Bhavishya-II
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Transcript of Bhavishya-II
Enhancing Primary Education in India
Team Name: Bhavishya-IICollege: IIT-Bombay
Primary Education
Primary healthcare
Empowerment of
women
Public Distribution
System
Employability of youth
Agricultural productivity
Timely justice to all
Civic Amenities
Research and
innovation
Electoral reforms in
politics
Social welfare to informal sector
workersThe youth of first learners is expected to become the enlightener of Indian future
Major fraction of India’s problems have taken huge shape because of inability and ignorance shown by people.
The youth of first learners is expected to become the enlightener of Indian future.
Education empowers people with skills of understanding, analysing and decision making.
Possible Concerns of StakeholdersGovernment
Infrastructure
Access to quality education
Awareness about education
High Learning outcomes
Teachers
Adequate Salary
Location of posting
Parents
Safety of children
School Environment
School Proximity
Students
Interesting curriculum
Go
vern
men
t • 10.2% growth in density to 3.55 schools/10 sqkm. in last 5 years
• High Awareness: Enrollment of 96.7% children with 50.2% of girls in 2012 Teac
he
rs • Salary is 3-5 times more than private sector
• Job security is an additional benefit
Pare
nts • High enrollment
suggests that these issues are not stopping parents from sending their wards to school
Stu
de
nts • These problems are
inherent in the system and need a paradigm change in the methodology of imparting education
Legend: Green = Not a major concernRed = Major concern to be tackled first
Measuring the Quality of Education
• Despite spending thousands of crores on education, there is no provision to track the impact of government’s efforts
• According to APRESt survey, infrastructure, decreasing teacher pupil ratio, high teacher salary etc. have no correlation with learning outcomes, traditionally believed otherwise
• Hence, all our efforts have not yielded desired results
WHY?
• Mid-term evaluations to measure the learning growth and provide feedback to the teacher for motivation and improvement scope
• End-term evaluation to assess the skills acquired and learning growth
• Making learning outcomes an explicit goal in Results Framework Document (RFD) of MHRD
• Not disclosing individual assessments in order to curb student stress
WHAT?
• State and National level committees to implement the policy in schools in their jurisdiction
• Committees to prepare a document listing out how to measure skills in the tests
• Extending contracts to private companies to conduct the tests
• Use these results for internal monitoring and assessment of the system
HOW?
Monitoring reading and arithmetic skills primary school students
A mid term evaluation to ensure regular learning and to provide feedback to teachers
An end term evaluation to measure yearly learning growth of students
Evaluation techniques to be decided by education boards
Web portal to make findings accessible to authorities
Government can collaborate with private companies and NGOs to conduct the evaluation process
Collaboration with private sector:
Gov. has collaborated with TCS to provide passport to Indian citizens resulting in improved efficiency
Collaboration with NGOs:
NGOs like ASER, Prathamare actively working in this field
Average cost per student per evaluation: ₹20
Cost per school (average 107 students): ₹2150
Yearly expense per school (2 tests/yr): ₹4300
Other expenses: ₹700
Total yearly expense per school: ₹5000
Total schools: 0.85 million
Total expense: ₹4.25 billion
Auxiliary expenses: ₹50 million
Total expense: ₹4.3 billion
Measuring the Quality of Education
Approximately 0.65% of the annual education budget
Causes Identified
High absence rate of teachers
Irresponsible Attitude of teachers
Ineffective teaching
Lack of incentives
High Job security
Proposed Solutions
Attendance of teachers and students on start and end of daily instruction
Incentives to teachers based on performance of students, attendance and several other factors
Biometric Attendance
Monetary Incentives
Substandard Education in India
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Students scoring above 60% marks in grade 4th & 5th
Boys Girls
Dat
a n
ot
avai
lab
le
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Arithmetic skills of students of grade 5th
Substraction Division
Cost Estimationtotal number of government schools – 8,00,000 approx.One time installation cost – ₹ 400-500 crore.Annual maintenance cost – ₹ 50-100 crore.
*(rough estimation of costs)
ScalabilityCan be started as a pilot project in some selected districtsExpanded on the lines of cash infusion system
Biometric machines should be battery driven keeping in mind the unavailability of regular power in many regions.
• Average teacher absence rate of 25% observed in a study conducted by APRESt
Requirement
• Will help monitor attendance and hence in decrease in absence rate
• Will help identify fraudulent enrolments
Advantages• Attendance of teachers
and students 2 times a day
• All the data to be collected and analysed to generate reports at district/state/national level and make them accessible through web portal.
Implementation
• Private tender can/should be given for installation and maintenance of machines as well as for studying data, summarizing and reporting.
Private Tender
Biometric Attendance
PROPOSED MODEL TO CALCULATE INCENTIVES
10% of annual salary as incentive can be given to teachers for extra-ordinary efforts towards education
• 30% incentive if meet the predecidedminimum requirement
• Additional 20% incentive on extra effort towards quality
50% weightage to end term evaluation performance
• 20% incentive if meet predecidedminimum requirement
20% weightage to mid term evaluation performance
• Incentive proportional to (actual attendance – minimum requirement
30% weightage to teacher’s attendance
According to APRESt survey incentive based method is 10-15 times more cost effective than decreasing pupil- teacher ratio
Individual incentives given to a teacher is more effective than incentives given to group
Awards for the teaching excellence can be distributed to teachers for their extra-ordinary efforts
Improved teacher attendance
Teachers teach enthusiastically
Better Performance of Students
Student learning improved
Incentives to teachers
Monetary Incentives
• Conduction of bi-yearly evaluation process by Private firms
• Biometric attendance machine maintenance to avoid discrepancy in data
• Good performance begets bonus but there is no penalty for underperforming
• Model will not motivate teachers content with their basic pay
• Incorporation of penalty in the model would see opposition of Teacher Associations
• Measuring reading skills involve a subjective component, therefore to ensure common careful evaluation criterion
• Evaluators taking the tests should be as objective as possible
Challenges to proposed models
Transparent Execution
No penalty Clause
Simple evaluation
test
• Karthik Muralidharan, Venkatesh Sundararaman.2011. “Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India”
• Karthik Muralidharan.2012. “Long-Term Effects of Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from India”
• Karthik Muralidharan .2013. “Priorities for Primary Education Policy in India’s 12th Five-year Plan”
• Michael Kremer, Nazmul Chaudhury, F. Halsey Rogers, Karthik Muralidharan, Jeffrey Hammer. “TEACHER ABSENCE IN
INDIA: A SNAPSHOT”
• “District information System for Education” http://dise.in/AR.htm
• “RSA Animate - Changing Education Paradigms”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDZFcDGpL4U
• “Inequalities 2013: Karthik Muralidharan on Measuring Learning Trajectories with Longitudinal Data”.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bkLMZKh4WBE
• “ASER”. http://www.asercentre.org/education/data/india/statistics
Bibliography