between Sadra’s Philosophy and Husserl's Phenomenology

8/15/2019 between Sadras Philosophy and Husserl's Phenomenology

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Transcendent Philosophy 2, 173-191 London Academy of Iranian Studies

The Notions of Mhiyyah and Eidos: A Comparisonbetween Sadrs Transcendent Philosophy and Husserls

Phenomenology

Abdul Rahim Afaki

AbstractBoth Mull Sadr and Edmund Husserl are the philosophers oftranscendence but different from each other with respect to partly theirown character and partly their affiliation with two different domains of

thought namely Muslim philosophy and Sfism and Western philosophyrespectively. Sadrs ikmatal-H al-Mutaliyyah (TranscendentWisdom)

1is characterized as eclecticism in the sense that this is an

attempt of reconciliation of and, at the same time, reaction against his predecessors like Aristotle, Ibn-Sn, Ibn-Arab, the Illuminationistsand the Peripatetics etc. In addition, he also incorporates the Muslimtheological elements in his thought. On the contrary, Husserls

transcendental philosophy, far more well known as phenomenology, isclaimed to be a radical way of philosophizing which rejects every

presupposition whatsoever pre-given by past philosophies, religion,culture and tradition.

Two Philosophers, if they are recognized by the same trait,

must have some intellectual resemblance though there might becertain differences, whether major or minor, between them. Both of

our thinkers reject rational conceptual process as an appropriate way

of approaching reality. Instead, both focus on intuitive experience to

unveil reality. In their philosophies of transcendence, the notion of

essence plays a vital role but its relationship to reality is perceived

differently. This will be the focal point of my paper. I would like

here to explore the notions of Mhiyyah and eidos as expounded


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174 Abdul Rahim Afaki

by Sadr and Husserl respectively. Mhiyyah and eidos are twodifferent versions of the notion of essence that is a very significant

milestone through their paths to reality. For Sadr, the ultimate

reality is the Necessary Existence (al-Wujd al-Wjib) which isabsolutely objective and transcendent and so cognizable only

through the Gnostic experience (Irfn). The Necessary Existent isto impart existence to the individuals to make them accidental

existences as the sun, being a source of light, is to impart light to

other objects in order to illuminate them as they appear to us.

Whereas the essence of an existent is not an objectively existing

reality rather it is a subjective working out of the nature of

particulars by human rationality. So essence always remains, for

Sadr, a secondary reality that is construed by a subjective mindrather than cognized as an objective reality. Furthermore, essence as

a secondary reality is unified (muttahid) with existence which is aprimordial reality that can never be known by conceptual mind but

only the Gnostic experience can unfold it.

Unlike Sadrs al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah being groundedupon the difference between essence and existence Husserls

phenomenology is based on the relationship between essence (eidos)

and the thing in itself. For him, eidos is tantamount to the thing-in-itself so his main focus is to workout an eidetic method to reach at

eidos; once it is achieved then the thing in itself will never be veiledany more. His eidetic method begins with the bracketing of all

ideas, concepts and beliefs pre-given by culture and tradition. With

this bracketing one absolutely breaks with actuality and is led to thetranscendental-subjective consciousness. This consciousness as a

pure intuition grasps eide (pl. ofeidos) of individual beings and sogives rise to the whole life-world as an object constituted by a

subject.

Drawing from their views on philosophy, this study will

explore the meanings of transcendence as manifested in Husserls

and Sadrs thought. Furthermore, it will delineate how their


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The Notions of Mhiyyah and Eidos: A Comparison 175

concepts of philosophy and transcendence lead towards the notion of

essence.

Both Mull Sadr and Edmund Husserl are the philosophersof transcendence but different from each other with respect to partly

their own character and partly their affiliation with two differentdomains of thought namely Muslim philosophy and Sfism andWestern philosophy respectively. Sadrs al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah (Transcendent Wisdom)1 is characterized aseclecticism in the sense that this is an attempt of reconciliation of

and, at the same time, reaction against his predecessors like

Aristotle, Ibn-Sn, Ibn-Arab, the Illuminationists and thePeripatetics etc. In addition, he also incorporates the Muslim

theological elements in his thought. On the contrary, Husserls

transcendental philosophy, far more well known as phenomenology,

is claimed to be a radical way of philosophizing which rejects

every presupposition whatsoever pre-given by past philosophies,

religion, culture and tradition.

Two Philosophers, if they are recognized by the same trait,

must have some intellectual resemblance though there might be

certain differences, whether major or minor, between them. Both of

our thinkers reject rational conceptual process as an appropriate way

of approaching reality. Instead, both focus on intuitive experience to

unveil reality. In their philosophies of transcendence, the notion of

essence plays a vital role but its relationship to reality is perceived

differently. This will be the focal point of my paper. I would likehere to explore the notions of Mhiyyah and eidos as expounded

by Sadr and Husserl respectively. Mhiyyah and eidos are twodifferent versions of the notion of essence that is a very significant

milestone through their paths to reality. For Sadr, the ultimate

reality is the Necessary Existence (al-Wujd al-Wjib) which isabsolutely objective and transcendent and so cognizable only

through the Gnostic experience (Irfn). The Necessary Existent is


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to impart existence to the individuals to make them accidental

existences as the sun, being a source of light, is to impart light to

other objects in order to illuminate them as they appear to us.

Whereas the essence of an existent is not an objectively existing

reality rather it is a subjective working out of the nature of

particulars by human rationality. So essence always remains, forSadr, a secondary reality that is construed by a subjective mindrather than cognized as an objective reality. Furthermore, essence as

a secondary reality is unified (muttahid) with existence which is a

primordial reality that can never be known by conceptual mind but

only the Gnostic experience can unfold it.

Unlike Sadrs al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah being groundedupon the difference between essence and existence Husserls

phenomenology is based on the relationship between essence (eidos)and the thing in itself. For him,

eidosis tantamount to the thing-in-

itself so his main focus is to workout an eidetic method to reach at

eidos; once it is achieved then the thing in itself will never be veiledany more. His eidetic method begins with the bracketing of all

ideas, concepts and beliefs pre-given by culture and tradition. With

this bracketing one absolutely breaks with actuality and is led to the

transcendental-subjective consciousness. This consciousness as a

pure intuition grasps eide (pl. ofeidos) of individual beings and so

gives rise to the whole life-world as an object constituted by a

subject.

Drawing from their views on philosophy, this study willexplore the meanings of transcendence as manifested in Husserls

and Sadrs thought. Furthermore, it will delineate how theirconcepts of philosophy and transcendence lead towards the notion of

essence.


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Views on Philosophy

Husserls and Sadrs views on philosophy are verysignificant in order to expound their notions of essence, for these

notions are deeply rooted in what they understand and how they

interpret philosophy. Sadr defines philosophy as the perfecting ofthe human self by cognizing through demonstration, within the

limits of mans potentiality, the realities of the things in themselves

in terms of judgments rather than mere opinions or imitations

(AsfrI, p.20). He further equates this definition with the view that philosophy is an attempt of man, within the limits of his

potentiality, to establish an intellectual order in relation to the

cosmos in order to become like the Divine (AsfrI, p.20). Theseviews reflect that Sadr is not only a Sfwhose objective is to havethe religious experience par excellence characterized by becoming

one with God. Rather in order to have that experience he focuses on

the intellectual grasping of all aspects of human life from its Origin

(al-Mabd) to the afterworld (al-Mad). He designs a grandintellectual scheme for perfecting his soul by accumulating the

Divine Wisdom (al-Hikmat al-Ilhiyyah) that encompasses alldomain of knowledge including the knowledge of God, the angels

and the Divine Scriptures. That is to say, the Divine Wisdom ranges

from the knowledge of how God originated the world, what the

laws of nature are and how they determine the functions of

cosmos to the knowledge of human self, how it is related to the

world as well as to the Heavens (al-Mal al-la) (AsfrI, pp.2-

3). Owing to the mind-body dualism of human existence, Sadrdivides philosophy into two types of hikma (wisdom) namely thetheoretical wisdom (al-hikamt al-nazariyyah) and the practicalwisdom (al-hikmat al-amaliyyah)

2 corresponding to the abstract

thinking and the relational action of man respectively (AsfrI, p.20). The task of the former is to cognize, with perfection, the

reality of the extraneous phenomena as things in themselves.

Whereas the objective of the later is to engage with the good actions


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in order to reach to the moral height. Thereby the human soul can

be able to control the human body so that it becomes totally

determined and dictated by the soul. As we have said earlier

Sadrs thought is eclectic in nature: the same is the case with hisdefinition of philosophy. So far he tends to amalgamate the

intellectual grasping of the things in themselves with the Sfexperience of becoming one with the Divine. Moreover, while he

explains the two types of wisdom he refers to the Qurn and theHadth to further elaborate his view of philosophy. In case of thetheoretical wisdom he quotes a Hadth in which the ProphetMuhammadis reported to ask Allah to make him see the things as

they are in themselves. Whereas drawing upon the verses 4, 5 and 6

of Srat al-Tn (Chapter 95 of the Qurn) Sadr explains thecombination of the theoretical and the practical wisdom. The Qurnsays:

We have indeed created man in the best of moulds (ahsani taqwm),then we abased him to the lowest of the low (asfala sfiln) except thosewho believe and do righteous deeds, and so for them shall be a rewardeverlasting. (Qurn 95:4-6)

According to Sadr, the term ahsani taqwm (the best ofmoulds) refers to the distinct and pure nature of the human soul

whereas the phrase asfala sfiln (the lowest of the low) defines the bodily aspect of the human existence that was derived from the

dense (kathf) and the dark (muzlim) material. Moreover, the phrase those who believe corresponds to those who have the

theoretical wisdom. That is to say, when once one totally submits toAllh one finds oneself able to know the reality of the world throughones belief in the Divine revelation. This ability necessarily leads

one to al-amal al-slih (the good deed) which is the sphere of thepractical wisdom. So mn (belief) and al-amal al-slih correspondto the theoretical and the practical wisdom respectively. When one

perfects oneself in terms of this bipartite wisdom one leads oneself

to become like the Divine. This two-dimensional view of philosophy


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(Falsafah) or wisdom (Hikmah) of Sadrs is known as al-Hikmatal-Mutaliyah (Transcendental Wisdom)3 (AsfrI, pp.21-22).

Unlike Sadrs eclectic view of Transcendental Wisdom, asdiscussed above, Edmund Husserl, rejecting every presupposition

given by tradition, culture, philosophy and science, emphasizes aradical way of philosophizing which he calls transcendental

phenomenology. Drawing upon Descartes Meditations, he tendsto begin with new meditationes de prima philosophiasubjected to

a Cartesian overthrow the immense philosophical literature with its

medley of great traditions. That is to say, Husserls transcendental

phenomenology begins with absolute poverty of knowledge being

devoid of any philosophical presupposition or pre-judgment (CM,

pp.1-6). This beginning of philosophical investigations with absolute

poverty of knowledge to cognize the phenomena is the first step of

Husserls phenomenological method which he calls the

phenomenological o (epoche). The epoche is not the denial ordoubt (as in case of the Cartesian method) concerning the existence

of world. Instead, it is a bracketing or suspension which

completely bars the beginners of philosophy from using any

judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Ideas, pp.110-

111). At this moment of complete disconnexion through the

phenomenological epoche the only thing that remains unaffected is

the consciousness in itself. That is to say, at the moment ofepochethere happens a reduction-a leading back to pure consciousness

which is the only phenomenological residuum after the complete

suspension of the world. The simultaneous happening of thephenomenological epoche and reduction makes pure transcendental

consciousness available as the only field of the radical

philosophizing which Husserl calls the science of phenomenology

(Ideas, p.113). The philosophical investigations proceed through the

experiences of pure transcendental consciousness which is a pure

intuition whereby philosophy takes shape of [t]he pure

phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing.


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Whatever appears to pure intuition is the thing in itself or

phenomenon which intuition cognizes in terms of its eidos (essence).

So phenomenology, according to Husserl, must bring to pure

expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and

their governing formulas of essence, the essences which directly

make themselves known in intuition, and the connections whichhave their roots purely in such essences. Each such statement of

essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word (LI,

Vol.I, p.249). This Husserlian notion seems to be an echo of Sadrsconcept of the theoretical wisdom which leads him to the things in

themselves in terms of the Gnostic experience of transcendence. But

the difference between them lies in the states of knowledge attained

through the intuitive experience. In case of Sadr, man becomes likethe Divine having the knowledge of the things in themselves.

Whereas in Husserls case, through intuitive experiences man, in

terms of the essences of the things in themselves, constitute the life-

world (Lebenswelt), the world in which we are always already

living and which furnishes the ground for all cognitive performance

and all scientific determinations (EJ, p.14).

Meanings of Transcendence

Owing to the simultaneous differences and resemblance in

their conceptions of philosophy, one can now understand the

difference between the meanings of the term transcendence as

comprehended by Husserl and Sadr. For Husserl, phenomenology,as shown above, is a radical way of philosophizing which sounds the

Cartesian radicalism in working out a philosophical method. Hisnotion of transcendental subjectivity can be grasped in relation to

the Cartesian view of the ego cogito. Husserls fundamental phenomenological method is that of transcendental epoche which

bars Egoor I-myself completely from the world of space and

time and all of its scientific ideation. The gateway to the

phenomenological investigations is the method of transcendental

epoche which leads one to an absolute poverty of knowledge.


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Thereby the whole concrete surrounding life-world is transformed

into only a phenomenon of being. In epoche, the surrounding life-

world does not remain as something existing rather it is something

that claims being (CM, pp.18-19). The world is the world of

experience and in epoche I experience it as I experienced it before

but the only difference is that I, as reflecting philosophically, nolonger keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in

existence involved in experiencing the world. In addition, all of the

processes of position takings regarding the world, the judgings,

valuings, and decidings, the process of setting ends and willing

means are also suspended, as they involve believing in the existence

of the world (CM, pp.19-20). This absolute and universal depriving

of all beliefs concerning the existential status (Seinsgeltung) of thelife-world and all existential position takings regarding it does not

lead one to nothingness. On the contrary, the epoche, with thisabsolute poverty of the surrounding life-world, leads one to the

absolute and universal richness of pure Ego or I-myself. The

richness of I-myself is characterized by my own pure conscious life,

in and by which the entire Objective world exists for me and is

precisely as it is for me. (CM, pp.20-21) Husserl relates his pure

transcendental consciousness to Descartes ego cogito, as it

experiences the objective world, perceives it, remembers it, thinks of

it, judges about it, values it, desires it, or the like which Descartes,

according to Husserl, indicated by the name cogito (CM, p.21).But Husserls pure Ego tends to remain above all life-world and

refrain[s] from doing any believing that takes the world straight-

forwardly as existing. Instead, the pure Ego enters the world thatgets its sense and acceptance or status [Sinn und Geltung] in and

from the Ego itself not independent of it (CM, p.21). The

transcendental epoche, as we have already discussed, as it leads Ego

back to the rich realm of its experience, is also called the

transcendental-phenomenological reduction. The method of

transcendental reduction, according to Husserl, makes

transcendental subjective consciousness epodictic in nature. Here


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Husserl again refers to the Cartesian notion of doubt to explain his

view ofepodicticity. In case of the Cartesian method, the ego sum is

found as certainly existing by doubting the existence of the whole

world around. Similarly, Husserl parenthesizes the extrinsically

existing life-world through epoche and reduction to find

transcendental subjective consciousness as epodictically evident. Inthis transcendence, according to Husserl, the epodictically evident

reduced Ego is not a piece of the worldneither the worldis a

piece ofEgo, rather

This transcendence is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly,despite the fact that anything worldly necessarily acquires all thedetermining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from myexperiencing it, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, atparticular times-notably the status of an evidently valid being is one itcan acquire only from my own evidences, my grounding acts. ( CM,

p.26)

Thanks to his notion of transcendence, Husserl rejects the

extrinsic and objective existence of life-world without denying the

status of the same as a domain of experience for pure transcendental

consciousness. Ultimately, this life-world is constituted by the

consciousness through the eidetic method of cognizing as we will

see in the next section of this study.

Like Husserl Sadr believes in transcending in order tocognize the realities of the things in themselves as we have already

seen in the last section where he defines philosophy. But his conceptof transcendence is entirely different from that of Husserls. In order

to comprehend the realities of the things in themselves, according to

Sadr, there is no need to deny their existence independent of thehuman mind. Instead, without such denial one can have a Gnostic

experience (Irfn) of the existence (Wujd) as such. Sadr uses themetaphor of journey (safar) to elaborate his view of transcendencewhich is gnostic in nature. His al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah is not


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simply the work of a philosopher who attempts to understand

everything by his reason or abstract thinking. But rather it is a sort of

intellectual movement that perfects the human soul by the

completion of the Four Journeys (al-Asfr al-arbaah). He describesthese Four Journeys in his magnum opus, al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah

fil-Asfr al-Aqliyat al-Arbaah (The Transcendental Wisdom in theFour Intellectual Journeys). The Four Journeys are as follows:

The First Journey: from the creatures (al-makhlqt) to the Truth (al-Haqq),

The Second Journey: continues in the Truth with the Truth,The Third Journey: from the Truth to the creatures with the Truth, andThe Fourth Journey: continues with the Truth in the creatures. (AsfrI,p.13)

Sadrs intellectual scheme implies that transcendence is amovement or journey from the creatures, the things in the

surrounding world, to the Divine in order to become like the Divine

as indicated as the First Journey above. This Journey is not merely a

mystic experience in which the human soul is lost in the Divine,

rather it is an intellectual movement of a Gnostic (rif) to becomelike the Divine reflecting on the nature of existence and its

accidents (awrid) (AsfrI, p.20). This is the character of histhought that demarcates him from the Sforder of Islamic traditionof which he himself is a part. He attempts to establish a necessary

relationship between the Hikmah and the existence (AsfrI, p.22).The Hikmah, for him, is the Divine Knowledge (al-Ilm al-

Ilhiyyah) whose main topic is the Absolute Being (al-Maujd al-Mutlaq). Moreover, as every being is an effect of some other beingthis sphere of learning focuses on the First Cause (al-Sabab al-

Awwal) of all beings (AsfrI, p.24).

Mhiyyah and Eidos

The main thrust of Sadrs philosophy is the ontologicalunderpinning of his Transcendental Wisdom, the focal point of the


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First Journey in his grand intellectual scheme whose task is to

cognize the nature of existence with all other notions related to it.

This study focuses on the notion of Mhiyyah (essence) as Sadrexpounds it in relation to the existence. Sadr believes that allessences (Mhiyyat) are the accidents of the existence4 which

become characteristically related to it first of all other accidents ofit (AsfrI, p.25). He considers existence as an unconceivable orundeterminable term, as it is beyond the known methods of

conceiving namely the definition (al-hadd) and the description

(al-rasm). The former is not applicable to existence, for in order todefine something one should necessarily know the genus (jins) and

the division (fasl) but existence is universally common to all,

therefore one cannot ascribe it to any particular genus. Moreover,

since it is devoid of genus therefore it is devoid of division. The

method of description is also not applicable to existence, for in this

case one describes something unknown by the help of some very

well-known meaning, but nothing is known better than the

existence. Therefore, it will be an absolute mistake to interpret the

existence by the help of some other entities considered as more

meaningful than the existence. So the existence, for Sadr, is beyondall demonstration and conception of the human mind (AsfrI, pp.25-26). That is to say, the existence is absolutely extrinsic and objective

being entirely independent of not only the human mind but anything

extraneous to it (AsfrI, p.27). It is the only reality that is real initself whereas all other entities including the essence, as they are, are

accidents of the existence. Sadr demarcates the Necessary

Existence (al-Wujd al-Wjib) that is a Being-in-Itself (Maujd biNafsih) from the accidental existence (al-wujd al-rid) that is abeing which depends on other to exist (maujd bi ghairih) (AsfrI, p.27). This distinction is grounded on his notion of hierarchy of

attribution of the meaning of the existence to different beings with

respect to their essences. The meaning of existence is common

among all beings that attribute it. However, all of the beings are

essentially different in the attribution of the meaning of the existence


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due to various respects. For instance, the Being that is uncaused by

any other prior being will be naturally the First and the Foremost

among all beings (Mutaqaddim ala jami al-maujdt bil-taba)or the existence of substance (wujd al-jauhar) is prior to theexistence of accident (wujd al-rid) (AsfrI, pp.35-36). Thehierarchy or the discrepancy in the attribution of the meaning ofexistence to all of the beings is to take place through their essences.

That is to say, the Divine is essentially different from the mortal, the

substance is essentially different from the quality, the form is

essentially different from the matter because the attribution of the

meaning of existence to these beings is different from each other.

Sadr defines essence (mhiyyah) as what something is as itis (al-shaiyu hua hua) or in other words it is an answer to the

question about a thing-What is it? For instance, to the question-

How much is it? The answer will be the mass (kammiyyah

) of

that thing which, according to Sadr, is the essence (AsfrII, pp.2-3).It implies that essence, unlike existence, is the matter of cognition

that can be encompassed by the human perception (mushhidah) asan accident of the existence. The underlying reality of all beings is

the existence that carries essences with it which can be cognized by

the conception of the human mind while the existence is beyond all

methods of cognition except the Gnostic experience as discussed

earlier. Meanings of essences always remain on the epistemic orcognitive plane and so they cannot guarantee the manifestations

(tashakhkhus) to beings as they are. Instead, the manifestation of

beings as they are in themselves is determined through theirexistential relationship to the Real Existence (al-Wujd al-Haqq)that is the Origin (al-Mabd) of all beings (AsfrII, p.12). Thedistinction between cognitive and the existential plane of the things

in themselves is essential in Sadrs philosophy to draw thesignificant difference between essence and existence. The essence of

the thing in itself, although it is one with the existence, belongs to

the cognitive side of being of that thing. Whereas the existence is not


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and cannot be a matter of cognition, rather it is absolutely existential

or ontic which relates everything to its cause, the Necessary

Existence or the Divine. For all beings are shadows (zill) andilluminations (ishrqt) of the Divine (AsfrII, p.12). So the onlyway to reach the existential realities of the things in themselves is

the Gnostic experience of becoming one with the Divine, the Originor Source of all existence.

Husserl may agree with Sadr on the view that essence issomething what is as it is and also on the view that reality cannot be

graspable through traditional empirical and rational methods of

cognition. However, he would intensely disagree with Sadr ondrawing a distinction between essence as something cognizable

being an accident of the existence that is an absolutely objective and

extrinsic reality. On the contrary, Husserl emphasizes on the

constitution of all reality by an absolutely pure transcendental

subjective consciousness as we have already seen above. This huge

difference between the two philosophers transcendence is due to the

distinction between their intellectual commitments and methods of

philosophizing. Sadr is an eclectic-revivalist of Muslim traditionsboth of philosophy and Sfism. So he has never been able to deviatefrom his absolute commitment to the Gnostic experience of oneness

of being to unveil all reality. While Husserl, being absolutely

committed to suspend all traditions of Western intellectualism, is to

work out a new method of unfolding the reality which he calls the

eidetic method or the method of eidetic description (CM, p.69).

The first step in this method, as shown earlier, is the transcendentalreduction which leads one to ones transcendental ego when one

parenthesizes all givenness of actuality. This is not simply a

transcendental-phenomenological reduction, rather it is an eidetic

reduction in which ego, though situated in the empirical

factualness, entirely breaks with the same. This ego, in the next

step, selects a fact of perception to change it into a pure possibility

by [a]bstaining from acceptance of its being. This shift of the


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actual perception into the realm of non-actualities takes place on the

plane of mere fantasy or imagination. The procedure of

fantasiableness or imaginableness of perception removes it from

all factualness to make it become the pure eidos perception, an

essential universality. The pure eidos is absolutely unconditioned

by any fact and so an a priori in the very true sense of the term.Along with the shift of a fact into an a priori universal the ego is also

transformed from an empirically situated subject into an intuitive

and epodictic consciousness of something universal (CM, pp.70-

71). Through this imaginative procedure of selecting facts to

transform them into the pure eidos perceptions, the transcendental

subjective consciousness constitutes whole of the life-world in terms

of eide.

One should not equate Husserls method of fantasying fact

into the pureeidos

to Sadrs way of the Gnostic experience to

become like the Divine though it can also be interpreted as a highly

imaginative and intuitive experience. Husserls eidetic ego does

break with actuality like Sadrs transcendent gnostic but in ordernot to become one with the Divine. Instead, his transcendental ego

becomes free of all factualness to constitute the same life-world

(Lebenswelt). Husserls transcendental phenomenology developsthrough the eidetic method whose all investigations are nothing but

uncoverings of the all embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such,which comprises all pure possibility-variants of..de facto ego and

this ego itself qua possibility (CM, p.71).

Conclusion

Although Sadr and Husserl both are the philosophers oftranscendence having certain commonalties between them, they

differ from each other as well with various respects. Both are deeply

interested in cognizing the realities of the things in themselves but

begin to attain this task very differently. The later is to reject the

whole tradition of his academic culture to find out a radical way of


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philosophizing. Whereas the former is to show an extremely

accommodative attitude towards the past philosophies in order to

reconcile the various intellectual currents of Muslim tradition in

terms of his al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah. Both focus ontranscendence to grasp the reality but their meanings of

transcendence are entirely different from each other. For Husserl,Egos break with factualness leads to the pure transcendental

consciousness which is free of all beliefs and position takings

regarding the spatio-temporal existence. So transcendence, being

absolutely devoid of any touch of religiosity, is merely an epistemic

or cognitive attempt of the Ego to see the phenomena differently.

That is to say, rather than cognizing the world with the pre-given

beliefs and ideas Transcendental Ego grasps the same in terms of

eidos perception which it intrinsically constitutes through its own

process of imaginableness or fantasiableness. For Sadr, on the otherhand, it is not enough to break with actuality to experience the

transcendence in the exact sense of the term. Instead, one should

attempt to have the Gnostic experience of becoming one with the

Divine in order to find oneself transcendent. So transcendence is not

merely a cognitive attempt rather it is a cognitive-existential

experience of the human soul through which the soul not only

becomes like the Divine, but simultaneously grasps the reality as

well. This is so as Sadr demarcates between existence and essencevery significantly. Essence, for him, is something cognizable

through the traditional methods of conceiving the objects like

defining and describing etc. while existence is universally common

underlying reality that cannot be determined or conceived throughthose methods. Therefore, the only way to know the existence is to

transcend this world to become one with the Absolute Existent, the

Origin of all existence. On the contrary, Husserl, though he is also

interested in grasping the reality of the things in themselves, is to

believe that reality is not beyond the human mind. Rather it can be

graspable by the human mind if the mind is reduced to the eidetic

Ego that can transform all fact into the pure eidos through the


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extraordinary procedure of fantasying or imagining. This eidetic

method ultimately leads not to the Divine but to the constitution of

the same life-world in which the Ego is always already living and

experiencing.

AbbreviationsAsfr Sadr al-Dn Shrz, al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah fil-Asfr al-Aqliyat al-Arbaah (The Transcendental Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys), 9Volumes, Bairt, Dr al-Ihy al-Turth al-Arab, 1419/1999 (The volume oneof this book is abbreviated asAsfrIand volume two asAsfrII)

MM Sadr al-Dn Shrz, al-Mabd wal-Mad(the Origin and theAfterworld), Bairt, Dr al-Hd, 1420/2000

CM Husserl, Edmund, Cartesianische Meditationen (Cartesian Meditations),

Trans. D. Cairns, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1967

EJ Husserl, Edmund,Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zurGenealogie der Logik(Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy ofLogic), Rev. and Ed. L. Landgrebe, Trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks,Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973

Ideas Husserl, Edmund,Ideen: zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und

Phnomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas: General Introduction to PurePhenomenology), Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, London, Allen & Unwin, 1931

LI Husserl, Edmund,Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations), 2Volumes, Trans. J. N. Findlay, New York, Humanities Press, 1970

Notes1. My translation of Sadrs al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyyah is a result ofbenefiting both from Fazlur Rahman and Hussein Nasr. The former translated theterm as the Sublime Wisdom while the later rendered it as the TranscendentTheosophy benefiting, may be, from Henry Corbin. See Fazlur Rahman, ThePhilosophy ofMull Sadr, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1975,p.19 and S. Hussein Nasr, Sadr al-Dn Shrzand his Transcendent Theosophy,Tehrn, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997


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2. This division ofal-Hikmah into al-Nazariyyah and al-Amaliyyah seemsto be very similar to that of Ibn-Sns. See Ibn-Sn, al-Ilhiyyt min Kitb al-Shif , researched by yt Allh Hasanzdeh al mul, Qum, Maktab al-Almal-Islam, 1386/1966, pp.11-123. After having gone through Sadrs definitions of philosophy which Ihave already discussed above as well as benefiting from Mrz Mahdshtiyn,Hussein Nasr comes to the conclusion that Sadrs this concept of wisdom is thesame as well known as al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyah. He says: There arethree basic principles upon which the Transcendent Theosophy stands: intellectualintuition or illumination (kashf or dhauq or ishrq); reason and rationaldemonstration (aqloristidll); and religion or revelation (sharorWah). It is bycombining the knowledge derived from these sources that the synthesis of MullSadr was brought about. This synthesis aimed to harmonize the knowledge that isaccessible to man through the following means, namely, Sfism, the school ofishrq, rational philosophy (identified by Mull Sadr with the Peripatetic school)and religious sciences including theology (kalm). See S. H. Nasr, Sadr al-DnShrz and his Transcendent Theosophy, Tehrn, Institute of Humanities andCultural Studies, 1997, pp.87-88

4. The priority of existence to essence is the view that demarcates Sadrfrom his predecessors including Ibn-Sn and al-Suhraward. He confessed that hehimself was of that opinion that essence is prior to existence but later he becameenlightened by the view that the objective realities are the existences not theessences which can be cognized by the subjective mind through the ordinarymethods of the human conception. All possible existences are the shadows andilluminations of One Real Light, the Necessary existence that cannot be conceived

through rational method but only by the Gnostic experience. For the NecessaryExistence is devoid of any essence, instead, its very existence is its essence. SeeAsfrI, pp.48-49 and MM, pp.30-40Bibliography1. Sadr al-Dn Shrz, al-Hikmat al-Mutaliyah fil-Asfr al-Aqliyat al-Arbaah (The Transcendental Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys), Volumes

1-9, Bairt, Dr al-Ihy al-Turth al-Arab, 1419/19992. .., al-Mabd wal-Mad (the Origin and theAfterworld), Bairt, Dar al-Hadi, 1420/20005. Ibn-Sn, al-Ilhiyyt min Kitb al-Shif, researched by yt AllhHasanzdeh al mul, Qum, Maktab al-Alm al-Islam, 1386/19663. Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mull Sadr, Albany, StateUniversity of New York Press, 19756. Nasr, S. Hussein, Sadr al-Dn Shrz and his Transcendent Theosophy,Tehrn, Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1997


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7. Husserl, Edmund, Cartesianische Meditationen (Cartesian Meditations),Trans. D. Cairns, The Hague, Nijhoff, 19678. , Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zurGenealogie der Logik(Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy ofLogic), Rev. and Ed. L. Landgrebe, Trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks,Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973

9. , Ideen: zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und Phnomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas: General Introduction to PurePhenomenology), Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, London, Allen & Unwin, 193110. , Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations), 2Volumes, Trans. J. N. Findlay, New York, Humanities Press, 1970

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