BEHIND THE SCENES

Major General Joginder Singh (Retired)Lancer International -New Delhi-1993

273 Pages-Fifteen Sketch Maps. ISBN-1-897829-20-5

Price-Hardbound-380/- Indian Rupees- (Not including postage)

Reviewed by A.H Amin

August 2000

When I saw this books short description on LANCER BOOKS promotional leaflet I immediately ordered one through Bharat Verma's London UK office.I was very excited and thought very seriously that this book would be a really fine magnum bonum type of an effort on the Indian Army.

At that time I was writing my book Pakistan Army till 1965 and hoped that this book would be a tremendous help.

Following are my personal observations written in late 1999.“Behind the Scenes”, setting aside other factors discussed in the succeeding paragraphs still is a welcome addition to the limited number of books available on the Indo Pak wars. 

Major General Joginder Singh possesses the distinction of being an insider in the higher Indian command and staff echelons in the period 1958-65 and his analysis carries

the weight of authority of a man who saw how various operational and higher command decisions were taken from close quarters.

Major General Joginder Singh the author was commissioned in the 5th Battalion 14th Punjab Regiment more popularly known as “ Ali Baba’s (its commanding officers designation) Forty Thieves” British Indian Army in 1937 after having joined the army through the “Y Cadet Scheme”.

 Joginder saw military action in the British operations against the Frontier tribes in the late 1930s. 

He attended the 1945 Army Staff Course at Quetta, served in various command and staff appointments including a stint at the Indian Ministry of Defence,

command of an Infantry Battalion (7 Punjab), Commander 80 Brigade-Nowshera Sector), Deputy Commandant Infantry School, Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps during the Sino-Indian War, GOC 5 Infantry Division and Chief of Staff of the Western Command under three successive GOC in chiefs. 

The last assignment included 1965 War after which Joginder finally retired in 1967.

The book is divided into five parts and covers the entire modern post-1947 Indian military history with maximum space devoted to the 1965 conflict while smaller tracts are devoted to the 1971 War, Interwar years followed by a small section dealing with the more recent developments.

The first part dealing with “National Strategy” feels that strategic insight is sadly lacking in India’s higher decision making echelons.

 He feels that politicians leading India are short-sighted and self- centred and feels that Indian higher leadership lacks the qualities necessary to attain India’s position of natural leadership in Asia.

Joginder discusses in considerable detail his experiences as 80 Infantry Brigade Commander where he first advanced the possibility that Akhnur bridge by virtue of being the sole link to Poonch Valley and the fact that it was defended by the weak 191 Infantry Brigade defending Chamb Sector .

This represented a serious imbalance in Indian defensive posture in South Kashmir and that it was most likely that Pakistan Army in case of war may capture it with ease using a force of an armoured brigade infantry division. 

Joginder states that a divisional exercise was held based on this scenario in April-May 1956 but the only outcome was that “GOC 26 Division was asked to proceed on pension” (Page-28) while no other changes were made in operational plans or organisational structure till 1965.

The layman readers may note that shortly before the September 1965 War the Indian High Command did agree to upgrade the Chamb Brigade to a Divison in August 1965 but at the time of Grand Slam Chamb was defended only by an infantry brigade and a squadron of light tanks. 

Joginder devotes a small chapter to his experiences as Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps responsible for Indian Occupied Kashmir and discusses his recommendations which included creation of an infantry division to defend Chamb, construction of a bridge on Chenab at Riasi as an alternative to Akhnur bridge stationing of an independent

armoured brigade in Jammu area and stationing of an infantry division size force as 15 Corps Reserve. 

None of the recommendations were followed by Joginders bosses !

The author’s discussion of Sino-Indian War is not much different from the other much known discussions in various well circulated books, so it is pointless to burden the readers with repetition of much discussed issues.

The most valuable albeit controversial part of the book is the one dealing with the authors experiences as Chief of Staff of the Western Command before and during 1965 war. 

The author had a high opinion of his first GOC Western Command who died in a helicopter crash in 1963 along with four general officers and an airforce air vice marshal. 

Joginder also had a very high opinion about his second GOC Manekshaw. 

It was during this period as the author discusses that the Western Command carried out a detailed appreciation dealing with a future Indo-Pak conflict and recommended an offensive posture with attack aimed at isolating Lahore (going for Balloki Headwork’s) and Sialkot (from Jammu-Samba area) and against the Mangla Dam-Mirpur area were planned.

 It was during this period that the Western Command’s proposals for opening a second front across the international border Joginder states that the Army Chief Chaudhry accepted the idea of opening a second front in case of war across the international border.

Joginder, however, noted that by 1964 Nehru incapable of taking any decisions due to bad health and indifferent mental state while defence held a very low priority with Nehru’s successor Shaastri. 

Thus the 1964 memorandum prepared by the Western Command was simply filed away. 

Joginder felt that General Chaudhri was not assertive in presenting the Indian political leadership with the true defence requirements.The controversial part of the book begins once Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh enters the scene as the third boss of the author as GOC Western Command in November 1964.

It appears that there was a personality clash between Joginder and Harbaksh while Harbaksh’s book “War Despatches” published before Joginder’s book indicates that Harbaksh did not have a very high opinion about Joginder.

Joginder states that Harbaksh wanted to base India’s main defence on River Bias while abandoning the entire territory from the international border till Beas. While it is impossible to confirm or deny this assertion it seems

highly improbable that Harbaksh could hold such an opinion whether one takes Harbaksh as an Indian or a Sikh.

Joginder states that at a conference held in May 1965 the GOC of 1st Indian Armoured Division advanced the thesis that the most likely axis of Pakistani main attack was Patti-Harike -Beas Bridge. It was this conference that the Indian Chief as per the author agreed to deploy an armoured brigade in Khem Karan area to meet the Pakistani armoured threat emanating from Kasur area.

Harbaksh Singh as per the author thought otherwise giving a higher priority to a Pakistani frontal threat in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Harbaksh Singh on the other hand states in his book that he had appreciated before the war that a Pakistani armour threat from Kasur towards the Beas bridge was most likely. 

There is no way in which Joginder’s assertions can be proved or disproved.Joginder’s approach towards Harbaksh Singh while discussing almost all aspects of the 1965 war is hostile to the point of being irrational. 

Thus he defends Major General Nirinjan Prasad who was sacked for exhibiting timidity and cowardice by Harbaksh Singh. Joginder thinks that Niranjan was sacked not because he was irresolute but because he was a difficult subordinate. Again it is not possible to agree or disagree with Joginder about this assertion. However, Niranjan’s

sacking was even justified by very neutral and dispassionate Indian military historians like Major Praval. 

There is one fact which stands out in 15 Division’s conduct on 6th, 7th and 8th September, i.e its conduct keeping in view its numerical superiority in infantry and the degree of surprise that it had achieved on 6th of September was not commensurate with the overwhelming advantages that it enjoyed.

As a matter of fact many Pakistani defenders of Lahore who were interviewed by this scribe were surprised at the lack of initiative exhibited by the 15 Division in its operations on the 6th of September 1965.

No one can deny the fact that two infantry brigades of this division bolted away in face of Pakistani counterattacks and that this led to a serious operational crisis on the 8/9 September once the 96 Brigade was brought forward to check the conditions of near rout. I am not implying that the Indians were non- Martial as many Pakistanis earnestly believe since it is a fact that a Pakistani unit from the Punjab Regiment opposite Barki also bolted away. 

What I am merely trying to point out is the fact that there was something seriously wrong with 15 Indian Division at divisional as well as brigade level.

However, Joginder denies it and sees Niranjan as an angel of a man since Harbaksh sacked him.Niranjan was also called Dhoti Parshad in Indian Army.Joginder asserts that he gave a suggestion that the BRB should be crossed at Barki , after the main Indian attacks against Lahore had failed on 6-9th September , but does not explain how it could have been successfully done, keeping in view the net performance of all Indian brigades of 7 and 15 Division tasked to contact the BRB, was pathetic by all definitions.

He asserts that he also suggested that the 26 Indian Division should bypass Sialkot and capture Sambrial west of Sialkot but does not explain how an infantry division would do so when an armoured division supported by two

infantry divisions had failed to capture even Chawinda which was hardly 11 miles from the border.

The author asserts that Harbaksh Singh took no interest in the main Indian attack i.e the 1 Corps operations opposite Chawinda but does not explain why it was so. Was it due to some inter arm rivalry or because Harbaksh was not interested that India should win the war?

The author’s conclusion that there was no worthwhile higher direction in 1965 war as far as the Indian Army is concerned stands out as one of the most credible conclusions of the book. 

His assertion that the 1965 War was a show of some “20 Lieutenant Colonel and their units and about seven regiments of the armoured corps....” is valid for both the armies conduct in 1965.Joginder flatly denies that General Chaudhri ever asked Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to the Beas River.

General Kaul whose book was published many years before Harbaksh Singh’s “War Despatches” had also made a similar accusation (i.e that such a withdrawal was suggested by Chaudhri).

 I came across a similar assertion in another book by an Indian Colonel H.C Karr’s book. It appears that Chaudhri did discuss something with Harbaksh about re-adjusting his position but since there is nothing on record, therefore, only a Prophet or a Jinn may ever know about what exactly happened. 

The possibility that Joginder dismisses this incident since Harbaksh Singh had written that it occurred cannot be denied since “opposition for opposition’s sake” is one of the cardinal attributes of the Sub Continental psyche.

The author agrees that the main failure at Chawinda occurred in the handling of 1st Indian Armoured Brigade on the 8th September 1965 but has spent far more energy in painting Harbaksh Singh as the main reason for the Indian failure all over the book. In this regard it appears that the book had the support of the Indian military establishment who were outraged by Harbaksh very frank and forthright remarks about the mishandling of Indian Army at various levels in the 1965 War.

In this regard the book stands out as more of a “Rejoinder” to Harbaksh’s “War Despatches” than a study carried out in a detached manner with the aim of correctly analysing the 1965 War.

The author gives no explanation why the Indians wasted two complete days doing nothing following their failure at Gadgor on the 8th of September. 

This was the most critical phase of war for the Pakistanis when they were off balance and it was possible for the Indian armour to regain its freedom of manoeuvre by outflanking the Pakistani force opposite them.

The situation after 10/11 September when the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division started reinforcing the 6th Armoured Division was totally transformed. The major Indian failure occurred on 8th 9th and 10th September and was entirely because of indecisiveness and lack of resolution in pressing forward on behalf of the Indian 1 Corps/1 Armoured Division/1st Armoured Brigade Commander.

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The author has also discussed 1971 War in brief but here his criticism is very mild about the higher direction in the war. Indian Western Command Chief Candeth has acknowledged in his book that had the Pakistanis attacked in late October 1971 all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would have been blown into winds. 

This proves that the plans to invade East Pakistan were not as sound as they appeared and that the Indian plan was only carried out successfully since Yahya was irresolute enough not to launch a counteroffensive in the Western Front as had been planned before 1971 War.

 Joginder does not explain how establishment of the Bangladesh strategically helped India in the long run since Bangladesh is militarily stronger than the old East

Pakistan and is not an Indian satellite as Indians had envisaged. Even Indian thinkers are divided about the strategic success of the 1971 War! 

Was it fought to add another feather to the Durga Devis cap or to liberate the Bengalis ! Indira’s conduct after the 1971 War does not paint a very bright picture about her motivation to start the 1971 War. 

Even if the aim was to help the Bengalis it failed since major killings by the Pakistan Army whatever their quantum took place in April-June 1971 and by November 1971 the situation was far different from that of June 1971. Genocide was committed but the Indians came not with a missionary’s motive to help the oppressed but for other reasons.

Wars are not fought for missionary purposes alone and 1971’s only enduring legacies are “a more aggressive and militarily viable Pakistan eager to vindicate its honour” and the creation of a smaller ethnic state which proves that after a decade or two all provinces of present day Indo Pak are tomorrow’s full time members of the UNO! 

In this regard the 1971 war as far as India was concerned was a strategic failure and only a symbolic success! It would have been a success only if India had the resolution to overrun West Pakistan or to at least recapture Pakistan held Kashmir.Joginder has not discussed anywhere the relative failure of the Indian command system especially with reference to the Western Command.

A dispassionate glance at the conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars proves that the Indian command system is too unwieldy and keeping in view the frontage, location of formations and their number it is very difficult for any man whether it is Harbaksh or Manekshaw to effectively command anything like the Western Command as it is and as it was in 1965 and 1971 wars. 

Joginder’s hero Manekshaw had nothing to do with actual operational command of any corps division or command in any of the three Indo Pak wars. The Indian failure at Chamb in 1971 which was criticised by Joginder definitely had a connection with the confusion in the Indian GHQ as the narratives of Candeth and Gurcharan Singh prove.

Joginder does not explain why Chamb, which was adequately defended in 1971, lost to Pakistan in 1971. It was a command failure and had a deeper connection with the divisional commanders personality and handling of armour than with anything at brigade or unit level where the Indian 191 Brigade was brilliantly led and managed to hold three infantry brigades supported by three tank regiments for more than two days.

An interesting revelation of the book is the fact that Ayub Khan commanded the Chamar Regiment and was under fire in WW Two and seen as not fit to command a battalion of his parent regiment Punjab Regiment.

How should we analyse the Indian Army’s failure in 1965 or how should I put it as a Pakistani? Joginder sees the hand of Harbaksh Singh in all Indian failures in 1965! This, however, is too simplistic an approach. There were deeper reasons for the Indian (as well as the Pakistani) failure to function as dynamic entities beyond unit level in 1965.

The Indian Army of 1965 was like the Austrian Army of 1809. It consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but was severely handicapped since rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, despite being impressive on paper had not made the Indian military machine really effective because of poor training at divisional and brigade level. 

It was numerically strong but organisationally ineffective having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally inept brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre- 1947 commissioned generation whom were initially supposed not to go beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in 1947.

The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a newly raised formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. 

The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides.

 It was a failure of command as well as staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. 

These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life.

 It was this British system in which every senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level. 

They were trained that way and there behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context.

How could one man, an army commander responsible for three corps is made responsible for failures that occurred at battalion brigade and divisional level!Once I heard about Joginder’s book in 1998, I had very high expectations and was convinced that a man who has been the Chief of Staff of the Western Command will be the best judge of 1965 War. 

In this regard the book was a big disappointment since instead of analysing Indian military history it is more of a proof that Joginder Singh was a very fine staff officer and that Harbaksh Singh was a horrible man! Joginder’s book is a welcome addition to the limited number of first hand/direct participant accounts on 1965 War. 

The fact that the writer has made some controversial assertions and has made an effort to write a rejoinder to Harbaksh Singh’s more famous “War Despatches”, however, does not diminish the historical value of the book, at least for the Pakistani readers of military history. I still maintain that the book thus retains the status of “must be read and indispensable books” on the list of all keen students of Indo Pak military history. 

However, his anti-Harbaksh bias should be taken with a pinch of salt. In addition his discussion of what could have been done must be viewed in relation to the relatively pathetic performance of both the armies in all three wars.

 The under employment of Pakistan and Indian Armies in all three wars have a deep connection with the conservative British colonial legacy. 

Harbaksh and various other actors were a product of that system and were relatively better or perceived to be better than their contemporaries and thus elevated to the higher command ranks. It was the outmoded system that proved to be a failure in all three wars. Individuals were just the tip of the iceberg.