of Lester B. Pearson’s NobelPeace Prize for his diplomatic effortstowards resolving the Suez Crisis in1956, Canadian expertise andknowledge have been integrated intoall peacekeeping missions in theregion. Known for their impartialityand professionalism, Canadianpeacekeepers have been recognizedby all parties to the conflict as apositive force in the monitoring,observing, and stabilizing of bordersas well as the agreements that governthem. As a result, Canada hascontributed, and will continue tocontribute, invaluable expertise inthe ongoing mobilization anddeployment of international missionsto the Middle Eastern conflicttheatre. Canadian initiatives havealso been central to behind-thescenes work supporting the resump-tion of bilateral and multilateralnegotiations, and a transition to thepeace building model of conflictmanagement that focuses on gover-nance, institution building, civiceducation, political rights and devel-opment aid.

The focus on third partypeace building in Israeli-Palestinian relations hasresulted from a key transi-tion in the politicaldynamics of the MiddleEast.

With Israel’s signing of formal peaceaccords with Egypt in 1979, andJordan in 1994, the Arab-Israelicontext no longer bears the prospectof escalation into all out inter-statewar, that is a war between Israel andthe leading Arab states. As a result,attention has shifted from bordercontrols between nation-states to

mitigating theunresolved,complicated andarguably moreprotracted arenaof the Israeli-Palestinianconflict; a conflict that takes placesimultaneously at multiple levels.

Israel’s relations with its neighboringstates (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan andEgypt) have stabilized to a greatdegree over the years, notwith-standing continued tensions withSyria and the recent clash withHezbollah in Lebanon. However, thestrategic and security relationshipbetween Israel and the Palestinianshas deteriorated drastically with thefailure of the Oslo Peace Process ofthe 1990s, and the ongoing cycle ofPalestinian suicide bomb attacks andIsraeli reprisals since the onset of thesecond Palestinian Uprising, the al-Aqsa Intifada since September 2000.Israeli-Palestinian relations have

been plagued by disillusionment dueto the absence of a peace dividendfrom the Oslo years, and lack ofprogress through the Quartet-sponsored Road Map. Both Israelisecurity and the political-economicsituation in the Palestinian areashave not improved as was expectedfrom the Road Map’s performance-based agenda.

The breakdown of formal peacenegotiations has been accompaniedby a growing unilateralism on theIsraeli side in response to publicdemands for increased security.Israeli unilateral withdrawal fromsouthern Lebanon in 2000 merelyincreased the capacity for Hezbollahto arm and recruit followers. Theineffectiveness of unilateral policieshas been further exposed on accountof the recent clashes in Gaza andLebanon. This has been evidencedby the construction since 2002 ofIsrael’s security barrier, as well as aseries of bypass roads, enclaves,checkpoints and other securitymeasures, which by extension,problematize Palestinian land claimsand movement towards national self-determination.

The Palestinian side hasundergone a process ofradicalization with thegrowth of a complexnetwork of militant groupsunder the umbrella of

Israel's old security area in Lebanon, whichroughly corresponds to the current area of UNpeacekeeping deployment in the country(www.factsofisrael.com Photo)

Israeli securitybarrier at the

village ofAbu-Dis

(Author’s Photo)

2 BISON

Hamas that has since takenover the PalestinianAuthority (PA).

This has been accompanied bycontinued incitement against Israelin Palestinian primary and secondaryeducational systems, cultural fora,and the media.

On both sides of the barrier, experi-ence of third party intervention hasbeen checkered at best. ThePalestinians have consistently soughtto internationalize the conflict inorder to draw in extra-regionalactors and publicize their plight. Forexample, in 2002 the UnitedNations, Amnesty International andHuman Rights Watch documentedand released reports about the Israelimilitary incursions into thePalestinian city of Jenin.1

Israel, on the other hand, has gener-ally rejected internationalinvolvement due to what manyIsraelis perceive as widespread anti-Israeli sentiment in the UnitedNations in particular and in interna-tional public opinion more generally,especially in Europe and Asia. Ofdirect concern to Israel is the polem-ical nature of many UN GeneralAssembly Resolutions on the MiddleEast, the transformation of interna-

tional meetings such as the 2001 UNWorld Conference against Racism inDurban, South Africa into an anti-Israel propaganda spectacle, and thesingling out of Israel for reprimandby such international institutions asthe International Court of Justice (aswitnessed by the case against Israel’ssecurity barrier).

Israel has refused to accept any thirdparty international force in itsrelations with the Palestinians, withthe exception of the TemporaryInternational Presence in the City ofHebron (TIPH). Established on May8, 1994 and staffed by personnelfrom Denmark, Italy, Norway,Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey,TIPH was a civilian observermission. Its role was to monitor andreport misconduct, but it had neitherthe military nor police capacity tointervene directly in incidents. TIPHwas in place for only two months.

After the inabilityof the PLA andIsrael to agree onthe extension ofits mandate andthe killing of twoTIPH observers bya Palestiniangunman west ofJerusalem onAugust 8, 1994,the Presence waswithdrawn.

An additional formof non-mediated peacekeeping wasthe Israeli-Palestinian exercise injoint patrols as stipulated by theOslo Accords of 1993. Whilelimited coordination developedbetween senior officers, the experi-ence of joint patrolling ultimately

failed on account of lack of trust andthe eventual violent engagement ofIsraeli soldiers and Palestiniansecurity forces during riots over thecontroversial opening of theHasmonean Tunnel in the Muslimquarter of East Jerusalem in 1996.

Although limited, any third partiescontemplating direct involvementmust consider these past experiencesin current planning and conceptual-ization. The potential fordeterioration of even the best orches-trated collaborations due to politicalturbulence and the rapid turnover ofpolitical events is high.

Political ChangesFundamental changesoccurred in the Israeli-Palestinian context withtwo elections that altereddynamics in the region.

Defence & Security Report 3

The West Bank – Israel's existing andapproved security barrier, and the Green Line

(www.answers.com Photo)

A-Ram entry point between Jerusalem and Ramallah (Authors' Photo)

1 “Jenin: IDF Military Operations”,http://hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/and “Jenin: Israel must answer questions,”<http://news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE150712002?open&of=ENG-351>

In Israel, the first major change wasthe disengagement from Gaza and anumber of settlements and militaryinstallations in the northern WestBank on August 22 and 23, 2005respectively. The disengagementresulted from an ongoing series ofshifts in Israeli domestic partypolitics.

The Kadima (literally “Forward”)Party, a break-away faction led bythen Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,emerged on the basis of widespreaddisgruntlement with the rulingLikud’s intransigence on territorial

concessions. Kadima’s appearance onthe political scene was followedalmost immediately by Ariel Sharon’smassive stroke and the uncertaintygiven by Ehud Olmert’s replacementas acting Prime Minister sinceJanuary 4 2006, and subsequentelection to the Prime Ministership inthe March 28 2006 elections to the17th Israeli Parliament (Knesset).

These changes in Israelipolitics demonstrated anincreased willingness bythe Israeli majority to cedeterritory on a unilateralbasis to the Palestinians inorder to comply with theRoad Map directives andstrengthen the Israelinational security agenda.

The Palestinians took a decidedlydifferent direction in their domesticpolitics over the last year with thesweeping victory of Hamas (IslamicResistance Movement) in thePalestinian elections to theLegislative Council on January 302006. Many Palestinians votedHamas as a protest vote against theruling Fatah party. However, manyalso used the ballot box to expresstheir disappointment in continuedIsraeli occupation and its policy of

convergencerather thandisengagement.The consolida-tion of Jewishsettlement blocsdestined toremain underIsraeli control(convergence),particularlyaroundJerusalem, arean anathema to

the Palestinians. For manyPalestinians, Hamas is regarded asthe only means to continue thestruggle against Israel.

The new reality of a Hamas-ledgovernment initially focused atten-tion away from formal negotiationstowards internal Palestinian issuesrelated to corruption, cronyism, andpoverty generated by the now-defunct Fatah government.

Although chosen by thePalestinian people in themost democratic election inthe Palestinian areas todate, Hamas is consideredby most Western govern-ments as a fanatic entitythat feeds in to the broaderinternational front ofIslamic and ideologicalgroups defined by USPresident George W. Bushas the “Axis of Evil.”

Hamas refuses to recognize the Stateof Israel. It considers violenceagainst Israel as a legitimate option,as witnessed by recent rocket attacksand the attack on Israeli soldiers,including the kidnapping of one, andrepudiates agreements signed by itspredecessor in the PalestinianAuthority. On these terms, Hamaswill be deprived of internationallegitimization lest it undergoes majorchanges to its policy platform andcore objectives.

In Canada, the political landscapehas also changed with the election ofa Conservative minority governmentled by Prime Minister StephenHarper. With the Conservatives ingovernment, Canada was the firststate to cut officially relations withthe Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.A-Ram Checkpoint (Author's Photo)

The July-August Israel-Hezbollah war area(www.queenstribune.com Photo)

4 BISON

Minister of Foreign Affairs PeterMackay announced “there will be nocontact and no funds, period”(although Canada will continue toprovide humanitarian assistancedirectly to the Palestinian peoplethrough routes other than thePalestinian Authority).2 Barring anyfundamental shifts in the policies ofthe Israeli, Palestinian and Canadianauthorities, the upcoming periodwill prove a challenging one inwhich to prompt a return to thenegotiating table and promotemeaningful conflict resolutionefforts.

CanadianPeacekeeping

Potential Canadian foreign policy has beenconsistently committed to the goal ofa comprehensive, just and lastingpeace in the Middle East. This goalinvolves the creation of a sovereign,independent, viable, democratic andterritorially contiguous Palestinianstate living side by side in peace andsecurity with Israel. Canadacondemns all acts of terrorism aswell as any effort by the parties topursue unilateral measures thatwould prejudice the negotiatingprocess. Final status issues such asPalestinian refugees, Jerusalem,borders and water, according toCanada, should be resolved withinthe context of a comprehensive andnegotiated settlement based on theobligations of both parties as set outby the Quartet’s Road Map andprevious efforts towards peace such

as the negotiations in Sharm al-Sheikh in 1999 and Taba in 2000.3

The challenge to Canadiansis to support conflictresolution efforts thatsimultaneously advanceCanadian foreign policypriorities in the region andmitigate the security needsdictated by the dynamiccontext of concrete devel-opments on the ground.

The failure of past attempts to intro-duce third party or non-mediatedpeacekeeping in the area and thedeterioration of Israeli-Palestinianrelations, as well as the new Israeli-Hezbollah war, serve as a challengeto peaceful conflict resolution effortsin the region.

Any possible model of thirdparty involvement revolvesaround the prerequisites ofan international force andits compatibility to condi-tions on the ground.

Such a force requires political willand authority, public support bothlocally and internationally, appro-priate composition and training, acohesive mandate with suitable rulesof engagement and force protection,proper equipment, and positiverelations with groups and resourceson the ground.

It is well understood that all interna-tional missions must have a clearexit strategy. The key issue iswhether an international force needsto be in-place before or after a finalagreement has been negotiatedbetween Israel and the Palestinians.Proposals for a mission in theabsence of an Israeli-Palestinianpeace agreement would differ funda-mentally from those in which peaceis negotiated beforehand. Indeed, inthe absence of an agreement or even

Peacekeepers arriving in Lebanon (AP Photo)

Israeli security barrier ((Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Photo)

2 Canada Cuts Hamas Relations, TheConservative Voice, March 30, 2006,<http://www.theconservativevoice.com/arti-cle/13482.html>

3 Canadian policy on key issues in theIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict, Department ofForeign Affairs website, <http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/middle_east/can_policy-en.asp#11>

Defence & Security Report 5

dialogue towards an agreement, itwill be difficult to obtain consensusaround the appearance of any thirdparty.

Israel has been consistently reluctantto negotiate “under fire” while thePalestinians claim they cannotnegotiate from the position of anoccupied nation constricted bybarriers, checkpoints and otherconditions of weakness. Palestinianscontinue to perceive their struggleagainst Israel as a necessary compo-nent of the state building process.

These incongruent perspec-tives on the timing ofnegotiations should promptCanada to support any andall efforts to entice theparties back to the negoti-ating table while at thesame time promoting stepsto ensure Israeli security as

well as movement towardsPalestinian self-determina-tion on the ground.

The issues related to the type offorce that would be deployed (if andwhen circumstances warranted it)are also significant. Are professionalsoldiers best equipped to deal withprotracted conditions of conflict? Amore robust mission runs the risk ofpossible embroilment of third partyparticipants in actual combat. Whattype of coalition would best servethe needs of the mission? Would theUN be the best framework for such amission? If not, would NATO orsome other configuration of actorsfunction more effectively? Is theUnited States the most suitablecandidate to lead the mission interms of its reputation among theparties to the conflict and itspositioning in world affairs? Orwould some other, less involvedparty, constitute a better leader?

Canadians have consistentlysupported UN missions, althoughNATO operations have proven moresuccessful in achieving their objec-tives, and have guided Canadianmilitary interventions in post-ColdWar years. Would the currentConservative government be moresupportive of anAmerican-ledmission consideringthe apparentconcurrence ofCanadian-US foreignpolicy interests onthe war on terror?Or does Canadaenvision anindependent role foritself within abroader coalition ofinternational actors?

What specific niche

could Canada occupy within theforce’s overall structure? Canada’smost recent combat experience inAfghanistan has become increasinglydangerous with the move ofCanadian operations from Kabul toKandahar. It is unclear whether theexperience of armed Canadian forcesin Afghanistan provides an appro-priate model for theIsraeli-Palestinian context. TheIsraeli-Palestinian theatre of opera-tions involves an asymmetricalrelationship between an establishednation state (Israel) that is in controlof a non-state structure (thePalestinian Authority) undergoingconditions of crisis and occupation.Afghanistan, on the other hand,represents a state in conflict with aninternal dissident movement thatendangers the idea of Afghan sover-eignty.

Also, with Canadian casualties inAfghanistan, Canadians may needactive convincing that Canadiannational interests and world orderwould be worth entertaining the riskof additional casualties in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

Canada seems best suitedto an integrated model ofpeacekeeping in the Israeli-

United Nations peacekeepers from France nextto the headquarters of United Nations InterimForce in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, Saturday August19, 2006 (AP Photo)

Israeli security barrier (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Photo)

6 BISON

Palestinian context thatincludes force projection, ifnecessary, along withemphasis on peacebuilding activities.

Both elements of such third partyintervention accord with theConservative government’s commit-ment to international engagementand overseas development assis-tance. Keeping in mind the negativeassociations of peacekeeping withsocial engineering, i.e., the ethno-centric and Western-biased notion ofcreating a society in one’s ownimage, Canadians can adapt theirexperience of multiculturalism to thecomplex exigencies of a peace-keeping and peace building missiondesigned to alleviate tensionsbetween Israelis and Palestinians inthe Middle East.

Policy Options forCanada

In the new environment ofacceptance of third partyintervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Canadacould play a significant roleif a two stage approach ofan international force inthe Palestinian areas isadopted.

The first or preparatory stage wouldinvolve intense dialogue with Israelisand Palestinians about the mandatefor intervention. These discussionsmight result in the preparation of adraft mandate to be approved byIsrael, the Palestinians, and the UNSecurity Council to provide interna-tional legitimacy and backing. TheCanadian government could play therole of interlocutor between theparties to the conflict and open

channels of communication. In orderto educate the Canadian publicabout this role, the government mustmake every effort to educate itscitizens on the benefits of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue as opposed torejectionist and/or extremist views.

On the ground, the firststage would involve supportfor Israel’s continuedwithdrawal from all areaseast of the separationbarrier and possiblechanges to the barrier’sroute to facilitate contiguityin areas destined for aPalestinian state.

These ideas accord with the policy ofIsrael’s new coalition government toredraw Israel’s borders by 2010 basedon Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’swithdrawal plan, as well asPalestinian demands for freedom ofmovement and land claims. In themeantime, Canada can direct itsfunding sources to the Palestinianeconomy while simultaneouslysupporting a Hamas ceasefire toplacate Israel’s demands for peaceand quiet.

The second stage wouldinvolve a greater role forthe work of civil societyand aid organizations.

Although both Israel and the PAhave shown little interest in a rolefor civil society in their own policyprocesses, Canada can generatewider support for peace initiatives bypromoting participation of regionalactors, non-governmental organiza-tions, donor states and civil societyin the region. In this way, the inter-national force would function in an

environment that promotes thedemocratic process and generates thepolitical capital to reach all levels ofsociety.

One of the most significant obstaclesto peace is the absence on thePalestinian side of proper state insti-tutions and processes. Consideringthe dire circumstances of thePalestinian economy and Canada’srefusal to conduct relations with theHamas government, it is essentialthat Canadian development assis-tance reach the people throughrelations with non-governmentalorganizations, both local and inter-national. Appealing to the“stomachs” of the Palestinian peoplemay prove conducive to the develop-ment of an alternative and moderatepolitical camp that would gainresources and delegitimize the prolif-eration of renegade armed factionsoperating against peace and socio-economic stability, therebymitigating Israel’s security concerns.

In pursuing these policy options,representatives from Canada, Israeland the Palestinians can develop aworking relationship to preclude theoccurrence of future crises.

There is every reason tobelieve that third partyintervention can increasepeace and stability in theregion.

A stable and thriving Middle Easternregion can only have positive effectsfor Canada now and in the future.For this reason, Canada has everyinterest in taking a more active rolein conflict resolution between Israeland the Arabs.

Defence & Security Report 7

Cen

tre

for D

efence a

University oWinnipeg

Cen

tre

for D

efence and Security

Stud

ies

University of ManitobaWinnipeg, Canada

Centre for Defence and Security StudiesUniversity CollegeThe University of ManitobaWinnipeg, MB R3T 2M8cdssum@cc.umanitoba.cawww.umanitoba.ca/centres/defence

Bison Defence & Security Reports provide a forum for expert commentary oncontemporary policy issues of direct relevance to Canada. They are designed todisseminate views, and to generate discussion and debate around options availableto decision-makers in the wide areas of defence and security. They are widely distrib-uted to the academic community, the attentive public, the media, governmentdepartments and agencies as warranted and the media.

The editors welcome submissions for publication as a Report. If published, a smallhonorarium is provided. Please forward any submissions to the Centre for Defenceand Security Studies, 351 University College, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg,Manitoba or on-line to cdssum@cc.umanitoba.ca