Beyond Faith and Isdentity Mobilizing Islamic Youth in Democratic Indonesia

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Beyond faith and identity: mobilizing Islamic youth in a democratic

IndonesiaKikue Hamayotsua

a Northern Illinois University,

Online publication date: 20 May 2011

To cite this Article Hamayotsu, Kikue(2011) 'Beyond faith and identity: mobilizing Islamic youth in a democraticIndonesia', The Pacific Review, 24: 2, 225 — 247

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The Pacific Review, Vol. 24 No. 2 2011: 225–247

Beyond faith and identity: mobilizingIslamic youth in a democratic Indonesia

Kikue Hamayotsu

Abstract There is a prevailing assumption amongst scholars and observers of In-donesian politics that there is a close link between religious identity and politicalidentity. How valid is this socio-cultural identity model in explaining the party af-filiation and political allegiance of increasingly pious Muslim youth to a politicalorganization in the context of democratic consolidation? In particular, how validis this assumption with consideration to contemporary Indonesian politics? Thisarticle engages this debate through a careful analysis of the member recruitmentand mobilization of the most successful religious-based Islamist organization inpost-authoritarian Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The article com-bines two strands of social movement theory, resource mobilization and opportunitystructures, to argue that the PKS’s relative success in recruiting committed Muslimyouth is explained by two interrelated factors: (1) merit-based cadre recruitmentand promotion, which offers young, ambitious and religiously conscious Muslimyouth fair and institutionalized political career opportunities and thus incentives tocommit themselves to the party’s collective interests; and (2) the timing of organiza-tional expansion that coincided with a rapid increase of state office – both executiveand legislative – at the sub-national levels as a result of localized democratic elec-tions.

Keywords political Islam; democratization; Indonesia; religion and politics, PKS;religious parties; social movement.

Introduction

To what extent does religious piety and identity shape political identity?To what extent does religious-based ascriptive identity condition affilia-tion and loyalty of supporters to a particular political organization? In the

Kikue Hamayotsu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois Univer-sity. The original version of this article was first presented at the American Political ScienceAssociation Annual Meeting in Toronto, 3–9 September 2009.

Address: Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115,USA. E-mail: [email protected]

The Pacific ReviewISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online C 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://www.informaworld.com/journalsDOI: 10.1080/09512748.2011.560960

D o w nl o ad ed B y : [ Th a m m a s a t U ni v e

r si t y] A t : 13 :17 22 J u n e 2011



226 The Pacific Review

literature of identity politics, scholars have sought to understand questionssuch as these. This article seeks to go somewhere along answering thesebroader theoretical questions regarding religion and politics through a care-

ful analysis of a Muslim-dominant democracy, Indonesia.Among scholars and observers of Indonesian politics, there is a prevail-

ing assumption that there must be a close link between religious identity andpolitical identity. This primordialist view was first popularized in the 1960swhen a prominent anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, introduced this concep-tual model founded on religious-based socio-cultural identity. Accordingto this identity category, the Muslim community in Java is broadly catego-rized into three types: abangan (nominal Muslim); santri (pious Muslim);and priyayi (the traditional aristocracy). The santri is further divided into

two categories: traditionalist (more syncretic) and modernist (more ortho-dox). These religious-social identities tend to correspond to political identi-ties and affiliation called aliran (current) (Geertz 1960). This socio-culturalclassification offered scholars a useful conceptual tool to explain party affil-iation and political and voting behaviors in Muslim communities (e.g., King1982; Samson 1968).

Almost five decades later, this socio-cultural aliran model still signifi-cantly conditions analysis and research methods of a later generation of scholars (e.g., King 2003; Liddle and Mujani 2007; Turmudi 2004). It is ex-

pected that the socio-religious categorization (either in terms of individualidentity or organizational affiliation) is readily translated into political cat-egory or affiliation. How valid is this socio-cultural identity model in ex-plaining party affiliation and loyalty of increasingly pious Muslim youth toa political organization in the context of democratic consolidation?

This article seeks to engage this debate through a careful analysis of the member recruitment and mobilization of the most successful religious-based Islamist organization in a post-authoritarian Indonesia, the Prosper-ous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), known as the PKS. Since its

inception in 1998, the PKS has managed to recruit a number of commit-ted Muslim youth to build the most dynamic religious-based national partyin Indonesia. The organizational expansion of the PKS poses an intriguingpuzzle because it has occurred against the backdrop of alleged declining po-litical Islam (i.e., declining popularity of religious-based parties and politicalinfluence of organized religions) and notoriously weakly-institutionalizedpolitical parties. This puzzle is even more intriguing if we consider broadersocio-economic transformations since the 1970s and Indonesia’s highlycompetitive and liberal religious and political market reinforced by them.Sustained economic growth and urbanization throughout the 1980s and1990s have brought about the Muslim urban middle class that is self-consciously and publicly religious. In the university campuses in cities andsuburban neighborhoods, various dakwah (missionary) organizations andreligious study groups mushroomed to meet – and further promote – spiri-tual aspirations of the Muslim youth, especially students. The campus dak-

wah movements including Jemaah Tarbiyah (the Education Movement)


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K. Hamayotsu: Beyond Faith and Identity 227

which later formed the PKS, gained prominence among students at a timewhen other oppositional and campus activism was severely restrained un-der the Suharto regime (Hefner 1993; Robison and Hadiz 2004: chaps. 4–5).

In the early 1990s, Suharto sought to accommodate – and co-opt – the ris-ing expectations of the Muslim middle class and endorsed establishmentof the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) led by hisprot ´ eg ´ e, then Minister of Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie (Hefner1993; Liddle 1996). An expansive network of state and private resourceschanneled through ICMI to the Muslim community allowed young Muslimmen and women new educational and career opportunities and upward so-cial mobility in the modern professional fields unavailable to them before.Against this backdrop, competition among a wide range of Islamic organi-

zations including both radicals and liberals has grown over the allegiance of the devout Muslim youth. At the onset of political opening after the fall of the Suharto regime, a number of Islamic movements chose to form politicalparties to realize their visions of society under a new democratic regime.Why and how has the PKS managed to recruit committed and qualifiedyoung members and keep them committed to the organization in the longterm while others have not?

This article combines two strands of social movement theory, ‘resourcemobilization’ and ‘opportunity structures’, to offer an alternative perspec-

tive to the question about long-term member commitment in Islamist or-ganizations. It argues that the PKS’s relative success in recruiting commit-ted Muslim youth is explained by two interrelated factors: (1) merit-basedcadre recruitment and promotion, which offers young, ambitious – and re-ligiously conscious – Muslim youth, fair and institutionalized political career

opportunities and thus incentives to commit themselves to the party’s collec-tive interests; and (2) the timing of organizational expansion that coincidedwith a rapid increase of state office – both executive and legislative – at thesub-national levels as a result of localized democratic elections.

This article suggests that the recruitment pattern of the PKS cannot befully explained by socio-cultural identity along the Geertz line, or mobiliza-tion of religious ideology, alone. The ability of party leaders to formulate or-ganizational and ideological instruments in order to mobilize targeted con-stituencies played a crucial role. Devising organizational mechanisms thatpromise political career opportunities for active and potential members hasallowed the PKS to transcend the traditional socio-cultural boundaries torecruit and commit a broader spectrum of pious and politically ambitiousMuslim youth.

In particular, this article revisits the socio-cultural positions that predict(1) party recruitment is done through mobilization of religious identity;and (2) party loyalty is almost absolute because followers are essentiallyattracted to the party’s religious ideology. In the Indonesian context, myfindings question two prevailing assumptions along those lines. The firstassumption is that on the one hand the Islamist is socio-culturally identi-fied with the ‘modernist (orthodox)’ and therefore mainly willing/able to


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mobilize modernist Muslims of Muhammadiyah background. On the otherhand, the Islamist is not able to recruit the ‘traditionalist (syncretic)’Muslims associated with influential Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The second as-

sumption this article finds necessary but insufficient is that it is the Islamistideology (inherited specifically from the Muslim Brotherhood) that attractsand binds PKS followers to the party in the long run.

These findings are primarily based on field research and numerous per-sonal in-depth interviews and communications with PKS members at allranks as well as leaders of other religious and political organizations inthe following localities in 2008 and 2009: Jakarta, Banten (Tangerang, KotaTangerang), West Java (Depok, Bandung), South Sulawesi (Makassar), andYogyakarta. The findings are also based on primary sources and materials

that the author collected at party branches at various levels and field obser-vations conducted through her participation in grassroots activities of theseorganizations.

Mobilizing Muslim youth in an era of democratizationand Islamization: theoretical views

Puzzle

Across the Muslim world, socio-economic and political transformationssince the 1970s have brought about growing prominence of political Is-lam. A range of non-state religious movements emerged to provide an al-ternative political outlet to address the interests of nascent Muslim urbanmiddle and working class, interests generally neglected under primarily un-democratic and/or avowedly secular Muslim regimes. Against our earlierexpectation that Islamists could only attract the impoverished Muslim com-munity, it was among the newly ascending urban middle class and small-

entrepreneurial Muslim constituencies that Islamist organizations gainedpopularity and political prominence as seen, for example, in Turkey andEgypt. Against the backdrop of the electoral rise of Islamist political orga-nizations, scholars and policy-makers have been trying to understand thecause of successful Islamist mobilization, especially Islamist recruitment of Muslim youth in the Muslim world. In a Muslim-dominant Indonesia, wehave witnessed a surprising rise of the Islamist party, the PKS, after theonset of democratic elections in 1999. In the first democratic national leg-islative elections in 1999, its predecessor, the Justice Party (PK), won only1.4 per cent of the popular vote, securing seven seats in the 550-memberHouse of Representatives (DPR). In the 2004 elections, the party garnered7.3 per cent of the popular vote to secure 45 seats, a significant leap fromthe prior elections. In the recent 2009 elections, the PKS increased its shareonly slightly to win 8 per cent of the popular vote, securing 57 seats in the560-member DPR (http://www.dpr.go.id/id/tentang-dpr/fraksi).


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Some observers view this recent electoral performance by the PKSalmost as a ‘defeat’, a sign of declining political Islam and weakeningreligious-based parties (Fealy 2009; Platzdasch 2009). It is important, how-

ever, to note two factors that indicate the PKS’s enduring political promi-nence and which sets the party apart from the rest of the religious-basedparties. First, in this election, all the other major parties – both secular na-tionalist and religious-based – appreciably lost the popular vote mainly dueto a landslide victory for the incumbent President Susilo Banbang Yudhoy-ono’s Democratic Party (PD). The PKS was the only party that did not(Kompas Indonesia Memilih; http://indonesiamemilih.kompas.com). Sec-ond, the PKS has emerged as the most powerful religious-based party to join the ruling coalition, with the PD as a leading partner.

The strength of the PKS is its well-organized party functionary and ma-chinery. The organization has grown rapidly and steadily since its inceptionin 1998 to achieve a more than ten-fold membership increase in the pastten years. Currently, approximately 700,000 members are registered. Whatis particularly intriguing about the PKS is its ability to recruit committedcadres, members ready to volunteer to serve the party almost for free andto remain committed to the organization’s collective cause in the long term.This is especially remarkable when we consider a range of hostile conditionsfor Islamists and weakly institutionalized political parties that suffer from

chronic incidence of opportunistic behaviors and factionalism (Hamayotsu2009).

The majority of the members are typically young, well educated andextremely pious. The average age of the party leaders is around mid 30sto early 40s. The current President, Tifatul Sembiring, for example, is 49(among the oldest) and the Secretary-General, Anis Matta, is only 42. Al-most 80 per cent of the cadres have tertiary education. A number of topleaders including Central Board members and members of parliament havea PhD in various fields, mainly in non-religious fields such as engineering

and economics (Bastoni and Anwar 2006).Moreover, the PKS has been able and willing to mobilize and recruitmembers from a mixed religious sociological background: both tradition-alist (associated with the NU) and modernist (Muhammadiyah). Againsta conventional assumption that the PKS could only mobilize the modernistMuslim community, there is no clear association between the PKS and mod-ernists in terms of membership. Nor is there factionalism or conflict alongthis socio-religious line within the organization in terms of promotion andleadership succession. Although it may be true that the PKS tends to at-tract more members from a modernist family background, numerous mem-bers from an NU family background are also very active in the PKS. Oneof the most prominent examples is the son of Solahdin Wahid, a memberof a prominent NU family (Interview, Rumadi, Wahid Institute, Jakarta, 17July 2009). A more general trend, however, seems to be that many mem-bers do not have any strong identification with those traditional categories,


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especially in urban settings where PKS members are typically re-cruited (Personal communication with PKS cadres, Jakarta and Banten,2008–2009).

As far as the PKS’s recruitment strategy is concerned, socio-religiousidentity means little. Asked about whether the traditional cultural identity,NU or Muhammadiyah, matters, one PKS politician laughed at the questionand said:

Some people fight over really small things, whether you pray an NUway or Muhammadiyah way, or if you end the fasting month today ortomorrow. What is more important for us is whether you actually prayand fast. How you do is less important. After all, we are all Muslims

and PKS is very inclusive. We welcome anybody (Interview, then PKSmember of regional legislative assembly, DPR-D Depok, Amri, 15July 2009)

Another leader echoes his view even more bluntly: ‘we don’t care aboutwhether you come from an NU or Muhammadiyah family. That question isno longer relevant in Indonesia’ (Interview, PKS Central Board member,Taridi, Jakarta, 22 July 2009),

The PKS’s ability to recruit committed Muslim youth from a mixed socio-

cultural background raises an important question – both theoretical andempirical. Theoretically, it poses a question about why some religious-basedpolitical organizations are able to recruit committed active members fromvarious socio-cultural backgrounds while others are not. The PKS’s rela-tively successful recruitment has occurred against the backdrop of allegeddeclining political Islam and organized religions in electoral politics – in-cluding both religious-based mass organizations (such as NU and Muham-

madiyah) and political parties (such as the United Development Party(PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Crescent Star Party

(PBB)) in the context of democratic transition (Pepinsky 2009; Platzdasch2009). Why is the PKS able to recruit and keep pious Muslim youth com-mitted to the organization in the long term while others are failing to do so?

Moreover, the PKS’s ability to recruit Muslims from mixed backgroundscalls into question the theoretical utility of the socio-religious identity cate-gory along the traditionalist–modernist line in explaining not only party af-filiation, but also member loyalty and voting behaviors in the Muslim com-munity. Explaining the Islamist recruitment pattern in Indonesia requiresus to go beyond the socio-religious identity paradigm.

Empirically, the PKS’s relative success in recruiting the increasingly pi-ous Muslim youth against the backdrop of democratization and Islamiza-tion is worth investigating because the youth in general and students in par-ticular are always vital brokers for political change in Indonesian politics(e.g., Aspinall 2005; Sidel 1998). Associational ties nurtured through stu-dent and alumni associations and political activism organized through these


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associations offer political parties and politicians important capital for po-litical mobilization and career advancement long after they are too old tobe considered youth. Religious-based student and youth associations (most

famously the Islamic Student Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam orHMI) offer prominent entry into political careers. Why are increasingly re-ligious young Muslim activists attracted and stay committed to a particularpolitical organization (i.e., PKS) rather than others?

Theoretical debates: explaining mobilization of Islamic youth

Ideological framing: political activism as ‘religious duty’

One of the prominent theoretical approaches that helps to explain thePKS’s appeals among the Muslim youth is an approach classified as ‘ide-ological framing’ in the social movement literature. Although they do notframe their arguments in such explicitly theoretical ways, some scholarsemphasize the power of religious ideology and ideas, and/or party leaders’techniques to formulate and communicate ideas to attract followers. As adakwah movement, the PKS first and foremost strives to disseminate Is-lamic norms and values in order to build an Islamic society. Politics is onlya tool to achieve this spiritual end. It is argued that the party’s emphasis

on religious activism and missions and visions of society based on Islamattracts Muslim youth who have become more religiously conscious andglobal in the past few decades (e.g., Bubalo et al . 2008: chap. 2; Machmudi2008; Permata 2008).

These studies, albeit implicitly, echo a theoretical claim Rosefsky-Wickham advances in her study on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Mobiliz-

ing Islam (Wickham 2002). She argues that the Brotherhood’s techniquesin framing their political activism as ‘religious mission’ explains why Mus-lim youth choose to commit themselves to the movement’s risky activism

in the long term despite the shortage of material incentives and relativelyhigh cost. One crucial difference between this framing view and the above-mentioned socio-cultural view is that the former emphasizes the functionof agency in the formation of collective religious identity. In this view, re-ligious identity and commitment is not given by birth or social context aspredicted by the Geertz view, but imbued and shaped by political agency.

This framing approach is indeed helpful in accounting for why devoutMuslim youth are inducted into the PKS in the first place. The PKS is intheory and in practice not simply a political party, but first and foremost amass-based religious movement intended to propagate Islamic teaching andpractices. The PKS was created as a political wing to carry out the religiousmission of a religious movement, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and formally defines itsprimary identity and mission as dakwah. PKS leaders particularly empha-size their social and political activism and service to the nation and to theglobal Muslim community (ummah) as religious obligation (wajib), service


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to the God, to teach and train new recruits to be good Muslims. Rewardsfor doing so are not material but spiritual (Interviews, young party cadres,2008–2009). It is through their regular contacts, training sessions and ex-

tracurricular activities such as volunteer social work as well as recreationaltrips and camps that the party develops exceptionally strong collective iden-tity, esprit de corps, among members. A comment of one of young cadreswell captures such an experience shared by many:

We, PKS, have a big vision, much bigger than just gaining politi-cal power in Indonesia unlike other organizations. We are fightingto reform society to create a just society based on Islam across the

globe. Our service is not only to the Indonesian nation, but also to theglobal community. It’s our commitment and service to the God . . .It is through religious service and dedication that we develop esprit

de corps among us. (Interview, PKS cadre, Farzi, Tangerang, 20 July2009)

We must take into account at least two structural conditions to under-stand why the PKS’s religious ideology works to attract young urban Mus-lims, especially students at secular elite universities such as University of

Indonesia (UI) or Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). The first condi-tion is sociological. Students who come to Jakarta or other big urban citiesto pursue tertiary education and professional careers tend to be isolatedfrom their home and traditional communal ties. In unfamiliar and lonelyurban settings, they look for social ties to rely on for security and comfort.The PKS can attract these young ambitious Muslims from rural areas be-cause their religious training and activities provide not only moral guidanceand meaning to their life in an alien environment, but also social and recre-ational ties and communal bonds to them.

The second condition is political. These young Muslims are a post-authoritarian generation who are hungry for change to build a better polit-ical and social system under a new democratic regime. The majority of thecurrent party leadership gained prominence and political skills in campusdakwah movements and led an anti-Suharto reformasi (reformation) stu-dent movement, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia)(Madrid 1999). They were distinctively anti-establishment and offered anantithesis to the older generation of Islamist leaders proud of their lineageto Masyumi, the once prominent Islamist party banned by the regime in the1960s. While the latter group was willingly co-opted into the pro-Islam net-work, ICMI, these Muslim student activists pursued their struggle to bringfundamental change and contributed to the end of the Suharto regime in1998. The party’s ideological messages that encourage individual dedica-tion to social and political justice and reformation as religious obligation,as emphasized by many Indonesian observers and activists, strikes a chord


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with these politically conscious reform-minded young Muslims, regardlessof their socio-cultural background (e.g., Permata 2008).

Political incentives: access to state power

This framing view can explain why the PKS has managed to attract reli-giously conscious Muslim youth to instill a new collective identity in thepost-authoritarian context. However, this ideological view alone cannotfully explain why the PKS can keep Muslim youth committed to the collec-tive interests of the organization in the long run while others cannot. Thevalidity of the ideological framing view can be questioned on at least threefronts. First, the PKS’s Islamist ideology has somewhat receded over time as

the PKS is involved in electoral politics and has grown faster (1999–2009).Second, there are many alternative social organizations which could of-

fer competing spiritual and socio-cultural functions, services and ideolo-gies for pious youth in Indonesia. If young Muslims wish to seek social tiesand spiritual rewards, they could join more established organizations suchas the NU, Muhammadiyah or the prominent Islamic Student Association(HMI), or youth wings of political parties associated with these organiza-tions. There are also many other – in fact too many – religious groups, in-cluding more puritanical or radical ones such as Hizbut Tahrir (e.g., Fuller

Collins 2003).Indeed, these religious-based organizations compete with one another

for the allegiance of young and promising Muslim leaders in the contextof highly competitive democratic elections and party politics. Member loy-alty to these organizations is not static or absolute (e.g., Morville 2005). Thecompetition among them has grown tense because mass religious organiza-tions are never apolitical in practice and seek to gain access to state powerand/or favor to compete for patronage. After 1998, some of these organiza-tions created their own political parties and at times have played a de facto

party role (i.e., the NU), while others seek and retain intimate associationswith particular parties (i.e., Muhammadiyah). Thus, the rise of the PKS andthe latter’s aggressive recruitment of young cadres has caused antagonisticreactions among those religious organizations.

Moreover, cadre membership and dedication in the PKS is not consis-tent with the party’s indoctrination efforts. The membership has changedconsiderably over time despite religious training and indoctrination beingalmost constant during the same period. For instance, in Kota Tangerang, asatellite city near Jakarta known for its pro-Islam initiatives, the number of cadres declined drastically between 2004 and 2009 not because of religioustraining or party ideology (which in fact have grown more intense), but, ac-cording to the district head of the PKS, because of local political conditionsthat negatively affected the morale of members (Interview, the district headof PKS Kota Tangerang, Suring, 23 July 2009). A similar trend was alsoevident in some other areas.


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This recruitment trend raises an endogenous problem with regard to thecausal effect of indoctrination and ideology on member commitment aspredicted by the ideological framing view. It may be likely that the party

indoctrination efforts to imbue religious identity are the result, as much asthe cause, of party membership and member morale as the party is more

involved in electoral competition. One district head of the PKS, for exam-ple, suggests that the leaders tried to intensify their religious training andto retune religious doctrines after the 2009 elections (in which the PKS didnot win as many votes as their official target) because member morale wasrunning so low that some members even became inactive (Interview, thedistrict head of PKS Tangerang, Rohamaben, 22 July 2009). It was the dis-appointing electoral results and the party leaders’ decision to join the rul-

ing coalition led by President Yudhoyono that demoralized party membercommitment. The party’s ideological position was not entirely helpful inovercoming this tendency.

Finally, it is also important to realize contextual differences in appreciat-ing the explanatory power of ideological framing; the Indonesian situationis in contrast with the Middle Eastern situation. In authoritarian Egypt,according to Wickham, it is the framing of religious ideology rather thanprovision of material incentives that worked to commit Muslim youth toIslamist activism in the long run, because the risk of getting involved in

the Brotherhood was disproportionately high while material rewards weremodest. For Tarbiyah activists under the authoritarian regime, the situationmay have been similar. In a post-authoritarian Indonesia, however, Islamistactivism is no longer risky at all. In the open democratic context, offeringpolitically ambitious youth spiritual rewards alone is not sufficient to keepthem committed to the organization. Material incentives become crucial asthe party gets more involved in electoral races for state power.

The PKS organizational structures: recruiting political ambitious

Muslim youth

A factor that fills the theoretical gap mentioned above – why the PKS isable to commit religious Muslim youth to the party organization in the longterm – is political incentives and organizational mechanisms that guaranteesuch incentives. The PKS’s strength is its dual overlapping identities thatthe party leadership has strategically built to achieve their collective goals;one as a religious-based social movement and another as a political party.In contrast, other organizations have failed or chosen not to build such dualidentity for various reasons. The PKS could attract and keep committedqualified young members because it promises the post-authoritarian gener-ation of not only pious but also politically ambitious Muslim youth fair and

institutionalized opportunities to attain political careers and join the corri-dors of state power; opportunities those Islamic youth were long systemati-cally denied under prior regimes.


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The PKS significantly differs from other political organizations in at leastthree related respects. It has devised internal organizational mechanismsthat guarantee: (1) fair merit-based recruitment and promotion; (2) pri-

ority on collective interests over individual; and (3) regular regenerationand smooth succession of leadership at all levels. These mechanisms allowyoung active and potential members – regardless of their social and culturalstatus – a chance to rise in the organization. The chances for promotion andpolitical careers for young Muslim leaders have increased considerably asthe PKS has gained direct access to legislative and executive powers againstthe backdrop of numerous democratized and localized elections.

The price of gaining state power in highly competitive and corrupt elec-toral politics and participation in the power-sharing ruling coalition is not

cheap, however. As the PKS becomes more embedded in the corridors of state power, some leaders have been involved in alleged corruption and/ordeals behind the scenes, thereby causing discontent and friction within theparty rank-and-file members. The recent arrest of a member of the Houseof Representatives, Muhammad Misbakhun, for alleged implication in theBank Century bailout scandal may offer one such example. The party willcontinue to face such dilemmas in order to maintain member allegiance andto survive politically. Overall, however, organizational cohesion of the PKSis still a distinctive feature among many other parties – both religious and

otherwise. In short, an institutionalized party organization is the key to un-derstanding the ability of the PKS to maintain committed followers.

Merit-based recruitment

The first organizational mechanism which facilitates loyalty among youngPKS members concerns member recruitment and promotion. The PKS em-phasizes three elements in the recruitment and promotion of members:(1) commitment; (2) qualification; and (3) grassroots support (e.g., Inter-

view, PKS Central Board member, Mohamad Sohibul Iman, Jakarta, 29June 2009). These qualities are constantly evaluated through a mandatoryweekly study group, the basic unit of member participation and activitiesorganized at the district level, and regularly reported to the higher echelonof the leadership.

In terms of commitment, the party (via group mentors) observes memberparticipation in regular and extracurricular activities and morale. It is alsoequipped with mechanisms to evaluate and discipline members’ moralityand deeds. There is no way that a new member could rise quickly withoutparticipating in those regular activities. In recent years, party nominationof non-cadre figures for executive offices (i.e., governors, mayors, districtheads) has caused some discontent among rank-and-file members preciselybecause they feel that the central board has breached the party principlesthat bind cadres together. The party leaders are under constant pressureto reconcile such internal discontent to keep the morale of party members


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high while considering a pragmatic strategy to secure economic resourcesto expand the organization in return for ‘selling’ party nominations to non-cadre figures, typically rich businessmen or prominent local figures (Inter-

views, former PKS member of DPR, Nursanita Nastion, 14 July 2009; PKSSecretary-General, Anis Matta, 11 July 2008).

In terms of qualification, what counts is not simply their educationalbackground and qualifications, but also their particular political quality andskills able to contribute to the party and the community at large. For ex-ample, former President Sembiring rose to the top post in 2005 due notonly to his long-term commitment to the movement, but also his leadershipqualities. He completed his tertiary education at the rather modest Insti-tute for Informatics and Computer Managements (STI&K). However, he

proved his leadership and political skill when, as a co-ordinator for a re-gional chapter in Sumatra, he garnered votes to bring 380 PKS representa-tives to provincial and district parliaments (DPR-D) throughout Sumatraand 17 representatives (out of a total of 45 PKS members) to the nationalparliament (DPR) in the 2004 elections (Permata 2008: 125).

In general, however, high-level educational qualifications and profes-sional expertise are valued in the organization and help members to risein the party. A number of members of parliament or candidates for leg-islative positions either have achieved fame as student leaders at the elite

University of Indonesia (such as Rama Pramata and Zulkieflimansyah, bothfrom the Faculty of Economics and both led the Student Senate at UI) orhave completed a PhD abroad (such as Nur Mahmudi in agriculture in theUS, or Mohamad Sohibul Iman in electronic engineering in Japan). Theseare only a few examples and all these leaders command high regard andpopularity among junior members as role models (Interviews, PKS cadres,various localities, 2008–2009).

Coupled with commitment and qualification, grassroots support of fellowmembers is essential to rise in the PKS. Although final approval is pend-

ing on the 99-member Majelis Syuro (Deliberation Assembly), the highestdecision-making body comprised of representatives from various regionsand organizations, branch leaders are elected by branch members at re-spective regional levels. The Syuro rarely overturns recommendations pro-posed by lower echelons of the party leadership unless there is a very se-rious reason to do so – again, only to protect the collective interests of theorganization as a whole. If they are compelled to make a decision contra-dictory to the will of rank-and-file members, the party leaders (i.e., Syuro)are obliged to explain their decisions to the members. A prominent exam-ple is the Syuro’s ruling to endorse Yudhoyono’s nomination of Boediono,former Central Bank bureaucrat, as his running mate for the presidentialelection in 2009. The decision stirred resentment and controversy amongmembers since many expected to have a PKS figure nominated as the vicepresidential candidate under the Yudhoyono ticket in return for supportinghim in the presidential race. However, personalistic promotion of leaders


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purely based on personal favor and/or nepotism remains very rare overallin the PKS.

Likewise, in the selection processes of party candidates for executive

offices at the regional level, the party invests considerable time and re-sources to assess the quality of candidates before coming to a conclusion.Regional branches initiate the process more than a year in advance of an ac-tual election by conducting member surveys (more than once) to assess thequality of candidates nominated by members. After scrutinizing selectedcandidates, they then make a final shortlist to be presented to the Syuro

in Jakarta which is subsequently scrutinized further. The Syuro will care-fully look into the results of these surveys to ensure these candidates arequalified and can garner adequate member support to run for a particular

office.1

To sum up, recruitment and promotion in the PKS is primarily basedon merit and commitment. The party has devised organizational mecha-nisms not only to monitor but also to discipline the deeds and morality of members from an early stage of recruitment. The mandatory weekly studygroup serves the primary monitoring functions. Moreover, the PKS has in-stitutionalized its own ‘justice’ system to discipline members. Members willbe punished by the judicial committee (Syariah Council) at the provinciallevel if they are found guilty of misconduct (such as a sexual scandal or cor-

ruption) as defined by party by-laws. A member who holds a high-rankingposition and is found guilty may run the risk of dismissal from office. Oneknown example is the alleged corruption case involving a DPR-D memberof the PKS at Jambi, Sumatra. Although he was found not guilty, he volun-teered to resign from the office. These institutional mechanisms, alongsidethe decision-making bodies and procedures mentioned above, keep mem-bers’ morale high to ensure effective operation of party machinery and or-ganizational cohesion.

Priority over collective interests over personal interests

Another organizational structure of the PKS that facilitates member loy-alty is the party’s emphasis on collective interests over personal private in-terests. The PKS has made a conscious effort in preventing the personalinterests of any dominant figure overriding or colliding with the collectiveinterests of the organization. In doing so, the party ensures that new andqualified leaders are given fair opportunities to be tested and promoted to

a higher-ranking position according to the accepted qualification mentionedabove. Moreover, PKS leaders believe that constant regeneration of lead-ership and circulation of power is crucial for recruitment of new leaders andultimately the political survival of the organization (Interview, PKS CentralBoard member, Taridi, Jakarata, 22 July 2009).


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The absence of dominant figures and smooth leadership succession

Their emphasis on collective interests and regeneration of the leadership is

reflected in the patterns of leadership succession at almost all levels. In prin-ciple and in practice, incumbent leaders give way to new leaders in order toencourage regeneration and to offer new people opportunities to test andgain leadership skills before running for state office (Interviews, PKS headsof the sub-district office and Central Board members). Thus, unlike manyother political and religious organizations, the PKS has never allowed a sin-gle dominant figure or a prominent family, however rich or charismatic,to control (and compromise) the organization; an equivalent of PKB’slate Abdurrahman Wahid or the Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle

(PDI – P)’s Megawati Sukarnoputri will never be an option. Leadership suc-cession is relatively smooth and factional and personal conflict over higheroffice is kept minimal (Permata 2008: 118). The PKS strictly prohibits stateoffice holders from concurrently holding a party office, thereby compellingthe party leaders to relinquish party office to take up an elected office ingovernment, either legislative or executive. As a result, former presidentsall have served one term (five years or less) and then stepped down to giveway to the next qualified candidate in line. There is certainly a conscious ef-fort to encourage regeneration of leadership to enable new members to gainexperience to build effective party machineries. Equally important, thesepower circulation structures help limit personal conflict over powerful posi-tions within the party.

All these organizational mechanisms devised by the party leaders andthe norms protected by them ensure that theoretically any qualified Muslimhas a reasonable chance to rise in the organizational hierarchy to achievestate office at a very young age; the youngest candidate for DPR legislativeoffice in the 2009 elections was 29. Moreover, the party leadership explic-itly reminds rank-and-file members of their readiness to promote and selectyoung and talented leaders for state office.2 In this way, these mechanisms

facilitate party recruitment of qualified members from a broader spectrumof social and cultural backgrounds, and helps ensure their loyalty to theorganization.

The effect of these mechanisms on member morale and long-term com-mitment is significant. PKS members commonly emphasize how comfort-able they are with these practices and principles embedded in the organiza-tion; minimal personal and factional conflict, the manner in which leadersare selected and their deeds and services are evaluated. Asked if membersleave the PKS or defect to other parties if they are not selected as candi-

dates for particular positions, one central board member responded in thefollowing way:

Of course, at times some people express unhappiness with certain per-sonnel decisions. That is normal in any organization. But, we all are


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aware of what we are fighting for together. We are here to serve thecommunity, not to serve self interests or personal ambitions. Selfishbehaviors, hedonism, materialism, or any of these kinds of attitude

seeking personal benefits will never survive in PKS since such behav-iors are simply not acceptable. (Interview, Jakarta, 29 July 2009)

In short, it is the highly institutionalized party structures that promiseactive and potential members fair access to political career opportunitiesthat accounts for the allegiance of politically ambitious Muslim youth. Someleaders’ involvement in dubious deals and corruption cases that overtly con-tradict the internal party principles have become prominent in recent yearsas the PKS draws closer to the locus of state power. Such tendencies have

caused anxiety and friction among the party ranks, posing a major challengeto the party leadership. The trends may increase as a result of some dras-tic institutional changes, such as introduction of the open-list electoral sys-tem, that have facilitated intra-party competition, deinstitutionalized par-ties and corruption (Tomsa 2010). If the PKS fails, it would likely be due toerosion of the organizational structures that have generated party cohesionand comparative leverage in negotiating with other rivaling parties, ratherthan other factors such as ideological and policy adjustment (e.g., Syariah)or decline of particular leaders.

Institutional context of Islamist recruitment:abundant democratized and localized elections

We have to take into account an additional institutional condition which al-lows the organizational mechanisms of the PKS to work particularly well torecruit and commit politically ambitious religious youth to the party organi-zation: the growing number of state offices – both executive and legislative –and numerous localized democratic elections. As suggested above, the PKSpromises young Muslim members reasonable access to state power in re-

turn for their commitment and service. However, in order to keep fulfillingthe political aspirations and expectations of the increasing number of youngmembers the party seeks to mobilize, there needs to be a sufficient numberof elected offices to be fought for.

The Indonesian democracy in the context of decentralization enterprisessince 2001 has provided such conditions. The timing of institutional changesintroduced at a time when the PKS is aggressively expanding its organiza-tions was critical. In the name of allocating more power to locals and inresponse to mounting political pressure, the government has endorsed theformation of new provinces and new regencies across the archipelago. Be-tween 1999 and 2009, the number of districts (kabupaten) dramatically in-creased from 300 to 510, while provinces increased from 26 to 33 (Fitraniet al . 2005). The increased number of regional governing units means thatthere are more offices – both legislative and executive – and more elections.Since direct elections for the head of regional government (Pilkada) were


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introduced in 2005, Indonesia has held elections at various sub-national lev-els almost every month to fill those offices (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009).

From the perspective of the PKS, campaigns for those local elec-

tions have offered opportunities for mobilizing and promoting qualifiedyoung members. The PKS has fought and won important local electionsincluding those for new gubernatorial positions in West Java, North Suma-tra and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) in 2008 alone. The newly elected gov-ernor of NTB supported by the PKS, KH Zainul Majdi, for example, is areligious teacher and has become the youngest governor (at 36) (Kompas,19 July 2008). The new governor of West Java province, Ahmad Heryawan,is a former head of an influential Muslim association, PUI (Persatuan Umat

Islam), and was 41 at the time of election. In both cases, the clean image of

the candidates were key selling campaign items. This not only appealed toyoung voters but, equally important, boosted the motivation and aspirationof other young party members.3

Moreover, winning sub-regional (district/municipality) office – both ex-ecutive (bupati/walikota) and legislative (DPR-D) – is strategically ex-tremely important for the PKS. The PKS has built a strategic coalitionwith an extensive network of NGOs to provide a range of social and wel-fare services to reach out to new constituencies. Such services include notonly religious preaching and schooling, but also healthcare, education, co-

operatives, charities, sports and other cultural and recreational activities(Hamayotsu 2009). The PKS especially focuses on healthcare and edu-cation as key strategic fields to further expand its constituencies. Havingaccess to (and control over) state bureaucracies in these fields is a politi-cal advantage against the backdrop of Indonesia’s weak state bureaucra-cies controlled by patronage politics and private interests (pk-sejahtera.org;http://pk-sejahtera.org/v2/print.php?id=7810).

Furthermore, Indonesia’s democratization and decentralization has givenoversight powers in these two fields (among others) of education and health

to the districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kotamadya). The allocationof oversight and political and budgetary powers – including control overbureaucratic appointments – means that the stake for winning office at thedistrict level (especially the executive office) is especially high for the PKS.The increased state office and political powers at the regional level has of-fered opportunities not only to gain crucial capital for expanding party or-ganization and constituencies, but also to fulfill the political aspirations of junior members at the local level. Due to the fact that electoral campaignsserve as internal mobilization of rank-and-file members, the PKS almost al-ways attempts to field its own candidates for those local offices even whenthe party has a very small chance of winning them (Interview, the districthead of PKS Kota Tangerang, Suring, 23 July 2009).

Against the backdrop of Indonesia’s weak state institutions, the rapid ex-pansion of local elections and offices have caused more negative outcomesthan originally intended, most notably corruption during and after elections


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(Buehler 2010). Alongside other national-level changes mentioned above,institutional changes at the local level may be a source of friction in thePKS since the party will have to fight for these local positions to match theincreased political ambitions of young members. Without the ambitious de-centralization projects and more elections and state offices, it is importantto emphasize, the PKS could not have achieved such a rapid organizationalexpansion as it has, primarily due to the internal logic of power circulationwithin the party; local elections and offices have served a crucial mechanismfor internal mobilization and political training for future leaders of the PKSto ascend within the party hierarchy.

Counter-factual evidence

Rivalry with Muhammadiyah

The political career opportunities for young Muslim leaders and organiza-tional structures that promise such opportunities are the key for successfulrecruitment and long-term commitment of young members in the PKS. Thetiming of institutional changes was also crucial for this outcome. Counter-factual evidence supports this argument. The lack of political incentives,

especially fair and institutionalized opportunities for qualified young mem-bers to achieve political ambitions in other organizations has negatively af-fected recruitment and long-term commitment of young qualified membersbecause those organizations – regardless of their ideological position – areunable to provide sufficient career incentives to ambitious young Muslimleaders.

The case of Muhammadiyah and its rivalry with the PKS offers a casein point. The PKS’s aggressive organizational expansion and recruitmentcampaigns have spurred antagonistic reactions especially from mass-based

religious organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah. Both orga-nizations are not political parties or organizations as such. However, twofactors justify comparing these organizations with the PKS. First, the PKSis in theory and in practice not simply a political party but essentially amass-based religious movement. The party was created as a political wingof the Tarbiyah movement initially to seek legislative representation andaccess to state resources to continue fighting for religious causes. Second,these religious organizations, both NU and Muhammadiyah, share multiplecharacteristics with the PKS. They are not purely religious but also politicalin many respects, although the balance between these two identities haschanged over time after democratization according to their respectiveattitudes to party politics. Their dual identities mean that they providesimilar services (e.g., religious education, healthcare) and are involved inoverlapping activities. Thus, it is not surprising they compete for the sameconstituencies and resources, including qualified young leaders as well as


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to achieve political careers. In fact, Muhammadiyah has never been ag-gressive in recruiting members (Interview, Muhammadiyah Central Boardmember and former Youth head, Mukti, Jakarta, 6 July 2009). A promi-

nent young Muhammadiyah leader, for example, suggests that Muham-madiyah should offer fellowship programs for selected young leaders, as thePKS does, in order to offer them incentives to increase their commitmentto Muhammadiyah (Interview, former head of Muhammadiyah’s studentmovement, Jakarta, 7 July 2009). He reiterates the political significance of such programs as the PKS has launched. The program is called PPSDMS(Program Pembinaan SDM Strategis, or Strategic Human Resource Devel-opment Program) and is offered at major elite universities in five regionsacross the archipelago to train future leaders identified with the PKS. The

program offers selected students not only free tuition, but also boardingand extracurricular courses and activities. PKS leaders describe this as amodern version of pesantren (religious boarding school) as it is intendedto imbue strong religious-based collective identity among the students byshared living and pursuit of intellectual and professional excellence. Theyalso compare this program to the abovementioned HMI, a Muslim studentassociation which has produced numerous prominent political and businesselites, since PPSDMS is intended to produce a network of pious and suc-cessful Muslim elites of modern outlook in future years.

Second, Muhammadiyah’s official detachment from party politics has dis-couraged recruitment and commitment of young talented leaders to the or-ganization and may actually do harm to the organization in the long runrather than the opposite. Many ambitious young leaders have been com-pelled to seek political careers in various other parties, such as secular-based Golkar and PDI-P, but found themselves powerless in those partiesdue to the lack of backing from Muhammadiyah. They also think Muham-

madiyah members have lost control of PAN (a party created by the formerChairman of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais) primarily due to the lack of of-

ficial endorsement by the organization. Those leaders argue that Muham-madiyah as an influential mass organization could support their politicalambitions in those parties in a variety of ways so that they would be morehighly ranked in the party lists to win legislative seats. However, theylament, such assistance has never come from the leadership (Interviews,Muhammadiyah youth leaders; Secretary-General Gunawan Hidayat andIman Rais, 14 July 2009).4

In short, despite the emphasis on bureaucratic procedures and qualityservice in Muhammadiyah, organizational inability and unwillingness tomeet the political aspirations of young Muslim leaders has discouragedtheir commitment to the organization. Many successful politicians who hailfrom Muhammadiyah families and communities are no longer active in, orloyal to, Muhammadiyah, but rather pledge allegiance to other organiza-tion such as the HMI or the PKS to achieve their political goals (Interview,Muhamad Najib, Deputy Chairman of the PAN, Jakarta, 14 July 2009).5


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political organizations. However, as the preceding pages have shown, thismay no longer entirely be the case. One of the most successful religious-based political movements in a post-authoritarian Indonesia, the PKS, has

managed to transcend this traditional category. It has devised its own col-lective identity to recruit not only more orthodox modernist Muslims (asexpected by the primordialist aliran model), but also traditionalists gener-ally associated with the NU against the broader sociological backdrop of growing piety in loosely connected and fluid urban community.

The successful recruitment by the PKS is to some extent explained by‘cultural framing’ – that is, the PKS’s ability to frame its social and politi-cal activism as religious duty and to identify local concerns with global is-sues concerning the Muslim community at large. However, my findings also

suggest that mobilization of religious ideology and identity alone, as pre-dicted by the cultural framing view, is not sufficient to explain long-termcommitment of PKS cadres to the party organization. They are indeed ini-tially inducted into the organization through religious activism and service.However, the organization needs to offer more than religious ideology thatemphasizes spiritual rewards to keep them dedicated to the organization tosurvive as a political movement.

Across the Muslim world, Islamist organizations have commonly at-tracted the ascending Muslim urban middle-class communities that have

grown pious against the backdrop of rapid socio-economic developmentand political transformations since the 1970s. It is important to remem-ber, however, that Indonesia’s democratic condition is much more openand competitive than its Muslim counterparts in the Middle East. As theIslamist organization is more involved in electoral politics, it needs to of-fer better incentives to keep members’ morale high because, unlike in au-thoritarian Egypt or its own authoritarian past, Indonesia’s Islamic youthnow enjoy abundant opportunities – and alternative outlets – not only toeasily participate in electoral politics but also to realize their own per-

sonal ambitions. It was the organizational structures that provide the post-authoritarian generation of ambitious Islamic youth fair opportunities toseek political careers and access to the corridors of state power, opportu-nities long unavailable to them under the previous regimes that help to ac-count for long-term commitment of PKS members to the collective interestsof the organization.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Eva Bellin, Bill Liddle and other participants of thepanel for their first-rate comments and Peni Hanggarini for her kind assis-tance in the final stage of revision. John T. Sidel, Dirk Tomsa and review-ers for The Pacific Review also provided valuable feedback. All errors andshortcomings are my own.


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Notes

1 The author is grateful to Yon Machmudi, himself an early nominee as the may-

oral candidate of Depok, West Java, for his inside information about the selec-tion process (Depok, 25 June 2009).2 Author observation at the PKS National Congress, Makassar, South Sulawesi,

21–23 July 2008.3 Author attendance at the congress, Makassar, South Sulawesi, 21–23 July 2008.4 Hidayat unsuccessfully ran for the 2009 elections from Golkar, while Rais led the

formation of the PMB.5 Najib hails from the Muhammadiyah family and is associated with the HMI.

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Beyond Faith and Isdentity Mobilizing Islamic Youth in Democratic Indonesia

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