Betumeen Reform and Regulation - Masaryk University · Betumeen Reform and Regulation The Struggle...

Film History, Volume 1. pp. 307-325. 1987Printed in ihc L'SA. All rights reserved

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Betumeen Reform and RegulationThe Struggle over Film Censorship in Progressive

America, 1909-1922

by Nancy J. Rosenbloom

Abstract The establishment of the Board ofCensors of Motion Picture Shows (later knownas the National Board of Review) in New Yorkin 1909 is discussed. The paper deals with theBoard's relationship to the motion picture in-dustry and its efforts to avoid a formal structureof centralized film censorship. The establish-ment of official censorship boards in severalstates and the industry's formation of theMPPDA in 1922 ultimately undercut the Na-tional Board's authority by 1922.

N owhere is the relationship between film and thesociety that produced it more lantahzing and

perhaps less understood than in the progressive era.During the first two decades of the twentieth cen-tury, reform captured the political imagination of ageneration of Americans who witnessed the develop-ment of the moving picture trade from its nickel-odeon origins into a major competitive industry. Po-litical liberals and moral conservatives struggled tocreate a response to film that satisfied tbe goals ofuplifting civilization without hampering its progress.If at first it appears reformers agreed that censorshipwas the most effective social and political response tomoving pictures, then closer analysis also shows thatreformers disagreed sharply as to whether theirtarget should be exhibition conditions or film contentand whether censorship should be official or volun-tary. While some reformers advocated prior censor-ship of film by municipal or state agencies, others ar-gued that such official legal censorship violated thefirst amendment.

The threat and reality of censorship between1909 and 1922 politicized the film industry as noother issue of the day. Members of the moving pic-ture trade, particularly the exhibitors and manufac-turers, reacted to the threats of external regulation inseveral ways. At first, they cooperated with civic re-formers in New York City to establish the NationalBoard of Censorship, a body committed to the prin-ciple of voluntary censorship. Only later did they or-ganize and develop an aggressive political campaignto protect themselves against the potentially hostilelegislation of municipal, state, and federal govern-ments. This campaign culminated in the creation ofthe Hays Office in 1922. Unlike the National Boardof Censorship which was directed by the reformers,the Hays Office directly represented the interests oftbe motion picture trade.

Although film had been a form of popular enter-tainment since the 1890s, it did not become an objectof close scrutiny until after 1907. By then, the popu-larity of moving pictures had begun to spreadbeyond the working class neighborhoods and ethnicghettos of urban America.^ Moving pictures were apublic form of entertainment, and, because of theirpublic character, they became a center of contro-versy.^ The controversy that developed over how bestto regulate both the content of the moving pictures aswell as the conditions of exhibition pitted reformersagainst each other. In New York City, public concernpeaked in 1908 when Mayor George McClellan cre-ated a furor within the film trade and film-goingpublic by closing the nickelodeons at Christmas.* Inthe aftermath of the theater closings, representativesof the motion picture trade, many of whom were si-

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Figure L New York Mayor George B. McClellan: the manwho closed the nickelodeons. NYPL Picture Collection.

multaneously involved in establishing the Motion Pic-ture Patents Company, negotiated a policy of volun-tary censorship with reformers. This effort at accom-modation between the moving picture trade andreformers had a national impact and led to the estab-lishment of a formal relationship that remained ineffect throughout the progressive era.

The struggle over film censorship began during aperiod historians have labelled "the progressive era."In spite of a decade of historical scholarship to clarifythe meaning of progressivism, the movement defieseasy definition.^ Some historians have attempted toidentify progressives from the perspective of their af-filiations and ideologies. On this point, there remainsbasic disagreement as to whether progressives as agroup represented entrepreneurs or corporate in-terests. Richard Hofstadter has argued that progres-sives came from a declining middle class anxious toprotect itself against the assault of modernity. RobertWiebe, on the other hand, locates the progressivesamong the rising middle classes of professionals,managers, and bureaucrats who were a product ofthe new economic order. If there is debate about thesocio-economic origins of progressives, then this is

also true of their value systems. Hofstadter sees pro-gressives as nostalgic, back ward-loo kin g reformers,mourning the loss of individualism. In contrast,Wiebe ciarifes the extent to which reform ideologycomplemented the organizational model of industrialAmerica by seeking to modernize social and politicalinstitutions through increased legislation, regulation,and bureaucratization.^

Amore meaningful approach to illuminate thehistorical context in which the censorship ques-

tion unfolded is to begin with the changes that tookplace within the political system itself.̂ As RichardMcCormick has shown, the fundamental changes ingovernment between 1900 and 1915—in particular,the increased reliance on administrative solutions tosocial problems, the enlarged sphere of public action,and the recognition of special interest groups—wereparticularly profound in New York State. In the firstdecade of the twentieth century, New York experi-enced a series of political crises, each followed by anexplosion of reform activity.' This, in turn, had aprofound effect on moving pictures. At once a tooland a target of reform activity, moving pictures elic-ited attention in an era of political transformation.

The relationship of film to the society that pro-duced it has been addressed most notably by RobertSklar, Garth Jowett, and Lary May.̂ In his landmarkstudy Film: The Democratic Art, Jowett has chronicledthe efforts at municipal, state, and federal control ofmoving pictures. He describes the battle that devel-oped between progressives and motion picture in-terests as concern for child welfare, health, and mo-rality led social workers to take a closer look at thenew medium. This concern, in turn, resulted in at-tempts at regulation of moving pictures through leg-islation. It was against the background of these devel-opments that Jowett explains the establishment of theNational Board of Gensorship—after 1915 called theNational Board of Review—as a body that activelycampaigned against censorship but ultimately failedto "become the official public voice of the film in-dustry."^ Jowett's interpretation of the NationalBoard of Gensorship, however, ignores its impact onthe politicization of the film industry and the in-dustry's mobilization against legal censorship. Theextent to which the industry began to organize as aspecial interest group and entered into debates con-cerning its own welfare was directly related to theability of the National Board of Censorship to me-diate between the public and the film industry.

Lary May approaches the question from a dif-ferent perspective in his provocative study ScreeningOut the Past: The Birth of Mass Culture and the MotionPicture Industry. Focusing on the transition of

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America from a producer to a consumer culture,May argues that moving pictures helped ease publicaccommodation to consumer values. In this context,he sees the reformers at the National Board of Cen-sorship as "vice crusaders." According to May, thereformers and the motion picture trade forged aconsensus that lasted from 1909 until the uproarover the racism in D. W. Griffith's THE BIRTH OFA NATION in 1915.'» While it is true that THEBIRTH OE A NATION simulated a vigorous debateover the need for film censorship, May's interpreta-tion overestimates the strength of the consensus thatexisted not just between the reformers and the filmtrade, but even among the reformers themselves.What May's argument has tended to obscure is thatreformers disagreed on the appropriate response tofilm regulation. The lively debate among reformersover official and voluntary censorship should not beoverlooked.

For all of the attention that the societal pressuresfor film censorship have received from social his-

torians like May and Jowett, surprisingly little workhas been done on the organized response of themoving picture trade to the campaigns for legal cen-sorship prior to the establishment of the Hays Of-fice." The following essay focuses on two questionsthat previous studies have not fully answered. First,precisely what was the basis of the relationship thatdeveloped between progressivism and the movingpicture trade interests with specific reference to thecensorship question? And second, how did this rela-tionship influence the strategy the film trade pur-sued in response to the campaigns for legal censor-ship prior to the creation of the Hays Office in 1922?These questions help illuminate the process by whichthe film industry learned to lobby effectively andprevent the imposition of federal control overmoving pictures. By the time Will Hays accepted theinvitation to help fight censorship in 1922, themoving picture industry had experienced a decade ofstruggle over the censorship question.

The establishment of the Board of Censorship ofPrograms of Motion Picture Shows in New York Cityearly in the spring of 1909 signaled the beginning ofthe courtship between the moving picture interestsand progressive reform. Founded on an experi-mental basis in the wake of theater closings duringthe previous Christmas holiday, the Board of Cen-sorship was created by a number of civic bodies inresponse to a resolution passed by the Association ofMotion Pictures Exhibitors of New York.̂ ^ Membersof non-partisan educational reform groups such asthe Public Education Association originally domi-nated the governing board, but it quickly expanded

to include more representation from middle-class,Protestant reform societies. The People's Institute inNew York City becanie its main sponsor when theBoard transformed itself into a national agency inMay 1909.*^ The project carried the imprimatur ofan advisory committee consisting of nearly sixtypublic figures, as diverse as Lyman Abbott, AndrewCarnegie, Samuel Gompers, Lenora O'Reilly, MarySimkovitch, and Stephen S. Wise.'*

As the sponsoring institution of the NationalBoard of Censorship, the People's Institute played asignificant role in organizing its work. Its leaders,Charles Sprague Smith and John Collier, identifiedwith the agenda of progressive reform.^^ Thefounder of the People's Institute in 1897, Smith hadtaught comparative literature at Columbia and Har-vard. His credentials satisfied even Charles Beard,among the most critical of the progressives.'^ Besideshis involvement with the People's Institute and theNational Board of Censorship, Smith experimentedwith social reform in creating the Ethical SocialLeague in 1908 and, as a member of the Wall StreetCommission, in investigating the Stock Exchange in1908 and 1909. John Collier, first chairman of theExecutive Committee on Censorship and the GeneralSecretary of the National Board, worked closely withSmith on the question of film censorship. He hadcharge of organizing the censorship committee andcommunicating with the manufacturers. At the sametime Collier remained committed to child welfare,and, in this regard, he supported the ideas of theprogressive eciucators. He argued that moving pic-tures had a significant role to play in the develop-ment of the child and held that ". . . education in-volves a positive liberation of the forces within thechild . . ."'^ Both Collier and Smith enjoyed a goodrelationship with the film manufacturers and helpedshape the relationship between them and the Board.

In the beginning, cooperation characterized therelationship between the trade and the reformers aswell as between the film manufacturers and the ex-hibitors. Although the New York Exhibitors initiatedthe establishment of the Board, the Chairman of theExecutive Committee on Censorship, John Collier,quickly invited the cooperation of the manufacturers.Collier suggested that the manufacturers voluntarilysubmit their films to prior censorship under stan-dards adopted by the Censorship Board in consulta-tion with the New York manufacturers, renters, andexhibitors. To convince the manufacturers of the ad-vantages of voluntary submission of their films tocenst)rship before exhibition. Collier suggested that,besides improving the moving picture business in thepublic's estimation, censorship would result in in-

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creased patronage in every neighborhood and un-dercut those who were trying to destroy the businessthrough unreasonable laws.*^

Exactly who aimed to harm the business is diffi-cult to assess because the moving picture exhibitorsand manufacturers had found themselves undersiege from a number of enemies in addition to thosereformers who had targeted the moving pictureshows. The moving picture trade offered stiff com-petition to the saloons, vaudeville houses, dance halls,and even the popular press for the nickels that theworking classes spent on entertainment. Hardfeelings erupted when moving pictures successfullyattracted patrons away from other forms of leisure.Accusations appearing in the trade press implied thatvaudeville interests and the popular press, in partic-ular, sought publicly to humiliate moving pictures.The moving picture trade feared that such smeartactics, if not petty graft on the part of their enemies,might lead to external censorship.'^ Yet instead ofseeking protection from Tammany Hall, itself underindictment by reformers, the moving picture exhib-itors saw tactical advantages in forging an alliancewith an assorted group of civic, social, political, andeven moral reformers. At the same time, the exhib-itors and the reformers understood they could ac-complish little without the active support of the man-ufacturers.

As members of the Board of Censorship hadhoped, the manufacturers responded favorably

to Collier's proposals for voluntary censorship.Those licensed manufacturers who had formed theMotion Picture Patents Company only shortly beforebegan to cooperate with the Board of Censorshipwithin weeks of its organization and submitted theirfirst films for inspection on 25 March 1909. The in-dependent producers, perhaps following the lead ofthe influential International Projecting and Pro-ducing Company, also agreed to submit theirproduct to the National Board of Censorship.̂ ** ByAugust 1909, the Board boasted it censored 75 per-cent of all films exhibited in the United States. How-ever, the Board did exempt two categories of filmsfrom their inspection; special releases and secretlyproduced pictures.^'

The cooperation between the Motion PicturePatents Company and the Board of Censorship re-flected their common goal of improving the qualityof pictures produced. Shortly after its formation, thePatents Company had circulated an announcementto the exhibitors detailing their objectives and clari-fying the advantages of such improvements not onlyto the exhibitors but also to the permanence and wel-

fare of the moving picture business. The eliminationof "cheap and inferior foreign films" and the encour-agement of patronage by "the better class of the com-munity" justified, in part, the formation of the Com-pany.^'^ As the main leaders of the trade, themembers of the Company ceased fighting againsteach other and instead focused on what they re-garded as the demoralizing impact of greedy foreigninterests. The Board of Censorship, like the PatentsCompany, saw itself as safeguarding an Americanstandard which excluded certain vulgar scenes pop-ular in foreign films.^^

A t the inception of their cooperative venture,representatives of the trade and of the re-

formers agreed to the advantages of making the NewYork censorship board a national body. Regardless ofthe atypicality of New York's cosmopolitan and het-erogeneous culture, it was still the geographic centerof the trade. Frank Dyer, the Vice President of theEdison Manufacturing Company who also served asthe President of the Motion Picture Patents Com-pany, encouraged Collier in his efforts to transformthe New York organization into a National Board.Arguing that the existence of many local censorshipboards could cripple the industry. Dyer agreed withCollier that a responsible National Board seemed tobe the only possible solution to moving picture cen-sorship, an event that loomed as inevitable. Althoughthe manufacturers reacted reluctantly at first. Dyerassured Collier that they would learn to accept theBoard's decisions, much as they had learned to ac-cept adverse court decisions.̂ "*

While the moving picture trade interests sup-ported the National Board out of enlightened self-in-terest, the members of the Board and most particu-larly Collier admitted from the beginning that self-in-terest also motivated them. In March, Collier hadindicated to the manufacturers that the Boardwanted to introduce "moving picture apparatus" intothe public schools.2^ The licensed manufacturers be-lieved that this was a fair exchange, even if it was notdirectly useful to their own goals of improving publicrelations, avoiding adverse legislation, and increasingcommercial opportunities. Collier actively cam-paigned to win the confidence of urban educatorsand found an influential ally in George Kleine, anoriginal member of the Motion Picture Patents Com-pany. Both agreed that the moving pictures—com-mercial films—had an educational value and that thepedagogical possibilities of the new industry had sig-nificant implications for the classroom and churches.Still, the dollar remained the bottom line. When Col-lier suggested several months later that moving pic-

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tures be shown in New York Gity's recreation centersfree of charge, Dyer objected on the grounds thatthis would unfairly harm the moving picture the-aters' profits.̂ **

The National Board of Censorship and themoving picture interests established a number of im-portant precedents during the first six months oftheir cooperative venture that set the pattern fortheir relationship over the next decade. Yet, in spiteof what appeared as general agreement, there alsoarose points of contention that would resurface andhinder the effectiveness of their work. The produc-tion of higher quality pictures emerged as the pri-mary goal of censorship. Seen almost as a panaceafor the instability—often verging on chaos—thatcharacterized the moving picture industry in 1909.censorship implied greater uniformity in productthrough the exercise of peer pressure. In order forthe smaller manufacturers to survive, they would beforced to conform to national standards set by theleaders of the trade, namely the licensed manufac-turers and the more important of the independentproducers.^' Both the reformers and the manufac-turers agreed that approval by the Board should beadvertised as a way to popularize acceptable filmsand gradually uplift public tastes and the films thatsatisfied them.^^ The trade interests, however, seizedupon this idea too enthusiastically, and the followingyear Charles Sprague Smith, Collier's boss at thePeople's Institute, warned the manufacturers and ex-hibitors against exploiting the Board's approval.Such publicity, according to Smith, jeopardized thework of the Board.^^

The moving picture manufacturers and the Na-tional Board of Censorship jointly defined how thework of the Board should proceed. At the least, botbsides agreed that tbe censorship of certain subjectswould be advantageous. Obscenity and crinie-for-crime's-sake ranked at the top of the list of problemsto be eliminated.'*'* During the first year of operation,the committee on censorship rejected films submittedby members of the Motion Picture Patents Companyfor depicting "the criminal passion and rough han-dling of a white girl by Negroes" as well as for devel-oping themes of infidelity, suicide, and the ridiculeof the insane.^' A typical communique between Col-lier, as General Secretary of the Board, and themembers of the Motion Picture Patents Gompanylisted the films seen at the offices of the PatentsGompany and then specified the causes for the rejec-tion of a particular film. For example, when the com-mittee rejected the Pathé film RAT D'HOTEL afterthree viewings, Gollier explained the film "hinges on

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A Model Ordinancefor regula ling

Motion Picture Theatres

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Tlie National Board of Censordiipol

Motion Pictures50 MADÍ5ON AVENUE

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Figure 2, Front cover of a 16-page pamphlet published bythe National Board of Censorship promoting local regula-tion of motion picture theaters, c. 1912. American Museumof the Moving Image.

the successful perpetration of the crime of burglaryaccomplished by chloroforming the victim."^^ Gollierand the others worried that the ease ofthe crime wassuggestive.

The committee had several alternatives besidesrejecting a film entirely. They might also suggest spe-cific eliminations or changes. For example, the com-mittee requested the elimination of a woman "reelingdrunk" from one film and the display of drawers(underwear) from another.^^ In Lubin's MAMA'SANGEL, the shots of a youngster throwing a bananapeel on the pavement had to be removed, while inother films made in 1910, the committee objected toshots of burglars engaged in various activities. Norcould the Katzenjammer kids get away with sawingthe legs of a chair in half.̂ ** At other times, the com-mittee would commend the pictures they saw in aneffort to encourage the production of certain themesor even influence more aesthetic criteria. The Board

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Nancy J. Rosenbloom

congratulated the Selig Company, a member of thePatents Company, for its choice of an industrial sub-ject and its "journalistic treatment of every day sub-jects.^^ Commenting favorably on an Edison film.Collier tentatively added his own personal observa-tions in a note to Horace Plimpton, tbe studio man-ager:

The conditions under which pictures areshown at the Patents Co. are well-nigh ideal,yet 1 had to get right under the screen to ob-tain a satisfactory view of the people's counte-nances. They are too small on the screen to bepersonalities. You'll notice, with an ensemblescene of French or Italian make, that theremay be a crowd of people on stage, yet a few,the central characters, are in the foregroundand are satisfactorily visible; you can watchtheir facial play.̂ ^On occasion, these suggestions threatened the

good will between the manufacturers and the censor-ship committee. When the committee began to in-trude more directly into their affairs, the manufac-turers objected vehemently. One such crisis developedlate in the fall of 1909 when American Mutoscopeand Biograph Company ceased submitting its films tothe Board. Biograph's president, J.J. Kennedy, whoalso served as Treasurer of the Motion PicturePatents Company, admitted that censorship was de-sirable and even necessary under existing conditionsbut criticized the leaders of the project at the People'sInstitute. Angrily, he complained to Dyer;

The producing and marketing of film is anindustry of too great importance, both com-mercially and in its relation to the public wel-fare, to be subjected to those who, after beingafforded every facility to accomplish the goodwork that they set out to do, now assume anattitude of controlhng or dominating the busi-

ness.37

The licensed manufacturers took this as well asother issues to a meeting with Charles Sprague Smiththat representatives from Biograph did not attend.The manufacturers requested that the committee oncensorship that had been formed under the auspicesof the People's Institute refrain from commenting onthe pictures outside of either rejecting them or sug-gesting changes. Concern for their independence,especially as it appeared to the public, led the manu-facturers to insist that the censorship committee notgive interviews or publish articles claiming that theywere influencing or directing the manufacturers "inany way in regard to the kind of pictures or methodof treatment thereof, which are being made byh " ^ ^

Smith disagreed with this criticism and cautionedthat the censorship committee relied on such pub-licity. Even though he conceded that the publicshould not think that tbe censorship committee di-rected the Patents Company, Smith insisted that thelegitimacy of the National Board of Censorship de-pended on its freedom to publicize its role in re-viewing the films produced by the Patents Com-pany.^^ Moreover, Smith insisted that Biograph'swithdrawal threatened the efficacy of the censorshipeffort. Again, the Patents Company, this time repre-sented by Secretary George Scull, argued for the in-dependence of the manufacturers not only in rela-tionship to the Board of Censorship but amongthemselves as members of the Motion Picture PatentsCompany.^" Each of the licensed manufacturers de-cided whether to submit their films, and Scullstressed that, while the Patents Company would pro-vide a viewing room for their convenience, it wouldnot force its members to comply with the desires ofthe National Board. Shortly after this altercation,Biograph reconsidered its refusal to submit its filmsand began cooperating again with the Board. Subse-quently, other members of the company witheld theirfilms from the Board for various reasons but neverfor a long period of time.

Challenges to the work of the National Board ofCensorship came from within its own ranks as

well. Mrs. Josephine Redding, editor of Vogue andamong the first members of the censoring com-mittee, decided to resign from the project, ostensiblybecause of internal strife on the committee. In afrank letter to her friend, Mrs. Horace Ply[i]mptom,she criticized both the film manufacturers for pro-ducing violent pictures and the censoring committeefor passing such films. Mrs. Redding expressed con-cern that film portrayals of violence engenderedtrouble from local magistrates and from a group shereferred to as "REEORMERS" or "Pseudo-Re-formers." She worried that these reformers wouldsucceed in having appointed a Public RecreationCommittee with jurisdiction over Motion Picturesand Cheap Theaters. Moreover, she feared the at-tempts to establish local censorship committees out-side of New York City, "each with its individual andin most instances unintelligible and hostile views ofstage production.'"*' Mrs. Redding requested that thePlimptons use their influence to "make the Pro-ducers reaUze the unwisdom" of exploiting violencein their pictures."*^

An even more serious challenge came the fol-lowing year when two of the charter members with-drew their support from the Board in the fall of1911. Representatives of the Woman's Municipal

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Figure 3. New York Mayor William Jay Gaynor, considered an ally of the motion picture interests,replaced George McClellan at City Hall in 1909. NYPL Picture Collection.

League and the Society for the Prevention of Crimeundercut the work of the Board by appealing for of-ficial censorship at a public hearing of a specialmayoral commission appointed to examine themoving picture shows in New York City. Decryingthe methods of the Board as inadequate, they arguedthat only an official, legal censorship would protectchildren under sixteen.^^ The public dissent of theformer board members against the mayoral commis-sion had the character of a political as well as a moralchallenge.

Mayor William J. Gaynor, the New York politicianresponsible for appointing the committee, had beenconsidered an ally of the moving picture interestssince December 1908. At that time, as ajustice of theappellate division of the Supreme Court of NewYork, he had granted an injunction against MayorGeorge McClellan's orders to close all the movingpicture theaters. Elected mayor in 1909, Gaynor haddisplaced McClellan as the choice of Tammany HallDemocrats. Initially, Gaynor had the support of

many anti-Tammany reformers as well and began acampaign that included a massive dean-up of the po-lice department, support for better housing, im-proved education, better health care for pregnantwomen, and more children's recreation facilities. ButGaynor soon alienated the anti-Tammany reformers,including Reverend Charles H. Parkhurst whom hedenounced as bilious.'*'* Parkhurst had been a leaderof anti-Tammany reform groups for two decades. Inthe 1890s, he had campaigned against cigar storesand saloons and had led an anti-vice crusade. Influ-ential in the City Vigilance League and in the Societyfor the Prevention of Crime, Parkhurst's oppositionto moving pictures was very much in character.'*^

In the early spring of 1911, Gaynor had ap-pointed a special commission under Raymond Fos-dick. Commissioner of Accounts, to examine the con-ditions of moving picture shows in New York City.Fosdick distinguished between the character of thefilms and the conditions in which they were exhib-ited, the same distinction the National Board of Gen-

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sorship had allowed in determining what fell underpolice jurisdiction and what belonged to their owncensorship work. Fosdick concluded that presentlaws and ordinances in New York City were inappli-cable to moving picture shows and suggested moreuniform legislation. At the same time, however, thereport strongly endorsed the work of the Board ofCensorship in improving "the character of the pic-tures."^^ While the mayor accepted Fosdick's report,the altercation outside his office caused by the resig-nation of the two former board members tarnishedthe image of the National Board of Censorship.

Those who favored legalized censorship and op-posed the National Board vehemently objected to theportrayal of crime on film. The Board of Censorshiphad already made its position on sensational repre-sentations of crime or of crime for crime's sake clear,and the manufacturers had agreed to eliminate theseoffensive themes. Answering the criticism that thedepiction of crime continued to appear in movingpictures, the Board defended its position "on [both]the theory that the motion picture is a form of dra-matic art and, together with the theater, must be al-lowed a certain liberty in depict ing moralproblems."^'

I f the incident outside of Gaynor's office offeredevidence that the proponents of official prior cen-

sorship were serious in their efforts to pressure theadministration into acting. Mayor Caynor had no in-tention, then or later, of giving in to their overt de-mands or covert manipulations. On the question thatfreedom of the press included moving pictures, nopublic figure was more outspoken than MayorGaynor. Gaynor objected consistently to legal censor-ship of moving pictures, and, when he died in Sep-tember 1913, the entire moving picture trademourned his death. Shortly before, in December1912, Gaynor vetoed a New York City ordinancepassed by Tammany and Fusion aldermen that es-tablished procedures and fees for classifying movingpicture shows but to which was added at the last mo-ment a censorship provision. Gaynor carefully ana-lyzed the issue for the aldermen, basing his veto onthe understanding that "no censorship can be estab-lished by law to decide in advance what may or maynot be lawfully printed or published."^^ Arguing that"the press" includes "all methods of expression bywriting or pictures," Gaynor insisted that the criminalpunishment for the publication of obscene, immoral,libelous, and indecent literature offered adequatelegislation on the question. Moreover, Gaynorstressed that censorship was not only unconstitu-tional but that it went against the historical develop-ment of free governments all over the world and was

antagonistic to mass society. It was as a friend ofdemocratic society that Gaynor commented that, incontemporary America, moving pictures were:

attended by great bulk of the people, many ofwhom cannot afford to pay the prices chargedby the theatres. They are a solace and an edu-cation to them. Why are we singling out thesepeople as subjects necessary to be protected bya censorship? Are they any more in need ofprotection by censorship than the rest of thecommunity? Are they better than the rest ofus, or worse?*^The confrontation outside the mayor's office in

November 1911 and the subsequent pressure toamend the municipal ordinance highlighted two crit-ical problems the Board of Censorship and the man-ufacturers then faced: how to explain publicly thenature of their relationship and how to convince thepublic that voluntary censorship was working. Thesewere not easy tasks since their opponents exploitedthe two most vulnerable points they could. First, themanufacturers, in fact, did finance the work of theBoard, although they insisted that they did not bribethe Board into passing undesirable films. Second, theBoard, in reality, had no legal authority to enforce itsdecisions but relied on the good faith of the manu-facturers and exhibitors to implement the changesthey suggested or to refrain from circulating offen-sive films. The Board of Censorship responded tothese complaints by emphasizing that, although theyhad no legal authority, they were effective in thenumbers of films they examined. Moreover, theBoard's published reports stressed that the People'sInstitute funded their work and that there never hadbeen any attempt to disguise the financial contribu-tions by the trade to the People's Institute. Ironically,the close relationship between the Institute and thetrade on the question of responsible voluntary cen-sorship appears to have been an underlying cause inthe campaign for legal censorship.

During these months of struggle on the efficacyof voluntary censorship, there occurred a change inleadership at the People's Institute that had a greatimpact on the future direction of the National Boardof Censorship. While Smith had a finely developedsense of politics, his untimely death on 30 March1910 left the National Board of Censorship largely inthe hands of the politically inexperienced John Col-lier, just at the moment when those favoring legal-ized censorship were beginning to lobby against thoseadvocating voluntary co-operation. In the monthsbefore his death, Smith expressed concern that re-formers from outside the Board were attempting totake control of the censorship project. While Collier

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and Smith both agreed that cooperation among re-formers, particularly on the question of child wel-fare, could only help their cause, they were particu-larly reluctant to give up control considering the in-stability of municipal politics. If the cityadministration under Mayor Gaynor had a liberalbias. Collier and Smith were far less sanguine aboutthe future.̂ *^

In casting about for a new leader, the People's In-stitute invited Frederic C. Howe to assume the posi-tion of director. During Howe's tenure—he resignedin September 1915—the work of the National Boardof Censorship became the main activity at thePeople's Institute. At the time of his appointment,Howe presented an impeccable progressive profile.The publication of The City: The Hope of Democracyearlier in 1910 represented his most recent achieve-ment and influenced his move from Cleveland toNew York City. Almost a decade of ])olitical experi-ence with Mayor Tom Johnson in Cleveland had in-volved him in such divergent issues as economic de-bates on Henry George's single tax program and hu-manitarian discussions about penal reform. Inaddition, his earlier career as a partner in the presti-gious law firm of Garfield, Garfield and Howe, as acity councilman, and as a Ohio state senator com-pleted his political education. Most importantly,Howe already had developed a national reputation.Even while director at the People's Institute, Howeactively supported his old friend Senator Robert LaFollette in his stillborn bid for the presidential nomi-nation and then rallied behind Woodrow Wilson,whom Howe had known from his student days atJohns Hopkins. In 1914, Wilson appointed HoweCommissioner of Ellis Island. Yet, in spite of Howe'simpressive résumé and his personal popularity, hedid have enemies. Not only had he antagonizedmany in Ohio politics by sbifting from the Repub-lican to the Democratic party in 1903, but his stub-born nature alienated powerful interests, as his muchpublicized run-in with the food supplier to Ellis Is-land showed.

In New York City, the intellectual energy ofGreenwich Village excited Howe. He invited EmmaGoldman and W. E. B. DuBois, among others, to ad-dress the People's Institute. Radical political ideas in-terested him, and he later recounted that during theyears immediately preceding the war it was "good tobe a liberal." An outspoken advocate of direct pri-maries, municipal ownership, labor legislation, andwomen's suffrage, Howe believed in and worked forconstructive change. This commitment radicalizedthe political environment at the Institute. Yet, eventhough Howe moved further to the left, he remained

Figure 4. Frederic C. Howe, Director of the NationalBoard of Censorship during the critical 1910—1915 pe-riod. NYPL Picture Collection.

loyal to democratic politics and progressive ideology.After the war, he finally resigned as Commissioner ofEllis Island rather than deport political radicals, and,for the following fourteen years, he continued tosupport progressivism until he returned to publicservice in Roosevelt's administration.^'

During Howe's tenure as chairman of the Na-tional Board of Censorship, the Board strengthenedits public stance that official prior censorship was un-constitutional. While Howe stressed the necessity of afree exchange of ideas in a democratic society, healso offered new justification for the work of the Na-tional Board of Censorship. Rather than representthe interests of the trade or of the reformers, theBoard now identified itself with the moving pictureaudience and espoused the position that it tried to"reflect what the people of the United States wouldthink about any given picture were they sitting enmasses to view it."^^ According to Howe, the Boardsought for the censoring committee as broad andrepresentative a body as possible. Moreover, Howeinsisted that the Board operated from the premisethat "the general conscience believes in free speech

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on religious and political matters; in the right ofpeople to live and enjoy themselves in the way theysee fit, so long as fundamental morality is not in-jured. "̂ ^

Howe reahzed that the censorship question wascomplicated, and, in particular, he was concernedwith the difficulty of applying general standards tocriticizing specific films. Taking as an example thedepiction of vice and crime and the dramatization ofstreet life in New York, he cautioned that in one au-dience it might encourage the desire for reformwhile in another the desire to imitate. Howe believedthat any censorship, whether voluntary or vested infederal and state officials, provoked dangers to a freesociety. Keenly sensitive to the importance of the me-dium in the formation of public opinion and to therole of public opinion in a democracy, Howe under-stood the political imphcations of legalized censor-ship—in fact of any censorship—as well as any manof his day. On this point, Howe frankly admitted

Aside from the question of the constitution-ality of such (official) censorship is the ques-tion ofthe ultimate effect ofthe assumption bythe State of the right of regulating this mostimportant avenue of expression (the motionpicture). Should the State pass upon the desir-ability of the portrayal of labor questions, ofSocialism, the Industrial Workers of theWorld, and the other insistent issues crowdingto the fore? . . . If such (official) censorship beprovided for, will not this great field of dra-matic expression be subjected to the fear ofsuppression, so that only tbe safe and sane, thepurely conventional, the uncontroversial filmwill be produced? . . . Tben the control of thisoffical board would be a prize worth strug-gling for—a prize comparable to the controlof the Associated Pre.ss, and almost as dan-gerous to the freedom of the country.̂ **Howe feared official censorship because it was

even more vulnerable to government and narrowlyindividualistic bias—if not outright graft—than vol-untary censorship. The mistakes that the NationalBoard made in judging particular films might posetemporary problems, Howe admitted to his critics,but tbis paled in comparision to the dangers posed bylegal censorship. Howe feared that legal censorshipwould

stifle, or threaten to stifle, the freedom of the(motion picture) industry as a mirror ofthe ev-eryday life, hopes and aspirations of thepeople. The motion picture show is not onlydemocracy's theatre. It is a great educational

agency, and it is likely to become a propagan-distic agency of unmeasured possibilities.^^Howe's appointment as executive chairman ofthe

National Board of Gensorship had promised greaterlegitimacy for its work. The moving picture interests,preoccupied with commercial and artistic problemsin the quickly expanding indtistry, did not realizebow far short of its goal the National Board of Gen-sorship had fallen by 1915. Between Smith's death in1910 and Howe's resignation five years later, the Na-tional Board of Gensorship offered the motion pic-ture industry an alliance with progressive reformers.Yet, in spite of their successful campaigns to upliftthe industry, increase patronage, introduce movingpictures into schools, and generally improve thepublic image of the industry, their joint efforts toallay the effect of those who favored legalized cen-sorship met strong and organized opposition. Whilethe most powerful segments of the moving picturetrade recognized the legitimacy of the NationalBoard of Gensorship, enemies of the trade exploitedthe establishment of the Board to reorganize theiropposition. As an external agency that promotedquality control in film production, the Board cer-tainly helped the industry achieve greater stability be-tween 1909 and 1915. But rather than disarm oppo-nents by the general improvement in the moving pic-tures, the cooperation of progressive reformers withthe moving picture interests seemed only to provokemore hostihty. From the beginning, tbe Board triedto answer its critics publicly, hoping in this way togain new support for its work. But as support for le-galized censorship increased, the Board became amouthpiece against censorship. The irony did notescape them.

Between 1912 and 1915, the two-pronged attackagainst the National Board of Gensorship and for le-galized censorship began to succeed. Proponents oflegalized censorship challenged the effectiveness ofthe Board on the grounds that it approved too manyundesirable films and scenes, that it did not enforceits decisions, and that the manufacturers exertedundue influence by paying for the censorship. Theseaccusations resulted in proposals for legalized cen-sorship in several states and a number of municipal-ities. Gensorsbip legislation passed in Pennsylvania in1911, in Kansas and Ohio in 1913, and in Maryiandin 1916. Moreover, in February 1915, the decisionfrom the United States Supreme Gourt in Mutual v.Ohio upheld the state's right to censor films beforeexhibition. Mutual Film Gorporation had challengedthe constitutionality of the Ohio censorship law firstin the District Gourt of Ohio and then on appeal in

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the United States Supreme Court. W. B. Saunders,the attorney for Mutual, contended that the Ohiocensorship law violated tbe federal constitution inthree ways: by placing an unlawful burden on inter-state commerce, by interfering with freedom ofspeech and publication, and by unlawfully delegatinglegislative power.^^ In February 1915, the SupremeCourt affirmed the decision of the federal districtcourt. Justice Joseph McKenna delivered the opinionof the Court on these three complaints. First, sincethe censorship extended only to film intended for ex-hibition in Ohio, he wrote, it did not place an un-lawful burden on interstate commerce. Second,McKetma accepted the argument that moving pic-tures may be "mediums of thought" but refused toconsider here the guarantees of free opinion andspeech. Third, McKenna denied that the Ohiostatute delegated legislative power to an admininstra-tive agency and further recognized the difficulty ofan exact separation of powers, stressing that the Ohiocensors had discretion only in executing the law.^'

The unfavorable decisions in Mutual v. Ohio, aswell as in its companion case Mutual v. Kansas,shocked the moving picture world. In the nearlytwenty years since moving pictures had begun tocompete as commercial entertainment, the industryhad undergone remarkable growth and had success-fully distinguished itself from the class of commonshows where it had originally been licensed. Arguingthat moving pictures were comparable to circuses.Judge McKenna ignored the social respectability filmhad attained by improving the dramatic value of thepictures. Surprised by the decision, many in the tradecontinued to claim first amendment protection in de-fending themselves against further state, municipal,and federal legislation and before the lengthy con-gressional hearings in 1914 atid 1916 on the questionof a federal censorship commission. By pursuing thistactic, however, the film trade interests may actuallyhave hurt their own goals. By 1915, the slogan "freespeech" had become the battle cry of political dissi-dents including labor organizers like the Interna-tional Workers of the World. The failure to stave offlegalized censorship through adjudication left thetrade divided on which tactic to pursue next. Al-though in 1909 the exhibitors and manufacturerswere unified in their support of voluntary censor-ship, by 1915 there was little consensus on how tobest defend the industry from the the harmful ef-fects of legalized censorship.

Amid this turmoil, the Motion Picture Board ofTrade, a newly chartered association, attempted toorganize support to defeat censorship legislation. Its

efforts were complicated by the recent dissolution ofthe Motion Picture Patents Company in the wake ofanti-trust legislation. The Edison ManufacturingCompany refused to contribute funds or attend anycensorship meetings held by the new association.^^ Inspite of this rebuff, the Board of Trade establishedan executive committee that included some formermembers of the Patents Company as well as repre-sentatives from the independents. The Motion Pic-ture Board of Trade helped to organize political lob-bying against specific censorship bills. For example,when the New Jersey legislature took up the issue inFebruary 1916, the Board sent a delegation of manu-facturers to Trenton to prevent the censorship billfrom passing.^^

Even though the Motion Picture Board of Tradedid not survive as a trade association, its energieswere not entirely wasted. Many in the film industryagreed that a cooperative effort among them wasnecessary if they were to protect themselves from un-favorable legislation. On 8 June 1916, representa-tives of the motion picture industry sponsored a lun-cheon at Delmonico's Restaurant in New York City todiscuss strategy for "bringing about united opposi-tion to the enactment of further censorship legisla-tion and the determination of definite policies onother matters affecting the industry as a whole."^^Two months later a new industry association, the Na-tional Association of the Motion Picture Industry(NAMPI), was created. Boasting that is representedthe interests of tbe movie fans, the Association'sfounders felt that the whole motion picture world"was suffering from dangerous, inimical and alto-gether unintelligent legislation."^* The NAMPIoperated on the premise that, for the motion pictureinterests to be successful in the state legislatures,public support was necessary. The new associationpurported to "bring the motion pictures closer to thepublic."^^

To assure its public success, the NAMPI turned tothe world of partisan politics seeking support fromboth the Democratic and Republican parties. The As-sociation organized a delegation to represent the in-dustry at a luncheon of the Republican NationalCommittee in October 1916, where one of the hon-ored guests was former governor of New York andpresidential hopeful Charles Evans Hughes.^^ Onlythree weeks later, the Executive Secretary of the As-sociation circulated editorials representing theopinions of President Woodrow Wilson and Hugheson the subject of film censorship. He claimed theirstatements represented the "first large achievementof the organization."^"*

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Learning from the experience of the Board ofTrade, the leadership of the NAMPI was determinedto unify all the branches of the industry under its or-ganizational umbrella. Producers, exhibitors, sup-pliers, distributors, owners of the exchanges, andtrade journalists sat on the Board of Directors anddefined the policies of the new association. Inseeking out new members, the leaders describedthemselves as an "intelligent and progressive leader-ship."^^ In the beginning, they had the support ofGeorge Eastman, D. W. Griffith, William Fox, AdamKessel, Jesse Lasky, Patrick A. Powers, Alfred Smith,and Edwin Thanhouser, among others. Yet, in spiteof these signs of cooperation, significant leaders ofthe industry refused to join. George Kleine, in partic-ular, distrusted the new association. In a frank letterto a Washington associate—a letter which Kleinenever sent—he did not even try to veil his dislike forthe Association's leaders.®^ Kleine remained outsidethis association, as he would later explain, for anumber of reasons. He disagreed with the attitude ofthe Association on censorship, disapproved of its fi-nancial expenditure to influence legislation, and re-jected the idea that one association could representthe divergent interests of producers, distributors,and exhibitors.^'

In some ways, Kleine's analysis was justified giventhe conflict-ridden relationship between the pro-ducers and not only distributors but also exhibitorsover block-booking.^^ The hostility that arose be-tween these two groups on the censorship questionthreatened the very stability of the association. Boththe exhibitors and the manufacturers used the cen-

sorship question to gain leverage against each other.While a full blown controversy arose after the war,even before then these tensions threatened the goalsof the NAMPI.

In January 1917, a squabble that focused on theassociation's special anti-censorship committeechaired by D. W. Griffith turned into a majorproblem when Lee J. Ochs, President of the MotionPicture Exhibitors League of America, called uponPat Powers, as a representative of the Universal Man-ufacturing Company, to resign from the committeeonly one week after he became a member. Ochs,acting in his official capacity, condemned Universalfor publishing a charge that "exhibitors like smuttypictures."^^ This claim had appeared in an in-housepaper at Universal sometime in 1916, supposedly toinspire the exhibitors' protest against such pictures.™Both agreed that the "enemies of a free screen" hadexploited the original editorial to prove the necessityfor motion picture censorship.'' Yet Ochs believedthat this published position, easily manipulated bytbose advocating censorship, compromised the anti-censorship committee and demanded Powers resig-nation. Although Powers remained on the com-mittee, the accusations between representatives ofthe manuacturers and exhibitors boded ill for the fu-ture of the association, especially in presenting aunited front on the censorship question.

While the motion picture trade attempted to or-ganize industry wide associations to deal with issuessuch as censorship, the National Board of Censorshipcontinued to operate. Howe resigned as chairmanearly in the spring of 1915, and Cranston Brenton,

Figure 5. The approval seal of the National Board ofReview as it appeared on the leader of a General FilmCompany release du?ing the CrarLston Brenton period, c.¡916. Marc WanamakerlBison Archives.

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Director of the American Red Cross, replaced him.The Board underwent an identity crisis, realizing thedisadvantages of calling itself a Board of Censorshipwhen it vociferously opposed official prior censor-ship. Its members agreed to change the name byeliminating the offensive reference to censorship andhenceforth called themselves the National Board ofReview.'^

The National Board of Review supported theanti-censorship campaign of the NAMPI. When theAssociation appointed a committee to take adminis-trative control of an organized anti-censorship cam-paign under the leadership of D. W. Griffith, theBoard of Review pledged its active cooperation inopposing political censorship.'^ The test would comein the spring of 1917 when seventeen state legisla-tures threatened to present censorship bills.'^ Onceestablished, the joint conference of members fromthe National Board of Review and the CensorshipCommittee of the NAMPI immediately raised thequestion of financing their work. The leadership ofthe Board of Review approached George Eastman toraise the possibility of collecting an assessment onnegative film from the producing companies.Eastman agreed to broach the issue with his attorney.The National Board wanted access to the fundsraised by the joint committee but was concerned that,without Eastman's intervention, it might appear thatthe Board received money from the organized mo-tion picture industry.'^

In spite of public suspicion that the Board of Re-view reflected the desires of the industry too closely,the record reveals no evidence of unsolicited funds toinfluence the Board's decisions. On the other hand,the censorship committee of the NAMPI did involveitself in partisan politics at the municipal level,funding candidates who were friendly to their in-terests. For example, in March 1918. the committeesolicited support for the Democratic alderman in the25th ward in Chicago, normally a Republican ward,to reward him for his staunch support for themoving pictures in this difficult city where censorshipwars had been fought for ten years.'^ The committeemet a similar appeal to influence a municipal electionin Kansas City.

As members of the motion picture trade associa-tion and the National Board of Review focused

on strategies to prevent further censorship legisla-tion, the entry of the United States in the World Warin April 1917 brought about a change in the relation-ship between the moving picture producers andmanufacturers and the federal government. Patri-otism aside, the joint efforts of the motion pictureindustry and the National Board of Review to coop-

erate with the federal government presented theman opportunity to gain public approval for theirwork. In this respect, the National Board of Reviewattempted to play a significant role by offering to co-ordinate the efforts of the moving picture interestswith the needs of the government. While a discussionof the role that the NAMPI and the National Boardof Review played in the organization of leisure forservicemen during the war is beyond the scope of thispaper, it should be noted that the further erosion ofpower the national Board of Review suffered duringthese years affected the response of the film trade tothe pressure for legal censorship after the war.

Shortly after the entry of the United States into thewar, the motion picture industry offered its ser-

vices to the War Commission on Training Camps Ac-tivities. Chaired by Raymond Fosdick—the memberof Mayor Gaynor's administration who had been incharge of investigating the motion pictures for himin 1911—the War Commission was charged by thePresident with "looking after the welfare of the en-listed men in the various training camps and navalstations in America."" The Commission insisted thatit be made clear that the sub-committee was a com-mittee of the motion picture interests and that itshould take the name'The Producers and Distrib-utors War Camp Motion Picture Committee cooper-ating with the Commissions on Training Camp Activ-ities of the War and Navy Department" (War CampMotion Picture Committee).'^ But in April 1918, allthe members of the War Camp Motion Picture Com-mittee who were employed by the National Board ofReview were asked to resign from that committee onthe grounds that their membership in it representeda conflict of interest. Members of the National Boardof Review realized the importance of maintaining itsreputation as a disinterested agency reviewing filmsfor the public and they did not want to threaten theiralready tenuous position in their on-going struggleover legal censorship. Yet, however innocent the pa-triotic gesture of the motion picture industry and theNational Board of Review to join in the war effortmight have appeared, it belied the very real powerstruggles behind the scenes that forced the resigna-tion of the members of the National Board of Re-view.

The major question as to whether members of theNational Board of Review should serve on the WarCamp Motion Picture Committee developed out ofcontroversy among the social service organizations.The YMCA led others in exerting pressure onmembers of the National Board to force their with-drawal.'̂ ^ A number of issues underlined the disunitywithin the social service agencies, some that dated

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from before the war and others that would resurfaceafter the war. First, the YMCA apparently resentedthe sub-committee appointed by the National Boardof Review and the NAMPI to work with the WarCommission because it challenged the YMCA's con-trol of the distribution of films to the services camps.Second, other social agencies including the RedCross, the American Social Hygiene Association, andthe Food Administration, were now producing filmsin cooperation with the Committee on Public Infor-mation (Creel Committee). Some members of theNAMPI expressed their concern that this was unfaircompetition in production, distribution, and exhibi-tion of films, even under the special circumstances ofthe war. However, there seemed little the NationalBoard of Review could do, and its exclusion fromplaying any role in mediating between the NAMPIand other social agencies, contributed to its emascula-tion. Privately, the Executive Secretary oí the Boardof Review bitterly lamented this outcome:

It is unnecessary to me to refer to the more orless obvious spirit of distrust and lack of en-thusiastic assistance which we encounteredfrom the first on the part of those verypersons from whom we originally felt wemight legitimately expect the heartiest cooper-ation. . . . It is to be regretted that among theenormous issues raised by the World Warthere still remains in the field of social servicea lack of magnanimity which apparently preventtwo organizations working unhampered in thesame field for the national good.̂ **Although the war allowed the possibility of closer

cooperation between the government and the film in-terests, the relationship that evolved was far fromuntroubled even on simple matters. The question oftrailers added to the films bearing the emblem of theCreel Committee and signifying that they had beenapproved by it affected the censorship question. Al-though the National Board of Review objected to theuse of such emblems, some film companies attachedthem. The National Board of Review feared thatsuch voluntary advertisement would lead the publicto conclude that the motion picture industry willinglyaccepted federal censorship.^'

Efforts for censorship legislation recommencednationwide at the conclusion of the war. Repre-

sentative Randall of California introduced a bill inCongress for a Federal Motion Picture Commissionon 10 January 1919, and state legislation was intro-duced in North Carolina and for the second time inNew York. The censorship committee of theNAMPI, a standing committee chaired in 1919 byGabriel Hess of Goldwyn Pictures, expanded its

membership to meet the challenge. Perceiving a crisissituation, the committee devised a concrete planbased on nation-wide propaganda against censor-ship. This plan included distributing trailers andslides to the exhibitors, producing short satires oncensorship with prominent stars, organizing statecommittees to lobby against legislation, and adver-tising extensively in the trade papers against censor-ship. The work was to be financed through contribu-tions from the film companies.^^

The campaign proposed by the censorship com-mittee of the association sought to alert its

members to the imminent dangers of censorship. Be-fore the war, the National Board of Review had com-plained that the moving picture producers did notrecognize the gravity of the situation.**^ After thewar, the National Board of Review found itself in anuntenable relationship with the NAMPI as the filmindustry became more directly involved in anti-cen-sorship work. While the National Board of Reviewdid not directly represent the interests of the film in-dustry—and the growing dissension between pro-ducers and distributors on the one hand and exhib-itors on the other makes it difficult to refer to anycommunity of industry interests—the NationalBoard of Review and the NAMPI ostensibly agreedin their opposition to official prior censorship. Still,the National Board of Review thought of itself as apublic voice and not as the voice of the industry. Inthis role, the National Board of Review found itselfon more shaky grounds than before the war. Be-tween 1919 and 1921, what little influence the Na-tional Board of Review retained in the industryeroded largely as a result of conflicts within themoving picture world.

In the spring of 1919, the censorship committeeof the NAMPI proposed self-censorship by the tradeitself. Directly at issue was the distribution and exhi-bition of films about venereal disease made duringthe war by the American Social Hygiene Assciationand now being shown in theaters to mixed audi-ences.̂ "* Labelling these films immoral, the NAMPIappeared to be leading a purity crusade. The realissue at stake, however, was competition in the man-ufacturing and distribution of films between the gov-ernment, social, agencies, and commercial producers.Yet, the NAMPI saw the exhibitors as culprits andattempted to close down exhibitors showing suchfilms. Arguing that the Association could police itsown films, the president of the Association, WilliamBrady, issued a press release announcing 13 resolu-tions passed by the producers and distributors. Theyintended to exclude their own films from theaters ex-hibiting films not passed by the Association.^^

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The publication of these resohitions infuriatedW. D. McGuire, the Executive Secretary at the Na-tional Board of Review. Not only was self-censorshipridiculous, as he wrote to his long-time friend PatPowers, but Brady and the National Association wereseriously damaging the campaign against official cen-sorship. McGuire complained that Brady's statementsdiscredited the National Board of Review by sug-gesting that pictures circulated tbat sliould not be ex-hibited. Moreover, McGuire believed that the pres-sure tactics introduced by the Association against theexhibitors were reprehensible. The National Associa-tion contradicted the policy strictly adhered to by theNational Board of Review that only public pressureshould be used to force conformity. Finally, McGuireasked Powers to make a statement to the press thatfirst clarified Universal's preference to submit theirpictures to the National Board of Review, a disinter-

ested organization and, second, insisted that publicconfidence could only be won through a disinter-ested censorship.'**' Soon thereafter, McGuire con-vinced the leadership at the NAMPI to retreat fromthe position of self-censorship. In 1919, the NAMPIpassed a series of resolutions reconfirming the im-portant role of the National Board of Review.**' Itwas a hollow victory.

In the months that followed the resolutionspassed by tbe NAMPI, the National Board struggledto re-establish its position with the National Associa-tion. Their relationship remained strained in spite ofpronouncements to the contrary. The move on tbepart of the National Association towards self-censor-ship diverged from a decade of experience with thecensorship question and represented a shift in policythat would be consolidated in the establishment ofthe Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Asso-

Figure 6. Cecil B. DeMille and Jesse Lasky greet Will Hays on his arrival in Hollywood, 1922. Marc Wana-maker/Bison Archives.

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Nancy J. Rosenbloom

ciation — the Hays Office—in 1922. Although theNational Association retreated from its original posi-tion of self-censorship and insisted films be sub-mitted and reviewed by the National Board of Re-view, the Board soon found itself in constant strugglewith the industry. Trailers showing that the films hadbeen passed by the Board were inadvertently or de-liberately left off films, and the Board suffered fromthe lack of publicity. More and more often the Boardfound itself in financial difficulties, and McGuireconstantly asked for temporary funds, which Powers,who was manufacturing the trailers for the NationalBoard of Review, usually provided.**^

In the meantime, the moving picture industry,plagued by persistent organizational crises, had diffi-culty confronting the assault on it launched in favorof legal censorship. The passage of a state law in NewYork in 1921 was among their most striking defeats.Unhappy witb the efficacy of the NAMPI. membersof the trade turned to Will Hays, former chairman ofthe Republican National Party, during the Christmasholidays of 1921, to discuss the creation of a new as-sociation to represent the interests of the producersand distributors. The censorship question rankedhigh on the agenda the new association set for itselfthat spring.

Much had transpired between 1909 and 1922.The phenomenal growth of the film industry, thefragmentation of reform in America, and the shiftingcontext of American pohtical life were all interre-lated. At the center of their relationship stood thecensorship question. Disagreements over the positiverole of government in society, the viability of legisla-tive and bureaucratic solutions to social problems, therecognition of special interest groups, and the pro-tection of individual rights informed the dialogue be-tween reformers on the question of censorship.Championing the cause of free speech, the progres-sives were beleaguered by their more conservativecounterparts in the world of reform. Nor did unityprevail within the industry. Open warfare replacedcooperation between exhibitors and manufacturerseven on the question of censorship. Peer pressure, soeffectively exercised in the early period, turned intoa powerful weapon used against each other after1917. Although in the beginning the film interestseschewed partisan politics, by 1922 they wanted toexploit the political world to their advantage. WillHays was not a gratuitous choice on the part of dis-crete film interests. When the film trade agreed tohim as their representative, they finally rejected themodel of social policy offered by the progressivesand their allies at the National Board of Censor-ship. •

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

* The idea for this paper originated in an NEHSummer Seminar, "American Political History inComparative Perspective," which Morton Keller of-fered at Brandeis University in the summer of 1985.An NEH Summer Stipend in the summer of 1986made completion of this article possible.

REFERENCES AND NOTES1. See Robert C Allen, "Motion Picture Exhibition in

Manhattan 1906-1912," in Film Before Griffith, ed.John C. Fell {Berkeley: University of California Press,1983), 162-175, ancl Russell Merritt, "NickelodeonTheaters, 1905-I9I4: Building an Audience for theMovies," in The Ameriain Film Industry, ed. Tino Baiio(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976),83-102.

2. Richard S. Randall, Censorship of the Movies: The Socialand Political Control ufa Mass Medium (Madison: Univer-sity of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

3. See especially Robert Sklar, Movie Made America (NewYork: Random House, 1975); Garth Jowett,/-"i/wt. TheDemocratic Art (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); and LaryMay, Screening out the Past: The Birth of Mass Culture andthe Motion Picture Industry (New York: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1980).

4. See especially Daniel T. Rodgers "In Search of Pro-gressivism," Reviews in American History 10 (1982):113-132. for a historiographical discussion oí thescholarship of the last fifteen years. See also RichardHofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (NewYork: Vintage, 1955) and Robert Wiebe, The Search forOrder: 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).

5. Wiebe, 164-195.6. See Richard McCormick, The Party Period and Public

Policy: American Politics from t/ie Age of Jackson to the Pro-gressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press,1986), especially "Progressivism: A ContemporaryReassessment," 263-288; "Prelude to Progressivism:The Transformation of New York State Politics,1890-1910," 289-310; and "The Discovery that Busi-ness Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins ofProgressivism," 311-355. See also Richard McCormickand Arthur Link, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, IL:Harían Davidson, 1983).

7. McCormick, "Prelude to Progressivism," 309.8. See especially Sklar, Movie Made America; 30-32 Jo-

wett, Film: The Democratic Art; 74-138 and MayScreening Out the Past, 43—59.

9. Jowett, 126.10. May, 86-92.11. See for a survey of the trade associations in the film

industry David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and KristinThompson, The Classical Hollywood Ciriema: Film Styleand Mode of Production to I960 (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1985), 96 - 112.

12. John Collier to Manufacturers, 15 March 1909, Docu-ment File, Edison Archives, Edison National HistoricSite, National Park Service, United States Departmentof the Interior. The original letterhead of the Board ofCensorship lists nine civic bodies that were represented

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on the governing board. These civic bodies are thePublic Education Society, the Public Schools, thePeople's Institute, the Federation of Churches, theWoman's Municipal League, the Ethical Social League,the Society for the Prevention of Crime, the Neighbor-hood Worker's Association, and the League for Polit-ical Education. The Reverend George William Knox ofUnion Theological Seminary and the Ethical-SocialLeague served as chairman of the governing board.The executive committee on censorship consisted ofMr. lohn Collier of the People's Institute; Mrs. Jose-phine Redding of Vogue magazine; and Albert Shiel[d]swho was Superintendant of Public Education on thelower East side. Also on the executive committee weretwo representatives of the Association of Motion Pic-ture Exhibitors of New York State. See David Ham-mack, Poiver and Society: Greater New York at the Turji ofthe Century (Russell Sage Foundation: 1982), andRichard Skolnick, "Civic Group Progressivism in NewYork City," New York History 51 (1970): 411-39. For astudy of the National Board of Censorship, see CharlesMatthew Feldman, The National Board of Censorship (Re-view) of Motion Pictures ¡909-1922 (New York; Arno,1977).

13. See, for example. Collier to Frank Dyer, 1 November1909, Document Eile. Edison Archives. Between Marchand November 1909, the letterhead had been changedto National Board oí Censorship of Motion PicturesEstablished by the People's Institute. New groups rep-resented on the governing board included the CharityOrganization Society, Children's Aid Society, and theCity Vigilance League. If anything, these three associa-tions were characterized by their Protestant orientationand moralizing reforms, see Hammack, passim. It is in-teresting to note that, throughout its formation,women dominated the membership of most of the re-form groups associated with the Board. In fact, severalof the groups had originated as women's auxiliaries topolitically oriented organizations.

14. Some other easily identifiable figures of the 57 nameson the advisory committee include Felix Adler, aGerman Jew who advocated the Americanization ofEastern European immigrants; R. F. Cutting, active inprivate civic reform; Edward Devine, writer; R. W. de-Forest, reformer with a special interest in tenement re-form; Richard Watson Gilder, advocate of tenementreform and one time president of the KindergartenAssociation; E. R. L. Gould, active in social welfare andmunicipal reform; George McAneny, journalist andcivic reformer; William H. Maxwell, first Superinten-dant of greater New York's public schools; James B.Reynolds, social worker, school reformer, and formerRoosevelt ally; Jacob Riis, photojournalist, housing re-former, and school reformer; Jacob Schiff and IssacSeligman, both German Jewish investment bankers;and Albert Shaw, editor of American Review of Reviews.See Hammack, passim.

15. See Robert J. Eisher, "Film Censorship and ProgressiveReform: The National Board of Censorship of MotionPictures, 1909-1922" Journal of Popular Fibn 4 (1975):143-156.

16. Charles Beard, "The Democracy of Charles SpragueSmith," The Civic Joumal (1910), Document File, Ed-ison Archives.

17. For biographical information on John Collier, see his

autobiography From Every Zenith (Denver: Sage Books,1963). See also John Collier, The Problem of Motion Pic-tures {New York: National Board of Censorship, 1910),and H. C. Judson, "Censoring Motion Pictures, an In-terview with John Collier," in The Moving Picture World,5 April I9I3, 25-26. While Collier is best known asU.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the 1930s, heserved as General Secretary and Educational Secretaryof the National Board of Censorship.

18. Collier to Manufacturers of Motion Pictures, 15 March1909, Document File, Edison Archives.

19. See, for example, "The Press and the Moving Picture,"The Moving Picture World 4 (20 March 1909): 325; Ste-phen W. Bush, "A Word of Good Cheer to all Friendsof the Moving Pictures," The Moving Picture World 6 (26March 1910): 462; "Newspaper Neurasthenia," TheMoving Picture World 1 (30 July 1910): 234-35.

20. Collier to Robert Adams, Central Branch YMCA, Phil-adelphia, 6 May 1909, Document File, Edison Ar-chives.

21. National Board of Censorship of Motion Pictures, 14August 1909, Box 38, George Kleine Collection(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). See alsothe The Report of the National Board of Censorship of Mo-tion Pictures, I May 1911, 7.

22. Announcement to Exhibitors from Motion PicturePatents Company, I February 1909, Box 1, MotionPicture Patents Company Administrative File, EdisonArchives.

23. Even among the members of the Patents Company,Pathe Frères seems to have had more than its share ofeliminations and rejections. See the weekly reports ofthe Board of Censorship, April through July 1909,passim, Document File, Edison Archives.

24. Dyer to Collier, 7 May 1909, Document File, EdisonArchives.

25. Collier to Manufactuers, 15 March 1909, DocumentFile, Edison Archives.

26. Scull to Collier, 28 October 1909, Document File, Ed-ison Archives.

27. Collier to Adams, 6 May 1909, Document File, EdisonArchives.

28. (killier to Manufacturers, 15 March 1909, DocumentFile, Edison Archives. Letter from the Board of Cen-sorship of Programs, New York City, to Mr. DwightMacDonald, 26 March 1909, Box 6, George KleineCollection.

29. Charles Sprague Smith to Dyer, 15 January 1910, Doc-ument File, Edison Archives. Smith realized that theculprit might be the distributor and not the producerbut all the same he warned Dyer that ". . . it is clearlyunwise that such advertisements should be used, be-cause the natural tendency would be to attach them tothose subjects which were the most risque, and the re-sult of that would be to tend to discredit the censor-ship."

30. Collier to Manufacturers, 15 March 1909, DocumentFile, Edison Archives. See also Board of Censorship toMacDonald, 26 March 1909, Kleine Collection.

31. Report of the Board of Censorship to the Gentlemenof the Motion Picture Patents Company, 23 April 1909and 27 April 1909. See also the letter to Mr. DwightMcDonald, 30 March 1909, Document File, Edison Ar-chives.

32. Report of the Board of Censorship to the Gentlemen

323

Nancy J. Rosenbloom

of the Motion Picture Patents Company, 12 )uly 1909.Document File, Edison Archives,

33. Report of the Board of Censorship to the Gentlemenof the Motion Picture Patents Company, 2 and 24 JulyÍ909, Document File, Edison Archives.

34. Report of the Board of Censorship to the Gentlemenof the Motion Picture Patents Company, September 6and October 17, 1910, as well as 10 May 1912, all inDocument File, Edison Archives.

35. Collier to Gentlemen of the Motion Picture PatentsCompany, 29 October 1909, Document File, EdisonArchives.

36. Collier to Horace Plimpton, 26 May 1909, DocumentFile, Edison Archives.

37. J. J. Kennedy to Dyer, 15 November 1909, DocumentFile, Edison Archives.

38. Dyer to Smith, 17 November 1909, Document File, Ed-ison Archives.

39. Smith to Dyer, 19 November 1909, Dotumeni File, Ed-ison Archives.

40. Scull to Smith, 23 November 1909, Document File, Ed-ison Archives.

41. Josephine Redding to Mrs. Ply[i]mpton, 9 June 1910.Document File, Edison Archives. In fact, Mrs. Reddingdid not resign.

42. Ibid.43. "New York Picture Theater Ordinance Discussed," The

Moving Picture World 10(18 November 1911): 543-45.See also Feldman, The National Board of Censorship.

44. For biographical information on WilliamJ. Gaynor, seeespecially "From Van Wyck to O'Dwyer" in The GreaterCity. New York. 1898-1948 Eds. Allan Nevins and JohnKrout, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948),72-81, and Eouis Heaton Pink, Caynor: The TammanyMayor Who Swallowed the Tiger (New York: Interna-tional, 1931),

45. See Hammack, passim.46. A Report on the Condition of Moving Picture Shows in New

York, 22 March 1911, 8-10, Document File, EdisonArchives.

47. A Report on the Conditions of Moving Picture Shows in NewYork, 9.

48. Mayor Gaynor, "Mayor Gaynor's Veto," The MovingPiciure World 15(11 January 1913): 135-36.

49. Ibid.50. Smith to Dyer, 31 lanuary and 20 March 1910; Collier

to Dyer. 22 and 30 March 1910, all in Document File,Edison Archives.

51. Frederic C. Howe, The Confessions of a Reformer, intro.by John Braeman (New York: Quadrangle. 1967). ForHowe's analysis of his years at the People's Institute,see especially pp. 240-254. See Eugene M. Tobin. Or-ganize or Perish: America's Independent Progressives,19I3-Í933 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 159.

52. Howe quoted in W. P. Eawson, "Standards of Censor-ship," Harper's Weekh (16 January 1915): 63.

53. Ibid.54. Ibid.55. Ibid.56. Mutual Film Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of

Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). See also Ira H. Carmen,Movies, Censorship, and the Law (Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan, 1966), 10-20.

57. Mutual V. Ohio.

58. C. H. Wilson to Horace Plimpton, 21 Itine 1915, Docu-ment File, Edison Archives.

59. J. W. Binder to Carl Wilson, Thomas Edison, Inc., 19February 1916, Document File, Edison Archives.

60. Invitation to Euncheon and Conference of the MotionPicture Industry, 3 June 1916, Document File, EdisonArchives.

61. Press Release from F. H. Elliott, Executive Secretary ofthe National Association of the Motion Picture In-dustry (NAMPI), "The Motion Pictures Big Part inAmerica's War for Democracy," 25 February 1918,Box 38, Kleine Collection.

62. Ibid.63. Elliot to Kleine, 5 October 1916, Box 38, Kleine Col-

lection.64. Elliot to Kleine, 27 October 1916, Box 38, Kleine Col-

lection.65. Ibid.66. Kleine to Kendall Banning, Director of Moving Pic-

tures, Washington. D. C, 11 July I9I7, Box 65, KleineCollection.

67. Kleine to Patrick A. Powers. 17 July 1918, Box 38,Kleine Collection. Powers of the Universal Manufac-turing Company was a member of the executive com-mittee of the NAMPI. Powers became very involved inanti-censorship work, and, through his role on the cen-sorship committee of the NAMPI, he developed a closerelationship with the Executive Secretary of the Na-tional Board of Review. He also was chairman of theWar Camp Motion Picture Committee, Powers re-signed from NAMPI in September 1919 because theAssociation passed a resolution in opposition to or-ganize labor. 30 September 1919. Box 20. Aitken Bros.Papers (Wisconsin Center for Film and Theater Re-search at the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison,Wisconsin).

68. See lor a brief discussion of block booking, Lewislacobs. The Rise of the American Film (New York: Hai-coLirt Brace, 1939). 164-66.

69. An Open Letter from Lee J. Ochs, President of theMotion Picture Exhibitors League of America Replyingto Published Statement by R. H. Cochrane, Vice Presi-dent of Universal Manufacturing Co., 18 January1917, Box 13, Aitken Bros. Papers.

70. Statement by R. H. Cochrane, Box 13, Aitken Bros.Papers.

71. Open letter from Ochs and statement by Cochrane.72. "Censors at Luncheon." The Moving Picture World 25 4

September 1915: 1625.73. W. D. McGuire, Executive Secretary of the National

Board ol Review, to Powers, 18 January 1917. Box 14,Aitken Bros. Papers.

74. These states included California, Colorada, Illinois,Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Arkansas,Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Tennesee, Utah,Washington, West Virginia, and Vermont. "Suggestionlor a letter to be written by the National Board to theMembers of the Producing Companies," [1917], Box13, Aitken Bros. Papers.

75. Report on the Joint Conference of Committee of theNational Board of Review with the Censorship Com-mittee of tbe NAMPI, 10 February 1917. Box 13,Aitken Bros. Papers.

7fi. Tbeodore Mitchell, Secretary of the NAMPI Censor-

324


ship Committee, to Powers, 18 March and 15 April1918, Box 16, Aitken Bros. Papers. Mitchell was alsothe general press representative of Epoch Product Cor-poration, which had produced THE BIRIH OF ANATION. The correspondence is on the letterhead ofEpoch. See also Kathleen McCarthy, "Nickel Vice andVirtue: Movie Censorship in Chicago, 1907—1915,"

Journal of Popular Film 5 (1976): 37-55.77. McGuire to Powers, 31 January 1918, Box 16, Aitken

Bros. Papers. McGuire sent Powers copies of corre-spondence between himself and LeeJ. Hanmer, Warand Navy Commissions on ! raining Camp Activities,30 January 1918, in which he suggested that Mr. Fos-dick write to Powers.

78. Hanmer to Powers, 18 February 1918, Box 16, AitkenBros. Papers.

79. McGuire to Powers, 24 April 1918, Box 17, AitkenBros. Papers.

80. McGuire to Powers, 17 April 1918, Box 16 AitkenBros. Papers.

81. McGuire to Powers, 22 November 1917, Box 15,Aitken Bros. Papers; McGuire to Powers, 17 December1917, Box 16, Aitken Bros. Papers.

82. Gabriel Hess to Powers, 23 January 1919, Box 17,Aitken Bros. Papers.

83. McGuire To Powers, 18 January 1917. Box 13. AitkenBros. Papers.

84. W. H. Zinsser, Director, Department ot Public Infor-mation for the American Social Hygiene Association,to Powers, 12 May 1919, And Zinsser to Hess 10 May1919, both in Box 19, Aitken Bros. Papers.

85. Elliott to Powers, 28 April 1919, Box 19, Aitken Bros.Papers. Included also was a NAMPI press release"Clean Motion Pictures Barred from Theaters Exhib-iting Indecent Films," 30 April 1919, Box 19, AitkenBros. Papers.

86. McGuire lo Powers, 20 June 1919, Box 19, AitkenBros. Papers.

87. McGuire to Powers, 15 May and 10 June 1919;McGuire to Hess, 14 May 1919; Resolutions in Refer-ence to Motion Picture Censorship, Adopted by JointConference Committee of Motion Picture Proucersand National Board of Review, Box 19, Aitken Bros.Papers.

88. McGuire to Powers, 11 July 1919, Box 19, AitkenBros.; McGuire lo Powers, 16 August 1919 and Elliottto Members of NAMPI, 3 November 1919, Box 20,Aitken Bros Papers; Elliott to H. M. Berman, UniversalMfg. Co., 6 February 1920, Box 21, Aitken Bros.Papers.

325

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