Bihar kosi flood report-Importance of Relief Chain Management in Disaster Response
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Transcript of Bihar kosi flood report-Importance of Relief Chain Management in Disaster Response
- 1.Distribution Network Designs in Relief Chain Management:
Governments response to Kosi Floods 2008
A project report submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Disaster Management
Submitted by
Animesh Prakash
2009DM007
Under the Guidance of
Dr. Janki Andharia
Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai
February, 2011
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that the dissertation titled Distribution Network Designs in Relief Chain Management: Governments response to Kosi Floods 2008 is the record of the original work done by Mr. Animesh Prakash under my guidance. The Results of the research presented in the dissertation have not previously formed the basis of the award of any degree, diploma or certificate in this or any other university.
Dr. Janki Andharia 28th February, 2011
Professor
Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management
Malati and Jal.A.D Naoroji Campus
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Post Box No. 8313, Deonar
Mumbai-400 088
India
DECLARATION
I, Animesh Prakash, hereby declare that this dissertation titled Distribution Network Designs in Relief Chain Management: Governments response to Kosi Floods 2008 is the outcome of my own study undertaken under the guidance of Dr. Janki Andharia, Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. It has not been previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma or certificate of this institute or any other institute or university. I have duly acknowledged all the sources used by me in the preparation of this dissertation.
Animesh Prakash Date: 28th February, 2011
Place: Mumbai
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I owe my sincere thanks to Dr. Parama Bhattacharya, who, in the role of my faculty supervisor during my internship in Bihar, helped me to conceive the idea for this study.
The thesis would never have evolved without the contribution of Dr. Janki Andharia. She has been extremely patient in going through my numerous drafts and bringing out even the minutest points of corrections. She, deserves a special mention for her constant support and advice during the entire period of research. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have completed the thesis under her supervision. I owe my sincere reverence and gratitude to Dr Andharia.
Dr Samrat Sinha, kept motivating me throughout the process of this study. Faculty Members at Jamsetji Tata Centre for Disaster Management, Tata Institute of Social Sciences have constantly reviewed this study and provided their valuable inputs. I convey my sincere thanks to all of them.
Thanks to Dr Anshu Sonak from University of Delhi, Ms. Shivangi from SEEDS, India and Mr. Naval Kishore Yadav, District Provident Fund Officer, Madhepura for their immense help with the data collection. Thanks to Mr. Surender Yadav from Rampur Lahi who took me to the most inaccessible places in the village for the data collection.
Thanks to my colleagues, for enriching the quality of the study through debates and discussions.
Special thanks to my school teachers, Mr. H.P. Bhatt, Late Mr. B.N. Khanna, Dr Sanjay Dubey, Mrs V Juyal and all others who have worked hard in shaping my personality. Their principles have always guided us to sail through the most difficult paths in life with courage and strength. Demise of Mr. Khanna in 2010 was a great loss for me. Undoubtedly, you were the best teacher I have ever seen and will ever see.
I convey my reverence to my parents, for their unmatched efforts in bringing the best opportunities in my life. Thanks to my brothers for loving me always.
Finally, thanks to Pakhi for being the most important source of inspiration in my life.
For those who lost their lives in Kosi..
CONTENT
- Chapter One: Introduction12
- 2. Importance of relief chain management in disaster response.....................12
3. History and an Overview of floods in Bihar.15 4. The Kosi
Blunder16 5. Vulnerability to floods and earthquakes......20 6.
Objectives.21 7. Chapter Two: Methodology..22 8. Methodology22 9.
Research Design..22 10. Sample..24 11. Data Collection-Tools and
Methods..34 12. The Scope and Limitations of the study37 13.
Chapter Three: Review of Literature....38 14. Comparision between
humanitarian and commercial supply chain...38 15. Distribution
Network Designs....43 16. Role of distribution in a post disaster
situation....44 17. Factors affecting distribution network
designs..46 18. Distribution network designs in a supply chain52
19. Chapter Four: The Impact of Floods in Rampur Lahi...64 20.
Rampur Lahi: An island of deprivation...64 21. Floods in the
Village: An overview....71 22. Chapter Five: 23. Relief and
Response experiences of Rampur Lahi: The Distribution Challenge..73
24. Critical time period- Relief and Response...73 25. Safety and
Shelters during flooding......76 26. As the Water Rose.78 27. The
Windfall- Event that shortened the critical time period..79 28.
Case Studies.....80 29. Evacuation of physically Disabled.....80
30. Scenario after the critical time period...83 31. Relocated
Survivors....83 32. Governments Aid Arrives.......85 33. The
Singheshwer Mega Camp..86 34. The MVC ad-hoc settlement....89 35.
Chapter Six: 36. Governments Relief and Response efforts: Analysing
the Distribution Network...96 37. State of disaster preparedness in
Bihar96 38. Governments Strategy for relief and response after the
floods99 39. Chapter Seven: Towards an enhanced distribution
framework...120 Appendices.130
References..149
List of Figures
- Madhepura; Political Map.09
40. Madhepura, map showing inundation..10 41. Madhepura, Road
Network...11 42. Map showing date wise inundation in Bihar18 43.
Sketch of Rampur Lahi, Stratification for Sampling..28 44. Photo
PRA being conducted in Ward no 01.29 45. Photo Group discussion
being conducted at ward no 12.29 46. Manufacturer Storage with
direct shipping.53 47. Manufacturer Storage with direct shipping
and In Transit merge55 48. Distributor Storage with package Carrier
delivery.56 49. Distributor storage with last mile delivery58 50.
Manufacturer/Distributor Storage with customer pick up.59 51.
Distribution Network Design in Humaniatrian Logistics for local
Donors...61 52. Outlay of Rampur Lahi..71 53. Breach of
Embankment..79 54. Photo.81 55. Photo81 56. Photo Children taking
bath in the newly formed river-Badiyahi Dhar....84 57. Photo One of
the boats used for evacuation and relief distribution in the
village. .....84 58. Outlay of MVC ad-hoc settlement....90 59.
Theoretical framework.122 60. Superimposition of Theoretical
framework on the real field situation124 61. Approaches in
Humanitarian Logistics..125 62. Distribution Network Design in
Humaniatrian Logistics for local Donors125List of Tables
- Categorisation of Respondents.33
63. Group discussions conducted during initial stage of data
collection35 64. PRAs conducted during initial stage of data
collection..36 65. Differences between Commercial and Humanitarian
Supply Chain, Beamon, 2003.40 66. Assets, Rampur Lahi.69 67. List
of people who died in Singheshwar Mega Camp. 68. Organisations
Intervening onand around MVC According to the Madhepura 69.
Collectorate.91 70. People from Rampur Lahi who died on MVC and
whose family members were 71. contacted during data collection..92
72. Relief Distribution Centre Shankarpur Block100 73. Summary of
Kosi floods evacuationrelief and response in Madhepura 74. District
(30/08/08-25/09/08).102 75. Accessibility to the Relief Camps...104
76. Evacuation by Army/NDRF /Para Military Forces.106 77. Pattern
of Relief Distribution.107 78. Summary of Findings and Supporting
Evidences....109 79. Pattern of evacuation..113 80. Number of Boats
commissioned for Relief and Rescue...114 81. Pattern of Relief
Distribution.115 82. Organisations Intervening onand around MVC
According to the Madhepura 83. Collectorate..118 84. Summary of
findings...119 85. NGOs and Flood Relief Intervention;District
MadhepuraDate of Reporting: 29-09-08..126Fig 01, Madhepura;
Political Map
Figure 02, Madhepura, map showing inundation.
Figure 03, Madhepura, Road Network
CHAPTER 01
INTRODUCTION
Importance of relief chain management in disaster response
An important characteristic of a powerful disaster is
infrastructure collapse in the affected region which could severely
impact the coping capacity of the affected community. Further it
could make the function of Relief Chain Management extremely
challenging in a disaster response. A prompt disaster response
requires rapid deployment of aid and assistance to the affected
area within a shortest possible time, while surpassing, immense
dynamic hurdles posed by the collapsed infrastructure. The two
components, of the relief chain on which its success relies are
logistics and distribution. The challenges increase in severity as
aid goes closer towards the real beneficiaries. In many
post-disaster situations, aid could not reach the true
beneficiaries.
Logistics has always been an important factor in humanitarian aid
operations, as logistics efforts account for 80% of disaster relief
(Turnick, 2005). However in India, the significance of disaster
logistics is not acknowledged. The speed of the humanitarian aid
after disaster depends on the ability of logisticians to procure,
transport and receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian relief
effort (Thomas 2003, p. 04).Distribution of aid is a vital aspect
of relief chain management. Disaster relief operations struggle
with very special circumstances, as they often have to be carried
out in an environment with destabilized infrastructure, (Cassidy,
2003; Long and Wood, 1995) ranging from a lack of electricity
supplies to limited transport facilities. Furthermore, since the
magnitude of most natural disasters are unpredictable, the demand
for goods in these disasters is also unpredictable (Cassidy, 2003;
Murray, 2005). Logisticians in this sector often have to work with
fragmented technology and poorly defined manual processes. There
are greater issues of safety as they may be operating in a
politically volatile climate. Thus it is evident that humanitarian
logistics is challenging as it has to be more flexible, and has to
function under severe constraints. The biggest hurdle faced by the
humanitarian logistics teams is the sheer complexity of the
operating conditions within which they have to work in order to
supply aid to those who have been affected by disasters.
Transparency and accountability also has gained its importance with
the donors, pledging millions in aid and goods, being more
inquisitive regarding the relief distribution. Inventory management
itself becomes an extremely challenging task in humanitarian
logistics. According to Iain Logan, former Operations Manager at
IFRC, the Balkan crisis unleashed an overwhelming response from the
donor community to the point that IFRC decided not to unload planes
carrying unsolicited goods. Richardson (1995) did a comprehensive
study on challenges that come across a logisticians way after a
disaster.
Ptashkin (2008) recognizes another challenge, i.e., to synchronize
network plans, operations, technologies and data to accomplish two
objectives: manage, monitor and deliver supplies and services to
citizens, service providers and survivors, and enable adaptation
and response to alerts and recovery from daily operating events and
catastrophic incidents. Lack of co-ordination amongst various
governmental and nongovernmental organization working in disaster
response.This lack of coordination often leads to confusion at last
mile (Murray, 2005).
Managing logistics while responding to a disaster is extremely
challenging particularly in cases of floods. Normally, floods of
great magnitude cripple the existing infrastructure and people may
be marooned in large numbers. Evacuation and relief distribution in
cases of flood would urgently require all possible sources of
conveyance, i.e. from boats to buses to helicopters. Therefore,
logistics while responding to floods are expected to pose more
varied challenges as compared to other disasters like earthquakes,
cyclones etc.
The importance of humanitarian logistics was recognized belatedly
by several organizations, particularly after the Indian Ocean
Tsunami. The Fritz Institute conducted a survey of the response to
the Tsunami and found that humanitarian organizations were struck
by the scarcity of trained and experienced logisticians in the
field. The survey found that 88% of the aid agencies had to recall
their most experienced logisticians from other organizations (such
as Darfur) to be redeployed to staff the Tsunami relief
efforts.
In another study by Lee Wassenhove (2006), it was observed that
exclusion of logistics in planning leads to fire fighting mentality
which makes the logistics management during a disaster- a complex
and challenging task. He states that, It is only recently that,
humanitarian organizations such as the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the World Food
Programme (WFP) have tried to pin-point logistics and supply chain
management as key to a relief operation. Other organizations in the
sector are beginning to follow suit and raise the profile and
professionalism of logisticians.
Other authors have also emphasized on the need of the logistics in
disaster response. Logistics serves as a bridge between disaster
preparedness and response, between procurement and distribution and
between headquarters and the field.It also provides a rich source
of data, since it is this department that handles the tracking of
goods, which could be used to analyse post-event effectiveness
(Thomas and Mizushima, 2005).
William B. Cassidy (2010)highlights the impact of relief chain
debacle in Haiti earthquake as well as Hurricane Katrina through
experiences of Dr. Holguin Veras who has been working with
Dominican and Haitian officials to determine ways of expediting
relief efforts.Haiti is a classic example of disasters gone worse
due to the chaotic relief chain management, similar to the
Hurricane Katrina, although it was on a much larger scale.
In India, the importance of relief chain management has been
gradually realized more and more strongly after major disasters,
like the Bhuj earthquake (2001), the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004),
the Kosi floods (2008) and the recent flash floods at Leh in
August, 2010. However,disaster logistics remains in its nascent
form in India. This study highlights the fact that a vast country
like India should be far more prepared for humanitarian logistics
to ensure effective deployment of aid and relief
interventions.
This study focuses on the Kosi floods of 2008, caused due to the
breach of the eastern embankment near Kusaha village in Nepal
(about 12 kms upstream of the Kosi barrage. A total population of
33,45,545 people living in 993 villages of 412 panchayats of 35
blocks of 5 districts were affected in the flood. About3,40,742
houses were damaged and 7.12,140 animals were affected. A total of
239 humans and 1232 animals lives were lost. (Department of
Planning and Development, Government of Bihar, 2009) However, the
lives lost after the subsequent epidemics were exponentially high.
Most of the people died due to lack of basic commodities which
could not reach them on time due to several reasons. Logistics
failure might be one them. This study explores how the government
in Madhepura district organized its supply chain during the Kosi
floods in 2008 and analyses its strengths and weaknesses.
History and an overview of floods in Bihar
A famous Albanian proverb says that, fire, water and government,
know nothing of mercy.
Floods in Bihar have placed 8.28 crore people from the state in a
perfect position to accredit this saying as most of these floods
can be seen rooted to be in human actions.
Bihar is the twelfth largest state of India. It accommodates
8,28,78,796 people and has a population density of 880 people/ Sq
Km. The state has an extensive river system. It is divided into two
parts by the Ganges, which flows from west to east. The region
lying in the north of Ganga is drained by Ghaghra, Gandak, Burhi
Gandak and Mahananda. All these rivers are tributaries of the
Ganges. The district lying to the north of Ganges forms North
Bihar. It has been cursed by recurring floods and in particular
Kosi has been the sorrow of this region. About 76% of the total
population of the North Bihar is reported to be flood prone.
Rashtriya Barh Aayog in its report in 1980 has assessed that 4.26
million hectares of area in Bihar is flood Prone. Only the state of
Uttar Pradesh (7.336 million hectares) had larger flood prone area
than Bihar. This implies that the number of persons hit by flood
per unit area in Bihar is the largest as compared to other states
in the country. Stating that the causes of floods in Bihar are
purely natural would not be appropriate. Several scholars have
fiercely debated over the issue, and many argue that floods in
Bihar are human induced.
During the promulgation of the First National Policy on Floods in
1954, only 25 lakh hectares of area in Bihar was flood prone.
According to the reassessment of the Second Irrigation Commission
of Bihar, in 1994, 68 lakh hectares were deemed to be flood prone.
This itself suggest that there is something much more than nature
itself which has resulted into increase in flood incidents in
Bihar. Mishra (2010) identifies shortsightedness exhibited by the
expert technical opinion, which, he believes, has taken
diametrically opposite stances in pre an post independence period.
It opposed construction of embankments during the British rule, as
the colonial rulers desisted spending on rehabilitation operations.
While in independent India, the technical opinion under the
political compulsion to do welfare of the people, has
wholeheartedly supported construction of embankments and big dams.
As a consequence, not only have flood control projects not
performed according to the initial expectations but have in fact
created a worse scenario, (Mishra, 2010)
The Kosi Blunder
River Kosi is one of the most vibrant and notorious rivers of
India. From its origin to its confluence with Ganga at Kursela, it
travels 729 kms and drains a total area of 69,300 sq. km. The river
is formed by the confluence of seven streams, namely, Indravati,
Sun Kosi, Tam Kosi, Likhu Kosi, Dudh Kosi, Arun Kosi and Tamar
Kosi. Besides this, major tributaries of Kosi, in India are Kamla,
Baghmati, Budhi Gandak and Bhutahi Balan.
Like a young child, who desists being disciplined, Kosi moves at
her own will, explores new paths and behaves unpredictably.
According to a popular hindu legend, it is believed that Kosi
cannot be contained by bunds or embankments. The myth goes like
this, Once a demon got attracted by the beauty of Kosi and proposed
to marry her. Kosi agreed on a condition that she would marry the
demon if he could contain her between the Himalayas and her
confluence with Ganga in a nights time, and if the demon fails, he
will have to pay with his life. The demon agreed and set on his
work. Seeing the pace of his work, Kosi feared that he would
accomplish the task before the set time. She sought help from her
father, Lord Shiva, who took the garb of a cock and roosted before
dawn could set in. The demon got nervous at this. Thinking he might
not be able to finish the job in time and will have to pay with his
life, he fled away from the place.
Historically, an embankment on Kosi was constructed in 12th century
by the king Lakshman II. The embankment was named Bir Bandh and its
remains can still be seen along the eastern bank of Kosi at
Bhimnagar in Supaul district.
During the British rule, particularly, in the 19th century, a
possibility of construction of bunds and embankments on Kosi as
flood prevention strategy was extensively reviewed. However,
experts opinion oscillated between two groups. One group considered
construction of embankments and bunds as inevitable flood control
measure. The other group believed that taming the Kosi river
through structural measures would accelerate floodings in this
region.
By the end of the 19th century, signing of Sugali pact between
India and Nepal, led to several studies, to explore the
possibilities to embank the river Kosi. A futile attempt was made
to construct marginal embankment along its course. This could not
be made due to heavy rains (Choudhary, 1960). W.A. Inglis toured
the Kosi region in India and Nepal in 1893 and suggested against
interference with the natural flow of the river. Shillingford in
1895 also questioned the practicality of taming the rivers course.
He writes that, the Kosi after reaching its westernmost limit will
go back near easternmost of its abounded channels and then begin
the work of moving westwards all over again (Mishra 2010 quoting
Shllingford date unavailable). Shillingford was criticized by
Charles Elliot (1895) who opined otherwise. He states that, there
seems to be no evidence adduced to show that the river has reached
its westernmost position or to show that if it has, it will return
violently from a direct southern to an extreme eastern course,
instead of doing so gradually (Elliot, 1895).
On Feb 24th, 1897, on the Calcutta flood conference, means were
suggested to build short length embankments to prevent floods in
isolated regions. This prompted local authorities, and indigo
planters to construct several such embankments. Its repercussions
were severe (OMalley, 1911). even after such severe follies,
authorities were unclear about a solution to this recurring
problem. Captain F.C. Hirst in 1908, strongly held the opinion that
embanking rivers was dangerous as was the case with Hwang Ho river
in China. He argued that through structural measures, a river can
be forced to follow a particular path. However, containing and
taming rivers flow through such human actions are against nature.
He states that, in the natures face, its an insult, which is not
yet known to leave unavenged (Hirst, 1908) W.A. Inglis, in 1909,
strongly refuted Hirst. He was of the opinion that embankments
designed with discretion and proper understanding of the case are
of good service (Inglis, 1909).
Amidst the debate over merits and demerits of these structural
measures, goovernments dilemma persisted and they strived hard to
arrive at a solution to the flood problems in Bihar. In relation to
this, Patna Flood Conference was held in 1937. In the conference,
governor Hallet; G.A.Hall and Dr. Rajendra Prasad all in one voice
spoke against the construction of embankments on rivers
(Proceedings of Patna Flood Conference, 1938, Pg 2, 8, 9 and 11).
Of all the embankments, Rajendra Prasad held responsible, the
railway embankments and district board roads, for floods
(Proceedings of Patna Flood Conference, 1938, Pg 8, 9).
At the Patna Flood Conference first attempt to dam the Kosi in
Nepal was given by Jimut Bahan Sen. He suggested it as the only
measure to check the Kosi (Proceedings of Patna Flood Conference,
1938, Pg 29). In 1942, Rai Bahadur PC Ghosh studied rivers of North
Bihar. He along with WL Murrel, the then superintending engineer
were of the opinion that improper maintenance of Tiljuga Bandh
(dam) would result in embankment collapse, thereby, drowning
thousands of people in Darbhanga district itself (Bahadur and
Ghosh, 1942, printed 1949).
Figure 04, Map showing date wise inundation in Bihar
Suggestions to embank Kosi started coming in more frequently after
1940s. the Kosi Plan of 1945 recommended construction of marginal
embankments built 16 kms apart from Nepal foothills to Ganges
(Mishra 2010 quoted from Post War Plan of Bihar, 1945).
Construction of 229 mts high dam in Barhkshetra was suggested in
1947. However, the project got repeatedly postponed until it was
dropped in 1951 on recommendation of Majumdar committee (Mullick,
Date not available).The committee sighted the reason that the
benefits of flood control would come only in the later stages of
the project. The committee came up with an alternative plan called
the Belkha Reservoir Scheme (Mullick, Date not available). Under
this scheme, 19.2 Km long, 20mt high earthen dam was to be
constructed, 14.4 kms downstream of Belka hills.
In 1953, another committee of experts was constituted after Nehrus
aerial survey of North Bihar on October 31st and November 1st. The
committee proposed construction of 1150 mts long barrage, 5 kms
upstream of Hanuman Nagar town. The embankment on kosi was approved
in December 1953. The Barrage was built at Bhimnagar between 1959
and 1963, and was inaugurated in 1963-64. An 1149 mt long barrage
was constructed along with 46 gates. Two canals were built on
either side of the barrage. These canals are Eastern and western
Kosi canals. However, this has not brought any respite from the
vagaries of Kosi. Rather, it has proved to be a nightmare in flood
management. In 1954, Bihar had 160 kms length of embankment, which
rose to 3465kms by 1992 (Various annual reports of the Department
of Water Resources, Government of Bihar).The Flood prone region in
1954 was 25 lakh hectares which rose to 68 lakh hectares in
1994.
Vulnerability to Floods and Earthquakes
Structural interventions for flood control on Kosi are also
challenged by numerous geographical complexities. The river has one
of the worlds largest river built alluvial fan. The Kosi mega fan
is 180km long and 150km wide. It cuts across Himalayas and Shiwalik
ranges carrying huge quantities of sediments. The upper catchment
of Kosi experiences heavy soil erosion due to very high rainfall in
these areas (mean 1451.8 mm/yr) the silt load in kosi is largest in
the rivers of Indian subcontinent. It averages 80 million
tones/year(Aggarwal and Bhoj, 1992). After the river reaches the
North Bihar plain, the silt load is deposited leading to
aggradation of the river bed. This offers resistance to the flow of
water thereby forcing the river to change its course. Precisely,
due to this reason containing the river within embankments from
both side could be a disastrous step in the long term. The silt
would be deposited within the embankment itself and gradually the
river bed would rise to such a level that the purpose of
constructing embankments would have no meaning. Apart from this
shifting of the river is also a natural evolution process. It can
be induced by several factors like earthquakes, landslides and
neotectonic activities (Aggarwal and Bhoj, 1992). The Kosi flood
plains are constantly being influenced by the compressive tectonic
regime resulting from the collision of the Indian and Eurasian
plates. Besides the presence of various active subsurface
structures like East Patna fault, Begusarai fault, Monghyr-Saharsa
ridge, Bhawanipur fault, Malda-Kisahnganj fault, Madhubani Graben
with sediment thickness of about 6 km and the shallow Purnea
Depression underneath the vicinity of Kosi and North Bihar flood
plains may result in uplift or subsidence of the surface, causing
changes in the river course (Aggarwal and Bhoj, 1992).
The flood management on Kosi is therefore far more challenging. The
loopholes in Kosi flood management became more and more evident
with time. Bihar experienced several devastating floods, even after
the construction of the barrage and the embankments. In most of the
cases, and particularly in the recent floods of 2008, the reason
for flooding was breach of the embankment itself. Of the numerous
floods that struck Bihar after 1950, some of the most destructive
were the floods of 1953, 1954, 1963, 1971, 1984, 1987, 1991,1995,
2004 and the most recent flood of 2008. The highest flood recorded
in the recent history of the river Kosi is reported to be 850,000
cusec (as against the average discharge of 55,000 cusec) on 24th
August 1954 (Reddy et. Al, 2008). In 2008, due to the breach of
embankment at Kusaha, the discharge of water rose to 1.66 lakh
cusec as against 25,744 cusec in the usual course. Kosi started
flowing on a new course, where at places it was 15- 20kms wide.
Length of the Kosi, flowing north to south on this new course, was
150kms. (Department of Planning and Development, Government of
Bihar, 2009)
Objectives:Kosi floods saw excessive loss of life and damage to
property. The role of disaster logistics and distribution networks
has not been explored in the context of these floods. The focus of
this study is to explore governments management of relief
logisticsand how it can be improved.
The specific objectives of this study are:-
- To identify the district governments mechanisms of managing logistics while responding to Kosi floods 2008.
86. To evaluate the efficiency of these mechanisms with respect
to its outreach to flood affected people. 87. To review and analyse
the strengths and weaknesses of the adopted distribution network
design for relief management with reference to strategic locations
of the relief camps, during the first month of the kosi floods in
2008. 88. To suggest ways of improving disaster logistics at
district level in Bihar.The research will primarily examine
governments response during the first month of the Kosi floods in
terms of logistics. It will also examine if the government had a
plan for the flood response or whether the response was mainly
adhoc. The study would also try to explore, if logistics was given
enough priority or significance during the flood response. For this
people from government responsible for managing logistics during
Kosi floods would be identified. Process of managing logistics and
relief distribution by these logistics service providers would be
captured and analysed. The study would look into the difficulties
faced by these logistics service providers. It will also examine
how evacuation and relief distribution was managed, how many people
were reached by the responders for evacuation and how many people
could not be reached. The study will look into the relief
provisions made by the government for those who were evacuated by
their aid as well as those who could not be evacuated.
CHAPTER 02
METHODOLOGY
Methodology
This is an exploratory study that it aims to explore the specific
distribution strategies in releif and its effectiveness forpeople
affected by floods.
The broad methodology of the research is qualitative. The study
draws significant qualitative data from the people affected by the
floods and also relies on some secondary sources for data
collection.
It examines the response, perspectives and insights of the
logistics service providers, the agencies of disaster management in
India and Bihar, the academicians and practioners engaged in
disaster response and the flood affected people in Bihar. In order
to analyse the consequences of the adopted strategies in
distribution of relief, during the Kosi floods response, this study
compares the different situations in which the affected people
found themselves at the time of the floods. Since very little is
known about distribution network designs in humanitarian logistics,
an exploratory, qualitative method is used.
The research design:
The study examines relief distribution from various perspectives.
First, the perspective of the logistics service providers from the
state government was considered to understand the situations and
circumstances which determined the adoption of specific strategies.
What consequences these strategies have? They will be evaluated by
examining the consequences on people placed in different
situations. Whether these strategies werecapable or not capable of
directly/indirectly benefitting the affected people would be
examined.
The three different sets of respondents, for the study were; (a)
the officials from various governmental departments who were
engaged in evacuation, relief distribution and other activities of
relief chain management, during the flood response, (b) the flood
affected people who were benefitted by the relief chain management
strategies adopted by the authorities. (c) the flood affected
people, to whom the benefits of these strategies could not reach,
thereby, influencing them adversely.
Questions addressed under each objective are as follows:-
- To evaluate the efficiency of these mechanisms with respect to its outreach to flood affected people.
89. For this objective, field data collection was guided by
following questions:- 90. Was logistics given enough priority or
significance during the flood response? If not:- 91. What
difficulties were faced by the responders due to this? 92. How did
that affect the victims of the flood? 93. How many people could be
reached by these responders for evacuation? 94. How many people
could not be reached by the government responders for evacuation?
95. Where were the people evacuated through governments aid
taken?Interviews were conducted with villagers who were either
reached by the Government logistics service providers (LSPs) or
were not reached by them. Further, interviews were conducted with
LSPs who worked during the first month of the floods.
- To review and analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the adopted distribution network design for relief management with reference to strategic locations of the relief camps, during the first month of the Kosi floods in 2008.
96. All the research questions listed above (under subsection 1)
helped in analysis of the strategies with which the LSPs handled
the distribution of the relief goods at various places in
Madhepura. The situation that existed during the Kosi response were
then reviewed and evaluated with reference to the existing
distribution network designs. 97. To suggest ways of improving
disaster logistics at district level in Bihar. 98. After the
detailed analysis of the data collected, the study identifies scope
of improvement and offers practical suggestions that could be
implemented at the district level in disaster management.Sample:-
Managing Humanitarian logistics while responding to a disaster like
floods is extremely challenging. Floods of great magnitude cripple
the existing infrastructure and people are marooned in large
numbers. Evacuation and relief distribution would urgently require
all possible sources of conveyance, i.e. from boats to buses to
helicopters. Therefore, logistics while responding to floods are
expected to pose more varied challenges as compared to other
disasters like earthquakes, cyclones etc. Therefore, floods were
preferred over other disasters, for the purpose of this
study.
The specific reasons for selecting Kosi floods as the
casewere:
- In April, 2009 it had been only 18 months since Kosi floods had swept Bihar. Its devastation was still visible and people could easily recollect the experiences of the disaster. Moreover, several families still living in ad hoc settlement established during the flood. Hence , research expected to retrieve the data with much accuracy as the event was still fresh in their memories.
99. The Kosi river in 2008 flooded those regions mostly which
had not seen major floods in past several years. Most of the people
(from all generations) had never experienced floods in their lives.
Even the administration was caught unawares. Therefore, researcher
expected to come across various complexities and learnings which
would be rather unique and enriching.In Madhepura district, the
severely affected blocks were Madhepura, Singheshwar, Shankarpur,
Murliganj, Kumarkhand, Udakishunganj, Aalamnagar, Bihariganj,
Chausa, Puraini and Gwalpada. The worst affected village during the
floods, in terms of loss of life and damage to property was
Jorganwa in Murliganj block.
At the same time there were villages like Rampur Lahi which were
placed in extreme complex situations. During floods Shankarpur
block headquarter was unreachable due to inundation and destruction
of REO road at Maujma. It was proposed to immediately reconstruct
Baily Bridge for effective relief distribution. During that period
the region was accessible only through boats. Moreover, in Rampur
Lahi a very large number of people were trapped between two rivers,
one of which was created only in the floods. Thus, the situation at
Rampur Lahi required more attention towards effective logistics for
evacuation and relief distribution.
Of all the affected areas, Rampur Lahi of Shankarpur block in
Madhepura district in Bihar was selected as the study area. People
from Rampur Lahi, either stayed in Singheshwar Mega Camp or in the
ad-hoc settlement, established at the MVC embankment. Only those
people who stayed in either of the camps were selected as
respondents for this study.
.Although, Rampur Lahi was one of the badly affected regions, it
was not the worst affected area in the district. The worst affected
Blocks were Murliganj, Kumarkhand, Udakishanganj etc. Jorganwa
village in Murliganj was, Particularly, the most affected village.
However, inspite of this Rampur Lahi of Shankarpur block was
preferred over Jorganwa panchayat due to the following reasons
:-
- I had an opportunity, on an earlier occasion to work for flood rehabilitation for one month. This made me well acquainted with the topography and social structure of the village. I had established good relations and contacts during his stay in the village. In the limited time and budget it would have been impractical for me to collect a comprehensive set of data from Jorganwa.
100. As stated earlier, due to destruction ofREO road at Maujma
and creation of a new river at Rampur Lahi during the flood, such
situations were created that provided a good base for a study
pertaining to disaster and logistics. 101. Since, I belong to
Bihar; I had an advantage of understanding the vernacular
languages, culture, customs and practices of the region. This
became an important point of consideration for giving preference to
Kosi floods over other recent floods in other parts of the
country.MVC camp and the Singheshwar Mega Camp were selected for
the case study because people of Rampur Lahi, who took refuge in
camps, stayed in either of the two camps.
After selecting the study area, next task involved selection
respondents from Humanitarian logisticians who were involved in
Kosi disaster response. At first it was proposed to select the
respondent both from NGOs and Governmental organization. After the
initial study various NGOs which worked at Rampur Lahi were
selected. However, it was later discovered that these NGOs worked
at different timeframes for brief periods and would have possibly
faced different challenges altogether because the dynamic nature of
the then situation. On the other hand, government worked right from
the beginning with various departments and their presence was
expected uniformly which can be stretched on a temporal platform.
Hence the study focuses only on governmental departments.
In order to get proper representation from various regions within
the village, and in order to equally capture different situations
that emerged within the village, it was stratified on the following
basis:-
- On the basis of administrative boundaries. (This classification helped in wardwise representation)
102. On the basis of severity of affected areas. This was
further sub classifiedinto:- 103. Area with access to safe route
104. Area with limited access to safe route but having
accessibility 105. Area with no access to safe route neither safe
location. 106. This classification and subclassifications helped in
considering the severity of the situation in relation to the
different situations in which the people were placed in.On the
basis of this the village, Rampur Lahi was divided into the
following categories (see figure 05):-
- Ward no 01 and 02 -Least affected areas.
107. Ward no 03, 04, 05 and 06 Moderately affected areas with
access to safe route. ( exception some parts of ward no 05 and 06
had limited access to safer route) Shown with red boundary 108.
Ward no 07, 08 and 09 Moderately affected areas with limited access
to safe route but with access to safe location. Shown with blue
boundary 109. Ward no10, 11 and 12- severely affected areas with no
access to either safe route or safe location. Shown with yellow
boundaryFig 05 Sketch of Rampur Lahi, Stratification for
Sampling
Figure 06 PRA being conducted in Ward no 01.Source: SEEDS India;
2010, Photograph by Animesh Prakash
Figure 07 Group discussion being conducted at ward no 12.Source:
SEEDS India; 2010, Photograph by Ankit Jaiswal
On the basis of this stratification:-
Ward no 01 and 02 were excluded from the sample as relatively these
were the least affected regions with only knee deepinundation. Most
sof the people were not compelled to evacuate by the forces of
water.
Thus, I could arrive at the final region from where the respondents
were interviewed. This is defined below:-
- Ward No. 03, 04, 05 and 06
110. Most of the areas in these wards lay between the MVC canal
and the Bariyahi Dhar. Which is the new river, that was created in
the floods. This river intersects the village into approximately
two equal halves and it has a north south gradient. This region had
three strongly built pukka houses which were used as a safer
temporary shelter. These houses were 111. Rajendra Yadavs house
112. Panchayat Bhawan 113. Trisum BhawanMVC embankment which became
the site for large ad hoc settlement during the flood is also next
to this region.
- Ward No 07, 08 and 09.
As a new river suddenly swelled, intersecting the village into
two halves, people of this region found themselves trapped between
two rivers Bariyahi Dhar and the Jogiya Chahi river. For them it
was difficult to escape but most of them had access to safe place
i.e., Chhoti Nahar (small canal embankment) which passes through
this region.
- Ward No.10, 11 and 12
This was a severely affected region with neither the safe route
nor the safer location. People were trapped between two rivers and
chhoti nahar embankment was at some distance. People of mahariji
tola, ward no 12 were so badly trapped that they had to
precariously cross two mighty rivers in order to reach a safer
location. People had no alternative, but to build long bamboo
platforms in order to escape drowning. Respondents were selected
from this area and were classified into the following
category:-
- Respondents who stayed in Singheshwar Mega Camp
1-a) Respondents who lost atleast one family member during the
flood
1-b) Respondents who did not experience any death in family during
the flood
- Respondents who stayed in MVC ad hoc settlement.
2-a) Respondents who lost atleast one family member during the
flood
2-b) Respondents who did not experience any death in family during
the flood
Sample Size
The total population of Rampur Lahi village is 10,500 people.
During initial visit group discussions were conducted. Villagers
reported that 20 people amongst those who lived in MVC camp died
within three months of the flood. Governments record were silent on
this aspect as data was not maintained. Singheshwar Mega Camp
incharge stated that it is extremely difficult to maintain such
records at this highly crowded ad hoc settlement where every day
hundreds of people came in and left and there was no systematic
registration mechanism.
After the pilot study, 20 no. of deaths from Rampur lahi was
considered as the base on which sample was developed. Asample size
of 14 respondents from Rampur Lahi was proposed. Out of these the
14, 07 respondent should be from MVC camp and the rest from the
Singheshwar Mega Camp. Atleast 40% of 20 deaths were targeted to be
covered from each camp. The other three respondents were selected
from the families who have not experienced any death. However,
while interviewing the people from Singheshwar Mega Camp it was
realized that there has been only a one death from the camp, hence
other 06 respondents included those respondents who have not
experienced any deaths in the family during the flood.
Although 50% of the total deaths were covered through the interview
of the relatives of the victims, only 5 of them i.e., 25% were
included in the final sample as it was decided that from a sample
size of 07 from each camp not more than 04 should be from those who
have not experienced deaths in a family.
Data started showing saturation after 4th and 5th interview in
Singheshwar mega camp. In case of MVC camp data started showing
saturation after 6th and 7th interview.
Considering the vast area to be covered in the village with
physical infrastructure collapse in floods and with motorcycle
being the only mode of transport( which was difficult to arrange)
mobility was difficult.
The proposed and the final sample is listed below:-
Table01 Categorisation of RespondentRegionSample
Category1-a1-b2-a2-bProposed SampleActual SampleProposed
SampleActual SampleProposed SampleActual SampleProposed
SampleActual SampleWard No. 03,04.05 and 0601-01-01-0102Ward No.
07, 08, and 0901-01-020301-Ward No.10, 11 and
120201010601010101Total (Actual Sample)01+ 06= 0704+03=07
1-a- Respondents who have experienced death in family during the
flood while staying in the Singheshwar mega camp.
1-b -Respondents who have not experienced death in family during
the flood while staying in the Singheshwar mega camp.
2-a- Respondents who have experienced death in family during the
flood while staying in the MVC camp.
2-b- Respondents who havenot experienced death in family during the
flood while staying in the MVC camp
Please note that:-
- In sample category 1-a and 1b all the actual sample were collected from the third region only. This is because of ward no.12, only people living in ward no Maharaji Tola were evacuated with governments aid and were taken to Singheshwar Mega Camp.
114. From sample category 1-a , actual sample was only 01 as
against the intended 04. This is because there was only one death
in singheshwar mega camp from the village.Selection of
Respondents
As I was unsure of how respondents in the category 1-a and 2-a
would be distributed in the village and as the total number of
people in this category was not very large, I have adopted a
snowball sampling method for data collection. In order to avoid
collecting data from a single concentrated region, the village was
divided into three zones (as mentioned earlier). Snowball sampling
method was adopted in each of these regions. Address of the first
respondent was obtained from Mr.Nawal Kishore Yadav who was
incharge of the Singheshwar mega camp. Subsequently, respondents
were reached with the reference of the previous respondent
interviewed.
Data Collection Tools and Methods
The data collection period were divided into two stages,
i.e.,
- Initial stage of data collection and
115. Final stage of data collection.The initial stage of data
collection also being the first stage of exploration, I preferred
to have a wide view of the subject without any prior assumptions.
At this stage I collected all the information that might have some
connection with the subject of the study and maintained detailed
notes. For eg, risk perception of the people during the time time
of flood, safe routes in the villages, class segregation in the
village based on social and economic structure, indigenous
knowledge of people etc. The following tools of data collection
were used:-
- Transect walk and observation
116. Group discussions 117. PRA 118. Unstructured
InterviewsDuring my first four visits to the village, all the
places in the village were covered. Simultaneously, I also met with
the villagers and explained my purpose of visit. These
conversations were crucial as it allowed me to build rapport with
the people. This has greatly helped me later too during subsequent
data collection.People were requested to congregate at
Mukhiyasplace in ward no 01 on the 5th visit. Social Mapping was
done with them. Safe routes and locations were identified during
this process. It was followed by group discussions using a
discussion guide on the floods. People who represented different
classes, communities and wards participated equally throughout the
process.
Table02 Group discussions conducted during initial stage of data
collection.SNCommunity/Group of peopleWardsPlace of FGD01People of
Rampur LahiAll WardsWard no 0102People with physical and mental
handicapWard no 05 & 09Ward no 05 & 0903Women and old
peopleAll WardsWard no 0104People who lived at SMC during floodWard
no 12 (Maharaji Tola)Ward no 12 (Maharaji Tola)05People who
experienced death of a family member while living at MVCAll
WardsWard no 05, 06 and 08.06Sardar families living on chhoti nehar
embankment since floodsWard no 12Ad-hoc settlement on the chhoti
nehar embankment07Mushar and sardar communityAll wards except 01
& 02Ward no 05, 06, 09 and 1208Muslim CommunityWard no 12 Ward
no 12 (Maharaji Tola)09Jha and YadavAll wardsWard no 05, 06,08, 09
and 12
In subsequent visits, group discussions were conducted in each tola
of each ward of the village with an exception of Maharaji Tola of
ward no 12. As it was inaccessible due to two rivers on the way
with broken bamboo bridges on them ,this was not even safe for a
motorcycle to cross. The region was visited after two months when
the water in the rivers receded and crossing them through
motorcycles became possible. Areas, which were inaccessible during
earlier visits were covered in these visits.
During these visits, three more PRAsin ward no 09, ward no. 03 and
ward no 05 were conducted to verify the data that were collected on
the 5th visit at the mukhiyas place.
Table3 PRAs conducted during initial stage of data
collection.S.NPlace of main activitiesTarget area01 Ward No.
01Rampur Lahi02Ward No. 02Ward No. 0203Ward No. 03Ward No. 0304Ward
No. 05Ward No. 0505Ward No.09Ward No. 08,0906Ward No.12Ward No.
12
Plans for the data collection for the final stage were made after
reviewing theof data collected during the first stage.
Subsequently, tools for final stage of data collection were
designed.
In the final stage of data collection, both primary and secondary
sources of data were collected. Main stool of data collection was
personal interviews. These interviews were both structured and
unstructured. Unstructured interviews were conducted with
journalists and TV correspondents, bearing in mind that they had
extensively covered Kosi Floods and Structured interviews might
just prevent or restrict them to share certain information of
substance.Other governmental officials were interviewed through
structured interview schedule at their offices.
Respondents from villages were also interviewed. Questions were
mostly open ended.
Each person was individually interviewed at home at a time
convenient to his/ her schedule. Interviews generally lasted from
30 to 90 minutes.
All of these questions were easily understood by the people.
However, some questions like question no 08 in set of questions
intended for respondents from singheshwar mega camp needed
additional explanation. These questions were asked either in hindi
or in the local language. Knowledge of the local language added to
the advantage of the researcher in conveying and receiving correct
messages.
Secondary Sources of data were mainly gathered from the district
information officer at the Madhepura Collectorate. He also gave
references of websites from where related information could be
retrieved.
The Scope and Limitations of the Study:- The study focuses only on
floods. Although during other natural disasters like earthquake and
landslide , similar problems might be faced, it is outside the
scope of the study. It can be a prospective research area to test
the findings of this study in context of other disaster.
Only governmental supply chain and governmental officials of
various departments taking up the role of humanitarian logisticians
are considered. Non Governmental Organizations and its logistics
fall outside the scope of the study primarily because different
NGOs kept coming in the region at different time and went out after
the intended intervention during their brief stay. Due to the
extremely dynamic situation after the floods and magnitude of the
challenge the time of the study is limited to the first three
months after the floods.
CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Comparison between Humanitarian and Commercial Supply Chain
In last few decades, level of comfort has tremendously increased
atleast in some fragments of the settlements, particularly the
urban settlements. Our daily Ration, cooked and ready to eat food,
clothes, medicines, luxury items like jewelry, car, T.V.,
refrigerator, you name them and you will find them in a store near
you, in most of the cases, at walking distance. If you dont feel
like walking upto the store, just make a phone call and the desired
product will be delivered at your place within no time. Captions
like, delivery in 30 minutes or free must have caught your
attention. All these comforts which we experience today is result
of years of research and innovations that has gone into commercial
supply chain.
However, many a times certain adverse conditions significantly
reduce the outreach of an existing supply chain. This adversities
can arise from situations like man made or natural disasters or a
massive accident blocking communication routes, or political
decisions like impositions of sanctions etc. Under such a situation
where the reach of the existing commercial supply chains is limited
to such an extent thatlife and well being of people is threatened,
role of Humanitarian Supply Chain becomes significant.
In a massive flood, a man is marooned on a tree for several days
and an agency brings the commodities essential for his survival at
that place itself. But just like him, there are several thousands
of people stranded at various places with absolute needs for basic
commodities. Non fulfillment of these requirement would make it
difficult for them to survive. This gives an idea about how
important could be the operations of Humanitarian supply chain. It
also explains the basic differences between a commercial and a
humanitarian supply chain. Where commercial supply chain generally
operates under normal conditions, the humanitarian supply chain
faces challenging conditions like collapsed infrastructure, lack of
information etc.
Inspite of this, unlike its commercial counterpart, Humanitarian
logistics is starved of research studies. The field of humanitarian
logistics is relatively new with significant research only having
begun to be undertaken within the last five years. (Maspero and
Ittman, 2008). Beamon (2003) differentiated commercial supply chain
and humanitarian relief chain on the basis of 07 criteria, i.e.,
Demand pattern, lead time, Distribution network configuration,
inventory control, information system, strategic goals and
performance measurement system.
Definitions of the factors listed by Beamon in the table 04 is
listed below:-
Demand Pattern is the pattern of a particular good or service that
a consumer/ group of consumer want at a given time.
Lead Time is the amount of time between the placing of an order and
the receipt of the goods ordered.
Distribution Network is the network of intermediaries between the
producer of goods and or services and the final user.
Inventory control is the supervision of supply and storage and
accessibility of items in order to insure an adequate supply and
storage and accessibility of items in order to ensure an adequate
supply without excessive oversupply.
Information System is a system consisting of network of all
communication channels used within an organisation.
Strategic Goal is the overall goal of an organisation in terms of
its market position in the medium or the long term.
Performance measurement system is a set of a measureable criteria
and methodology to enable performance to be measured
objectively.
Table02, Difference between Commercial and Humanitarian Supply
Chain (Beamon, 2004, quoted from Maspero and Ittman, 2008)
Table 4 Differences between Commercial and Humanitarian Supply
Chain, Beamon, 2003
In the above table Beamon has highlighted crucial differences
between commercial and the humanitarian supply chain. A careful
examination of the table suggests that basic differences between
the two primarily exist because they operate under different
conditions and in different circumstances.
The major and perhaps the most important difference between
Humanitarian relief chain and commercial supply chain is the
different strategic goals they desire to achieve. A commercial
supply chain aims at providing high quality products at low cost to
maximize profitability and achieve higher customer satisfaction.
However, humanitarian relief chain aims at minimizing loss of life
and alleviating sufferings (Thomas, 2003). In order to achieve,
this strategic goal, a relief chain has to respond in approximately
zero lead time. As lead time increases, so the chances of deaths
and sufferings also increase. Hence, it is required to respond to
the most urgent demands of the affected community within no
time.
Unlike commercial supply chain, humanitarian relief chain which
normally operates in response to a crisis situation or a disaster
does not have the advantage of proper demand predictability. This
is because demand is generated from sudden random events which
themselves are unpredictable in terms of timing, location, type and
size. Demand requirement can be estimated only on the basis rapid
damage assessments or needs analysis. There is every possibility
that outcomes of these rapid assessments would give highly inflated
or deflated figures or would altogether omit some important
immediate demands of the affected community. As a result,
misleading demand pattern could lead to inappropriate
intervention.
A well defined information flow, as in commercial supply chain, can
possibly guide the respondents to establish correct demand pattern.
However, establishment of proper information system is itself
jeopardized in a post disaster situation, due to massive
destruction of the community infrastructure.
All these factors make timely dissemination of relief in the
affected community, an extremely difficult task. Due to lack of
information flow, proper demand pattern is not established. As a
result, delivering appropriate aid in close to zero lead time
becomes extremely difficult. An alternative solution to this
problem can be rooted to better preparedness. Establishing large
inventories as preparedness towards disaster response might lead to
timely and improved aid delivery. Although the strategy involves
high costs, considering the stakes involved, the expenses may be
considered necessary. Determining inventory levels based on the
demand, demand locations and lead times are some of the problems
that are expected to emerge while planning for proper disaster
preparedness.
Beamon and Balcik (2008) have made comparison between For-profit
supply chain and humanitarian relief chain They have stated broad
differences between the two supply chains on the basis of strategic
goals, demand characteristics and customer characteristics.
Strategic Goals:- As put in by Ballon (2004, p 35-37), three prime
objectives for firms logistics strategy are: (a) Cost reduction,
(b) Capital reduction and (c) Service improvement. Based on this,
the strategic objective of a commercial supply chain system is
producing profit and high quality goods or services corresponding
to customer goals or values.
The Humanitarian relief chain operates with ultimate goal of saving
lives and reducing human sufferings. NGOs, however, have two major
bottom lines: Mission effectiveness and financial sustainability
(Moore, 2000, Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001). Although, cost is
common consideration in both the supply chains, it is slightly
lower on a priority in a relief chain when compared to time. Van
Wassenhove (2006) points out, the pressure of time in the relief
chain is not a question of money but a difference between life and
death.
Demand Characteristics: Demand in a commercial chain are products
and services. In a relief chain demands are supplies (aid) and
people (Beamon, 2003). More prominent variations are seen in demand
patterns. Commercial chain has a predictable and relatively stable
demand pattern, whereas, demand pattern in relief chain is highly
unpredictable. This is because, demand is generated suddenly due to
random events like a disaster. Information regarding location, type
or size of disaster or demand requirements and its volume are not
known very clearly.
Beamon and Balcik (2008), have also described the unique
characteristic of the order fulfillment process for the relief
chain responding to quick onset emergency. Following factors make
process different than that in a commercial chain:-
Zero Lead Time: Disaster strikes usually without warnings and
creates sudden demands. The lead time, ie, the time between the
moment disaster strikes and the time supplies reaches should be
close to zero.
Transportation unreliabity: Uncertainity in demand location,
damages incurred to infrastructure and various other dynamic
factors that emerges after a disaster makes it to establish
reliable transportation routes for relief distribution.
Pricing: As disaster creates abnormal demands, suppliers are lured
to raise their prices in response. For most non commodity
commercial industries pricing is relatively static over reasonable
time horizon (Beamon, Balcik, 2008).
Customer Characteristics:-There are significant differences between
commercial chain customers and aid recipients.Unlike the commercial
chain, the aid recipient does not have the luxury of market choice
for supply (relief supplies). Thus, the aid recipient operates in
an unregulated monopoly, where the stakes associated with supplies
are often life or death (Beamon, Balcik, 2008).
Another significant problem in the field of humanitarian relief
chain is determining a well defined distribution network system. As
a disaster creates sudden and unpredictable conditions and timely
information on the location, type and size of events, state of
existing infrastructure are not known, the task of distribution of
aid is perhaps the most difficult one in a humanitarian relief
chain.
Distribution Network Designs
From the discussions over differences between the two supply chains
in the previous section, some of the factors that emerged time and
again, indicated, how challenging could be the task of establishing
a distribution network in a humanitarian supply chain. Maspero and
Ittmann have quoted Beamon in their paper, The rise of humanitarian
Logistics, that Distribution network configuration in a relief
chain is challenging due to the nature of the unknowns (Locations,
type and size of events, politics and culture) and last mile
considerations.
The importance of a proper distribution network in relief chain was
emphasized by Balcik and Beamons statement that, The stakes
associated with relief supplies are often life or death. Inspite of
this there are very few studies published in the field of
distribution network in humanitarian relief chain. Anna Nagurney
and Qiang Patrick Qiang in their book, Fragile Networks:
Identifying vulnerabilities and synergies in an uncertain world
describes methodological approaches that both capture and measure
network vulnerabilities and performance. This book formalizes
concept of network robustness, an important aspect associated with
network vulnerabilities.
Anna Naguerney et al, in their paper titled supply chain network
models for humanitarian logistics: Identifying synergies and
vulnerabilities, have spoken about the benefits of integration of
multiple supply chains for two organisations.
Ali Ekici et al, in their paper, Modeling influenza pandemic and
strategies for food distribution, attempts to comprehend,
geographically, the spread of diseases and construct a food
distribution network.
Each of these papers have made a significant contribution in the
field of network in supply chain. However, unlike the commercial
supply chain, Humanitarian relief chain still lack studies that
directly deals with distribution network models. The focus of this
research is to analyse the existing Distribution network models in
a commercial supply chain and to construct a distribution network
model for the relief chain by adapting the merits of commercial
chain that can be workable in uncertain conditions under which a
relief chain operates.
Role of distribution in a post disaster situation
The word Distribution in a humanitarian supply chain, ideally
refers to the steps taken to move and store relief goods and
services from a donors end to the beneficiaries end.
Section 2 (d) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 defines disaster
as a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area
arising from natural or man made causes, or by accident or
negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human
suffering or damage to, and destruction of property, or damage to,
or degradation of environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude
as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the
affected area.
Going by this definition of a disaster, it is apparently clear that
the community hit by the disaster is incapable of coping up with
its impact. In order to mitigate its impact, the community largely
relies on help from external agencies. Furthermore, the definition
also highlights that a disaster leads to loss of life and property.
Hence, the significance of distribution of relief goods and
services can be understood by the fact that:
- The local community hit by a disaster requires help from external agencies to cope up with its impact.
119. Proper and timely distribution of relief goods and services
can prevent further loss of lives and property and can bring
respite to the affected community.Examples from the recent
disasters in India clearly indicate the significance of a proper
relief distribution in a post disaster situation. In Kosi floods of
2008, approximately 1300 people from Maharaji tola in Rampur Lahi,
were trapped between two flooding rivers. With no safe location to
hide, they prepared several bamboo platforms and stayed on it for
as long as 90 days. They had no access to safe drinking water,
food, sanitation or medical facilities. By the first week, the
little food stock they had (maize, sattu, choora etc) had been
consumed. Majority of them were sick and needed medical attention.
Governments aid arrived after 10 days. People were given the much
needed bottled water, food packages and medicines. Most of them
(800 people) were eventually evacuated in a phased manner.
In another example from cloudburst and flashflood of August 2010 in
Leh district, 1431 houses were either completely destroyed or
received substantial damages (Damage Assessment Report;
TATA-LAHDC). Leh district has a very harsh climate. In winter, the
temperature goes as low as -30 degree centigrade. In an immediate
relief and response work, 12 various organisations provided
temporary shelters (camps, tents and huts) to the affected
community. Around 35 various governmental and nongovernmental
organisation were engaged in distribution of blankets and beddings
to these affected people.
In both the cases, various organisations responded quickly to the
immediate needs of the affected communities. Distribution of relief
goods like food medicines, blankets etc during a disaster response
is a significant but neglected area of planning and in order to
prevent secondary threat and bring down further fatalities.
Factors affecting distribution network designs
In this section, broader goals in a commercial supply chain are
identified. Further, cost and service factors which determines
adoptions of distribution network designs keeping in mind the
broader goals of a firm is dealt with. This section provides a
platform to study that how the similar factors from the commercial
supply chain, when operational in humanitarian relief chain is
prioritized and subsequently on the basis of this prioritization a
distribution network design is adopted in a humanitarian relief
chain. After discussing the broader goals, service and cost factors
in commercial supply chain, the same factors are studied in respect
of humanitarian supply chain. The various distribution network
designs as present in the existing commercial supply chains are
then evaluated on the similar parameters to determine an
appropriate distribution network design, in the last mile and
immediately after the floods (as the study is centered in the last
mile and during the first three months). This section, thus provide
the basis on which the analysis of governments distribution process
during first three months of Kosi floods, is done in the later
sections of the study.
Factors affecting distribution network designs
Performance of distribution network is evaluated broadly along two
dimensions:-
- Customer needs that are met
120. Cost of meeting customer needs.These broad goals, guides a
company to adopt a distribution network design which in turn also
determines the strategies for, the inventories, transportations,
facilities and handling and information.
Structure of a distribution network also influences key service
factors which are essential to achieve better customer services and
ensure customer satisfaction. Some of these factors are:
- Response Time
121. Product Variety 122. Product Availability 123. Customer
Experience 124. Order Visibility 125. ReturnabilityApart from these
service factors, there are four main cost factors, which are also
considered as the main drivers in a supply chain. These factors
are:
- Inventories
126. Transportation 127. Facilities and handling and 128.
InformationDistribution network designs are adopted in such a way
that it affects the above stated factors (cost and services) to
achieve its strategic goals. In a commercial supply chain,
companies driven by profitability, decides on adopting a
distribution network design that would decrease its cost and
increase its revenues. In humanitarian supply chain, service
factors like Response time, product availability etc are
prioritized before cost factors while determining distribution
network designs.
Response Time is the time between placing an order and receiving
the delivery.Product Variety is the different number of products
that a distribution network has to offer.Product Availability is
the probability of having a product in stock when order arrives.
Customer experience includes the ease with which a customer can
place and receive their order. The ability to track the order from
placement to delivery is order visibility and the ability to return
unsatisfactory merchandise is the returnability.
Same factors when operate in a relief chain behave differently.
Some of these differences have been elaborately dealt with, in
earlier sections. The reasons for emergence of these differences
are discussed below:
- Strategic Goals :- The ultimate goal of a relief chain is to save lives and reduce human sufferings. The stakes ofsupplies, in a relief chain are human life and health.
129. Uncertainties:-As discussed in earlier sections, relief
chain operates in an extremely uncertain environment. The demand
uncertainties pertaining to location, type and various demands
great flexibilities in a relief chain.Slack (1991), Beamon and
Balcik (2008) have emphasized on the importance of flexibility in a
relief chain. They have discussed, the following, three
flexibilities in their respective works:-
- Volume Flexibility (ability to respond to different magnitudes of disasters): Volume flexibility allows an organisation to respond to different magnitudes of disaster, with a wider range of relief in less response time. Beamon and Balcik defines volume flexibility as the number of tier I supplies (individual units) an organisation can provide during the critical time period for relief, ie, the time during which the greatest number of lives is lost.
130. Delivery Flexibility (time to respond to disasters): Beamon
(2008) defines delivery flexibility as the minimum response time,
which is the elapsed time between the onset of disaster and the
arrival time of the organisations first supplies to the disasters
site. 131. Mix Flexibility: Mix flexibility for the relief chain is
the ability of an organisation to provide different types of items
during a particular period.Hence, from above discussion, it becomes
apparent that unlike distribution network in supply chain whose
performance is measured on the basis of customer needs and costs
involved, distribution network in relief chain should be evaluated
on the following parameters:-
- Beneficiaries needs that are met.
132. The Time in which these needs are met. 133. Beneficiaries
covered/Leftout by the distribution network or in other words, the
reach of the distribution network.As the basic differences in a
distribution network designs in a supply chain and a relief chain
are so evident, it is also expected that key factors in a
distribution network design will also be prioritized differently in
the two supply chains. The key factors in a distribution design, as
discussed earlier are, Response time, product variety, product
availability, customer experience, order visibility, and
returnability. The order in which these factors are prioritized in
a relief chain are as discussed as under:-
- Response Time: As stakes in a relief chain is human life and health, response time is a very crucial factor. Critical time period for relief is the time during which the greatest number of lives is lost. Efficiency of relief chain in the critical time period plays a significant role in bringing down the total death toll. In 2010, Leh flashflood, Major Neetu singh, of 740 TPT workshop, 7014 EME battalion, reported that their unit responded to the disaster within 10 minutes and saved 89 lives from a place, 3 kms away from Phyang village. Damage assessment report of the district authorities lists 248 dead and 76 people missing from the whole district. (www.ladakhflood.org). Thus, with a very quick response to the disaster, the unit has saved lives equal to 36% of the total deaths. This explains how crucial, response time in a relief chain can be.
134. Product Availability: Product availability is probability
of having a product in stock when the demand arises. Due to,
disasters being extremely random and uncertain events, to maintain
the product availability for the affected area and population is
rather challenging (as location, type and volume is uncertain), It
requires a great deal of preparedness and planning. 135. The
repercussions of not having the product availability can be huge.
As procuring and arranging all the goods after a disaster has
struck, would lead to increase in the response time which might
result in increase of losses of life and property. 136. Product
Variety: Product Variety is different number of products that a
distribution network offers. In response to a disaster, a variety
of products are required to be supplied in the affected area. This
could range from ready to eat foods, bottled water, a variety of
medicines, hygiene kits, tents, blankets, clothing etc. Group
discussions conducted in Rampur Lahi, Madhepura revealed that Post
Kosi flood, people taking rescue on MVC embankment survived on
Khichdi (dal and rice cooked together) which was served once a day,
for a month. 137. Customer Experience: Beamon (2008) states that
aid recipient does not have the luxury of market choice for supply.
Thus, the aid recipient operates in an unregulated monopoly, where
the stakes associated with supplies are often life or death.
Hilhorst (2002) have raised the concern that as there is no formal
contract between NGOs and recipients may not have effective
mechanisms for representation and often lack recourse to appeal, if
their expectations are not met. All this, however, does not mean
that customer experience is not important or does not have a
significant part to play in success of a relief chain. A section
ahead, deals with a case study which shows that how peoples refusal
to accept bad relief goods have resulted in clogging of warehouses,
railway godowns etc. Allthough, most of the relief goods are
distributed for free, dignity of the beneficiaries should not be
hurt at any cost. It is essential to ensure the beneficiaries
satisfaction while distributing the goods to them. 138.
Returnability: Returnability of relief goods which were dispatched
with intentions of free distribution, would mean additional costs
involved. In cases of NGOs returnability, which signifies failure
of projects, might also have a negative impact on its functions in
future projects as well. NGOs, which have two major bottom lines:
mission effectiveness and financial sustainability (Moore, 2000;
Lindenberg and Bryant 2001, p 218) would rather prefer to dump
these goods on site rather than to return it to the source. Its
repercussions could be clogging of the relief chain facilities,
which would mean additional pressure on it. 139. Order Visibility:
Order visibility is a characteristics of commercial supply chain.
Its practicality in a humanitarian relief chain can be put to
fierce debate. However, obtaining some sort of visibility in a
relief chain can be significant particularly in the last mile
distribution. For eg, visibility about date, time and place of
arrival of medical assistance would help needy people to congregate
at one place, thereby, making it easier for relief operations as
well. However, it might come up with additional disadvantages as
well. Like there can be chances of pilferages, looting or
threatening socially vulnerable groups and preventing them to
collect relief.Of the six factors, due to the reasons cited above,
response time is of extreme priority as the stakes involved with it
are human life and health. Product availability and product variety
comes next, respectively. These two factors are essentially
important as it deals with meeting up with the basic needs of the
affected communities. Customer experience, with which, are
associated the important issues of human rights and dignity, comes
next and returnability and order visibility which can be questioned
on the basis of its practicality and implications inspite of its
significance are placed down in the order of priority.
Hence, the order of priority which determines the importance of the
various factors in a relief chain are as under:-
- Response Time
140. Product Availability 141. Product Variety 142. Customer
Experience 143. Returnability 144. Order VisibilityThis sequence in
priority of the above listed factors will be utilized to analyse
the merits of the commercial distribution network designs and to
adopt some of these merits in the distribution framework for the
humanitarian relief chain, which will be discussed in the later
sections. Next section deals with the analysis of distribution
network designs as propounded by Peter Meindl and Sunil
Chopra
Distribution Network Designs in a Supply Chain.
Meindl and Chopra, in their paper, Designing the delivery network
for a supply chain, have discussed six distinct distribution
network designs that can be adopted in a commercial supply chain
management. These six network designs are:-
- Manufacturer Storage with direct shipping
145. Manufacturer Storage with direct shipping and In Transit
merge. 146. Distributor Storage with package Carrier delivery 147.
Distributor Storage withlast mile delivery 148.
Manufacturer/Distributor Storage with customer pick up 149. Retail
Storage with customer pick upAuthors have used several factors for
the evaluation of the performance of these network designs. These
factors are categorized broadly into:-
- Cost Factor
150. Inventory 151. Transportation 152. Facilities and Handling
153. Information 154. Service Factor 155. Response Time 156.
Product Availability 157. Product Variety 158. Customer Experience
159. Returnability 160. Order VisibilityManufacturer Storage with
direct shipping
In this distribution network design, a product is delivered
directly from the manufacturer to the customer location. The design
either bypasses retailers or restricts their role to the
information flow only. All the inventories are stored at
manufacturers end. Retailer does not hold any inventories.
Diagrammatic representation is as under:-
Fig:08 Manufacturer Storage with direct shipping
Merits
- Inventory: This design allows a manufacturer to centralize inventories at his end. A manufacturer can aggregate demand across all retailers, as a result, a high level of product availability is maintained with lower level of inventory.
161. Facilities and Handling: The design allows a supply chain
to save on the fixed cost of facilities. This is because, all the
inventories are centralized at the manufacturers end. Manufacturer
also saves on additional warehouses as aggregation of inventories
at Manufacturers end eliminates the need of additional warehousing
space. 162. As the retailer is eliminated from the product flow,
some costs on handling is also saved. However if a manufacturer is
incapable to develop single unit delivery, it can have significant
negative impact on handling cost and response time. 163. Product
Variety: The design allows a manufacturer to maintain a high level
of product variety to its customer. Drop shipping model allows a
customer to choose from any of the products, a manufacturer
produces, as all of these products are aggregated at manufacturers
end. 164. Product Availability: Retailers does not hold any
inventory. All the products are aggregated and stocked at
manufacturers end. This allows a manufacturer to maintain a high
level of available product 165. Customer Satisfaction: In terms of
delivery of goods, customer satisfaction is usually good. However,
difficulty in handling returns might lead to customer
dissatisfaction. Demerits
- Transportation: Outbound transportation costs (costs incurred in sending material out of a facility) are high because of the average outbound distance to the end consumer is large.
166. Information: A retailer forms an important link, between
the manufacturer and customer. As the retailer does not hold any
inventory, a strong information mechanism is required to
disseminate correctinformation about the product availability to
the customers and demands to the manufacturer. 167. Response Time:
Due to the increased outbound distances, response time is usually
high. 168. Order Visibility: It is very important and at the same
time very difficult to ensure order visibility. Order tracking is
difficult as requires complete integration of information system at
both the retailer and the manufacturer. 169. Returnability:
Returnability is expensive under this design as it would require
establishment of additional set ups by the retailers or a product
can be directly returned by the customer which would involve high
transportation and coordination costs.Manufacturer Storage with
direct shipping and In Transit merge
One of the disadvantages of a drop shipping is that an end customer
might get several small packages from various manufacturer
directly, as products are send directly from manufacturers to the
customers. Manufacturer storage with intransit merge combines
pieces of the order coming from different locations so that the
customer gets a single delivery. The design is illustrated
below:
- Fig09 Manufacturer Storage with direct shipping and In Transit merge
Cost involved in In-transit merge is slightly higher than drop
shipping as, although transportation cost is dropped due to
reduction in outbound distance but investment required for setting
up facilities for handling and information makes the total cost go
up.
Service factors remain similar to that of drop shipping except that
this model provides better customer satisfaction as it facilitates
merging of several packages so that customer gets a single
delivery.
Distributor Storage with package Carrier delivery
Under this design inventory is held, not by manufacturers but by
the distributors/retailers in intermediate warehouses. In order to
Transport products from the intermediate location to the final
customer packaged carriers are used. The following diagram depicts
the Distributor storage with package carrier delivery, distribution
network:
- Fig 10Distributor Storage with package Carrier delivery
170. Merits 171. Cost Factor 172. Transportation: Transportation
cost is less than the cost involved in manufacturer storage
designs. Intermediate warehouse decreases the outbound distance.
Although, inbound distance is increased, more economic mode of
transportation can be employed for inbound shipments. Hence the
overall transportation cost goes down. 173. Information: A less
complex information infrastructure is required as compared to the
manufacturer storage, as the ware house serves as the buffer
between the manufacturer and the customer.Service Factor
- Response Time: As compared to the Manufacturer storage designs, response time in this design is less. This is because the intermediate warehouses, which are located closer to the customer, reduce the outbound distance.
174. Customer Experience: The design allows achieving better
customer satisfaction as it facilitates single delivery in less
response time. 175. Order Visibility: As a single shipment reaches
the customer from the warehouse, involving one stage of the supply
chain, the design offers better order visibility. 176. Order
Returnability:An intermediate warehouse ensures better
returnability as compared to the manufacturer storage as order
returnability can be processed using this facilityMerits
- Inventory: Due to setting up of intermediate warehousing facilities, aggregation of demand is uncertain. The cost of maintaining inventories at the intermediate warehouses is more than storage at manufacturers end.
177. Facilities and Handling: Facilities and Handling cost is
also high as compared to the manufacturer designs as this design
prevents aggregation of products at one place. 178. Product
Availability: In order to maintain the same level of availability
as the manufacturer storage a higher cost would be required in this
distribution network design. The design also offers less product
variety as compared to the other two designs.Distributor storage
with last mile delivery
Distributor storage with last mile delivery is a distribution
network designed with intentions of delivering the products to a
customers doorsteps. As the transportation cost involved is bound
to high, more warehouses are required to be located in such a way
that they are much closer to the customers. As a result
infrastructural cost is also high in this design.
Fig 11Distributor storage with last mile delivery
Merits and Demerits
This design performs, extremely good on service factors. However,
better customer service comes at a higher cost. As the warehouses
are setup closer to the customers, response time is very less. The
design requires huge infrastructural setup and maintenance cost.
Product availability requires heavy expenditure and product variety
is also less as compared to distributor storage with package
carrier delivery.
Manufacturer/Distributor Storage with customer pick up
- In this design, inventory is stored at the manufacturer or distributors warehouse, but a customer has to come to a designated place to pick up their orders placed through internet, phone or any other medium.The figure represented below shows the functions in this distribution network design:-
179. Fig 12 Manufacturer/Distributor Storage with customer pick up 180. This network requires higher response time. However, if a product is stored at pick up sites response time is substantially reduced. Transportati