Biennial Budgeting: Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions
Transcript of Biennial Budgeting: Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions
Biennial Budgeting: Issues, Options, and
Congressional Actions
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
January 10, 2017
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R44732
Biennial Budgeting: Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions
Congressional Research Service
Summary Difficulties in the timely enactment of budgetary legislation have long fueled interest in the idea
that the congressional budget process could be better structured in a way that eases time
constraints. The need for consideration of budget matters in the form of concurrent resolutions on
the budget, reconciliation measures, tax measures, public debt measures, authorizations, regular
appropriations, continuing appropriations, and supplemental appropriations has been criticized as
time consuming, repetitive, and inefficient. One long-discussed reform proposal would change
the budget cycle from one to two years.
Biennial budgeting includes several variations. It may involve multiyear authorizations, two-year
budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, or some combination of the three. Most proposals
incorporate all three factors.
Biennial budgeting has a long history at the state level. Although the trend since World War II has
been for states to convert to an annual budget cycle, according to the National Conference of
State Legislatures, 19 states currently operate with a two-year cycle, and some states operate with
mixed cycles that put significant portions of their budgets on a two-year cycle.
In addition to congressional support, biennial budgeting has received support from the Reagan,
George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations.
Proponents of biennial budgeting generally contend that a two-year budget cycle would (1)
reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual review of routine matters, (2)
reserve the second session of each Congress for improved congressional oversight and program
review, and (3) allow better long-term planning at the federal, state, and local levels.
Critics of biennial budgeting have countered that the projected benefits would prove to be
illusory. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much
as 30 months in advance (rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle). This would result in less
accurate forecasts and could require Congress to choose between allowing the President greater
latitude for making budgetary adjustments in the off-years or engaging in mid-cycle corrections
to a degree that would effectively undercut any reduction in the workload or intended
improvements in planning. Opponents also point out that annual review of appropriations
requests is an important part of oversight that would be lost under a biennial budget with no
guarantee that a separate oversight session would be effective. Furthermore, they argue that
reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters may only raise the stakes
and thereby heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Types of Biennial Budgeting ........................................................................................................... 2
Multiyear Authorizations .......................................................................................................... 3 Two-Year Budget Resolutions ................................................................................................... 4 Two-Year Appropriations .......................................................................................................... 5
Arguments Favoring and Opposing Biennial Budgeting................................................................. 7
Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting ........................................................... 7 Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting ........................................................... 8
Congressional Action on Biennial Budgeting ................................................................................. 8
97th Congress ........................................................................................................................... 10
100th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 10
101st
Congress.......................................................................................................................... 10 102
nd Congress ........................................................................................................................ 10
103rd
Congress .......................................................................................................................... 11 105
th Congress .......................................................................................................................... 11
106th Congress .......................................................................................................................... 11
107th Congress .......................................................................................................................... 11
108th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 12
109th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 12
112th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 12
113th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 12
114th Congress ......................................................................................................................... 12
Biennial Budgeting in the States ................................................................................................... 12
Tables
Table 1. Last Regular Appropriations Act Date of Enactment, FY1996-FY2016 ........................... 1
Table 2. States with Annual and Biennial Budgets (2011) ............................................................ 13
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 15
Biennial Budgeting: Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions
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Introduction One of the chief congressional concerns about the budget process in recent years has been the
amount of time it requires. The current process—which provides for consideration of various
budget questions in the form of concurrent resolutions on the budget, reconciliation measures, tax
measures, public debt measures, authorizations, regular appropriations, continuing appropriations,
and supplemental appropriations—has been faulted as repetitive and inefficient. This, in turn, has
fueled interest in the idea that the congressional budget process could be better structured to
promote a more efficient use of Congress’s limited time.
Despite the perceived or actual permanence of much federal spending, the process of formulating,
enacting, and executing budgets has remained characteristically annual. This annual budget cycle
poses a dilemma for Congress. On the one hand, annual review of spending legislation can afford
Congress the opportunity to maximize its influence concerning the operation of various programs
and policies. On the other hand, many Members have expressed concern with the high percentage
of congressional workload that is devoted to budgetary matters.1
An annual budget cycle, however, is dependent on the timely enactment of budgetary legislation.
Consideration of individual pieces of budgetary legislation is often closely linked to consideration
of other pieces, so that delays in consideration of one measure may have an impact on the timing
of consideration of all subsequent budgetary legislation. In recent years, final action on
appropriations measures has occurred an average of 106 days after the start of the fiscal year on
October 1 (see Table 1). The result has often been frustration with the budget process and a desire
to reduce the number or frequency of budget measures that need to be considered.
The budget process has sometimes been criticized as unnecessarily repetitive as well, with some
questions being debated in various forms several times each year. Defense policy, for example,
may be debated in terms of its priority in the context of the overall budget in the budget
resolution, in terms of policy and planning in an authorization measure, and in terms of funding
levels in an appropriations bill, only to have the entire process repeated the next year. Although
not every program is addressed in all three aspects every year, critics contend that repetition
prevents efficient consideration and contributes to the overall complexity of the budget process,
as well as to inefficiency and delay.
Table 1. Last Regular Appropriations Act Date of Enactment, FY1996-FY2016
Fiscal Year Public Law Date of Enactment Days Late
FY1996 P.L. 104-134 April 26, 1996 208
FY1997 P.L. 104-208 September 30, 1996 0
FY1998 P.L. 105-118
P.L. 105-119 November 26, 1997 57
FY1999 P.L. 105-277 October 21, 1998 21
FY2000 P.L. 106-113 November 29, 1999 60
FY2001 P.L. 106-553
P.L. 106-554 December 21, 2000 82
1 Raffaela Wakeman et al., “Vital Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress,” Brookings Institution and
American Enterprise Institute, July 9, 2013,Table 7, https://www.brookings.edu/research/vital-statistics-on-
congressdata-on-the-u-s-congress-a-joint-effort-from-brookings-and-the-american-enterprise-institute/.
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Fiscal Year Public Law Date of Enactment Days Late
FY2002
P.L. 107-115
P.L. 107-116
P.L. 107-117
January 10, 2002 102
FY2003 P.L. 108-7 February 20, 2003 143
FY2004 P.L. 108-199 January 23, 2004 115
FY2005 P.L. 108-447 December 8, 2004 69
FY2006 P.L. 109-149 December 30, 2005 91
FY2007 P.L. 110-5 February 15, 2007 138
FY2008 P.L. 110-161 December 26, 2007 87
FY2009 P.L. 111-8 March 11, 2009 162
FY2010 P.L. 111-118 December 19, 2009 80
FY2011 P.L. 112-10 April 15, 2011 197
FY2012 P.L. 112-74 December 23, 2011 84
FY2013 P.L. 113-6 March 26, 2013 177
FY2014 P.L. 113-76 January 17, 2014 109
FY2015 P.L. 114-4 March 4, 2015 155
Source: Compiled by CRS with data from the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress.
A number of possible reforms, such as automatic continuing resolutions, joint budget resolutions,
or merging the authorization and appropriations processes—have been advanced, at least in part,
in the hope that they could make the budget process operate in a more timely fashion. For
example, advocates of an automatic continuing resolution argue that it could reduce deadline
pressures in the appropriations process, those in favor of a joint budget resolution suggest that it
would promote early agreement on budget priorities between Congress and the President, and
some argue that a merged authorization-appropriations process could reduce the volume of
legislation that needs to be considered in any given session of Congress. While these proposals
have their critics, some see these and other proposed reforms as potentially making the timely
enactment of budget legislation easier and, therefore, better budgetary outcomes more likely.
Another possible approach to addressing this concern is to change the budget cycle from one year
to two years. By reducing the frequency of\ budgetary actions, and better separating their
consideration, proponents of such a reform contend that Congress would be able to undertake
each stage with more attention to detail.
Types of Biennial Budgeting Biennial budgeting as a concept has many permutations and may include any of the following: a
requirement for multiyear authorizations, two-year budget resolutions, and two-year
appropriations. Biennial appropriations may refer to all appropriations being enacted for a two-
year period, all appropriations being enacted for two succeeding one-year periods in a single
measure, or even a system under which some appropriations are enacted for either a two-year
period or two one-year periods in each year of a two-year cycle. These components may be
adopted individually or in concert and may be applied under a variety of schedules. Because of
this, biennial budgeting may have different meanings for different people.
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Multiyear Authorizations
Many biennial budgeting proposals require that all authorizations be enacted for periods longer
than one fiscal year. Under current practice, many authorizations are already enacted for
multiyear periods. The chief exceptions to this are the Department of Defense and Intelligence
authorizations, which are considered annually. Most proposals also divide action so that
authorizations are scheduled to be considered in the second year of each Congress, separate from
consideration of regular appropriations measures. One proposed benefit of multi-year
authorizations is that the authorizations could be in place before the appropriations process
begins, providing for a smoother working relationship between authorizers and appropriators.2
One chief concern regarding a multiyear authorization requirement is that unless supported by
biennial appropriations, they may lack the degree of certainty required to achieve the promised
benefits of long-range planning.
Although the requirement for multiyear authorizations is often advanced as a relatively minor
aspect of a biennial budgeting, such a system could have major repercussions with regard to those
specific issue areas where it would have impact. For example, Congress has operated under the
presumption that the Defense and Intelligence authorizations are sensitive to myriad foreign
policy issues and that these need to be addressed every year.
An experiment with two-year authorizations for the Department of Defense in the 1980s proved
unsuccessful. This failure has been partly attributed to the fact that the experiment was not part of
a comprehensive move to biennial budgeting and was not supported by two-year appropriations,
but another contributing factor was that it was overtaken by other budgetary decisions. The deficit
reduction concerns that led to a late 1987 budget summit between Congress and President Reagan
also effectively required the second year of the two-year authorization to be amended extensively.
Given this experience, support for two-year defense authorizations waned.3
As proposed in S. 92 and H.R. 3586 (106th Congress), biennial budgeting would establish a
“budget year” and an “authorization/oversight year” for each Congress. This proposed division
could augment the separation of authorizations and appropriations currently embodied in House
and Senate rules, and it could enhance the perceived difference between authorizations and
appropriations that some Members feel has been weakened in recent decades.4 By adjusting
reauthorization periods so that most major authorizations could be scheduled for the second year
of a Congress, floor time for the consideration of authorizations would not be in competition with
appropriations. However, the result could instead be an erosion of the separation between
authorizations and appropriations. Without opportunity to consider authorizing legislation in the
first year of a Congress, Members may use appropriations bills as legislative vehicles to revise
policy questions immediately through appropriations bills rather than have to wait for the second
authorization/oversight session.
2 Representative William H. Natcher testified in 1993 that requiring multiyear authorizations, to be enacted the year
before appropriations measures, would serve the Congress well. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of
Congress, Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. William H. Natcher, hearing, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., March 11, 1993
(Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 5. 3 David C. Morrison, “Two at a Time,” National Journal, vol. 21, no. 35 (September 2, 1989), p. 2172; and Robert J.
Art, “The Pentagon: The Case for Biennial Budgeting,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 104, no. 2 (summer 1989), pp.
193-214. 4 As illustrated by testimony on budget process reform on several occasions in recent years. One example is the
extensive testimony before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1992.
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The use of appropriations bills to include authorizing language or bypassing the need for separate
authorizing language altogether could become a significant concern if it becomes desirable to
consider policy questions in the first year of a Congress. This, in turn, could undercut the intent of
creating separate sessions dedicated to different purposes. For example, changes in the
international climate could require a reassessment of priorities for defense or foreign operations
spending, or changes in the economy could spur the need for a reevaluation of domestic policies
without respect to whether it was the first or second year of a Congress. The incentive could be
especially great when an election signals a dramatic shift in national priorities and lawmakers
want to address those issues in policy terms rather that solely as matters of funding, as the Reagan
Administration did in 1981, the Clinton Administration did in 1993, or House Republicans did in
1995 with the Contract With America.
Two-Year Budget Resolutions
Since the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act in 1974, the budget process has centered
around the concurrent resolution on the budget, which sets aggregate budget policies and
functional priorities for Congress. The budget resolution is used to coordinate the various
budgetary actions that are to be taken over the course of a session of Congress. Proposals to
convert the budget process to a two-year cycle likewise typically involve a process centered
around a two-year budget resolution.
Although the budget process is characteristically annual, there are a number of aspects that
encourage Congress to look beyond a single fiscal year. In particular, Section 301(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act currently requires that the budget resolution include binding figures for
the upcoming fiscal year plus planning levels for at least each of the four ensuing fiscal years. In
recent years, budget resolutions have typically included planning levels beyond the minimum
number required by the Congressional Budget Act. For example, the budget resolution for
FY2016 (S.Con.Res. 11, 114th Congress) included planning levels through FY2025. The Budget
Act also provides for the enforcement of the five-year totals for revenues and direct spending and
allows multiyear reconciliation instructions. In addition, the Senate’s Pay-As-You-Go point of
order (Section 201(a) of S.Con.Res. 21, 110th Congress, the FY2008 budget resolution) prohibits
the consideration of revenue or direct spending legislation that would increase or cause an on-
budget deficit for the period of the current fiscal year and the five ensuing fiscal years or the
period of the current fiscal year and the 10 ensuing fiscal years.5
Proponents of biennial budget resolutions suggest that both Congress and the President would
benefit by extending the binding levels to two years, adopting the broad outlines of fiscal policy
only once each Congress. As Joseph White of the Brookings Institution stated in testimony before
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1993, “Annual fights about priorities
between the same Congress and President do nobody any good.”6 Additionally, Congress has
been unable to adopt a budget resolution in a number of years and has had to use some other
means to coordinate and enforce budgetary actions in those years.7 Proponents of a two-year
budget resolution argue that this recent experience demonstrates that it is not necessary to adopt a
5 For more on the PAYGO point of order, see CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement Procedures: The Senate
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr. 6 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Budget Process: Testimony of Hon. Anthony
Beilenson and a Panel of Experts, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1993 (Washington,: GPO, 1993), p. 82. 7 See CRS Report R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution, by
Megan S. Lynch.
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budget resolution every year and that a two-year budget resolution would better reflect current
practice.
Opponents, however, contend that by allowing Congress the opportunity to participate in setting
fiscal policy, budget resolutions have served a useful purpose and that the inability to adopt a
budget resolution has been a portent of further budgetary battles throughout the year rather than
an indication that Congress is still in agreement on the policies that were adopted in the previous
year. They further contend that while fiscal policy can be set for two-year periods, it is potentially
subject to considerable uncertainty and that eliminating an opportunity to either alter or confirm
current policy makes the process weaker.
According to supporters, the experience with presidential-congressional budget summits—
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s but most recently embodied in the Bipartisan Budget Act of
20158—has demonstrated the effectiveness of establishing a multiyear framework for the budget.
Notably, the 1987 agreement between Congress and the Reagan Administration, the 1990
agreement with the Bush Administration, the 1993 and 1997 agreements with the Clinton
Administration, and the Budget Control Act of 20119 have all been built around the projected
future impact of a long-term budget plan. Subsequent budget resolutions, and budget
implementing legislation, have generally adhered to these agreements. By institutionalizing this
arrangement, advocates of biennial budgeting hope to duplicate its perceived success.
Some opponents, and some proponents of biennial budgeting as well, argue that the lessons to be
learned from successful executive-congressional summits are somewhat narrower. Opponents
suggest that while these occasional summits have proved useful in the context of facilitating the
following year’s budget process, it would not be possible to institutionalize the process. They
suggest that the political and budgetary context that brings Congress and the President to the
bargaining table is also necessary to ensure a commitment to implementing the outcome. Some
proponents feel that a biennial budget resolution should be adopted only within the context of an
overall move to a two-year cycle. Without biennial implementation, they argue, a biennial budget
resolution would not present sufficient certainty for long-term planning, significant savings in
congressional workload, or additional time for oversight.
Two-Year Appropriations
The most controversial aspect of biennial budgeting proposals is, arguably, a two-year cycle for
appropriations. Most proposals would require all regular appropriations measures to be
considered in the first year of each Congress either for a single two-year fiscal period or for two
one-year periods. In both cases Congress would not need to act on appropriations during the
second year of each Congress—except for emergency and other supplemental appropriations
needs. In at least one case, a modified form of this proposal has contemplated the consideration of
an annual defense appropriation measure and half of the remaining appropriation as two-year
measures in each of the two years of a Congress.10
Some proposals in the past have opted for a
timetable that would simply stretch out the current one so that while the appropriations process
could begin in the first session of a Congress, the fiscal biennium would not begin until October 1
of the second year. This would give Congress and the President a period of 20 months, rather than
the current eight months, to negotiate appropriations details. Under such proposals, Congress
8 P.L. 114-74. 9 P.L. 112-25. 10 S. 385, 114th Congress.
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would still not need to act on appropriations in the off year except for emergency or supplemental
appropriations.
Most proponents of biennial budgeting contend that two-year appropriations are an essential part
of any biennial budgeting system. In their view, it is primarily the annual nature of the current
appropriations process that produces the strain on the current system. They assert that a major
benefit of biennial appropriations would be that during the two years for each Congress, there
would be a year in which routine appropriations actions could be avoided. Although emergency
and other supplemental appropriations actions might be necessary in the off year, they believe
that the net effect of this change would still be a reduction of congressional workload and would
free up enough time for Congress to conduct more meaningful program reviews. For the
executive branch, as well as for state and local governments, biennial appropriations would be
beneficial, they argue, because they would provide sufficient certainty to allow for better long-
term planning. Finally, proponents also suggest that reducing the number of times in which
Congress and the President must confront each other over budget priorities would allow for better
overall comity between the two branches.
Current practice already includes limited use of a number of the devices proposed as part of a
biennial budgeting system. For example, appropriations currently provide for both advance
appropriations to become available in future fiscal years and budget authority available for
periods of longer than a single fiscal year for a number of programs. In the view of opponents,
however, making these practices mandatory for all programs will not result in greater benefits.
They contend that routine appropriations do not cause conflict and delays in the budget process,
so widening these practices to mandate their use for all programs every other year would not
result in any significant improvements in the process. Conflict and delay occur because of a lack
of consensus on non-routine matters, either within Congress or between Congress and the
President. Attempting to resolve these issues for two years at a time, they assert, would simply
raise the stakes and thereby heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay. In addition,
they argue that it is the impending start of the fiscal year on October 1 and the anticipation of a
new budget submission by the President the following February that force action. Without these
deadlines, it is possible that it could take the full two years for Congress and the President to
produce a budget, making projections of a year devoted to oversight less likely.
Critics of two-year appropriations also point out that budget forecasts are prone to error and that
with a total budget of approximately $3.5 trillion in FY2016, even small errors in terms of
percentage can result in significant errors in terms of dollars of revenues or expenditures.
Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30
months in advance (rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle). Even if routine appropriations
could be considered every other year, with only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions,
critics argue that a two-year cycle would inevitably result in incorrect funding decisions. Whether
the result was to provide too much or too little funding for individual programs, it could
necessitate Congress choosing between allowing the President greater latitude for making
budgetary adjustments in the off years or for Congress itself to engage in mid-cycle corrections to
a degree that would nullify any anticipated time savings or planning advantages.
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Arguments Favoring and Opposing Biennial
Budgeting
Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting
Supporters of biennial budgeting generally contend that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce
congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual consideration of routine or repetitious
matters, (2) allow Congress to reserve time to promote improved oversight and program review
and (3) allow better long-term planning by agencies, at the federal, state, and local levels.11
Advocates assert that reducing the number of times that Congress has to consider budget
questions would allow more time for agency and program oversight. By effectively dividing each
Congress into a budget year and an authorization/oversight year, a two-year cycle might reduce
competition for Members’ time and attention and allow for more effective use of authorizations to
establish policy. Congress would not have to resort to appropriating in the absence of a current
authorization as often, since the authorizations would not be crowded out of the congressional
schedule by appropriations questions. Another anticipated benefit is that executive branch
agencies, relieved of the need to develop and defend budget proposals as frequently, could better
manage federal programs.
One of the chief arguments of proponents of biennial budgeting is that it increases certainty about
the level of future funding and thus, allows better long-range planning by federal agencies and by
state and local governments. The Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush
Administrations expressed support for biennial budgeting.12
The 1993 report of the National
Performance Review (the Gore Commission) noted, “Considerable time could be saved—and
used more effectively—in both the executive and legislative branches of government if budgets
and appropriations were moved to a biennial cycle.”13
The Clinton Administration’s final budget
submission in 2000 reiterated its support for biennial budgeting.14
The George W. Bush
Administration also included support for biennial budgeting (as well as other budget process
reforms) in the President’s annual budget submission to Congress. For example, the FY2004
budget stated that
a biennial budget would allow lawmakers to devote more time every other year to
ensuring that taxpayers’ money is spent wisely and efficiently. In addition, Government
11 See, for example, “Biennial Budgeting: Better Value for Taxpayers” available at http://www.thirdway.org/report/
biennial-budgeting-better-value-for-taxpayers. 12 Unlike his predecessors, President Obama did not express a formal position on biennial budgeting. In September
2010, however, at his Senate confirmation hearing, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director-designate Jacob
Lew stated that the “annual budget process gives us precious little time to focus on program implementation, both in
the executive branch and in the legislative branch” but also that “there are many challenges to biennial budgeting.” See
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget, Nomination of the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, of New York, to be
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, hearing and executive business meeting, 111th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 16, 2010, S.Hrg. 111-737 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 24-25. 13 U.S. Office of the Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Mission-Driven,
Results-Oriented Budgeting, accompanying report of the National Performance Review (Washington: GPO, 1993), p.
59. 14 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001, Analytical Perspectives (Washington: GPO,
2000), p. 287.
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agencies would receive more stable funding, which would facilitate longer range
planning and improved fiscal management.15
Supporters point to the multiyear nature of the budget summit agreements between Congress and
the President that have been a major part of the budget process for several decades as evidence of
the efficacy of multiyear budgeting and as a major factor in recent years for promoting more
efficient consideration of budgetary legislation.
Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting
Critics of biennial budgeting have countered with several arguments as to why some of the
projected benefits could prove to be illusory or insufficient to overcome the disadvantages.16
Reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters, they suggest, may only
raise the stakes and thereby heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay. In addition,
enacting a budget resolution and spending legislation every other year could reduce congressional
workload or aid longer-term planning only in the second year of the cycle. Even that benefit may
not accrue without accurate budget projections. Making accurate projections of revenues and
expenditures is always difficult, and because a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30
months in advance (rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle), biennial budgets would be more
susceptible to error. Less accurate forecasting, they argue, could result in providing either too
much or too little money for individual programs, and some fear that this would increase the need
for supplemental appropriations or other adjustments that would effectively undercut any
intended improvements in planning.
With only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions, critics argue that a two-year cycle could
require Congress to choose between allowing the President greater latitude for making budgetary
adjustments in the off-years or engaging in mid-cycle corrections to a degree that would nullify
any anticipated time savings or planning advantages. Furthermore, they argue that annual review
of appropriations requests is an important part of oversight that would be lost under a biennial
budget, with no guarantee that committees would take advantage of a separate oversight session
or that oversight separate from review of funding decisions would be as effective.
In addition, they contend that the institutional incentives for supporting two-year budgets can
vary based on the expected budgetary outcome. A budget plan that locks in an amount for the
second year of a biennium would draw relatively little support from program advocates in a time
of increasing budgets (because the program might receive more generous funding later) and,
alternately, would draw relatively little support from program cutters in times of decreasing
budgets (because the program would be somewhat insulated from possible later cuts). In other
words, an action to lock in future budgetary resources may draw opposition when some
decisionmakers believe that a “better” decision may be arrived at in the future.
Congressional Action on Biennial Budgeting Almost from the time the Congressional Budget Act was enacted in 1974, budget process reform
has been a topic of congressional interest, and biennial budgeting was discussed at least as far
15 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, Analytical Perspectives (Washington: GPO,
2003), p. 318. 16 See, for example, Richard Kogan, Robert Greenstein, and James R. Horney, “Biennial Budgeting: Do the Drawbacks
Outweigh the Advantages?,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 20, 2012, http://www.cbpp.org/research/
biennial-budgeting-do-the-drawbacks-outweigh-the-advantages.
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back as the 95th Congress (1977-1978).
17 Hearings on budget process reform have often included
testimony concerning biennial budgeting. In addition, on several occasions, both the House and
Senate have conducted hearings specifically on biennial budgeting.18
Survey findings19
and the
level of cosponsorship of biennial budgeting proposals have also demonstrated congressional
interest in biennial budgeting.20
In recent years, the Committees on Rules and the Budget have generally shared jurisdiction in the
House over budget process reform, and both have considered the issue of biennial budgeting. In
the Senate, the Budget Committee currently exercises jurisdiction over the budget process.21
A number of federal committees and commissions organized to study possible procedural or
structural reforms of Congress, the budget process, or both have also considered biennial
budgeting. In addition to the Gore Commission (noted previously), the National Economic
Commission22
and the Study Group on Senate Practices and Procedures (also known as the
Pearson-Ribicoff Commission, after former Senators James Pearson and Abraham Ribicoff)
recommended a form of biennial budgeting. The Pearson-Ribicoff Commission recommended
that Congress consider half of the regular appropriations bills each year.23
In 1993, both the
Senate and House members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress included
proposals for a two-year budget cycle in their recommendations to their respective chambers
(S.Rept. 103-215, vol. 1, and H.Rept. 103-413, vol. 1). In the Senate, these recommendations
were subsequently introduced as S. 1824, referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration,
and reported in 1994 (S.Rept. 103-297). It is notable that in contrast to the comprehensive
approach to biennial budgeting taken in most biennial budgeting proposals, S. 1824, as reported,
included two-year budget resolutions and multiyear authorizations but not two-year
appropriations.
Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S.
2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97th Congress). Additional action, outlined
below, occurred with respect to biennial budgeting during the 100th, 101
st, 102
nd, 103
rd, 104
th,
17 For a more detailed discussion of earlier consideration of biennial budgeting, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee
on Rules and Administration, Improving the Operation of the Legislative Branch of the Federal Government, and for
Other Purposes, report to accompany S. 1824, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Rept. 103-297 (Washington: GPO, 1994), pp.
10-14. 18 Printed hearings specifically addressing biennial budgeting include U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Operations, The Vice President’s National Performance Review—Recommending A Biennial Budget Process, hearings,
103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 7, 1993 (Washington: GPO, 1994); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, S. 261—Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, hearings, 105th Cong., 1st sess., April 23,
1997 (Washington: GPO, 1997). 19 For example, 85% of Representatives and 87.5% of Senators responding to a 1987 survey indicated that they agreed
or strongly agreed with the idea of appropriating on a two-year schedule. Congress Speaks—A Survey of the 100th
Congress (Washington: Center for Responsive Politics, 1988), pp. 34. 20 For example, Representative David Dreier introduced H.Res. 396 (106th Congress) on November 18, 1999, with 245
cosponsors, expressing the sense of the House in favor of biennial budgeting legislation. 21 Prior to the 109th Congress, the Committees on Governmental Affairs and the Budget shared jurisdiction over the
budget process under a standing order of the Senate (in effect between August 4, 1977, and January 2005). The order
provided that if one committee reported a measure, the other had 30 days to report or be discharged from further
consideration. Jurisdiction was consolidated in the Budget Committee under the terms of S.Res. 445 (108th Congress). 22 U.S. National Economic Commission, Report of the National Economic Commission (Washington: GPO, 1989), p.
11. 23 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Report of the Study Group on Senate Practices and
Procedures, committee print, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Prt. 98-242 (Washington: GPO, 1984), p. 21.
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105th, 106
th, 107
th, 108
th, 109
th, 112
th, 113
th, and 114
th Congresses. None of these proposals was
ultimately enacted.
97th Congress
S. 2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981, was introduced on January 25, 1982.
This bill would have amended the Congressional Budget Act to provide for a biennial budget
cycle. The measure was jointly referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee
on Governmental Affairs. The Committee on the Budget held hearings on the measure on
September 14, 16, 21, and 23, 1982.
100th Congress
On May 6, 1987, during consideration of S.Con.Res. 49, the budget resolution for FY1988, an
amendment (S.Amdt. 186 to S.Amdt. 174) was offered on the floor of the Senate to express the
sense of the Congress that biennial budget process should be enacted into law that year. The
amendment was tabled, 53-45.24
S. 2478, the Biennial Budget Act of 1988, was introduced on June 7, 1988. The measure was
jointly referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs.
The Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the measure on June 7, 1988. S. 2478
was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs on August 25, 1988, with amendments
(S.Rept. 100-499). No further action was taken.
101st Congress
S. 29, the Biennial Budget Act, was introduced on January 25, 1989. The measure was jointly
referred to the Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs. The
Committees on Budget and Governmental Affairs held joint hearings on the measure on October
18, 1989. S. 29 was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs on March 21, 1990
(S.Rept. 101-254). No further action was taken.
On May 4, 1989, during consideration of S.Con.Res. 30, the Senate budget resolution for
FY1990, an amendment (S.Amdt. 88) was offered on the floor of the Senate to express the sense
of the Senate that Congress should enact legislation to establish a biennial budget process. The
amendment was agreed to by a voice vote25
and was included in the Senate substitute amendment
to H.Con.Res. 106, the vehicle for the FY1990 budget resolution. This provision was ultimately
removed in conference (H.Rept. 101-50).
102nd Congress
H.R. 1889, the Budget Simplification and Reform Act of 1991, was introduced on April 17, 1991.
This budget process reform bill included provisions establishing a biennial budget. The measure
was jointly referred to Committee on Governmental Operations (and subsequently referred to the
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security) and the Committee on Rules (and
subsequently referred to the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process). The Subcommittee on the
Legislative Process held hearings on the measure on September 18 and 25, 1992.
24 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 133, part 9 (May 6, 1987), p. 11437. 25 Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 135, part 6 (May 4, 1989), p. 8234.
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103rd Congress
Following the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, H.R.
3801, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994, was introduced on February 3, 1994. This bill
included provisions establishing a biennial budget. The measure was jointly referred to the
Committees on Government Operations, House Administration, and Rules (and subsequently
referred to the Subcommittee on the Rules of the House and Subcommittee on the Legislative
Process). The Committee on House Administration held hearings on the measure on June 14, 30,
and July 14, 1994. The Subcommittee on the Rules of the House held hearings on March 9, 10,
16, 24, and April 13, 1994. The Subcommittee on Legislative Process held hearings on February
25 and March 2, 1994. No further action was taken.
S. 1824, the companion measure to H.R. 3801, was introduced on February 3, 1994. The measure
was referred to the Committee on Rules, which held hearings on February 10, 24, March 10, 17,
and April 28 (S.Hrg. 103-488). The bill was reported with an amendment on July 1, 1994 (S.Rept.
103-297). No further action was taken.
105th Congress
S. 261, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, was introduced on February 4, 1997. The
measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental
Affairs. The Committee on the Budget held a hearing on February 13, 1997. The Committee on
Governmental Affairs held a hearing on April 23, 1997 (S.Hrg. 105-138). The bill was reported
by the Committee on Governmental Affairs with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on
September 4, 1997 (S.Rept. 105-72). No further action was taken.
106th Congress
S. 92, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act, was introduced on January 19, 1999. The
measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental
Affairs. The Committees on the Budget and Governmental Affairs held a joint hearing on January
27, 1999. The bill was reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs with an amendment
in the nature of a substitute on March 10, 1999 (S.Rept. 106-12). No further action was taken.
S. 93, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1999, was introduced on January 19, 1999. This bill
included provisions providing for a biennial budget. The measure was jointly referred to the
Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs. The Committees on the
Budget and Governmental Affairs held a joint hearing on January 27, 1999. No further action was
taken.
On May 16, 2000, during consideration of H.R. 853, an amendment (H.Amdt. 708) was offered
on the floor of the House to add a new title establishing a biennial budget process. The
amendment was rejected, 201-217.26
107th Congress
H.R. 981, the Budget Responsibility and Efficiency Act of 2001, was introduced on March 13,
2001. This bill would have amended the Congressional Budget Act to provide for a biennial
budget cycle. The measure was jointly referred to the Committee on the Budget, Committee on
26 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 146, part 6 (May 16, 2000), p. 7978.
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Rules, and Committee on Government Reform. The Committee on the Budget reported the
measure with an amendment on September 5, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-200, Part I). The Committee on
Rules reported the measure with an amendment on November 14, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-200, Part 2).
No further action was taken.
108th Congress
During House consideration of H.R. 4663, the Spending Control Act of 2004, an amendment
(H.Amdt. 621) was offered that sought to replace the text of the bill with the “Family Budget
Protection Act of 2004,” a budget process reform proposal containing provisions to provide for a
biennial budget. The amendment was rejected, 88-326.27
109th Congress
S. 3521, the Stop Over Spending Act of 2006, was introduced on June 15, 2006. This bill
contained provisions providing for a biennial budget cycle. The measure was referred to the
Committee on the Budget, which reported the measure with an amendment on July 14, 2006
(S.Rept. 109-283). No further action was taken.
112th Congress
H.R. 114, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act of 2011, was introduced on January 5,
2011. The measure was jointly referred to the Committees on the Budget, Oversight and
Government Reform, and Rules (and subsequently referred to the Subcommittee on the
Legislative and Budget Process). The Subcommittee on the Legislative and Budget Process held a
hearing on January 24, 2012.
113th Congress
During Senate consideration of S.Con.Res. 8, the FY2014 budget resolution, an amendment was
offered that created a deficit-neutral reserve fund for the establishment of a biennial budget and
appropriations process (S.Amdt. 136). The amendment was adopted, 68-31.28
The resolution
passed the Senate, 50-49, but final action on resolving differences did not occur before the end of
the Congress. Additionally, the House Budget Committee reported H.R. 1869, the Biennial
Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2014, with an amendment (H.Rept. 113-382).
114th Congress
The Senate Committee on the Budget held a hearing on biennial budgeting November 4, 2015.
Biennial Budgeting in the States Perhaps because many Representatives and Senators have government experience at the state
level, state practices are often cited in deliberations on budget process reform. In particular, 19
states operate under a two-year budget cycle (see Table 2Error! Reference source not found.),
27 House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 150, part 10 (June 24, 2004), p. 14089. 28 Senate debate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 159, part 43 (March 22, 2013), p. S2282.
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and this experience has been cited by many in discussing the applicability of biennial budgeting
to the federal government.
Table 2. States with Annual and Biennial Budgets (2011)
Annual Budget with
Annual Legislative
Sessions
(31 states)
Biennial Budget with
Annual Legislative
Sessions
(15 states)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizonaa
Arkansas
Colorado
California
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansasb
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouric
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
West Virginia
Connecticut
Hawaii
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyomingd
Source: Ronald K. Snell, State Experiences with Annual and Biennial Budgeting, National Conference of State
Legislatures, April 2011, p. 3, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/state-experiences-with-annual-and-
biennial-budgeti.aspx.
Notes:
a. In Arizona, some small agencies are on a biennial cycle; the rest are on an annual cycle.
b. In Kansas, 20 agencies are on a biennial cycle; the rest are on an annual cycle.
c. In Missouri, the operating budget is on an annual basis; the capital budget is on a biennial cycle.
d. These states enact consolidated two-year budgets; all other states with biennial budgets enact two annual
budgets simultaneously.
However, the state experience does not provide any single answer concerning biennial
budgeting.29
Some states that operate under an annual cycle have significant portions of their
29 This has been the conclusion of the Government Accountability Office in a number of studies on biennial budgeting
and the states. See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Biennial Budgeting: Three States’
(continued...)
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budgets enacted on a two-year cycle. For example, Missouri enacts its operating budget on an
annual cycle but its capital budget on a biennial cycle,30
whereas Kansas budgets for some
regulatory agencies two years at a time within the overall context of an annual budget.
Conversely, some states with biennial cycles do a significant portion of their budgeting on an
annual basis. For example, Virginia and Oregon both enact a biennial budget that is routinely
amended during the session when the budget is being executed. Minnesota considers both its
operating and capital budgets on two-year cycles but in different years. As a result, examples can
be found supporting arguments for and against adopting a two-year cycle at the federal level.31
One argument of opponents of a two-year cycle has been that the trend among states has been to
shift from biennial to annual budget cycles, particularly in those states with larger populations.
This trend, opponents have suggested, demonstrates that biennial budgeting represents a way of
budgeting less applicable to modern circumstances. In support of this, they have pointed out that,
while 44 states operated with biennial budget cycles in 1940, this was because most state
legislatures at that time tended to meet every other year.32
As of 2011, with the prevalence of
annual sessions, 31 states use annual cycles, including seven of the 10 most populous states.33
However, at least three states (Hawaii in 1967, Nebraska in 1987, and Connecticut in 1991) have
switched to biennial budgeting after extended periods in which they used annual cycles, while
several others (Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) returned to biennial cycles after brief
experiments with annual budgets.
As discussed above, one of the main arguments made by opponents of biennial budgeting has
been that it would inevitably lead to greater authority for the President. Again the experience at
the state level is inconclusive. Both annual and biennial budget cycles have been coupled with
varying degrees of executive branch discretion and authority. For example, Maine, with a biennial
budget, has far stricter limits on the governor’s authority to transfer funds or cut spending
unilaterally than does South Dakota, which has an annual budget.34
The natural tension between the desire for longer planning horizons and the increasing inaccuracy
of budget projections when stretched over longer periods has not been solved at the state level.
This is because the same basic system of funding stability and incremental budget changes that
characterizes federal budgeting also operates in the state context. Few state programs are subject
to sweeping changes in any given year, regardless of the budget cycle. This suggests that both the
benefits of a longer budget cycle to improve planning and concerns related to the inadequacy of
long-term forecasts may be overstated in the context of state budgeting.
(...continued)
Experiences, GAO-01-132, October 2000, p. 6. 30 An operating budgeting accounts for day-to-day government expenditures and is typically funded with current
revenues such as taxes and short-term debt (less than one-year maturity). A capital budget accounts for capital
expenditures that are funded by a mix of long-term debt and current revenues. 31 Ronald K. Snell, “Annual vs. Biennial Budgeting: No Clear Winner,” Spectrum, vol. 68 (winter 1995), p. 23. 32 Ibid. 33 California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania all operate with annual cycles, whereas North
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas operate with biennial cycles. 34 Snell, “Annual vs. Biennial Budgeting,” p. 23.
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Author Contact Information
James V. Saturno
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
[email protected], 7-2381