Belief and Bomb

8/8/2019 Belief and Bomb

1/283

BELIEFS AND THE BOMB:THE ROLE OF LEADERSWORLD VIEWS AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS

ON PROLIFERATION DECISIONS

by

K.P. OReilly

Bachelor of ArtsLawrence University, 1993

Master of ArtsMarquette University, 2004

Juris DoctorEmory University School of Law, 1996

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

Political Science

College of Arts and Science

University of South Carolina

2009

Accepted by:

Dr. Harvey Starr, Major Professor

Dr. Donald J. Puchala, Committee Member

Dr. Jerel Rosati, Committee Member

Dr. Akan Malici, Committee Member

James Buggy, Dean of the Graduate School


2/283

UMI Number: 3350351

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy

submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and

photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper

alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript

and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized

copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

______________________________________________________________

UMI Microform 3350351Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected againstunauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

_______________________________________________________________

ProQuest LLC789 East Eisenhower Parkway

P.O. Box 1346Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346


3/283

ii

Copyright by K.P. OReilly, 2009All Rights Reserved.


4/283

iii

DEDICATION

To all my friends and family who provided encouragement over the course of my

studies and especially to my parents, Katherine and Terrance, for their enduring patience,

love, and support during this project as well as all my other endeavors.


5/283

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation committee members for

their comments and critiques. Special thanks to Dr. Harvey Starr, who as my advisor

bore the brunt of reviewing numerous initial drafts and subsequent revisions. His sharp

eye has helped to ensure the soundness of the research design and to keep the project

focused. Dr. Akan Malici, at Furman University, provided invaluable assistance and

advice in dealing with my numerous questions and facing the occasional methodological

pitfalls that befell me in the course of conducting the operational code analysis.

Throughout the process I received tremendous help from reference librarians literally the

world over. The reference staff at Duke University provided me with unfettered access to

items in storage and helped in locating materials despite of an ongoing library renovation.

Ms. Esta Jones and her assistant Freddie at the Archive for Contemporary History at the

University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, South Africa provided me with a wealth of

information and documents all the while offering tremendous hospitality during my visit.

Special thanks also to Ms. Glenda Lynch for serving as my go between in requesting and

retrieving documents from the National Library of Australia in Canberra. Lastly, I must

thank Dr. Gordon Smith and Ms. Sallie Buice at the Walker Institute for International and

Area Studies, at the University of South Carolina, not only for the travel support provided

by a Ceny Walker Fellowship, but for all the support they have offered during my time at

the University of South Carolina.


6/283

v

ABSTRACT

Why do countries build nuclear weapons? The revolutionary nature of the

decision to go or not go nuclear highlights the importance of individual decision-makers,

as leaders ultimately draw upon their own conceptions of themselves and the world

around them. Despite the importance of this factor, the role of individual leaders world

views and strategic preferences has been largely omitted in the study of proliferation.

This project advances a new analytical framework which provides a systematic and

generalizable approach addressing how leaders perceptions of the international system

may influence nuclear proliferation decisions. By utilizing a multi-method approach

employing qualitative, quantitative, and game theory methodologies, this project

develops a framework that captures the interactive and strategic nature of international

politics weighing how views of SelfandOther influence decision-making. The result is a

dyadic approach where the key to proliferation lies in understanding a leaders perception

of the strategic interaction between actors. By understanding the motivations driving

proliferation decisions we may ultimately develop policy solutions that might stem or

even rollback nuclear proliferation. In developing this framework the project re-examines

the proliferation decisions in several countries including South Africa, India, Libya, and

Australia.


7/283

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................... iv

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................. ix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO

THE STUDY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.............................................................. 12

CHAPTER THREE

A NEW ANAYTICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................... 25

CHAPTER FOUR

CASES AND METHODOLOGY.................................................................................... 49

CHAPTER FIVE

SOUTH AFRICA......................................................................................................... 75

CHAPTER SIX

INDIA...................................................................................................................... 124

CHAPTER SEVEN

LIBYA..................................................................................................................... 175

CHAPTER EIGHT

AUSTRALIA ........................................................................................................... 211

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 244


8/283

vii

REFERENCES.................................................................................................................... 257

APPENDIX ASTRATEGIC INTERACTION GAMES ........................................................... 270

APPENDIX B ARCHIVAL RESEARCH............................................................................. 271

APPENDIX C QADHAFI RESEARCH ................................................................................ 272


9/283

viii

LIST OF TABLES

3.1 A Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) 41

3.2 Holsti Typologies, Preferences and Proliferation Expectations 44

3.3 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions using TOM 46

5.1 South African Leaders Operational Codes 110

5.2 Vorsters Perceptions of Self and Other 114

5.3 De Klerks Perceptions of Self and Other 120

6.1 Indian Leaders Operational Codes 161

6.2 Gandhis Perceptions of Self and Other 1656.3 Vajpayees Perceptions of Self and Other 171

7.1 Qadhafis Operational Code 198

7.2 Qadhafis Perceptions of Self and Other 202

8.1 Gortons Operational Code 236

8.2 Gortons Perceptions of Self and Other 239

9.1 Proliferation Opportunity and Willingness 246

9.2 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying theModified Holsti Typologies 248

9.3 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying TIP 248


10/283

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 Scale of Influence of Decision-Makers Beliefs 31

3.2 Georges Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs 36

3.3 Modified Holsti Typology Matrix 39

3.4 Example of a Subjective Game 42

4.1 Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS) 58

4.2 VICS Coding Example 58

4.3 Operational Code Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs 60

5.1 South African Leaders Perceptions of Self and Other 111

5.2 Vorsters Subjective Game 115

5.3 De Klerks Subjective Game 120

6.1 Indian Leaders Perceptions of Self and Other 162

6.2 Gandhis Subjective Game 166

6.3 Vajpayees Subjective Game 172

7.1 Qadhafis Perceptions of Self and Other 200

7.2 Qadhafis Subjective Game 203

8.1 Gortons Perceptions of Self and Other 238

8.2 Gortons Subjective Game 241


11/283

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

What makes mankind tragic is not that they are the victims of nature, it is

that they are conscious of it.1

Nuclear weapons have proven to be a problematic feature of the modern world for

both practitioners and scholars alike. For practitioners the spread of these weapons

introduces uncertainty in their dealing with others. Accordingly, for many countries the

spread of nuclear weapons is considered one of the greatest threats to their national

security. Meanwhile, for scholars the spread of these weapons has ignited debate as to

their role and utility in international politics (Sagan and Waltz 2002). Indeed the

presence of nuclear weapons seems to offer several paradoxes. On the one hand, nuclear

weapons indicate a states power in terms of military, economic, and technical prowess.

Yet, on numerous occasions, nuclear weapon states have been challenged and defeated by

non-nuclear weapons states as evidenced in the US experience in Vietnam and the Soviet

Unions adventure in Afghanistan. Even their massive destructive power, which makes

them initially attractive as weapons, is now believed to be driving international norms

prohibiting their use (Tannenwald 2007). In sum, while the benefits of these weapons

may be unsure, they continue to pose potentially serious consequences for global politics

(Asal and Beardsley 2009; Gartzke and Kroenig 2009; Horowitz 2009).

1 Joseph Conrad (1857-1924)


12/283

2

The uncertain and troubling impact of these weapons on the international system

is equaled only by the continuing challenge to understand the motivations for nuclear

proliferationwhy do countries build nuclear weapons? This conundrum has led

researchers to refer to the issue as the proliferation puzzle (Davis and Frankel 1994).

The inability to grasp the motivations for proliferation has resulted in a tragic

sensibility among many proliferation scholars who depict future proliferation as an

inevitable outcome (Hymans 2006). For instance, during the 1960s, proliferation

forecasts predicted the possibility of upwards of 25 nuclear weapons states before 1970.2

With the end of the Cold War predictions asserted the likelihood of rampant proliferation

with the demise of the bi-polar international system (Mearsheimer 1990). Despite such

foreboding predictions, today there are only five acknowledged and four

unacknowledged and de facto nuclear weapons states.3 However, even today

proliferation headlines focus on the recent proliferation efforts by the countries of Iran

and North Korea.

Adding to this puzzle are the frequently overlooked, yet perhaps more interesting,

accounts of states which have purposefully abandoned or foresworn development of

nuclear weapons programs. The number of states abandoning nuclear weapons programs

2 President John F. Kennedy is famously quoted during the course of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treatynegotiations as saying, "I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.

3 The terms acknowledged and unacknowledged nuclear weapon state is common terminology

referencing states position in the international nonproliferation regime. Acknowledged nuclear weaponstates are those whose status is recognized in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1971. This groupincludes the United States, Peoples Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union(now Russia). Unacknowledged nuclear weapon states are those states widely recognized to have nuclearweapons, but are not signatories to the NPT. Currently, this group includes Pakistan, India, and Israel.North Korea presents its own dilemma as a non-nuclear weapons state signatory to the NPT that hassubsequently withdrawn from the Treaty. While North Koreas decision to withdraw has been questionedas to its legality, its tests conducted in October 2006, although of uncertain success, has caused mostobservers to consider North Korea a de facto nuclear weapons state.


13/283

3

during the 1990s was actually greater than the number actively seeking to develop such

capabilities (Roberts 1999). At the end of the Cold War, the world faced the possibility

of four new nuclear weapons states with the newly independent states of Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, and Belarus each retaining weapons built by the former Soviet Union. The

latter three all relinquished their claims to the weapons, sending them to Russia which

assumed the Soviet Unions status as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. Even

more astonishing was the move by the South African government to relinquish its nuclear

weapons. In March 1993, Prime Minister F.W. De Klerk announced to the world his

governments intention to abandon South Africas nuclear weapon program which had

successfully constructed six nuclear devices along with various delivery systems. The

South African case is the first instance of a country actually developing nuclear weapons

capability and then subsequently voluntarily abandoning its program. More recently, in

2003, Libya followed these states in ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. These specific

instances of nonproliferation, along with the cases of Argentina, Brazil, South Korea,

Taiwan, and Sweden, serve as counter-examples to the relatively rare instances of

proliferation which have occurred. More importantly, they present the critical question of

why do some states decide not to pursue or, even more importantly, reconsider becoming

a nuclear weapon state. Only through an accurate understanding the causal elements

influencing such decisions can scholars and policy-makers hope to control, or even

potentially curb, nuclear proliferation once and for all. The critical question then for the

study of international relations is what can be learned from these cases which explain

why states choose to or not to go nuclear?


14/283

4

Studies of nuclear proliferation run the theoretical gambit utilizing various

perspectives. Researchers have examined a wide array of variables ranging from the

systemic to the domestic-political level in offering an explanation of this phenomenon.

For the most part the dominant approaches in examining the proliferation dilemma tie

back to the broader ongoing debate in international relations between realism and

liberalism regarding their disagreement as to the critical loci for attempting understanding

and explaining states behavior. Nevertheless, the application of these paradigms as

applied to the proliferation puzzle have come up wanting, offering explanations often

found ill-fitting at best or contradicted by actual cases.

Like much of the theorizing in political science, the variables which researchers

point to as critical in the outcome of state proliferation decisionssecurity, technological

capacity, economic development, domestic political competitiononly provide one part

of the picture, the opportunity to proliferate. Few of the models applied to proliferation

have addressed the issue ofwillingness as a driving force in such decisions (Starr 1978;

Most and Starr 1989). Problematically, the issue of state willingness is internalized and

implicitly linked to the factors which provide states with the opportunity to engage in

proliferation. As is the case for most questions facing international relations scholars, the

debate as to why states choose to go nuclear in developing nuclear weapons capability

revolves around the issue of preferences, and the inevitable quandary of where do

preferences come from and for which audience, domestic or international, are preferences

supposed to satisfy.

The bulk of the scholarship examining nuclear proliferation sees preferences as

endogenous, shaped either by the international system or by the domestic political


15/283


16/283

6

unaccounted for (Montgomery and Sagan 2009).4 Again, these variables based on

external security and domestic politics appear to present only half of the equation,

demonstrating the opportunity, but not the willingness, to proliferate. Moreover, the

revolutionary nature that the decision to go or not go nuclear further highlights the

importance of individual decision-makers, as leaders ultimately draw upon their own

conceptions of themselves and the world around them (Hymans 2006). Initial research as

to the intersection of beliefs and proliferation by Long and Grillot (2000) suggests that

beliefs act not simply as strategic guides, but that beliefs are determinative of the very

preferences which drive state strategy.

In seeking to break new ground to further advance the inquiry on the motivations

driving nuclear proliferation by examining the role of individual leaders preferences, this

project aims to address the overarching questionWhat impact do leaders views of the

international political environment have on proliferation decisions? More specifically,

how do perceptions of interactions with others influence whether nuclear weapons are

seen as necessary for achieving political goals in the international system? This project

argues that understanding particular leaders like Saddam Hussein or Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad is the key to understanding proliferationand crafting strategies to stop it.

Leaders world views provide insight as to their strategic interactions where decisions

are the result of ones own preferences andanticipating the actions of others (Lake and

Powell 1999). By understanding leaders world views and strategic preferences, we can

obtain a more vivid picture of the motivations driving leaders proliferation decisions.

Ultimately, the development of a leaders interaction framework helps to develop policy

4 See the upcoming special edition of theJournal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming) for several articleutilizing quantitative methods in examining the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation.


17/283

7

solutions as to the types of strategies and tactics which might stem or even rollback

nuclear proliferation.

However, from the outset one caution must be made. This project is not an

attempt to further any theory pertaining to great leaders or great men and women in

history. For the leaders examined, their rise to power was far from being preordained,

resulting more from circumstances and political compromise than historic certainty. In

the cases of South Africa (Vorster), India (Gandhi), and Australia (Gorton), the leaders in

question came to power following the sudden and unexpected death of their predecessors

by way of assassination, heart attack, and a swimming accident. In most cases these

leaders entered their countrys highest office with the most modest of political

expectations being placed upon them. Nevertheless, these leaders each came to face an

enormous decision as to the fate of their countrys future policy concerning the

development of nuclear weapons. These decision-makers deserve our attention then as

students of international relations, as the resulting outcomes of these decisions in turn

shaped world politics (Marfleet and Walker 2006). Accordingly, the attempt here is to

rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientist

have consigned them by striving to better understand why they make certain decisions

(Byman and Pollack 2001).

Consequently, this project advances a new analytical framework which provides a

systematic and generalizable approach addressing how leaders perceptions of the

international system influence nuclear proliferation decisions. The contention made here

is that application of a cognitive, decision-making framework is both necessary and

useful in explaining states proliferation decisions. The inherent nature of the decision


18/283

8

environment surrounding proliferation decisions makes it an ideal candidate for

cognitive approaches as individuals preferences and perceptions hold even stronger sway

in such decision-making situations (Hymans 2006; Holsti 1976). This framework

captures the interactive nature of international politics, weighing how views of ones self

andothers influence decision-making (Walker 2004). The result is a dyadic approach,

akin to the research on the democratic peace theory, where the key to proliferation lies in

understanding the interactions between actors (Montgomery and Sagan 2009).

The project utilizes a multi-method approach employing qualitative, quantitative,

and game theory methodologies to address the research question at hand. Qualitatively,

leaders public statements are coded using operational code analysis (Walker and Shafer

2006). This quantitative data is converted into several numerically scored indices

permitting testing of the statistical significance of differences in world views over time

and between leaders, including a proxy average world leader score. The development of

leaders world views then lends itself to making inferences about their preferences when

dealing with others; their so-called subjective games (Maoz 1990; Walker 1990).

These subjective games constructed from leaders perceptions of the international system

are analyzed through use of Brams (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM) game construct.

The use of TOM provides for a dynamic examination of sequential moves by players

capturing the action-reaction nature of international politics more realistically than the

simultaneous moves of conventional game theory. The combination of the qualitative

data and the game modeling offers a significant analytical breakthrough, as a leaders

desired outcome and expected strategies are not simply assumed by imposing exogenous


19/283

9

preferences, but are endogenized by inputting their preferences as revealed by their world

view.

The limited use of cognitive models in the study of nuclear proliferation is due in

part to their perceived shortcomings concerning replication and generalizability, thereby

limiting their usefulness in making meaningful comparisons. However, recent

developments in the research program on operational code analysis have done much to

overcome this shortcoming. The principle advantage of operational code analysis is its

ability to convert qualitative data into quantitative data. This allows for particular and

specified measurements which can be made across subjects permitting statistical analysis

to generate probabilistic generalizations. As Walker and Schafer assert, It is one thing

to say that that a leader is driven by a need for power. It is quite another to say that his or

her need for power is higher than all but 5 percent of the population of other leaders

(2006a:27). Such an understanding of a leaders belief system is critical in understanding

international interactions, as beliefs serve to define their view of the international

environment and orient their strategic and tactical approach given ones view of the

international system (Malici 2006; George 1969).

By developing the operational codes of leaders, the goal is to determine whether a

leaders perceived strategic interaction is a necessary variable in explaining

proliferation. The aim is not to simply discard the existing macro-theories on

proliferation, but to incorporate micro-foundation in seeking to provide more robust

results (Walker and Shafer 2006b). In doing so the project confronts the challenge set

forth by Sagan (1996-97), when he writes:

The challenge for scholars is not to produce increasing numbersof detailed, but atheoretical, case studies of states nuclear


20/283

10

proliferation and restraint decisions, but it is to produce theory-driven comparative studies to help determine the conditionsunder which different causal forces produced similaroutcomes.But future scholarship focusing on how differentgovernments assess the nuclear potential and intentions of

neighbors, on why pro-bomb and anti-bomb domestic coalitionsform and gain influence, and on when and how NPT normsabout legitimate behavior constrain statesmen will be extremelyimportant (85).

The cases developed in the project include South Africa, India, Libya and

Australia. These countries cover an array of proliferation outcomes including instances

of nonproliferation, proliferation, and rollback. The cases of South Africa and India

provide a unique opportunity to examine multiple proliferation decisions made within the

same state. Extensive archival work has been conducted including a visit to the Archive

for Contemporary Affairs at the University of the Free State in the Republic of South

Africa, as well as consulting the National Library of Australia. Given that these cases

have been studied extensively at the systemic and domestic level of analysis, they provide

fertile ground for hypothesis testing of the decision-making framework developed by this

project and permit direct comparisons of outcomes through the application of these

different explanatory models.

The remainder of this project is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two delves

into the existing literature pertaining to nuclear proliferation examining the various

approaches and models that have been used in exploring the proliferation puzzle.

Chapter Three develops the new analytical framework being proposed, expectations for

proliferation outcomes, and the derived hypotheses to be tested. Chapter Four will

discuss the methodology used in carrying out this project, specifically detailing the use of

operational code analysis and the application of the Verbs in Context System (VIC)


21/283

11

content analysis coding procedure. The following four chapters will detail the

substantive case studies examining the nuclear developments, the existing explanations

for the proliferation outcome, and apply the analytical framework. They will be

examined in the following order: Chapter Five will deal with South Africa; Chapter Six

will deal with India; Chapter Seven will cover Libya; and, Chapter Eight will examine

Australia. Lastly, Chapter Nine will summarize the findings, offering some conclusions

and parting thoughts as to the efficacy of this new framework in better understanding the

phenomenon of nuclear proliferation.


22/283

12

CHAPTER TWO

THE STUDY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The development and spread of nuclear weapons has been and continues to be a

problematic field of study in international relations. Despite decades of studies, the

dynamics of nuclear proliferation remain largely a mystery (Ogilvie-White 1996:43).

In posing the question why do states build nuclear weapons?, Sagan writes, given

the importance of this central proliferation puzzle, it is surprising how little sustained

attention has been devoted to examining and comparing alternative answers (1996-97:

54). Nevertheless, debate has raged over how to contain the spread of nuclear weapons

versus whether proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Indeed it has been

suggested that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may be a positive outcome in terms of

international security accompanied by the provocative tagline more may be better

(Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990, 1981).

At the most generalized level of hypothesizing, the literature on states

proliferation decisions has pointed to two separate factors as critical: technological

determinants and motives (Ogilvie-White 1986). The technological determinant

hypothesis posits that the development of nuclear technology develops its own

momentum whereby states will develop nuclear weapons as soon as it becomes

technologically feasible. An early version of this hypothesis was advanced by Kegley

(1980) which asserts that states will develop nuclear weapons when they simultaneously

possess the technological and economic means to do so. This model, however, failed to


23/283

13

predict many of the states that would later challenge nonproliferation including Iraq, Iran,

and North Korea. By the 1990s, 30 countries possessed the technological capability to

build nuclear weapons almost immediately with numerous others operating or

constructing nuclear reactors, hence possessing the potential to pursue such a goal (Sagan

1996-97). Yet almost none of these states has acted to develop nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, a principle shortcoming of this model, as acknowledged by Kegley, is the

failure to account for the motives, incentives, and states intentions as well as

psychological and cognitive variables. Not surprisingly, the greater part of the

proliferation literature has shifted focus to the motivations underpinning states

proliferation decisions.

This second class of hypotheses, focusing on motives, has resulted in an abundant

literature. In a comprehensive article reviewing the motive-based hypotheses for

proliferation, Sagan (1996-97) devises three models for classifying the various

theoretical conceptions addressing motives for proliferation circulating in the literature.

Sagan labeled them the security model, the domestic politics model, and the norms

model. Of note, Sagan emphasizes that these models are of particular importance due to

the fact that they focus on the demand side (i.e. motives) of the proliferation equation

rather than the supply side (i.e. technological determinants).

By far the most widely advanced theories regarding proliferation motives has

been the so-called security rationale, or the security model. This significant theoretical

conception traces its origins from the realist and neorealist camp. Similar to the

popularity that the realist paradigm enjoyed during the Cold War period, the security

based conception of nuclear proliferation has taken on near-consensus status by both


24/283

14

international relations scholars, and perhaps more critically, policymakers (Sagan 1996-

97:54).

Driven by the logic of realism, the security model depicts state decision-making

processes as a unitary actor employing utility-maximizing rationales. Accordingly, the

development of nuclear weapons is the attempt by states to further their own interests.

Specifically, the driving motivation for nuclear weapons stems from national security

considerations which represent the most basic state interest, state survival. As routinely

postulated by realists, the focus on security results from the anarchical nature of the

international system characterized as a self-help system where states must provide for

their own security (Waltz 1979). This security consideration postulate is summarized

whereby states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant

military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do

not face such threats they will willingly remain non-nuclear states (Sagan 1996-97:54).

Given that proliferation is the result of overt security concerns, realists maintain

proliferation restraint results from the absence of a military threat.

The application of realisms basic assumptions regarding the international system

seemingly encourages further nuclear proliferation. Once the Pandoras box of nuclear

proliferation is opened with one state possessing such a capability other states will follow

to ensure their own security. As one US policymaker fittingly summed up the logic of

this model, proliferation begets proliferation (Schultz 1984:18). This argument, often

referred to by the title of Waltzs provocative 1981 article, The Spread of Nuclear

Weapons: More May Be Better, emphasizes the importance realism places on the

assumptions of states as rational actors. For Waltz, nuclear proliferation has an air of


25/283

15

inevitability, albeit not necessarily immediacy, given that rational deterrence mandates

that states possess second strike capability to truly enjoy the security benefits of such

weapons. According to Waltz, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international

system will impose stability, demanding caution and restraint on state actions.

Linked to this realist security hypothesis is some of the work in formal game

theory modeling. In assessing the future of nuclear proliferation, Bueno de Mesquita and

Riker (1982) assert that the increase in nuclear weapons will serve to stabilize the

international system by adjusting cost/benefit calculations according to when states deal

with nuclear weapon states.5

In modeling the choice to go nuclear, the game that is

depicted demonstrates a pay-off structure in accordance with a prisoners dilemma, the

game structure commonly used in classic deterrence theory. The logic of the game

dictates that playersas utility maximizersseek out their best pay-off translating into

the decision to develop nuclear weapons. Players in this proliferation game who choose

not to proliferate always lose, receiving their worst pay-off. The failure to proliferate

when confronted by a nuclear rival only serves to increase the potentiality of war and

blackmail. Bueno de Mesquita and Riker note as supporting evidence the proliferation

case of Pakistan, where that nations pursuit of nuclear weapons appears directly tied to

resolving the asymmetry in its capabilities and those of its rival, India.

Nevertheless, it was Waltz (1990), the originator of neorealism, who subsequently

questioned the rational actor assumption driving the security model of proliferation.

Waltz points out that the inherent logic of deterrence ostensibly makes proliferation futile

by weakening states through draining economic resources. Indeed, the deterrence factor

5 As with most game modeling certain assumptions are made. For Bueno de Mesquita and Riker a keyassumption is that nuclear weapon nations possess sufficient second strike capability to inflict unacceptablelosses.


26/283

16

of nuclear weapons and the security dilemma they create, leading to spiraling arms races,

has been examined previously (Jervis 1978). A second factor cited by Waltz is the claim

that military leaders dislike the uncertainty that nuclear weapons present. Realisms

detractors point out that Waltzs rebuttal points to the major flaws of the realist security

based argument for proliferation; that it fails to account for non-military sources of power

and the shortcoming of the rational actor model for state decision-making (Ogilvie-White

1996). The realists focus on resources (i.e. nuclear weapons) as a source of power has

been severely criticized in failing to recognize and solve the problem of transferability or

fungibility of power resourceswhat may equate power in one setting may be

unworkable, ill-suited, irrelevant, or even detrimental in another setting, creating what is

often referred to as the paradox of power (Baldwin 1979; Hart 1976). Furthermore,

Waltzs discussion of military leaders thinking delves far a field from the normal

comfort zone of neorealism, reaching into the realm of political psychology, and certainly

well below the systemic level of analysis.

Following in the realist tradition, others have sought to reinforce the security

model of proliferation with its focus on system level causation (Betts 1993; Davis 1993).

These studies too have run into problems that point out the difficulty of addressing the

puzzle of proliferation strictly from the system level of analysis. Davis (1993) argues that

security concerns may lead a state to avoid nuclear weapons where such may serve to

undermine security and instead support the international nonproliferation regime. While

accounting for why proliferation has not experienced a dramatic increase, examples of

states pursuing nuclear weapons which seem counter to their security interests (e.g. North

Korea) or refusing to participate in the nonproliferation regime despite incentive to do so


27/283

17

(e.g. Pakistan and India) are not resolved (Ogilvie-White 1996). While seeming to point

out the importance of domestic politics and other unit variables in such decisions, Davis

summarily disposes of such factors as secondary to system level factors. Betts (1993)

sought to address the impact state characteristics, but in a strictly realist fashion. In

acknowledging that there may be differing types of states in the system reacting

differently to the forces of the anarchical international system, it is the nature of the

international system, argues Betts, which determines state behavior. States may pursue

nuclear weapons because they seek international prestige, are isolated, or face security

threats. Again, critics of this approach point out that by failing to look at other non-

system level factors Betts fails to provide much in the way of explanation or predictive

power. By example, in the cases of states pursuing nuclear weapons due to international

isolation, such isolation appears precisely due to their domestic political systems (e.g.

South Africa and North Korea), hence their status in the international community and

pursuit of nuclear weapons appears tied to the features of their domestic government

(Ogilvie-White 1996:46).

While offering an arguably attractive parsimonious model for proliferation, the

security model, and its associated realist based derivates, has been severely undermined

by those cases where states, despite strong security incentives, have decided not to

develop nuclear weapons. Such cases have put in doubt both its explanatory and

predictive power. In challenging the realist proliferation argument, other scholars assert

that nuclear weapons are dissimilar from other conventional weapons where the decision

to go nuclear goes beyond the realm of security and often is the subject of domestic

political considerations. Due to the perceived shortcoming of the security model and its


28/283

18

underlying realist assumptions, mounting scholarship has put forward alternative motive-

based hypotheses for proliferation focusing instead on domestic politics/institutions and

norms.

Under the umbrella of domestic determinants (Singh and Way 2004) are two

similar yet distinct points of view. The first theory, labeled by Sagan as the Domestic

Politics Model, focuses on the creation of domestic coalitions within the government

either supporting or preventing the development of nuclear weapons. Key players in this

model include a states nuclear energy establishment, the military, and politicians facing

political parties and/or populations in favor of, or opposed to, nuclear weapons

development. Under this model, proliferation is the result of parochial bureaucratic or

political interests of at least some individual actors within the state (Sagan 1996-97:63).6

International threats serve as a rational facade whereby nuclear programs are not drive by

such concerns, but rather nuclear weapons programs are solutions looking for a problem

to which to attach themselves so as to justify their existence (Sagan 1996-97:65).

Hence, it is not changes occurring at the international level, but domestic political

concerns and major political changes occurring within a state that drive decisions to or

not to go nuclear. This approach has been variously applied to explain the decisions

reached by states including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa. The domestic

politics model is not without flaws however. Problematically, there is no theory of

domestic politics covering nuclear proliferation that identifies the conditions under which

coalitions are formed and obtain enough power to produce their preferred outcome.

6 These domestic politics models correspond to Allisons (1971) Model II (Organizational Politics) andModel III (Bureaucratic Politics), however, their treatment is often blurred incorporating elements of bothinto the analysis.


29/283

19

Other theories discussing the role of domestic politics on proliferation decisions

focus more generally on the organization of domestic political institutions. Stressing the

internal make-up of the state, these approaches place the decision of nuclear proliferation

as spanning both the international system as well as domestic considerations. Moreover,

whereas realism is faulted for its myopic focus on military/security goals, these

alternative theories specifically recognize an array of state interests/goals which may

come from either the international or domestic level akin to Putnams (1988) two-level

game analysis. Of particular interest here, Solingen (2007, 1994) offers a regime based

model of nuclear proliferation which ascribes importance to the political and economic

orientation of the state. She asserts that democratic states pursuing liberal economic

policies, or internationalizing as she labels it, will be less likely to develop nuclear

weapons given their reliance on the global economy and international community. This

result will hold despite a state possessing the requisite technological acumen. Such states

may keep the nuclear option open going forward, but see the development of nuclear

weapons as problematic, defeating other state interests. Meanwhile, more inward-looking

regimes, which seek to maintain support through nationalistic appeal, are prone to pursue

nuclear weapons. Leaders in these regimes will cite external threats as justification for

proliferation, but their true motives are based on appeals to nationalism for the purposes

of bolstering domestic political support. While advancing the idea for proliferation

literature to develop its understanding of nuclear logics, Solingens framework is left

with the lingering uncertainty as to when and why such regime come into power or how

an inward-looking regime might be rehabilitated.


30/283

20

It is also worth noting that subsumed in this institutional approach is what Sagan

calls the norms model. According to this model the presence of international norms

relating to nuclear weapons influence whether a country associates prestige with the

acquisition of or the abstention from such weapons. Much of the literature pertaining to

norms and nuclear proliferation draws heavily on concepts advanced in the literature of

embedded liberalism by Ruggie (1983) and normative regimes as discussed by

Nadelmann (1990). Chafetz (1993) contends that within liberal democracies, which he

labels the core, the presence of shared norms and values has resulted in cooperation to

prevent proliferation. The basis of this approach lies in the older foundations of the

security communities discussed initially by Deutsch (1957). As to the development of

international norms regarding nuclear weapons, Adler (1992) points to the growth of an

international epistemic community devaluing the prestige factor associated with a

states development of nuclear weapons.

While the domestic politics and institutional approaches have sought to correct

the perceived overly deterministic state as rational actor assumption of the security

model, they too fail to provide a complete representation of the proliferation puzzle.

First, while stressing the importance of institutions, these models cannot offer insight as

to which institutions or coalitions are most likely to influence policy (Ogilvie-White

1996). Secondly, where realism is faulted for ignoring domestic factors, the focus on

organizations and institutions within a state raises the inevitable agency problem within

politics. Organizations and institutions take on exaggerated levels of importance ignoring

the role of individuals who make up these bodies. Accordingly, the beliefs and values of

the individual are bypassed. These neoliberal institutional models of proliferation suffer


31/283

21

then from a lack of an accounting for how individuals learn and how individual learning

may influence policy.7

While the scholarship on proliferation has expanded to look at both system and

domestic level variables, little, if any, research has examined the role of cognitive

variables, or the beliefs of the individual decision-makers, in determining state policy

regarding nuclear proliferation. Generally, the research regarding nuclear proliferation

shares much in common with prevailing theories of international relations whereby they

assume that leaders beliefs simply mirror the foreign and domestic realities that they

face as they make foreign policy decisions (Walker and Schafer 2006a:4). Beliefs are

viewed as endogenous, merely acting as a conveyor belt providing the decision-maker

with information about the environment. In part, this assumption has been argued as

necessary due to the typically secretive nature of such policy decisions. Furthermore, the

application of cognitive models to the issue of proliferation is looked upon with suspicion

suffering from the same familiar criticism leveled against the use of cognitive models

generallythat they are difficult to quantify to readily offer themselves to generalizable

application.

Despite apparent apprehension, applications of cognitive theories appear to have

much to offer in adding to our understanding of the proliferation puzzle. Perhaps most

importantly, the cognitive approach, in viewing beliefs as exogenous, allows for the

possibility that beliefs might indeed be a causal mechanism. Accordingly, beliefs are put

7 Undoubtedly neoliberalism and other non-system level theories have addressed the issue of learning(Deutsch 1963; Axelrod 1984; Etheredge 1986; March and Olsen 1988). However, these approaches focusprimarily with learning occurring at the aggregated state/institutional level and do not address specificallythe impact of individual learning. In questioning the analytical viability of the notion of organizationallearning, Levy (1994) argues that these bodies do not literally learn, but learn only through theindividuals inside them.


32/283

22

forth as operating independently from the surrounding realities or environment which can

steer decision-making by shaping the decision-makers perceptions of reality (Snyder,

Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Rather than serving as mirror of reality, it is contended that

beliefs may work to distort, block or re-cast information regarding the environment. As

Holsti (1976) asserts, the influence of beliefs is made even more important when, as is

often the case, the situation is uncertain and the available information is either limited or

far too abundant presenting challenges to leaders to organize and process such.

Moreover, beliefs can play a role when changes in the environment conflict with pre-

existing beliefs resulting in misperceptions and flawed decision-making (Jervis 1976).

The examination of beliefs allows for more rigorous testing of these variables by

answering the question of whether beliefs passively mirror reality or do they, actively

steer the decision of leaders independent of external realities (Walker and Schafer

2006a:6-7). Indeed, cognitive models have been applied to an ever increasing number of

situations and actors (Schafer and Walker 2006).

Nevertheless, the application of cognitive frameworks to proliferation decisions is

still an infrequent occurrence. In examining the case of South Africa, Purkitt and

Burgess assert that within the white-minority, apartheid government, leaders possessed a

so-called laager mentality prompting the decision to proliferate (Purkitt et al. 2002).

This mindset caused these leaders to have a heightened, if not exaggerated, fear of

external threats. While pointing to a belief system as a potential causal variable, this

conception was underdeveloped, uncertain as whether this was a group or individual

psychology, and underspecified, relying on anecdotal evidence (Purkitt et al. 2002).

Subsequently, Long and Grillot (2000), in examining the case of South Africa and


33/283

23

Ukraine, also sought to develop the role of ideational factors in these states decisions in

the 1990s to forgo nuclear weapons. Driven by what they see as the failure of the

traditional security and domestic politics models to satisfactorily explain these decisions,

they argue that leaders beliefs play a significant role in both preference formation and

strategic choice regarding nuclear policymaking (2000:36) (authors italics). While

bolstering the case for the inclusion of ideational variable in the analysis of proliferation,

the authors stopped far short from developing a comprehensive framework based on

beliefs as influencing preferences.

The most notable effort to date in developing a cognitive model of nuclear

proliferation is Jacque Hymans The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (2006).

Hymans offers a comprehensive framework for explaining proliferation decisions by

developing different formulations of identity and nationalism, operationalized in a

concept he terms national identity conceptions (NICs). The work seeks to differentiate

leaders based on their own perceptions of identity. What distinguishes Hymans work is

that at a time when most political scientists and many psychologists downplay

individual differences, it is important to stress that Hymans categorization applies to

leaders, not states (Jervis 2006:270). According to Hymans, a leaders nationalism

might serve to either reinforce cooperation or provide an explosive psychological

cocktail that in mixing together pride, ego, and ambition drives certain leaders to seek

out nuclear weapons (Hymans 2006:2). In essence, Hymans argues that what a nation

stands for and how high it stands in the nuclear race is not only a social factor but is

grounded intersubjectively within the individual leader (Raum 2006). This

differentiation among leaders explains why proliferation has not simply been driven by


34/283

24

the spread of technical knowhow, but remains an infrequent occurrence as the NIC which

favors proliferation lies as an extreme type according to Hymans analysis.

Based on the current state of the literature, what this project seeks to do is build

on the proliferation scholarship seeking to better grasp the motivations driving

proliferation outcomes. Specifically, given the recent, yet meager, attention paid to

developing a cognitive understanding of proliferation, the goal of this project is to

attempt the creation of a new analytical framework for examining nuclear proliferation

outcomes based on how leaders perceive their strategic interactions combining their view

of Self and Other in the international system. Theoretically, the project expands on the

existing proliferation literature on the causes of proliferation in two ways. First, the

project offers an important contribution to the study of proliferation by building a

systematic examination of how leaders beliefs impact proliferation decisions. Second, it

fills a void in previous studies which have examined the role of decision-makers by

developing an analytical framework that provides for generalizable findings, permitting

meaningful cross-case comparisons. Overall, the project seeks to further develop an

avenue of proliferation research which the literature has only just begun to make inroads.

The next chapter will develop the analytical framework at the heart of this study.


35/283

25

CHAPTER THREE

AFRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DECISIONS

The goal of this chapter is to flesh-out a framework of decision-making which

addresses the specific question of leaders decisions to go nuclear. Specifically, this

project endeavors to apply an agent-based, cognitive framework to examine proliferation

decisions. The attempt to develop a foreign policy decision-making approach for studying

international relations phenomenon has a long lineage including the prominent efforts of

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962; 1954). The contention here is that application of a

cognitive, decision-making framework is both necessary and useful in explaining states

proliferation decisions. As Marfleet and Walker assert, foreign policy decisions generate

processes of world politics (2006:54). Nevertheless, the impact of individual leaders

world views and strategic preferences has been largely an omitted variable in the study of

proliferation, but one that may serve to further substantiate or contradict existing

explanations.

In support of this position three issues are addressed in this chapter prior to laying

out the theoretical framework employed by this study. First, by understanding the

motivations of leaders through a cognitive, decision-making framework the willingness

component of the opportunity/willingness dynamic of proliferation is purposely

targeted. Second, the inherent nature of the decision environment surrounding

proliferation decisions makes it an ideal candidate for examination through an agent


36/283

26

based, cognitive approach as individuals world views and preferences hold even stronger

sway in such decision-making situations. Lastly, the particular framework used in this

project, borrowing heavily from operational code analysis, is well suited to address the

issue of proliferation, as part of the larger phenomenon of international security, given its

focus on perceptions of power, control, conflict, and cooperation, each of which serves as

foundational conditions in both neorealism and neoliberalism. What emerges is a

framework which allows for the creation of strategic interactions models based on

expectations derived from leaders perceptions of themselves and other actors in the

international system.

The opportunity/willingness dynamic

As discussed in the previous chapter, a perceived shortcoming in the proliferation

literature has been its failure to equally address both parts of the opportunity and

willingness dynamic of states proliferation decisions. The figurative scale points to the

lopsided attention paid to factors which can be characterized as providing the

opportunity for states to proliferate including things like external security threats or

domestic government regime type. What is lacking is a better understanding of how such

opportunistic factors are perceived by leaders and affect their willingness to pursue

certain actions. As Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin claim, it is impossible to probe the why of

states behavior without also doing something about the motivations of decision-makers

(1962:137) (authors italics). What we find is that the proliferation scholarship, as well

as much of international relations, focuses on the situational rather than the


37/283

27

dispositional.8 The motivations of leaders (i.e. willingness) are assumed from the

presence of external conditions. This tension is hardly new, as Harold and Margret

Sprout (1957) noted decades ago, political scientists need to separate and study both the

psychological environment and the operational environment. The advantage offered by a

cognitive, decision-making approach is the attempt to pull out the motivations of leaders

and treat them as an exogenous variable.

The continuing focus on factors which provide the opportunity for proliferation is

troublesome as it treads in the waters of determinism. Nuclear proliferation, like other

political events, require the intersection, or conjunction, of opportunityAND willingness

(Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995). The substitution of opportunity for willingness produces

an outcome at odds with how the political world actually operates.9 Indeed, Meyer

(1984) reported over two decades ago that the presence of technological capability was a

deficient indicator of which states proliferate. Why then are we to suppose that factors

such as external threats, alliances, international regimes, regime type, or economic

openness serve as better indicators? While offering improved explanations over the

technology/capabilities hypothesis, these factors, too, serve to set a scene, or in the words

of the Sprouts (1957), a milieu. However, this situational environment created by the

presence of these factors is just one of the environments at work. While setting the

context, or operational environment, in which leaders act, there is still the need to link

this environment to the perceptions of the decision maker, their psychological

8 For a recent and accessible discussion the situational versus dispositional dynamic in the study ofpsychology see Philip Zimbardo (2007) The Lucifer Effect. The work revisits the famous Stanford prisonexperiment overseen by Zimbardo in 1971.

9 As Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995) note the use of opportunity as a stand-in for willingness offers perverseoutcomes when thinking of political events such as war where to contend that the outbreak of war resultsfrom opportunity alone flies in the face of both logic and the weight of historical evidence.


38/283

28

environment, for what matters in decision-making is not how the milieu is, but how the

decision-maker imagines it to be (Sprout and Sprout 1957:314). Consequently, the

effort is not to isolate decision makers, but to suggest that they represent an important

variable as they function at the intersection of the various pressures working in any

given decision situation (Snyder 1962:1).

Operational code analysis is well situated to be of use in examining the

opportunity/willingness dynamic of proliferation decisions given its aim to develop a

subjects perception of Self and Other. Leaders world views provide insight as to

their strategic interactions where decisions are the result of ones own preferences and

anticipating the actions of others (Lake and Powell 1999). Accordingly, decisions are not

made in a vacuum, but are made in the strategic context of the environment surrounding

the decision-maker. In the instance of nuclear proliferation, the willingness to pursue and

develop nuclear weapons hinges not just on how one sees the world and wishes to act, but

also how one perceives other actors in the international system. While a given leader

may wish to act more cooperatively, perceptions regarding the anticipated actions of

ones adversaries might demand the pursuit of alternative strategies to counter possible

threats. In developing this relationship between ones perceptions of Self and Other,

operational code analysis can aid in illustrating how divergent preferences attributed to

Self and Other impact strategic decisions (Malici 2006, 2005; Marfleet and Miller

2005; Walker 2004; Maoz 1990). The result is a game-theoretic, dyadic approach where

the key to proliferation lies in understanding the interactions between actors

(Montgomery and Sagan 2009).


39/283

29

The Characteristics of the Proliferation Decision

It goes without much debate to assert that not all decisions are equal in terms of

difficulty, complexity, and ramifications. The decision to go nuclear is not a run-of-

the-mill decision. Not only does it have near and long term impacts, some of which may

or may not be known at the time, but it also places significant demands on the allocation

of state resources. It has been described as the nearly ideal-type big decision representing

a leap in the dark on many dimensions (Hymans 2006). Of critical importance to this

projects examination of proliferation decisions are the studies, which in examining big

decisions, have found that in such situations individuals values and beliefs played a

disproportionately influential role (Chong 2000; Holsti 1976). As the Sprouts assert, the

higher one moves in the hierarchy of a great powers government, the more one is

impressed by the remoteness of executives from the operational environment in which

their decisions are executed (1957:321). In such settings the attributes of individual

decision makers cannot be relegated to the status of a residual category as if

characterizing them as just so much background noise. Instead, a cognitive process

perspective is fundamental and should be at the starting point of analysis, rather than a

luxury to be indulged in order to reduce some of the variance unexplained by other, more

powerful, approaches (Holsti 1976: 36).

As a big decision, the choice of whether to proliferate eschews the typical cost-

benefit calculations that underlie the standard application of the rational choice

perspective (Hymans 2006). In examining these decisions from the rational choice

perspective, Chong (2000) found that in such instances final decisions were most often a

reflection of certain psychological factors. Included among these influential factors were


40/283

30

the core beliefs of the decision-maker. Mirroring conditional restraints of crisis

decision-making, big decisions typically present situations where relevant information

may either be unavailable or contradictory, yet decision-makers cannot wait for such

discrepancies to be rectified.

Specifically, in the context of the operational code, Holsti (1976) contends that

the role of leaders beliefs is amplified in certain scenarios.10 This theme was revisited

by Hymans (2006), who pointed out four of these scenarios which appear to closely

resemble the characteristics of proliferation decisions:

1.

Non-routine situations that require more than merely theapplication of standard operating procedures and decisionrules;

2. Decisions made at the pinnacle of the governmenthierarchy by leaders who are relatively free fromorganizational and other constraints or who may at leastdefine their roles in ways that enhance their latitude forchoice;

3. Situations that contain highly ambiguous components andare thus open to a variety of interpretations;

4. Long range planning, a task that inherently involvesconsiderable uncertainty.

The international scope of the proliferation decision further empowers individual

decision-makers as such foreign policy choices are typically characterized as possessing

structural uncertainty (Holsti 1976:31; Steinbrunner 1974).

10 Holsti (1976) came up with seven circumstances where decision makers beliefs systems are critical: 1)Non-routine situations that require more than merely the application of standard operating procedures anddecision rules; 2) Decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relativelyfree from organizational and other constraints; 3) Long-range policy planning; 4) When the situation itselfis highly ambiguous, and thus open to interpretation; 5) Circumstances of information overload in whichdecision makers are forced to use a variety of strategies to cope with a problem; 6) unanticipated events inwhich initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive sets; 7) Circumstances in which complex cognitivetasks associated with decision making may be impaired or otherwise significantly affected by the varioustypes of stress that impinge on top-ranking executives.


41/283

31

It must be emphasized that just because beliefs may take on a greater role in these

decision environments this does not imply a direct linkage between beliefs and policies.

In accordance with previous research, the claim advanced here is that beliefs act as a

framework or map which establish the boundaries within which the decision is made

(Holsti 1976:34-35). The goal is not to exaggerate the individual decision-maker and

ignore the role of bureaucratic politics, but to recognize a sliding scale where one or the

other may play a greater role depending on the type of decision at hand (see Figure 3.1).

In the case of the decision by states to go nuclear the role of individual decision-

makers beliefs is near its pinnacle.

Small Decisions:- Certainty of outcomes- Low Stakes- Complete information

Big Decisions:- Taken by top leaders- Uncertain outcomes- High Stakes- Incomplete information

Figure 3.1. Sliding Scale of Influence of Decision-Makers Beliefs

Aside from the cognitive arguments asserting how the structural elements of such

decisions heighten the impact of individual decision-makers, the historical evidence

demonstrates the extreme top-down, political nature of proliferation decisions. At the end

of the day there must be an explicit decision by state leaders to acquire nuclear weapons.

As Meyers reminds us, it is human decision makers who choose whether to

manufacture nuclear weapons. Atomic bombs dont build themselves (1984:17-18). In

nearly all instances of proliferation the final decision rested with one person, who may or

may not have been complemented by a small advising body.

Beliefs of Decision-Maker

Standard operating procedures


42/283

32

In the case of Indias 1974 so-called peaceful nuclear explosion, the final

decision to go forward was Prime Minster Indira Gandhis alone and even the initial

decision, made in 1972, to move forward with a detonation was made by her after very

limited consultation with a very small number of close advisors. A similar scenario would

play out in India again two decades later regarding the 1998 testing decision. Less than

100 days into his coalition government, Prime Minster A.B. Vajpayee authorized the

series of nuclear tests occurring in May 1998. Again the decision by an Indian leader

was made alone without consultation of his cabinet which was not informed of the

decision until after the fact. This situation is not unique to India, as the case studies

show, be it Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Libya or North Korea,

the number of individuals involved in proliferation decisions has typically been

extremely small and, more often than not, hinged on the choice made by a single

individual. Although proliferation decisions are not special in this regard, one need only

think of the context surrounding decisions related to war, it shows that this decision to

go nuclear exists in a rarified decision environment.

Neorealim, Neoliberalism, and Operational Code Analysis

A goal of this project is to further develop micro-foundations so to enhance

macro-foundations as encapsulated by the paradigms of neorealism and neoliberalism. It

is the connection with the factors stressed by both neorealism and neoliberalism which

provides operational code analysis with an advantage in examining the foundations of

these macro-level theories. First, operational code analysis assumes the rationality of

individual leaders. As we shall see, operational code analysis is built on the premise of

actors making choices in the presence of cognitive restraints on rationality (Holsti


43/283

33

1977:2). Second, the actions of leaders are based on their diagnosis of the nature of the

international system and the necessity to pursue various strategies to achieve ones goals

in the given system. How a leader views the persistence and likelihood of either conflict

or cooperation establishes the context for framing strategic preferences in pursuing ones

goals.

Both neorealism and neoliberalism assumes that leaders will act to protect and

advance their interests. It is well noted that these two theories differ as to the best

approaches to be taken by actors in the international system. Neorealism emphasizes the

need for self-reliance in maintaining and obtaining capabilities to pursue ones interests.

For neoliberalism, actors can best achieve their interests through cooperation among

states bolstered by international regimes and institutions. While these theories advocate

divergent approaches in achieving ends, both hold as a primary assumption that actors are

rational in the pursuit of their interests. Moreover, both assume that rationality is

imposed from the top-down coming from the objective realities of the international

system in which actors operate. Termed substantive reality by Simon (1985), structural

theories hold that actors make choices based on their knowledge of the external

environment which are mirrored by their beliefs.

Operational code analysis also maintains the assumption of rationality, however,

an actors rationality is influenced by their beliefs as subjective representations of

reality (Tetlock 1998:876). Instead of simply mirroring the external environment,

cognitive theories assert that actors beliefs can distort reality to varying degrees. As

Jervis (1976) and others have found, an actors beliefs can lead to misperceptions where

actions fail to account for the objective reality of the international system resulting in


44/283

34

inappropriate, detrimental, or even disastrous policies. Beliefs, therefore, attain the status

of being critical causal mechanisms, which for operational code analysis, as well as other

cognitive theories, must be viewed independently as having an exogenous role to play

rather than being mere transmission belts of the external environment (Walker and

Schafer 2006a; Rose 1998). In summarizing various assertions regarding the role of

beliefs, Walker and Schafer (2006a) write:

They can and often do operate as causal mechanismsindependently of the realities that they are assumed to mirrorin other theories. Instead of passively reflecting reality, theysteer the decisions of leaders by shaping the leaders

perceptions of reality, acting as mechanisms of cognitive andmotivated bias that distort, block, and recast incominginformation from the environment (5).

It must be noted that operational code analysis utilizes a model of bounded

rationality (Simon 1985). Unlike the more onerous instrumental rationality model,

which imposes the expectation that actors undertake an open and comprehensive

examination of costs and benefits, bounded rationality points to actors as seeking

shortcuts where costs and benefits are framed by their beliefs. In this model, beliefs act

to bias decisions with behaviors guided by beliefs of the external environment rather than

being the product of a process meant to optimize potential behaviors (Holsti 1976). As

George describes, operational code analysis allows for bounding the alternative ways in

which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of

making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action (1969: 200).

While differing with structural theories as to the role of actors beliefs,

operational code analysis is unambiguously linked to these theories given the

fundamental nature of the beliefs it seeks to assess. Operational code analysis, however,


45/283

35

avoids the common pitfall associated with behavioralists efforts in applying and

stretching concepts of psychology and psychoanalysis to examine political phenomena,

as it specifically utilizes the conceptual underpinnings of neorealism and neoliberalism

(Holsti 1977).11 From its origins with Nathan Leites (1953; 1951) attempts to build a

model for explaining Bolshevik behaviors, operational code analysis has focused on ideas

of power, conflict, cooperation, and control. These factors were articulated by George

(1969) who developed a heuristic framework by posing ten fundamental questions of how

an individual views the world and their position in it (Figure 3.2). George claimed that in

answering these key questions researchers would capture a leaders fundamental

orientation towards the problem of leadership and action (1969:200). These questions

are further distilled with half of them targeting so-called philosophical beliefs and the

other half illuminating instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs outline the

fundamental assumptions and premises an actor has regarding the nature of politics, the

nature of conflict, as well as the ability to control outcomes versus historical fate (George

1969). Meanwhile, instrumental beliefs provide information as to how the actor, given

their view of the political universe, sees the relationship between ends and means,

specifically what sort of actions (i.e. tactics) will best serve in attaining ones goals.

Operational code analysis thereby is a twofold process which develops the world view

of an individual as to their diagnosis of the political universe along with their tactical

approaches, or strategic preferences, to achieve political goals.

11 This is not to say that operational code analysis is devoid of assumptions borrowed from psychology. Inparticular the concepts of cognitive dissonance and cognitive consistency theory play not insignificant rolesin operational code analysis as well as many other cognitive decision-making frameworks.


46/283

36

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code

P-1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the politicaluniverse essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is thefundamental character of ones political opponents?

P-2. What are the prospects for the realizations of ones fundamental

values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one bepessimistic?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?P-4. How much control or mastery can one have over historical

development? What is ones role in moving and shaping historyin the desired direction?

P-5. What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historicaldevelopment?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for

political action?I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and

accepted?I-4. What is the best timing of action to advance ones interests?I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing ones

interests?

Figure 3.2. Georges Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs

Linking Beliefs and Motivations: The Development of Operational Code Analysis

In utilizing the questions posed by George regarding leaders instrumental and

philosophical world views, Holsti (1977) constructed a typology matrix encompassing a

range of possible operational codes. As conceived by Holsti, these typologies focus

explicitly on what he identified as the master belief. For Holsti, the primary belief was

the question George labeled as P-1 focusing on the essential nature of the political

universe. According to Holsti this master belief dominates the other beliefs serving to

constrain the other elements of an individuals world view.


47/283

37

Holstis identifies six operational codes typologies: A, B, C, D, E, and F

(Figure3.3). The delineation of the six types is the result of classifying the groups based

on answers to two fundamental questions:

1. Is conflict perceived as a permanent part of thepolitical universe, or is this condition at leastpotentially amenable to amelioration or eradication?

2. Where does one locate the sources of conflict and theconditions of peace? In human nature? In thecharacteristics of nations? In the nature of the systemwithin which nations interact? (Holsti 1977:157). 12

These questions correspond to Georges P-1 regarding the nature of conflict (permanent

vs. temporary) and the source of conflict (international system, society, or individual).

The construction of typologies, based on differing operational codes, serves as a critical

first step in making meaningful comparisons.13

Building on this initial foundation, subsequent works have advanced the

operational code typology scheme (Walker 1990, 1983). Expanding on the concept of

master belief, Walker increased the number of master beliefs to include Strategic

Approach to Goals (I-1), Ability to control historical developments (P-4), as well as the

nature of the political universe (P-1) as previously identified by Holsti. The revised

Holsti typology matrix constructed by Walker is organized to account for beliefs about

power relationships (P-4) as well as ones cooperative or conflictual perceptions of Self

(I-1) and the Other (P-1) (Malici 2006). By calculating the scores of the master beliefs for

12Subsequently, types D, E, and F are collapsed into a single type (Type D) given that all three share thebelief that conflict, while caused by different sources, is a permanent fixture of the political universe(Walker 1990, 1983).

13 As Holsti (1977) notes numerous other studies had previously sought to develop typologies based onobserved traits and behaviors of leaders including Heradstveits (1977), Caldwell (1976), Johnson (1977),Putnam (1973), and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962).


48/283

38

Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b), leaders views can be plotted within the four

quadrants of the Holsti typology.14 These indices are plotted as dimensions on the

vertical (P-1/I-1) and the horizontal (P-4) axes. By using these scores one may locate a

subjects world view and strategic orientation as standard deviations from the mean of the

norming group of world leaders.15 Placement of a leaders world view of Self and

Other is used to reveal predictions about strategic preferences regarding strategies

which are labeled in accordance with game theory terminology of settle, submit,

dominate and deadlock. Again this interactive facet of operational code is helpful as it

recognizes that individuals do not act in a vacuum. Perceptions of others impact the

strategies leaders employs.

The revised Holsti typologies, supported by the master beliefs, provide insight as

to how leaders view the international system (cooperative or conflictual) and also their

own perceptions of their ability to control developments. For example, the quadrants for

Type A and C indicate a leader who views the international system in relatively

cooperative terms. However, Type A leaders see themselves as having more control over

historical developments than Type C leaders. Consequently, Type A leaders are

predisposed toward more ambitious cooperative strategies. Nevertheless, both types

generally seek out cooperative strategies. Conversely, Type B and Type D see the

international system in terms of conflict rather than cooperation. As for control over

historical developments, Type B perceives himself as possessing greater control making

him less likely to shift policy in favor of cooperation. Generally, both Type B and Type

14 For further discussion of the plotting of Self and Other perceptions in the Modified Holsti TypologyMatrix see Chapter Four.

15 The use and development of this norming group is taken up in Chapter 4.


49/283

39

D are predisposed to conflictual tactics and strategies in striving to dominate outcomes

(Malici 2006).

Type A

Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstandingand miscommunication. A conflictual spiral, basedupon misperception and impulsive responses, is the majordanger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind toconciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, basedupon a leaders ability and willingness to shape historicaldevelopment. The future is relatively predictable, andcontrol over it is possible. Establish goals within aframework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursuebroadly international goals incrementally with flexiblestrategies that control risk by avoiding escalation andacting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise.Emphasize resources that establish a climate fornegotiation and compromise and avoid the early use offorce.

Strategic Preference Ordering:

Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

Type C

Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the statesystem to reflect the latent harmony of interests. Thesource of conflict is the anarchical state system, whichpermits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponentsvary in nature, goals and responses to conciliation andfirmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unlessthe state system is changes, because predictability andcontrol over historical development is low under anarchy.Establish optimal goals vigorously with a comprehensiveframework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks bylimiting means rather than ends. Act quickly whenconciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatoryactions whenever possible, other resources than militarycapabilities are useful.


Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit

Type D

Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D),nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Powerdisequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents mayvary, and responses to conciliation and firmness areuncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in theshort run depends upon the quality of leadership and apower equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is controlover historical development. Seek limited goal flexiblywith moderate means. Use military force if theopportunity and circumstances require it, but only as afinal resort.


Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

Type B

Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states;miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes ofwar. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism iswarranted regarding realization of goals. The politicalfuture is relatively predictable, and control over historicaldevelopments is possible. One should seek optimal goalsvigorously within a comprehensive framework. Controlrisks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic andresource may be appropriate, including the use of forcewhen it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.


Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit

Figure 3.3. Modified Holsti Typologies Matrix

A major advantage of operational code analysis in examining foreign policy and

international relations is its efforts to develop the strategic interactions of individual

leaders, as revealed by perceptions of Self and Other. This allows researchers to make


50/283

Belief and Bomb

Documents

Transcript of Belief and Bomb