Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues

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This article was downloaded by: [Newcastle University] On: 19 December 2014, At: 10:17 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK International Journal of Water Resources Development Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijw20 Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues Surjit S. Bhalla & Arindom Mookerjee Published online: 21 Jul 2010. To cite this article: Surjit S. Bhalla & Arindom Mookerjee (2001) Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 17:1, 89-98, DOI: 10.1080/713672558 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713672558 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access

Transcript of Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues

Page 1: Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues

This article was downloaded by: [Newcastle University]On: 19 December 2014, At: 10:17Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journalof Water ResourcesDevelopmentPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijw20

Big Dam Development: Facts,Figures and Pending IssuesSurjit S. Bhalla & Arindom MookerjeePublished online: 21 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Surjit S. Bhalla & Arindom Mookerjee (2001) Big DamDevelopment: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues, International Journal of WaterResources Development, 17:1, 89-98, DOI: 10.1080/713672558

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713672558

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access

Page 2: Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and Pending Issues

and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Water Resources Development, Vol. 17, No. 1, 89–98, 2001

Big Dam Development: Facts, Figures and PendingIssues

SURJIT S. BHALLA & ARINDOM MOOKERJEE

Oxus Research & Investments, B-189, Greater Kailash—I, New Delhi, India

ABSTRACT This paper traces the genesis of the con�ict in the Narmada Valley,narrowing down the focus of the debate to the actual numbers displaced. It lays out theclaims and counterclaims of all parties involved: the Government, NBA, and inter-national funding agencies such as the World Bank. It provides ample alternatives tothose existing numbers culminating in an economic estimation of the actual number ofpeople displaced and, hence, the actual magnitude of human costs involved. The bene�tsobtained from big dams in India since independence are reviewed, the internal rate ofreturn, and the policy implications resulting from the establishment of a correct measureof costs and bene�ts.

Introduction

At the heart of most developmental projects lie primary objectives of povertyalleviation, improvement in the standard of living of the people, achievingef�ciency in the supply-side management of a scarce resource given the demandfor it, ensuring �nancial viability and ecological sustainability. The Narmadariver �ows through one of the poorest regions in India where shortage of cleandrinking water is endemic. Subsistence farming has already deforested existingwatersheds. The states of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh that will be served bythe Narmada development are without adequate water and electrical supply.Further there are fundamental forward linkages in terms of employment gener-ation among the rural poor.

All of this is to be assessed against the backdrop of considerable costs—both�nancial and human—that go into the conception, formulation and completionof the project. It is this element of ‘human’ costs and the potential rate of returnon investments in big dams that are the focus of this paper.

The macro aspects of the costs and bene�ts of big dams are a well-researchedtopic and the debate inevitably boils down to the internal rate of return on theriver valley project juxtaposed with the magnitude of the human costs asmeasured by the sheer number of people displaced, and the �nancial burden ofresettling those displaced. This paper attempts to arrive at an economic estimateof the number of people displaced as a result of construction of big dams inIndia and to compute the returns generated by investments in such projects.

Not that there is any dearth of these estimates. They range from 145 millionto 50 million, re�ecting varying strands of ideological exaggerations, politicalaf�liations and moral thoughts. The study investigates the correctness and

0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 On-line/01/010089–10 Ó 2001 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/07900620120025079

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robustness of these claims and tries to establish a �gure closer to 3–4 million asthe actual, economically sensible number of people displaced in India. It alsocarries out a case study of 87 Indian dams and their effects on irrigation andagricultural productivity to compute an internal rate of return in excess of 9%that is better by far than any public service units (PSUs) the government isholding on to.

Narmada Project

The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, which was set up in 1969 for con�ictresolution between the states bene�ting from the Narmada Valley Project (NVP),submitted its report in 1978. Only after that did �nancial allocation and work onthe project begin. At about the same time the �rst registered protest occurred inNimar.

Throughout the 1980s the protests were sustained and streamlined by variousNGOs and social workers. In particular the work of Arch Vahini and theNarmada Bachao Andolan (NBA, Medha Patkar) deserves mention. What isnoteworthy here is that the Arch Vahini, which was active in the villages ofGujarat, started its campaign with total opposition to the dam but has subse-quently, through the course of its struggle, veered round to the view that theGujarat government will ful�l its promises regarding land compensation andreforestation. The NBA has taken the opposite route. Beginning with a construc-tive approach towards the construction of dams, they now demand a completestop to all dam-building activities.

What were the issues related to the construction of the Narmada dam? Hereone must emphasize that the greater issues are by no means peculiar to theconstruction of a ‘big’ dam of 85 m across the Narmada river—these issues havecropped up and have been dealt with anywhere in the world where theconstruction of a river valley project has been envisioned. However, the greaterproblems—of acute shortage of water and power supply—are very much afeature of the region. In fact the project was conceived precisely to solve theproblem of the parched areas and promote industrialization!

The typical problem areas are those of ecological imbalances, strained sociopo-litical equations and changed economic content of life and livelihood. Alteredecology of the impounded water and changed stream characteristics wouldendanger ecological sustainability by leading to deforestation and resultant lossof wildlife and vegetation, development of biomass etc. The fear of submergencehas caused considerable concerns among tribals and women in particular withregard to their social relations.

Finally the central question of displacement and relocation. The opposition todams stems primarily from the economic issue of livelihood, private property andsurvival. The greater the number of people displaced, the greater the burden ofresettlement. Hence the greater the human costs, and, by extension, the morepotent the argument against big dams. It must be borne in mind that the issueof people directly displaced as a consequence of the construction of the dam isdifferent from those affected by the construction of dam infrastructure, irrigationcanals, compensatory afforestation, secondary displacement and so on. The latteris a much larger group and the project-affected are treated differently than theimmediate human costs of those displaced directly in any study.

The NBA viewpoint has been given a �llip by celebrity writer Arundhati

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Roy’s explosive booklet entitled The Greater Common Good. That was when thewhole issue was sensationalized and its scale changed beyond the logical limitsof economic sense. The focus of the debate changed and the actual number ofpeople displaced and the contribution of big dams to the national economy andwell-being of its people became ‘the’ central issues. Nothing much was saidabout the ecological viability and environmental impact analysis of the NVP, nowords of sympathy for estranged social relations but very wrong conclusionsabout big dams. Overnight, the canvas of issues changed and narrowed downto:1. Big dams are not, and have never been, productive in the economic sense.

They do not contribute much to agricultural growth or poverty reduction.Irrigation from big dams has contributed only 12% of the total produce.

2. The government violated the democratic rights of the displaced by notseeking their permission before the project was implemented.

3. The number of persons displaced by big dams is huge. Indeed. Ms Roy’sconservative estimate is 30 to 40 million, but the round �gure of 50 million isconsistently preferred by her.

The displacement story is big and along with the bene�ts of big dams forms thecentrepiece of this paper. Any assessment of the bene�ts of big dams mustconfront the human costs of displacing 50 million people. If the true displace-ment number were 3 million or even 10 million, it would not carry the sameweight, the same human costs. It is critical that the number displaced becorrectly assessed.

The government estimate of the people displaced by the Sardar SarovarProject is 40 000 while the NBA says this is about 415 000. Between these twoextremes is the ‘objective’ Morse Commission Report which suggests that100 000 is a conservative estimate and that the likely number displaced is about150 000. Only by estimating an average displaced �gure per dam can anassessment of the total displaced by the 3300 dams in India be made.

The IIPA Study

The Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) undertook a study of 54dams and concluded that the average number displaced per dam was 44 182. Forthe 3300 dams in India, the total displaced is therefore 44 182 times 3300 or 145million. This means that there have been close to 3 million people displacedannually for 50 years continuously. In other words, every fourth Indian today isa dam-displaced person or her descendant.

TGCG Estimate

In The Greater Common Good (TGCG), writer Arundhuti Roy has worked out herown estimate. While she feels that the IIPA estimate of 145 million is too large,she takes an average dam displacement �gure of 10 000 people. This yields 33million displaced. An unof�cial �gure quoted by N.C. Saxena, Secretary to thePlanning Commission, is quoted: “in the region of 50 million (of which 40million were displaced by dams)”. So the �gure is either 33 or 40 million, whichis conveniently rounded off to an explosive 50 million estimate. This means thatevery tenth rural person (one in every two rural families) belongs to thedisplaced.

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Alternative Estimates

Having looked at some of the estimates of the number of people displaced as aresult of construction of dams in India, let us derive some alternative estimatesfrom other sources of data available.

The World Bank Study

The World Bank (1996) carried out a survey of all projects (dams, power,transport etc.) involving resettlement. There were 146 such projects worldwide.Since displacement data are provided per project, a per dam estimate is hard tocome by. There were 58 projects in the ‘central gravity’ of the distribution—1000to 10 000—and each such project displaced an average of 4189 persons. If thesame displacement estimate is applied to each of India’s 3300 dams (an exagger-ated assumption), then one obtains a ‘maximum’ estimate of about 14 million.

IMBD Study

The International Rivers Network, an anti-dam organization, provides the onlyestimates available of people displaced exclusively by dams. They state that thereare more than 40 000 big dams and the total displaced worldwide is between 30and 60 million. If 45 million is assumed to be representative, then an averagedam displaces 1125 people. For India’s 3300 big dams, that is 3.7 million.

CWC Data

The Central Water Commission (CWC) reports on displacement for each damthrough its Project Completion Reports and such estimates are easily availablefor at least 87 (mostly) very large dams. These data can be used to estimate moreaccurately the number of people displaced by big dams. The data reveal that theaverage number of persons displaced by a dam whose height is 15 m or above(84 of the 87 in the sample) is 19 425. For dams of 25 m or above (71 of the 87in sample) the �gure is 22 349.

So the easy way is to impute this average on the 3300 dams in India to obtainthe total displacement �gure. It is the easy way but the wrong way. The averageso obtained has to be adjusted. Using the unadjusted average is like taking theaverage of the incomes of the 84 or 71 richest women in India and thenmultiplying by 1 billion to arrive at India’s GDP.

Data on 87 dams contains information on the number displaced, the damheight, the submergence area and the gross storage area. A simple model is usedto predict the numbers displaced in each project. According to this model, thenumber of people displaced is a function of:

· height of the dam (larger dams displace more people);· submergence area (the wider the expanse of area submerged, the more people

displaced);· storage area (more storage area would mean fewer displaced).

The model is estimated in logarithmic terms with no constants (Table 1). Thereare 73 observations in the sample and the dependent variable is the log ofdisplacement.

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Table 1. Model for the prediction of displacement numbers

Independent variables Coeff. Std. Error t-stat.

Log ofSubmergence area 1.37 0.29 4.74Height of the dam 2.03 0.26 7.98Storage 2 0.67 0.30 2 2.28

Adjusted R2 for the model 0.61

The model shows that the elasticity estimates are non-linear in nature. Thenumber of people displaced is very sensitive to the actual height of the dam.Every increase of the height of the dam by 1 m leads to an increase in thenumber of people displaced by a factor of 2. Storage capacity has the expectednegative sign. The more water that is stored in the reservoir, the less thedisplacement number.

These rich data can be used to derive a reasonably accurate assessment of thepeople displaced by dams in different height categories. For those in the sample,where the total displacement of 87 of the largest dams is 1.6 m, the model haspredicted 1.55 m when the predicted displacement of each dam was calculated.

One can make further analysis of the averages in each category. The regressionequation is used to predict the number of people displaced. Table 2 lists theaverages.

Let us take an example. Overall, our model estimates will be:

l( no. displaced) 5 {2.03 * (l(dam ht.)) 1 1.37 * (l(submergence area))–0.67 *(l(storage))}

5 {2.03 * l(53.1) 1 1.37 * l(95.5)—0.67 * l(1457.7)}

5 {2.03 * 3.97 1 1.37 * 4.56 — 0.67* 7.28}

5 9.43

Hence, the average number of people displaced by a dam of height 53.1 m

5 exp (9.43)5 12436.89

Typically, a dam of 15 m and above is taken as a big dam. The average for thecategory 15–25 m works out, by a similar process, to 1072 persons per dam.

But what about the Sardar Sarovar Project? The height of the dam is assumedto be one that was originally planned. This is important, as the substantial

Table 2. Averages from the Central Water Commission data

Average dam height Average submergence Average storageRange (m) area (km2) capacity (MCM)

, 15 m 12.7 21.8 34.615–20m 16.7 8.8 38.215–25m 20.1 15.0 67.6Overall 53.1 95.5 1457.7

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Table 3. Sardar Sarovar Project—key statistics

Height of the dam 125 mSubmergence area 375.9 km2

Storage capacity 9500 MCMNo. of people actually displaced 127 446No. of people predicted to be displaced 128 588

Note: The �rst four �gures are obtained from the Central WaterCommission data and the �fth, the predicted number of people,is derived from the model described above.

content of the agitation against the construction of the dam relates to its height.Let us look at the possible �gure for the number of persons displaced had thedam height been allowed to stay as it was �rst conceived. Table 3 gives theSardar Sarovar Project (SSP) statistics.

The model not only predicts a �gure for the number of people likely to bedisplaced almost exactly matching the CWC �gure, but predicts this assuminga height of 125 m.

Economic Method of Calculating the Dam Displaced

Here the assumption is that number of people uprooted is directly proportionalto the amount of money spent on irrigation projects. The SSP is taken as anexample. The irrigation (dam and canal) component of the SSP is slated to costRs 8125 crore (1 crore 5 10 million) in 1999 prices. If it is assumed that the SSPdisplaced 150 000 people (Morse Report) then each Rs 1000 crores of expenditureon irrigation displaces 18 500 people. Since 1947, the total expenditure on ‘majorand medium’ irrigation projects has been to the tune of 185 000 crores. Byassuming that all of this went on the construction of dams, an upper boundestimate of people displaced may be obtained.

More people are displaced by larger dams that cost more. The smaller thedam, the lower the cost, the fewer the number of people displaced. So, thearithmetic is as follows:

Rs 8125 crs on SSP displaces 150 000 peopleHence, 185 000 crs in 3300 dams displaces {(185000/8125)*150000} people

5 3.4 million people

The striking result is the similarity of the two results obtained from the IMBDand the economic method—both agreeing that the total number of peopledisplaced as a result of the construction of 3300 dams in India is in the vicinityof 3.4 to 3.7 million.

Bene�ts of Large Dams

Having established that the human costs of displacement are considerably lowerthan projected, one needs to assess the true bene�ts from the construction ofthese dams. The bene�ts come in many hues: in the generation of electricity,provision of drinking water and irrigation. For this paper, we shall concentrateon the last one. How much have big dams helped in improving agriculturalproductivity and, in value terms, what has been the internal rate of return?

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Since there are no of�cial statistical data giving the breakdown of agriculturalproduction under irrigated or rainfed conditions, the World Bank report on theirrigation sector in India may be cited to assess the contribution of irrigatedagriculture. “Various estimates point to a contribution from irrigated agricultureto overall agricultural production of about two-thirds, and under some estimatesan even higher contribution” (World Bank, 1998b, p. 2). These estimates weremade on the basis of nationwide data on areas, yields and output for eightprincipal crops (four major food crops and four major non-food crops) whichtogether account for over 70% of the total gross cropped area.

Total irrigation expenditure (on both major and medium forms of irrigation—the former includes big dams, the latter does not) since independence hastotalled 187 000 crores (1999 prices). Total agricultural output in 1998–99 wasclose to 500 000 crores. A 12% share (a statistic quoted by Ms Roy) means 60 000crores. By de�nition, the contribution of big dams to total production prior to theconstruction of 3300 dams was miniscule. These numbers can be used tocalculate the internal rate of return (IRR) on big dams. Depending on theassumptions one makes for how much of the total investment for irrigation isinvestment for big dams (whether 100% or 75%) and depreciation rates (3–5%),one obtains IRRs in the range of 3 to 9%.

To compute the IRR, it is assumed that, being a capital-intensive project, theentire duration of the exercise will be 20 years. The rate of growth of agriculturaloutput is assumed at 3% per anum while the rate of interest at which marketborrowings take place is 8%. Thus for year 0, the initial out�ow is (187) 1 (8%of 187) or 201.96 crores. For the second year, the incremental in�ows are to thetune of 15.04 crores. This is arrived at by subtracting the interest cost (14.96)from the increased agricultural output of 30.90 (30 is the level of output in the�rst year). This process is iterated for 20 years and the IRR computed on thebasis of incremental in�ows. The results are presented in Table 4.

The use of irrigation as a tool for poverty alleviation cannot be overempha-sized. Between 1964 and 1994, the national average price of rice and wheat—thestaple Indian food—declined by 2.2% and 3.3% respectively in real terms. Datashows that in places like Punjab and Haryana that have over 70% of croppedarea under irrigation, the incidence of poverty is just 10%. However, in thosedistricts with less than 10% of cropped area under irrigation, the povertyincidence is 69%. Not only have irrigation facilities helped bring more areasunder cultivation, they have resulted in signi�cant productivity enhancements—besides making the Indian farmers less dependent on the monsoons.

Policy Implications

The success of big dams in generating a return in the range of 9% 1 has seriousimplications for the government’s privatization programmes. None of the otherwings of government enterprise, including those involved with infrastructuredevelopment, has been able to produce such a performance.

However, graver concerns relate to the appropriate pricing of water as ascarce resource. This calls for prudent management of ‘effective demand’ forwater on one hand and streamlining the supply of the same on the other. Sinceurbanization is seen as a natural consequence of higher growth and more rapidindustrialization, there are limited opportunities to impact on the demand side

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Table 4. Calculating the internal rate of return

Cash-�ow period Flows Agricultural output Interest cost

cf0 2 201.96 – 14.96cf1 15.04 30.00 14.96cf2 15.94 30.90 14.96cf3 16.87 31.83 14.96cf4 17.82 32.78 14.96cf5 18.81 33.77 14.96cf6 19.82 34.78 14.96cf7 20.86 35.82 14.96cf8 21.94 36.90 14.96cf9 23.04 38.00 14.96cf10 24.18 39.14 14.96cf11 25.36 40.32 14.96cf12 26.57 41.53 14.96cf13 27.81 42.77 14.96cf14 29.10 44.06 14.96cf15 30.42 45.38 14.96cf16 31.78 46.74 14.96cf17 33.18 48.14 14.96cf18 34.63 49.59 14.96cf19 36.11 51.07 14.96cf20 37.65 52.61 14.96IRR 0.09

of the resource. The three primary uses of dam water are in industrialization,irrigation and residential demand for clean water.

Though industry uses much less water than irrigation, it has historicallytended to be more pro�igate with its use. Its severity is enhanced by the fact thata lot of untreated industrial wastes make both ground- and surface water un�tfor consumption. There is a case here for allowing industries to develop privatewater systems. There is a much more potent case for irrigation where waterrequirements are greater. Irrigation is responsible for 83% of consumptive wateruse in India. To be effective, therefore, any reforms must target this sector. Astudy by Sandra Postel (1993) of the Worldwatch Institute has concluded thatraising irrigation ef�ciencies by just 10% would save enough water to supplyindustrial needs and all global residential water uses.

However, even with all these changes, the scope for better management ofdemand is limited. A very high proportion of the supply is lost through leaks.The World Bank has found that unaccounted-for water (water that is producedbut not paid for because of leaks or ‘administrative losses’) averaged 35% of totalsupply. Better operation and maintenance of the system is called for: repairingcanals, levelling �elds to ensure even water distribution, matching reservoirreleases to actual downstream needs.

Experience shows us, however, that these issues remain mere rhetoric andthe only way to pave the way for better water management is to recognize themarket for water and establish conditions for its uninterrupted functioning. Thecrux of the problem is that the users pay far too little for service. The averagecost of the water produced by water-supply projects �nanced by the World Bankin the period 1966–81 was about US$1.29 per 1000 gallons (1 gallon 5 3.8 litres).The average tariff was about US$0.69 per 1000 gallons. Since the average level

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of unaccounted for water was about 35%, the effective price was about US$0.45per 1000 gallons—about a third that of producing water.

The most crucial element in any water conservation exercise is appropriatedesign of tariffs. A simple economic principle—progressive water charges—should be followed. Clearly, water for irrigation and water for gardening is notthe same—nor should they be charged for at the same rate. The tariffs shoulduse marginal costing to re�ect actual costs of the resource and that of producingit. The pressing case for social subsidies in water is hard to justify given that itsmain use is in industries, or irrigation (rich farmers and not landless peasants)and household activities.

Contrary to the ideal situation, where the cost is recovered from the users, in1993–94 such revenues accounted for less than 1% of total state receipts andwere equivalent to only10% of the states’ revenue expenditures in irrigation. InFebruary 1997, Punjab went so far as to write off all charges for water and powerfor irrigation! So much for the recommendations of the Vaidyanathan Com-mittee on the pricing of irrigation water.

Conclusions

Some of the big conclusions about big dams are:

· Big dams are productive. They have contributed signi�cantly towards agricul-tural growth and poverty reduction.

· Big dams represent one of the most productive of government investments,recording an internal rate of return in excess of 9%—much more than any PSUreturns it has been able to garner!

· The key element in the movement against big dams—the ‘human costs’—areactually considerably lower than activists or ideologically driven celebritieswould have us believe. By all accounts, the number of people displaced bydams in India has been in the region of 3–4 million and not the outlandish 50million that is quoted in support of the activists.

· The question of resettlement of those uprooted remains. But the magnitude ofthe problem is at once reduced and seems manageable.

· The larger issues and policy implications must not be lost sight of amidst thefrenzy of opposition. These issues relate to the creation of water markets, fairpricing of water as a resource and sound environmental management of thedam and resettlement sites. Only by letting the free hand of the marketoperate shall we ever be able to design appropriate tariffs and aid conser-vation.

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Information Agency).Morse, B. & Berger, T. (1992) Sardar Sarovar: The Report of the Independent Review (Ottawa, Resource

Futures International (RFI)).Ojha, R.K. (1989) Environmental impact of Narmada Valley: Government of India Guidelines and

Safeguards, Folklore (June).Postel, S. (1993) The politics of water, World Watch, 6(4), July–August.Roy, A. (1999a) The Greater Common Good, �rst published in Outlook, and then released as a booklet

by India Book Distributors.Roy, A. (1999b) In which Mr Bhalla gets his sums wrong, Indian Express, 20 September.Times of India (1999) Do we really give a dam?, Times of India, Special Report, 8 August.Verghese, B.G. (1999) Rejoinder to ‘The Greater Common Good’, Outlook, 5 July.World Bank (1996) Resettlement and Development: The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary

Resettlement 1986–1993, Social Policy and Resettlement Division, World Bank Environment Depart-ment (Washington, DC, World Bank).

World Bank (1998a) Report on Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management, Report No.18322, Vol. 1, 27 June 27 (Washington, DC, World Bank).

World Bank (1998b) Report on the Irrigation Sector, Report No. 18416 IN, 10 September (Washington,DC, World Bank).

World Resources (1998–99) Environmental Change and Human Health (Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress).

Besides these, data and information have been sourced from:The Narmada website, www.narmda.orgInternational Rivers Network website, www.irn.orgCentral Water Commission, Government of India.

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