Belated Crusaders - Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655

8/13/2019 Belated Crusaders - Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655

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American Society of Church History

Belated Crusaders: Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655Author(s): Ruth KleinmanReviewed work(s):Source: Church History, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 34-46Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of the American Society of Church HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3165097.

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Belated Crusaders:ReligiousFears in Anglo-FrenchDiplomacy

1654-1655RUTH KLEINMAN

Historians have commonly taken the secularization of politics and diplomacyas one of the great themes of the seventeenth century, and rightly so. But secularattitudes in matters of state did not move in an unbroken, irresistible progres-sion; until well into the century they coexisted with more traditional modes ofthought and developed against resistance from many people who still believedit immoral to divorce religion from politics. Moreover it was by no means alwaysclear which trend was the stronger. Thus long after the Peace of Westphalia,for example, the possibility of international religious war continued to seem real,even to the point where fears of it entered into considerations of diplomacy. Oneinteresting case of this kind arose in the course of Anglo-French negotiationsduring the mid-1650s, when apprehension of a Catholic crusade on the one sideand rumors of a Protestant one on the other added a special dimension to an al-ready complicated situation.

By the summer of 1654 Cromwell and the English Council of State had notyet decided between France and Spain for either war or alliance. Both werecourting England, and since Cromwell had concluded peace with the Dutch, theCommonwealth was at liberty to embark on new military ventures if interestshould point the way in one direction or another. Spain's West Indies trade wasvery tempting to Englishmen, but on the other hand France and England werealready fighting an undeclared small-scale privateering war in the channel. Be-sides, France was sheltering the Stuarts and their plots for restoration; at themoment indeed one of the French envoys in London was being expelled for par-ticipation in the latest royalist conspiracy.1 Thus the anti-French and the anti-Spanish party in the Council each had their arguments. Even from the religiouspoint of view the choice was difficult, given Cromwell's preoccupation with whathe called the Protestant Interest.

Modern historians have debated the genuineness of Cromwell's commitment tothe international Protestant cause. The most skeptical one among them has treatedthe Protector's concern for the good of Protestants on the continent as merewindow-dressing.2 He found apparent corroboration in the reports of contem-porary Protestant ambassadors in London who were constantly trying to pene-trate Cromwell's real motives because they found it hard to credit his pro-fessed ones, and were generally inclined to take his religious statements on foreign

1. This was Baron de Baas, Mazarin's personal representative who had been sent to sec-ond the ambassador Antoine de Bordeaux. In joining the plot against Cromwell Baasapparently acted independently; at least no evidence has ever proved Mazarin was in-volved and Cromwell took Mazarin's word for his innocence. See Wilbur C. Abbott,ed., The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell (Cambridge, Massachusetts' HarvardUniversity Press, 1937-1947), 3:303-349.2. Abbott, 3:365-366.

Ms. Kleinman is associate professor of history in the City University of NewYork, Brooklyn College.34


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BELATED CRUSADERSaffairs as a deliberate cover for mundane political calculations.3 The diplomats'predicament, however, proves nothing except their own secular evolution. Themost balanced and most recent judgments hold that Cromwell was sincere in hisefforts to combine religious and material interests in his foreign policy.4 Theythus bear out Gardiner's classic assessment of the man: His mind still workedon the lines of the Elizabethan period, when the championship of Protestantismabroad was imposed on Englishmen by interest as well as by duty. 5

If we take Cromwell at his word, therefore, the religious attitude of Franceand Spain counted in any decision for or against either,6 and here the two powerslooked to be almost even. Although France might have seemed friendlier thanSpain to Protestantism because French Huguenots enjoyed official toleration,Cromwell did not feel sufficiently reassured about their continued safety. Fromthe beginning of his administration he had expressed a sense of special obliga-tion to help them if they found themselves oppressed, since they had looked toEngland in the 1620s and had, in his opinion, been betrayed by Charles I.7 AndCromwell had acted on his belief. In 1651, when the French Fronde was at itsheight and Bordeaux, the hub of a region with a heavily Protestant population,declared itself for the prince of Conde and preparedto resist royal authority, Crom-well had sent a number of agents to the city in order to determine how far therebels were ready to go and what support actually existed for English interven-tion.8 But the radical republican group which eventually took control of Bordeauxwas a small minority; its sentiments found little echo among most of the in-habitants of either the city itself or the surrounding province. Besides, althoughthe revolutionary committee sent delegates to London with promises of conces-sions for England in return for aid against the royal army, they balked at hand-ing over the city to the English altogether, and Cromwell decided conditions didnot favor the dispatch of an expedition. Huguenots did not in any case pre-dominate among the Bordeaux radicals, and by far the majority of their coreli-gionists in southwestern France gave no sign of wishing to rebel at all. Conde andhis friends tried to persuade Cromwell otherwise; they also tried to persuade theHuguenots to rally to the Fronde, without success in either case.9 Yet Cromwellcontinued to watch the situation closely through reports from a variety of in-formants. In January of 1654 he sent the minister of the London Huguenot con-gregation, Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, on a mission into the Rhone valley to verifyaccounts of Huguenot distress and desperation.1? He himself, without wait-ing for what Stouppe might have to say, complained repeatedly to the French am-

3. Abbott, 4:48.4. Antonia Fraser, Cromwell: The Lord Protector (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),pp. 408-410, 536, 553; Robert S. Paul, The Lord Protector: Religion and Politics in theLife of Oliver Cromwell (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), pp. 334-342.5. Samuel R. Gardiner, History of the Commonwealthand Protectorate (London: Long-mans, Green and Co., 1894-1901), 2:88. See also Charles H. Firth, Oliver Cromwellandthe Rule of the Puritans in England, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1900),p. 363; and Jacob N. Bowman, The Protestant Interest in Cromwell'sForeign Relations(Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1900), passim.6. Abbott, 4:139.7. Ibid., 3:112.8. Ibid., 2:524-525; Gardiner,2:92-94; Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde: TheImpact of the English Civil War and Bevolution on France (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1967), p. 161.9. Knachel, pp. 201-214; Sal A. Westrich, The Orme of Bordeaux (Baltimore: Johns Hop-kins University Pressi 1972), pp. 40-59, 92-95.10. Abbott, 3:259; Gardiner, 2: 425.

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bassador about alleged infringements of the Edict of Nantes which had beenbrought to his attention.1Such concern for French domestic affairs was something Mazarin could notapprove even though he was willing to be accommodating in other respects, sug-gesting, for example, that France was not wedded to the idea of supporting theStuarts.l2 He had to be accommodating because he preferred to have Englandas an ally or at least a benevolent neutral rather than an additional enemy inFrance's continuing war against Spain. Internally too France was vulnerable,just recovering from the Fronde; civil peace still seemed very fragile while theexiled prince of Conde was keeping up his efforts to get English help for raisingfresh rebellion.13 Moreover the government noted uneasily the communicationsbetween Huguenots and their sympathizers in England.14 Nobody took the loyaltyof the Huguenots for granted. During the Fronde Reformed ministers had con-demned the English example of revolt and regicide as strongly as had Catholicpreachers,l5 and indeed with only individual exceptions the French Huguenotshad resisted all blandishments and remained singularly peaceful. The crown haddone its best to keep them in that mind by issuing the Declaration of Saint-Germain in May of 1652, which expressed gratitude for their obedience, assuredthem of their privileges under the Edict of Nantes and hinted at greater thoughunspecified benefits to come.ls On the whole they were disposed to trust thecrown's good will and it has been pointed out that their loyalty was the morereliable since they had lost their autonomous military power and become dependentsolely on the authority of the king for their continued toleration.17 That is clearerin retrospect however than it was to contemporaries. At the time Cromwell'ssolicitude on their behalf did not look reassuring. Mazarin continually assuredCromwell that his intelligence regarding the Huguenots must be faulty and urgedhim to believe they were satisfied with their lot.'8 But it seemed Cromwell wasunwilling to do that. During the spring and summer of 1654 diplomatic rumorspersisted that he was thinking of sending an expedition against one or another11. France, Archives Diplomatiques du Ministare des Affaires Etrangares, CorrespondancePolztique: Angleterre (henceforth cited as CPA), 63, folios 190-190 verso, Baas toMazarin, 23 March 1654; 64, folios 63-64, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 18 May 1654; 62

folios 536-537, Bordeaux to Brienne, 6 July 1654. All these and subsequent dates arenew style.12. Jules Mazarin,Lettres du CardinalMazarin pendant son Ministare,ed. by P. A. Ch6rueland G. d'Avenel, Collection de Documents In6dits sur l'Histoire de France, 3e S6rie,Histoire Politique, 27 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1872-1906), 6:121, to Bordeaux,6 February 1654; 136, to Bordeaux and Baas, 25 March 1654.13. Barribre, Conde's chief agent in London, collaborated with the Spanish ambassador inurging a Spanish alliance on Cromwelland also tried to lure Cromwell nto an invasionof France by constant reports of Huguenot suffering and readiness to revolt. Frenchconcern over his activities and Mazarin's efforts to counteract his arguments formedone of the main themes in the diplomatic correspondence or the years 1653-1655,withexamples too numerous to mention.14. For typical instances see Mazarin, Lettrcs, 6:123, to Bordeaux, 6 February 1654;144, to Bordeaux, 7 April 1654; 156 to Bordeaux 3 May 1654. Mazarin especially wantedto know the names descriptions and hiding places of the Huguenot ministers Cromwellwas reportedly sending into France.15. Georges Ascoli, La GrandeBretagne devant l'Opinion Frangaise au 17e Siacle, Travauxet M6moiresde l'Universit6 de Lille, nouv. s6rie, fasc. 13, 2 vols. (Paris: Gamber, 1930),1:76.16. Ruth Kleinman, Gratitude Revisted: The Declaration of Saint-Germain,1652, FrenchHistorical Studies 5 (Spring 1968): 249-262.17. Knachel, pp. 107-111; W. J. Stankiewiez, Politics and Beligion in 17th Century France(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 136-147. et passim.18. Mazarin, Lettres, 6: 131-134, memorandumto Baas and Bordeaux, 25 March 1654;170, to Bordeaux, 24 May 1654; 227-228, to Bordeaux, 20 July 1654.

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BELATED CRUSADERSpart of the southwestern French coast, and the French ambassador seriously be-lieved it possible that Cromwell might be preparing to use the religious issue asa pretext for an open break with France.'9

Nevertheless Mazarin worked to keep alive prospects for an Anglo-Frenchalliance. That involved maintaining the spirit of the Declaration of Saint-Germainand following the advice the ambassador sent home from London: to show favorto the Huguenots and give them no cause for grievances.20 No fundamental legalalterations were made; rather it was a matter of continuing the relaxed interpreta-tion of the Edict of Nantes so congregations could multiply beyond the strictlimits imposed earlier and Protestants could occasionally reappear in offices theyhad not been permitted to hold for a long time.2' More important than specificbenefits, though, was the promise of greater ones which the Huguenots read intothem. Their confidence grew so much that even one of their partisans later hadto admit that the Reformed triumphed a little too loudly. 22 Mazarin left themto enjoy their hopes for the sake of winning English friendship. Given the cir-cumstances this was a rational course, but it was not a popular one. A good manyFrenchmen disagreed with his objective in the first place-instead of dealingwith Cromwell they would have liked to see Louis XIV mounting an invasionof England to help his cousin Charles to his rightful place, and they also tendedto equate heresy, republicanism and rebellion.23 Furthermore the government'sbenevolent posture towards the Huguenots aroused the official opposition of theFrench clergy. The bishop of Montauban acted as their spokesman when hepreached Louis' coronation sermon in June 1654; he reminded the king of the oathhe had just taken to protect the Roman Catholic Church,complainedof recent royalleniency in permitting Huguenots to hold offices and send unauthorized deputa-tions to court and admonished Louis to return to the more rigorous interpreta-tion of the Edict of Nantes prevailing before the Fronde.24 For the time beingMazarin ignored the protest but he could not make it disappear; the clergy's dis-pleasure remained constant.25At this juncture, while Mazarin was trying to gauge Cromwell's intentions19. CPA, 62, folios 428-428 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 26 March 1654; folios 433 verso-434 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 30 March 1654; 63, folios 337-340 verso, Baas to

Mazarin, 21 April 1654; folios 394, 395 verso, 397-398 verso, Baas to Mazarin, 30April 1654; folios 453-454, Louis XIV to Bordeaux and Baas, 17 June 1654; 64, folios138-139, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 16 July 1654. For Bordeaux's opinion regarding Crom-well's use of the religious pretext see 63, folios 360-363, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 27 April1654.20. CPA, 63, folios 313 verso-314,Bordeaux to Mazarin, 16 April 1654.21. Elie Benoist, Histoire de I'Edit de Nantes. . . (Delft: A. Beman, 1693-1695), 3, pt.1: 156-212. Above all a friendly and encouraging tone was maintained when Huguenotsbrought complaintsto court. One English informant noted that Mazarin seemed to havebecome their advocate, and he also noted the reason: the cardinal was telling Catholicclergy that since the Huguenots only asked for the justice due them and had donenothing to forfeit it, he had neither reason nor inclination to make war on them-especially while England was so well armed. John Thurloe, A Collection of the StatePapers of John Thurloe, Esq., Secretary, first to the Council of State, and afterwardsto the Two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell,ed. by Thomas Birch (London:printed for executor of F. Gyles, 1742), 2:69, from Monsieur Augier's secretary inParis, 14 February 1654.22. Benoist, 3, pt. 1:158.23. Ascoli, 1:76, 112-113.24. Assemblees du Clerg6 de France, Becueil des Actes, Titres et Menmoires .... ed. by M.du Saulzet, 2d ed. (Paris: Veuve de F. Muguet et al., 1768-1771), 13:672-687, 8 June1654.25. Not to mention individual protests, the Assembly of the Clergy presented a formalremonstrance on 2 April 1656. Assembl6es du Clerge de France, Becuel . . 13:624-64&

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CnuiCH HISTORYon the one hand and placate him with benevolence towards the Huguenots on theother, he received a strange combination of intelligence and advice to reverse hispolicy completely. In July of 1654 the royal pensioner and sometime informantTheodore Brachet de La Milletiere submitted a memorandum warning of an im-mediately impending threat from Cromwell and all European Protestants andurging as a preventive measure the prompt conversion of the French Hugue-nots.26 According to La Milletiere Cromwell was sending emissaries aroundProtestant Europe to prepare the reunion of the various denominations into onecommon confession, centering on the proclamation as an article of faith that thepope was Anti-Christ.27 To that end the English Parliament which was to meetin September would issue a call for deputies from all the Protestant states.28Cromwell's object in promoting such a reunion was to start a grand war of re-ligion in which France would be the first victim while he kept Spain at bay untillater with hopes of an alliance against what he would call their common enemy.Furthermore he would pave the way for his invasion of France by enlisting thesympathies of the Huguenots and arousing them to revolt against their king.29As proof that these plans were already afoot La Milletiere cited trips across theChannel by Protestant ministers, of which the government was aware, and par-ticularly a recent passage through France by the minister of the French Huguenotcongregation in London.80

La Milletiere's character and background did not make him the most reliableinformant. He had a mania; the single object of his life was to convert the Cal-vinists of France to Catholicism. There were reasons for this, some of them ma-terial, some of them not. He had been born into a Huguenot family of the robe,his father holding the office of intendant in the household of Navarre.31 In hisyouth he had been sent to study at the University of Heidelberg and trained fora career in the law, but he became an amateur theologian rather than a practic-ing lawyer or royal jurist. While still a young man he was named an elder inthe consistory of Charenton, the congregation drawing on Paris, and took activepart in religious and political conferences. The queen-mother appointed him toserve for a term as Huguenot deputy-general for the third estate; the 1620 As-sembly of La Rochelle used him as secretary and envoy to the Dutch States-General; the Assembly of Milhau entrusted him with similarly responsible func-26. CPA, 60, folios 359-377, Advis AMonseigneurle Cardinal sur le dessein du Protecteurd'Angleterre de r6unir, en une, toutes les communionsprotestantes avec le moyen dele pr6venir et de l'en empacher , 21 July 1654. Part of the Advis was publishedby FranqoisP. G. Guizot in Histoire de la WRpublique'Angleterre et de Cromwell,1649-1658 (Paris: Didier, 1854), 2:426-436, but Guizot omitted La MilletiBre's recommenda-tions for preventiveaction.27. OPA, 60, folios 359, 361, 361 verso.28. CPA, 60, folios 359 verso, 360.29. CPA, 60, folios 360, 361 verso, 362-366 verso.30. CPA 60, folios 359 verso-360.31. Almost all that is known about La MilletiAre'slife was collected and publishedby EmileHaag and Eugene Haag, La France Protestante (Paris, Geneva: J. Cherbuliez,1846-1858), 2:494-497. Some references to La Milleti6re's earlier career are to be found inBenoist, 2:423, 514-515, 578; 3, pt. 1:33-34; ard in Jack A. Clarke,Huguenot Warrior:The Life and Times of Henri de Bohan, 1579-1638 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1966). pp. 38, 131. In Socie6t du Protestantisme Frangais, Bulletin 8 (1859):252-253,the editors published a brief biographical notice which contributed nothing new exceptthe claim that La Milletiere had been Mazarin's confidential agent, but other than areference to a short discussionof the Advis in Guizot, 2:76 they presentedno evidencefor that.

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BELATED CRUSADERStions.32 In those years he defended the right of Huguenots to rebel against royalauthority if the crown violated its obligations under the Edict of Nantes. More-over he suited his actions to his theory by working for the duke of Rohan, oneof the moving spirits behind the outbreak of civil war in 1625.33 That led to LaMilletiere's arrest and condemnation to death in 1627-1628, though Louis XIIIgranted him his life. How he turned himself around we do not know, but heemerged from several years in prison with a royal pension, carried out a missionon behalf of the crown to pacify the Protestants of Nimes and devoted the lastthirty years of his life to controversial writings urging the return of the ReformedChurch to Rome.

His former brethren had their own opinion concerning the reason for his de-fection. When he was finally read out of the Reformed Church in 1645, the min-ister repeated to him Christ's words to Judas, and upon La Milletiere's protestthat he was no Judas, the minister replied that that indeed was so, since Judasalready had the purse and you are still hunting it. 34 Though he became a Catholicconvert in the same year, Catholics apparently did not trust him either. Accord-ing to the most charitable judgment of him he was a good man, but vain, withsomething unhinged in his head .35During the 1630s he tried to serve Richelieuin promoting a project of Catholic-Protestant reunion which the cardinal wasknown to favor,36and it is likely that he thought news of Cromwell's alleged plansmight prompt Mazarin to revive the scheme. Since 1628 La Milletiere had pub-lished a long series of books and pamphlets arguing the merits of the Catholicposition on justification, free will, the real presence, as well as other disputedpoints of doctrine.3 He evidently considered himself an irrefutable authority onthese matters, for he proposed, in the same memorandum to Mazarin, that two ofhis works, The Light of the True Church and The Light of the True Faith, beused to convince the Huguenot ministers who in turn would persuade their con-gregations to convert.38 So far the ministers had ignored both books but La Mil-letiere attributed their lack of response to confusion in the face of truth.39 More-over he believed he had found an original line of argument which would compelthem to yield once and for all: if it were demonstrated to them that debates onpoints of belief only exalted human reason above faith and therefore encouraged.skepticism and atheism instead of religion, they would have to admit that theProtestant reformers had been wrong to divide the church on the strength oftheir own opinions. And, since the original grievances against Church corruption32. The Hugenots complained about violations of the Edict of Nantes while their noble lead-ers sought special profits in opposing the crown, and the Assemblies of La Rochelle andMilhau among others endorsed the principle of armed resistance.33. This civil war ended in Rohan's defeat, the siege and capture of La Rochelle by the royalarmy and the modification of the Edict of Nantes through the peace of Alais in 1629,by which the Huguenots lost their rights to fortify their cities, arm themselves, andhold political assemblies. For a favorable interpretation of Rohan's role in these events,see Clarke Huguenot Warrior.34. Haag and Haag, 2:496. This and subsequent translations are the author's.35. Ibid.36. Ibid., p. 495; between 1634 and 1637 he published three books on means ofreuniting the Reformed churches with Rome, and although the Sorbonne found histheology wanting, Richelieu 's intervention protected him from open censure. For Rich-elieu's own interest in reunion projects see William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason ofState (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 87, n. 222; p. 189, n. 43.37. Haag and Haag, 2:494-497 list 48 titles altogether for the years 1628-1664, not count-ing his 1622 discourse justifying armed rebellion,38. CPA, 60, folios 369 verso-370.39. CPA, 60, folio 369 verso.

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CHURCHHISTORYhad meanwhile been answered by reforms within Catholicism, the ministers wouldhave no reasonable option left except to return to Rome.40 Actually neither LaMilletiere's main argument nor its corollaries had the least originality. They hadall been commonplaces of Catholic polemic since the sixteenth century, so that LaMilletiere's confidence in his powers was a measure of his self-delusion. But howmuch of the information he was offering as bait for his project was also a delusion?

Considering the circumstances of his departure from the Reformed Church,Huguenot ministers or other leading members of the Reformed community whomight have been in touch with English emissaries and correspondents were un-likely to take La Milletiere into their confidence. Whatever news he gleaned musttherefore have been second-hand at best. Mazarin could not have been ignorantof his limitations, seeing that the man had been trying to make himself useful tothe government in the same way for some twenty years. Nevertheless La Mil-letiere's report, however self-serving, was not altogether negligible. It containedplausible elements, and first of all two verifiable facts: Cromwell's first Parlia-ment under the Instrument of Government had indeed been called for early Sep-tember, and Cromwell had sent the minister Stouppe to survey the situation ofthe French Huguenots. Mazarin knew something of that already and had Stouppe'saccount of his travels almost as soon as Cromwell did, in fact almost simul-taneously with La Milletiere's memorandum.41As it happened Stouppe had foundno inclination to revolt, though that was no guarantee for the future. Even LaMilletiere's assertion that there was a plan afoot to reunite the Protestant churchesseemed to be confirmed by independent information. Mazarin evidently convincedhimself of this, for in October he wrote Bordeaux in London as though it werean accepted fact that Cromwell was still thinking of getting himself electedprotector of all the Huguenots and Protestants. 42 And he added something LaMilletiere had not known at all, namely, that besides having

. . ordered several ministers of the so-called Reformed Church on secret tripsin this kingdom [Cromwelll moreover has recently sent people to Switzerlandand Germany to work for the accomplishment of this design.43Mazarin's intelligence was accurate. A Scottish minister devoted to ecumenism,John Dury, was indeed staying in Switzerland under the wing of the English am-bassador John Pell, in order to investigate the possibility of agreement betweenthe Swiss and English churches. His inquiry was to extend into southern Ger-many and the Netherlands as well, and he had the backing of Cromwell for hismission. It only remained to be seen whether the enterprise meant what La Mil-letiere thought it did, and if so, what might have to be done about it.

Meanwhile the English had their own fears of religious war. Some monthsbefore La Milletiere warned Mazarin of the alleged Protestant plot against theCatholic powers, Cromwell had been telling the Swiss ambassador an exactly op-posite story, saying he knew . . by notification from every side, and especiallyfrom my correspondence,that the Pope actually seeks to reconcile Spain and Francewith each other to turn the weapons of both these powers against the evangelicalstates. 44 There is no evidence that Cromwell had any specific grounds for thisbelief. Apparently he interpreted reports of papal efforts to mediate between40. CPA, 60, folios 369-371.41. CPA, 63, folios 530-532,Bordeaux to Servien, 23 July 1654.42. Mazarin, Lettres, 6:333 to Bordeaux, 3 October1654.43. Ibid44. Abbott, 3:159-160, 25 January 1654

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BELATED CRUSADERSFrance and Spain in the light of ancient enmity, without regard to the realities ofpapal power at the moment.45 He was so sure of his judgment, however, thathe warned the Swiss they might well be first in line of attack because of theirgeographic position, and he thought the best precaution would be a confidentialcorrespondetce among the Protestant Swiss cantons, England and the Nether-lands.46 John Pell's embassy three months later was the consequence of thoseideas, and Dury's mission made a complement to it. A defensive league seemsto have been all Cromwell had in mind at the time, not an offensive one, nor anactual confederation. Yet he had in the past entertained thought of a Prot-estant confederation, and it was a subject close to Dury's heart.In a sense John Dury was the counterpart of La Milletiere, more respectablebut equally singleminded. His career in the ministry could be considered an ecu-menical movement in itself, since he had been ordained in both the Presbyterianand Anglican rites, had served English communities in the Netherlands and EastPrussia, and had cultivated contacts with Lutheran pietists in Sweden and Den-mark as well as Germany.47 He had been involved in projects for Protestant re-union before, first on the Continent under the sponsorship of Gustavus Adolphusof Sweden and later in England itself.48 Throughout his life his aim was

to stir up . . . thoughts of brotherly kindnesse, of meekness, and of peace; tothe end that some waves may be taken up, which will help to reconcile the af-fections of many divided about Circumstantials; and to preserve and keep en-tire the Unity which remains about Fundamentals; and to prevent or cure themanifold Misprisions, which increase our confusions, and obstruct the Remediesof our diseases.49

Dury's certainty of shared fundamental beliefs did not however extend to Cath-olicism. He saw the Catholic church as a menace to Protestants everywhere,though particularly in Germany, and in fact was convinced that the house ofAustria intended to exterminate Protestantism altogether. He had arrived at thisconclusion in the 1630s and a remedy had suggested itself to him at the same time.In his opinion the safety of Protestantism could best be secured by a confedera-tion joyning the Protestant states [of Europe] together in counsels and actionsof peace and war tending to their mutual preservation. 50 The confederationwould of course have to be accompanied and fortified by collaboration among thevarious churches for a united ideological front. Moreover he thought it desirablethat England should take the lead in forming the organization, since the effortwould first of all bring domestic benefits by drawing together Anglicans andPresbyterians.6145. Abbott, pp. 160-161.46. Ibid., p. 160.47. For the fullest account of Dury's life and work see John M. Batten, John Dury: Ad-vocate of Christian Reunion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); pp. 1-83deal with the earlier period, up to 1640. See also Wilbur K. Jordan, The Developmentof Religious Toleration in England (1932-1940; rpt., Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter

Smith, 1965), 2:364-370; and Ruth Rouse and S. C. Neill, eds., A History of the Ecumen-ical Movement,1517-1948,2d ed. (Philadelphia: WestminsterPress, 1967-1970), 1:134-136.48. John Dury, A Summarie Account of... . JD.'s Former and Latter Negotiation for theProcuring of True Gospel Peace .. . ongst the Protestant Churches,and Academies(London: printed for author, 1657), pp. 1-24; Batten, pp. 18-119.49. As cited in Batten, p. 105.50. John Dury, A Summary Discourse Concerningthe Work of Peace Ecclesiasticall, HowIt May ConcurreWith the Aims of a Civill ConfederationAmongst Protestants: Presentedto the Considerationof My Lord AmbassadorSir T. Bow, eto. at Hamburg . . . 1639(Cambridge: Roger Daniell, 1641), p. 1.51. Ibid., passim.

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CHURCH HISTORYDury elaborated on these ideas in a further pamphlet, Motives to Induce theProtestant Princes to Mind the Worke of Peace Ecclesiasticall, and tried to in-terest Charles I in both the domestic and foreign aspects of his scheme.52 What-

ever the king may have thought of the proposals, he was not to have the leisurefor ambitious novelties in any case. But once the civil war was over and theCouncil of State began to concern itself with English relations abroad, Dury re-turned to the charge. He was part of Milton's circle, which welcomed his ecu-menical and anti-Catholic orientation,53 and he also had sympathizers on thecouncil and among Independents generally. Thus he secured appointment aslibrarian of Saint James's Palace with an additional salary for services as a pam-phleteer.54 His views on the necessity for Protestant reconciliation and confedera-tion had not changed over the years, despite the Peace of Westphalia and the factthat the German Protestants were obviously holding their own, and he still sawEngland as the natural leader of the international Protestant cause.55 He now usedhis position to urge his program on both the council and the Protector.A number of historians have noted a close correspondence between Dury'sprojects and Cromwell's actual foreign policy, though only John Batten has gone sofar as to credit Dury with the molding of that policy.56 By way of proof Battenpointed to the reports of contemporaries, including La Milletiere, which connectedDury's name with various Cromwellianschemes for an anti-Catholicleague.57In thecase of La Milletiere at least, this historian misread the text, for La Milletiere nevermentioned Dury and attributed to Cromwell himself the plans he was discussing.58There is no direct evidence to tell us just how decisive Dury's influence was, as-suming he did influence Cromwell. All that can safely be said is that to a re-markable extent Cromwell shared Dury's opinions regarding the usefulness ofreligious and political unity among Protestant countries. In negotations with theNetherlands in the course of the Dutch war he actually proposed the creation ofan Anglo-Dutch state with reciprocal membership in each other's representativebodies.59 The Dutch found this hard to take seriously, so that Cromwell had todrop the notion in the final peace talks of 1654. Apparently he never took it upagain with any other power, but he did pursue more limited plans for a Protestantdiplomatic league, and in these Dury sometimes played a part.It seems Dury had no connection with the Dutch project. While that was stillunder discussion, however, the Council of State sent him along with the Englishambassador to Sweden, Bulstrode Whitelocke. Whitelocke had instructions fromCromwell to negotiate a treaty of trade and friendship and, beyond that, to enlistSweden if possible for a grand Protestant alliance.60 Dury presumably was torenew old acquaintances with Swedish divines and second Whitelocke's effortsby working on the religious front. In the event, the treaty which was signed in52. John Dury, Motives to Induce the Protestant Princes to Mind the Worke of Peace Ec-clesiasticall Amongst Themselves. . . (n.p., 1639). Batten, p. 86 cites a London print-ing of 1641.53. David Masson, The Life of John Milton (London: Macmillan and Co., 1877), 4:631;5:158, 200, 230, 235-236, 315, 448.54. Batten, pp. 118-119, 143.55. Ibid., pp. 143-145. Dury still held to the same militant ideas in later years, judgingby the pamphlet generally attributed to him: The Interest of England in the ProtestantCause (London: no pub., 1659).56. Batten, pp. 143-146.57. Ibid., p. 144.58. CPA, 60, folios 359-361.59. Abbott, 3:45-125; Paul, pp. 281-284.60. Batten, pp. 145-146, Gardiner, 2:377-380.

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BELATED CRUSADERSthe summer of 1654 had only practical economic objectives, with no mention ofa general Protestant alliance or any reunion of denominations.61 Far from beingdiscouraged, Dury had meanwhile obtained permission from Cromwell to ac-company Pell to the Protestant Swiss cantons.62 Pell was going in order to fortifyAnglo-Swiss relations and keep an eye on French policy in the area, and Duryfor his part was to confer with theologians in the various cantons about the pos-sibility of establishing the necessary fundamentals on which all Protestant churchescould agree as a basis for collaboration. He went about this work from May of1654 through the next year, concluded with a lengthy circuit through friendlysouthern German courts and the Netherlands and returned to England in 1657.63

La Milletiere had been fantasizing when he alleged the condemnation of thepope as Anti-Christ would be the cornerstone of the proposed reunion. Dury con-centrated on the scriptures and on basic Christian charity; he was not interestedin adding new doctrines to the old ones. La Milletiere was wrong also in his as-sumption that a union of Protestant churches would succeed-Dury returned toEngland with empty hands. Wherever he went churches received him with respectand dismissed him with professions of good will; no one offered him any firmcommitments. Theologians in the different cantons could not even agree on theexpressions of sympathy they were willing to place on record, and the story wasthe same in Germany and the Netherlands.4 The political side of the Englishmission in Switzerland did not fare much better. The Swiss had not invitedCromwell's friendship from fear of an outside Catholic attack. They had more im-mediately practical aims than that, as Pell soon found out. At the time, theywere negotiating the renewal of their traditional agreement to furnish mercenariesto the French crown, and although some of the clergy indeed opposed dealingswith a Catholic power, the politicians worried more over French arrears in pay-ments under the previous contract and over the future status of their toll exemp-tions in the parts of Alsace which France had gained from the Habsburgs in1648.65 What they wanted from England was diplomatic pressure on France topay her obligations and assure them of their trade privileges.6 They showed nointerest in a formal Protestant alliance: so it must have been clear to all observers,and especially to Mazarin, that they were not likely to be carried away by re-ligious enthusiasm into dangerous political experiments.In one respect however La Milletiere's warning of a Protestant crusade wasnot completely fanciful. Even if an actual Protestant confederation was highly im-probable, a military coalition of Protestant states under the leadership of Englandremained a possibility. Cromwell had spared no effort in the past to bring suchan alliance about; before trying it with the Swiss he had urged it successively onthe Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. Nor did he give up the idea-he reverted61. Abbott, 3:911-915.62. Ibid., pp. 232-238.63. Dury, A. Suinmarie Account . .., pp. 24-46. See also K. Brauer, Die UnionstaetigkeitJohn Duries unter dem Protektorat Oliver Cromwells (Marburg: printed for author,1905).64. Brauer, pp. 79-89.65. Robert Vaughan, The Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, and the State of Europe duringthe Early Part of the Reign of Louis XIV (London: H. Colburn, 1838-1839), 1:5-7,Pell to Thurloe, 12 June 1654; 16-17, Pell to Thurloe, 11 July 1654; J. A. Pupikoserand J. Kaiser, eds., Die Bidgenoessischen Abschiede aus dem Zeitraume von 1649 bis1680, Amtliche Sammlung der Aelteren Eidgenoessischen Abschiede 6 (Frauenfeld: J.Huber, 1867), 1:219-467 passim.66. Vaughan, 1:54, Pell to Thurloe, 19 September 1654.

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CHURCHHISTORYto a similar combination two years later, in 1656.67 He also maintained corre-spondence with the elector of Brandenburg and lesser German princes and al-together acted as though he were at least unofficially the protector of all theHuguenots and Protestants of Europe, to use Mazarin's phrase. Mazarin, as wehave seen, took seriously Cromwell's potential for acting in the name of religion.He did not need to weigh the sincerity of the Protector's motives-the politicalimplications for France were the same whether Cromwell was sincere or a hyp-ocrite as long as she had Protestant neighbors as well as a Huguenot minorityinside the kingdom whom he could cultivate as friends and clients. Contrary towhat La Milletiere had hoped however, fear of a Protestant league did not deflectMazarin from his aim of securing the English alliance. In the months that fol-lowed the only question in his mind concerned Cromwell's ability to maintainhimself in power given his current difficulties with Parliament.68 No doubt hewould have preferred to do without Cromwell, but as long as Cromwell did ruleEngland Mazarin accepted his commitment to international Protestantism as acondition of dealing with him. He therefore ignored the major part of La Mil-letiere's memorandum with its recommendations for speedy conversion of theHuguenots just as he ignored the remonstrances of the French clergy, and con-centrated instead on the task of convincing Cromwell of Louis XIV's good willtowards his Huguenot subjects. That task indeed took on prime importance.

By late July of 1654 the English commissioners had finally reached thepoint of presenting their list of proposed treaty terms, and they insisted on formalguarantees for the rights of the Huguenots despite French efforts to head off sucha demand.69 Since treaty guarantees for its own subjects were unacceptable tothe crown as derogatory of its authority, Mazarin could only counter with the as-surance that they were unnecessary. The memoranda prepared in Paris and theinstructions sent to London all repeated this line of argument: the refusal of anarticle in favor of the Huguenots should not be construed by Cromwell as a signof hostility towards them, because the king held them in affection, esteemed theloyalty they had shown during his minority, and was enforcing all the laws whichprotected them.70 There was even a suggestion that he might reconfirm the Edictof Nantes if necessary.71 Even so it took almost a year and a half to bring Crom-well around to the French point of view, and in the interim France had furtherto prove her good religious intentions by intervening on behalf of the Walden-sian Protestants in Savoy. These people had resisted the duke of Savoy's attemptsto restrict them to their original places of residence. Resistance led to punitiveaction in the spring of 1655, and unfortunately the duke used some French troopswhich had been detached to his service. As soon as news of the massacres inPiedmont arrived in London Cromwell mobilized financial and diplomatic re-67. Abbott, 4:352-354, 410.68. Mazarin, Lettres, 6:333, to Bordeaux, 8 October 1654.69. CPA, 62, folios 546-549 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne 23 July 1654; 63, folios 530-532,Bordeaux to Servien, 23 .uly 1654: folios 540-541, 542 verso, Bordeaux to Servien, 5August 1654; folios 543-543 bis, 545 verso, Bordeaux to Servien, 6 August 1654; folios558-560, Bordeaux to Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 566-566 verso, Bordeaux to Mazsrin,13 August 1654; 62, folios 564-566, 568, Bordeaux to Brienne, 15 August 1654; folios578-579 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne 27 August 1654.70. CPA, 64, folios 153-157, unsigned memorandum, 1 August 1654; 63, folios 548, 550-550verso, memorandum from Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 554-556 verso, memorandumfrom Servien, 13 August 1654; folios 571-575 verso, memorandum from Servien, 27 Au-gust 1654.71. CPA, 63, folios 554-556 verso, memoranalm from Servien, 13 August 1654.

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BELATED CRUSADERSsources to relieve the Waldenses.72The presenceof French soldiers in Savoyhad to be explained,and he madeit clear he wouldconsiderFrenchhelp for thePiedmonteseProtestants as a positive inducement o proceedwith the pendingtreaty.73Mazarin did more than help; he took the lead in mediationbecause,aside from concern over the English treaty, the royal council fearedthat unlessthe duke of Savoy could be persuadedto settle his troubles speedily Englandmight raise troops in the Protestantcantons and also rouse the French Hugue-nots in orderto make war on him.74 Indeedapprehension egardingCromwell'sinterestin the Huguenotswas constantly n the background.Until well into 1655Mazarin received reports from the French ambassadoras well as from othersourcesthat Cromwell, n concertwith the prince of Conde and the Spaniards,had designson La Rochelle and the island of Re.75That happened o be wishfulthinkingon the part of Conde'speopleand the Spanishambassador, ut on theotherhandCondehad not yet met a final rebuff n his effortsto get some sort ofEnglish support,76while the ReverendStouppewas still passing along the cor-respondenceof his French friends to Cromwell'schief of intelligence.77Uncer-tainty finallyendedwhen Cromwellopenly committedhimselfagainst Spain andin November1655 signed the treaty of Westminster,by which commercialdif-ficultieswere resolvedand, what was at least equally important, he contractingparties undertook o give no aid to each other's presentlydeclared enemies orrebels.78That left English protectionof the Huguenotsup to discretion,muchas the Frenchhad suggestedall along: . . . it is better . . . to leave out of thetreaty the freedomof both parties to make amicablerepresentationswhen in-dicated,whichwill be respectedaccording o the proofsof friendship hey receivefrom one anotherin other matters. 79

Mazarin'spatienceand persistencethus paid good dividends,a great dealbetter than could have been expected had advice such as La Milletiere'spre-vailed. 1654-1655was no time for Franceto provokeCromwellwith a Catholiccrusade,spiritualor otherwise. After all, thoughin the summerand fall of 1654Cromwelland the Council of State were already planning a naval expeditionagainst the SpanishWest Indies, naval warfareoverseas did not mean Englandwould have to ally herselfwith France. The Council of State did not even be-lieve that such an expeditionwould escalate into war with Spain in Europe.80When Cromwelldid decide in favor of the treaty with France, he claimedthe72. Abbott, 3:717-743.73. Ibid., pp. 726-728; CPA, 66, folios 60-60 verso, Cromwell to Mazarin, 4 June 1655;folios 61-61 verso, Cromwell o Louis XIV, 4 June 1655.74. CPA, 65, folios 137-140,Bordeaux to Brienne, 24 June 1655; Gardiner,3:380-381.75. CPA, 62, folios 599 verso-600, Bordeaux to Brienne, 17 September 1654; folios 638verso, 640-640 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 9 November 1654; 64, folios 287-288,,289verso, Bordeaux to Mazarin, 24 December1654; 66, folios 2-6 verso, Whyte to Mazarin,undated but with notation of January 1655; 65, folios 57-59 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne,25 February 1655; 66, folios 49-53, Propositions and advice given by an English mer-chant to His Eminence 25 April 1655; 65, folios 137-140, Bordeaux to Brienne, 24 June

1655.76. His agent Barribredid not leave London until the spring of 1656; CPA, 65, folios 268-268 verso, Bordeaux to Brienne, 15 May 1656.77. Thurloe, 2:555-556, 600-601, 614-615, 624-625, 646-647, 665, 678, 680-681, 692, 697-698,702, 711, 718-719, 739; 3:92.78. Abbott, 3:876-877; CPA, 66, folios 122-135, Cromwell's ratification of the treaty, 7November 1655; folios 136-137, Cromwell's ratification of the secret articles, 7 Novem-ber 1655.79. CPA, 64, folio 154 verso, unsigned memorandumprobably drafted by Servien, 1 Au-gust 1654.80. Abbott, 3:260-261.

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CHURCH HISTORYFrench crown's good treatment of the Huguenots had been part of the consid-erations which moved him to it.81 Since the treaty of Westminster followed al-most immediately upon the pacification of Savoy under French auspices, Crom-well's words were probably true. He went on to a military alliance with Francein 1657 and to joint operations in the Spanish Netherlands which gave theEnglish Mardyck and Dunkirk and the French the final edge over Spain in theirlong drawn-out war. Although he continued watchful over the Protestant in-terest in France and elsewhere in Europe, he never was able to enlist other Prot-estant powers in an anti-Habsburg coalition, nor did he resume the project forreunion among Protestant denominations.

John Dury, disappointed when he received no further official backing after1657, eventually denounced Cromwell most bitterly as a hypocritical opportunistwho had simply used him and his ideas to enhance his own reputation.82 In thelight of all the evidence this was an unfair as well as an ungrateful judgment.83Cromwell had to accommodate himself to political realities on the internationalscene, and Dury was a bad loser. La Milletiere on the other hand apparentlyresigned himself to the slip of what he had thought a great opportunity. There isno record of his again offering advice to the government on the conduct of foreignor religious affairs; he returned to his previous occupations and produced twomore books before he died in 1665.84 It is true that once the treaty of West-minster had been safely signed, the French crown began to yield discreetly toclerical pressure for stricter regulation of the Huguenots. In 1656 the Assemblyof the Clergy was more successful than the bishop of Montauban had been atLouis' coronation two years earlier; its formal remonstrance against the Declara-tion of Saint-Germain was answered by a succession of edicts and legal decisionswhich gradually deprived the Huguenots of the gains they had made, or had beenallowed to think they had made, since 1648.85 Yet those were domestic matters.Not even the Assembly of the Clergy thought to suggest the terms of foreignpolicy; there secular calculations reigned supreme.81. Abbott, 4:139, Cromwell's instructions to Colonel William Lockhart, his ambassadortoFrance, April 1656.82. As cited in Batten, p. 172; Dury was addressingan appeal to CharlesII for support.83. Ibid.; Brauer, pp. 197-201.84. Haag and Haag, 2:496-497.85. F. A. Isambert, ed., Beeueil G6neral des Anciennes Lois Frangaises, depuis I'An 420jusqu'd la Bvolution. . . (Paris: Bellin - Le Prieur, 1821-1833), 17:335, Declaration tothe effect that the Edict of Nantes and the declarations, judgments and regulationsgiven in consequenceof it, will be kept and observed, and that two commissioners willbe sent to have them enforced, 18 July 1656; 339, Declaration . . . prohibiting theProtestants from practicing their religion in cities which are the seats of archbishopsor bishops, and in places or lordships belonging to clergy; and that ministers may notpreach outside their place of residence, December 1656; 346, Judgment of the royalcouncil which revokes that of 21 May 1652, and prohibits ministers of the ReformedReligion from preaching in more than one place, 11 January 1657; 346, Judgment ofthe royal council which orders that temples built by Protestant highjusticiars will bedemolishedwhen the [present] lord is Catholic, and that whoever acquires the domainmay not establish Protestant exercises under cover of the high justice included in thedomain rights, 11 January 1657; 356, Prohibition of any Reformed colloquiesother thanthe annual synod, which must be held in the presence of a royal commissioner and maynot discuss matters other than church discipline, 26 July 1657.

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Belated Crusaders - Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655

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Transcript of Belated Crusaders - Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654-1655