Bielen ENG

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

1/22

69

Paradoxes in the Perception of Contemporary Russia

PARADOXES IN HE PERCEPION OF

CONEMPORARY RUSSIAStanisaw Biele*

Te perception o Russia in international relations is an interesting cogni-tive problem. It also has certain practical consequences. Russia is among thoseparticipants in international relations who had a strong infuence on the 20thcentury. However, its sel-assessment in this matter diers undamentally romthose o other participants in international lie.

Te way Russias image is presented in the world is an oshoot o the de-termination o its political elites. Tey express their states great power identityin international relations through the prism o neo-imperial ambitions. Tisundermines Russias credibility in the eyes o international opinion.

Te article shows how contemporary Russia is perceived through the prismo certain antinomies and paradoxes. Tese concern the sel-denition o Russiain the world, its civilizational-geopolitical identication, its relative weakness

despite being a nuclear raw materials power, its attempts to create a new stateideology (sovereign democracy) colored with imperial and nationalist senti-ments, and the need or Russia to give up on dening its vital interests in termso omnipresence in the world as this clashes with internal imperatives, whoseessence lies in economic growth and modernization. Te complexity o emerg-ing processes in Russia makes it a challenge to get to know the country betterand build objective images o it.

1. Te essence o international perception

International perception is a complex process. Te denitions o perceptionormulated under the infuence o psychologists do not adequately describe

* Stanisaw Biele is a Doctor Habil. of Political Sciences, lecturer at the Institute of International

Relations, Warsaw University; Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly Stosunki Midzynarodowe-Interna-

tional Relations.www.ism.uw.edu.pl; e-mail: [email protected]

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

2/22

70

Stanisaw Biele

it. A number o American authors pointed this out already in the mid-20thcentury. Infuenced by the eects and threats o the Cold War, they dealt withthe question o the complexity o the conditions o international perception(especially Kenneth Boulding). In the 1970s, Robert Jervis stressed the needto link international perception with the intentions and behaviors o actorson the international scene as well as decision-makers in interstate relations. Oparticular interest was his proposal postulating a link in international analysesbetween the psychological environment and the operational environment.He criticized supporters o a psychological approach to international relationsor a number o reasons: attaching more importance to emotional actors than

to cognitive ones; drawing conclusions more on the basis o laboratory experi-ments than on processes taking place in the real world; ocusing too narrowlyon decision-makers, and at the same time having an incorrect view o confictso interest within the whole structure o the system o international relations.

In the Polish literature on this subject, Jervis approach was adopted byJerzy Wiatr who clearly rejected psychological reductionism and examined thequestion o correct and incorrect perception o international relations rom asociological viewpoint. But it was Jze Kukuka who provided the most com-

prehensive interpretation o international perception in Polish political scienceliterature1.

Te prevailing view in the eld today is that perception determines not onlythe process o sensory refection o objects and phenomena in the real world,but also the nding and understanding o the sense o their existence in variousdimensions. Te essence o the process o perception leads to the orming odynamic images o objects and phenomena in the international environment.Tis process shows at the same time that there is an active cognitive relationship

between the observer and the observed reality. In an increasingly complicatedinternational reality, perception is decreasingly involuntary or spontaneous andincreasingly conscious and intentional.

Te content o the images o states in the international arena depends toa large extent on subjective conditions. An essential yet unsettling role in the

1 Kukuka J. Postrzeganie midzynarodowe [International Perception].Stosunki Midzynarodowe,

1992, vol. 16, p. 91-103; idem, Teoria stosunkw midzynarodowych [The Theory of International Re-

lations], Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2000, p. 123-132.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

3/22

71


process o international perception is played by myths and stereotypes, but alsoby mistakes in perception and attribution, inherent in human nature. In addi-tion, in international relations inormation fows on a par with disinormation,so there occurs the widespread phenomenon o alsication o reality and ma-nipulation o various data that have an infuence on the eects o perception.For this reason, experts and the media play such an important role throughthem inormation reaches ordinary people. Te high level o knowledge andproessionalism among people who gather and analyze inormation has a posi-tive infuence on the quality o images created by them.

It should be noted that deective images (i.e. those that are incomplete, inad-

equate, idealized or catastrophic) are ormed most oten when the gathering andutilization o inormation is selective and carried out exclusively on the basis opreexisting preerences. Experts have greater chances o taking into accountunexpected inormation and o creating objective images, while practitionersmore oten pay attention to inormation that they desire and have requestedbeorehand and also have a tendency to create images that are biased or shapedby conditions prevailing at the moment.

Keeping these observations in mind, it is worth examining the international

perception o Russia as it is an interesting cognitive problem. Tis is a stateabout which thousands o papers have been written in the last 15 years or so, al-though the majority o them have taken a rather negative view. Russia is amongthe handul o actors in international relations which have had a strong infu-ence on the 20th century. Its sel-assessment in this matter diers undamentallyrom the assessment o other participants in international relations.

Russians are aware o the truth that in this day and age the way a country ispresented on the international stage is more important than the reality. For this

reason, there is no shortage o critics o the way Russia presents itsel abroad,even among loyal stalwarts o the system, such as Sergei Karaganov, one o thebest known Russian political scientists. In his opinion, Kremlin oreign policylacks a solid clarication o the motives or Russians actions in international re-lations, which leads to a negative perception o its moves, when in reality thingsare quite dierent2.

2 Karaganov S. Russia and the International Order in: ed. Dov Lynch What Russia Sees, Chaillot

Paper, January 2005, no. 74, p. 23-43.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

4/22

72

Stanisaw Biele

Russia and especially its elite nd themselves in a phase o developmentwhere, in the ace o ever tougher international games, they are keen on dem-onstrating their independence and new subjectivity in international relations.Tereore, they show a strong determination to deend the rightness o their ac-tions, but in the process make plenty o mistakes. For example, Russia declaresitsel an ally o the West in the ght against international terrorism and at thesame time supports terrorist groups such as Hamas. It stakes a lot on energycooperation with the West and at the same time does not shy away rom resort-ing to energy blackmail.

In Russias structure o perception o the international environment, two

target groups are o prime importance: post-Soviet in the near abroad andWestern. Te neighboring group, linked to the post-Soviet space, is the mostimportant point o reerence, both or the political elites and society at large.Historical experience plays an essential role in the perception o the nearabroad. Te images o post-Soviet states neighboring Russia and the percep-tion o Russia in the near abroad are ormed under the direct infuence ogeopolitical actors, tensions and conficts, culture and language.

In turn, Western perception o Russia determines its wider positioning in

the world. Experiences and collisions with a culture that is higher and moredeveloped than its own, mutual attraction and repulsion these are phenomenaaccompanying the entire modern history o Russia in its confict and coopera-tion with the West, especially its European core. For Western states, Russia ischaracterized by national, cultural and religious distinctiveness. It is not only amatter o geographic exoticism, resulting rom Asiatic origins. Russianness otenmeans civilizational dissimilarity, as pointed out by Arnold oynbee, and morerecently, Samuel Huntington. For these reasons, Russians ear that the Westwill close in on itsel, leaving them outside. But the West also remains some-thing dierent and oreign in the perception o Russians. According to YuriLevada, the ather o contemporary Russian sociology who died in November2006, sociological studies show that subconsciously Russians ear Europeaninfuences, the European way o lie, mentality, democracy all this is or themsomething oreign and not entirely understandable3. Tis results rom the act

3 Levada: Rosjanie panicznie boj si zmian [Levada: Russians Have a Morbid Fear of Change].

Dziennik18-19.1.2006.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

5/22

73


that while Russia is a European state, it is at the same time dierent rom theWest, being a unique bridge between the West and Asia.

It is also worth remembering that there are big dierences between the Westand the states o Central and Eastern Europe in their perceptions o Russia.Tese are rst o all due to dissimilar historical experiences and the geopoliticsassociated with them. Western European states did not experience Soviet oc-cupation and view Russia as a generally responsible, i occasionally awkward,partner4. For these reasons, rom time to time they accuse Central and EasternEuropeans o stirring up anti-Russian eelings.

However, Russia is trying to preserve as much as possible o its old great

power status, maintaining strong ties with the biggest Western powers, whichcreates irritation in the capitals o middle-sized powers, such as Warsaw. Polesare annoyed by the cold distance with which Russia relates to their country. Butnone o the political orces in Poland have come up with a recipe or displayedany initiative to change this state o aairs5. Tere are strong indications thatPoles will keep wallowing in their powerlessness and anger, while at the sametime others will be doing quite a good business with Russia6.

2. Problems with the sel-defnition o Russia in the world

One can present contemporary Russia through the prism o certain antino-mies and paradoxes. A paradox involves reasoning in which correct assumptionsand conclusions lead to contradictions, even to alsehoods. Paradoxes thus un-derstood concern the sel-denition o Russia in the world. Tereore it is worthpointing out:

- the civilizational and geopolitical paradox,

- the paradox o power,4 Western states are satisfied with the pragmatic achievements in the stabilization of Russian statehood

and the predictability of Kremlin policies, while Polish expectations of Russia often have a maxima-

list character.5 Szacki W. Co zrobi, eby Rosja nas polubia [What to Do to Make Russia Like Us]. Gazeta

Wyborcza, 11.3.2005.6 In the 1990s in Warsaw some Russian diplomats used to say that when a lion is sick, even a monkey

can beat it. It was a warning against the consequences of what would happen when the lion reco-

vers. Who knows if we are not facing that very situation at present.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

6/22

74

Stanisaw Biele

- the paradox o democratization, and- the paradoxes in international activity.In economic terms Russia is at once a developed country, which is ormally

conrmed by its membership in the group o the worlds richest states (G8),a developing country, and weakly developed one (as shown by indicators oeconomic growth and the social situation o the population), and even a ailingstate, as some described it in the 1990s.

Tere is no shortage o other paradoxes. It is thereore typical o contempo-rary Russia that:

1. social conservatism and resistance exist alongside openness towards inno-

vative undertakings;2. hostility and distrust towards all kinds o dierences are mixed with ac-

ceptance o outside infuences and growing international activity;3. the uniqueness o Russia is stressed together with a readiness to compare

with and imitate others;4. various undertakings are accompanied by maximalism, i.e. engagement in

something on a gigantic scale regardless o costs, while at the same timethere is greater concern about the prot and loss balance;

5. one still comes across a reluctance to compromise in domestic and inter-national aairs, which suggests a tendency towards dichotomous thinkingon the all or nothing principle (zero-sum game model). At the same time,in recent years one can observe increasing pragmatism in Russian politicsand a growing willingness to make concessions.

Tere is a widespread belie that Russia played a decisive role in the all o theUSSR, particularly ater Yeltsins election victory in June 1991. He set out toundermine the already tottering position o Gorbachev and eradicate supportor the old elites. Events connected with the unsuccessul coup o August 1991accelerated the pace o events, especially the Russian Federations assumptiono central government powers. However, roles were soon reversed. From a stateaiming to break up the USSR, Russia began to change into a deender o theSoviet heritage, conscious o its position and resources.

Many contradictions accompanied this process. In spite o declarations andconstitutional transormations in a democratic direction, Russia is seen in theworld as:

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

7/22

75


- an unstable state, with a political leadership with authoritarian tendenciesand a maa-like oligarchic inrastructure;

- a nuclear power which is incapable o handling centriugal tendenciesother than by means o a bloody war, as the tragedy o Chechnya shows;

- a state which dismantled a totalitarian structure but presides over a societywhich has not yet shaken o the Soviet mentality and has not establisheda democratic political culture7.

Problems with sel-denition concern Russias historical, political, nationaland cultural spheres. In the historical sphere, it has to do with the degree oidentication with the past, with distinguishing between what was bad andworth discarding, and what is worth keeping or continuing. A particular obsta-cle seems to be the strong attachment to the imperial character o Russias past.For hundreds o years, Russia was an imperial state, which with the dramaticchanges o the early 1990s suddenly lost its raison detre. In this situation weare dealing with not only a revolution in the politico-economic order, but alsoa revolution in the consciousness o society, which must redene its identity aswell as reevaluate its national interests.

Many Russians eel closer to imagined and inherited history than to real

history that is being currently created. Sel-denition and the identity resultingrom that process oten revolve around the desire or reclaiming or restoringwhat has been lost, rather than or sel-renewal and creation o something new.Te ormer involves the eorts o various social groups to get back what theylost, or at least limit the damages resulting rom the loss o empire. Te latteris based on a complete break with the past, the previous political order and itsuniversal claims. Tis is the type o sel-denition that West Germans acceptedater the Second World War under the pressure o the victorious Allies. In Rus-sia too it seemed that the state emerging rom the USSR was radically andeectively breaking with the past. However, the changes initiated rom abovesoon provoked a conservative backlash. Within a ew years o the collapse o theUSSR, the question o the revival o Russias great power status was put on thepolitical agenda, given that Russia was not only the legal successor to the USSR,but also the heir to a noble tradition o imperial greatness.

7 See: Biele S. Tosamo midzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej [International Identity of Rus-

sian Federation]. Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa, 2006.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

8/22

76

Stanisaw Biele

In the political sphere there is a dissonance between the drive to build amodern state and the implementation o democratic practices and old habitsand customs rom the epoch o totalitarianism. A striking characteristic o thisis the clashing o two tendencies on the one hand, we see modernization, i.e.an opening up to Western ideas and values, but on the other, an escape intoautarchy and isolation with the aim o preserving Russian distinctiveness. Telatter is sometimes associated with the search or a mythical third way o de-velopment, which is expressed through emphasis on the sel-contained civiliza-tion o Russia. Arguments between occidentalists and eurasianists are to a largeextent a refection o this. Deenders o the distinctive character o Russia are

worried that the spread o the Western way o lie is leading Russia to negate itsown cultural identity. Being a consequence o modernization, cultural unica-tion is undermining the meaning o the values making up the uniqueness oRussia, setting that state apart in the world.

Arnold oynbee already a long time ago observed that Russia chose variousadaptive strategies. Te rst o these he dubbed the zealot opposition o OldBelievers, the essence o which was not to turn against the West as such, butto reuse the acceptance o oreign models. Its opposite was uncompromising

herodianism which Peter the Great became an exponent o. Te essence othis approach was the transormation o Russia rom an Orthodox universalstate to one o the parochial or peripheral powers o the Western world. Tethird strategy was communism, aspiring to universal leadership o the Sovietempire.

At present Russia is conronted with the necessity o choosing an adaptivestrategy which will protect it rom repeating historical disasters. Tis means, in-stead o mechanically transerring rom above Western experiences and modelsto Russian soil, drawing on them in order to work out its own reorm programsthat enable it to enter into the current o civilizational transormation. Russianscall this strategy organic adaptation.

2.1. Te civilizational-geopolitical paradox

In the geopolitical sense Russia is both Europe and Asia, connecting Eastand West, North and South, which in itsel makes it a unique phenomenon.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

9/22

77


So, the special signicance o geopolitics in the case o Russia is determined byits particular geographic situation. Its Eurasian characteristics dene its borders,natural barriers which have protected it against invasions, and enclose withinthemselves culture and history that maintain mythical continuity. Te geogra-phy o Russia is loaded with aective and symbolic meanings. Tey are so ideo-logically charged that they strongly reinorce the genuine eeling o belongingto a Great Russia, and dene the genus lociin which one can nd the originalnational spirit. Nature and geography exert an overpowering infuence on theattitude o Russians in their contacts with other nations. Te low-lying andlimitless Russian expanses have served to make the people averse to moderation

and compromise, and have given rise to extreme attitudes o an all or nothingnature. Various descriptions o the national character o Russians emerge romsuch premises8.

Te geography o Russia has iconic signicance, symbolizing a distinct land-scape, harsh climate, and wealth o customs which contribute to a continuousawareness o its place in the world. Te collective infuence o the various waysin which people understand and perceive a known space is contained in theconcept otopophilia which was introduced in 1974 by Yi-Fu uan, an Ameri-

can o Chinese origin, in a book with this title. A counterpart o topophilia isgeopietism, meaning experiencing ones native land as an object to which specialvalue is attached. Te emotional bond with ones native land is connected withthe belie that it is part o the living national tissue.

Te vastness o Russia led to the ormation o the unique national psychol-ogy o Russians which stresses destiny and place in the world. Space appearedas a synonym or power and position. Te enormous spaces resulted in thedevelopment o a certain style in social lie which maniests itsel in the waypolitics is conducted, but also in the way the results o all types o activities,

including architecture or art, is presented. As Andrzej Chodubski wrote, glori-cation o the idea o largeness and monumentalism in relation to space meantthat since the dawn o its statehood, Russia was organized or expansion andterritorial conquest9.

8 . . . [Character of Russian People] :

, 2005.9 Chodubski A. Elementy identyfikacji kulturowej Rosji [Elements of Russian Cultural Identity].

Sprawy Polityczne, 2001, no. 3, p. 90.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

10/22

78

Stanisaw Biele

Te geopolitical position o Russia gives it thereore the capacity to infu-ence the most important processes on the Eurasian landmass and orces allparticipants in international relations to reckon with it. Te Eurasian activity oRussia makes it an important global actor on the international stage. All kindso activities and roles in this eld are o key signicance to the internationalorder.

In Poland this actor is in act orgotten and emphasis is put on the eco-nomic weakness and marginalization o Russia. Meanwhile, the US cannot im-agine resolving the most pressing problems o the contemporary world, e.g.the Korean or Aghan questions, without the help and advice o Russia. For its

part, Russia can eectively limit American infuence by supporting states thatclearly oppose Washingtons policies (the most spectacular example being sup-port or anti-American Iran). Russian protection o authoritarian regimes in thenear abroad is at the same time a substantial limitation o Western infuence,especially American, in countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan or urkmenistan.Geopolitics means that, regardless o weaknesses in other areas, Russia is animportant player on the international scene. Without its participation it is notpossible to imagine any conguration o orces that would have signicance in

the processes o establishing global equilibrium.Te geopolitical situation o Russia as a bridge between two continents, andalso its physical environment and type o neighborhood, shaped the politicaldevelopment o the state as well as its image. Te troublesome geopoliticalsituation arose because Russia, lying in the middle o the Eurasian continent,put powers located in its immediate vicinity in the position o natural rivals.From this viewpoint, Alexei Kara-Murzas thesis that the geopolitical positiono Russia had and has a conrontational character is correct10. Te authoritar-ian severity o the state is the inevitable result. Tis partly explains why milita-

rism was closely connected with autocracy in Russian history. Frontline areasplayed a crucial role in dening the ability to repel invasions and maintain thestates internal stability. Tere was also another side to this phenomenon. Oten,the authoritarian government itsel looked or a place where it could bare its

10 Kara-Murza A. A. Zmiana formuy tosamoci: Rosja midzy okcydentalizmem a samoistnoci

[The Change of Identity Formula: Russia between the Occidentalism and Self-existence]. in: Agnie-

szka Magdziak-Miszewska et al. (eds),Polacy i Rosjanie. 100 kluczowych poj [Poles and Russians.

100 Key Concepts], Biblioteka WIZI, Warszawa 2002, p. 218.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

11/22

79


claws. Creating an image o a distinctive civilization, surrounded on all sidesby adversaries, it created the ideological oundations or urther conquests andimperial expansion. Russia was always surrounded by rebellious provinces orunriendly states. From the chauvinist point o view, a riendly neighbor couldonly be a subordinated neighbor11.

Te complicated historical experience explains in a certain way the currentassumptions behind the deense doctrine o Russia, which attaches so muchweight to the so-called near abroad. On top o that, the loss o Central Europeas an important buer zone against the West placed Russia in a new situation.Looking rom this perspective, it is easier to understand the sources o Russian

resistance to NAOs eastward expansion in the 1990s.Te physical setting o Russia has kept it away rom the sources o the Wests

dynamic civilization and delayed socio-economic development, putting it in anunavorable position both in relation to Western Europe and later the US andJapan. In terms o economic and technological indicators, Russia has laggedbehind the major powers in every epoch. However, through its contacts withstronger European powers, Russia has continuously adopted experiences, cul-ture and worldviews rom its adversaries.

Te aspiration or the rebirth o geopolitical power seems to be the only wayto restore the personal dignity and pride o the Russian political elites. Teyare not divided by their attitude towards a state bent on pursuing greatnessand power, but by their attitude towards reorm. Because o dramatic histori-cal experiences, and especially the living memory o the Great Fatherland War,the Russian government and society are unusually sensitive to every potentialthreat to territorial integrity and inviolability o borders. Tis territorial impera-tive dictates Russian resistance to solving the problem o the Kurile Islands onthe basis o rational compromise. It also uels the contempt o Russians or theright o Chechens to sel-determination. However, the stabilization o territo-rial ownership through demarcation o borders with China perhaps gives somebasis to think that slow but signicant changes are taking place in this regard inthe mentality o Russian elites.

11 Paradowski R., Rosyjski konflikt kulturowy i perspektywy imperialne [Russian Cultural Conflict

and Imperial Prospects] in: Piotr Kraszewski (ed.), Cywilizacja Rosji imperialnej [The Imperial Rus-

sia Civilization], Instytut Wschodni UAM, Pozna 2002, p. 49-62.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

12/22

80

Stanisaw Biele

Contemporary powers have already abandoned the atavistic view thatgrowth is to a larger extent the result o territorial conquests than o inter-nal economic development and peaceul trade. Similar processes will certainlyemerge among the Russians as well. For that reason, one should be cautiouswhen making judgments. One should give up traditional stereotypes and pat-terns o thought regarding Russia. An astute observer o the Russian scene,George Kennan (1904-2005) warned against the ignorance evident in treatingRussia as a country unceasingly and wrongly expansionistic. reating it likethis oversimplies matters greatly and gives an erroneous picture o a large parto the history o Russian diplomacy in the sarist period12. Generalizing about

the contemporary governments o Russia or about the conduct o that countryin the uture on the basis o the historical record is a dangerous mistake.

2.2. Te paradox o power

Russia is rst and oremost a large world exporter o energy resources, havingone o the largest nuclear potentials in the world. It is thereore a nuclear rawmaterials power. Te nuclear potential o Russia guarantees its passive strategic

deense. In the opinion o military commentators, or Russia, deeply rustratedby the loss o its superpower position, and at the same time, claiming the rightto have a say in the ate o the world, the nuclear bogeyman has become its lastbest hope. In deense doctrine, the relatively cheap nuclear capacity o the Rus-sian armed orces is considered their most cost-eective element.

As a consequence o its nuclear status, Russia is only state which negotiatesand concludes disarmament treaties with the biggest power o our times theUnited States. Russia has a similarly important voice in reaching agreementsin the eld o conventional disarmament in Europe. None o the eorts o theinternational community in the area o non-prolieration o weapons o massdestruction would have succeeded without cooperation with Russia. Te prob-lem o access to nuclear weapons by North Korea or Iran cannot be resolved inany orum which does not take into account Russias views.

Active diplomacy is a matter o linking energy weapons as oensive instru-ments and nuclear weapons as deensive ones. In this eld Russia has no com-

12. Kennan G. F., On American Principles, Foreign Affairs, 1995, no. 2.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

13/22

81


petitors, with the exception o the US, which has the largest number o greatpower attributes. Te nuclear actor has a generally destructive eect it con-stantly uels or even deepens the worlds suspicion o Russia. Te oil actor hasthe opposite eect it contributes to increasing the constructive interest ovarious states in Russia.

Moreover, a distinctive aspect o Russia is its sel-creation through exaggera-tion o its strong points. Te ability to create alse ideas and infated images oits power remains a specialty o Russian elites13. Russians themselves oten putthemselves in the oreront o world powers. Russia is undoubtedly a power-ul nuclear power, has the largest territory, with the greatest reserves o natural

resources in the world. Tis is all true. However, these advantages do not makeit a major economic power. Te Russian paradox in the economic sphere liesin the act that according to World Bank indicators, Russia lags behind othermiddle-income states. At the same time, it continues to be a key state in theinternational conguration o orces.

Russia belongs to the G8 group o the richest states in the world, whichcreate some two-thirds o the worlds GNP. Although it contributes ar lesscompared to the other members, this did not prevent it rom assuming the

presidency o the body in 2006 and preparing a discussion on ways to improvemechanisms o global management. Te G8 serves as the contemporary equiva-lent o the 19th century European concert o great powers. Membership inthis inormal club coners prestige and distinction on Russia, although in rankit does not compare with Western powers.

Many objective indicators point to the avorable development o Russia. Inthe last six years, there has been continuous and noticeable economic growth,the external debt o Russia has decreased, the state has accumulated huge budg-et surpluses, and pensions and salaries are paid on time. Infation has gonedown to around 10%, while unemployment is not as high as in other post-com-munist states, hovering in the vicinity o 7-8%. So i all these indicators showgrowth, what then is the reason or the pessimism expressed in most analysesand assessments? It is paradoxical that the elements which Russians identiyas their strong points are also the source o their states weakness. On the one

13 . ., : [Russias Interna-

tional Image: The Creating Strategy], : , 2003.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

14/22

82

Stanisaw Biele

hand, they enable Russia to rebuild its great power status, ensure a balancedbudget, build up reserves, and increase deense spending, as well as exert pres-sure on smaller and weaker states with the aim o gaining political advantages.But, on the other hand, they push the state in the direction o extensive growth,which closes the road to modernization and linkage with the most developedWestern powers14.

2.3. Te paradox o democratization

In the course o 16 years Russia went rom having a repressive dictatorshipo the Communist Party and secret services to a system in which the ate oindividual political ocials depends on more or less democratic elections, or-ganized systematically and in accordance with standards recognized around theworld. No one in Russia idealizes the results achieved by the transormation; onthe contrary, there are more critics than enthusiasts, but this does not mean thatRussia is steadily sliding downhill.

Te paradox lies in the act that Russia proclaims its return to liberal de-mocracy, while the world views it as being anti-liberal. Tis is urther proo o

how dicult it is to understand the Russian syndrome. At present it is hardto say unequivocally whether the authoritarian tendencies, maniested in thecampaign to rid Russia o robber-baron capitalism and create conditions orstable economic growth, will turn out to be strong and long-lasting. Decisionssuch as limiting the authority o governors, conducting a campaign againstmedia reedom, orcing disloyal oligarchs to emigrate, as well as infexibility onthe Chechen question are widely perceived as signs o tightening o the screws.Russian history clearly shows that periods like this last much longer than fashes

o liberal reorm. I this tendency gets stronger, it could turn out that VladimirPutins team is ending the Russian thaw which began in the mid-1980s withMikhail Gorbachevsperestroika.

President Putin takes every opportunity to argue against claims that Russiais heading in an authoritarian direction. He stresses that Russia has chosen thepath o democracy and that this is a choice it will stick with. Announcements

14 See: Neumann I. B., Russia as a Great Power, in: Jakob Hedenskog et al. (eds),Russia as a Great

Power. Dimensions of Security under Putin, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 13-28.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

15/22

83


o reorms strengthening the executive branch are not a reaction to the terroristattack in North Ossetia in September 2004. Tere is considerable evidence thatPutin is simply continuing activities launched in 2000 aimed at restoring theunctioning o the state. Putins rst term saw the slow and careul resuscitationo state structures, which were in an advanced state o decay when Boris Yeltsininherited them ater the all o the USSR. As Russians themselves assert, thepresident had to start rom elementary things, without which no steps orwardwould have been possible. Te rst task carried out was to restore the abilityto control the security structures. Te next priority was to revive Russian in-terests in its immediate neighborhood, i.e. above all, in the post-Soviet space.

Te most important goal, however, was to restore Russias great power statusin the world, based on real sovereignty. Te maintenance o ull independencerom others is or Russia not only a question o political and international legalidentity, but also a condition or survival. Without this element, it is dicult tounderstand its attitude towards other powers.

Under Putins rule, the Russian state has undergone consolidation, with theexecutive branch expanding its control over all spheres o public lie. Te presi-dent o Russia has a chance o going down in history as someone who restored

order, stability, and economic growth ollowing the years o disarray under Gor-bachev and Yeltsin. Belie in supremacy o the state as well as in the useulnessand necessity o strengthening his eectiveness as a wise plenipotentiary o theentire national community this is the core o current presidential doctrine.Tere are strong indications that the priority o contemporary Russian elites iseconomic growth and civilizational development, not democracy and institu-tions o civil society. For this reason, there are so many reerences in the politicalrhetoric to the distinctive nature o the Russian system. Te Kremlin today pro-claims that in line with the distinctiveness o Russia, it is building a distinctiveRussian democracy. Tere is no lack o ironic suggestions that this system canbe called petroleum democracy.

In discussions about democratization in Russia, the so-called rst law opetropolitics, ormulated by New York imes commentator Tomas Fried-man, has gained popularity. Let us recall that petropolitics is the politics ostates exporting petroleum. Te law states the ollowing: In countries rich inpetroleum, the price o this raw material and the pace o expansion o civic

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

16/22

84

Stanisaw Biele

reedoms are always inversely proportional. Te biggest enemy o Russian de-mocracy is thereore not the Kremlin or the oligarchs, but the high price o oil.As Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev argues, Russia is governed todayby a regime whose entire legitimacy is based on extraction o enormous protsrom the sale o oil and gas. Te West, dependent on Russian supplies o theseenergy resources, gives de facto support to this regime and prevents any kind ochange. In Krastevs opinion, reedom in Russia will blossom only when theprice o oil alls in Western states. Te one and only indicator o the success othe European policy o promoting democracy would be the ending o Westerndependence on Russian oil and gas, not only through diversication o energy

suppliers, but also through the search or renewable energy sources15.A urther paradox is the linking o sovereignty and democracy in a single

political concept16. Its basic premises are set orth in the book entitled Sov-ereignty, published under the editorship o Nikita Garadiya, and also in thebook Putin: His Ideology by Alexei Chaadayev, ocially accepted by the po-litical technocrats o the presidential administration. Te rst o these booksincludes excerpts o presidential speeches about the condition o the state, aninterview with one o Putins possible successors Dmitry Medvedev, remarks by

Vladislav Surkov, head ideologist o the Kremlin, made to activists o the OneRussia party, and around a dozen interviews and essays, refecting the traditiono enlightened loyalism. Authors such as Chaadayev and Garadiya, journal-ists like Vitaly retyakov and Maxim Sokolov, and military strategists such asAndrei Kokoshin are reputed to be the most important ideological ocials inPutins special services.

Te concept o sovereign democracy means that Russia rejects the liberaldemocracy o the West17. Kremlin strategists argue that the entire world cannotbe expected to ollow one model. Just as the priority or American democracy isreedom, and or European democracy it is equality, or Russian democracy atthe present stage security is o the highest importance. In act, it is a question o

15 Krastev I., Putinowskie spoeczestwo obywatelskie [Putins Civil Society],Europa-Tygod-

nik Idei, 2005, no. 43, 26 Oct. 2005.16 Idem, Sovereign Democracy. Russian-Style, Opendemocracy.net, 16.11.2006, http://www.opende-

mocracy.net/globalization-istitutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp (29.03.2007).17 Janelinas T., Sovereign Democracy Yet Another Attempt to Define Russian Regime,Lithua-

nian Foreign Policy Review, 2006, no. 2 (6), p. 119-133.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

17/22

85


defecting societal pressure rom below and international pressure rom above,both o which led to the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. Accord-ing to Kremlin specialists, attempts at so-called democratization are nothingbut an eort by the West to limit the sovereignty o post-Soviet states. Russiais also becoming a target o this. Calls or democratization, support rom theoutside or independent liberal parties, appeals or observation o human rightsare or Chaadayev, one o the Kremlins political technocrats, a new crusadeagainst Russia, conducted by the West. According to him, this crusade is sup-ported in Russia by agents o oreign infuence, namely domestic liberals, anddeenders o human rights and national minorities.

As dened by Kremlin ideologues, sovereignty is not a right to which thestate or nation is entitled but rather the potential o the state, its economic in-dependence, military power, and cultural identity. Another basic element o asovereign state is an elite with nationally oriented views. Te national charactero the elite is the most important actor determining the strength o a sovereignstate.

Te slogan sovereign democracy is used in an opportunistic ashion toserve the current needs o the government. Sovereign democracy is presented as

a struggle with chaos and disorder. It is a type o state ideology, seasoned withimperialist and nationalist sentiments.

In building the intellectual justication or the sovereign democracy project,Kremlin ideologues turned to the intellectual heritage o continental Europe to the French political rationalism o Francois Guizot, a 19th-century philoso-pher and prime minister o France, and to the decisionism o Carl Schmitt,the court jurist o the Tird Reich and a leading gure in the contemporaryanti-liberal tradition. Guizot and Schmitt are surprising pillars o the Kremlinidea o sovereign democracy. What the Russian ideologues like is the anti-revo-lutionary stance and deep distrust o two undamental concepts o contempo-rary democracy: the idea o representation as an expression o the pluralisticcharacter o modern-day society and the idea o popular sovereignty. Anti-pop-ulism and anti-pluralism are characteristics distinguishing the current regimein Moscow. Its ideologues, ollowing Schmitts ootsteps, preer to dene sov-ereign democracy as the identity o rulers and the ruled. Following Guizotsootsteps, they consider as sovereign not the people (electorate), but reason

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

18/22

86

Stanisaw Biele

nding its expression in consensus achieved by responsible political elites. Inthe Kremlins mixture o Guizots anti-populism and Schmitts anti-liberalism,elections do not serve to express diering, oten opposing interests, but are atool or demonstrating the identity o rulers and the ruled. Elections do notserve to represent people but to represent the authorities beore the people. Tedenition o Schmitt, according to which the sovereign is he who decides onthe state o emergency, is perectly suited to the almost metaphysical role othe gure o president in the present-day Russian political system. Te Schmit-tian denition o democracy in categories o identity rather than representationdoes not enable one to distinguish democracy rom dictatorship in any substan-

tial way, which in the eyes o Kremlin theoreticians o democracy is certainly astrong point o this concept.

Russian and oreign critics o Putin are usually dismissive o the intellectualcontents o the idea o sovereign democracy. Tey are interested in the true na-ture o the regime, and not how the regime tries to present and legitimize itsel.In their opinion, sovereign democracy only has propaganda value. Te onlyrole o this concept is to protect the regime against Western criticism.

However, there are also those who believe that the concept o sovereign de-

mocracy embodies the nostalgia o Putins Russia or the ideological orce oattraction exerted by the USSR. It is a question o creating an alternative modelor Western states discouraged by the growth o populism and the pressure oglobalization.

2.4. Paradoxes in Russias international activities

At the beginning o the 21st century, Russian oreign policy is still deter-

mined not so much by positive as by negative goals: to not let itsel be margin-alized in international aairs, to avoid isolation o the state in the internationalarena and urther reduction o its importance, and to avoid involvement incontentious international problems that could threaten the progress o internalreorms. Russia oten denes itsel not in an inclusive sense, within the sys-tem o participants in international relations, but rather in an exclusive senseagainst other states. Tis means stressing dierences and contrasts, and a de-sire to separate onesel rom others. One can be certain that in the oreseeable

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

19/22

87


uture Russia will not agree to join any kind o international structure at theprice o giving up even part o its independence. Tis is something that can-not be imagined either by Russian elites or by broad sections o the politicallyconscious population.

Tere exists an enormous discrepancy between Russian aspirations and thepossibilities or achieving them. Neither economic growth nor strong politicalleadership can erase in a short time the huge deciencies and distances separat-ing Russia rom the biggest powers o the contemporary world. It will remain agreat power more through the consent o the other powers, or in other words,a licensed power. It is a partner which is respected, but which cannot always

be depended on. So the basic question is lack o trust. Respect or Russia resultsabove all rom the conviction that the weakness o the Russian state is not onlya problem or it, but also or many other states. No serious Western observerdenies or this reason the European character o Russia and its membership inthe European security system.

In international relations, Russia operates in a manner that is dierent romother states. Tis is a phenomenon encountered many times in history. Teduality o Russian behavior lies in the act that it generally accepts the values

and rules o the game recognized by other states. But at the same time it reservesthe right to its own interpretation o certain standards, which undermines itscredibility in the eyes o international opinion.

Russia has broken with the expansionist policies which contributed to thesquandering o resources, has limited the development o oensive weapons,and has stopped supporting various revolutionary regimes and sending thou-sands o advisors to a host o countries. It is undergoing demilitarization o itspolitical thinking (resulting in reduction o the army and o arms sales) andimplementing disarmament agreements. However, it is not clear whether it hasgiven up on its imperial ambitions. Te governing class o Russia keeps cling-ing to the delusion o great power status, which is delaying the introduction odemocratic standards.

Russians are in the process o reevaluating their involvement in internationalaairs. Teir misortune is that they lack a clear idea regarding the proper placeo contemporary Russia in the global power system. Te biggest problem boilsdown to overcoming the strongly rooted complex o playing the role o one o

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

20/22

88

Stanisaw Biele

the most important decision-makers. Tis calls or Russia to give up on den-ing its vital interests in terms o omnipresence in the world. Russia needssel-limitation. It is a paradox that contemporary Russia has chosen to assumethe role o regional power and wants to be active on a continental scale whilecontinually taking on tasks that place it in the ranks o powers with global am-bitions.

Still conducting multivector diplomacy, Russia in the oreseeable uture willonly be able to aord limited globalism, i.e. co-shaping the international or-der, based on partnerlike relations with other powers and collective undertakingo activities to alleviate and resolve regional and international conficts.

In Russian thinking about oreign policy, domestic imperatives predomi-nate. International interests have to serve domestic modernization, which hasstill not had the desired social eects. Te economization o politics is supposedto lead to the eects o economic growth being translated into changes that areperceivable by the people. Te dynamics o oreign involvement will dependon this and it is in this context that the world will accept the return o Russianpower to the great game. Russia is particularly keen on being attractive to inves-tors, a precondition o which is not only internal policy, but also good political

relations with the richest states o the West. odays Russia subordinates to thisgoal all other areas o activity, stressing especially the role o so-called economicdiplomacy.

In the West experts oten reiterate a basic act that Russia must now acceptin its conduct o international relations. It must in spite o internal resistance adapt to the new world order and its own changed position within it. Its long-term interests lie in the development o normal, constructive cooperation withthe West. In the opinion o Zbigniew Brzezinski, in the long run the only ad-vantageous choice or Russians is closer ties with the Euroatlantic community.Otherwise it risks geopolitical isolation and exposure to the Islamic threat romthe south as well as Chinese power rom the east. Brzezinski is right to pointout that nations do not change their images o themselves or their historicalates o their own ree will, but only when they have to. So it is a question notonly o will but o realizing a certain necessity. An understanding o objectiveconditions can perhaps come to Russia more quickly i it bears in mind thatin the past century many nations and states have had to undamentally change

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

21/22

89


their views o their own aspirations and position in the world. Tis was thecase, above all, with Germany and Japan, but also with Great Britain, France,Holland and urkey.

Russia is no longer the leader o states dissatised with the internationalorder that emerged ater the Cold War. It is not a state striving at any price torevise the existing status quo. Russia played such a role under the Soviet fag,but it paid a high price or this, with mostly negative results. For this reason,Russia views the European Union as a serious economic and political partner.However, in international security matters, the Western European states do notyet speak with one voice, and on the Iraq question are simply divided. In this

sense, although Russia tries to maintain the best possible relations with them,the entire EU is not as attractive a partner as the US. Moreover, there has beena serious rit in transatlantic relations, which in Soviet times would have beenviewed by Moscow as a success, but given the new realities Russia is now keenon good relations with each side o the Atlantic divide. In act, all divisionsin the Atlantic community are to the detriment o Russia. It has to thereorecalculate to what extent good relations with the US will not adversely aectits attractive economic relations with Western European states. Russia has to

maintain a balance in its relations between the two parts o the Western worldto the benet o its own national interests. While maintaining partnerlike rela-tions with the US, Russia gladly accepts invitations to everything that is Euro-pean. Maintaining a balance in its relations with the US and the EU, and alsowith individual European states, is the most important task o Russian oreignpolicy. It is a unique paradox that Russia is today just as keen on Western unityas is the West itsel.

According to specialists, this is just the beginning o the challenges acingRussia. ransatlantic rivalry will keep on intensiying in the oreseeable uture,which will pose continual dilemmas or Russia. Each o the parties realizes per-ectly well that playing the other two parties o against each other would be anabsurd mistake18.

Te states o Western Europe and North America have not stopped criticiz-ing Russia or its various departures rom the rules and standards o the Westernworld, but at the same time they are striving to improve the climate and develop

18 Lynch D.,Russia Faces Europe. Chaillot Papers, May 2003, no. 60.

8/3/2019 Bielen ENG

22/22

90

Stanisaw Biele

relations, not reeze or worsen them. Tere is a certain dualism in the way Rus-sia is treated. Western states declare that they are striving to build somethingtruly common with Russia, but treat it like a partner rom outside, whoseinterests and values oten diverge rom those o Europe. Such partnership, inthe opinion o Russian experts, is simply doomed to cyclical reproduction ocrises.

Conclusions

Processes emerging in Russia are complicated and dicult to evaluate or in-terpret in an unambiguous way. Observers o Russia do not express categoricalopinions either regarding the eects o internal transormation or their infu-ence on international processes. It is interesting that there was a greater varietyo scenarios and predictions in the early years o Russias transormation (mostlypessimistic) than now at the beginning o the 21st century. Various observersview Russia with pessimism or with optimism. Pessimists view it as a nuclearpower in a very precarious position because o its political and social instability.Optimists see a semi-authoritarian leadership, striving or stability, but at the

price o sacricing certain democratic reedoms. It is obvious that both the pes-simistic and optimistic views lead to oversimplication in the ace o an unclearreality just as a catastrophic or euphoric view does not at all refect reality.Many observers are stuck in a normativistic i not idealistic current o thoughton the question o Russia, demanding conditions that it must ull in order tobe recognized as a normal state. Normativists are convinced that the world canbe rapidly rebuilt on the Western model. Tey are inected with the end ohistory vision, i.e. the victory o liberalism on a global scale, when in the mean-

time the world is undergoing urther diversication, not turning back to com-munism. Examples o Chinas transormation, and also the dynamics o growtho the so-called Asian tigers should be instructive. Tereore it is worth lookingsometimes at the uture o Russia as well rom a non-Western perspective.

Bielen ENG

Documents

Transcript of Bielen ENG