Beyond Parsons? A Critique of Ralf Dahrendorf's Conflict TheoryAuthor(s): Peter WeingartSource: Social Forces, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Dec., 1969), pp. 151-165Published by: University of North Carolina PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2575256Accessed: 13/03/2009 14:26

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Volume 48 Number 2

SOCIAL FORCES December I969

BEYOND PARSONS? A CRITIQUE OF RALF DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT

THEORY PETER WEINGART

The Institute of the Econtomitic Scienzces of the Trade Unions Di6sseldorf, Germany

ABSTRACT

Dahrendorf attempts to synthesize the Marxian concepts of class, class interests, and class conflict on the one hand and the methodology and the concepts of the modern theory of action, on the other, in his analysis of social conflict and change. In this, authority appears as the focus of social conflicts and plays a dual role in social structures, as both an integrative force and a source of conflict. In each social structure ("imperatively coordinated association") there are two classes, rulers and ruled, whose conflicting interests are defined in terms of role- expectations. In trying to account theoretically for the occurrence-in the same social structure -of both obedience and conflict, Dahrendorf is forced to resort to a voluntaristic explanation of conflict and change. Likewise Dahrendorf cannot fulfill his promise to provide a concept of change which transcends given structures, in the Marxian sense. His explanation of change turns out to be identical with that of social mobility. The synthesis between Marx and Parsons fails.

I. CONFLICT THEORY: MEDIATION BETWEEN

MARX AND PARSONS

ociologists are reluctantly rediscovering S the theme of conflict and power only to

be deadlocked by the incompatibilities between past and present theories. Whereas Marx, as the principal exponent of conflict theory, is rejected by the prevalent positivistic school for his idealistic philosophy of history and the crudeness of his conceptual categories, modern structural-functional theory, when it concerns itself with conflict at all, has been unable to break loose from the constraints of its basic theoretical assumptions. Thus it is forced to resort to a voluntaristic explanation that lies outside the domain of a genuine socio- logical methodology.

Dahrendorf's sociologie engagee, seemingly a way out of this dilemma and praised as a breakthrough, turns out to be no exception once its assumptions and concepts are carefully scrutinized. What is intended as a synthesis of

Marxian engagement and the refined methods and techniques of modern social science (Dah- rendorf,1955 :33) and above all as a step beyond Parsons, ends in the same dilemma, and ignores some of the more significant contribu- tions of modern theorists.

Dahrendorf's criticism is directed against those sociologists whose works suggest that industrial society is characteriezd by consensus and integration-an image which effectively, albeit unintentionally, supports a conservatism serving as a justification of the status quo. He calls for a sociological science that is re- sponsible to the moral pathos of its founders. This is the core of his sociologie engage'e. He traces his critique back to the tradition of sociology insofar as it has its roots in the social philosophies of Hobbes and Marx. Like these conflict-theorists, he wants to redirect the focus of inquiry to the phenomena of inequality, power, and social conflict. Methodologically, however, Dahrendorf believes modern sociaL

152 SOCIAL FORCES

theory to be superior. The sociologie engagee thus implies a synthesis of a "traditional" focus of inquiry and modern sociological method- ology. The basic question, then, is how this synthesis can be accomplished. To clarify Dahrendorf's approach, his position in relation to both Marx and Parsons must be outlined.

Marx's Notion of Social Structure and Power

Marx's starting point is the production and reproduction of the material culture in which human life is embedded. Capitalism as only a historically specific form of the social produc- tion process has generated material conditions which in turn are vehicles of the social condi- tions to which individuals are subjected. Prop- erty arrangements underlie the existence of "'surplus" labor, performed in excess of the socially "necessary" labor, by those who do not own any means of production. In this sense property is conceived of as the basis of the master-servant relationship, in which the work- er possesses only his marketable labor. This antithesis of capital and wage labor, of power and subjection, is for Marx the basis of the social structure. Society is divided into two principal classes arising from this structural antithesis, whose objective interests arise from their respective positions in the production process. The class structure, for Marx, is identical with the power structure. Both are considered in their historically specific forms, and the function and genesis of power is thus inseparable from the structure of a concrete historical society. For Marx, power is not an irreducible phenomenon.

In the same manner the historical process is explained through a dialectic inherent in power. The social class which becomes the ruling material force of the society is forced to pro- mulgate its particular interest as the common interest of the whole society. The objective conflicts which continue to exist between rulers and ruled are merely suppressed. With every new class rising to power, new conflicts evolve. In this way ruling classes produce the conditions of their own destruction. These conditions are the dynamic elements of history.

Marx thus overcomes those voluntaristic coercion- theories in which power as a means of social inte- gration is linked with the will of individuals, and

in which concrete states of social structure are interpreted as mere expressions of the self-interest of individual wills. At the same time he overcomes those consensus-theories (subsequent to Rousseau)'I in which integration of social order is the result of a common will, composed of all individual wills Hfibner,1967 :52).

Parsons' Explanation of Power

Parsons' explanation of power is more sophisticated than many of his critics are will- ing to concede. For him, social order is realized basically through the internalization of norms and values, but value consensus alone cannot guarantee order. There is also the need for "isome supplementary coordination provided by explicit prescriptive or prohibitory role-expec- tations (e.g., laws) enunciated by actors in specially differentiated roles to which is at- tached 'responsibility' !" (Parsons and Shils, 1962:203). In this context, authority is identi- cal with social controls, external to "ego," and has an integrative function which goes beyond that of internalization in that it helps to define norms and secure their observance. To this aspect of "negative coordination" is inseparably linked that of "positive coordination"-"in the sense of contributing to the realization of certain shared collective goals through col- laborated activity" (Parsons and Shils,1962: 197). This coordinating function, necessary because of the inability of norms to entirely determine action, is implemented by specific roles with the institutionalized right to con- trol the behavior of others. The content of leadership roles, however, depends on the sys- tem-goal. Power is consequently "the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment has been made. . ." (Parsons, 1960:221). Power, under conditions of scarcity, must integrate partial interests and direct them to the system-goal. This process is, in Parsons' words, the "artificial identification of interests through the manipulation of rewards and de- privations. . ." (Parsons and Shils,1962:230). However, the genesis of this normative system, which is maintained by power and which is the source of social stability, remains without any link to the concrete social structure and is thus unexplained.

1 Author's comment.

DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 153

These two basically different conceptions of power, Marx's and Parsons', are Dahrendorf's starting point. From Marx's theory he bor- rows one central element, the notion of social change as a normal and continuous phenomenon of society; not only isolated parts of society but its entire structure change. Conflicts, as the cause of change, are inevitably produced in the social structure (Dahrendorf,1957 :25). Dahrendorf points out, however, that property has been replaced in the course of history as the main structuring force which for Marx explained the antithesis of classes. Dahrendorf claims that authority relations now are the basis of social conflict. Thus, authority becomes the key analytical category of his theory; for only in reference to it can the structural sources of conflict be investigated and the analysis of change become "structural analysis (Struktur- analyse) ."

Dahrendorf's critique of Parsons is essen- tially directed against the "conservative" bias implicit in a conceptual system that emphasizes problems of stability and order, while failing to explain phenomena of change and conflict. His analysis stresses that part of the social structure which is characterized by power and coercion, conflict and change, and which has "equal reality," as that of integration (Dah- rendorf,1958a :127). Rather than discard the conceptual apparatus of structural-functional theory altogether, Dahrendorf claims to sup- plement it with other categories directed to- ward an explanation of social conflict.

Dahrendorf uses the concept of authority to overcome the deficiencies of the structural- functional approach wherever it fails to explain the phenomena of social change and conflict. However, as I hope to show, Dahrendorf's con- cepts, even where they seem to be linked to Marx's theory, contain the methodological im- plications and hence limitations of structural- functional theory. Furthermore, the "integra- tive bias" of these implications makes it impossible for him to fulfill his promise--i.e., to expand the structural-functional approach with conflict theory-to say nothing of his going beyond it.

II. DAHRENDORF S CONCEPT OF "STRUCTURE"

According to Dahrendorf the dynamic var-

iables that influence social structure can orig- inate in the structure itself. While Parsons merely provides an analysis of the structure as an entity which undergoes change, Marx cen- ters his analysis on the dynamic variables them- selves. The problem is to explain integration and conflict; however this may be achieved, the effort invariably leads to some notion of a dialectic relation between stability and change. To balance the image of society as integrated, Dahrendorf begins by outlining conflicting ele- ments.

The dynamics of social structures develop from authority relations. According to this "central thesis" the basic phenomenon, social conflict, is found in all societies at all times (cf. Dahrendorf,1962c :216). Authority is an element of social structure, but, according to Dahrendorf does not contribute to that struc- ture's functional integration. Consequently, authority must be defined in terms other than those of structural-functional theory.

The Confusion of Factual Substrate and Institutional Structure

The resulting formula of the "twin-face of social structure" (Doppelgesicht der Sozial- struktutr) seems to correspond to those ap- proaches that conceive of social structure as being differentiated into two levels. David Lockwood (1956:136), for example, made the distinction between Parsons' model, as the level of normative integration, and another level, which he calls the "factual substrate." He defines the "substratum of social action" as the factual disposition of means in the situation of action which structures differential Leb- enschancen and produces interests of a non- normative kind-that is, interests other than those which actors have in conforming with the normative definition of the situation. The factual substrate is characterized by scarcity of means, and the instrumental character of human action to actors. Both lead to the emergence of interests in the utilitarian sense of the term. Conflict of interest is thus the central element rather than normative integration. Lockwood, like Dahrendorf, proposed the analysis of this level of the social structure as a supplement to Parsons' social system in order to focus on the origins of conflicts. Indeed, Dahrendorf

154 SOCIAL FORCES

uses the term factual substrate himself, dis- tinguishing an integrated from a conflicting social structure. Dahrendorf claims, however, that the "twin-face" cannot be fully defined by the dichotomy of stability and instability, equi- librium and conflict, or more generally, norm and substrate. The structural levels described by these terms are essentially identical and both must be included in any analysis of social structures. The real task is to distinguish be- tween institutional and behavioral aspects of authority and, likewise, of integration. This distinction of the two aspects of social structure runs across the two levels and reveals the true character of the "twin-face" as well as the premature symmetry of Parsons' theory (cf. Dahrendorf,1957 :161). Corresponding to the dualism of integration and conflict theory is the dualism of a number of concepts. These concepts are analogous insofar as both theories are supposedly equally valid and simply explain different phenomena of social action (cf. Dah- rendorf,1957:159f). "As the term 'integration' corresponds to that of 'authority' on the insti- tutional level, the concept of 'values' corre- sponds to that of 'interests' on the behavioral level" (Dahrendorf,1957 :161).

Though Dahrendorf (1957:160,200) follows Lockwood in distinguishing between a norma- tive structure and a factual substrate, he de- parts from him in his explanation of power and interest. Dahrendorf alters the meaning of the terms "factual substrate" and "normative struc- ture." "Under whichever aspect one deals with social structure, one cannot avoid includ- ing the level of a 'factual' or institutional structure ('substrate') as well as that of the 'ideological' or . . . behavioral structure in the analysis."2 Factual substrate thus becomnes identical with "institutional structure" and normative structure with "ideological" or "be- havioral structure." That institutions are "fac- tual" in the sense of their postulated identity with the factual substrate is to be seen in the position (or status) structure of society. It is reality as distinguished from values. And so, for Dahrendorf, factual substrate becomes

merely another terml for the institutionalized normative order.

With this normative concept of institution, Dahrendorf's criticism of Lockwood's distinc- tion between factual substrate and normative structure turns out not to be directed against the questionable division itself, though this certainly merits serious discussion. A factual level of social structure, in Lockwood's sense (and closely linked to Marx's concept of base and superstructure), is unknown to Dahrendorf. It is misleading to relate his understanding of the institutional level to Lockwood's concept of factual substrate.3 Consequently his thesis about the "twin-face" of the social structure is not related to the problem of the correspondence between a normative and a factual level.

Rather, it appears that Dahrendorf's in- terpretation of the two levels corresponds di- rectly to Parsons' social system. The institu- tional level is identical with Parsons' positional structure; the "behavioral," or normative, level with his corresponding roles. This pair- ing, which Parsons (cf. 1954a:393f) also calls the normnative and factual aspects of a social system, is in Dahrendorf's (1962f :69) own understanding the same as that of structure and function. It is not surprising, against this background, to see Dahrendorf (1959a :1963) conclude: "Categories like role, institution, norms, structure, even function are as useful in terms of the coercion model as they are for the analysis of social integration" (italics mine). This statement is surprising only if juxtaposed with his intended criticism of the structural- functional apparatus.

It can be shown further that Dahrendorf's (cf. 1957 :138f) conception of authority is not justified by a historical analysis, as his dis- cussion of the disappearance of private property would suggest. The conception is rather an analytical-theoretical one. The question raised by Marx of a relationship between the "ob- jective" social structure and a class-and-power structure does not receive his attention.

Authority as Role-Relationship

Dahrendorf's analytical concept of structure,

2 At this point (1957:160) it is misleading that he does niot make his correction of Lockwood's concepts explicit.

3 Cf. Dahrendorf (1957:160,204) and for the ambivalent usage of the concept "factual substrate" and "factual structure" respectively.

DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 155

his normative definition of the term, leads him back to structural-functional theory and its difficulties in explaining conflict and change. The connection of authority to social structure, in which he tries to locate the origin of social conflicts in the social structure, means in this context nothing else but that authority resides in roles. The elementary concept of role can- not be derived from authority, as Dahrendorf (cf. 1961:27) claims at one point. The relation is rather the other way around: authority is linked to role and derived from it.

Authority thus turns out to be defined as legitimate institutionalized role-expectation of superordination and subordination. Although Dahrendorf takes the definition of authority from Weber, it is identical with Parsons' con- ception. Authority is an institution as it is for Parsons. In this sense authority relation- ships are nothing else but a specific form of complementary social behavior. Authority is only one integrated pattern of action in the whole role structure of a social system (cf. Hiibner, 1967:202).

From the concept of social structure defined in ternms of social action, the explanation of authority, coercion, conflict, social classes, class interests, and social change emerge. Dah- rendorf's intention to establish a link with Marxian theory can succeed only on the most formal level of these concepts. The concrete relations of dependency found in the social structure, out of which class interests and class conflicts arise, must enter the categorial sys- tem at a more abstract level, if conflict theory is to overcome the limitations of equilibrium- theories. But Dahrendorf succumbs to the very conceptual constraints of structural-func- tional theory that he pretends to avoid. In his model of society, the function and genesis of authority necessarily are defined in a different way, methodologically, than Marx defines themii.

Authority as a Source of Conflict

Dahrendorf's theoretical foundation of au- thority varies somewhat with various contexts. His distinction between the social contract ;i(pacte d'association) and the contract of authority (pacte de gouvernement), in which the former always precedes the latter, is closely related to Parsons' model (cf. Dahrendorf,

1960a :221; 1959b :46; 1961 :28; 1965:240,241). Authority, to Parsons, is a necessary supplement to the normative system which can never be explicit enough to guide all action in every possible circumstance. Dahrendorf's differences with Parsons begin where he attaches to au- thority functions that are not integrative, but are sources of conflict. Thus, he says, the same structure of authority which guarantees inte- gration also becomes the source of conflict (cf. 1959b :46). The reason for this is that authority is always coercion, the rule of some over others. Coercion implies, further, the particularization of interest and permits the conclusion that authority not only enforces norms, but performs a norm-setting function as well. This aspect is most important to Dahrendorf when he wants to explain conflict and change, in opposition to Parsons, who stresses authority as an integral subpart of the normative system. With the norm-setting func- tion, Dahrendorf can explain authority only as a prerequisite of ruling groups. This other- wise implicit formulation can be found in his use of the reference-group concept. Here (cf.1961:28), norms originate from social groups in authority positions who use their authority in order to legislate norms. And, in an almost Marxian phrase, Dahrendorf (cf. 1961 :32) writes that the value system is com- mon to the whole society only in the sense that it is undisputed; actually, it is imposed by the ruling class.

Dahrendorf now finds himself in a delicate position, trying to go beyond Parsons without relinquishing his action-theory approach. This is reflected in the character of authority: on the one hand, it functions to integrate society under a common normative system and to act as a mechanism of social control. On the other hand, it has the instrumental capacity to impose a value system derived from the goals of a minority. Dahrendorf's attempt to evade the consequences of structural-functional theory confronts a difficulty. He has to explain both the integration of society and the conflicts for the attainment of authority as the resultants of the will and intention of a social power group which is able to institutionalize its ends as a comprehensive normative system. Whether Dahrendorf is able to resolve this impasse

156 SOCIAL FORCES

depends on the possibility of explaining the relation of interest and authority to the concept of social structure as developed in action theory.

III. SOCIETY AS "IMPERATIVELY COORDINATED

ASSOCIATION" (HERRSCHAFTSVERBAND)

By means of conflict theory Dahrendorf (1958b:82) intends to present a model which, in contrast to the ahistoric conception of the social system, makes possible the explanation of the "structural origin of social conflicts." He argues that the structural origins of social conflicts are found in the authority relations of organized social entities, and that these entities appear as coercively integrated Her- rschaftsverband. (In his English edition of Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Dahrendorf uses the ponderous translation of Weber's term, "imperatively coordinated as- sociation.") This term contains all the elements of his theoretical pretensions which can be deduced from his critique of the structural- functional system. Even though employing the model of Herrschaftsverband is meant as an alternative to the concept of system, it can be shown that behind this model nothing else is concealed but the familiar notion of the scalar structure of a system (cf. 1957 :216; 1959b: 20ff). Authority, in the Herrschaftsverband as in the social system, constitutes the "coercive, controlling element" (1957:162). In both models it is understood as a functional im- perative. Coercion which, in contrast to norma- tive consensus, is the integrating force of the Herrschaftsverband is defined, exactly as in Parsons' "system," as the sanction against deviation from norms. Dahrendorf thus fails to establish that coercion is unique to the Herrschaftsverband or that it is a specifically different aspect of authority from that term's structural-functional definition. Indeed, the coercive nature of authority simply results from its integrative function. Basically, co- ercion in Dahrendorf's understanding does not differ from social control (cf. 1959b :45f). Dahrendorf has to demonstrate that authority coercively integrates and causes conflict at the same time.

Dahrendorf's Definitions of Role and Interest

Dahrendorf's decisive shift away from Par- sons lies in the definition of "role," through which alone the notion of Doppelgesicht of social structure becomes understandable. Roles in conflict theory have a "non-integrative aspect of behavior" (1957:161). They are to be de- fined "through certain expected interest orien- tations, which principally point beyond the integration of an existing structure and can have disruptive consequences" (1957 :161f). Dahrendorf can thus establish the structural conflict of positions in the social structure. The Herrschaftsverband then is split into two role aggregates according to their "possession of or exclusion from legitimate power" (1957: 163). This opposition becomes comprehensible as the starting point of the conflict theory if different and contradicting role-expectations are associated with the authority and non- authority roles. This, however, Dahrendorf has to subsume a priori, just like the assertion that it is the opposition between rulers and ruled which determines the split of the Herr- schaftsverband and the conflicts within it. That leads to the following question: What justifies the claim that conflicting role-expectations are identical with contradicting interests?

The value of the role-concept, in its original explication, is, above all, that social behavior can be analyzed systematically insofar as it is normatively oriented and a function of expec- tations. Expectation in turn requires the as- sumption of consensus. Role relations are always complementary patterns of behavior. Problems of deviation are explained in this context through the vagueness of the norms or through the plurality of expectations. The concept of interest, on the other hand, has no place in this idea. Conformity with the norms is part of need-dispositions (cf. Parsons and Shils, 1962:191), and thus in the "interest" of the actor. In other words, interest is not disruptive but integrative.

Dahrendorf's notion of "objective interest" is a recourse to Marx, whose intention it was to demonstrate that interests are determined by social structure, rather than to explain them psychologically (cf. Dahrendorf,1957 :166). Ac- cording to Dahrendorf's action-theory defi- nition of structure, however, "objective inter-

DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 157

ests" are attached to positions; they are "role- interests," expected patterns of behavior. On the other hand, the term "interest" does not imply an assumption about the contents of interests, but is supposed to be only a theo- retical construction (cf. Dahrendorf,1957:166). However, from this specification of "objective interests," their antagonistic character cannot be derived as being structural in origin. It appears rather that interest is identical with role-expectation. The notion that there are contradictory orientations would seem then to require some idea of the contents of the inter- ests. The postulate of antithetical interest ori- entations, on the other hand, is one of the essential preconditions of the model: that posi- tions in the Herrschaftsverband are divided into two groups, one of which is characterized by the possession of power, the other by its ab- sence. The first has an interest in conserving the present structure, the second wants to change it (cf. Dahrendorf,1957 :167). Indeed, the supposedly formal definition of interests has already some concrete contents. It is identical with the definition of positions to which the interests are linked. The postulate with which the contraposition of interests is asserted ap- plies equally to the structure of the Herrschtafts- verband out of which the antagonistic interests were supposed to evolve. In other words, the antagonism which was to be explained through role-behavior (as interest-oriented) is actually part of its definition, part of what Dahrendorf defines to be role-interests.

The identity of assumptions about structure and interests is not accidental. It is inevitable, because the "interests" as well as the structure, consisting of positions and roles, are both de- fined through role-expectations. For action theory there cannot be a structurally originated interest in the Marxian sense (cf. Dahrendorf, 1957:166), because antagonistic interests cannot be derived from a common normative system.

The difficulties of his approach force Dah- rendorf back to a functional reference in de- fining interest. This reference is implied when the elements of conflict theory are constructed as a mirror image of integration theory. In this model every element contributes to social change (cf. 1958b:81). Accordingly, it is the function of authority roles to tuphold the status

quo and the function of subordinate roles to challenge the present systerm (cf. 1957:162). For Dahrendorf, the individual acts in com- pliance with his role if he contributes to the conflict of contradicting interests, and not to integration (1957:169). This clearly demon- strates that "conflict" serves as an analytical point of reference in the same manner as "integration" does for the structural-functional theory. That is, integration and conflict are both "prerequisites" of society. This implies obviously an a priori solution of the problem posed: to analyze conflict as generated by structural causes. It is another consequence of the action-theoretical approach. A theory of social change which relies on this solution has to result in contradictions.

It may be said that the same is true of Dah- rendorf's definition of social class. He defines classes as being identical with the antagonistic role aggregates of rulers and ruled (cf. 1957: 139; 1962a:154). The criterion for the definition of classes is not property but the possession of authority positions. Accordingly, in each Herrschaftsverband, there can be only two classes. Therefore, "class" is not, in Dah- rendorf's scheme, an independent analytical concept. Classes represent merely the positional (factual) aspect, while class interests are role- expectations. Classes and their interests, as elements of the analytical action system, turn out to be identical with the status-role com- plex. Dahrendorf's intention, to distinguish analytically between the factual structure and the interests originating in it, is absorbed into the circular definition of roles and role-expec- tations. The identity with the role-concept, in turn, means that all assumptions about classes and their interests, their unity and conflicts, are assumptions about the normative system and have to be derived from it.

The Reductionist Consequences

One insoluble contradiction in Dahrendorf's explanation of conflict resides in the relation between norm-oriented behavior and interest- oriented behavior. The Herrschaftsverbannd, like the social system, is characterized by legiti- mate authority. With the expectation to rule directed to the rulers and to obey directed to the ruled (which is the definition of legitimate

158 SOCIAL FORCES

authority), it is quite conceivable that the ruled at the same time expect that the rulers want to preserve the status quo. What is in- conceivable is that the rulers reciprocally ex- pect the ruled to desire the overthrow of the present order. These two mutually exclusive expectations, to obey and to revolt, are a con- sequence of Dahrendorf's equating interest with role-expectation. The contradiction lies solely in the role of the ruled. It is the contradiction between the acceptance of the legitimacy of authority and resisting it. The incidence of legitimacy and illegitimacy of authority are in an inexplicable relation to each other in the same way as obedience and rebellion of the -ruled. Conflict of interest, defined in the posi- tional structure as an inter-role conflict, is actually an intra-role conflict between the con- tradictory role-expectations of obedience and revolt.

In the context of role theory this dilemma cannot be solved. The only solution is con- tained in Dahrendorf's own interpretation of -the theory.

Dahrendorf transforms the concept of role- expectations into that of Rollenzumntung. This neans, in essence, that role-expectations are

not internalized, but that the individual is simply confronted with them. He can decide whether to accept or reject the role bestowed upon him (cf. Tenbruck,1961:11,13). The re- jection, however, is sanctioned negatively. The normative element is thus replaced by the co- ercion of sanctions which are to guarantee *conformity with expectations (Dahrendorf, 1964b :6). This is the very same contention Parsons has criticized in Durkheim's analysis. -"Here the individual is still thought of in utilitarian terms as pursuing his own private ends under a given set of conditions. The only clifference is that the conditions include a set of socially sanctioned rules" (Parsons, 1964: 380). In the same context he writes: ". . . be- sides this (the motives of moral obligation)4 there is always the motive of 'interest' which, looking upon the rules as essentially condi- tions of action in terms of the comparative personal advantage of obedience or disobe- dience and acceptance of the sanctions which will have to be suffered" (1964:404). With the

help of the utilitarian element in his role-con- cept, Dahrendorf can solve the dilemma of the ruled, but only by sacrificing the progress which the role-concept represents for action theory.

In the context of this reinterpretation of the role-concept, Dahrendorf has to see conflict as arising from the expectations of obedience which the rulers address to the ruled, on the one hand, and the interests of the ruled in authority. The interest in authority exists because authority has the implicit instrumental value for the realization of different ends (Dah- rendorf,1957:201; 1960b:571). This in turn makes it necessary to ask where the ends orig- inate and what they comprise; for, an interest in authority is provoked by these "material interests" which the rulers are able to realize to the disadvantage of the ruled. These ma- terial interests are, in Dahrendorf's scheme, manifest, as opposed to latent, interests and represent psychological realities (cf. 1957:169, 177). They constitute the value system of a class which, in the case of the ruled is an unfulfilled claim, and in the case of the rulers an end to be realized. As conscious and, above all, specific interests, they have to be incom- patible. Their importance for the theory lies in the fact that they are automatically in conflict with each other, implying either the preserva- tion or change of the status quo. It is thus demanded of the theory that it explain the contradiction of the specific contents of the manifest interests if the contest for authority is to be analyzed. Dahrendorf cannot predict the various configurations of conflicts, but has to resort to the descriptive analysis of the mianifest interests involved in them. The above conclusion, that Dahrendorf cannot account for a structurally originated interest, is thus supported on the level of manifest interests. This leads to the most important consequence of his approach.

In view of these difficulties, Dahrendorf is compelled to fall back on the "will, wishes and sentiments" of a person or a group. The question of the genesis of interests is referred to psychological determinants of decisions. In- terests remain psychological in the same way as the Witl zur Macht which, being a psycho- logical element, Dahrendorf excludes from 4 Author's comment.

DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 159

sociological analysis (cf. 1957 :201,footnote). The concept of interest and the complementary concept of instrumental authority, which are both derived from the notion of social struc- ture in action theory, converge in a volun- taristic theory of conflict.

Against this background, authority cannot be understood simply as a functional supplement to social structure. The voluntaristic element in the power concept breaks this link. Social integration has to assume a different nature. It does this for Dahrendorf in exactly the same fashion as it does for Mosca, whom he criti- cizes: that the ruling class determines the culture of a people (cf. Dahrendorf,1957:195; 1964b :40). For the conflict theory, values are merely interests which have been insti- tutionalized as norms (cf. 1957:161). The ruling class produces the social norms and they in turn have their roots in the indetermin- able will of the class members because they are neither embedded in a comprehensive norma- tive system nor do they stand in any definable relation to the "factual" social structure. The possible argument that there is competition between several ruling classes of different Herrschaftsverband (cf. 1957:195) is ineffec- tive (and it would not change the logic of the conflict theory) because Dahrendorf defines the state as an all-inclusive "Herrschafts- verband."

IV. THE EXPLANATION OF CONFLICT AND CHANGE

It is apparent by now that Dahrendorf's concept of structure does not imply the dialec- tic of self-originating antagonisms as he intends to show, but that conflict is postulated as a prerequisite of the social structure. The ubi- quity of authority, in the context of this tlheory, correlates perfectly with the ubiquity of con- flict (cf. Dahrendorf,1962c:216). The plurality of values as a source of conflicts and not the utilitarianistic dilemma proves to be the main- spring of his theory. The element of non- normiiative conditions is not even problematical to him. While Parsons mentions at least a realistic situation which is, so to speak, belozw the social structure, even though he does not specify it, Dahrendorf's recourse to the Hob- besian tradition (cf. Dahrendorf,1962e :108) remains a declaration with no bearing on Ihis

argunent. The object of conflicts is not the scarcity of means but authority (cf. 1962b:126; 1962c :217). The distribution of facilities and rewards, for Dahrendorf, is only an ancil- lary consequence of the institutionalization of interests as values which the possession of authority makes possible (cf. 1959a :140,293).

On the level of epistemological analysis, Dahrendorf reveals the "metatheoretical prem- ises" of his theory (cf. 1962b:127). Here he calls for an "institutionalized liberalism" (1964c :66), the preservation of a multitude of options (1964c:51). That may be a function of conflicts; it certainly is not their explana- tion. Thus he speaks of the "purpose and the consequence" of social conflicts as being the provision of the opportunity for social change and progress (cf. 1962b :126f). Conflicts are not so much the cause of change but merely de- termine its course and its morphology.

Dahrendorf's "historical model of society" is intended to transcend the implications of the "historical process" in Parsons' social sys- tem (cf. Dahrendorf,1962e :97,98; 1962b :124). Conflict is postulated as a basic principle and the "position of phenomena is specified not only in reference to the system but in the inclusive process of history" (1962f :81). He defines structural change as the "deviation of values (normative structure) or institutions (factual structure) of a structural entity at a given point of time . . . from those of a pre- ceding point of time" (1957:203). The genetic question of change is abandoned; the defini- tion includes only its configuration. In its comparative-static character it can hardly be said to transcend Parsons' definition of change (cf. Parsons, 1959:495). The intended differ- ence between values and factual institutions cannot be sustained, as the analysis of the structure-concept has shown. The change of the value system is concomitant with the change of the normative institutions. Ironically enough, the imiplications of his concepts defeat Dah- rendorf's critique of Marx: that it is "meta- physically informed" to establish a dependency between processes on the normative and the institutional level. However, given the back- ground of the relation between position and roles as the central unit of the social structure, this dependency is inescapable.

160 SOCIAL FORCES

The Dimension of Change

Another source of the difficulties and con- tradictions, aside from the disparity between theoretical intentions and analytical implica- tions of the concepts used, is the confusion of different levels of abstraction. The division of the social structure into two analytical com- ponents leads, in the context of a higher level of abstraction, to entirely different results in- compatible with the definition of social change. Where Dahrendorf talks about the possibilities of solving conflicts, it is mainly the normative structure which changes, but not the institu- tional. Thus the attempt to solve conflicts at their roots is ill-advised because the ultimate causes of conflicts are to be found in immutable structural elements (cf. Dahrendorf,1962d: 103). Any regulation of conflicts has to be concerned with manifestations rather than with causes. In the contest for authority, the object is its legitimacy, not the entire authority struc- ture. If, however, institutions are not the object of conflicts, any possible change they may undergo must remain altogether incompre- hensible. Dahrendorf is entangled in the di- lemma that on the one hand he has to admit the change of institutions, while on the other hand he insists on an immutable authority structure.

This dilemma results from his conceiving authority to be a functional prerequisite (1964a: 83) which does not remain on an analytical level, but is reified, becoming the empirical basis of each social structure, the basic social relation (cf. 1959b :103). This elucidates the dimensions which the "historical" can have in his theory. Where the "structures of authority and power" serve as the "poles to which all historical variables can be fastened" and are declared to be the "substrate of change" (1964a: 83f), the historical comprises those changing configurations contained within an invariable formal structure.

Consequently Dahrendorf's criticism of Par- sons, that the concepts of "structure and func- tion" are not fit to describe tendencies which transcend the boundaries of an existing struc- ture (cf. 1962f :79f), falls back upon itself. Like Parsons he is dedicated to a theory which analyzes social processes against the back- ground of a structure of functional prerequi- sites. The invariant authority structure is

identical in one formal dimension with Par- sons' structure. Both are understood as a role structure which analytically always re- mains the same.

Social Change as Individual Mobility

Finally a question may be posed which has remained unanswered so far. What are the factual conditions of structural change, of the "exchange of roles" resulting from conflict? The contest for authority is always a "class conflict" for Dahrendorf, and classes are de- fined in terms of roles. "Class membership is derived from the roles an individual holds. The recruitment to a class evolves from the re- cruitment to a role. . ." (Dahrendorf,1957: 153f). The attainment of authority by a class, then, presents itself as a problem of role alloca- tion. The individual is a role occupant and by virtue of that a class member. With a change of roles, he changes his class membership. What Dahrendorf (1957:201) describes as the "instrumental aspect of structural change," namely the change of personnel in authority positions, is the explanation of the role-ex- change as a phenomenon of social mobility. While he tries to prove, with the correct pre- mise of the difference between "classes" and "stratum," that social mobility is only acci- dentally, not systematically, associated with the formation of classes, social mobility turns out to be the only relevant principle according to which individuals rise into authority posi- tions or have to abandon them (cf. 1957:181ff). Thus his contention that the larger the scope of mobility, the less basic and comprehensive is class conflict (cf. 1957:185).

The process of mobility, however, transcends neither the existing social structure nor the authoritative order. "Mobility of single indi- viduals means neither directly a reorientation of the social-structural criteria nor does it ab- rogate the existing selective mechanisms by which the incumbents of societal authority posi- tions are chosen" (Huibner,1967 :175f). One reason for the distinction of class theory from stratification-theories is the intention to ex- plain not only the flux of personnel within the role structure but the change of the structure itself. Mobility, however, is an aspect of so- cial stratification and joined to it. Therefore,

DAHRENDORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 161

it cannot be an explanation of structural change.

Because a structural explanation is not im- plied, stability and instability must be defined in terms of the degree of mobility (cf. Dahren- dorf,1957 :184), and understood voluntaristic- ally. What Dahrendorf has not explained is the evolution of new social groups into positions of political relevance. Only then would the exist- ing social structure be questioned, and with it the basis of legitimacy on which the present order of authority rests (cf. Huibner,1967: 177).

An explanation of this nature would have to show that social conditions can develop con- trary to the intentions of the rulers. It would have to enumerate the circumstances under which social power asserts itself independently of the prevailing normative system. Dahren- dorf's analysis of power, which could have a bearing on this problem, has more a program- matic status than a systematic place in his approach. Power and authority are in a dia- lectic relation, a fact which becomes obvious in a revolution when illegitimate power and legitimate authority are reversed (cf. Dahren- dorf,1960b :571). The "sociologically amorph- ous" concept of power, which he takes from Weber, falls out of his analysis because of the self-imposed restriction of his inquiry to the level of legitimate order. The rigid distinction between power and authority according to the criterion of legitimacy is plausible only in the context of action theory. Only in that theory does power assume the structurally unde- termined and instrumental character which is supposedly endemic to it.

In order to support the thesis that the dia- lectic of power and authority establishes the society as an inherently historical one (cf. Dahrendorf,1960b:571), the theory needs one further aspect, aside from the solution of the relation between obedience and rebellion. It does not account for the allocation of factual conditions of social power. In Parsons' social system the "facilities" are allocated to roles according to their defined tasks. All sub- ordinate roles, however, are defined normatively and for Dahrendorf in particular, through the norm-setting function of authority. As insti- tutionalized roles, defined by the expectation

of obedience, they are allocated only those facili- ties which are in accordance with these expec- tations. Parsons defines illegitimate power- though residually-as an incomnplete integra- tion of the normative system or, more speci- fically, a malfunction of the allocative mnechanisms. For Dahrendorf it means instead the disintegration and/or change of the order of authority, which actually should be explained by the origins of power. There remains an irreconcilable contradiction: between the func- tions of authority and the question of how the ruled attain the facilities with which to over- throw the existing order. The phrases, the "inner dialectic of power and authority" as well as "the historical function of authority" (1960b: 571), prove to be meaningless. Actually it is at this point where the analysis of change of the authoritative order and social structure would have to begin.

The ambitious attempt to join the Marxian tradition of social thought with modern theory does not succeed. Even where Dahrendorf claims to have avoided the historical-philo- sophical and metaphysical implications of Marx's theory, he places himself in direct opposition to his announced intentions. The notion of role-exchange conceals an implied cyclical model of history which is not less metaphysical than Marx's implication of lin- ear progress. Like Parsons, he must in- terpret social processes as movements be- tween integration and disintegration, equilib- rium and disequilibrium. This stands in op- position to his original intention to understand the historical process of society, in contrast to Parsons, as transcending any existing structure.

The conceptual system of Dahrendorf's con- flict theory reflects its purely functionalist nature, although it has been proposed as a supplement to structural-functional theory. The specific concepts which supposedly make the analysis of conflict and change possible are situated analytically within the same frame of reference as that of the functionalist approach which, according to Dahrendorf, is inadequate for such an analysis. To avoid this dilemma, he takes recourse in variables which elude systematic investigation. Dahrendorf's volun- taristic explanation of authority, power, and

162 SOCIAL FORCES

colnflict is hardly less residual than that of the much criticized structural-functional approach.

V. THE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS

RISE TO POWER

Although this paper so far has been limited to showing the shortcomings of a conceptual apparatus or what is claimed to be conlflict theory, one is tempted into looking at the ef- fort to explain a concrete historical process of change. Both Dahrendorf and Parsons have addressed themselves to the same topic: the Nazis' rise to power. He-re again it is par- ticularly convenient for the evaluation of Dahrendorf's theory that he starts out from and explicitly criticizes Parsons' (1954b) famous paper on "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany." In his article which bears the conspicuously similar title, "Democ- racy and Social Structure in Germany," Dah- rendorf (1962g) attributes to Parsons the suc- cess of having given a coherent picture of the German society. However, due to Parsons' theoretical approach, it is limited to a descrip- tion of the value system in Germany before 1933. In his analysis only the dominance of the Prussian aristocracy, the state bureaucracy, and the military remain as the "factual sub- strate." "Although this is an important factor it remains unexplained and is certainly not the only structural aspect of the German society of which it can be said that it prevents the functioning of German democracy" (1962g :266 and for a similar critique, 1965:66). Dahren- dorf, on the other hand, claims to place the "factual substrate" of stratification and the institutional structuring of the German society in the center of his analysis. This intention shows the same elements as his theoretical critique of Parsons.

Parsons (1954b :116) in his answer to the question why the "democratic" solution of the 1918 revolution failed "to stick," i.e., why Germany did not continue in the "main line of the evolution of Western society," begins with a description of the Prussian social structure which he finds characterized by "interdepen- dent 'feudal,' militaristic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian features" (1954b:106) due to the predominant role of the "Junker" aristocracy and a highly developed civil service. The pres-

tigious standing of both these groups had a corollary in "a peculiar tendency towards the formalization of status in Germany" (1954b: 110). These features of the German social structure stood out as peculiar to it and differ- ent from those elements which are to be found in all industrialized nations.

Parsons' analysis becomes somewhat social- psychological where he turns to the actual ex- planation of nationaal socialism. He interprets the departure from the short-lived democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic as a "mobilization of the extremely deep-seated ro- mantic tendencies of German society" (1954b: 123). They, in turn, are to be explained as a reaction to the rapid social change constituted by the ubiquitous process of rationalization. That these tendencies were stronger than else- where was due to the exceptional formalization of social status which "tends to absorb less of the individual's emotional attachment" (1954b :121).

The question which poses itself now is in what respect Dahrendorf's theory offers an explanation beyond that by Parsons and, per- haps, even with different results.

As far as the description of the historical configuration of the German social structure before 1933 is concerned, one finds little differ- ence between the two authors, not to mention any evidence of the intended emphasis on the "factual substrate." Dahrendorf, too, focuses on the authoritarian elements of the social structure. To him this fact is documented pri- marily by two dependent phenomena. In im- perial Germany social order and integration was realized through the state. The unique Prussian idea of the state as being separated from and above society, as the utopian reali- zation of a common good, persisted through- out the Weimar Republic and was clearly incompatible with its liberal, democratic con- stitution. In spite of the country's rapid in- dustrialization, the bourgeoisie was oriented toward the Prussian aristocracy and its feudal- istic and patriarchal-authoritarian values (Dah- rendorf,1962g :270). These values remained manifest in religious, military, economic, and political institutions after the end of the war to the extent that even the leaders of the labor movement adhered to them. (Dahrendorf,

DAHREND ORF'S CONFLICT THEORY 163

1962g :276f., cites Lassalle in this context). Just like Parsons, Dahrendorf then finds the source of right extremism in the middle classes. Their antidemocratic sentiments, although a universal phenomenon in modern societies, could become virulent because they developed in an authoritarian social structure. Thus, they found the way to power barred to them in more liberal societies (cf. 1965:430).

Where in this explanation does one find elements of the conflict theory as instrumental and necessary? First of all, it is obvious that Dahrendorf's analysis does not have a "factual substrate" as its frame of reference any more than is the case in Parsons' study. Dahrendorf (1962g :283) takes recourse to the "illiberal traditions," authoritarian and potentially "totali- tarian, i.e., utopian" traits of the social struc- ture, loosely using the term "structure" where he is actually describing the aspects of the pre- dominant value system. This is hardly surpris- ing in view of the criticism applied above to Dahrendorf's usage of the concept of "factual substrate." That critique, on the contrary, is corroborated by the status which the concept has in the concrete historical analysis.

Secondly, one can turn to the question, which role Dahrendorf attributes to the elites, i.e., the agents of social change in the context of his theory, in bringing about the process of change. Dahrenclorf's central argument is that the im- perial elite lost its political basis at the end of World War I. The period of the Weimar Republic which followed was characterized by the fact that no counterelite rose up to save the state which until then had been embodied by the traditional elite (1965:428). The bourge- ois republicans and the socialists did not ef- fectively take the place of the earlier elite. Instead, the new groups in power were, at best, able to preserve the status quo (1965:418). This situation encouraged attack from more determined groups. Such an antidemocratic group arose with the national socialists. Join- ing forces with the equally antidemocratic conservatives, they were able to gain the power to liquidate the Weimar Republic. A liberal elite which could have stopped them did not exist.

In this argument the elite concept has little more than decorative value. To begin with, the

historical observation that the political elite of Weimar was too weak cannot, in its purely mechanistic sense, be accounted for by the conflict theory because that elite did have the virtual power. The theory can also not ac- count for the actual change of power in terms of the description of the elites. The change is, instead, explained in terms of the programs and values that these elites represented. The de- cisive aspect of the explanation is the anti- democratic leanings, above all, of the middle classes out of which the national socialist elite recruited itself.

In the historical analysis the conflict-theo- retical concept of "class" is replaced by the largely economically defined term "middle class." In the conflict theory, classes are de- fined according to the status of their members relative to the possession of power, and con- flict is to be understood as the struggle for power, but neither would suffice to explain the Nazi-Machtergreifung. Even in Dahrendorf's own account of the events, the argument is carried by a combination of two factors: the prevailing Prus,sian value system and the threats, primarily felt in an economic context, to the middle classes. Due to these threats the middle classes constituted the social basis of the support for the national socialists as shown outwardly in the increasing NSDAP-vote. Moreover, as the takeover by the Nazis oc- curred in the frame of a, however badly, func- tioning parliamentary system, the problem is not so much the actual change of power but the genesis of the fascist ideology. That question, however, is not even explicitly asked by Dahrendorf.

Thus, in no way is the conflict theoretical class concept or the concept of elites instru- mental in leading to the explanation which itself is historically plausible. Indeed, the middle-class theory of national socialism which Dahrendorf supplements by the very same factors as Parsons to make it valid for the German situation does not remain the only explanatory scheme in his solution to the "German question."

In his Gesellschcaft und Demokrcatie in Deutschland, Dahrendorf embeds his answer in a more complex approach. Underlying his general analysis of the German society is a

164 SOCIAL FORCES

rudimentary theory of democracy "according to which a limited number of areas in the social structure has to be analyzed to find those factors that determine the effectiveness of political constitutions" (1965:40). This aims at a theory of the relation between democracy and social structure, a yet unreached goal of political sociology. Dahrendorf (1965 :43) does not claim to be successful but simply to be a little ahead of others.

He selects four structural areas as primarily important: the degree of the realization of general citizenship, i.e., equality of participa- tion, the degree of a rational regulation of conflicts, the degree of political plurality, espe- cially as represented by the elites, and finally the degree to which the value system encour- ages political and social involvement and par- ticipation (1965 :40f).

Evaluating these four factors as they are manifested in the German social structure with reference to the basic problem, the national socialist acquisition of power, Dahrendorf (1965:417-418) observes basically the same facts which have already been cited, though in a slightly different context. The role of citizenship had been little developed so that, in spite of industrialization, a value system prevailed which did not allow the free play of interests "on the market of political decisions." The institutions of that society manifested the principle according to which conflicts were treated. The solution was sought in the elim- ination of the sources of conflicts rather than in their rational regulation. Democracy could thus be discredited as the worst of all systems. The monopolistic elite of the German empire left a vacuum which at that time was not filled by another group. The coalition which took its place, bound together by the common fear of a revolution from the left, encouraged a more closed and determined group to set an end to the state of undecidedness. Finally, the prevalence of private as opposed to public virtues also accounts for the success of the usurpation of power by the radical right.

The syndrome of these four factors for Dah- rendorf explains the antidemocratic tendencies but not the exact direction of change as either toward an authoritarian or a totalitarian solu- tion (1965:420). The missing link in this

explanation is still another aspect: the fact that to establish a liberal democracy, Germany had to undergo a social revolution. This revo- lution had to be a bourgeois revolution in order to bring about the adaptation of the social structure to the industrial development of the country, i.e., its economic structure (1965: 428). According to Dahrendorf it is exactly that which national socialism accomplished. It broke with old traditions, destroyed the rem- nants of the imperial aristocracy when their representatives tried, halfheartedly, to over- throw Hitler on July 20, 1944, and disrupted the old social structure, thus opening the way for Germany into modernity (1965:431ff).

This application of Dahrendorf's theory of democracy to the question of how the Third Reich was possible clearly supports what was said earlier of his explanation of conflict and change. The four factors show that the model of the liberal democracy is the frame of ref- erence in terms of which the historical develop- ment is interpreted. The process of change is not causally explained, as it was intended, but described in an ex post facto fashion which then easily establishes a degree of determinism in the analysis. Thus, by comparing the con- figurations of the German social structure be- fore and after Hitler, he can arrive at the unique answer that fascism merely served as an agent of history to bring about the in- evitable: the realization of a liberal democracy in Germany, a solution so undifferentiated in view of past and present facts that it finds few followers. What is more important in this context, however, is that Dahrendorf's con- flict theory either fails to explain or is not even systematically applied to the very prob- lem of German history, the inadequate ex- planations of which by the social sciences were at the basis of his theoretical intent.

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DIFFERENTIATION IN URBAN NEGRO AREAS 165

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SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN NEGRO AREAS OF AMERICAN CITIES*

WILFRED G. MARSTON York University

ABSTRACT

This study examines the extent to which social class segregation within Negro communities is accounted for by a distance model. This involves a comparison of the relative variation of socioeconomic status by distance from city center and by age of neighborhood within Negro communities of 16 American cities of varying size and regional location. While socioeconomic

* A revised version of a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1967.