Bilateral margining and isda simm (public)

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Market Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk Expert Network 23 February 2017

Transcript of Bilateral margining and isda simm (public)

Market Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk Expert Network

23 February 2017

About

Zhong Zhi Hu – European Banks Supervision

• Joined DNB in November 2015 with focus on Market Risk, Counterparty

Credit Risk, Liquidity Risk, Interest Rate Risk and Central Clearing

• Nerd at heart

• Fitness junkie and in love with travelling

Agenda

• This agenda item have been removed from this

“non-confidential/public” version

• This agenda item have been removed from this

“non-confidential/public” version

• Bilateral Margining and ISDA’s Standard Initial Margining Model

(SIMM)

• Round-table

Disclaimer

• Several slides that contain “confidential/non-public” content have

been removed

• Therefore this presentation can be shared. This document is for

educational purposes only

Bilateral Margining and ISDA’s Standard Initial Margining Model

(SIMM)

Zhong Zhi Hu – European Banks Supervision, 23-02-17

Financial crisis of 2007-2009

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US Government

Bailout

• Filed for bankruptcy in September 2008

• Many counterparties were protected by the collateral

posted by Lehman under ISDA Master Agreements

• Over 66,000 of Lehman’s OTC derivatives were

cleared at LCH.Clearnet

Margining of non-centrally cleared

derivatives (bilateral)History

2009: G20 seeks to reduce systemic risk in the non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives markets

• all standardized OTC derivatives should be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) and traded on organized trading

platforms, where appropriate

• non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives should be subject to margin requirements and higher capital requirements

2013-2016: BCBS/IOSCO worked on a framework for margin requirements of non-centrally cleared derivatives

• Imposing two-way initial margin and unilateral exchange of variation margin

• Swaps and physically settled FX forwards are excluded from IM requirements but not from VM requirements

Regulation

• US: under Dodd-Frank Act by the US CFTC

• EU: under European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

• Jan 2017: The EC has endorsed the final draft RTS by ESMA/EBA/EIOPA (ESA’s)

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Size of non-centrally cleared derivatives

2013Q4: USD 123-141 trn notional amount of non-cleared Interest

Rate Derivatives (IRD). This is ±175% of world GDP (2016)

• 21-25% of total IRD notional amount (USD 600 trn)

• 2015Q2: the notional amount of non-cleared IRD dropped to USD 86 trn

The non-cleared OTC derivatives market is unlikely to disappear

• Some OTC derivatives cannot be centrally cleared due to complexity and illiquidity

of some products. This poses difficulties for CCPs in developing valuation models

for computing margining requirements.

• Firms will always have tailored, bespoke risks they need to hedge

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EMIR definition of counterparties

Financial Counterparty

(FC)

- Credit institutions

- Insurers/reinsurers

- Investment firms

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Non-Financial Counterparty

(NFC+)

- Above clearing threshold

Non-Financial Counterparty

(NFC-)

- Below clearing threshold

- Excluded from margining

requirements

• FC and NFC+ are subject to margining requirements

• Central banks and sovereigns are not required to post margins

Phase-in period for IM requirements

Phase 1 - March 2017

Initial Margin requirements commence where aggregate month-end notional amount exceeds EUR 3 trillion

• only 12 EU entities meet this threshold

• Variation Margin requirements commence for all counterparties

• VM requirements will mainly impact smaller (financial) counterparties as most large counterparties

already post VM

Phase 2 - September 2017

Initial Margin requirements where aggregate month-end notional amount exceeds EUR 2.25 trillion

Phase 3 - September 2018

Initial Margin requirements where aggregate month-end notional amount exceeds EUR 1.5 trillion

Phase 4 - September 2019

Initial Margin requirements where aggregate month-end notional amount exceeds EUR 0.75 trillion

Phase 5 -September 2020

Initial Margin requirements where aggregate month-end notional amount exceeds EUR 8 billion

End of phase-in.

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Margining rules

• EU entities are obliged to collect and post margins to non-EU FC and NFC+

• Intragroup transactions are exempted from bilateral margining requirements if certain conditions

are met

Initial Margining

• No netting of IM between 2 parties, whereas ISDA master agreement allows for bilateral netting

• Concentration limit for IM collateral depending on nature (cash, bonds, equities)

• Strict rules on the segregation and rehypothecation of initial margin collateral

Variation Margining

• Parties are required to exchange VM daily subject to a minimum transfer amount of EUR 500k (EU)

or USD 500k (US)

• VM collateral can be rehypothecated and does not need to be segregated

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Margining computation

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Initial margining

• BCBS/IOSCO: IM may be calculated using a standardised margin schedule or an internal models (or a third party model)

• IM models should cover potential future exposure (PFE) at the 99% confidence level over a 10-day horizon

Variation margining

• Based on current exposure and is calculated by the mark-to-market value of derivatives

Standardised initial margin schedule (BCBS/IOSCO)

.

Fundamentals of ISDA SIMM

ISDA estimates the total IM for the entire market under standardised is USD 10.2 trn vs USD

1.7 trn under internal models

ISDA key requirements for a standard internal model

Similarity with FRTB

• Adopts essentially the same risk factors and models them in a similar way

• SIMM takes into account non-delta risks: vega and curvature sensitivities

• Main difference: IM is based on a 99% VaR while FRTB is based on a 97.5% Expected Shortfall

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• Easy to replicate and transparent

• Quick

• Extensible

• Low cost

• Governance

• Margin appropriateness

ISDA SIMM

Four product classes

• Interest rates and FX

• Equities

• Credit Qualifying (investment grade) and non-qualifying

• Commodities

IM amount

• IM per risk class IMrisk class = Deltarisk class + Vegarisk class + Curvaturerisk class

• Curvature and vega only need to be computed for products with optionality and volatility sensitivity respectively

• Netting only within product class: no cross-product class netting

• IM for product class

• r = risk class

• 𝜓 = correlation

• Total IM requirement for institution

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Six risk classes

• Interest rates

• FX

• Equities

• Credit Qualifying

• Credit non-qualifying

• Commodities

SIMM Methodology

ISDA SIMM methodology is based on a 2nd order Taylor polynomial

• Use of sensitivities (portfolio greeks) rather than “full reval” method

• Delta-gamma-vega approximation

• 𝛥 𝑉 ≈𝛿𝑉

𝛿𝑋∗ 𝛥 𝑋 + ½ ∗

𝛿2𝑉

𝛿𝑋2 ∗ 𝛥(𝑋)² +𝛿𝑉

𝛿 𝜎∗ 𝛥(𝜎)

• Δ(V) ≈ delta*Δ(X) + ½*gamma*Δ(X)² + vega*Δ(σ)

ISDA SIMM: no need to estimate Δ(X) and Δ(σ) that correspond to a 99% PFE

• These are hard to estimate for every traded OTC and form potential margining disputes

• ISDA provides risk weights (RW) and correlations which are calibrated to cover the PFE

at a 10-d horizon at ≥ 99%.

• Only need to compute the sensitivities

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SIMM computation

Netting set of two trades

• €20m 3-year payer swap with DV01 of -1500

• €5 m 10-year receiver swap with DV01 of 1200

𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝑅 & 𝐹𝑋 = 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 & 𝐹𝑋 + 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐼𝑅 & 𝐹𝑋 + 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎𝐼𝑅 & 𝐹𝑋

𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝑅 = 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 (curvature and vega do not have to be calculated for IR swaps)

• 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 = 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌2 + (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

2 + 2𝜌3𝑌,10𝑌 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌 ∗ (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

• 𝑅𝑊3𝑌, 𝑅𝑊10𝑌 and 𝜌3𝑌,10𝑌 can be found from ISDA SIMM tables

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SIMM computation

𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 = 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌2 + (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

2 + 2𝜌3𝑌,10𝑌 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌 (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

• €20m 3-year payer swap with DV01 of -1500

• €5 m 10-year receiver swap with DV01 of 1200

ISDA SIMM risk weights 𝑅𝑊 for IR products of different currencies

• regular volatility currencies: USD, EUR, GBP, CHF, AUD, NZD, CAD, SEK, NOK, DKK, HKD, KRW, SGD, and TWD

• low-volatility currencies: JPY

• high-volatility currencies: all other currencies

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SIMM computation

𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 = 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌2 + (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

2 + 2𝜌3𝑌,10𝑌 𝐷𝑉013𝑌 ∗ 𝑅𝑊3𝑌 (𝐷𝑉0110𝑌∗ 𝑅𝑊10𝑌)

• €20m 3-year payer swap with DV01 of -1500

• €5 m 10-year receiver swap with DV01 of 1200

The margining rules allow for netting within product class

• 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅 = −1500 ∗ 47 2 + (1200 ∗ 45)2+2 ∗ 0.831 −1500 ∗ 47 (1200 ∗ 45)

• 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝑅 = 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑅=39,484

Under no netting within product-class

• 𝐼𝑀3𝑌 = −1500 ∗ 47 2 = 70,500

• 𝐼𝑀10𝑌 = 1200 ∗ 45 2 = 54,000

• Individual margining amounts are higher due absence of netting benefits

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Concerns

• IM impacts market-wide liquidity as the IM collateral cannot be re-

used except in a fairly narrow set of circumstances

• It becomes harder to access the OTC markets, while most market

participants use OTC derivatives to hedge their risks

• Procyclicaclity

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Links

• BCBS/IOSCO http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.pdf

• ISDA SIMM Methodology http://isda.link/simmmethodology

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