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TRUTHS AND LIES:

IRONY AND INTRIGUE IN TARlKH-I BAYHAQl

by

Soheila Amirsoleimani

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Near Eastern Studies)

in The University of Michigan 1995

Doctoral Committee:

Professor James Stewart-Robinson, Chair Professor James A. Bellamy Assistant Professor Michael D. Bonner Professor H. Don Cameron Professor Rudi P. Lindner

UMI Number: 9527577

Copyright 1995 by Amirsoleimani, Soheila

All eights reserved.

OMI Microform 9527577 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Soheila Amirsoleimani(C) _________________________________________________

All Rights Reserved 1995

ToMaman and Aqshandi

&Susan and Sepideh

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Gemot Windfuhr for his support and encourage­

ment throughout the course of my studies at Michigan. This dissertation has received

great benefit from his constructive criticisms. Deep gratitude goes to the members of

my committee for their support and understanding. I would like to thank my chairman,

Professor James Stewart-Robinson, who has always been supportive, understanding, and

gentle. He has given of his time liberally, and has patiently advised and listened. Seeing

him in the course of these past years has brought the gift of warmth which one cannot

capture in words. I had the good fortune of studying Arabic with Professor James Bel­

lamy. Though I will remain a novice in the field of Arabic studies, I hope to carry with

me the rigor that I came to know in his classes. Professor Don Cameron has shown sup­

port and patience, and I have greatly benefited from his advice. Professor Rudi Lindner

has always been kind and supportive both throughout the course of my examinations and

in the dissertation stage. Professor Michael Bonner has always found time to read and

comment on my work, which has improved as a result of his criticisms.

I would also like to thank the Near Eastern Studies Department, the Center for

Middle Eastern and North African Studies, the Center for the Education of Women,

and The Fellowships Office. I specifically would like to thank Mrs. Valerie Eaglin at

the Center for the Education of Women, and Mrs. Mary Jarrett and Mrs. Sandra Miller

at the Fellowships Office. Thanks are also due to Dr. Jonathan Rodgers and Mr. John

Downey at the Harlan Hatcher Library. They have both been most helpful in the course

of my research.

Dr. John Kolars, now in Santa Fe, New Mexico, was always encouraging, support­

ive, and kind in the course of my graduate studies at Michigan. I appreciate the kindness

of both Didar Akar and Harry Weeks who have known just the right words to say to a

weary dissertation writer in the last stage of her work. A special thanks goes to Harry

who has patiently watched over all the sultans and the amirs. His calm presence and his

good cheer have been a source of comfort and encouragement in the last month. And

many thanks and a big hug go to my friend and buddy Nuha Khoury who has done all

the shopping and cooking for the past month. She has been a true friend and Vemullah.

I would like to thank my parents, Maman and Aqshandi, and my sisters, Susan and

Sepideh, whose love and support I always carry with me. This dissertation is dedicated

to them.

Finally, I would like to thank five people whose lives and works have especially

inspired me. I have had many teachers throughout my life who have taught me many

things. I remember them affectionately and will hand to others their lessons and mine.

My mother has always been and will always be my foremost teacher. I have always

watched and admired her strength, belief, perseverance, and hope, all in the face of

adversity. I have only begun following her example. Never will a daughter reach the

heights climbed by her mother.

Charles Kaplan inspired me in the course of my undergraduate studies at North-

ridge. He taught with conviction and rigor. And he instilled in me the love of a language

and literature not my own.

Two of my teachers are men whom time and place have separated from me. Abu

al-Fazl BayhaqT and Kenneth Burke. I know both of them from their works. They have

left behind that trace of eternity that can only emenate from the lives of those who seek

wisdom and understanding earnestly. It is understanding that they teach, its virtues and

rewards.

And my living teacher, my master (ustad), K. Allin Luther. It is his teaching, his

work, and most importantly, his example that has taught and inspired me in the past

years. We have sat in classrooms, in his office facing the blue or grey patch of the sky

above the trees, and in his study at home. And we have read stories, from the past of a

land that we both love. We have listened to the voices of this past, to Mawlavl, Nizami,

BayhaqT. We have listened to “the beauty of their inflections.” And we have sought the

wisdom of silence from this past.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION......................................................................................................... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................. iii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. ‘ALl QARfB AND ASIGHTIGIN GHAZI 28

III. THE FIRST ATTEMPT AGAINSTTHE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH 66

IV. THE SECOND ATTEMPT AGAINSTTHE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH 84

V. ARYARUQ, YUSUF, SUBASHl,‘ ALl DA YAH, BIGTUGHDI 119

VI. CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 146

BIBLIOGRAPHY 151

v

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Abu al-Fazl BayhaqT (385-470/995-1077), a Khurasanian scribe of the Ghaz-

navids, wrote a history of this Perso-Islamic dynasty (388-582/994-1186) in his work re­

ferred to as Tarlkh-i BayhaqT (450/1058). The Ghaznavids ruled in an area now compris­

ing eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and northern India. With the loss of the greater Khurasan

to the nomadic Saljuqs in 431/1040, the empire was reduced to parts of Afghanistan and

northern India, chiefly the Panjab. The downfall of the Ghaznavids in Khurasan also di­

vides the period of the first three kings from those of the later ones. BayhaqT himself

epitomized the history of the Ghaznavids in terms of “principal” (asl), versus “minor”

(far‘). For BayhaqT it is the principal territories of Khurasan and Jibal, but especially

Khurasan, as opposed to the minor territories in India. He wrote his history of the Ghaz­

navids, all of which has been lost save the volume studied here, after approximately 29

years had passed from the loss of Khurasan.1

The Turkish Ghaznavids succeeded the eastern Iranian dynasty of the Samanids

(204-395/819-1005) in ruling Khurasan. From their Samanid masters the Ghaznavids

inherited the manners of kings and the means of statecraft. One of the means of state­

craft was the chancery bureau (dlvan-i rasa’il). By the time of the Ghaznavid kings the

chancery practices of the land of Iran had long been established. After the Arab inva­

sions (21/642) it was the ex-Sasanian scribes (dablran) who had continued these tra­

ditions, first in Middle Iranian PahlavT and later in Arabic.2 And under the ‘Abbasids

(132-656/749-1258) the scribes held high status, some becoming viziers. Indeed, in the

3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries the clothes of scribes symbolized their professional iden­

tity.3

The scribes trained in the crafts of various administrative branches, with the most

skilled writers specifically responsible for official correspondence.4 Under the first

2

Ghaznavid amir, Mahmud, the language of official correspondence changed from Ara­

bic to Persian.5 It is in Tarlkh-i BayhaqT that some of the earliest examples of Persian

correspondence have survived.

The scribes learned the art of composition (insha’) by gaining a mastery of rhetoric

(balaghat). They attempted to persuade rulers and statesmen, by using rhetorical devices

like metaphor (istParah), hyperbole (mubalaghah), and allusion (isharah). With orders

from rulers, the scribes would prepare drafts of letters (sawad), which the chancery min­

ister would then read. He would make changes, or accept the draft as it was. Once he

approved the document, a fair copy (bayad naql) would be drawn.6 The art of the secre­

tary (a’ln-i dablrl) was handed down in the Khurasanian scribal class from master (ustad)

to apprentice (shagird).7 And traces of this art have survived in manuals of rhetoric and

exemplary epistle copies.

Abu al-Fazl Muhammad b. al-Husayn BayhaqT belonged to this Khurasanian class

of scribes.8 He was born in the Haris-abad district of Bayhaq, a small town close to

Nishapur, in the year 385/995. The chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan was his master

in the courts of the early Ghaznavids. BayhaqT served in the chancery bureau of five

Ghaznavid rulers. He saw the glory of Ghaznavid power under the first ruler Mahmud

(388-421/998-1030). Then, in the courts of Mahmud’s sons, Muhammad and Mas'ud,

BayhaqT witnessed, as kings and courtiers gained in power, which they later lost. The

scribe fled the scene of defeat under M as‘ud in 431/1040. It was during the reigns of

Farrukhzad and Ibrahim, in the much diminished Ghaznavid state of the later period,

that BayhaqT wrote his works. He composed a manual of rhetoric called ZTnat al-kuttab,

which has not survived. After retiring from official service he wrote his magnum opus,

Tarlkh-i Nasirl (date of completion 450/1059), a history of the Ghaznavid dynasty from

the time of its founder Sabuktigln (366-387/977-997) to the time of Ibrahim (451—

492/1059-1099). With the loss of at least 25 volumes of this work, we have only the

portion on the rule of Mas‘ud, the last monarch of the early Ghaznavids.

M as‘ud followed the thirty-year rule of his father Mahmud after the short rule of

Mahmud’s favorite son Muhammad. In the last months of his life, Mahmud cast aside

the militarily stronger Mas‘ud for the weaker and gentler Muhammad. BayhaqT narrates

3

the ten-year rule of Mas'ud (421-431/1030-1040) as a tale of court intrigues, M as‘ud’s

wine drinking and hunting trips, and the escalating conflict with the Turkmen Saljuqs.

It was Mahmud who had, ironically, prepared the way for the loss of Khurasan, by

allowing the settlements of the nomadic Turkmens in that province. The Turkmen dis­

turbances in Khurasan dated back to the time of Mahmud.9 Besides the struggle against

the Turkmen Saljuqs, BayhaqT ascribes other reasons for the loss of Khurasan. Conflict

with the neighboring Qarakhanid rulers of Transoxania and the rebellion of a tributory

ruler in Khvarazm, on the northern borders of Khurasan, played a role in the final Ghaz­

navid loss. Both the Qarakhanid leader ‘Alltigln and the rulers of Khvarazm had always

housed the Saljuqs. But by 426/1034-1035, the Turkmen Saljuqs could not find shelter

in either province.10 This was due to a complicated set of events that dated back to the

beginning of M as'ud’s rule.

M as‘ud had promised territories to the Qarakhanid leader ‘Alltigln, in return for

possible military help in the succession conflict. No conflict issued, but ‘Alltigln contin­

ued to demand the grant of territories. Therefore, after the Khvarazm! leader Harun re­

belled against M as'ud in 425/1033-1034, ‘Alltigln allied himself with the former. With

the death of ‘AlTtigTn in 426/1034—1035, his sons attempted to attack Ghaznavid ter­

ritories, along with Harun. But M as'ud stopped this plan by ordering Harun’s murder

(426/1034-1035).

It was at this point that the Saljuqs came to Khurasan (426/1034-1035) from

Khvarazm. The disturbed atmosphere in that province forced the Saljuqs to leave. But

they were also unwelcome in Transoxania, since, unlike ‘AlTtigTn, his sons did not main­

tain good relations with the Turkmen Saljuqs.11

The struggle against the Saljuqs and the troubles with the Qarakhanid and Khva-

razmT rulers contributed to the loss of Khurasan. In addition, the diminished power of

the Ghaznavid forces, due to intrigues against military leaders, also played a role in this

loss.

Approach

In this study I will analyze these stories of intrigue in Tarlkh-i BayhaqT. Despite

much interest in BayhaqT as a historian and the relatively large number of studies of

4

The History, no one has attempted a close analysis of the text. I will discuss The History

from a rhetorical perspective, specifically, analyzing the trope of irony.

Literary devices were recommended in manuals of rhetoric to poets as well as

to scribes.12 In his manual of rhetoric called Asrar al-balaghah, JurjanI (d. 471/1078—

1079) calls attention to the merits of rhetoric for understanding. He asserts, “Knowledge

first entered the human mind through the senses and the natural disposition (tiba4) and

only afterwards by thought and reflection. The first kind of knowledge is, therefore, as­

sociated with the mind by a closer relationship and earlier claims than the second one.” 13

JurjanI connects the art of language, be it in poems or works of prose, with the first kind

of knowledge, arrived at through the senses. He, thus, recommends the use of rhetoric

for what it teaches, and not only for how it adorns. It is through rhetoric that one gains

an understanding of that which is unfamiliar, by likening or contrasting it to what one

has come to know. BayhaqT displays knowledge of rhetoric in this larger sense, contain­

ing both its means and their persuasive qualities for understanding.

Verbal irony, classically defined as the art of saying one thing and meaning an­

other, is recommended by rhetoricians, who call it by such terms as, ai-iltifat, al-kifayat

wa al-ta4rid, and al-kalam al-muhtamil bi-al-ma‘nayayn al-diddayn.14

But in The History of BayhaqT, irony does not arise as a result of conflicting or

disharmonious meanings in discourse alone. It also arises when one views the action of

the story proceeding without the full knowledge of the characters involved. While dra­

matic irony is, thus, created, it is irony in history, which involves matters of prophecy

and prediction, that especially characterizes The History. It is the “eternal” stance of

someone who gazes at past events, lost cities, men and women drawn to the close of

their lives, or entrusted to their graves that invites meanings, beyond sought or imposed

boundaries of human lives.

The overarching attitude assumed and advised is the stance of eternity, sub specie

aeternitatis. Yet, it is not an ironic stance by which the ironist assumes a superior attitude

towards others. Rather, it is humble irony, wherein the ironist seeks a fundamental kin­

ship with friends and foes alike.15 It is the attitude of a man who has drawn close to the

end of his life, one who is, thus, searching for meanings of that which he has witnessed

and shared. He takes pleasure in telling lived and read stories of the past, “in history for

its own sake.” 16 And as he tells the stories of predecessors and contemporaries, he re­

flects. He draws the lessons that he has learned. And to those who will come after him,

he hands these lessons, these letters of the past.

As he remembers the stories of the past, be it the past of Mas’ud’s ten-year history

or other times and places encountered in books, BayhaqT contemplates the meaning of

these stories. Remembrance of Mas’ud’s court brings back other remembrances, images,

and stories. It is the analogical chain of remembrance to remembrance, image to image,

and story to story that orders the narrative.

Intrigue (hTlah) is one of the recurring themes in the narrative. In narrating the

stories of intrigue under Mas'ud, BayhaqT recalls yet other such stories in which “in­

triguing” is the main action of the narrative. HTlah is ingrained in the very texture of

The History, most widely as an action. Thus appear verbal compounds such as hTlah

sakhtan (to fashion intrigue), hTlah kardan (to cause intrigue), lata’if al-hTyal bi-kar avar-

dan (to use means of intrigue), dar hTlat uftadan (to fall into intrigue), dar hTlat dast zadan

(to have a hand in intrigue). There are yet other terms, used in the same way as hTlah,

which abound in the text. These include tazrib, talbTs, fisad, zarq, afsOn, makr, charbak,

tatmT1, ifti’al, ‘ishvah, shu’badah, ghurur, ghadr, nayrang, tadbTr, fitnah, tamvTh, ighra1,

ta'rTz, and finally, farTb. Other than the five verbal compounds with the word hTlah, eigh­

teen other verbs, meaning to intrigue, also appear in The History.17 This modus operan-

di is used for various ends. People intrigue so as to avoid a possibly embarrassing situa­

tion. They intrigue against others, enemies, with results ranging from arrest and exile to

torture and execution. And at times, they intrigue to save a man’s reputation, or life.

I have divided the stories of intrigue by studying the attitude that BayhaqT assumes

towards them. It is the consequence of intrigue that determines his attitude. It ranges

from humorous, to dispassionate and at times disdainful, and finally, to one of approval.

BayhaqT assumes an amused attitude towards intrigue when no one suffers unnecessarily

as a result of it. But in most of the stories of intrigue, where men are defamed, impris­

oned, or put to death in consequence of others’ plots, BayhaqT observes disdainfully. Yet,

when the use of intrigue has a good result, like the saving of a man’s life or the preven­

tion of unjust acts, then, BayhaqT approves of it.

6

In this study, I will analyze the second category of intrigue. One can epitomize

the intrigue in three of these stories, using the metaphors of food (nan), wine (sharab),

and hunt (shikar). In the other stories, it is the use of letters (namah) that connects these

narratives of intrigue. It is the belief in understanding the past through its own self­

describing means that has motivated this interpretive approach.18 The numerous letters

in The History have received the attention of almost all BayhaqT scholars, many of whom

have remarked on letters and their significance for understanding the text. The epistolary

nature of The History, considered against Bayhaql’s scribal tradition, has led at least one

scholar to regard TarTkh-i BayhaqT an extended intelligence report (insha’).19

All seven stories of intrigue are about plots against military leaders of M as‘ud’s

court. In these stories, the intrigue is unfolded in its entirety, from its inception to its

end. Intriguers conceive and carry out ruses against men who, knowingly or unknow­

ingly, approach their fate of arrest and exile.

In three stories of intrigue it is anger that motivates the intriguer. One can explain

the motive of anger in terms of two historical tropes: one, the conflict over the succes­

sion, and the other, the struggle against the Saljuqs. In the remaining four stories, the

motive is envy. It is courtiers that intrigue against their enemies. In the courts of the

early Ghaznavid rulers, envy of other men resulted in rivalries. And these rivalries them­

selves nurtured envy.

The Succession Conflict

Mahmud favored the weaker Muhammad and mistrusted the stronger M as‘ud.20

But he moved the succession to Muhammad only at the end of his life. With the death

of Mahmud, the Ghaznavid courtiers, headed by the commmander-in-chief ‘AIT QarTb,

called Muhammad to the throne. Mas'ud, who was in faraway Isfahan, learned about this

through letters. He was encouraged to seize the throne by letters from his aunt, Hurrah-

yi KhuttalT, and so he set out for Khurasan. While he was in Ray, he received promises

of allegiance from the very courtiers who had enthroned Muhammad, even as they ac­

companied the latter. On the road to fight Mas‘ud, the same courtiers deposed and ar­

rested Muhammad in TagTnabad, then joined Mas‘ud in Herat.

7

The ten-year rule of M as'ud culminated in a disastrous defeat by the Saljuqs in

431/1039-1040. The dispirited Mas‘ud then left for India, fearing an enemy attack on his

capital Ghazna. It was on this journey that his ghulams revolted and raised Muhammad

to the throne. Muhammad, who was reportedly blind, abdicated in favor of his son

Ahmad, and M as‘ud was killed in 432/1040-1041.21

The stories of two hats, set at the beginning and at the end of this ten-year history,

evoke the irony of conflict between the two brothers. In the first story, it is Muhammad’s

hat which seems to have symbolized doom for the courtiers. Unaware that courtiers

had alleged loyalty to M as‘ud, Muhammad set out to deal with his brother’s challenge,

but instead, was arrested by the courtiers in Taglnabad. On the night before this arrest,

Muhammad’s hat had fallen from his head, and many had interpreted this as a bad omen.

In the second story, it is M as'ud’s loss of his hat that symbolizes his fateful end. While

imprisoned after the revolt of his ghulams, Mas‘ud was visited by two of his brother’s

sons, ‘Abd al-Rahlm and ‘Abd al-Rahman. ‘Abd al-Rahman threw his uncle’s headgear

on the ground, while his more compassionate brother put it back on the deposed king’s

head. Later, in seeking revenge for his father, Mawdud rewarded ‘Abd al-Rahlm for this

kind gesture, while killing ‘Abd al-Rahman and the others responsible for the revolt.22

The Struggle Against the Saljuqs

One can distinguish three periods in the struggle against the Saljuqs. The first pe­

riod comprised the first half of M as‘ud’s reign (421^125/1030-1034), with no real bat­

tles. BayhaqT reports of Turkmen disturbances in this period, but only after the Ghaz­

navid capture of their leaders in 422/1030-1031.23 With news of the Saljuqs’ intentions

to avenge their leaders, M as‘ud sent troops to closely examine the Turkmen affairs in

424/1032-1033. Later in that year when he received the news of Turkmen disturbances

in Ray, the amir ordered their capture as well.24 By 425/1033-1034 M as‘ud received

news of more disturbances in Khurasan.25

The second half of M as‘ud’s reign was especially marked by the struggle against

the Saljuqs. One can distinguish two periods in the second half. In the years 426-

429/1034-1038 the Ghaznavids fought in two pitched battles against the Saljuqs. In the

year 426/1034-1035 Mas‘ud sent off troops to fight the Saljuqs in a pitched battle for the

8

first time. This was his response to the Saljuqs’ request for the territories of Nasa and

Faravah. The Saljuqs defeated the Ghaznavid troops, and consequently, the sultan was

forced to grant them not only Nasa and Faravah, but also, Dahistan 26

After the defeat of 426/1034-1035, with the exception of hunting trips Mas'ud

stayed away from Khurasan altogether for the next three years.27 Turkmen distur­

bances continued there in the year 427/1035-1036, and the Saljuqs were emboldened

to ask the sultan for Marv, Sarakhs, and Bavard at the beginning of 428/1036-1037.28

Later in this year, the Ghaznavid vizier’s strong show of force against the Saljuqs around

Herat resulted in the Turkmen Saljuqs retreating to Nasa and Faravah.29 At the end of

428/1036-1037, M as'ud put an even greater distance between himself and the troubles in

Khurasan by conducting a ghazv in India.30

After his victory at HansI in 429/1037-1038, Mas'ud ordered the army leader

SubashI to fight the Saljuqs in a second battle. As with BigtughdT in 426/1034-1035,

SubashI was also defeated. By the end of this middle period, the Saljuqs assumed a re­

spectful attitude towards the conventions of rule. In the aftermath of the 426/1034-1035

defeat, the sultan had not only granted territories to the Saljuqs, but also sent them the

Ghaznavid insignia as well as ceremonial attire and hats. The messenger’s report that the

Saljuqs had made fun of these formalities, and stepped on the hats contrasts sharply with

the later Saljuq compliance with the conventions of rule in the year 429/1037-1038.31

Finally, M as'ud came to Khurasan and personally fought the Turkmen Saljuqs

only in the last two years of his rule. But by this time, the Saljuqs fought more fervently

than they had done before. While M as'ud’s army leaders had initiated the battles of

426/1034-1035 and 429/1037-1038, it was the Saljuqs who began and continued the

fight in 430/1038-1039.25

They did so in spite of the Ghaznavids’ moderate successes in the battles of ‘All-

abad and Talkhab.32 After the battle of Talkhab, M as'ud rode to Sarakhs, where in see­

ing the Saljuq forces, he was dismayed. In the two-day conflict between the two forces,

in which the Saljuq leaders and M as'ud did not participate, the tired and hungry Ghaz­

navid troops fared worse. Thus, when the vizier suggested sending a messenger to the

Saljuqs, and pretending to negotiate a truce without the sultan’s knowledge, M as'ud ac­

9

cepted. The Saljuqs seem to have played along with the vizier’s scheme. But according

to the messenger’s report, they already had ideas of rulership.33

In the last year of his rule, Mas'ud went from place to place in pursuit of the

Turkmen Saljuqs, searching all the while for fodder, before he and his people were

put to flight in the battle of Dandanqan. By the time of this battle, the Ghaznavid sol­

diers had engaged in unsuccessful pursuits, which only resulted in fatiguing them and

their mounts. Though both armies suffered from lack of food and fodder, the nomadic

Saljuqs, used to the harshness of steppe life, withstood the adverse conditions better than

M as'ud’s troops. By the time of the decisive battle of Dandanqan on the 9th of Ramadan

of the year 431/30th of May of 1040, the two armies had pitched battles as well as en­

gaged in numerous skirmishes.

By the time the two sides faced each other in the decisive battle of Dandanqan in

431/1039-1040, they were both suffering from exhaustion, thirst, and hunger. On a hot

day on the ninth of Ramadan of 431/1039-1040, it was the lack of water which caused

the final Ghaznavid defeat.34 Once Mas'ud ordered the troops to move towards the only

pool, they broke ranks, and many disheartened soldiers joined their comrades who had

earlier defected to the Saljuqs. Mas'ud and his loyal nobles and courtiers, fatigued and

disheveled, made their way back to the distant capital. They were greeted by the confi­

dants of the noblewomen of Ghazna, who clothed and consoled them.35

BayhaqT speaks of an embarrassed Mas'ud in returning to the capital.36 After

receiving the news of yet another defeat around Balkh, M as'ud gave way to fear. Hav­

ing lost Khurasan, his economic center and the scene of destruction for most of his rule,

M as'ud fled Ghazna, in fear of a Saljuq attack. The Saljuqs did not invade Ghazna, but

remained in Khurasan for a long time to come.

Envy

Rivalries existed among courtiers of all three early Ghaznavid rulers. And in­

trigues resulted in some cases. Under Mahmud the two recorded instances of intrigue

were conducted by military leaders against viziers. Under M as'ud military leaders were

the object of intrigues, by both civilian and military courtiers. The commander-in-chief

‘All QarTb was the instigator of two known intrigues under Mahmud. First it was against

10

the vizier Asfara’TnT. And then, in alliance with others, ‘All Qarlb intrigued against the

second vizier Ahmad Hasan MaymandT. The sultan imprisoned both viziers, and it was

only under Mas'ud that Ahmad Hasan returned to the court.37

Rivalries in the court of Muhammad centered around the choice of ruler. Men like

‘AIT QarTb and Mahmud’s brother Yusuf who honored the wishes of the late sultan by

enthroning Muhammad were pitted against courtiers such as Bu Sahl Zawzani and the

military leader GhazT who supported Mas'ud. Bu Sahl Zawzani fled Ghazna, and GhazT

announced M as'ud’s arrival in Khurasan.38 Under Muhammad, the only known instance

of intrigue is the arrest of the sultan himself. The very courtiers who had pledged loyalty

to Muhammad earlier arrested him in TagTnabad.39

It was in the court of Mas'ud that the alliances and animosities of the first two

courts, especially that of Mahmud, were played out, at times leading to new circles of

friends and foes. Not all animosities culminated in intrigue. And intrigues did not all

end in imprisonments. The jealousies of other scribes towards the chief secretary Bu

Nasr Mushkan remained harmless.40 Similarly, neither intrigue against the Khvarazm­

shah Altuntash succeeded in imprisonment. Unlike the arrest of military courtiers, the

arrest and execution of Mahmud’s last vizier Hasanak, a fierce enemy of Mas'ud, did not

follow feigned cordiality before a plot of intrigue.41

The factionalism in M as'ud’s court was between the men of the old order and the

newly-risen group. In this court, old enemies like the vizier Ahmad Hasan and the mil­

itary leader Khvarazmshah Altuntash were both Mahmudlyan, men of the old order.

The new group, Mas'udiyan, men who rose in status in the court of Mas'ud, comprised

courtiers like Zawzani and military leaders like Aryaruq and GhazT. Members of the old

guard, men like ‘AIT Dayah, BigtughdT, and BilgatigTn were contemptuous of this new

circle at court. They intrigued against the men of the new order, just as did the sultan

and his people, against the men of the old.42

TarTkh-i BayhaqT

Six editions of TarTkh-i BayhaqT have so far been published, the most annotated

among them being the 1350/1971 edition by ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz.43 With the loss of

most of the History, only volumes five through nine and a chapter on Khvarazm remain,

11

comprising 945 pages in the 1350/1971 edition. Chancery letters and official messages

abound in The History. Other than stories of M as'ud’s time, BayhaqT narrates anec­

dotes about Mahmud and his father Sabuktigln. Also mentioned are stories of Sasanian,

Umayyad (41-132/661-750), ‘Abbasid (132-656/749-1258), Tahirid (205-59/821-73),

Saffarid (253-900/867-1495), and Samanid (204-395/819-1005) rulers and viziers.

BayhaqT also encloses Persian and Arabic poems of earlier and contemporary poets.

While poems of predecessors are by well-known poets like RudakT and al-MutanabbT, the

author encloses the poems of lesser known contemporaries, one of whom, Bu HanTfah

AskafT, was his own friend. Other than stories and poems, The History also includes ser­

mons on kingship, ethics, and the transience of this world.

Three types of headings exist in The History: volume, chronology, and topic. In

the absence of knowledge about the transmission of TarTkh-i BayhaqT, one cannot de­

termine if all the headings were, in fact, by the author, or if some were inserted by later

scribes. The text includes the remainder of volume five (year 421/1030) and entire vol­

umes six (421-422/1030-1031), seven (422-424/1030-1033), and nine (430-432/1038-

1041), and the chapter on Khvarazm. Volume eight (424-429/1032-1038) has gaps in

the beginning and the middle, concerning the years 424/1032-1033 and 425/1033-1034.

The volume on Khvarazm includes events relating to its conquest at the time of Mahmud

(408/1017-1018), and those leading to its loss at the time of Mas'ud (426/1034-1035).

The pace of the narrative is much slower in the first three volumes (five, six, and seven),

containing the events of the first four years of rule.44 BayhaqT relates the last six years

of M as'ud’s reign in a more hasty manner (volumes eight and nine). Volume six (421—

422/1030-1031) stands out as the one in which the narrative pace is slowest. Indeed, this

volume contains the largest number of stories of earlier times.

The chronology of the ten-year rule is maintained. But stories, letters, and po­

ems of this period remind BayhaqT of earlier times and places. All the volumes con­

tain accounts from earlier periods. BayhaqT narrates these as he relates the narrative of

M as'ud’s rule in the years 421—432/1030—1041. The account of the year 427/1035-1036

is the only one without any such stories. It is also the shortest year-entry in the whole

work. Indeed, the accounts for the three-year period 427^129/1035-1038, between the

first two defeats by the Saljuqs, are the briefest in the text. These were the years spent

12

chiefly in drinking and hunting by the sultan, notwithstanding, or perhaps because of the

Saljuq threat. The accounts for the first two years of rule, 421-422/1030-1031 (num­

ber of pages, 180 and 200), and the year of the final defeat, 431/1039-1040 (number of

pages, 92) are the longest.

Not all the stories in the text have headings. Among the stories analyzed in this

study, four narratives, (the intrigues against Aryaruq, GhazT, Yusuf, and the second at­

tempt against Altuntash) have headings, while the others do not. A linear characteriza­

tion of the text, based on the three types of headings, does not prove beneficial. Rather,

its narrative form invites that one view The History analogically. BayhaqT takes the

reader from story to story, remembering the past of M as'ud’s history. This reminds the

author of stories of even earlier times and places. After these stories, BayhaqT again re­

sumes the narrative of M as'ud’s history, while at times also advising future generations.

Other Texts

One can divide other texts containing information on M as'ud’s history into near

contemporary and later works. The work by 'UtbT, TarTkh-i YamTnT (death of author

427/1036 or 431/1039-1040), is devoted to the reign of Mahmud.45 It is useful for

this study by providing information about the earlier service of military men like the

Khvarazmshah Altuntash. In another near contemporary history, TarTkh-i STstan

(448/1056), a local history of STstan, the succession conflict and the struggle against the

Saljuqs are briefly mentioned.46 Zayn al-akhbar ( dedicated to the fifth Ghaznavid sul­

tan ‘Abd al-RashTd, 441-444/1050-1053), a general history of Iran, also contains infor­

mation on M as'ud’s history.47 Among these three sources, Tarlkh-i GardTzT contains the

most detailed accounts on Mas'ud.

The later historians, like their earlier counterparts, relate the history of M as'ud

mostly in terms of the succession conflict and the struggle against the Saljuqs. The only

historical work which contains stories of court intrigue in Mahmud’s time is the much

later TarTkh-i nigaristan (908/1502-1503).48 The local history of Bayhaq, TarTkh-i

Bayhaq (dates of the author, 490-565/1097-1170) contains less information on the po­

litical history of Mas'ud than other 6th-7th/l2th-13th century sources.49 The Saljuq

history Rahat al-sudur va ayat al-surur (begun in 599/1202-1203), based on the Saljuq-

13

namah of Nishapuri, provides much detail about the struggle against the Saljuqs.50 The

Arabic Saljuq source, Akhbar al-dawlah al-Saljuqlyyah (622/1225) is another impor­

tant source for the history of this struggle.51 In his general history of Islamic lands,

al-Kamil fi al-tarlkh, Ibn al-Athlr (555-630/1160-1234) relates much information about

the ten-year rule of Mas‘ud.52 In his general history of Iran Tabaqat-i Nasirl Juzjani

(658/1259-1260) mostly relates information on the succession conflict and the struggle

against Saljuqs, though not with as much detail as the previous source.53 The work of

al-‘lbrl (Bar Hebraeus) (d. 664-1286), Mukhtasar al-duwal also contains a notice about

the conflict between the two brothers.54

Among the works of the next century, the work of Shabankara’I (d. 759/1358),

Majma* al-ansab, a general history of Iran, but particularly a history of Fars and the

Shabankara’T Kurds, merits attention for its fullness of detail.55 Other 8th/14th century

texts, like Ja m i‘ al-tavarlkh (717/1317-1318), TarTkh-i guzldah (730/1329-1330), and

al-Bidayah wa al-nihayah (/1301-1370) are mainly devoted to the conflict between the

two Ghaznavid brothers.56 Tarlkh-i khayrat (858/1454), with entries on the conflict be­

tween the brothers, is the least detailed of the 9th/15th century sources.57 Faslh KhvafI

reports the details of the first conflict in his Mujmal-i FasThT (845/1441-1442).58 But

the author also relates some information on Mahmud’s first two viziers. The general his­

tory of Mirkhvand (837-903/1433-1498), Rawdat al-safa, based on the Saljuq-namah,

provides the most detailed account on the succession conflict and the struggle against the

Saljuqs.59

In the 10th/16th century Khvandmlr discusses the succession conflict in his Khula-

sat al-akhbar fT bayan al-athar (904/1498-1499).60 The later 10th/16th and 1 lth/17th

century sources are by Indian historians, who in writing histories of India have inevitably

included the Ghaznavids. The most detailed of these accounts are Tarlkh-i alfl (1000/

1591-1592) and Gulshan-i Ibrahim! (1018/1609— 1610).61 In the 13th/19th century, an­

other Indian historian, Harshakah Ray, included the first conflict between the Ghaznavid

brothers in his Majma* al-akhbar (1220/1805-1806).62

Among the sources falling within the genre of andarz, advice literature, Nizam

al-Mulk’s Slyasat-namah (author’s dates, 408-485/1018-1092) and the later Vasaya-yi

Nizam al-Mulk TusI (9th/l 5th century) respectively include information on the conflict

14

between the brothers, and the intrigues against Mahmud’s viziers.63 Three biographies

of viziers include entries on the viziers of the Ghaznavids, and thus, stories of intrigue.

But Athar al-vuzara’ (883/1478), with inclusion of stories about the vizier Maymandi

and his letter of conditions during M as'ud’s rule, is more comprehensive than the earlier

Nasa’im al-ashar (725/1324-1325) and the later Dastur al-vuzara’ (914/1508-1509).64

In his collection of stories, Javami' al-hikayat va lavami' al-rivayat (630/1232-1233),

‘AwfT also includes tales of Mahmud’s disfavor towards courtiers and M as'ud’s seizure

of gifts.65

Scholarship

The work of Sa'Td NafTsT, Dar pTramun-i TarTkh-i BayhaqT (2 vs., Tehran: 1342/

1963) is invaluable for Ghaznavid studies. NafisT has collected some lost parts of The

History in addition to any information on the dynasty found in other sources. The works

of three historians of the Ghaznavids merit close attention. The Life and Times of

Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (Cambridge: 1931) by Muhammad Nazim contains much in­

formation on this period of Ghaznavid history, especially MahmOd’s Indian raids. The

foremost historian of the Ghaznavids, Clifford E. Bosworth has studied the reigns of both

the early amirs and the later ones in his works (The Ghaznavids: their empire in Afghan­

istan and Eastern Iran, 994—1040, Edinburgh: 1963; The Later Ghaznavids: splendour

and decay, 1040-1186, New York: 1977). Bosworth has followed Bayhaql’s epitomiz­

ing motif of principal ( ‘asl) versus minor (far'), in distinguishing the reigns of the early

Ghaznavids from those of the later ones after the loss of Khurasan. In The Ghaznavids

Bosworth has closely examined the many aspects of life in Khurasan. And he has noted

the main historical themes of this period, in studying the reign of Mas'ud. Another histo­

rian, Rudolf Gelpke, has discussed the first three years of M as'ud’s rule (Sultan M as'ud I.

von Gazna: Die drei ersten Jahre seiner Herrschaft 421-/1030-424/1033, Munich: 1957).

Concentrating on the politics of the court, Gelpke has read The History very closely.

Other than for its richness of information on the Ghaznavids, Tarlkh-i BayhaqT

has also received the attention of scholars for its literary and historiographical qualities.

Malik al-Shu‘ara Bahar, in his classic work on Persian prose (Sabk-shinasT ya tarikh-i

tatavvur-i nasr-i FarsT, v.2, Tehran: 1337/1958, pp. 66-87) is the precursor of this group

15

of scholars. Bahar especially calls attention to the simple yet complex diction of the text.

Also mentioned are Arabic borrowings, use of analogy, and rhetorical techniques. Like

Bahar, Minovi has pointed out the detailed descriptions in the text (“The Persian histo­

rian BayhaqT,” Historians of the Middle East, ed. P. Holt and B. Lewis, London: 1962,

pp. 138-140). Minovi calls attention to the fact that BayhaqT collected documents for his

work, while in the courts of the Ghaznavid kings. Though speaking of BayhaqT as a fair-

minded historian, Minovi considers the author inaccurate in his stories of earlier periods,

in contrast to those of his own time. In his work, La langue des plus anciens monuments

de la prose persane (Paris: 1963, pp. 76-78), Lazard distinguishes The History from ear­

lier examples of Persian prose due to its use of Arabic. He explains this by hypothesiz­

ing that perhaps the scribes of The History introduced Arabic words into the text. Both

the diction and style of The History, as well as BayhaqT’s secretarial manner of compo­

sition attract the attention of Lazard, who takes note of the many official documents con­

tained in the text. NafTsT has also pointed out the complexity of The History’s language,

but he has also referred to it as archaic (El, II, 1:1130).

Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT (Meshed: 1971) is the only collection of articles on The

History. Five articles merit special attention for the purposes of this study. IslamT

Nadushan and Bahr al-‘UlumT have remarked on The History as a work of advice, andarz

(IslamT Nadushan, “Jahan-bTnT-yi Abu al-Fazl BayhaqT,” pp. 1-38; Bahr al-‘UlumT,

“TarTkh-i BayhaqT ya a’Tnah-ya ‘ibrat,” pp. 53-67). Nadushan defines BayhaqT’s world­

view in light of the court and its influences, similar motifs of thought between BayhaqT

and FirdawsT, and BayhaqT’s character traits. Mas’ud’s court, believes Nadushan, with

its betrayals, imprisonments, and deaths bore lessons for BayhaqT, lessons leading to re­

flection and caution. The perceived similarities between BayhaqT and FirdawsT include

the expressed wish of both authors for ending their works, their belief in wisdom, the

transience of the world, fate, and inevitable consequences of actions. Both authors de­

voted a long time to writing their works, and were afraid of not finishing them before

dying. Nadushan predicates his opinion about shared ideas between the two authors on

BayhaqT’s familiarity with the Khuday-namah of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ and similar values of

the times. BayhaqT is characterized as tempered but humorless in his prose style, and yet

optimistic and congenial towards others. Nadushan remarks on how BayhaqT always re­

16

members the good qualities and service of others. The critic ends with a statement on the

poetic nature of Bayhaql’s prose and thought. It is this poetic essence in The History that

has led other scholars to characterize it as one of the most eloquent samples of Persian

prose. But Nadushan is the only who has called attention to it.

Ruknl YazdT has classified the knowledge one procures about the chancery bu­

reau, including the various types of letters (“Dlvan-i risalat va a’Tn-i dablrl az khilal-i

Tarlkh-i BayhaqT,” pp. 233-272). Riza’T has studied the Mas'udTyan official, and perhaps

the foremost instigator of intrigue, Bu Sahl Zawzani (“Bu Sahl Zawzani dar TarTkh-i

BayhaqT,” pp. 220-232). Finally, K. Allin Luther has called attention to the epistolary

nature of The History in his article on the comparison of BayhaqT and later Saljuq histo­

rians (“BayhaqT and the later Saljuq historians: some comparative remarks,” pp. 14-33).

Luther precedes others in recommending a rhetorical approach towards The History, con­

sidering writing and speech types of human behavior.

Marilyn R. Waldman’s work, Towards a Theory of Historical Narrative, a Case

Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography (Columbus: 1980) is the only book-length

treatment of The History. Waldman discusses the text, BayhaqT as a writer and historian,

and the place of The History within the Perso-Islamic tradition of historical prose. She

ends her work with a discussion on the value of analyzing The History through speech

act theory. In a similar fashion to Minovi, she proposes that The History is comprised of

historical accounts and interpolations. The “interpolations,” she considers devices which

allow the author to emphasize or expand on narrative themes.66 Waldman notes the

chancery nature of the text, and like SaiTm (“TawjTh-i tamsTl-ha-yi tarikhi-yi BayhaqT,”

in Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT, pp. 333-353), points to the use of analogy in The History.67

In her discussion of the text, she speaks of the slow pace of the narrative in the first four

years of M as'ud’s rule, as opposed to the hastened narrative of the last six years. She re­

marks on BayhaqT’s close attention to structure in his composition, and his interest in ob­

servation of human speech, emotion, and interaction. She also notes BayhaqT’s interest in

history for its own sake.68

Waldman attributes Bayhaql’s personal and imaginative style to the “Islamic re­

naissance” of the 4th-6th/10th-12th centuries, when cultural accomplishments bore the

stamp of individual innovations, The traditions of the Buyid (320-454/932-1062) and

17

the Samanid-Ghaznavid historians within this larger framework provided BayhaqT with

examples for historical writing. She places BayhaqT within the tradition of the secular

historians of the 4th-6th/10th-12th centuries, many of whom wrote about the court.69

These historians offered ethical, rather than theological grounds, for the value of history,

which teaches through examples of the past. Waldman mentions that other traditions of

thought like sufism, Persian dualism, the sharTah, philosophical history, and political

theory seem to have influenced BayhaqT.70

Like Luther, Waldman is also interested in studying The History in ways that

would lead one to reconstruct patterns of thought and behavior. It is this intended goal

that motivates her interest in the text as a historical narrative, one, which allows direct

and indirect viewing of the past, “its images and representations.”71

Stephen Humphreys has mentioned BayhaqT in Islamic History: a Framework

for Inquiry (Princeton: 1991). He has compared BayhaqT with the Egyptian historian

Ibn TaghribirdT. Humphreys calls attention to the moral framework of The History and

BayhaqT’s use of rhetoric, which enshrines the workings of the Ghaznavid political sys­

tem. The author remarks on the importance of appearances, despite the cruel reality of

intrigue and its results.72 Julia Scott Meisami has also remarked on the analogical na­

ture of The History (“The past in service of the present: two views of history in medieval

Persia,” Poetics Today, 1993, 14:2, pp. 247-275). But in comparing FirdawsT and Bay­

haqT, she has differentiated between the Iranian narrative of the former as opposed to

the Islamic one of BayhaqT. Meisami considers the paucity of pre-Islamic narratives in

The History an indication of BayhaqT’s antipathy towards this past.73

Chapters

In chapters two through four, I will analyze irony in the intrigues against ‘AIT

QarTb, GhazT, and Altuntash, using the means of letters. Chapter two comprises the suc­

cessful intrigues against the commanders ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT. In chapters three and

four I will discuss the two unsuccessful intrigues against the KhvarazmI ruler Altuntash.

In chapter five, I will study the intrigues against Aryaruq, Yusuf, and the three Mah-

mudlyan military leaders ‘AIT Dayah, SubashI, and Bigtughdl, using the metaphors of

food, wine, and hunt. I will conclude with a discussion of BayhaqT’s ironic stance.

18

Notes to Chapter I

I Tarlkh-i BayhaqI, ed. ‘All Akbar Fayyaz (Meshed: 1350/1971). I will use this edition throughout the study, and will refer to it as The History.

2Roemer, “Insha’,” El, II, v. 3, (Leiden: 1954-), p. 1242; Sellheim and Sourdel, “Katib,” El, II, v. 4, p. 755.

3Sellheim and Sourdel, op.cit., p. 756.

4Bosworth, “Abu ‘Abdallah al-Khwarazml on the technical terms of the secretary’s art,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, v. 12/part 2, (Leiden: 1969), p. 158. Also see the Arabic original in Mafatih al-‘ulum of KhvarazmI (d. 387/997), (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 65-69.

5‘AqTlI, Sayf al-DIn Hajji b. Nizam, Athar al-vuzara’, ed. Mir Jalal al-DTn Husaynl Ar- mavl (Tehran: 1337/1958), p. 153.

6Bosworth, op.cit., pp. 158-164.

7BayhaqT, pp. 283-284.

8Ibn Funduq, Tarlkh-i Bayhaq (Tehran: 1317/1938), pp. 175-178.

9GardTzT, 411; Husaynl, 3; Ibn al-Athlr, 476; JuzjanI, 231. Nazim gives the date as 416/1025-1026. We know of residents of Nasa and Ablvard complaining about Turkmen disturbances in the year 418/1027-1028 (Gardlzl, 415). Also see Nazim, pp. 62-66.

10BayhaqI, p. 77, pp. 563-565, 603-607, 653, and 927-945. It is especially in the chap­ter on Khvarazm (pp. 927-945) that BayhaqI explains the role of troubles in Khvarazm in the final loss of Khurasan.

II The foremost historian of the Ghaznavids C. E. Bosworth discusses the downfall of Ghaznavid power in Khurasan in his work, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghan­istan and Eastern Iran, 994-1040, (Edinburgh: 1963), pp. 241-268.

12I have studied the Persian manual of rhetoric, Tarjuman al-balaghah (ed. Ahmad Ate§, Istanbul:) and consulted the Arabic manual, Asrar al-balaghah (ed. Hellmut Ritter, Istan­bul: 1954). The later Tarjuman al-balaghah (507/1113-1114) is also addressed to both poets and scribes, pp. 7, 14, 20, 27, 31, 36, 38, 75, 88, 89, 91, 108, 111, and 112.

,3I have cited the translation given by Hellmut Ritter. See the English introduction in Asrar al-balaghah, p. 15. For the Arabic original, see pp. 108-109.

In his article, “Islamic rhetoric and the Persian historians: 1000-1300 A.D.,” Luther takes issue with Ritter’s characterization in this introduction that the “Arabs” had no use

19

for the first two branches of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, namely, the deliberative and the judi­cial. Luther points to the convention of disputes in front of rulers and the admiration held among the literati for spoken eloquence with the aim to persuade, p. 91. It is this use of rhetoric, argumentation with the aim to persuade, that especially interests me in Tarikh-i BayhaqI.

,4RaduyanI, Tarjuman al-balaghah, pp. 79-81, 99, 89-91.

15In the Western tradition, I have found the ideas of Kenneth Burke especially com­patible with the goals of this study. He speaks of irony in his four master tropes in A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric of Motives (New York: 1962), pp. 511-517. Burke has inspired several generations of historians and literary critics alike, among them, Hayden White, Wayne Boothe, and Denise Donoghue. Indeed, Hayden White has based the very framework of his study, Metahistory (Baltimore: 1973) on the four tropes discussed by Burke (metaphor, synecdoche, metonomy, and irony). Wayne Boothe has done a study of his own on irony called, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: 1974). And in Ferocious Alphabets (Boston: 1981), Donoghue has contrasted Burke’s approach to lan­guage and literature with the approach of the post-modernist critic Derrida.

My readings on irony have led me to a study done on verbal irony in linguistics (Prag­matics, A Reader, ed. Steven Davis, New York: 1991). In their article on irony (pp. 550-564), Don Sperber and Deidre Wilson suggest that the speaker of an ironic state­ment, instead of using a proposition, mentions it in such a way, “ . . . as to make clear that he rejects it as ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant. For the hearer, under­standing such an utterance involves both realizing that it is a case of mention rather than use, and also recognizing the speaker’s attitude to the proposition mentioned,” p. 557.

Other readings on irony have also included a series of studies in psychology, challenging the ideas of Sperber and Wilson (Journal of Experimental Psychology: 1984, pp. 121— 126, 127-129, 130-136). Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig propose a pretense theory of irony, where the ironist pretends innocence, intending the addresses of the irony to dis­cover the pretense, p. 121.

The literature on irony, in the fields of linguistics, psychology, Western analytical philos­ophy, and literary criticism, is vast. My studies in irony in language and its uses in West­ern literature have deepened my understanding of irony in general. But it is how irony is created in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI that interests me here. And for that, it is Burke’s ideas about irony in history and the overarching humble irony that best express my understanding of BayhaqT’s ironic stance.

16Waldman, Marilyn R., Towards a Theory of Historical Narrative: a Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography (Columbus: 1980), p. 72.

17Bayhaqi, hilah, hilat, or lata’if al-hiyal, (39, 69, 102, 113, 121, 165, 173, 185, 213, 222, 241, 276^82=284, 298-299, 304, 332, 378, 411, 414, 422^123, 444, 504, 513, 523, 533, 536, 539, 546, 582, 696, 727-728, 746, 822, 839, 841, 921, 934).

20

hllat kardan, (121, 165, 213, 241, 298, 332, 411, 414, 533, 727, 934); hllat sakhtan, (39, i02, 113, 173, 222, 241, 276, 299, 378, 523, 536, 546, 746); lata’if al-hiyal bi-kar avar- dan, (69, 102, 422, 921); dar hllat uftadan, (304); dast dar hllat zadan, (423); dar hllat Istadan, (283).

tazrib, (174, 222, 276, 277, 286, 288, 298, 378, 405, 416, 500, 521, 754, 912); talbls, (129, 174, 277, 405, 517, 561, 718); fisad, (322, 406, 416, 500, 808, 921); zarq, (165, 504, 612, 679, 710, 758); afsun, (182, 297, 607, 743); makr, (234, 504, 582, 778); char- bak, (182, 326); tatml4, (378,402); ifti'al, (165, 539); ‘ishvah, (612, 679); shu'badah, (539); ghurur, (679); ghadr, (778); nayrang, (416); tadblr, (410, 414); fitnah, (322); tamvlh, (129); ighra’, (298); ta‘riz, (276); farib, (58).

Other verbs meaning “to intrigue,” mahzar sakhtan, (27-28); farlftan, (71, 283, 284,325, 622, 756, 934); tadblr sakhtan, (107, 285, 299, 499, 544); surat inghashtan, (173); ta ‘blyah kardan, (325); tadblr kardan, (424, 444, 921); faribanldan, (559, 934); afsun sakhtan, (607); afsun ravan kardan, (743); talbls kardan, (718); surat zisht kardan, (440); tadblr khata pish giriftan, (514); ‘ishvah dadan, (759, 819); surat bastan, (875); ghadr kardan, (875); tazrib kardan, (222, 298, 378); tazrib nigashtan, (276).

18This belief is especially inspired by the works of Roy Mottahedeh. He speaks of self­describing means in the preface to his work, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton: 1980).

19Luther, K. Allin, “BayhaqI and the later Saljuq historians: some comparative remarks,” Yadnamah-yi . . . , p. 24.

20Both Nizam al-Mulk and Firishtah report Mahmud’s love for Muhammad (Nizam al-Mulk, 220-221; Firishtah, 388). The author of Tarlkh-i A lfl also tells the story of Mahmud asking his two sons what they would do after his death. While Muhammad re­portedly said that he would pray, Mas'ud replied that he would do what Mahmud did to his own brother Isma‘il; that is, usurp the throne (851-852). (For Mahmud’s seizure of the throne, see MIrkhvand, 93-95).

Other than the account of the succession conflict in The History (discussed in Chapter 2), we possess accounts of the conflict in other near contemporary and later texts (Ibn al-Athlr, 398-400; Shabankara’I, 70-76; Mustawfl, 180; al-‘lbrl, 708-709; Gardlzl, 419— 422; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . , 718; MIrkhvand, 126-127; HamadanI, 161— 163; Firishtah, 386-387; Alfl, 859-860; Muqlm Haravl, 277-278; Tarlkh-i Sistan, 610; Faslh KhvafI, 148; Harshakah Ray, 524; Musavl, 682; Ibn al-Kathlr, 975; Haydarl, 485- 487). Details and discrepancies abound in these texts. But from a comparison of these works and The History, the courtiers Yusuf, Hasanak, and ‘All Qarlb seem to have been especially instrumental in the later arrest of Muhammad, just as earlier, they had raised him to the throne. From the text of The History, we know that only Hasanak was put to the gallows, this coming after the arrest of ‘All Qarlb and before that of the prince Yusuf (note the mistaken reports about the deaths of these three men in MIrkhvand, HamadanI, and Alfl). Faslh KhvafI speaks of an oath between the military leaders ‘All Qarlb and

21

Bigtughdl in the presence of the chancery minister Bu Nasr Mushkan. The two report­edly swore to take care of the court and be allies, until a Ghaznavid ruler would ascend the throne.

The conflict at the end of M as'ud’s rule is also treated in other sources (GardlzT, 438- 440; Shabankara’I, 81; MustawfT, 763; al-‘lbrl, 709; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . ., 718-720; MIrkhvand, 130-132; HamadanI, 161-163; Firishtah, 397-398; Alfl, 914- 917; ibn al-Kathlr, 980; Muqlm Haravl, 283-285; Ghaffarl, 642; Musavl, 682; Haydarl, 496-498; BadavunT, 303-307).

21 Most of the sources relate that Muhammad’s son Ahmad killed Mas'ud (MIrkhvand, 130-132; al-'Ibrl, 709; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . , 718-720; Firishtah, 397- 398; Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 496-498). Among this group of sources, three also speak of the sons of ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf as the allies of Ahmad (MIrkhvand, 130-132; Khvandmlr, 718-720; Firishtah, 397-398). Ibn al-Kathlr also attributes the killing of M as'ud to Ahmad, but the author mistakenly calls Yusuf, rather than his son, the ally of Muhammad (Ibn al-Kathlr, 980). Also note the mistaken reports of the author of Tankh-i alfl and Haydarl, who speak of ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf themselves, and not their sons, as the allies of Ahmad against his uncle Mas'ud (Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 496- 497).

Gardlzl reports that the fortress-keeper (kutval) killed Mas'ud, and Muqlm Haravl and BadavunT seem to have taken their information on M as'ud’s death from this earlier source (Gardlzl, 440; BadavunT, 303-307; Muqlm Haravl, 283-285). Al-Husaynl and Shabankara’T report that Muhammad himself killed Mas'ud (Husaynl, 14; Shabankara’T, 81), and HamadanI reports ‘Abd al-Rahlm and ‘Abd al-Rahman as having killed their un­cle (HamadanI, 163). This last attribution does not accord with the story of M as'ud’s headgear, and the kindness shown by ‘Abd al-Rahlm. See Bosworth’s The L ater Ghaz­navids . . . , pp. 17-20 for M as'ud’s imprisonment and death.

22For the first hat story, see Ibn al-Athlr, 399; Khvandmlr, Khulasah al-akhbar . . . . 718; HamadanI, 162; Firishtah, 386-387. For the second story, see Ibn al-Athlr, 486; Husaynl, 14; Firishtah, 400; Alfl, 914-917; Haydarl, 499. I have been unable to find the only source, Riyaz al-siyahah (author, ShirvanT?) that reports this incident as having taken place between Ahmad and ‘Abd al-Rahman (ShirvanT, 763).

23This capture itself came after the Turkmen Saljuqs had joined the troops of Mas'ud, who had expected a succession battle for the throne, BayhaqI, pp. 77, 348.

24ibid„ pp. 474-475, 510-514.

25ibid., p. 558. These concerned disturbances around the KhurasanI towns, Marv, Badghls, and Sarakhs, and Bavard.

The only known instance in which the Ghaznavid ruler took the field in these first five years was the plundering of the Indian temple, Sarsatl. Since this was in the latter part

22

of 424/1032-1033, recorded in one of the lost parts of The History, our knowledge about this victory comes from other sources. Some give the 424/1032-1033 date for this vic­tory, while at least three sources have recorded the year 425/1033-1034. (Sources with the year 424/1032-1033 for this victory, Gardlzl, 427; Muqlm Haravl, 279; BadavunT, 302; Firishtah, 391; Haydarl, 494—495; Harshakah Ray, 524-525; sources with the year 425/1033-1034, Ibn al-Athlr, 433; Alfl 869).

A 424/1032-1033 dinar of Herat with the word fath on top of the reverse field also sug­gests that it was actually the year 424/1032-1033 in which Mas'ud conquered SarsatT, and that he went to Herat after this conquest (Spink Taisei 31/445. I have also looked at a similar coin from Mr. Steve Album’s stock, now at Tubingen). Yet an even more plau­sible explanation for the word fath, considering the local nature of Islamic mints, is the show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs around Herat in this year. We do not have any record of the show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs, if it, indeed, occurred. We only have Bayhaql’s report of M as'ud’s intention to disperse the Turkmen Saljuqs from around Herat, (BayhaqI, 512). However, the report of this show of force could have been in one of the lost parts of The History.

26BayhaqI, pp. 611-644. The chain of events which led to the Saljuqs’ request from M as'ud for the grant of territories involved M as'ud’s policy in the tributory of Khvarazm and the Saljuqs’ conflict with the local ruler of land, Shah Malik. For a summary about the nomadic Saljuqs in Khurasan, see Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, pp. 205-226. For the Ghaznavid-Saljuq conflict, see Bosworth, op.cit., pp. 241-249. For the details of the 426/1034-1035 defeat, see BayhaqI, pp. 628-632 and al-Husaynl, pp. 6-12.

27The 427/1035-1036 ANS 000.999.7236 coin of M as'ud is probably from the mint of Marv al-Rud, where Mas'ud went hunting in this year. BayhaqI reports, “And on Thurs­day, the ninth of Jamadl al-’ula the amir prepared for hunting, and went to the valleys of Marv al-Rud,” p. 651.

28BayhaqI, pp. 660-661.

29For the letter of the vizier to M as'ud about the former’s successes against the Turkmen Saljuqs, see BayhaqI, p.687.

The word fath appears on top of the reverse fields of Nishapuri dinars for the years 428/1036-1037 and 429/1037-1038. One might attribute such a display of victory on coins for the year 429/1037-1038 to M as'ud’s conquest of the Hans! fortress in India (BayhaqI, 703-704). But the appearance of fath on the coins of the year 428/1036- 1037 can best be explained by the strong show of force against the Turkmen Saljuqs in Herat. Though the coins for these two years seem not to have been cast from the same dies, another possibility is that they tell of the same victory. Considering the chronol­ogy of events, this must have been the vizier’s victory against the Turkmen Saljuqs (The 428/1036-1037 dinars of Nishapur with the word fath on top of the reverse field: ANS 1922.211.89; ANS 1972.288.57; ANS 1968.216.4lOst 1304. I also looked at a similar dinar of Nishapur from Mr. Album’s stock (now in the Tubingen collection;

23

the 429/1037-1038 dinars of Nishapur with the word fath on top of the reverse field:ANS 1947.72.1; ANS 1972.288.58; Sourdel 255. Among the 428/1036-1037 set of coins, I have not seen the photograph of the coin in Ostrup’s catologue. Also, among the 429/1037-1038 set of coins, I have not seen the photograph of the coin in Sourdel’s cato­logue. Also previously in Mr. Album’s stock, now owned by the Tubingen Museum, are the 428/1036-1037 dinar of Nishapur, Tubingen EH1 B l, and the 429/1037-1038 dinar of Nishapur, Tubingen EH1 B2. But, unfortunately, there are no references to the coins’ inscriptions).

Sourdel has catologued a 427/1035-1036 dinar of Nishapur with the word zafar on top of the obverse field. None of the other 427/1035-1036 dinars of Nishapur that I have come across (ANS 1972.288.56; ANS 1922.211.88; SA’s stock) display the word zafar on top of the obverse field. Also, none of the textual sources refer to overwhelming “victories” against the two foremost enemies of the empire; namely, the sons of the Qarakhanid rebel leader, ‘Alltigln, or the Turkmen Saljuqs, to warrant such a display of victory on coins. BayhaqI reports the troubles that the Turkmen Saljuqs were caus­ing for the people of Khurasan in this year, p. 649. Upon receiving this news from the governor of Khurasan, Mas'ud consulted with his courtiers and decided on sending an army of 10,000 horsemen and 5000 footmen to Khurasan, p. 650. Could the 427/1035- 1036 coins with the word zafar on top of the obverse field be the historical record of this army’s victory against the Turkmen Saljuqs? Or, could Sourdel, as he himself ex­pressed doubts about the correctness of the date, have simply misread 427/1035-1036 for 429/1037-1038?

30BayhaqI, pp. 698-699 and 703-704. M as'ud declared his intention of doing a ghazv to his courtiers towards the end of the year 428/1036-1037. He conquered the HansI fortress on the 20th of RabI' al-awwal in the year 429/1037-1038.

31 For the Saljuqs’ attitude in 426/1034—1035, see BayhaqI, pp. 640-645. In The Ghaz­navids, Bosworth discusses the Saljuqs’ attitude in his section on M as'ud’s downfall. Bosworth points out the Saljuqs’ surprise at their own victory in the year 426/1034—1035, and takes note of the fact that at this point, the Saljuq leaders did not yet think of themselves as a united body, p. 242. In negotiations following the Saljuq victory, the three leaders sent three different messengers to M as'ud’s court.

For the details of the 429/1037-1038 defeat, see BayhaqI, pp. 717-720. For the account of the Saljuqs in Nishapur, see pp. 730-733. Also see the section on the attitudes of the people of Nishapur and the Saljuqs in Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, pp. 258-268.

In the year 429/1037-1038, Tughril symbolically assumed power by sitting on M as'ud’s throne in Nishapur. From the text of The History, we know that the battle took place in the ninth month of the year, and that Tughril did not arrive in Nishapur for at least an­other twenty-two days. Yet the date of a Nishapuri dinar does not accord with this tex­tual chronology of events. It is a 428/1036-1037 dinar bearing Tughril’s name (ANS 1964.23.2). This numismatic vs. textual discord opens the gate to conjecture about Saljuq relations with the people of Nishapur. Unfortunately I have not been able to compare the 428/1036-1037 Nishapuri dinar of Tughril with the 428/1036-1037 di­

24

nars of Mas'ud. Did the nobles of Nishapur, as Allin Luther suggested in a conversa­tion about this numismatic vs. textual discord, try to appease the Saljuqs through mint­ing in Tughril’s name? By 428/1036-1037, the Ghaznavids had lost Nasa, Faravah, and Dahistan to the Saljuqs, and had been asked to “grant” the cities of Marv, Sarakhs, and Bavard. We know that after the vizier’s successful show of force in Herat, the Saljuqs mostly retired to Nasa and Faravah for a while. Could the Saljuqs’ close vicinity in Nasa have caused the Nishapuri authorities to mint in Tughril’s name towards the end of this year? I also learned about a 430/1038-1039 dinar of Nishapur with Tughril’s name from Mr. Album.

32BayhaqI, the 426/1034-1035 battle, pp. 625-632; the 429/1037-1038 battle, pp. 707- 720; the ‘All-abad battle, pp. 752-755; the Talkhab battle, see pp. 756-764.

33ibid., pp. 765-781. The Ghaznavid messenger to the Saljuqs reported that despite their expressions of servitude, the Saljuqs had ideas of kingship in mind, p. 778.

34For the battle of Dandanqan and the state of the two forces prior to this battle, see BayhaqI, pp. 826-840.

35ibid., p. 862.

36ibid., p. 863.

37For the intrigues against Asfara’Inl and Ahmad Hasan, see note 1 in chapter two. For the intrigue against Asfara’TnT, see Vasaya . . . , 623-625; ‘Aqlll, 150-152; and GhaffarT, 102-103. Khvandmlr (Dastur al-vuzara’) also speaks of Mahmud’s disfavor towards As- fara’Inl (Khvandmlr, 136-147.

For the intrigue against Ahmad Hasan, see MunshI KirmanI, 40-43; Vasaya . . . , 627- 629; ‘Aqlll, 152-186; and GhaffarT, 104-105. Note that Khvandmlr only relates the ani­mosity of ‘All Qarlb and Altuntash towards Ahmad Hasan, (139-140).

For ‘All Qarlb, GhazI, see chapter 2; for the Khvarazmshah Altuntash and Bu Sahl Za- wzani see chapters 3 and 4. Also for Zawzani see note 42 in chapter 2. And for Aryaruq, Yusuf, and the group of Mahmudlyan (Bilgatigln, Bigtughdl, and ‘All Dayah), see chap­ters 2 and 5.

Arslan Jazib was the governor of Tus and later commander of Khurasan under Mahmud, (Yamlnl, 197; BayhaqI, 169). This military leader accompanied Mahmud on many mili­tary expeditions, (YamTnl, 281-283/286/313).

Bahr al-‘UlumI has also spoken of envy in the court of Mas'ud, and BayhaqT’s warning against this emotion, “TarTkh-i BayhaqT ya a’Tnah-yi ‘ibrat,” p. 55, in Yadnamah-yi. . .

38Bayhaqi, p. 27.

25

39See note 12.

40BayhaqT, op.cit., pp. 178-180.

41ibid., pp. 221-236. For Mahmud’s decision to choose Hasanak as his third vizier, see BayhaqT, 467-468; MunshT KirmanI, 43-44; ‘Aqlll, 186-192; and Khvandmlr, Dastur . . . ,1 4 1 -1 4 4 .

For the Fatimid treatment of the charge against Hasanak of being a Qarmatl, see al- MaqrlzT, Ahmad b. ‘All, Itti‘ad al-hunafa bi-’akhbar al-a’immat al-Fatimlyyln al-khulafa, ed. Muhammad Hilmi Muhammad Ahmad (Cairo: 1390/1971), pp. 137-139 and 214, note 4. Also see Waldman, (168-169).

For the story of Hasanak’s execution, see ShafT‘1 (Yadnamah-yi. . .) , 374-392 and Waldman, 93-94, 101. Waldman also gives a translation of the story, (167-176).

42For this factionalism at the court, see Bosworth’s The Ghaznavids, 230-234; Waldman, 180; and Islam! Nadushan (Yadnamah-yi. . . ) , 5.

43ed. W. H. Morley, Bibliotheca Indica, v. 59 (Calcutta: 1862); ed. SaTd NaflsI (Tehran: n.p., 1307/1889-1890) (lithographed edition); ed. SaTd NafisT, 3 vs. (Tehran: 1319— 1332/1940-1953); ed. ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz and Qasim GhanT (Mashhad: 1324/1945); ed. ‘AIT Akbar Fayyaz (Mashhad: 1350/1971); Muhammad KhatTb-Rahbar (Tehran: 1368/1988).

44Waldman explains the varied pace of the narrative in terms of BayhaqT’s old age.She considers BayhaqT’s sermon on the death of Farrukhzad to be a turning point in the text, after which the pace of the narrative is especially fast. Nonetheless, she men­tions the possibility of the author’s greater interest in the earlier years of M as‘ud’s rule, Towards a Theory . . . , pp. 56-57. She notes the present and past time frames in Bay­haqT’s narrative, but she believes that the shift from the past of M as‘ud’s history to the death of Farrukhzad is disruptive, resulting in, “ . . . breaking down the sense of involve­ment that BayhaqT has tried to build for the reader.” (p. 57) An analogical approach to The History guards against this sense of disruption. For by adopting such an approach, one expects, rather than is surprised, that BayhaqT includes other stories that he remem­bers, as he narrates M as‘ud’s history.

45JurbazqanT, Tarjumah-yi tarlkh-i YamTnT (‘UtbT), ed. Ja'far Shu'ar (Tehran: 1978).

46anon., TarTkh-i STstan, ed. Malik al-Shu‘ara Bahar (Tehran: 1314/1935).

47GardIzT, Abu SaTd ‘Abd al-Hayy b. Zahhak b. Mahmud, Zayn al-akhbar, ed. ‘Abd al- Hayy HabTbl (Tehran: 1363/1984).

48Kashani, Qazi Ahmad b. Ghaffari, Tarikh-i nigaristan (Tehran:n.d.).

26

49Bayhaqi (Ibn Funduq), Abu al-Hasan ‘All b. Zayd, Tarikh-i Bayhaq, ed. Ahmad Bah- manyar, 2nd ed. (Tehran: 1317/1938).

50RavandT, Muhammad b. ‘All b. Sulayman, Rahat al-sudur va ayat al-surur, ed. Muhammad Iqbal (Lahore: 1921).

51 al-HusaynT, Sadr al-DTn, Akhbar al-dawlah al-Saljuqiyyah, ed. Muhammad Iqbal (La­hore: 1933).

52Ibn al-Athlr, al-Kamil fi al-tarikh, v. 9 (Beirut: 1966).

53JuzjanT, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, ed. ‘Abd al-Hayy Hablbl, 2nd ed. (Kabul: 1342/1963).

54al-‘Ibri (Bar Hebraeus), Mukhtasar al-duwal, in Dar plramun-i Tarikh-i BayhaqT, ed. SaTd NaflsI ( 2 vs., Tehran: 1342/1963), pp. 707-709. Since I did not have access to individual editions of some other texts, I will refer to citations of these works contained in NaflsT’s study. I will refer to this study as Dar plramun.

55Shabankara’I, Muhammad b. ‘All b. Muhammad, Majma* al-ansab fi al-tavarlkh, ed. MTr-Hashim Muhaddis (Tehran: 1346/1967).

56HamadanI, Khvajah Rashid al-DTn Fazl Allah, Fasl-I az Jama* al-tavarTkh, ed. Muham­mad Dablr Slyaq (Tehran: 1338/1959).

MustawfT, Hamd Allah, Tarikh-i guzTdah, ed. ‘Abd al-Husayn Nava’T, 2nd ed. (Tehran: 1362/1983).

Ibn al-Kathlr, al-Bidayah wa al-nahayah (Cairo: n.d.).

57MusavT, Fazl Allah, Tarikh-i khayrat, in Dar plramun, pp. 674—686.

58FasIh KhvafT, Mujmal-i Faslhl, in Par plramun, pp. 145-150.

59Mlrkhvand, TarTkh-i rawzat al-safa (Tehran: 1339/1960).Nishapuri,

Zahir al-DTn, Saljuq-namah, ed. Isma’Tl Afshar (Tehran: 1332/1953).

60KhvandmIr, Khulasat al-;ikhbar fT bayan ahval al-akhyar, in Dar plramun, pp. 709-723.

61 Firishtah, Gulshan-i IbrahlmT, in Dar plramun, pp. 318-425.

62Harshakah Ray, Majma* al-akhbar, in Dar plramun, pp. 517-529.

27

63Nizam al-Mulk, Siyar al-Muluk, ed. Hurbert Darke (Tehran: 1962); anon., Vasaya-yi Nizam al-Mulk TusI, in Dar plramun, pp. 622-635.

64‘Aqlll, Sayf al-DTn Hajjl b. Nizam, Athar al-vuzara’, ed. Mir Jalal al-DIn Husaynl Ar- mavl (Tehran: 1337/1958).

MunshT KirmanT, Nasir al-DIn, Nasa’im al-ashar min lata’im al-akhbar, ed. Mir Jalal al- DIn Husaynl Armavl (Tehran: 1364/1985).

Khvandmlr, Ghiyas al-DIn b. Himam al-DTn, Dastur al-vuzara’, ed. Sa'Id NaflsI (Tehran: 1317). '

65‘AwfI, Sadld al-DIn Muhammad, Javami1 al-hikayat va lavami* al-ravayat, ed. Amir Banu and Mazahir Musaffk (Tehran: 1353/1974).

66Waldman, M. R., Towards a Theory . . . (columbus: 1980), pp. 53 and 73.

67ibid., for chancery nature, see pp. 63-64; for analogy, see p. 73.

68ibid., for pace of the narrative, see p. 56; for structure, see pp. 51-53; for human speech, see p. 65; for history for its own sake, see p. 72.

69ibid., pp. 121-129.

70ibid.,p. 132.

71 ibid., p. 115.

72Humphrey, R. Stephen, Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry (Princeton: 1991), pp. 128-147.

73T w o other articles on The History are by Gilbert Lazard and ‘Abbas Mllanl. Gilbert Lazard, “Un mdmorialiste persan du XIe siecle: BeyhaqI,” Etudes de civilization medi-evale (EKe-X IIe siecles) melanges offerts a Edmond-Rene Labande a 1’occasion de son— ■ - w . . . . . .

depart a la retraite et du XXe anniversaire du C.E.S.C.M. (Poitiers: n.d.). In this article Lazard treats the story of intrigue about the courtier Haslrl (the story in The History, pp. 197-212); ‘Abbas Milan!, “Tarlkh dar Tarlkh-i BayhaqI,” IranshinasI, 1994, 5:4, pp. 702- 721.

CHAPTER II

‘ALi QARlB AND ASIGHTIGIN GHAZl

The intrigues against these two men were for different reasons. One can best un­

derstand M as'ud’s motivation for his intrigue against the great commander ‘AIT QarTb

in the context of the succession to the throne.1 ‘AIT QarTb headed the courtiers who

called Muhammad to the throne from Guzganan. Whether this had been done as a tem­

porary measure of stability, or in compliance with the late amir’s final wishes is un­

known. Mas'ud maintained a well-meaning appearance towards ‘AIT QarTb until the

troops reached Herat. ‘AIT expected to be arrested; but in faithful allegiance to the dead

Mahmud, ‘AIT QarTb came to the scene of his own capture.

The initiators of the intrigue against GhazT were men of the old order, the

MahmudTyan.2 They envied men like GhazT, who had gained in status at M as'ud’s

court, overshadowing members of the old guard. GhazT had announced the arrival of the

amir in Khurasan, and Mas'ud seemed grateful for this service. But at least one group

of the MahmudTyan, ‘AIT Dayah, BigtughdT, and BilgatigTn, could not tolerate the rise of

men like GhazT.3

BayhaqT mentions ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT in the course of The History, both before

and after their capture. ‘AIT QarTb pleaded for mercy, expected that M as‘ud would arrest

him, and knowingly came to the scene of his own arrest.4 While this man of the old or­

der predicted his own fate, GhazT did not. Before the intrigue, GhazT appears as a strong

military man, a conspirator in the intrigue against ‘AIT QarTb, and finally, as a man un­

aware of his coming fate.5 Therefore, the prophecy of the intrigue is made by its victim

in the case of ‘AIT QarTb; whereas with GhazT, it is BayhaqT who tells of the victim’s ap­

proaching fate. Having been a party to the intrigue against ‘AIT QarTb, GhazT fell victim

to the intrigue of the MahmudTyan himself. It was this shared destiny of intrigue and ar­

rest that made others remember the two jointly.6

28

29

One can characterize both stories in terms of the theme of appearances vs. reali­

ties. In both stories, lies about the intrigue appear in letters. But the reality of the arrest

is foretold in monologues. This conflict of appearances vs. realities, the lie of M as'ud’s

good will towards ‘All as opposed to his prediction of the arrest, creates irony. BayhaqI

dramatizes the arrest in a court scene in the first story, and on the banks of the Oxus in

the second.

‘AIT Qarlb

The intrigue against ‘All Qarlb unfolds in three sections of volume five. Not all

of the material deals with the plot. One can summarize the relevant events prior to the

capture as follows: 1) the declaration of allegiance by the courtiers at Taglnabad, and its

acceptance by Mas‘ud while on his way to Herat (letters); 2) Mas'ud seeking to seize

the throne during his brother’s reign (letters); 3) ‘All Qarlb prophesying his own arrest

in Taglnabad (monologue); 4) the meeting of Mas‘ud and ‘All QarTb in Herat (the scene

of intrigue at the court). Considered in terms of the theme of appearances vs. realities,

the story divides into three parts. In the first part, the lies surrounding the intrigue are

in letters that involve the succession conflict and its resolution. In the second part, the

victim of the intrigue predicts his own arrest. And finally, in the court scene ‘All Qarlb is

arrested.

Appearances: Letters

The Courtiers at Taglnabad

The succession conflict and its resolution is the organizing theme among the nu­

merous letters which appear in this part. In the remainder of the first section (volume

five), which focuses on the courtiers of Ghazna, specifically on ‘All Qarlb, both the

courtiers and M as'ud explained away Muhammad’s rule to each other, but in different

ways. They did so in letters and for various reasons of their own. The courtiers sought

security by expressing obedience. And Mas'ud asked for loyalty, by guaranteeing his

trust in them. Both letters resonate with irony, with the courtiers assuming an obedient

attitude in their letter, and Mas‘ud seeming to trust these men in his. In the case of the

30

courtiers, this attitude contradicts their earlier allegiance to Muhammad. In the case of

M as'ud, this trust proves false, considering the arrest of ‘All Qarlb.

The letter of the Ghazna courtiers to M as'ud stands at the head of volume five,

parts of which have been lost. Most of the courtiers at Taglnabad were men of the old or­

der. So even if they had no cause to worry for having called Muhammad to the throne,

as did ‘All Qarlb, they were still concerned on account of their earlier allegiance to

Muhammad and their service to Mahmud. Therefore, in their letter, they asked for safety

(aman) from Mas'ud, which, all throughout, they masked in various guises. Two things

were important for their request for safety, that they had had no choice but to swear loy­

alty to Muhammad earlier, and that their present loyalty was to Mas'ud.

The courtiers began, " . . . [the] obstacles and hindrances [were] removed and be­

came nil. Affairs were set right and [the] hearts are obedient and [the] intentions are

right [emphases mine].”7 The obstacle to M as'ud’s accession was Muhammad, and it

was the courtiers who had removed him. The implication that the courtiers held enough

power to unseat a ruler is ironic, given that they assumed an attitude of obedience, which

showed lack of power, in the letter. In the next statement, the use of the present tense re­

sults in humorous irony, implying that there was a time in the past when hearts were not

obedient and intentions were not right.

The courtiers then explained Muhammad’s rule, introduced by a passage on qaza,

farman (or hukm), ‘adl, and fazl.8 Qaza, or Divine decree, overrules murad-i adaml,

man’s wishes, and the command to bestow favors or misfortunes is only His. There­

fore, God decreed that Muhammad rule for a while, but then commanded (farman) that

M as'ud become the amir. By means of this narrative of the succession conflict, in which

the courtiers resorted to Divine power, they denied their role in the whole affair.

Then they stated, ‘‘And in whatever He does, there is justice [‘adl]. And kingdoms

on the earth go from one [person] to another due to His kindness [fazl].”9 The rela­

tion between God’s justice, being all-encompassing, and God’s kindness (fazl), embod­

ied here in His granting of kingdoms from one person to another, is a representational

one. For His justice encompasses all that He does; for example, granting kingdoms from

one person to another. This implicitly justifies Muhammad’s rule, and all that it encom­

passed, including the courtiers’ allegiance.

31

The courtiers sought pardon for this earlier allegiance by, first, taking refuge un­

der Mahmud’s name, calling Muhammad “a branch from the foundation of the late

Amir. . . . ” So any expressions of enmity towards Muhammad would, “ . . . go back to

the main stem [asl],” meaning Mahmud.10 But as far as the succession of M as'ud was

concerned, he had cause for enmity towards Mahmud, who had chosen Muhammad over

him.

The courtiers also sought pardon by explaining that their allegiance was com­

manded by both God and king. It had been fated that Muhammad rule for a while, when

“He had inevitably given commands as kings do. And those that were present from ev­

ery group, higher and lower, obeyed those commands with submission and obedience.” 11

So God had legitimized Muhammad, and he had done what kings do. But most impor­

tantly, the courtiers had done nothing wrong, since they merely obeyed both God and the

king.

Next, the courtiers turned to the succession of Mas'ud. They stated, “Once his

[Muhammad’s] time had passed, God, may He be exalted and glorified, granted the ser­

vants the main branch from the foundation of the state, [the one] who was the true suc­

cessor.” 12 This narrative of the succession claim is humorous: so Muhammad was a

branch, though a minor one; but a main branch that had been out of sight was, now, in

view. They legitimized M as'ud’s claim, saying, “And . . . [the Sultan] cast a shadow

over the country, since he was a successor [khalifat], and he was the [one] chosen by

the representative of the Prophet, may peace be upon him [khallfat-i khallfat-i mustafa

‘aliyhl al-salam].”13 Irony arises in considering that it was M as'ud who first wrote

to the 'Abbasid caliph al-Qadir, with the news of his own trip to Khurasan and the re­

quest for a treaty and titles. Only then did the politically weak but symbolically powerful

caliph grant M as'ud titles and a treaty regarding Ghaznavid cities.14

More important in relation to the succession of Mas'ud was the courtiers’ preten­

sion that his claim was just. They said, “Today, they have inevitably [nachar] come to­

wards the righteous [ruler], and have considered his obedience more binding [farlzah-tar]

[emphasis mine].” 15 The implication is that the earlier obedience to Muhammad had

been justified, but that their obedience to M as'ud was even more so. Therefore, all was

well, with no one to be blamed for past actions.

32

They ended the letter with a short note (mulattafah).16 First is a report on

Muhammad’s affairs. The courtiers mentioned the arrest of Muhammad, “ . . . according

to the royal order in the royal handwriting . . . ” 17 M as'ud could always charge them

with earlier disloyalty to himself, but also with later treason against Muhammad. So, it

was important for men who had helped the accession of Muhammad, men like ‘AIT Qarlb

and Yusuf, at least, to deny any responsibility for his arrest.

In the plea of mercy which follows, the courtiers ask that M as'ud consider their

allegiance to Muhammad a transgression, tajavuz. But, as they explained, the alle­

giance was in keeping with the wishes of the late amir Mahmud. Therefore, their trans­

gression against M as'ud was because of their loyalty to Mahmud. The courtiers veiled

this truth, by stating, " . . . if at that time they chose to calm matters and obeyed the

order of the late Lord, may God be pleased with him, now that a more righteous lord

[khudavand-I haqq-tar] has emerged and his order has arrived, they have fulfilled all the

necessary conditions of servitude and obedience [emphasis mine].” 18 So they had done

nothing wrong in alleging loyalty to Muhammad, who was, after all, “a righteous lord,”

though, according to this false narrative, not as righteous as Mas'ud.

In fourteen days, the courtiers received Mas'Od’s reply.19 The sultan had written

a few lines in his own handwriting, addressing ‘AIT QarTb as the learned leader (hajib-i

fazil) and brother. ‘AIT QarTb had M as'ud’s letter read to all the courtiers and troops.20

Afterwards, he ordered the leaders of the various garrisons to take the troops to their out­

posts. He then had the scribe Bu SaTd read a letter in M as'ud’s own handwriting, the

full text of which BayhaqT provides.21

In this letter, Mas'ud both reassured the courtiers and justified his own seizure of

the throne. Though the amir had received written allegiance from the members of the old

guard, they had not yet joined him. So, he had to ensure that they come to Herat, bring­

ing Mahmud’s troops. But it was, also, symbolically important to establish his just claim

to the throne. The reassurances would prove false in the case of at least two courtiers,

and the claim was contradictory as presented.

M as'ud reassured the courtiers in this way, “It was and has been determined for

us that at the time [dar an vaqt] when our father the late Amir passed away, and the

lofty Amir [our] brother Abu Ahmad was called to ascend the throne, no other [action]

33

would have been in the best interest of the kingdom [salah-i vaqt-i mulk].”22 The use of

dar an vaqt, at that time, echoes its use in the letter by the courtiers. They had mentioned

the call to Muhammad as a necessity at the time, and M as'ud was implicitly accepting

this narrative of events, and thus, seemingly, excusing the courtiers’ earlier allegiance.

But this narrative was important for Mas'ud as well, who had to fabricate his claim to

succession in the face of this earlier allegiance to Muhammad.

Like the courtiers, Mas'ud used the epistolary convention of third person plu­

ral in referring to those who had called Muhammad to the throne. The amir stated,

“baradar Abu Ahmad ra bikhandand, [they called [our] brother Abu Ahmad].”23 The

use of the third person creates a desired ambiguity about those responsible for the call

to Muhammad. And both the courtiers and Mas'ud needed this ambiguity, for their in­

dividual purposes. The courtiers needed to throw off the responsibility of having called

Muhammad to Ghazna. And Mas'ud needed to ensure that ‘AIT QarTb would bring the

courtiers, and most importantly, Mahmud’s army to Herat.

M as'ud, then, excused the call to Muhammad by saying that at that time, “We had

conquered a distant and renowned province. And [we] were intending towards Hamadan

and Baghdad, so that there would be no danger from the Daylamites.”24 The conquest

of faraway territories implies that Mas'ud could not come to Ghazna quickly, even if

called. But the fact remained that the courtiers had not called M as'ud as early as he had

probably wished. The discord between his face-saving statement, that he would not have

been able to come, and the reality, that they had not called him early on, seems humor­

ous.

The sultan, then, stated that the letter which he sent to Muhammad carried words

of, " . . . condolences, congratulations, and advice [nasThat].”25 The fact that Mas'ud

immediately sent his brother words of congratulations and advice is ironic. Congratulat­

ing Muhammad for his accession to the throne implies the admission of his higher status

as king. But advice (nasThat) always suggests a better understanding, and thus, a higher

symbolic position on the part of the one who offers it.

The word nasThat, advice, is the key to the explanation of Muhammad’s mistake

and M as'ud’s success. M as'ud’s advice, as reconstructed from his own reference to it,

34

seems to have been for Muhammad to rule as his representative, khalifat, and to have

sent his brother what he had asked, not named.26

Under those conditions, the amir exclaimed, “We would not have come into con­

flict with him at all . . . we would have called the courtiers and army leaders that we

needed and made for Baghdad, so that the land of Muslims would come under the rule

of us two brothers.”27 So, if only Muhammad had accepted the lower status of repre­

sentative, when he was already the amir, Mas'ud would have gone to Baghdad and con­

quered even more lands. The implied conclusion is that Muhammad had made a mistake

by refusing this generous offer, when in reality, it would have been a lowering of his sta­

tus. Even more significant was the suggestion that Mas'ud would have been greater than

imagined, if only given the chance.

Muhammad’s mistake is not stated but implied, and M as'ud’s success is ultimately

attributed to divine decree. The amir said, “But the brother closed the gate of his own

prosperity, and thought that the decisions o f . . . mortals would equal the decree of the

Creator.”28 The latent contradiction in this statement creates irony. If God had decreed

that M as'ud rule, as claimed, then Muhammad had to make the mistake that would result

in M as'ud’s rise.

Mas'ud, also, closed his letter with a short note (mulattafah), which comprises

orders about Muhammad. The amir ordered that the courtiers keep his brother in the

Kuhtlz fortress, without explaining why he could not be sent to Guzganan. As for Herat,

M as'ud wrote that it would be unseemly (zisht) to bring him there, explaining, " . . . we

could not see him in . . . [captivity].”29 In other words, it was not the arrest which

was unseemly, but the fact that M as'ud would have to witness his brother in captivity.

The letter ends with the appointment of Muhammad’s attendant, Bigtigln, as the police

chief of both Taglnabad and Bust, and the mention of a decision in the future regarding

Muhammad.30

Mas‘ud

The second section of volume five focuses on Mas'ud after the news of his father’s

death. The reported events of this section, the events which resulted in the succession

conflict and its resolution, predate those of the previous one. Therefore, in this section,

35

one views how Mas'ud succeeded in seizing the throne, when his father had opposed it

and his brother had already assumed power. Knowledge of opposition to the succession

of M as'ud and his own efforts in seizing the throne shows that the narrative of Mas'ud as

rightful ruler was false. And this falsehood, in many instances, had comic effects. The

letters in this section concern the succession conflict, and the lies that surrounded it.

One can identify a range of attitudes about the fate of the throne in the fifteen let­

ters whose contents BayhaqT either refers to or provides.31 The letter of M as'ud’s aunt,

Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, initiated a series of letters which almost all center on the topic of

succession to the throne. M as'ud reacted to the letters that he received in Isfahan and on

his way to Khurasan in letters of his own.

Hurrah-yi KhuttalT sent Mas'ud a letter, encouraging him to seize the throne.32

After the news about the death of Mahmud, she said, " . . . we all remained remorseful,

since [we] had not seen him for a week. And ‘AIT QarTb is in charge of everything.”33

The immediate change of attitude is comical. First she seems sad and sorrowful about

Mahmud’s death, but then, she quickly tends to the business at hand, with the news about

'AIT QarTb.

She mentioned that Muhammad had been called from Guzganan, but then stated, “

. . . [your] brother Muhammad will not be able to perform this big task, and this court

has many enemies.”34 These assessments demonstrate that she was informed about

the political realities of the Ghaznavid court. But they contradict the powerless attitude

that Hurrah-yi KhuttalT displayed next, in appealing to Mas'ud to ascend the throne.

She said, “ . . . we women and the treasures [of the state] have fallen in the desert of

Ghazna.”35

Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, then, falsely called Mas'ud the successor of Mahmud, whereas

in reality, the late amir had moved the succession to Muhammad. She asked Mas'ud not

to concern himself with the territories he had conquered, since “ . . . [he] can conquer

other territories.”36 But as the record of his ten year rule demonstrates, M as'ud would

have more success in losing territories than in increasing the Ghaznavid kingdom.

In letters to the ‘Abbasid caliph and the Kakuyid ruler ‘Ala al-Dawlah, Mas'ud

assumed the attitude that the throne was his. BayhaqT does not provide the text of the

letter to the caliph, but gives a summary of its content when mentioning the caliph’s re-

36

sponse to it. The caliph wrote Mas'ud with condolences about Mahmud’s death, and the

grant of titles and a treaty.37 But Mas'ud himself had asked for these, mentioning that

he was going to Khurasan to assume power. So the caliph approved Mas'ud as the right­

ful ruler and granted him territories and a title, with instructions from the latter himself.

Considering the fact that the ‘Abbasid caliph held no real political power at this point, he

was granting what was not his to give. And with Muhammad having already ascended

the throne according to his father’s wish, Mas'ud was asking for a kingdom that, strictly

speaking, was not his either.

Once M as'ud received this politically hollow, but symbolically important sanction,

he believed the truth of his own claim. The letter to ‘Ala al-Dawlah reveals the amir’s

attitude.38 The letter is framed by its objectives, that ‘Ala al-Dawlah should represent

Ghaznavid power in Isfahan, and that there would be an attack in case of his disobedi­

ence. Therefore, Mas'ud first spoke to ‘Ala al-Dawlah in a kind and flattering tone, say­

ing, " . . . no representative will be more deserving than amir ‘Ala al-Dawlah . . . ”39

But in the end, the amir threatened him with an attack. Mas'ud stated, “If we return [to

Isfahan] with anger, the siege of this place will be in a different way.”40 So, the amir

flattered ‘Ala al-Dawlah with being the best of representatives, but warned that he him­

self could be the worst of enemies.

BayhaqT then writes about Mas'ud in Ray, where he received three letters. The au­

thor does not give the full text of any of these letters, but mostly summarizes them. First

was a letter of M as'ud’s sworn confidants, saying that the Ghazna courtiers had alleged

loyalty to Muhammad. This news worried Mas'ud, who then wrote to his brother. But

with the letter of the caliph, the amir received the approval that the Ghaznavid courtiers

had denied him.

But then, they secretly wrote Mas'ud, saying, “Muhammad was called to the

throne only as a temporary measure, and [he] does nothing but drink and enjoy him­

self.”41 It is ironically humorous to consider these letters jointly. First came the alle­

giance to Muhammad, whom the courtiers were, soon afterwards, denouncing to Mas'ud.

And the caliph was declaring M as'ud the rightful ruler when his brother had already as­

cended the throne.

37

The Damghan part of BayhaqT’s narrative next relates to intrigue, associated with

Bu Sahl ZawzanI, and letters received, belatedly, from Mahmud.42 In the course of his

trip to Khurasan, M as'ud was joined by Bu Sahl close to Damghan. He was a partisan of

Mas'ud, and thus, had been jailed during Muhammad’s rule.

BayhaqI associates Bu Sahl with secrecy, by first speaking about his private meet­

ing with Mas'ud, saying, " . . . [it] lasted from [the time of] the evening prayer til mid­

night.”43 This intimates intrigue by Bu Sahl, given that he would incite Mas'ud against

other courtiers the most.

BayhaqI then displays his own disapproval towards Bu Sahl. The author says, “In

the old days, when Amir . . . [Mas'ud] was in Herat, the greatest of his servants was

this man, but he behaved badly towards people. And [he] had a bad temper and was

coarse.”44

The expectation that one has at this point is to learn about an instance where Bu

Sahl caused trouble for others. But instead, the author mentions what he seems to con­

sider a lie about Bu Sahl, whom “ . . . [they] slandered . . . in relation to his faith.”45 So

he was not a good-natured man, but then, the fact that others falsely accused him was not

fair either. By referring to these lies about Bu Sahl, the author painstakingly tries to es­

tablish that he himself has told the truth about him. For it implies that BayhaqI has not

simply joined others in slandering Bu Sahl, but also defended him against their false ac­

cusations.

Next, BayhaqI speaks of letters from Mahmud to the Kakuyid leader and others,

carrying the message that, “ . . . [I] disown my son [Mas'ud].”46 A fast rider brought

these letters to the amir close to Damghan, and Bu Sahl ZawzanI and others advised

M as'ud to publicize the letters. They reasoned, “ . . . people would read these [let­

ters] and see what [your] father had planned, as opposed to what God decreed.”47 But

M as'ud objected to this advice, as well as to the advice that he should punish the scribes

who had written the letter, saying, “If at the end of his life [the late Sultan] saw this un­

kindness necessary, and he had a purpose for this, one should consider the many things

wherein he had our best interest at heart.”48 The amir had the letters torn and thrown

into the nearby dam.49

38

BayhaqT points out the “morals” of the stories of Bu Sahl and Mahmud’s letters

with the results of ambiguity and irony.50 In talking about Bu Sahl, BayhaqT mentions

that people respected him, whether they liked him or not. The author draws the conclu­

sion that “ . . . men should try to make a good name for themselves . . . [which] will not

leave them until they go into the grave.”51 The last statement, “until they go into the

grave,” creates ambiguity. Considered against BayhaqT’s moral maxim that what remains

from a person’s existence is a name, and that one should leave behind a good name, the

statement invites an ironic reading. As though others respected Bu Sahl as long as he

was alive, but once he died they denounced him.

About Mahmfld’s letters, BayhaqT says, “ . . . both the scribes and those to whom

[they] had written were relieved . . . since they realized that [Mas'ud] would not concern

himself with that [affair].”52 M as'ud’s order for the destruction of the letters appears as

a kind act to save a dead father’s good reputation, and to exonerate innocent scribes. Yet

these letters in which Mahmud had explicitly disowned his son could cause trouble for

M as'ud at this point, since he was seeking legitimacy and support.

BayhaqT follows the Damghan narrative with two stories from the time of the ‘Ab-

basid caliph M a’mun. First is the story of Harun al-RashTd’s vizier Fazl RabT'.53 Ac­

cording to the wishes of Harun al-RashTd, the vizier sided with the “righteous” caliph

Muhammad, but also denounced Ma’mun who won the succession battle. Fazl RabT' was

deposed though not imprisoned. But men like ‘Abd Allah Tahir interceded with M a’mun

on behalf of Fazl RabT'. Thus, he regained a high status at court, because of his past rep­

utation. BayhaqT concludes, “This story came to an end, and when a wise [man] reflects

on this, [he] will know how [great] these men [of affairs] have been.”54

Irony arises in considering three discords in the story. One is over the succession

conflict, which, similar to the Ghaznavid one, ended differently from the way Harun had

wished. Two, one sees Fazl RabT' receive respect and honor, even after having been de­

posed. So the official became a symbol of the power, which had been lost in a real polit­

ical sense. Finally, one views Fazl RabT', first, at the height of power, but later, content

simply to sit at court. It is the realization, the fear, that one’s life can so easily change,

leading to such different perspectives as that of a vizier and then a court companion that

results in the expectation of ironies of fate.

39

The second story relates to letters in the ‘Abbasid succession conflict.55 When the

two ‘Abbasid brothers were fighting over the caliphate, nobles from the opposing courts

wrote the two secret letters of support. Once he ascended the throne, M a’mun asked

what he should do about the letters. His vizier Hasan ibn Sahl suggested reading them

and throwing out the traitors of both sides from the court. BayhaqT reports that M a’mun

laughed and said, “ . . . then no one will remain from either side and they will go and

join the enemy, leaving us behind.”56 Ma’mun then ordered the letters to be burnt.

In this story and the one about Mas'ud, the rulers received the advice that they

should publicize the letters. But in both stories, they had them destroyed, seemingly out

of concern for the writers. But the letters would disclose matters interfering with the

claim to the throne by the rulers themselves. The humor and realism in comments about

loyalty by M a’mun contrast with the pretense of loyalty in Mas'ud. Especially since he

seems loyal to a father whose expressed sentiment towards him was the opposite.

BayhaqT concludes with a passage on his reasons for including these kinds of sto­

ries. These stories embellish history and teach wise men with diligence to use intrigue,

hTlah, so as to raise their status or learn about a branch of knowledge previously un­

known to them.57 The connection made between intrigue and knowledge creates irony,

since intrigue involves deception, whereas one usually associates knowledge with truth.

The narrative continues with the report of M as'ud’s letter to GhazT, with orders to

prepare Nishapur for the arrival of the sultan.58 Once in Nishapur and prior to the ar­

rival of the caliph’s messenger, Mas'ud assumed the rights of his position.59 He had al­

ready ascended the throne in Nishapur.60 But the ceremony in that city, once the mes­

senger arrived, shows the symbolic importance of this approval for everyone.61 The

amir then ordered copies of the caliph’s letter and contract to be sent to many cities in

the empire.62

The second section ends in Herat, where, BayhaqT reports, the sultan received daily

letters from the military corps in Ghazna.63 At the end of the first section, the author

depicts the Ghazna courtiers preparing to leave for Herat.64 So the reported events in

this section led to those in the previous one, which BayhaqT closes by saying, “And ev­

erything was settled and . . . [the courtiers] departed for H erat. . . ”65 And he ends the

40

second section with Mingitarak presenting their letter to Mas'ud, and the departure of a

messenger to the courtiers.66

Realities

‘AIT Qarlb

In the third section of volume five, BayhaqT narrates ‘AIT QarTb’s prophecy in

TagTnabad and the scene of intrigue in Herat. The author picks up the narrative which he

had left off, so as to relate the situation of Mas'ud at the time of Muhammad’s reign.67

‘AIT QarTb informed the courtiers about M as'ud’s order to leave for Herat, and they pre­

pared to leave.68 In a private session before this departure, ‘AIT QarTb confided in the

chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan. In a two-part monologue addressed to Bu Nasr, ‘AIT

QarTb prophesied his own arrest and the factionalism at M as'ud’s court.69

He began his monologue with a nostalgic farewell, saying, “Farewell to you, [my]

dear friend. It has been a long time that we have kept each other company, without one

hurting the other.”70 When Bu Nasr then asked ‘AIT why he spoke so sadly, he reas­

sured the Chief Secretary about coming to Herat.71 But ‘AIT then foretold his own fu­

ture arrest in a way that would characterize the ten-year court history of M as'ud 72

‘AIT QarTb called the actions of Mas'ud, writing in his own handwriting, addressing

him in familiar ways, and granting ‘AlT’s brother a high position, all acts of deception,

farTb. ‘AIT called these acts “seeds,” saying, “These are all seeds, so that I would fall into

the trap.”73 He named the courtiers who would play a role in his coming arrest, includ­

ing ‘AIT Dayah and GhazT. These two men would become the objects of intrigue them­

selves, and ‘AIT Dayah would plot against GhazT as well. So while in this intrigue, the

two conspired against ‘AIT QarTb, in less than a year, GhazT himself would become the

victim of ‘AIT Dayah.

‘AIT QarTb explained that he could easily escape with the Ghaznavid treasury and

his troops, and even conquer new territories. He stated, “ . . . with this army, [one] could

seize Kirman and Ahvaz, all the way to Baghdad . . . ”74 But he renounced doing that,

out of loyalty to Mahmud. Mas'ud and his people would not rest easy, and “ . . . the

rulers of the surrounding territories would consider my lord Mahmud [responsible for]

. . . [the discord in the house of Ghazna] . . . ”75

41

‘AIT here assumed the pose of a hero, one who could easily evade his tragic fate,

but would not because of loyalty. The prediction of the arrest and ‘All’s submissive at­

titude make the victim more powerful than his intriguers. He knew what would hap­

pen to him, and he accepted it, despite the ability to reverse his fate. So, it is as though

he allowed the intriguers to carry out their plot, being aware of their actions and mo­

tives regarding him. In contrast, the intriguers appear unaware, and thus, less powerful.

They seem unaware of the fact that they would succeed in capturing ‘AIT, not because of

their great mastery at intrigue, but because of the nobility that prevented him from escap­

ing. So, he was the victim of his own principles, while they were, also, the object of his

irony.

‘AIT continued this pose as a hero, expressing that he was ready to be sacrificed.

He said, “I wish that [they] would imprison me somewhere . . . ”76 But he contrasted his

own assumed nobility, with the baseness of the intriguers, stating “But I know that these

helpless [men] would not allow this prince to let me live, since they will be scared. And

. . . [this Amir] will covet my wealth, and make himself infamous [badnam].”77 The

contrast drawn is between nobility on the part of ‘AIT, manifest in his willingness to be

sacrificed, and baseness in the intriguers, especially Mas'ud, who appears as greedy for

wealth and unconcerned about his reputation.

The awareness of his own flaws makes ‘AIT QarTb a tragic figure, and the irony of

his fate, foreboding.78 He regretted his role in the succession conflict. Other courtiers

had distanced themselves from the decision to bring Muhammad, and called him “ ‘AIT,

the king-maker.”79 He ended this part of his monologue with a restatement of his de­

cision to go to Herat, despite his premonitions. He said, “It will be as God, may His

mention be exalted, has willed. I have accepted [my] fate, and I will not choose infamy

[badnamT] under any conditions.”80 This contrasts with the last passage about the in­

triguers, especially Mas‘ud. The amir would make himself infamous by plotting against

‘AIT, while he refused to lose his own good name, even in the face of arrest and exile.

By speaking of his loyalty in this way, ‘AIT QarTb elevated his own status while he con­

demned the intriguers even more.

At this point, Bu Nasr replied, “May [God] grant [you] . . . the great Hajib a long

life! [There] will be nothing but favors and kindness. Once [I] get to Herat, what should

42

I do if the subject comes up?”81 ‘All Qarlb showed his last glimmer of hope for safety,

but he immediately discounted this possibility, saying, “ . . . I am certain that [it will not

come up] until I am in their clutches.”82 In his first two statements, Bu Nasr consoled

‘AIT. But the question that the chief secretary then raised shows that he knew there might

be a plot, which he was offering to help prevent.

‘AIT QarTb closed his monologue by predicting the future factionalism at the court,

where, “ . . . the MahmudTyan will be like traitors and strangers among [the men of the

new order] . . . ”83 He called M as'ud’s shame, sharm, the only hope that men like him­

self and Bu Nasr had that might keep the amir from plotting against them. Otherwise, he

said, “ . . . you will [ailj . i . ’84 He then wept, embraced Bu Nasr, and left.

BayhaqT ends this scene by calling attention to this story as a tragedy, and to the

irony of the victim’s tragic vision. The author states, “I, Bu al-Fazl, would say that men

like ‘AIT are rare. And the fact that he spoke to my master in this way was as though he

had seen and knew what would happen to him.”85

Appearances vs. Realities

‘AIT QarTb vs. Mas‘ud

In the court scene BayhaqT recreates ‘AIT QarTb’s arrest. In the passage before this

scene, the author says, “ . . . [‘AIT QarTb] treated everyone kindly and smiled ironically—

and I never saw him laugh, but only smile. Such a hardened man he was— deep in

thought, as though he knew what would happen.”86 On Wednesday the third of Dhu al-

Qa'dah of 421/1030, when ‘AIT QarTb arrived in Herat, Mas'ud held court in the ‘AdnanT

Garden. The niceties of court ceremony and M as'ud’s kind words play against earlier

foreshadowings and details of the scene—details that gain in significance after viewing

the arrest.

I will discuss the scene in three parts based on the departures of the Khvarazmshah,

‘AIT QarTb, and his brother MingTtarak. ‘AIT QarTb and his people entered the court from

one entrance, and the Khvarazmshah Altuntash from another.87 This is significant, since

by leaving the court from the same door from which he had entered, the Khvarazmshah

did not witness the arrest, and was told about it only later. The scene continues with the

43

ceremonies of court seating, ‘AIT QarTb kissing the ground three times, and his offerings

of a ring and one thousand dinars to Mas'ud.

With the Khvarazmshah AltOntash on his right and ‘All QarTb on his left, Mas'ud

spoke kindly to the latter. ‘AIT responded as though he had been reassured, and the

Khvarazmshah implicitly advised against the intrigue, yet to come. This advice on be­

half of the victim of intrigue relates to all men of the old order, including Altuntash him­

self. He said, “The servant ‘AIT suffered much, so no trouble arose . . . And though there

are many worthy servants who have come [with the Lord] or will come to serve, a few

elder statesmen are here who spent years in the service of sultan Mahmud. If you see

fit, they should be kept [rather than] turned into enemies. For the treasure of a state is

its elders.”88 M as‘ud’s response to this advice is ironic. He said, “The Khvarazmshah’s

words are like those of [our] father . . . we listen to them with contentment and accept

his kind advice.”89 Mas'ud spoke the truth. He honored neither Mahmud’s will on the

fate of the Ghaznavid kingship, nor the Khvarazmshah’s advice on the fate of ‘AIT QarTb.

BayhaqT closes this part of the scene with the Khvarazmshah’s departure from the

same door he had entered.90 ‘AIT QarTb also attempted to leave, but the sultan motioned

to him to stay. Next, Mas'ud asked ‘AIT about the affairs of Muhammad and his treasury.

‘AIT responded in the presence of a few courtiers, including his own brother MingTtarak.

M as‘ud then ordered, “[Now] return and rest [a while], because many decisions [tadbTr]

and matters need your attention.”91

‘AIT QarTb rose, kissed the ground, and left from the same door he had entered.

M as‘ud’s last statement to ‘AIT is ironic. Considering that he would be arrested soon,

there were no matters that could possibly need his attention. The use of the word tadbTr,

decision or advice, also creates irony. If one interprets tadbTr as intrigue, implied in

some other instances of its use in The History, then the statement becomes partially true.

There was an intrigue that involved ‘AIT. But rather than being by him, it was against

him.

In the third part of the scene, with MingTtarak still in the court, M as'ud sent out,

first ‘Abdus and then Tahir with messages for ‘AIT.92 Tahir returned with ‘AlT’s sup­

posed replies. And then MingTtarak asked the sultan for permission to host a gathering

for ‘AIT. M as'ud granted his permission, after which MingTtarak left cheerfully.

44

The victim of irony here was MingTtarak, considering his earnest and unsuspecting

attitude in the face of both his own and ‘All’s arrest. The court scene ends with an ironic

statement before the report of the arrest. BayhaqI says, “And what gathering would

[MingTtarak] host? . . . they had [already] captured ‘AIT. And that message which Tahir

brought back about the troops and Makran was a lie.”93 The author then continues with

a terse report about the earlier plunder of ‘AlT’s belongings by GhazT, and the arrest of

MingTtarak. BayhaqT ends the story of ‘AIT QarTb and his brother with the Arabic state­

ment, “wa kana akhar al-‘ahd bi-hima; [And that was the end of their time].”94

Ghazi

The three MahmudTyan who plotted against Aryaruq and GhazT knew that the

amir would be reluctant to arrest GhazT. GhazT had announced the arrival of M as'ud in

Khurasan. And the amir had spoken of this service with gratitude. Therefore, the men of

the old order had to do three things to secure GhazT’s imprisonment and exile. First was

the arrest of Aryaruq which was accomplished 95 Then, they falsely led GhazT to be­

lieve that M as'ud would soon arrest him.96 Even after GhazT’s escape and the capture,

the MahmudTyan realized that M as‘0d might still pardon him. It was for this reason that

they continued slandering GhazT to the amir.97 Mas'ud finally succumbed to their plots,

and exiled GhazT.

A summary of this story of intrigue is as follows: 1) commentary; 2) the lie of in­

trigue (transmitters and letters); 3) the escape (the Oxus); 4) the arrest (the banks of the

Oxus and the Garden of Muhammad); 5) the order of exile. The story comprises a com­

mentary and a two-part narrative. In his commentary, BayhaqT discusses why the plot

succeeded, establishing a confidence with his readers. This confidential narrator-reader

relationship resembles that of the ironist to the ironologist.98 In both cases, there is a

joined confidence against a victim. Between a narrator and his reader, this victim is the

character or group of characters in the narrative, and between an ironist and the one who

perceives his use of irony, that is, the ironologist, this is against anyone on whom the

ironic meaning is lost.

In the first part of the narrative, the lies surrounding the intrigue are transmitted

through letters. In the second part, one sees GhazT escape and be arrested. While under

45

arrest in the palace, GhazT hoped for a pardon, and the intriguers schemed so this would

not happen. Irony arises in viewing the victim’s hope and the intriguers’ fear, with the

knowledge of the final exile that the reader, the ironologist, shares with BayhaqT, the iro­

nist.

Realities: Commentary

The author first establishes his own trustworthiness as a narrator, a narrative con­

vention which is not uncommon with BayhaqT. As though posing the rhetorical question,

“why should I lie,” he states that all those involved in the story had passed away, and

their quarrels had, thus, been postponed til Judgement D ay ." By doing this, BayhaqT

associates himself with his readers, against those involved in the story, who had become

“victims” of the irony of death.

He gives three reasons for the arrest, the tenacity of the intriguers, imprudent acts

on GhazT’s part, and finally, Fate, from which there is no escape. GhazT became afraid

after Aryaruq’s capture and stopped drinking wine. But the MahmudTyan continued their

deceptions and lies about GhazT. BayhaqT states, “ . . . the Amir’s heart filled [with ran­

cor], but [he] showed kingly forebearance.” 100

Appearances

TVansmittors and Letters

The MahmudTyan transmitted the lie of arrest through two women, who seem to

have been unaware of the plot. Thus, they were victims and intriguers at once, having

been deceived by the MahmudTyan to transmit the lie of arrest to GhazT. The author

speaks about the noblewoman as the widow of Hasan Mihran and the daughter of Bu al-

Fazl BustT, only referring to her as hurrah (noblewoman). This hurrah was the godmother

of a servant woman in GhazT’s harem, and as BayhaqT states, “She had a nice handwrit­

ing and wrote Persian very well.” 101 This statement gains an ironic significance, given

that the means of the intrigue was letters. Deception through letters is, therefore, associ­

ated with the veil of apparent beauty, handwriting, and the reality of words, which in this

cas^ conveyed a lie.

46

BayhaqT does not name the ones who transmitted the lie to the hurrah, out of seem­

ingly good-hearted advice, saying, “The Amir will arrest poor GhazT. [It] is getting close

and will be on such a night.” 102 In return, the hurrah informed the servant woman, who

disclosed this to GhazT. She said, “Take care of your affairs as long as [you] are free, so

that [they] will not unexpectedly capture [you] like Aryaruq.” 103 Irony arises in con­

sidering that, in the end, it was because GhazT acted on this advice and fled that he was

captured by surprise.

The distraught GhazT asked the servant woman to call in the hurrah, who answered

that she was afraid to meet, and would write letters instead. BayhaqT does not include

the contents of any of these letters. He points to this noblewoman as a victim of in­

trigue, in a confidential statement to his readers. He states, “ . . . the MahmudTyan were

skilled in such things. How could this [hurrah] woman know? Therefore, fate did as it

pleased.” 104 The final chain of transmission about the lie of the arrest was on the night

before the supposed capture. The intriguers, remaining unnamed, told this lie to the no­

blewoman, who transmitted it to the servant girl through a letter, and she to GhazT.105

Appearances vs. Realities

Escape and Arrest

This part on the escape, the struggle, and the arrest comprises three scenes. In the

first scene, BayhaqT focuses on GhazT, who became afraid when he read the letter. Bay­

haqT says, “Fire fell inside GhazT, because others had [also] scared him.” 106 So he de­

cided to escape. But in order not to arouse suspicion, he pretended that the sultan was

sending him on an important assignment. Therefore, GhazT used intrigue himself, in an

attempt to evade the rumored arrest.

The escape brought GhazT and his small entourage of ghulams and five slave girls

to a two-way road, one towards Khurasan, and the other towards the Oxus. BayhaqT nar­

rates, “ . . . like a stupified [man, GhazT] remained motionless.” 107 He asked his people

which direction to take. And they all showed their loyalty and trust towards him by de­

ferring to him. Then, they swore, “ . . . if [they] come to capture us, we will wage battle,

[sacrificing our lives if needed].” 108 This statement is humorously ironic, considering

that this small group of ghulams could not, and did not, withstand the Ghaznavid forces.

47

GhazT fled to the Oxus. But once he had passed the river, he regretted his deci­

sion, saying, “[I] made a mistake since [I] came to the land of the enemies .” 109 This

is in ironic contrast to the expression of trust that his people had shown. So, they trusted

his judgement when he himself did not. He stated, “[I] will become very infamous be­

cause here is an enemy of Mahmud’s state such as ‘Alltigln.” 110 Just as GhazT decided

to go to Khvarazm and ask Altuntash to intercede on his behalf, M as'ud’s troops came

into view, and as BayhaqT describes, “GhazT became very surprised.” 111 Irony arises

in considering that GhazT expressed fear of disrepute, for having entered the land of an

enemy of the dead king Mahmud, rather than the reigning Mas‘Qd. Another ground for

irony is that Mas'Gd’s troops arrived, just as GhazT had hit upon a possible solution to his

dilemma.

While fear, regret, and surprise characterize the mood of the first scene, in the

second scene the mood changes from a confused panic to calm at the end. BayhaqT be­

gins and ends the next scene in the court. The banks of the Oxus are the location of the

struggle in the middle of this scene. He begins, “Next day when [we] went to the court,

[there] was a big confusion and the troops were leaving one after another.” 112 M as’ud

had his confidant ‘AbdGs carry a message to GhazT, along with his ring and a note of safe

passage in his own handwriting. The sultan said, “Your enemies carried out [their plot],

but [you] can still make amends. Return, so that [they] won’t succeed . . . [we] will treat

you as [you] had been [treated before].” 113 Mas'Gd’s message contains both truths and

lies. The pardon seems to have been an actual possibility. But given one’s knowledge of

the order of exile, the promise to treat GhazT as before is really a lie.

In the middle part of this scene BayhaqT focuses on the struggle between the

MahmudTyan troops and those of GhazT. The MahmudTyan had sent out choice military

troops, secretly instructed to kill GhazT if possible.114 BayhaqT mentions that GhazT at­

tempted to escape, and was injured in the course of the struggle.115 Once ‘Abdus ar­

rived and ended the struggle, he scolded the troops, saying, “ . . . [you] did not have

an order to fight. Why did you . . . ? [You] should have waited . . . until another order

would reach [you].” 116 It was as though Mas'ud, and vicariously his confidant, were

defending GhazT against his enemies, when, ultimately, it was M as'ud who held the

power to imprison or pardon him.

48

‘Abdus went towards GhazT who, as BayhaqT describes, “ . . . was sorrowfully

standing on top of [a hill].”117 The imagery of high ground is ironic, given GhazT’s

fallen status. But especially because it recalls the same imagery in the story of Aryaruq,

where one views the intriguers plotting atop a high ground. It is as though the Mah­

mudTyan reversed their own lowered status by bringing down GhazT. And lost power

on the parts of both the antagonists and their victim was in ironic contrast to their sur­

roundings. The irony of self-entrapment is epitomized in the question that ‘Abdus asked,

“ . . . what demon possessed you, so that [you] made yourself the prey of enemies?” 118

‘Abdus’s statement rings with irony: there were enemies who plotted against GhazT, and

he did play into their hands. In reply, GhazT fell to the ground, cried, and said, “It was

fate and [they] frightened [me].” 119

Back at the court, Mas'ud received a message from ‘Abdus, along with GhazT’s

shield, after which, “ . . . [the Amir] quieted down.” 120 M as‘ud then asked the courtiers

to leave, and retired to his private chambers himself.

In the third scene BayhaqT discloses the events at court and before the exile. GhazT

returned with the troops, and stayed in the Muhammadi palace. M as‘ud sent him plates

of food and words of comfort, and had court physicians treat his injured knee. In con­

trast to these kind acts towards GhazT in the court, one thousand foot soldiers surrounded

the palace without his knowledge. This part of the scene ends with the statement that,

“ ‘Abdus returned after the female servants had lain down with [GhazT].” 121

On the day after the arrest, the sultan addressed his courtiers, saying, “GhazT is

an upright and capable man. He was not at fault since [they] frightened him. [One]

can resolve this situation, and whoever intrigued [like] this will be punished.” 122 The

courtiers expressed their agreement with Mas'ud, as though they could do otherwise.

What creates humorous irony is that the three intriguers were most likely at court on

that day, confirming GhazT’s innocence along with everyone else. Also, men like Ahmad

Hasan and Bu Nasr were much too astute to believe that Mas‘ud would actually do

what he promised. Thus, the image created of at least two groups of courtiers is that of

masked intriguers and observers.

49

BayhaqT then writes, “When ‘Abdus told GhazT about [all] this, he became very

happy.” 123 This earnest attitude on the part of GhazT seems foolish, in the face of the

preceding arrests and the intrigues that were yet to come.

Mas'ud sent GhazT a message with the court physicians and received one in return.

In his message, the sultan comforted GhazT, openly expressing that, “ . . . [they] plotted

this against you.” 124 But it is the reasons Mas'ud gave for the house arrest that relate to

him. He said, “The intention is so that [you] would be close to us, the physicians would

treat you with care and attention, and this injury would be healed.” 125 One can ascribe

one of two intentions to Mas'ud, one, the amir intended to pardon GhazT, circumstances

permitting; two, Mas'ud worried that GhazT, though injured and unarmed, might pro­

voke others to an uprising against the court. So the amir guarded against this with a false

promise. In either case, whether Mas'ud was in earnest or lying, his statements ring with

irony, considering his soon-to-follow order of exile. In the former case, this is due to the

fate of exile, against his earlier intention of pardon. And in the latter, the irony is in the

discord between his words and actions.

The attitude of GhazT was still earnest at this point. When he heard this message,

he kissed the ground just as he was sitting, wept, and prayed.126 He indirectly pleaded

his own innocence, by ascribing fault to the intriguers. He said, “[They] plotted [this

against] me, [and] therefore such a [grave] mistake resulted.” 127 So the plea for inno­

cence was also an admission of foolishness. In other words, “they entrapped me, and I

played right into their hands.”

GhazT, then, spoke of actions by himself and Mas'ud, first abstractly, and then in

concrete terms. In the general statement about actions of subjects and rulers, GhazT ex­

claimed, “Servants err while lords forgive.” 128 But Mas'ud had not forgiven anyone be­

fore, and was not about to do so with GhazT. He ended his message with an indirect plea

for mercy, saying, “I cannot express enough regret. The Lord will do that which befits

his eminence.” 129 This indirect plea for mercy implies a following statement that, “And

I hope this will be a pardon.”

BayhaqT speaks of the intriguers’ reaction to this turn of events, leading the reader

to expect the final exile. Once they learned about the exchange between M as'ud and

GhazT, they feared that Mas'ud would grant a pardon. The author states, " . . . [they]

50

intrigued [again] so that which had resulted [had befallen/uftadah] would not be lost

[would not rise/bar-nakhTzad].” 130 Irony arises in consequence of attributing two ref­

erents to the passive participle uftadah. One could interpret the use of this word, mean­

ing fallen, to refer to the intrigue as well as to GhazT himself, whose injured knee pre­

vented him from standing. GhazT’s people were pleased with this turn of events. BayhaqT

ends this part with the report of their reaction, saying, “ . . . in two [or] three days, [they]

came out of their hiding places and, went [to see GhazT].” 131 The image of these men

and women stealthily coming out of their places, and going to see GhazT provides comic

relief.

Exile

The second part begins with the statement, “[I] will not prolong the story more

than this.” 132 BayhaqT, again, attributes the amir’s decision to exile GhazT to the Mah-

mudTyan’s continuous intrigues, GhazT’s own mistakes, and fate. The author explains, “

. . . the Amir . . . realized that this matter was beyond repair.” 133

He called in ‘Abdus, who carried the news of this decision back to GhazT. Mas'ud

first expressed frustration at the whole affair, saying, “[It] is impossible to make a whole

world revolt for the sake of one person who has committed a treason like this.” 134 So,

in contrast to the earlier defense of GhazT at court, Mas'ud was, now, siding with the in­

triguers against him.

M as'ud gave GhazT false hopes of future release, by referring to the exile as a tem­

porary condition, so he could return after, “ . . . this bad name will have left you . . . ” 135

But that never happened. Instead, GhazT gained an even worse reputation later, by at­

tempting to escape from prison.136 Except for two women servants, the amir took away

all of GhazT’s ghulams and possessions. Two women had helped in the plot, so it seems

ironically befitting that two other women should have then comforted GhazT in his im­

prisonment. M as'ud also ordered spies to watch over GhazT, so that, “ . . . no action or

word of this man [GhazT] remains unknown.” 137

Earlier, GhazT had indirectly expressed his hope for a pardon, saying, “Servants err

while lords forgive.” But once ‘Abdus told him about the decision, GhazT realized that

all he could do was submit to his fate of arrest. He said, “The best interests of servants

51

is in what lords command.” 138 He expressed that ‘Abdus accept him in friendship, and

in spite of assurances that things were better than imagined, GhazT exclaimed, “I am not

a child, and [I] know that [I] will not see . . . [you] after today.” 139 This is the first time

in the story that one sees GhazT assessing his own situation accurately. Yet by this point,

it was too late to correct mistakes, like drinking excessively and escaping on the basis of

a rumored piece of information. By this point, GhazT, the victim of intrigue and irony,

predicted the irony of his own fateful end. ‘Abdus promised loyalty, accepted GhazT, and

in a gesture of both sympathy and farewell, embraced him.

BayhaqT reports that Mas'ud became upset, when ‘Abdus told him about all this.

The amir said, “This man is innocent. [Only] God, may He be exalted and glorified,

could protect servants, but [one] should not allow any harm to come to [GhazT]. [We]

entrust him to you; look after his affairs.” 140 With these expressions of concern, M as‘ud

seems as helpless as GhazT actually was to reverse the situation. The amir then ordered

lavish preparations for the imprisonment, but also that they take away GhazT at night,

so that people would not see the departure.141 In other words, M as'ud feared that

people would see the situation for what it was. But he hoped that the victim himself

would not do that, being made comfortable with food and women. BayhaqT concludes,

“ . . . [they] took away GhazT, and that was the end of his time [kana akhar al-‘ahd bihT],

since . . . [GhazT] was not seen either.” 142

Sermons

BayhaqT ends both stories of intrigue with a sermon. These two share the same,

basic pattern of other sermons in The History.143 He advises living wisely, by adopting

the virtues of frugality and kindness. For by doing this, one remains unattached to the

vanishing riches of this world. And since all that remains from a person’s life is a name,

it is through acts of kindness and gentleness that a good name is left behind. The ser­

mons on ‘AIT QarTb and GhazT share these elements. And like the other sermons, they

also contain a part in which BayhaqT ponders the individual meanings of these men’s

lives. But the different lessons drawn in the two cases demonstrate the contrasting at­

titude of the ironist towards the victims of irony. BayhaqT points to the tragic aspect of

‘AIT Qarib’s fate, and to ‘AIT as a tragic victim. But the author portrays GhazT as a fool,

52

by emphasizing the ironic comedy of his earlier arrogance and his unawareness almost to

the end.

In the case of ‘All Qarlb, it is the meaning of his capture that BayhaqT examines.

Both in the beginning and at the end of the sermon, he refers to its fatefulness. First,

the author compares the fate of ‘AIT QarTb to that of the Khurasanian military leader Bu

Muslim, saying, “ . . . [it] seems as though [they] took [‘AIT] by fate, like Bu Muslim and

others, as it is manifest in books.”144 The analogy with a great Khurasan! leader like Bu

Muslim raises the status of ‘AIT QarTb to that of a tragic hero.

BayhaqT then offers the charge of disloyalty made against ‘AIT QarTb. But the au­

thor neither confirms nor dismisses this charge. Rather, he excuses himself from making

judgments by saying, “I have nothing to do with that, and composing [sukhan randan]

is my task.” 145 He speaks of the Day of Judgment when all secrets, razha, will be re­

vealed. One can associate the word razha, secrets, with intrigue. Therefore, on that

day, intrigues, like this one, will be revealed. BayhaqT also repeats the courtiers’ charge

against ‘AIT, stating, “ . . . [they] said, ‘what business was it of his [‘AlT’s] to place and

displace rulers?’ ” 146 With ‘AIT captured, they could lay the blame for the succession

conflict on him. This way they could absolve themselves of their earlier allegiance to

Muhammad, by scapegoating ‘AIT QarTb. The sermon ends with Persian and Arabic

statements on inescapable fate, which did as it pleased.147

In the sermon on GhazT, BayhaqT invites attention to GhazT’s lack of foresight and

wisdom. As though using GhazT as an example, BayhaqT advises one on how to live,

first by maxims, and then a story. He states, “Wise is the man who is not deceived by

favors and gifts from the world, and is aware of its [inevitable] reclaims . . . ” 148 One

can relate this general statement to GhazT by saying, “GhazT was both deceived and un­

aware, and therefore, unwise and foolish.” The author then expresses that one should

live by doing good deeds, and not wishing everything for oneself. It is to illustrate this

last maxim that the scribe narrates a satirical story about a man called Zibraqan. The

legendary Zibraqan was a man who, despite his considerable wealth, never offered gifts

or favors to anyone. Rather, he himself ate sumptuously and dressed lavishly. The poet

Hutay’ah composed a line of poetry about Zibraqan, saying, “Give up your noble deeds,

do not go seeking them/but remain [in your place], for you are the one [who should]

53

clothe and feed [others].” 149 When the miserly Zibraqan was told by his companions

that the poem was a piece of satire, he sought justice at the court of the caliph ‘Umar

ibn al-Khattab. Once called to the court, Hutay’ah protested that a poet should judge Zi-

braqan’s grievance. Therefore, the caliph called in Hassan b. Thabit, who after hearing

the bayt, exclaimed, “Oh the Commander of the Faithful, [Hutay’ah] has not ridiculed,

but defecated on [Zibraqan].” 150

BayhaqT closes the story with the report of ‘Umar’s smile at this interpretation.

He then draws the conclusion that, “ . . . [it] has been four hundred and some years that

[they] write and read this [bayt], and now I wrote [it] again. So that, perhaps, someone

might read this and [it] be of use. For [only] a good name is remembered.” 151 The

comic irony that arises has to do with two things. Not only was Zibraqan unaware of

how others perceived him, but he was also ignorant about their actions regarding him.

This was exactly the same with GhazT. And that was the comic irony of his fate.

Had he been more aware, GhazT could have possibly saved himself. Instead, he

was entrapped since he did not discern how others perceived him. In viewing a victim of

ignorance like GhazT, the association BayhaqT earlier made between knowledge and in­

trigue gains justification. The knowledge that GhazT lacked but badly needed was about

intrigue, and it was partly due to this that he was arrested.

54

Notes to Chapter II

1 According to Nizami ‘Aruzl, ‘All QarTb was present in a gathering with sultan Mahmud and his favorite ghulam Ayyaz. In this majlis, Mahmud especially fastened his gaze on the locks of Ayyaz’s hair. The amir was then so love-crazed by the beauty of the hair that he ordered the slave to cut it. ‘All Qarlb turned to the poet Unsurl at this point, and asked him to compose a few lines of poetry for the melancholy amir; Chahar Maqalah (Tehran: 1909), pp. 34-36.

Other stories about ‘All QarTb relate to his intrigues against the first two viziers of Mahmud and the succession conflict between his sons. Mahmud himself was suspicious of his viziers, especially Asfara’ml, who had royal tastes in ghulams and objets d ’art.The vizier hid a favorite ghulam from Mahmud, who suspected this action. The sul­tan was subsequently enraged upon discovery (Nasa’im, 39^40; Yazdl KirmanI, 39-47; KhvandmTr [Dastur al-vuzara’], 136-139; Mustawfl, 179; FasTh Khvafi 146; Firishtah, 379). The author of Nasa’im al-ashar and Firishtah ascribe the deposing of the vizier to this incident, while KhvandmTr cautions that some historians relate the removal to this. Shabankari’T does not speak of any intrigues, but attributes much wealth to the vizier.The author also reports unjust policies by Asfara’Inl in the provinces (52). ‘AqTlI, the au­thor of Vasaya, and Ghaffarl relate the story of the intrigue against Asfara’InT in detail (‘AqTlI, 150-152; Vasaya, 623-625; Ghaffarl, 102-103). None of the authors mentions the reasons for this animosity. ‘AIT QarTb clandestinely placed a precious dagger and wine cup acquired on an Indian raid in the vizier’s residence. The military leader then told Mahmud about the vizier’s “hidden treasures.” And thereafter followed M ahmud’s rage and the imprisonment of the vizier.

‘AIT QarTb also intrigued against Mahmud’s second vizier Ahmad Hasan Maymandl. ‘AqTlI, the author of Vasaya, and Ghaffarl tell the unsuccessful story of this intrigue ( ‘AqTlI, 152-186; Vasaya, 627-629; KhvandmTr [Dastur], 168; Ghaffarl, 104-105). Away from the capital, the vizier had purchased and sent precious winter coats to his household in Ghazna. When ‘AIT QarTb and the Khvarazmshah Altuntash learned about this through their spies, they ordered that the merchant be brought back to the court. Upon learning this, possibly through his own spies, Ahmad Hasan appealed to his own ally in the court, Mahmud’s wife Mahd Chagal. She reassured the vizier that she would help defuse the intrigue. And indeed, when the merchant was brought to the court, she expressed out­rage to Mahmud that “her” gifts through a messenger merchant had been displayed in such fashion at court. Mahmud apologized to his wife, while the intriguing courtiers be­moaned this loss. Other enemies of Ahmad Hasan in the court of Mahmud included the third vizier Hasanak, the courtier Haslrl, and Mahmud’s sister Hurrah-yi Khuttali. De­spite the efforts of the commander Arslan Jazib, the prince Mas‘ud, and the chief secre­tary Bu Nasr Mushkan, Mahmud eventually deposed and imprisoned Ahmad Hasan. Yet the amir did so with the reassurance that no harm would come to his boyhood classmate. Ahmad Hasan was released and brought back from his Indian exile once M as‘ud seized the throne. The revenge that the vizier then sought unsuccessfully against Haslrl and his son can best be understood within the context of the earlier Mahmudiyan intrigues (Bay­haqT, 197-212/also see Lazard’s article about this story).

55

The last story relating to ‘All QarTb involves his role in the succession conflict. At least six sources other than Tarikh-i BayhaqT mention him as the main courtier responsible for calling Muhammad to the throne (KhvafT, 148; GardTzT, 419-422; BadavunT, 30—31; KhvandmTr, FT bayan . . . /7 18; Firishtah, 386-387; Muqlm HaravT, 277-278). As for the arrest of Muhammad in TagTnabad, Fasih KhvafT and HamadanT attribute this action to ‘AIT QarTb and Mahmud’s brother Yusuf (KhvafT, 148; HamadanT, 161-163). But other authors also name Hasanak (MTrkhvand, 126-127; HusaynT RazT, 485-487; Firishtah, 386-387; AlfT, 859-860).

Four sources also incorrectly speak of Mas'ud ordering the execution of ‘AIT QarTb upon succession to the throne (MTrkhvand, 126-127; KhvandmTr, 718; AlfT, 859-860; HamadanT, 161-163). Fasih KhvafT is the only historian who speaks of an allegiance between ‘AIT QarTb and the military leader Bigtughdi, after Mahmud’s death. The two courtiers swore to remain allies and protect the court until the resolution of succession to the throne. HusaynT RazT and the author of TarTkh-i alfT mistakenly attribute the al­lies of Ahmad in killing M as'ud at GTrT to have been ‘AIT QarTb and Yusuf, rather than their sons (HusaynT RazT, 496-498; AlfT, 914-917). But another group of historians cor­rectly ascribe Ahmad’s allies to have been the sons of ‘AIT QarTb and Yusuf (KhvandmTr, FT bayan . . . /7 18—720; Firishtah, 397-398; MTrkhvand, 130-131).

2‘UtbT mentions AsightigTn GhazT in the account of one of Mahmud’s raids in India, but does not give the date for this conquest, p. 293. Nazim gives the date of 395/1004-1005 for this raid, p. 99.

3Firishtah mentions ‘AIT Dayah in two contexts (396-397). In the succession conflict, the author relates that in a rebellion against Muhammad, the general Ayyaz, along with ghu­lams and ‘AIT Dayah left Ghazna towards Bust. Muhammad sent troops after them. Yet the group of MahmudT military men joined Mas'ud in Nishapur. The author also reports the arrest of ‘AIT Dayah after the Dandanqan defeat in 431/1039-1040. MuqTm HaravT also cites this arrest (283-285). BilgatigTn is not mentioned in any sources other than The History. But BigtughdT attracted the attention of later historians in the context of the struggle against the Saljuqs (JuzjanT, 16; AlfT, 893-895; Firishtah, 392-393; MuqTm HaravT, 280) and his later arrest (Firishtah, 396-397; MuqTm HaravT, 284). Only the au­thor of TarTkh-i STstan took note of his service in that province (the 15th of 422/14 Jan­uary 1031) (363).

4In the letter of the TagTnabad nobles, it was especially ‘AIT QarTb who was pleading for mercy (1-4). ‘AIT QarTb spoke of his coming demise in a monologue addressed to Bu Nasr Mushkan (58-60), and then left TagTnabad to join M as'ud in Herat (61-62).

5GhazT appears as a strong military man in four instances: in the letter of Mas'ud, where the leader was asked to prepare Nishapur for the new sultan’s arrival (39-40), the greet­ing of M as'ud in Nishapur (40-42), in preparations for receiving the messenger of the caliph (49-51), and in letters sent to Qadir Khan and Altuntash (93 & 105). In the letter to Altuntash after the first unsucessful attempt of intrigue, one of the justifications of­fered for sending people after the KhvarazmT leader was the need for advice in the ap­

56

pointment of officials, one of whom was GhazT. In his letter of reply Altuntash spoke approvingly of this choice, despite the courtiers’ displeasure, as the letter implied (106). GhazT was the army leader in charge of ‘AIT QarTb’s possessions and people (66 & 68). The unaware state of the Commander-in-Chief did not continue long before he fell prey to the ruses of MahmudTyan (71, 168-169, 172-174).

6They were remembered in the narrative of the second plot against Altuntash. In inciting M as‘ud for the necessity of a ruse against Altuntash, the military head and Mas'udTyan courtier Bu Sahl ZawzanT used the fallen leaders as examples. He argued that these strong military men whose power had jeapardized Mas‘ud were no longer a threat, and that only Altuntash remained to be captured (402). Ironically, upon discovering the at­tempt of intrigue against himself, Altuntash also mentioned the fallen leaders to his adju- dant and advisor Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad (423).

7BayhaqT, The History, p. 1.

8Divine attributes, see sifat, MacDonald, El, I, v. 4., p. 406.

9BayhaqT. op.cit., p. 2.

I0ibid.

11 ibid.

12ibid.

13ibid.

l4ibid., p. 18.

15ibid.

16See RuknT YazdT’s article (Yadnamah-yi BayhaqT), where he discusses different types of letters in the Ghaznavid chancery, pp. 233-272.

17BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 3.

18ibid.

19ibid., p. 6.

20ibid., pp. 6-7.

21 ibid., pp. 8-9. ft is clear from the text that ‘AIT had not spoken of this letter to the troops. But they had been present for the reading of what seems to have been a more general letter, addressed to both the troops and the courtiers.

57

22ibid„ p. 8.

23 ibid.

24ibid.

25ibid. M as'ud sent the letter with an ‘AlavT messenger.

26ibid., BayhaqT refers to this “advice” both in the section on the affairs of M as'ud dur­ing Muhammad’s rule and in the letter to Qadir Khan (pp. 18 and 91).

27ibid., p. 8.

28ibid.

2^ibid.

30Mas‘ud stated that he would make this decision upon arrival in Herat, ibid., pp. 8-9.

31 From the name of this noblewoman, Bosworth surmises that she married a ruler of Khuttalan (The Ghaznavids/237). During the rule of Mahmud, his sister was in the cir­cle of intriguers, including ‘AIT QarTb, that was hostile towards the vizier MaymandT (‘AqTlT, 152-187). With the exception of this letter, BayhaqT speaks of Hurrah-yi Khut- talT in five other occasions. The commander BigtigTn brought the noblewomen, includ­ing Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, from Ghazna to Balkh in 421/1030-1031 (BayhaqT, 87). Bay­haqT relates her affection for one of Mahmud’s special servants, NushtigTn, in the story of M as'ud’s pleasure-house (BayhaqT, 146). NushtigTn was both the servant of Mahmud and the spy of M as'ud (also see Waldman on M as'ud’s pleasure-house/164-166). The actions of Hurrah-yi KhuttalT in the other remembrances by BayhaqT mark various stages in M as'ud’s personal and political history. At the dawn of his sultanate when he ar­rived in Ghazna, M as'ud was greeted by sumptuous dishes, sent by his aunt (BayhaqT, 334). In tattered clothes back from the Dandanqan defeat, the sultan was again cared for and comforted by the noblewomen of Ghazna (BayhaqT, 862). And when, in fear of the Saljuqs, he decided to flee Ghazna and take his women and treasures with him, the women of the court echoed his fears to others, and faithfully followed (BayhaqT, 895).

32ibid., pp. 13-14.

33ibid., p. 13.

34ibid.

35ibid.

36ibid., p. 14.

58

37ibid., p. 18.

38ibid., pp. 16-17.

39ibid., p. 16.

40ibid., p. 17.

41 ibid., p. 19., BayhaqT names the courtiers who had written to Mas'ud: Amir Yusuf,‘All QarTb, Bu Sahl Hamdavl, ‘All Mlka’Il, Bu ‘AIT Kutval. I will talk about M as'ud’s uncle Yusuf in the context of the intrigue against him (chapter 5). Hamdavl is mentioned in The History in many instances. He was suggested for the position of the vizier after the ruse against Ahmad Hasan in the court of Mahmud (468). Hamdavl was, in fact, the vizier of Muhammad during his short rule (196). During the rule of Mas'ud, the courtier both aspired to the position of the vizier and was suggested for it (108/899). Only in the very beginning of the sultanate did he assume the air of a vizier. But in M as'ud’s rule, Hamdavl was suggested as a second vizier after the death of the first vizier Ahmad Hasan. Indeed, it was in the scene of this consultation that the earlier one of Mahmud’s court was remembered (467-468). It was after the Dandanqan defeat and before the flight to India that Mas'ud himself suggested Hamdavl for the office of the vizierate.But it was for the vizierate of the Saljuqs. When the courtiers vainly tried to dissuade M as'ud from his decision to leave, the sultan reassured them of their future safety by ex­claiming, “If the enemies come here, Bui Qasim Kaslr has gold, [he] can offer [it] and become the head of the military. Bu Sahl Hamdavl also has gold and will attain vizier­ate.” (899) In M as'ud’s reign, Hamdavl held positions as the head of the intelligent of­fice (196) and the adjudant and advisor to the military leader Tash Farrash in Ray (499- 507). M as'ud appointed Hamdavl to the second position, after the first appointed advisor to Ray engaged more in merrymaking than in governing (468). Hamdavl was present in the gathering before Hasanak was executed. He was, also suggested as the military head twice. The first time it was Ahmad Hasan who, assuming an attitude of disinterestedness in the position of the vizier, suggested this to Bu Sahl Zawzanl. In fact, Ahmad Hasan also mentioned that Bu Sahl himself should become M as'ud’s vizier (183). It is, indeed, ironic that the second suggestion for the military head, also by Ahmad Hasan, came af­ter Bu Sahl Zawzanl was deposed from this very position and imprisoned, once his in­trigue against Altuntash failed (429). Hamdavl engaged in two intrigues, one against the tax collector of Pushang, Muzaffar Tahir, resulting in the latter’s hanging (563). The other attempted intrigue was against the governor of Khurasan SurT. Hamdavl merely spoke ill of SurT to the sultan, who was always receptive to such provocations (816).But Bu Sahl Hamdavl himself had been the object of such ill talk, by the second vizier Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad (813). All the other instances where BayhaqT speaks of Hamdavl are informed by two motifs, one, the struggle against the Saljuqs (574/715—716/721— 722/725/805/813/815-816/882/895, and the other, which is not treated in this study, the Ghaznavid suzerainty in Ray and subsequent troubles with the Kakuyids 655/668- 669/684/706-709/901).

BayhaqT speaks of both Abu al-Muzaffar ‘AIT MTka’Tl and his two sons. In the reign of Mahmud and upon his suggestion, ‘AIT MTka’Tl treated the family of Tabbanlyan kindly

59

(264). In the reign of Mas'ud, this affluent courtier entertained people, including the amir, in wine parties (197/320). His son Muzaffar, the ra’Ts of Ghazna, greeted M as'ud in Parvan, when the latter was returning to the capital to seize the throne (322). Muzaffar died in 427/ (649). ‘AIT MTka’Tl’s other son Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Husayn b. MTka’Tl was taken prisoner by the Saljuqs in their struggle against the Ghaznavids (806). ‘AIT MTka’Tl was also engaged in the preparations and the reception for the messenger of the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Qa’im in 423/1031-1032 (379-380/383-385/387). Later in that year, the Ghaz- navid courtier headed the pilgrimmage to Mecca and was robed by Mas'ud before depar­ture (455/459). BayhaqT mentions ‘AIT MTka’Tl in relation to the ChaganTyan ruler under Ghaznavid suzerainty, but the reference remains unclear (646/see Fayyaz’s footnote 2).

The colonel (sarhang) Bu ‘AIT Kutval, the keeper of Ghazna fortress, is mentioned in var­ious contexts. He remained in Ghazna and sent news of M as'ud’s victory over Muham­mad to other cities (5). The colonel was also the official responsible for sending Muhammad to Mulatan (84). In a letter to the Qarakhanid ruler Qadir Khan, the victo­rious M as‘ud named Bu ‘AIT Kutval, among other military men who had supported the sultan (94/96). The colonel was put in charge of three arrested leaders in the first two years of M as'ud’s reign (MingTtarak, Aryaruq, GhazT) (109/295/307). And the intrigue against yet three other military leaders in the last year of the reign was, in fact, in his fortress (872-873). In keeping with the Ghaznavid rituals of service, in 422/1030-1031, Bu ‘AIT went to greet M as'ud in his seizure of the throne as far away as Shajkav (333) (see Fallah Rastigar’s article in Yadnamah . . . on the rituals of the court/412-467). In 425/1033-1034, the colonel both hosted the king, and was once left with the prince Sa‘Td in charge of Ghazna (526/557). Bu ‘AIT was, again, left in charge of affairs in Ghazna with the prince in 427/1035-1036 (658). BayhaqT also recalls Bu ‘AIT in relation to the building of M as‘ud’s palace in this year (652). In the next year, M as'ud was the guest of the colonel in the fortress (686), and in 429/1037-1038, Bu ‘AIT had the snowy roads cleared for Mas'Qd’s return from the HansT conquest (704). When the sultan finally left Ghazna for Khurasan to fight the Turkmen in 430/1038-1039, he left prince Sa’Td at the head of the government in the capital (736). And before departure, prince Sa’Td and several courtiers, among them Bu ‘AIT, were robed (736/see the article on Ghaznavid court rituals in Yadnamah . . .) . After the temporary truce with the Turkmen Saljuqs in that year, M as'ud sent a letter to the colonel, asking for weapons of battle suited for the desert, horses and camels, and gold and clothes (782). In the aftermath of the Dandanqan defeat, when M as'ud and his people made their way back to Ghazna through Ghur, Bu ‘AIT, again, sent them provisions (862). The last two entries on the colonel concern his military campaign in Khalj in the year 432/1040-1041 (892). Bu ‘AIT victoriously re­turned from this campaign, and came to the court on Monday the first of RabT‘ al-Awwal 432/1040-1041.

42BayhaqT devotes the section before the Damghan narrative to the affairs of Ray, pp. 19-27. Since I have not included the affairs of Ray in this study, I have precluded it from my discussion here. Yet it is interesting to note that Mas'ud used the motif of principal versus minor territories, first introduced by Hurrah-yi KhuttalT, both in meetings with his own courtiers and the nobles of Ray (19/21).

60

In sources other than The History, Zawzanl is mentioned only in the context of M as'ud’s sultanate. Shabankara’T speaks of the courtier’s evil nature and relates an admixture of the two plots of intrigue against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash (73/79-80). AwfT has ref­erences to the role of Bu Sahl in seizing gifts given during Muhammad’s time, the ruses against Altuntash, and Bu Sahl’s discharge in 423/1031-1032 (87-89). ‘AqTlI speaks of Zawzanl as the vizier of M as'ud before the arrival of Maymandl from India. In this context, the author also notes the ruse against Altuntash, and finally the discharge of Bu Sahl (192-193). A courtier of M as'ud at the time of his father and a fugitive during Muhammad’s rule, Zawzanl rose to the position of the head of the military department in the sultanate of Mas'ud. Other than the two ruses against Altuntash, Bu Sahl was also responsible for the repossession of gifts given by Muhammad (336-340). The courtier was imprisoned after the second ruse (chapter 4). But he was then released and joined the court as a companion to the king (561/613). BayhaqT narrates yet another intrigue of Bu Sahl against the tax collector of Pushang, Muzaffar Tahir, and M as'ud’s anger in the aftermath of this man’s execution (561). Even more interestingly, the author refers to a later intrigue o f Bu Sahl during Mawdud’s time, this one against the first messenger of truce to the Saljuqs, Bu Nasr Slnl (640). After the death of the chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan in 431/1039-1040, M as'ud chose Bu Sahl as the head of the chancery (800). But in the later years of the struggle against the Saljuqs, one notes changed relations be­tween Bu Sahl and men of the old order. Bu Sahl, like Bu Nasr Mushkan and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad, witnessed the decline of an order they had all known, an order to which they all belonged, notwithstanding their conflicting claims to the rungs of its hierarchy. But with the rise of Saljuq power in the face of M as'ud’s inaction til 430/1038-1039 and fear after Dandanqan, men like ‘Abd al-Samad and Zawzanl spoke in union to the sul­tan (872). They would timidly advise that he thwart the Saljuq menace to Khurasan and the Ghaznavid order (870). And they would despair as they viewed life, their lives, un­alterably changed by the loss of Khurasan (820). After Dandanqan Zawzanl was one of the courtiers who became the object of the King’s anger. Bu Sahl was sent away to Bust on the third of Zi al-Hajjah of 431/1039-1040. (Also see Riza’T’s article on Bu Sahl Za­wzanl in Yadnamah . . . , pp. 220-232). I will discuss the relationship between Zawzanl and the scribe BayhaqT in the last chapter of this study (in The History, 801).

43BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 27.

44ibid.

45ibid.

46ibid., pp. 28-29, The messenger who presented the letters to M as'ud from the dead sultan also carried congratulatory messages, treausures, and robes of honor for the Is­fahan conquest.

47ibid., p. 30.

48ibid.

61

49ibid.

50ibid., p. 31., MinovT has noted the contrast between BayhaqI’s reliability in reporting events of his period of history, as opposed to those of earlier times (Holt & Louise/138- 140). For the purposes of this study, focused on the Ghaznavid loss of Khurasan, I have confined myself to discussing these “legendary” stories as they relate to the loss of Khurasan narrative.

5'ibid.

52ibid.

53ibid., pp. 31-37.

54ibid., p. 37.

55ibid., pp. 37-39.

56ibid., p. 38.

57ibid., p. 39, BayhaqT also speaks here of the importance of one’s efforts in attaining success.

58ibid.

59ibid., pp. 41-42.

60ibid., p. 41.

61ibid., pp. 50-53, in the passages before this, both the coming of M as’ud and the mes­senger of the caliph al-Qadir, as well as news about Ray are given (40-50).

62ibid., p. 53.

63ibid., pp. 54-55.

64ibid., p. 11.

65 ibid.

66ibid., pp. 55-56.

67ibid., pp. 11-56.

68ibid., pp. 57-58.

62

69ibid„ pp. 58-60.

70ibid., p. 58.

7'ibid.

72‘AIT QarTb spoke of zishtT, unseemliness; badnamT, infamy, and hTlah, intrigue, in the assessment of his own predicament.

73ibid., p. 58.

74ibid., p. 59.

75ibid.

76ibid.

77ibid.

78ibid., pp. 59-60.

79ibid., p. 60.

80ibid.

8'ibid.

82ibid., ‘AIT QarTb at first turned down this kind offer by Bu Nasr, most likely because it would bespeak of the military leader’s suspicion in M as'ud’s eyes.

83ibid.

84ibid.

85ibid.

86ibid., p. 62.

87ibid., p. 63.

88ibid., pp. 63-64.

89ibid., p. 64.

90ibid.

63

91 ibid., p. 65.

92ibid., p. 65.

" ib id ., p. 66.

" ib id .

95ibid., pp. 282-298.

% ibid„ p. 299.

97ibid., p. 304.

98ibid., p. 298.

" ib id .

100ibid., p. 299.

101 ibid.

102ibid.

103ibid., p. 300.

104ibid.

105ibid.

106ibid.

,07ibid.

108ibid.

109ibid., p. 301.

1,0ibid.

111 ibid.

112ibid.

113ibid., BayhaqT also relates that Mas'ud uttered binding oaths.

64

14ibid.

,5ibid„ pp. 301-302.

16ibid., p. 302.

I7ibid.

18ibid. In the story of Aryaruq, it is the three intriguers of the old guard that are associ- ited with the image of high ground, p. 285.ated

19ibid.

20ibid., p. 303.

21 ibid.

22ibid.

23ibid., p. 304.

24ibid.

25ibid.

26ibid.

27ibid.

28ibid.

29ibid.

30ibid.

31 ibid.

32ibid.

33ibid.

34ibid., p. 305.

35ibid.

36ibid., pp. 546-547

65

' 37ibid.

138ibid.

' 39ibid., p. 306.

,40ibid.

141 ibid., pp. 306-307, M as'ud ordered large plates of food, one thousand dinars and twenty thousand dirhems, a special place in the fortress of KuhtTz, and three Indian ghu­lams in the service of GhazT. The amir assigned three hundred horsemen, two hundred foot soldiers, and a forerunner to transport GhazT.

I42ibid., p. 307.

,430 ther than the stories of ‘AIT QarTb and Aryaruq and GhazT, BayhaqT includes four other sermons in The History. These follow the death of four men. One is after the exe­cution of sultan Mahmud’s last vizier and the bitter enemy of Mas'ud, Hasanak MTka’Tl (234-246). Another one is after the death of the Khvarazmshah Altuntash (448). The next one follows the entry on the death of the Ghaznavid ruler Farrukhzad, in whose reign BayhaqT composed The History (480-497). In remembering the death of his master and mentor Bu Nasr Mushkan, BayhaqT contemplates the life of Bu Nasr fondly and in sadness (795-802). I will discuss the sermons in the final chapter of this study.

144ibid., p. 68.

145ibid.

146ibid.

147ibid.

I48ibid„ 158. p. 68, in the Persian statement Bayhaqi exclaims, “Since the life o f . . . [‘AIT QarTb] had to end this way, how could [he] have opposed Fate?” The Arabic state­ment ends the story, “May God keep us from ominous fate.”

149ibid., Marilyn Waldman has translated the second hemistich as, “just sit down, for you are the well-garbed glutton.” But both descriptive adjectives used for Zibraqan are in the active form, ta’im and kasT, (Waldman, 113). Ibn al-‘AdTm mentions a Himad b. al- Zibraqan who had been alleged with heresy, zindiqT (Bughyat. . . /706). Also, al-KutubT narrates the same story in his entry on Hutay’ah (Faw at. . . 1211) .

150BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 68.

15'ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ATTEMPT AGAINST THE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH

Mahmud conquered Khvarazm from the Ma’munids in the year 408/1017-1018.1

The rulership of this northern province and the title of Khvarazmshah was then granted

to Altuntash al-hajib Abu SaTd, one of the most important figures in Ghaznavid military

history.2 Altuntash had been a Turkish slave. Having served under Sabuktigln, he had

risen to the highest military rank, that of the great hajib. The Khvarazmshah accompa­

nied Mahmud on many military campaigns, and finally died, fighting ‘AlItigTn on behalf

of M as‘ud in the year 423/1031-32.3

After the death of Altuntash, his son HarOn was appointed as the ruler of Khva­

razm. Yet despite favors and the rulership of Khvarazm, HarOn only ruled as a repre­

sentative for M as'ud’s son SaTd. It was SaTd who received the title of Khvarazmshah.4

Harun revolted against Mas'ud in the year 426/1034-35. BayhaqT does not directly ex­

plain the rebellion in terms of suspicions due to the earlier intrigue against Altuntash, or

disappointment at not receiving the title of Khvarazmshah. But the author regards the

loss of Khvarazm significant in the final Ghaznavid defeat by the Saljuqs.5 He implies

a causal chain, from the intrigues against Altuntash through the loss of Khvarazm to the

loss of Khurasan.6 In statements about the revolt, the author takes account of conflicts

between Harun and his advisor ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the son of M as'ud’s second vizier. Bay­

haqT also speaks of suspicions towards the Ghaznavid court after the death of Harun’s

brother SittT.7

Rudolf Gelpke considers that the appointment of Harun as only a representa­

tive contributed to his revolt in 426/1034-35.8 One can only conjecture about this or

other possible grounds for the revolt. The history of intrigues against Harun’s father

Altuntash would seem to have played a role. Bosworth also mentions the withheld title

and the unascertained circumstances of SittT’s death as contributing factors in the loss

66

67

of Khvarazm.9 In the larger context of his study, Bosworth also takes note of intrigues

in M as'ud’s court, and their effects on the political and military losses for the Ghaz-

navids.10

M as'ud engaged in two intrigues against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash. They both

failed. The first attempt to bring down Altuntash followed the plot against ‘All QarTb

in 421/1030. The second attempt was made in the year 423/1031-32, before Altuntash

died fighting ‘Alltigln on behalf of Mas'ud. In both instances, the men of the new order

motivated the amir, appealing to his jealousy of the wealth and power of a great military

leader like Altuntash.

In the next two chapters, I will discuss the two narratives by focusing on how

Altuntash escaped the intrigue, while Mas'Od entrapped himself. The irony lies in the

reversal of the action and character roles between the intriguer and his “victim.” The two

plots against Altuntash did not succeed, and Mas'ud untruthfully denied them in letters.

The intriguer had assumed the attitude of power over his victim, by plotting to capture

him off guard. But when the wise (khiradmand) “victim” evaded the plot, the intriguer

was symbolically forced into a weaker position, in order to regain the former’s loyalty.

Irony in history (irony of fate) arises when one considers the intrigues against

Altuntash in light of his role in three preceding affairs. The first of these is the intrigues

by Altuntash himself, against Ahmad Hasan Maymandl in the court of Mahmud. In

these intrigues, Altuntash conspired with ‘All QarTb, yet another victim of intrigue un­

der Mas'ud. The two courtiers failed in one of their reported ruses against MaymandT.

But they finally succeeded in overturning the favorable opinion of Mahmud against his

second vizier.11 It is especially in relation to the second plot against Altuntash that his

own intrigues become ironic, since MaymandT, whom Mas'ud had called back from im­

prisonment, admonished the amir for this plot.12

Another ground is Altuntash’s support for M as'ud in the succession conflict. Ac­

cording to M as'ud himself, the Khvarazmshah used intrigue (lata’if al-hTyal) to ensure

the amir’s accession to the throne.13 This loyalty, however motivated, did not guaran­

tee the reward of safety for the Khvarazmshah. The final ground for irony is the attempt

of Altuntash to prevent the intrigue against 'AIT QarTb. Not only was this attempt unsuc­

68

cessful, but the fact that the one undertaking it was himself close to becoming a victim of

intrigue suggests irony.

BayhaqI tells the intrigue after ‘AIT QarTb’s arrest in the course of his narrative of

the year 421/1030. Therefore, between the first part of the story (the messages of the

Khvarazmshah and those of the two intermediaries) and the other parts, the text contains

other unrelated accounts.14

The Khvarazmshah suspected a plot against himself, and asked two courtiers to

speak on his behalf. M as‘ud thus gave him permission to leave, but retracted it, with

pressures from the intriguing M as‘udlyan. By then, Altuntash had already left for

Khvarazm. He refused to return, and excused his refusal on several grounds. Subse­

quently, M as‘ud admitted the intrigue to his chief secretary, and sought to secure Altun-

tash’s continued loyalty by means of a letter.

One can epitomize the intrigue in terms of three attitudes and actions by the pro­

tagonists. The Khvarazmshah suspected the plot, left once he received an order, and

refused to return. M as'ud permitted the leave, sent a messenger after Altuntash with

the retraction of the earlier order, and later denied the plot. What creates irony is that

it was actions by the Khvarazmshah, the “victim,” that prompted the ones by Mas'ud,

the intriguer in the story. It was the suspicion, the departure, and the refusal to return by

Altuntash that led to reactions by Mas'ud and others.

The Khvarazmshah Altuntash suspected M as'ud and his partisans of plotting

against him. Altuntash sought the mediation of two courtiers of the old order, Bu al-

Hasan ‘Aqlll and the chief secretary Bu Nasr Mushkan.15 The Khvarazmshah had

come to Herat with presents for Mas'ud, and had spoken on behalf of ‘AIT Qarib.16

After ‘AlT’s arrest, which Mas'Qd justified in a message to Altuntash, he worried for his

own safety. He accompanied the sultan to Paryab at his request, and in both Herat and

Paryab, he sought the support of Bu al-Hasan ‘AqTlT and Bu Nasr Mushkan.

The Khvarazmshah asked for this support in a secret message, conveyed by his

chamberlain M as‘adT. Altuntash entreated the two courtiers to use intrigue (lata’if

al-hTyal), so he could return to Khvarazm quickly. He expressed anger at ‘AIT QarTb’s

arrest, and predicted similar ends for other members of the old guard.17

69

The reply by ‘AqllT is ironic on two grounds. First is that he was worried about

himself at this point. He promised that he would speak on behalf of the Khvarazmshah,

but only after expressing fears of his own, saying, “Oh Mas'adT! leave me to myself, be­

cause the Sultan considers me one of the Pidarlyan [partisans of Mahmud] as well.” 18

The mistrust that one thus associates with ‘AqllT based on this statement of fear is contra­

dicted next. He predicted that M as‘ud would, in the end, speak to the men of the old or­

der, after conspiracies with the Mas‘OdTyan. ‘AqllT explained, " . . . since . . . [this Amir]

has known and tested . . . [the Mahmudiyan] through time.” 19

‘AqllT and Bu Nasr displayed contrasting attitudes towards the request by Altun­

tash. ‘AqllT’s expression of his own fear tells that the courtier considered the request a

burden. But Bu Nasr thanked the Khvarazmshah, and by doing this, implicitly acknowl­

edged his higher position in the Ghaznavid hierarchy. The chief secretary said, “ . . . I

accept [this task] with honor.”20 As BayhaqT reports, the Khvarazmshah calmed down

with these replies, but, “ . . . especially with that of Bu Nasr Mushkan . . . ”21 This

statement gains an ironic significance, considered against expressions of support. ‘AqllT

later expressed his support unconditionally, while Bu Nasr cautiously promised his. The

earnest attitude of ‘AqllT appears comical, in contrast to the prudent behavior of Bu Nasr.

Both courtiers then predicated their promise of support on M as'ud’s good opinion

of them. In the case of ‘AqllT, his overconfidence in his own good standing contradicts

the earlier expression of fear, creating irony. He stated, “ . . . it has been determined for

the Sultan that my motive behind what I say is nothing other than what is best [for the

State].”22 In contrast, Bu Nasr gave proof of M as'ud’s favorable attitude towards him

in statements about the sultan’s behavior. After speaking of M as‘ud’s kindness towards

him, Bu Nasr said, “ . . . [I] heard from confidants that [the Amir] has not allowed any­

one to speak [badly] of me.”23

The two courtiers assumed opposite attitudes in promising their support to the

Khvarazmshah. ‘Aqlll’s promise of unconditional support rings with humorous irony,

given his earlier attitude of fear and disconcern. He said, “ . . . today I will undertake

this [task], so the Khvarazmshah would return to the friends’ favor.”24 In contrast to

‘AqllT, Bu Nasr promised that he would speak on behalf of Altuntash only if M as‘ud

70

would ask for advice. Bu Nasr stated. “If [the Amir] speaks [to me] and asks for any ad­

vice, I will first bring up the topic of the Khvarazmshah, so he will return to favor.”25

Closing remarks in both messages result in irony. ‘AqTlI repeated his earlier pre­

diction of future advice from members of the old guard, after plots by the men of the

new order. He referred to the partisans of M as'ud as “this newly-risen group,” who held

the reins of power.26 But the courtier continued, “In the end, this Amir will speak about

these matters with [the] Pidarlyan, since he has known and tested them through time.”27

Bu Nasr advised that they bring up the subject of Altuntash in the guise of per­

mission for his retirement, and not disclose his wish to leave. In other words, the chief

secretary suggested deception to evade a possible plot. He said, " . . . [they should say]

th a t . . . [the Khvarazmshah’s] wish is to repent from military [service], and retire to the

shrine of the late amir. That an offspring of the Lord should be [appointed] as Khva­

razmshah, so that a l l . . . [of Altuntash’s] children and people would serve that noble-

born child.”28 Once presented with such a plan, Mas'ud and his partisans would not

capture Altuntash, but return him to his province. Bu Nasr reasoned, " . . . [they] know

that [a] border [like Khvarazm] would not be maintained, were it not for . . . [the Khva­

razmshah’s] great [ability].”29

It is ironic to suggest the same means as that of the intriguers to evade their pos­

sible plot. But more interestingly, the form this suggestion took became true. After the

death of Altuntash, it was, indeed, a son of M as'ud who became Khvarazmshah, with

Harun only as his representative. Bu Nasr was also prophetically correct that Altuntash

was mainly responsible for the Ghaznavids’ stronghold in Khvarazm, given the Ghaz-

navid loss of this province after his death.

Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT and Bu Nasr spoke on the Khvarazmshah’s behalf on the way

to Paryab. BayhaqT relates the Khvarazmshah’s condition first on his own authority,

and then on the authority of Bu Nasr. BayhaqT inevitably draws a less detailed pic­

ture of events, given that he was not a witness himself. On BayhaqI’s authority, Bu al-

Hasan ‘AqllT brought up the topic of the Khvarazmshah several times. M as'ud responded

kindly, and stated that he should return to Khvarazm. Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT informed the

Khvarazmshah, and also, Bu Nasr told Mas'adT.30

71

But the detailed narrative by the chief secretary contradicts this account. Bu Nasr

reported that despite the amir’s seemingly favorable attitude towards the Khvarazmshah,

they had incited M as'ud to capture him. The chief secretary stated, “ . . . the Amir

[unwillingly] alluded to this in a private session . . . on the way [to Paryab].”31 Bu

Nasr and ‘AqllT advised M as'ud against any plot of intrigue. They objected, “ . . . [the

Khvarazmshah] is an obedient subject and has many offsprings, notables, servants,

and followers. [He] has not acted in a way, for which [he] should deserve . . . disfavor

. . ”32

The sultan’s response to this creates humorous ambiguity. On the one hand, it

seems that this counsel was effective for at least a short while, given M as'ud’s kind

words and actions. But with the hindsight of the attempted plot, one can interpret all that

the amir did and said, regarding the Khvarazmshah, as insincere and false.

Mas'ud agreed with the two courtiers, stating that he had punished the person who

had spoken badly of Altuntash. The sultan vowed, “ . . . and . . . from now on no one

will dare to mention him, except with kindness.”33 It is as though by this statement, the

amir wished to show proof of his own innocence to shrewd men like Bu Nasr and ‘AqTlT.

Once in Paryab, M as'ud granted Altuntash his robe, and permitted his leave. The

Khvarazmshah left in the early morning on the next day, but without a customary final

request for permission. In a secret message to Bu Nasr, Altuntash, again, spoke of his

suspicion of Mas'ud. The Khvarazmshah stated, " . . . [by] tomorrow night when [they]

will be informed, we will have left. I will not ask for another permission until I leave,

because I see the order not right [kazh].”34 He pointed out that the amir was merciful,

generous, and noble, but that he listened to bad counsel. In other words, Mas'ud had

many good qualities, though not sound judgement. Altuntash characterized the men of

the new order as “standing viziers.”35 He then said, “[They] will ruin this upright affair

[kar-i rast-nahadah].”36

Altuntash again asked for mediation, despite misgivings that there would be sus­

picion towards his supporters as well. He said, " . . . I am leaving, and [I] do not know

what will become of you. For here, [there] is no good foundation.”37 He asked that Bu

Nasr look after his welfare, as in the past, though he might not be secure either.38 The

Khvarazmshah closed his message in this way, " . . . the order [nizam] that reigned has

72

dissolved, and things have changed. But [we] will see what will happen.”39 Bu Nasr

ended this part of his narrative with the expression of his own concern. Thus, while all

throughout Bu Nasr had provided solace for Altuntash, in the end, the chief secretary

was made to worry on his own account.

M as'ud and his partisans attempted to capture the Khvarazmshah, once they learn­

ed that he had left for Khvarazm. When the news of his unceremonious departure ar­

rived, they dispatched ‘Abdus after him. But it was not the departure that prompted the

intrigue. On the night before the departure, the Mas'OdTyan had been plotting against the

Khvarazmshah. Bu Nasr stated, “ . . . at night [they] had prevailed on the Amir . . . that

Altuntash should be captured and this opportunity should not be lost. Then, they re­

ceived the news that he had gone ten to twelve farsang towards his own province.”40

The image is that of the intriguers plotting away, while their victim had already escaped.

This defies the expectation that the victim “recognize” his plight. Instead, the recognition

is by the intriguers, who realized that their victim had escaped.

‘Abdus brought Altuntash the sultan’s message to return. The Khvarazmshah re­

fused, and by doing this evaded the plot of intrigue. Instead, he sent back ‘Abdus with

a message explaining his refusal. This turn of events is, indeed, comical. It is as though

the intriguer, the more powerful protagonist, were requesting that his victim return, so

the intriguer would capture him. But the victim’s refusal upset this plan.

Both messages contain reasons— for the request to return on M as'ud’s part, and

for the refusal to return on the Khvarazmshah’s. Irony arises as a result of the disparity

between the real reasons for the request and the refusal, and those stated. M as‘ud asked

that the Khvarazmshah return, so he would be captured. But the reasons the amir gave

were a few things in need of discussion, and some honors that the Khvarazmshah had not

yet received. ‘Abdus concluded the message in this way, “ . . . we had given an order to

leave and [he] left, and those matters remain [unfinished].”41

The Khvarazmshah refused to return because he did not want to risk being ar­

rested. But he explained his refusal by resorting to rules of conduct and duties of service.

He first restated that, “The order was for me to leave, and according to the kingly order,

I left.”42 The implication here is, “I did what you told me to do.” One reason for his

refusal to return was that it would be unseemly, zisht. After stating what remained unfin­

73

ished could be completed by letters, he spoke of a letter about unrest by Turkmen tribes.

Altuntash closed the message with another reason for his refusal. He remarked, “[There]

might be unexpected trouble [in Khvarazm] because of my absence.”43 Considering the

attempted arrest, this trouble could have been the overthrow of Altuntash himself. The

Khvarazmshah then rewarded ‘Abdus, so that the latter would represent him well, and

offer his excuse.44

Once he returned to the camp, ‘Abdus disclosed what had happened. Conse­

quently, Bu Nasr reported, “ . . . [it] was known th a t . . . [Altuntash] was very fright­

ened.”45 It was only then that Mas'ud admitted the intrigue. Bu Nasr related this ad­

mission, but first he mentioned the amir’s anger towards the Mas'udTyan. These men

had accused the courtiers of the old order, men like Bu Nasr Mushkan and Bu al-Hasan

‘AqllT, of treason, and charged, “ . . . these Pidarlyan [partisans of Mahmud] will not al­

low any wish [by this Amir] to come true, or any fortune to be gained . . . ”46 But with

the failure of the plot and the fear of adverse consequences, Mas'ud was angry at his

own partisans, despite their expressions of loyalty. The image of self-entanglement in

this instance evokes irony.

In a private session with the chief secretary, Mas'ud repeatedly said that the Khva­

razmshah had become suspicious, while Bu Nasr Mushkan asked the sultan’s reasons

for saying this. M as'ud finally admitted the intrigue in response to these inquiries. The

image of Mas'ud, concerned and yet unwilling to admit the intrigue, and the shrewd Bu

Nasr pretending ignorance, is comical.

The dialogue centers on the loyalty of Altuntash. And it ends with the decision to

write him a letter, asking for his continued allegiance. This is highly ironic. Through­

out the intrigue it was Altuntash’s loyalty that had been at issue. But in the end, it was

M as'ud who testified to his own loyalty and trust, in order to regain this allegiance,

feared lost. After assertions by Mas'ud that the Khvarazmshah had become suspicious,

Bu Nasr defended him, saying, " . . . he is a very wise and obedient man, and [he] re­

ceived many favors from the Sultan. [He] gave ample thanks in our [presence].”47 This

statement by Bu Nasr is only partially true, given that the Khvarazmshah also expressed

his suspicions towards Mas'ud, especially to the chief secretary. The amir repeated his

worry, which led Bu Nasr to ask, " . . . what is the reason?”48 BayhaqT reports the ad­

74

missions to the intrigue only indirectly. He only quotes M as’ud’s opening statement,

that, “These [people] will not let anything stay on the right course [qa‘idah-yi rast].”49

In his reply Bu Nasr recalled his earlier warning about the men of the new or­

der, related the advice of the Khvarazmshah on the way to Paryab, and testified to his

loyalty.50 The chief secretary closed his remarks with the question, “Has the Sultan

heard anything else?”51 The form that this question takes, if the sultan had heard any­

thing rather than done anything himself, creates irony. Bu Nasr most likely suspected

the intrigue all along, but asked about it in a way that wouldn’t endanger him. BayhaqT

reports M as’ud’s admission only indirectly, saying, “[The Amir] completely revealed

what had happened, and what they had incited him to do.”52 Bu Nasr again swore to

the Khvarazmshah’s loyalty.

Finally, M as’ud stated the need to win over Altuntash by means of a letter. It were

to be a letter, the sultan exclaimed, “ . . . [that we] would sign, and in which [we] would

write a few lines in our own handwriting.”53 Once Bu Nasr had found out what the let­

ter should contain, he remarked, “I know how the letter should be written.”54

Letters

In both plots against Altuntash, M as’ud explained away the intrigues in letters.

Considering this attitude of non-admission, the main purpose of the letters was to guar­

antee the Khvarazmshah’s continued loyalty. The two letters share similarities in rhetor­

ical patterns, though the letter sent after the more elaborate second attempt is, under­

standably, longer and more complex. The letters contain two parts. M as’ud spoke about

the Khvarazmshah and himself in the first part, as opposed to enviers, intriguers, in

the second. Whereas in the two intrigues, Mas’ud joined forces with enviers of the

Khvarazmshah, in these explanations about these failed attempts, the amir figuratively

changed sides. It was as though he and Altuntash faced not each other, but together

faced those who were envious of them.

The first letter begins with Altuntash’s services to the sultan, the sultan’s inten­

tions towards the Khvarazmshah, and a revised narrative of the intrigue. After the cus­

tomary salutations, Mas’ud immediately compared the Khvarazmshah to the late amir

Mahmud. M as’ud said, ” . . . in our heart [we] find the learned Hajib, Uncle Khvarazm-

75

shah Altuntash in place [jay-gah] of our father, the late Amir.”55 This symbolic eleva­

tion of the Khvarazmshah through a comparison with Mahmud is comical, since Mas'ud

seems to have disregarded the advice of both elders.

The sultan then called attention to Altuntash’s services in the reigns of Mahmud

and Muhammad, including the use of intrigue (lata’if al-hlyal) on behalf of M as'ud.56

He ended with a statement on the loyalty and friendship of Altuntash, saying, ‘‘[One]

can [only] imagine the high regard that someone like this has for friendship and obedi­

ence.”57 The conclusion drawn would be that a person like the Khvarazmshah would

not forsake friends, or disobey rulers. It is implied that Mas'ud was both a ruler and a

friend, which would help guarantee Altuntash’s loyalty on two fronts.

Mas'ud characterized his own actions mostly in terms of good intentions. Irony

arises in considering that it was shrewd to speak about intentions, given that one can

make any claims about things which are veiled. It is actions that one might not be able to

disclaim, given enough evidence. But intentions, or in other words attitude, can always

be disputed.

The sultan promised future favors, saying, “ . . . [one] can know how committed

we are to honoring [Altuntash], granting [him] territories, raising his offspring in sta­

tus, and giving them titles.”58 Mas'ud explained his past actions, also, in terms of in­

tentions. The call to service in Herat was so that Altuntash, “ . . . would see us,” said the

amir, ‘‘and receive the reward of his own good actions.”59 “The good action” had been

the use of intrigue, to guarantee the succession of Mas'ud. He also used this means. Yet

in his case, it was not for, but against Altuntash.

M as'ud offered two reasons for having wished that Altuntash accompany him to

Balkh, to consult him in state affairs, and to honor him more suitably.60 The amir re­

stated the very reasons that Altuntash had given for his refusal to return, concluding,

“ . . . [we] gave an order [for Altuntash] to leave.”61 Mimicking the Khvarazmshah

like this has a mocking effect. In the case of Altuntash, the intention of stating these

reasons was to evade the intrigue. But in the case of Mas'ud, faced as he was with a

fait accompli, it was to regain a loyalty that he himself had almost lost, by approving an

action (the leave) that had already been completed.

76

The passage that follows this statement is a narrative of the intrigue. M as'ud ex­

plained sending ‘Abdus after Altuntash in this way; “ . . . [‘Abdus] conveyed our profuse

regard for [the Khvarazmshah], and mentioned that [there] are a few other matters to dis­

cuss with [the leader]. . . ”62 The sultan reiterated the refusal to return, but lied about

his own attitude in the aftermath of the refusal. He stated, “We found the opinion of the

Hajib sound in this matter.”63

In the second part of the letter, Mas'ud mentioned hasidan-i dawlat, those envi­

ous in the state, and advised that Altuntash should remain loyal. The sultan charged the

envious men with lying, without specifying the nature of their lies. He stated, “But one

thing pains us and [we] fear, lest the envious men in the state . . . have related lies. [We]

do not know if what [we] have intuited is true.”64 The reference to the envious men is

concise and indirect. It is only in the next statement that one can connect these unnamed

people to the Khvarazmshah, the very object of this appeal. “But,” continued Mas'ud,

“[we] find [it] necessary to do our utmost in all that will bring comfort and peace of

mind to . . . [the Khvarazmshah].”65

The sultan ended the letter with orders about what Altuntash should do. The use

of the modal bayad, meaning both must and should, creates an ambiguous tone of a com­

manding, and yet respectful attitude by Mas'ud. Considering the amir’s loss of symbolic

power as a result of the intrigue, this respectful attitude is comically suitable. Mas'ud

advised that the Khvarazmshah should listen to the messenger, reply as requested, and

most importantly, that he should confide in the Ghaznavid ruler. He ended by saying,

“ . . . [Altuntash] should speak openly about matters, since [we] regard his opinion

very highly . . . ”66 Both the advice and the reason given for it are lies. The truth was

that Altuntash could not speak openly. And the plot proves that M as'ud did not regard

Altuntash as a kind advisor, but a threat.

Mas'ud guaranteed the authenticity of the letter by writing a few lines in his own

handwriting. The letter ends with the Arabic phrase, “wa-llah al-mu'In li-qada’

huquqi-hi.”67

BayhaqT speaks of two messages by Altuntash, after receiving this letter, one to

Mas'ud, and the other, to Bu Nasr. Irony arises in the contrast between the veiled men­

77

tion of the intrigue in the message to Mas'ud, as opposed to its candid assessment to Bu

Nasr.

One can characterize the message to Mas'ud as an advice letter (andarz). Altuntash

first offered advice on specific matters that Mas'ud had sought, regarding Qadir Khan,

‘Alltigln, Ahmad Hasan, and Ghazl. One cannot disregard the irony of fate, concerning

Ahmad Hasan. He had been arrested and imprisoned by Mahmud, due to the intrigues

of Altuntash, among others. And Mas'ud was, then, asking for the opinion of Altuntash,

himself the object of an attempted intrigue, concerning his old enemy, soon to become an

ally. The Khvarazmshah refrained from giving any advice about Ahmad Hasan, referring

to the old animosity.68

Altuntash then epitomized the past, present, and the future of the Ghaznavid state

in a more general piece of advice. He first repeated that the sultan himself had asked for

advice, and spoke of his wisdom. By doing this, the Khvarazmshah assumed a humble

attitude, despite the symbolically higher status of someone who gives advice.69

The thread that runs through his characterization of the Ghaznavid state is the

word qa'idah, order. Altuntash spoke of Mahmud as the founder of the state, saying,

“ . . . the late Amir enjoyed a long life. He established the government and the order

[qa'idah] of the state, solid and erect [as they have been], [entrusted it] to the Lord,

and departed.”70 The advice that followed anticipates all the subsequent intrigues at

Mas'Od’s court, especially the second attempt against Altuntash himself. He warned,

“If the Amir sees fit, no one should have the audacity and the impudence to upset the or­

der [qa'idah] o f . . . [the state].”71 The prophecy of future unrest informed this advice.

Altuntash forewarned, “ . . . lest the order [qa'idah] of all things would be overturned.”72

So, while Mahmud had put things in order by establishing the state, there was fear that

Mas'ud would upset this order, causing its loss.

In a message to Bu Nasr, Altuntash spoke of unnamed enemies and M as'ud to­

gether, in contrast to how M as'ud had separated the two in his letter. The Khvarazmshah

faulted unnamed enemies with the intrigue, while mentioning favors by M as'ud to­

wards himself.73 The resolution of the attempted intrigue was due to Bu Nasr, after

which, " . . . I was more relieved.”74 About unnamed enemies, however, Altuntash

78

warned, “That group [of Pisarlyan] will not let anything . . . remain on the right course

[qa‘idah-yi rast].”75

In the last part of the message, Altuntash absolved Mas'ud from blame, while

placing it with enemies, “bad amuzan,” bad teachers.76 Through this description of

events, the victim was “saving” Mas'ud. But the description is also unflattering. Despite

his portrayal as a kind ruler, M as'ud still appears as a poor judge of character.

In the middle of this communique, Altuntash expressed his suspicion and loyalty

at once. He swore off coming to the court in the future, but stated that he would remain

loyal to Mas'ud. This loyalty was a promise of help, if such help were needed in send­

ing troops or fighting enemies in person.77 Hence, though there was loyalty, there was

no trust. The expression of loyalty implies how Altuntash would behave, while the sus­

picion makes clear his attitude about Mas'ud. And it is the discord between the two that

creates irony.

The story ends with closures by the two narrators. Bu Nasr regretted having dis­

closed this message to the amir, which he did not keep confidential. BayhaqT briefly

refers to the second attempt of intrigue, but ends by saying, “[That story] will be told in

its place.”78

Altuntash acted wisely, considering the final outcome of the intrigue. And Mas'ud

acted foolishly. The contrast between the wisdom displayed by Altuntash and the un-

foresightedness of Mas'ud creates irony. It was an unplanned intrigue, with the amir first

giving an order of leave which he then tried to take back.

He first denied the intrigue, both through words and symbolic actions, such as

granting robes. He realized he had missed his chance to capture Altuntash, and tried to

reverse this turn of events. But when the intrigue failed, the amir panicked. At that point,

his attitude changed, from a seeming kindness masking envious greed, to one of regret

and benevolence. And in this newly assumed attitude, due to the reversal of the action,

lies the comedy.

79

Notes to Chapter III

BayhaqT, 925; ‘UtbT, 376; GardlzT, 396. Ibn al-Athlr has recorded this conquest in the entry for the year 407/1016-1017 (ibn al-Athlr, 265).

2‘UtbT provides valuable information on Altuntash for his service under Mahmud. Altun­tash accompanied Mahmud on many of his military campaigns, and fought fervently in the Ghaznavid army (‘UtbT, 188, 223, 286, 293, 313) (also see ibn al-AthTr, 213).Also mentioned are Altuntash’s service in arresting and bringing to the court the ruler of Gharchistan Shah Shar ( ‘UtbT, 328-329). In helping Qabus b. VushmgTr against Ilak Khan, Mahmud sent Altuntash with 10,000 horse men (‘UtbT, 227). BayhaqT notes that the Khvarazmshah was left with 1500 horse men in the province of Khvarazm, after the conquest of that province (BayhaqT, 926). For the role of the Khvarazmshah in the in­trigue against Ahmad Hasan MaymandT, Mahmud’s second vizier and M as‘ud’s first, see note 1 in chapter 2. Nizam al-Mulk gives the text of a letter by Ahmad Hasan to the Khvarazmshah, in which the vizier denied the former’s request for increased funds (Nizam al-Mulk, 299-300). Also see Barthold’s article on Altuntash (El, 322-323). Barthold speaks of the Khvarazmshah’s energy and foresight in administering the af­fairs of Khvarazm against the neighboring Turkish tribes. But Barthold points out that the Khvarazmshah’s wise measures secured his own rule, rather than that of the Ghaz­navid suzerains. Also mentioned is the suspicion of both Mahmud and Mas‘ud towards the Khvarazmshah (also see Bosworth, 238). Tolstov has pointed out that Altuntash, as predecessor governors of Khvarazm, identified with the local interests of the province (Tolstov, 291). Barthold speaks of attempted plots under both amirs against Altuntash. Yet I have not come across any mention of such an attempt under Mahmud.

3For the battle against ‘AlTtigTn and the subsequent injury and death of Altuntash, see BayhaqT pp. 436-451.

4BayhaqT, p. 453.

5For the account of the revolt and Harun’s subsequent murder see, pp. 563 and 607. For BayhaqT’s narrative account of the causal chain of events, see pp. 927-945.

6ibid., p. 403.

7ibid., pp. 517-518, see Fayyaz’s note about the mysterious circumstances of Sitti’s death. The beginning of the account is, now lost.

8Gelpke, p. 140.

9Bosworth (The Ghaznavids . . .) , p. 238.

10ibid„ pp. 230-234.

80

1 'Ahmad Hasan MaymandT was Mahmud’s second vizier, and M as'ud’s first. He held the vizierate for 13 years under Mahmud, and was then deposed and imprisoned in In­dia. MaymandT died in 424/1032-1033, after less than three years of service in M as'ud’s court (‘AqllT, 152-186; Khvandmlr, Dastur . . . , 139-140; MunshT KirmanT, 40-43).

12BayhaqT, pp. 181-195, 409.

13From the text of The History, it appears that Altuntash was with M as'ud during his campaign in Isfahan and Ray. When the amir received the letter of his aunt, he called the courtiers for consultation, including the Khvarazmshah (BayhaqT, 14). Ironically, the ref­erence to the use of intrigue by Altuntash was in the letter where M as'ud explained away the first attempt of intrigue, p. 102.

l4The other accounts are, respectively and according to Fayyaz’s sub-headings, the condition of GhazT, calling Ahmad Hasan, appointment of Bu Nasr Mushkan to the chancery, Bu Nasr’s advice to Mas'ud, past mistakes ( ‘AlTtigln, the Turkmen Saljuqs), Muhammad’s condition (BayhaqT’s heading), letter to Qadir Khan, pp. 71-96.

,5The author of Athar al-vuzara’ mentions the courtier Bu al-Hasan ‘AqllT in entries on Mahmud’s second and third viziers. MaymandT mentions ‘AqTlT as one of his detractors in the court of Mahmud, asking Bu Nasr to speak to ‘AqTlT on behalf of the vizier. When he was deposed, 'AqTlT was one of the courtiers suggested for vizierate. But Mahmud did not favor ‘AqTlT, considering him provincial and uncultured ( ‘AqTlT, 157-158; 190-191).

Other than The History, the most detailed source on Bu Nasr Mushkan, the chief secre­tary in the courts of the first three Ghaznavid rulers, is Athar al-vuzara’. In this manual on viziers, parts of a work by Bu Nasr, called Maqamat-i Bu Nasr Mushkan, now lost, has been preserved (‘AqTlT, 152-186).

l6BayhaqT, pp. 63-64.

17ibid„ p. 69.

18ibid.

19ibid., p. 70.

20ibid.

2'ibid.

22ibid., pp. 69-70.

23ibid., p. 70.

24ibid.

81

25ibid.

26ibid.

27ibid.

28ibid.

29ibid.

30ibid., p. 97.

3'ibid.

32ibid. The two courtiers further reasoned that the safeguard of a border like Khvarazm depended on the Khvarazmshah.

33ibid.

34ibid., p. 98.

35ibid.

36ibid.

37ibid., p. 99.

38ibid.

39ibid.

40ibid.

4 'ibid.

42ibid.

43ibid.

44ibid., Bu Nasr also told of the Khvarazmshah riding away with ‘Abdus, and speaking to him privately.

45ibid„ p. 100.

46ibid.

82

47ibid.

48ibid.

49ibid.

50ibid., pp. 100-101.

51 ibid., p. 101.

52ibid.

53ibid.

54ibid.

55ibid., p. 102.

56ibid.

57ibid., p. 103.

58ibid.

59ibid.

60M as‘ud mentioned the conflict with ‘AlTtigln and correspondance with the friendly Qarakhanid leader Qadir Khan as the state affairs in need of discussion.

61 ibid., the amir explained that he granted the leave for fear of troubles in Khvarazm.

62ibid., p. 104.

63ibid., Altuntash’s hasty leave and subsequent refusal to return was due to his suspicion of a plot, pp. 98-99.

64ibid., p. 104.

65ibid.

66ibid„ p. 105.

67ibid.

68ibid., p. 106.

83

69ibid„ p. 107.

70ibid., nahadan means both to establish and to entrust.

71 ibid.

72ibid., Bu Nasr reports that Mas'ud liked the reply by the Khvarazmshah.

73ibid.

74ibid.

75ibid.

76ibid.

77ibid., the message ended with the statement, " . . . until this affair will be known.”

78ibid., p. 108.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND ATTEMPT AGAINST THE KHVARAZMSHAH ALTUNTASH

M as'ud attempted a second plot of intrigue against the Khvarazmshah Altuntash in

the year 423/1031-32. Ironically, the Khvarazmshah died fighting ‘Alltigln on the sul­

tan’s behalf shortly after this attempt.1 The narrative of the second attempt is one of

the most striking examples of irony in The History. M as'ud and two courtiers intrigued

against Altuntash. The plot did not succeed. But the two courtiers suffered the fates of

imprisonment and murder. The one who had initially sought the arrest and murder of

Altuntash, Bu Sahl ZawzanI, was imprisoned in the end. And Qa’id Malanjuq, the mil­

itary commander in charge of killing the Khvarazmshah, was murdered. The one ulti­

mately responsible for the intrigue, that is, Sultan Mas'ud, denied his own role in yet an­

other letter to the Khvarazmshah, this time containing even more honors for the latter’s

continued loyalty.

In this chapter, I will discuss the intrigue, the letter, and finally, the end of the

story. Irony arises in consequence of the reversal of the action, and the visible sacrifice

of the intriguer turned victim. The Khvarazmshah was honored and respected, instead of

arrested or killed. And Bu Sahl was scapegoated, in the need for easing the tension of

a failed plot. Also ironic is the fact that Mas'ud wrote letters both in intriguing against

Altuntash and denying the plot, whereas he learned the truth about how Altuntash dis­

covered and evaded the plot in an oral message.

BayhaqT narrates this second plot also on the authority of Bu Nasr. In this elabo­

rate story of intrigue, Bu Sahl and Mas'ud attempted the arrest and murder of Altuntash

through Malanjuq, a subordinate commander and a fierce enemy of the Khvarazmshah.

But the chamberlain of Altuntash gained knowledge of the plot, and warned him in

a code letter to Khvarazm. When the vizier and others learned about the code letter

84

85

through spies, they interrogated the chamberlain. M as'ud denied the plot, and punished a

courtier who had supposedly spread this lie.

But then an official letter arrived, telling of the accidental death of Malanjuq in

the Khvarazm! court. Mas'ud confessed only then, and sought the help of his vizier and

chief secretary. Once they found out the real circumstances of MalanjOq’s death, Ahmad

Hasan suggested that Bu Sahl be sacrificed.

I will first discuss BayhaqT’s introduction to the story, and then analyze the intrigue

in terms of its consequences: interrogation, sacrifice, murder, reprimand, and finally im­

prisonment.

BayhaqT begins the story with the characterization of the plot by Bu Sahl, followed

by commentaries about the loss of Khvarazm. It is both foreboding and satirical to view

the projected outcomes of the plot, against the hindsight of its failure. BO Sahl convinced

the amir that, “The Khvarazmshah AltOntash is not upright, and [one] should have cap­

tured him in Shaburqan. When [he] left, he was suspicious.”2 Bu Sahl then pointed

out that strong military men like ‘All QarTb, Aryaruq, and GhazI had all fallen, and that

only the Khvarazmshah remained, whose demise would increase the status and wealth

of the kingship. Bu Sahl said, “If [one] removes . . . [AltOntash] from office and has a

trusted [servant] of the Lord seated there, a great kingship and many treasures and troops

will be gained.”3 M as'ud was convinced at that point, asking, “What is the solution?”4

The plan of intrigue then offered depended on three things: its secrecy, a hostile military

leader raised against the Khvarazmshah, and the very symbol of M as'ud’s approval, his

handwriting. The plot of intrigue would succeed, said BO Sahl, “ . . . i f . . . [it] remains

hidden.”5 Qa’id MalanjOq would be best to bring down AltOntash, since, as BO Sahl put

it, " . . . [MalanjOq] is thirsty for the Khvarazmshah’s blood.”6 And the amir’s handwrit­

ing would gain the trust of MalanjOq, who would be the only one with knowledge of the

plot.7 Mas'Od agreed to this plan and wrote the letter.

BayhaqT achieves irony by following this plan of intrigue with a commentary

about BO Sahl. Both commentaries center on the effect of the intrigue on the loss of

Khvarazm. In the first one, the chief secretary Bu Nasr pointed to Zawzam’s thoughtless­

ness in believing that the plot would remain a secret. The outcome was the loss of the

Khvarazmshah. Bu Nasr then stated, " . . . [BO Sahl did not think that] in alertness and

86

dexterity [there] is no one like [the Khvarazmshah, and that one] could not overthrow

him so easily. The whole world would revolt.”8

The author also includes his own thoughts on the consequences of the intrigue. He

attributes the loss of Khurasan to the troubles in Khvarazm, saying, “After the decree of

God, may He be glorified and exalted, [one] must know that Khurasan was lost on ac­

count of Khvarazm.”9 BayhaqT also remembers the Khvarazmshah’s advisor/adjudant,

Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad, another shrewd and wise man of affairs. The commentary ends

with the promise that, “All these will be mentioned in their [appropriate] places [bah

ja-yi khud].” 10

The exposure of the intrigue was due to the code letter of the Khvarazmshah’s

chamberlain Bu Muhammad M as‘adl. Bu Nasr related, “Once this letter in the sul­

tan’s handwriting was sent off, the Amir told that secret to [his confidant] ‘Abdus.” 11

‘Abdus, in turn, told this secret to his friend Bu al-Fath Hataml. And HatamT related it

to M as‘adl, the Khvarazmshah’s chamberlain. After sending the KhvarazmI court a let­

ter about the plot, Mas'adT sent the code letter in confirmation of what he had previously

written. Once the Ghaznavid spies confiscated this code letter, M as‘adl was called to the

court and interrogated.

The humor in this passage lies in the fact that everyone involved seems to have ex­

pected confidentiality, while no one seems to have kept matters confidential. Irony arises

in considering that Mas‘ud was responsible for the disclosure of the plot himself.

He asked the vizier to call Mas‘ad! to the court. Both the vizier and Bu Nasr were

present at this interrogation, while the sultan, ‘Abdus, and Bu Sahl were not. Bu Nasr

related, “ . . . [they] asked about the code letter.” 12 M as‘adl justified his own action

indirectly, by stating the terms of his appointment as the Khvarazmshah’s chamberlain.

He named both the sultan and Bu Nasr as his guarantors, saying, “ . . . [the] Lord knows

that no wrongdoing would come from me, and khvajah Bu Nasr can vouch [for] me.” 13

M as'adI then mentioned “an important matter” which made it necessary to write the code

letter. When they asked what it was, Mas‘adl refused to answer. Bu Nasr then narrated,

“ [They] said ‘you must answer since [it is only due to] the high esteem of your master

that this question is in this way. Otherwise [we] would question [you] differently.’ ” 14

M as‘adl asked for and received a guarantee of safety, after which, “[The Chamber­

87

lain] related that affair which [he said] ‘[I] heard from Bu al-Fath Hatami and he from

‘Abdus.’ ” 15

BayhaqT then focuses on the vizier Ahmad Hasan, in presenting the solution to this

turn of events. The vizier predicted the scapegoating of Bu al-Fath Hatami, despite the

hunch that he had innocently said what he had heard. It is the private conversations of

the vizier with the chief secretary that reveal the former’s suspicions about the truth of

the plot. Yet both Ahmad Hasan and Bu Nasr continued with the pretense that Hatami

had lied about the intrigue.

After M as'adi’s confession, Ahmad Hasan turned to the chief secretary and an­

grily said, “[Do you] see what [they] are doing?” 16 The vizier then asked Mas'adT if he

had already written Altuntash, to which the chamberlain replied, “[I] have written and

[I] sent this [code letter] as the confirmation of that.”17 At this point, the vizier restated

M as'adl’s terms of appointment, thus excusing the writing of the code letter. But Ahmad

Hasan assumed an attitude of disbelief towards the intrigue. He said, “But [one] must

punish Bu al-Fath Hatami, since [he] has told a lie [durugh].” 18

But in his private conversation with Bu Nasr, Ahmad Hasan contradicted this state­

ment. All three parts of the monologue imply that the vizier suspected the plot. Bu Nasr

continued the narrative with the vizier’s message to the sultan. After stating that Ahmad

Hasan spoke to him confidentially, pushldah, the chief secretary related the vizier’s mes­

sage that, “Tell the Sultan not to reveal this secret to ‘Abdus and Bu Sahl ZawzanI, un­

til [we see] what happens.” 19 Ahmad Hasan then proposed that Mas‘adl write to the

Khvarazmshah that, “ . . . what had been written before was false.”20

Finally, the vizier evaluated the solution and predicted the outcome of the disclo­

sure. He considered this solution to be the best course of action at the time, though they

still had to wait for the Khvarazm! response. The vizier predicted two sets of outcomes

for the disclosure of the intrigue. First was the sacrifice of Bu al-Fath Hatami, which

would allow the pretense of the lie to be maintained. Ahmad Hasan stated, “ . . . the Sul­

tan will not continue with this affair, and will sacrifize H atam i. . . ”21 The monologue

ends with the prediction of a worse outcome, that, “ . . . this thing will not remain a se­

cret, and a big misfortune will rise.”22 As predicted, all the consequences of the intrigue

88

were misfortunes, the murder of Malanjuq, the imprisonment of Bu Sahl, and finally, the

very loss of Khvarazm.

BO Nasr took Ahmad Hasan’s message to Mas’ud who faulted Hatami for lying,

just as the vizier had predicted. The amir was so astonished at first that he could not

speak. The imagery of surprise is comical, considering that Mas'ud was responsible for

both the plot and its disclosure.

He sent back a message to the vizier, containing both an order and the denial of

the intrigue. The order was, “[One] should say whatever is appropriate regarding this

matter;” in other words, it would be up to the vizier to find a solution for the troubles

at hand.23 Mas'ud then scapegoated Bu al-Fath Hatami. Calling the news of the in­

trigue “a lie (durOgh),” the amir explained, " . . . [there] is animosity between Bu Sahl

and ‘Abdus, and this dog [Hatami] has come up with such a deceit, and has fashioned a

falsehood like this.”24

Once the vizier received this message, he consoled Mas'adI, who wrote two code

letters to the Khvarazmshah, saying, “What had been written [before] had been a ruse,

which Bu al-Fath attempted between two nobles who were not on good terms with each

other. As a result, Hatami received a punishment and [they] took away the informa­

tion ministry of Balkh which [they] had given him.”25 Therefore, the plot against the

Khvarazmshah was denied through the lie about a fabricated plot, also unsuccessful, with

its instigator becoming his own victim.

The section ends with the report of the sacrifice of Bu al-Fath Hatami. Bu Nasr ex­

plained that, " . . . [they] flogged Bu al-Fath five hundred times, and took back the infor­

mation [ministry] of Balkh which [they] had given him.”26 By the end of this section,

where one has witnessed the sacrifice of Hatami, the narrative tension is resolved. It is

as though M as'adl’s letters and the report of Hataml’s punishment have together proved

the falsehood of the intrigue. It is the pretense of no intrigue which is suggested, and the

sacrifice of a victim which is necessitated.

But in the very next scene, suspicions expressed about the plot contradict this ap­

parent sense of calm. Suspicions by the vizier and denials by Mas'ud recall a similar

exchange between the chief secretary and the amir, right before the first attempt against

Altuntash.27 This echoing of the past adds to the comedy of the vizier attempting to un­

89

mask Mas'ud, who falsely insisted that the plot was a lie. This suspicion and denial ex­

change causes irony, especially since it comes right before the news of Malanjuq’s mur­

der.

The exchange between Ahmad Hasan and the amir was through messages. The

messenger was Bu Nasr, in whom the vizier first confided. The words of Ahmad Hasan

to his confidant are open and direct expressions about the intrigue, conveying a sincere

attitude of anger and surprise. Ahmad Hasan began, “Did [you] see what [they] did? . . .

And that is Altuntash, not the black demon [dlv], and [someone] like Ahmad ‘Abd al-

Samad [is] with him. How could this be fair to them?”28

The vizier then echoed an earlier statement about future troubles, but immedi­

ately retracted it, based on past knowledge of Altuntash. Ahmad Hasan remarked, “But

the Turk is wise and has become old. [He] will not want to make himself infamous

. . . ”29 Therefore, the guarantee that no troubles would rise was not due to the wisdom

of the amir, but that of his victim. The vizier ended his confidential talk to Bu Nasr with

the mention of an ironic twist. With the past animosity between Altuntash and Ahmad

Hasan, the latter astonishingly pointed out how he might be considered responsible for

the plot. As though asking Bu Nasr to bear witness to his innocence, the vizier then said,

“ . . . I myself am quite removed from these matters as [you] see.”30

In the message to the amir, Ahmad Hasan also pointed to the intrigue, but this time

indirectly and with caution. The vizier told the chief secretary to ask Mas'ud, “At all

events, something has happened unbeknownst to me. If the Lord sees [fit] inform me,

so that which is necessary . . . will be done.”31

Bu Nasr delivered the message to Mas'ud, who angrily repeated a more detailed

version of the denial story. The contrast between this expression of anger and that of

the vizier creates irony. Ahmad Hasan became angry because the amir had attempted

a plot against a loyal servant like Altuntash. But Mas'ud was enraged because this plot

had been exposed.

M as'ud began his message with a categorical denial of the intrigue. He said,

“Nothing of the kind has happened over which [one] should worry.”32 His retelling of

the denial story, as though to prove his own innocence to the vizier, is childlike and hu­

morous. The chain of transmitters remained the same. M as'ud lied that, “Bu Sahl was

90

only telling us that Altuntash was easily lost in Shaburqan, [and] I yelled at him. ‘Abdus

has gone and told Hatami that, ‘This Bu Sahl will not refrain from deceit.’ Hatami has

made a big to do about this. Therefore, he got what he deserved and received a punish­

ment.”33 Bu Nasr’s incredulous attitude about this story is evident in his ironic charac­

terization of things. He said, “ . . . this is sim ple,. . . [one] can rectify this, if [emphasis

mine] nothing else has happened.”34 This conditional statement implies that, “Some­

thing else has happened.”

Bu Nasr conveyed this message to Ahmad Hasan, who also maintained an incred­

ulous attitude towards M as'ud’s denial. The vizier exclaimed, “Oh Bu Nasr, [something]

has gone on and [it] has gone on secretly. [They] kept it from us. And [you] will see

what will develop as a result of this.”35 Bu Nasr closed this part of his narrative by say­

ing, “Then [I] returned.”36

Similar to his behavior in the first attempt, Mas'ud only admitted the intrigue when

he realized that it had failed miserably, with consequences beyond his control. In this

story, this was after the news of MalanjOq’s murder. The amir confessed to his chief

secretary, and sought the advice of the vizier, this after just having denied the intrigue

to them both. First came the confession scene with Bu Nasr, followed with the private

meeting with both the chief secretary and the vizier.

BayhaqT portrays Bu Nasr sitting with Mas'ud, when the letter carrying the news

of the murder arrived. Once he read the letter, the sultan became angry. But when Bu

Nasr attempted to leave, M as‘ud motioned to the chief secretary to stay. After the depar­

ture of the attendants and companions, the amir threw the letter to Bu Nasr.

In this letter, the postmaster of Khvarazm, ‘Abd Allah Hatami, told of Malanjuq’s

death, but falsified its circumstances. The death is explained as an accident, due to

Malanjuq’s insolent behavior at the KhvarazmI court. The postmaster made no mention

of the secret letter to Malanjuq, but enclosed a memo that intimates his knowledge of the

intrigue. ‘Abd Allah wrote, “ . . . [the Khvarazmshah] has used caution . . . so no trouble

should rise. Accordingly, [they] brought Malanjuq’s scribe and . . . son to the divan and

arrested [them ]. . . ”37

After Bu Nasr finished reading the letter, the sultan asked him what might hap­

pen. So, the one ultimately responsible for the plot was asking what its failure meant,

91

just as earlier he had inquired how it would succeed. Bu Nasr outlined the epistolary

consequences of the intrigue, even though, initially, he stated, “[I] cannot divine the un­

known.”38

First he spoke of the unlikelihood of an accidental death in the Khvarazm! court,

saying, “ . . . the Khvarazmshah is a very wise, noble, and self-restrained ma n . . . . No

one has the audacity to . . . raise trouble in his presence, let alone that a leader like Qa’id

[Malanjuq] should get killed by mistake.”39 Bu Nasr then drew the conclusion that,

“ . . . [there] must be something behind this.”40

The chief secretary implied that this letter was a false testimony of what had hap­

pened, by saying, “ . . . the Postmaster cannot, in appearance, write anything other than

by their approval and dictation.”41 But the conditions of his appointment obliged the

postmaster to reveal the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s death. So Bu Nasr reasoned,

“Until the secret letter [of ‘Abd Allah Hatami] arrives, [one] cannot know [the truth of]

this event.”42 Therefore, a secret letter would be the means for revealing the conditions

surrounding the failed plot, attempted through a secret letter, and disclosed through an­

other secret letter.

It was at this point that M as'ud confessed to Bu Nasr. The confessional tone that

the sultan assumed is ironic, considering his earlier denials. He said, “How long can

[I] hide [this] from you . . . Bu Nasr?”43 Instead of repeating the story of intrigue on

M as'ud’s authority, Bu Nasr quoted the sultan as saying, “Bu Sahl incited us to [do] this

and that, and [there] is a letter in our handwriting [saying] such and such.”44

Next, Mas'ud expressed what might have happened at the Khvarazm! court, and

worried about the exposure of his own role in the plot. He said, “Once the letter of the

Chamberlain arrived, [they] must have killed Qa’id and made up this excuse.”45 It then

becomes clear that the sultan confessed, only once he realized that the failure might have

much worse consequences. He explained, " . . . my worry is not due to Qa’id’s murder,

but [it] is because that letter in our handwriting should not fall into their hands.”46 In

other words, it was not the murder of one of the conspirators that concerned M as'ud,

but how he would be able to deny his own role in the intrigue. The private session ended

with M as'ud’s standard question after botched plots of intrigue. The amir asked, “What

is the solution?”47 And Bu Nasr replied that only the vizier would know.

92

In the next scene BayhaqT dramatizes the session in which the sultan, Bu Nasr,

and Ahmad Hasan were present. M as'ud confessed to the vizier, after he had read the

postmaster’s letter, unknowingly saying that the matter could be resolved. In his narra­

tive, Bu Nasr summarized the confession, which M as’ud ended by saying, “ . . . now the

worry is due [to the fact that] the letter should not fall into Altuntash’s hands.”48

The vizier advised M as'ud about the situation, but only after first scolding him

about what he had done. The words of Ahmad Hasan to the amir evoke the imagery of

a father disciplining a child, or a teacher punishing a student. Ahmad Hasan first evoked

fear in Mas'ud, but in the end offered advice. The vizier repeated M as'ud’s worry that

the letter had fallen in Altuntash’s hands, and then added, “The Khvarazmshah is lost.”49

The intensity of fear increases even more with the statement that, “[I] wish no other trou­

ble would arise.”50

Ahmad Hasan then completely changed his tone by saying, “But [I] know that

[trouble] will not [rise].”51 He gave two reasons for this reassurance. The first was that

the Khvarazmshah would realize that others had instigated the intrigue. The vizier stated,

“ . . . the Turk is old and wise. [He] knows that [they] have incited the Lord . . . ”52

Ahmad Hasan then offered himself as a scapegoat. He based this on his past animosity

with Altuntash, saying, " . . . relations between Altuntash and me have never been good,

and at any event, [he] will consider this my doing.”53 Irony arises in considering both

reasons for this reassurance. In the first one, it is, again, the alertness of the victim that

the vizier mentioned. He then assumed the pose of a victim himself, who, though inno­

cent, was willing to be sacrifized for Mas'ud.

Ahmad Hasan symbolically absolved Mas'ud from responsibility for the intrigue,

by saying, “Bu Sahl did not do right, and did not honor the favors of the Lord, with this

wrong advice which he gave.”54 This statement afforded the needed appearance of

M as'ud as righteous ruler, one who did not commit injustice or do wrong.

The only thing for which Ahmad Hasan scolded M as'ud was that he had not in­

formed the vizier about the intrigue. He said, " . . . I do not know what the reason has

been for hiding this from me.”55 Then, the vizier spoke regretfully of advice he would

have given, if only told about the intrigue. The conclusion drawn about the vizier’s at­

93

titude is that M as'ud was more wrong in not consulting Ahmad Hasan, than intriguing

against Altuntash.

M as‘ud’s response to this scolding implies the admission of wrongdoing. He said,

“What is done is done,” and then asked, “What is the solution now?”56 One can para­

phrase this as, “I know I have made a mistake, but what should I do now to correct it.”57

This implied admission of guilt prepares the way for the advice of the vizier. He

advised that they write a letter to the postmaster in which, “ . . . [one] should not make

this affair of Qa’id [seem too] important.”58 Ahmad Hasan warned against writing to

the Khvarazmshah, until learning about the real circumstances of the murder. And then,

the vizier stated, “ . . . [we] will deliberate in accordance with what we read.”59

Ahmad Hasan ended his monologue with a remark which initiated an exchange be­

tween the sultan and Bu Nasr. The vizier mentioned the fact that Bu al-Fath had revealed

the plot on account of his brother, the postmaster in Khvarazm.60 The sultan then re­

membered that, in Mahmud’s court, Bu al-Fath used to secretly write about chancery

matters to his father, then in M as'ud’s service in Herat. When Bu Nasr expressed his

regretful ignorance about this news, M as'ud asked what the chief secretary would have

done then. He said, “[I] would have ordered [that they] take him by the collar and throw

him out of the divan, because a disloyal scribe is of no use.”61 This recollection about

Bu al-Fath HatamI serves as a closure to the account of his sacrifice. He was punished

for, seemingly, having told a lie. But then it becomes clear that, though not a liar, he was

in the habit of revealing official secrets. Thus, the punishment he received earlier gains

justification at this point in the story, but for a different reason. The scene ends with the

departure of the vizier and Bu Nasr.

With the plot thus acknowledged by Mas'ud, there were more sacrifices. The amir

reprimanded both Bu Sahl and ‘Abdus. But the contrast between the attribution of their

faults creates irony. To Bu Sahl, M as‘ud said, “Until when [will there be] these bad

counsels of yours? If you speak to me about anything other than the [military] from

now on, [I] will have [them] wring your neck.”62 M as'ud also reprimanded his confi­

dant ‘Abdus, but for having disclosed the amir’s secret. The ironic meaning that emerges

in considering these faults is that Bu Sahl was wrong in advising intrigue. But it would

94

have been best if ‘Abdus had not disclosed that there was a plot, so it would have suc­

ceeded.63

This part of the narrative ends with a statement which characterizes this intrigue

as a political and moral coup for the members of the old guard. Bu Nasr said, “ . . . the

Amir was very preoccupied after this, and would speak about matters [only] to me and

khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]. The air of [self-importance which] these people had assumed

disappeared, as it was determined that whatever [they] say and think is wrong.”64

This is the mid-point in the story. The confession by M as'ud resolves the narrative

tension in the first part. And the conclusion drawn by Bu Nasr establishes the higher sta­

tus of the Mahmudlyan. The reversal of the intrigue comes next, with knowledge about

the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s death.

The postmaster at the KhvarazmI court sent news of what had really happened

through a traveller. Bu Nasr narrated, “One day [I] was a t . . . home [when they] said, ‘A

traveller is at the door [who] says, “[I] have an important matter to [discuss].” ’ ”65 The

traveller asked to meet with Bu Nasr privately, then took out a small letter from the top

of his cane, which he gave to Bu Nasr. The image of a letter placed in a cane conveys

the secret nature of the message.

The secret message of ‘Abd Allah HatamI follows the narrative pattern in the first

part of the story, where there was an intrigue, a lie, and then, the truth. M as'ud plotted,

then lied about it, and finally told the truth. ‘Abd Allah first mentioned how he had used

intrigue to send this message. Next, he said that the letter sent before was by the order

of the Khvarazmshah and false. In the oral message that the traveller then conveyed, Bu

Nasr learned the real circumstances of Malanjuq’s murder, that is, the truth.

‘Abd Allah began, “[I] have planned and plotted [hllat-ha kardah-am] and given

this traveller a sum of money and guaranteed that [he] will receive . . . [another] sum at

the court, so that [he] took on this danger and came.”66 The next statement about the

previous letter is ironic. The Khvarazmshah and his advisor had rewarded ‘Abd Allah,

giving him silver and clothes. But then he said, “ . . . if [I] had written otherwise, there

would have been fear for [my] life.”67 In other words, they had rewarded him to lie, but

they were ready to kill him if he were to tell the truth.

95

The truth was that Malanjuq had held a dinner party, where he had openly com­

plained about the Khvarazmshah and his advisor that, “ . . . Altuntash and Ahmad are

for themselves, their children, and their ghulams. [There] will be an end to this . . . ”68

The next day at the court, the Khvarazmshah confronted Malanjuq, saying, “Hadn’t [you]

found meat and sweets that [you] devoured me and my advisor?”69 The statement is

ironic, given that it was the Khvarazmshah that, in the end, “devoured” Malanjuq.

‘Abd Allah reported that Malanjuq gave a harsh answer, after which, “The

Khvarazmshah laughed and looked at Ahmad.”70 When the two met privately, Altuntash

mentioned “the kingly airs” Malanjuq had assumed. It was Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad who

planned and carried out the murder. At a weekly Friday gathering at his house, he or­

dered Malanjuq killed and his body paraded around the city.71 Therefore, the one who

had hoped to overthrow the Khvarazmshah was, literally, thrown to the ground himself.

The report, then, of an interrogation and a confiscation mirrors those in the Ghaz-

navid court. But in the KhvarazmI court, they took place after the disclosure of the in­

trigue. Whereas in the Ghaznavid court, it was the confiscation of the code letter by

M as‘adl and his interrogation which made the disclosure known.

At the KhvarazmI court, they interrogated Malanjuq’s scribe, who finally con­

fessed and gave them the secret letter from Mas'ud. The message ended with the report

of conditions at the KhvarazmI court, where “At the time of the Friday prayer, [they] pro­

nounced the sermon as before. . . . [though they have] started buying more ghulams and

mounts . . . ”72

Bu Nasr wrote down this message and took it to Mas'ud, who after reading it gave

a start and said, “[One] should seal this until tomorrow when khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]

comes [to the court].”73 Malanjuq’s murder is one of the ways in which the intrigue was

reversed. The imprisonment of Bu Sahl, the very instigator of the plot, is the more im­

portant one. The vizier advised the imprisonment of Bu Sahl, and M as'ud and his confi­

dants used intrigue to arrest him. He was, then, taken away and imprisoned.74

In this part, also, the narrative comprises an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The in­

trigue is the advice by Ahmad Hasan, followed by the false pretense of calm right before

Bu Sahl’s arrest. The truth is the reality of the imprisonment, after the appearance of Bu

Sahl’s good standing.

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On the day after the message arrived, Mas'ud met privately with the vizier and the

chief secretary. The amir agreed to the advice by the vizier, even before he had offered

it. Ahmad Hasan provoked fear in Mas'ud, saying, “ . . . this is the consequence of an

unconsidered action. [One] should regard Altuntash [lost] . . . and [I] wish no [other]

problem would rise, like an alliance with ‘Alltigln . . . ”75

The next statement by Bu Nasr is ironic. He discounted the possibility of an upris­

ing, on account of Altuntash’s loyalty to Mahmud. This loyalty to Mahmud was, indeed,

one of the reasons why M as'ud viewed the Khvarazmshah with suspicion. But at this

point, Bu Nasr mentioned it to comfort the amir. He replied, “What should [I] do with

my own handwriting that [they] hold as proof? And if [they] use [it] as evidence, how

could [I] deny [it]?”76

Ahmad Hasan, then, intimated a solution, an intrigue (tadblr), while characterizing

its “good” consequences. He said, " . . . there is one thing tha t . . . can slightly ease this

situation in time. And [there] is an alternative for this [meaning, the removal of Bu Sahl

from office], though [it] would be painful for the Lord. But [there] is no alternative for

Altuntash and that large border.”77

The affection of M as'ud for Bu Sahl is exaggerated here, leading the amir to state,

“If [I] have to sacrifice a dear child, [I] would, so this matter w i l l . . . be resolved . . . ”78

This willingness for a much bigger sacrifice symbolically sanctions the smaller sacri­

fice of Bu Sahl, suggested by the vizier. He said, " . . . once . . . [Bu Sahl] is arrested,

this guilt [gunah] will be attributed only to him.”79 In other words, the admission of Bu

Sahl’s guilt would mean the innocence of Mas'ud.

The monologue ends in a way that implies a political and moral coup for the

vizier, against the amir. Ahmad Hasan mentioned writing two letters to Altuntash. The

letter from Mas'ud would remove suspicions by the Khvarazmshah, who, still, would not

come to the court, but, at least, would not ally himself with an enemy like ‘Alltigln.80

But, more importantly, the vizier could advise the Khvarazmshah in a letter of his own.

Ahmad Hasan said, " . . . [I] could put a mirror in front of . . . [him] . . . , [he] will listen

to . . . [me] and [this] thing will be settled.”81

Mas'ud immediately agreed to this scheme, and the vizier left with the chief sec­

retary. The confidential statement of the vizier to Bu Nasr shows a sense of vindication,

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that advice by men of the new order like Bu Sahl would only have bad consequences.

The vizier said, “This Lord came to a recognition now, when [it] is very late. But [it] is

still fortunate, so that from now on, [nothing] like this would occur.”82

Bu Sahl was arrested and sent away to a fortress on the next day. This reversal of

intrigue came after the false pretense that things were normal at the court. The narrative

of this day, with no reported dialogues, reflects the very tenor of this day’s activities.

On this day, Ahmad Hasan, Bu Sahl, and Bu Nasr sat in their divans. And once

he had ordered the seizure of Bu Sahl’s wealth, Mas’ud sent word to the vizier, saying,

“The Khvajah [must] finish that man’s affairs.”83 What creates irony is the image of Bu

Sahl, who, unknowingly, must have heard this message, since he was sitting in his divan.

Ahmad Hasan then asked for troop counts. So, Bu Sahl was busy counting troops

while the troops had already seized his belongings, and arrested his people. With a fi­

nal order from the amir, Ahmad Hasan had Bu Sahl arrested. The narrative of the arrest

ends with a statement which signifies the reversal of the intrigue. Bu Nasr remarked,

“[They] took Bu Sahl to the fortress and chained [him]. And that evil deed . . . echoed

in his head.”84

Letters

The day after this arrest Mas’ud met privately with the vizier and the chief secre­

tary. The statement made by the amir epitomizes where matters stood at this point. He

said, “Bu Sahl’s story is finished and [it] was for the best, since the man would not let

anything good happen . . . what should [one] do now?”85 The plot having failed, it was

time to explain it. So it was time to turn to the vizier and his solutions, his intrigues. The

vizier mentioned four letters to Altuntash, two would be from the KhvarazmI chamber-

lain M as’adI, and the other two from himself and M as’Od. In these four letters, they fal­

sified the plot against the Khvarazmshah.

There was a lie about the relationship of Mas’adl’s letters to each other. In his of­

ficial letter, M as’adI was, supposedly, conveying information about the intrigue with the

court’s approval. While in his code letter, he was telling the “truth” about what had hap­

pened. In the first letter, the reason given for the arrest of Bu Sahl was both plots against

Altuntash. In other words, Bu Sahl was, belatedly, charged with the first attempt as well.

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M as'adl wrote, “ . . . Bu Sahl has committed and still commits treasons regarding the

state, to the extent that he plotted against a noble elder like the Khvarazmshah, when he

first came to the court. So, he had to return [to Khvarazm] with misgivings.”86 In this

way, only Bu Sahl received blame for the first attempt, which afforded M as'ud and other

conspirators an absolution from their guilt. The second attempt also remains vague in

this letter, with no direct mention of how Bu Sahl had plotted against Altuntash.

It was the code letter by M as‘adl that would contain the supposed circumstances

of the plot, which, in reality, were fabrications about Bu Sahl’s guilt, as opposed to

M as'ud’s innocence. The lies that the vizier, thus, made up had to do with both the amir

and Bu Sahl, but also with letters and wine. Ahmad Hasan falsified, “ . . . Bu Sahl had

found an opportunity when wine had overpowered [daryaftah bud] the Lord, written a

letter, on which a note was scribed in the King’s handwriting, and sent it to Khvarazm.

The next day when the Lord had thought about this and wanted the letter back, . . . [Bu

Sahl] swore that he, also, had thought about it, and realized that [it] was wrong. So

[he] had torn it up. Once [it] was known that [Bu Sahl] had lied, [the Amir] punished

him.”87

The images of wine and letters epitomize this false narrative of events. The im­

age of wine is associated with Mas'ud, who seems symbolically weakened for having

made an error in judgement. This is because of the effects of wine, which “overpow­

ers” (daryaftan) its victims. Whereas Bu Sahl, though the victim of his own plot, appears

shrewd and wily, and thus, in terms of practical knowledge, more powerful than Mas'ud.

Bu Sahl’s mode of behavior, intriguing, is closely associated with letters. He is supposed

to have written a letter, had Mas'ud inscribe it, and lied about having torn it up. And the

news of Bu Sahl’s, supposedly, single-handed plot was, again, in a letter, this one from

the chamberlain Mas'adl.

The vizier suggested that M as'adl send this code letter the next day. Ahmad

Hasan, also, advised that they send letters from himself and Mas'ud. In the letter from

Mas'ud, Bu Nasr, " . . . [would] win over . . . [Altuntash’s] heart [daryaftah ayad].”88

The use of the verb daryaftan, to overpower or win over, creates irony. In the previous

false narrative, overpowering, intriguing, is by means of wine, associated with Mas'ud,

who appears as its victim. In this instance, however, the means of overpowering, letters,

99

was associated not with a victim, but an intriguer. Bu Nasr would write letters, intrigue,

so as to gain the trust and loyalty of Altuntash.

The narrative of this private meeting, like those of the attempted plot and the se­

cret message of ‘Abd Allah, comprises an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The intrigue was

the vizier’s advice, followed by the lies in suggested letters. Then came the truth of how

Altuntash would react to these lies, in a statement by Ahmad Hasan. He said, “Although

all these are intrigues [nayrang] and will not be lost on . . . shrewd and crafty [men like

Altutash and ‘Abd al-Sam ad],. . . at least an [apparent] calm would follow. Therefore,

[Altuntash] would be relieved.”89

The amir promised, “Khvajah [Ahmad Hasan] should know that after this, every­

thing that will be done, concerning the state, the treasury, and decisions [tadblr] will be

with his knowledge.”90 Decisions (solutions), or intrigues, in this case as well as in the

first atttempt against Altuntash, had followed failed plots. So, it was Mas'ud who had al­

ways intrigued and failed, and it was Ahmad Hasan who had schemed in order to save

the amir.

The meeting ended in a way that symbolizes the shared confidence between Mas­

'ud and his two top officials. The vizier kissed the ground, wept, and advised that

Mas'ud value the elders of the state, who, “ . . . are better than a thousand young men.”91

Mas'ud then called Ahmad Hasan near to himself, and embraced the vizier. Bu Nasr

added, “[The Amir] also spoke kindly to me.”92 This final piece of advice, intrigue, was

a plea for men like the vizier and the chief secretary. They were experienced in matters

of intrigue, as opposed to men like Bu Sahl, who ended up becoming their own victims.

BayhaqI then gives the text of the letter from Mas'ud. This letter, like the one after

the first attempt, is also divided into two parts. The amir spoke of himself and Altuntash

in the first part, as opposed to enviers in the state, in this case BO Sahl ZawzanI, in the

second.

Mas'ud began by comparing Altuntash to Mahmud, saying, “The learned Hajib,

Uncle Khvarazmshah, may God prolong his life, is in place of our father today, and he is

the most important foundation of the state [emphasis mine].”93 An effect of this sym­

bolic elevation of the Khvarazmshah is, inevitably, the lowered status of Mas'ud.

100

What follows is a moral elevation of Altuntash, who, “ . . . has shown honesty, sin­

cerity, and faith, concerning all matters.”94 The mention of these good traits implies

a contrasting set of traits that were M as'ud’s own. The amir then spoke of two pieces

of advice by Altuntash, as proof for his good traits. One, to the courtiers at the time of

Mahmud’s death, was in support of M as’ud as successor. And the other was to the sul­

tan after his accession. Irony arises in considering that the first piece of advice had been

to ‘All QarTb and others to support M as'ud over Muhammad; whereas in the second one,

the Khvarazmshah had spoken on behalf of ‘All, after M as'ud’s accession to the throne.

The first passage centers on Altuntash as a good and honest man. Next is that

being good and honest means rewards, both in this world and the next. Mas’ud ended

this passage with the optative statement, “May he always live and may no one hear of

his loss.”95 The reward (naslb) that Mas'ud himself had intended for Altuntash was

arrest, and it had been due to another letter, the first code letter of Mas'adl, that the

Khvarazmshah did not lose his life.

M as'ud then mentioned that he was embarrassed, because unlike Altuntash who

had shown good faith and loyalty, “ . . . [there] has not been a just reward from us,

but rather, enemies and slanderers, young men [who are] unthoughtful and inexperi­

enced have done things [that are] despicable . . . ”96 What creates irony is that the con­

trast between Altuntash and Mas'ud is distorted. Good faith and loyalty on the part of

Altuntash did, actually, meet with its opposite in the amir, bad intentions and mistrust.

But the contrast stated here only charges M as'ud with neglect, in not having rewarded

the Khvarazmshah deservedly.

M as'ud ended this part with the promise of future rewards. But first, he appealed

to Altuntash on the basis of his own wisdom. Considering that the amir could not com­

pletely deny his own role in the plot, given the evidence of his handwriting, it was best

to appeal his case by resorting to others, including the victim. His wisdom guaranteed

that the Khvarazmshah, " . . . would look at what is primary [asl], and not concern him­

self with something secondary [far'] . . . ”97 The term asl echoes an earlier mention in

the first letter of The History. In that letter, an appeal for safety by Ghazna courtiers,

they had excused their prior allegiance to Muhammad by calling him, “a branch from

the main [asl] tree of the late Amir [Mahmud].”98 In this appeal, also, the association

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between Mahmud and that which is primary, a$l, would best guarantee Altuntash’s con­

tinued loyalty, with M as'ud symbolically lowered as far*.

Next the amir, explicitly, mentioned Mahmud as his guarantor, saying, “I f . . . [the

Khvarazmshah] is concerned over matters that others have told him about, or things that

they have shown him, he should think of the late Amir . . . , and not about what enviers

and slanderers present [nahand] to him.”99 This mirrors the false narrative of the in­

trigue, where the matter Bu Sahl had told Mas'ud was the plot against Altuntash, and

the thing shown was the letter to Malanjuq. But now, the amir was advising Altuntash

to disregard this letter, whose very existence is implied in the advice.

Mas'Od, then, restated his confidence in Altuntash’s own wisdom, saying, " . . .

[the Khvarazmshah] has wisdom, discernment, perception, and good judgement, so that

[others] cannot prevail on him that easily.” 100 So, Altuntash would withstand the influ­

ence of others, given his wisdom, when Mas'ud had not done this himself.

He ended this part with a wish and a promise. The wish was that God would re­

ward Altuntash fairly. This was in contrast to the amir, who had tried but failed to do the

opposite. The promise was that, " . . . if something has happened to cast an aspersion on

his rank or to pain him [in any way], it would be amended [daryaftah shavad].” 101 Ear­

lier uses of the verb daryaftan indicate intrigue. First it was in relation to wine, which

had, supposedly, overpowered Mas'ud, and then, in relation to letters, through which Bu

Nasr would win over Altuntash. In this passage, the promise is to make up for pains and

worries that the plot might have caused. And since Mas'ud could not deny the plot, but

only minimize his own role, in other words, lie, daryaftan implies intrigue once again.

In the second part of the letter, the amir spoke about Bu Sahl. In this description

of events at the Ghaznavid court, Bu Sahl gains an even higher status as an intriguer than

he had actually earned. In this part, Mas'ud explained his own actions in regards to Bu

Sahl, first, for his appointment as a courtier, and then, for his dismissal and imprison­

ment.

The amir explained that Bu Sahl joined the court since, “He had served us for a

long time, and had suffered because of his affection for us, having been imprisoned in

the Ghazna fortress.” 102 Bu Sahl would, also, be imprisoned after this failed plot. But

102

this time, it was due to orders from Mas'ud. When in the past, it had been on account of

him.

Bu Sahl joined the court because, " . . . [it] seemed [nimud] to us then that he was

the most well-meaning and the kindest of servants.”103 The use of the verb nimudan, to

seem, implies that M as'ud considered his own past judgement of Bu Sahl to have been

wrong. But it also allows an ironic reading of the statement, with M as'ud as victim. For

it implies that he had not been discerning enough to differentiate between how people

appear, seem to be, and what they are really like.

Finally, Bu Sahl joined the court since when the amir first assumed power,

“[There] was no one with us from the elders of the state . . . to offer any advice [tadblr]

” 104 Thg implication is that if the members of the old guard had actually been with

Mas'ud, they would have advised the dismissal or arrest of Bu Sahl. So in this instance,

one can consider the word tadblr to mean intrigue. And the intrigue, or advice, would

have been against BO Sahl.

M as'ud spoke of the dismissal and imprisonment of Bu Sahl in terms of faction­

alism and intrigue. Bu Sahl gained in power at court, and the Mahmudlyan became,

“ . . . broken-hearted and u p se t. . . ” 105 This narrative of events, that the members

of the old guard disliked the rise of Bu Sahl is accurate. But this account implies that

M as'ud’s sympathies lay with the former rather than with Bu Sahl, when, in reality, it

had been just the opposite.

Bu Sahl gained in power to such extent that, " . . . he even aspired to the vizier-

ate.” 106 But the amir, wisely, chose Ahmad Hasan. M as'ud said, " . . . [we] ended

. . . [his] long suffering, and adorned the vizierate with his excellence . . . ” 107 The im­

plicit mention of the earlier exile of Ahmad Hasan is clever. The Khvarazmshah, along

with ‘All Qarlb, had been the main intriguer against the vizier.108 So the reminder about

the intrigue by Altuntash made it impossible for him to assume the moral high ground.

For he himself had not been above intrigue and deceit.

M as'ud next turned to his second reason for the dismissal and imprisonment of Bu

Sahl. The amir had appointed him as the military head, so that, " . . . our court would be

free of his intrigues and lies [tasahhub va tabassut] . . . ” 109 This is comical. It is un­

103

clear why if, indeed, Bu Sahl was as knavish as depicted, M as‘ud not only kept him in

the court, but even granted him the high position of military head.

Bu Sahl had continued his deceit. The amir said, “[He] would slander the masters

of the sword, and fabricate lies [talbls mTsakht] about them, as he has done now about

the hajib Altuntash, having incited Qa’id Malanjuq, and made a big to do about him. [Bu

Sahl] has asked that we should change our good opinion of the Hajib, who is, truly, in

place of our father and uncle.”110

This is a relatively open admission of the role of Bu Sahl in the intrigue, but a lie

about Mas'ud. There was asking by Bu Sahl, but not about the amir changing his opin­

ion about Altuntash, since he seems to have already viewed him with suspicion, mistrust,

and envy. So M as'ud had been ready for a plot, when one was offered by Bu Sahl. In

this passage, M as'ud again compared the Khvarazmshah with Mahmud, but also with his

uncle Yusuf. Despite the apparent respect and affection, the amir had reasons for hatred

of all three. He had plotted and failed twice against Altuntash, been denied the succes­

sion by Mahmud, and his uncle Yusuf had, at first, sworn loyalty to Muhammad.

Mas'ud, then, mentioned his decision to dismiss and imprison Bu Sahl, saying,

“When . . . his heinous crimes became apparent [zahir] to us, [we] ordered that [they]

take away the ministry of military affairs from him, and imprison him somewhere . . .

” *11 The use of zahir gashtan, to become apparent, recalls the earlier use of a similar

verb, nimudan, to seem or appear, where Mas'ud had said, " . . . [it] seemed to us . . . [in

the beginning of our rule] th a t . . . [Bu Sahl] was the most well-meaning and the kindest

of servants. . . ”*12 So first he had seemed the most well-meaning of servants, but later,

it became apparent that he was the most deceitful. What this implies about M as'ud is un­

flattering and humorous. He lacked insight to such an extent that he was so wide of the

mark in his estimation of a top official.

The amir symbolically held up Bu Sahl as the victim of the intrigue, by saying,

“ . . . [his dismissal and arrest] was so that other impudent servants would be punished

by his example, and take heed.”113 The implication is that there actually were other

servants who were plotting and scheming, as Bu Sahl had done. But once they saw

what happened to him they stopped. So, Mas'ud lacked the power to control his own

104

courtiers. And they stopped their schemes only for fear of reprisal. These implied con­

clusions put both the amir and his court in an unfavorable light.

M as'ud concluded the letter with a the promise of rewards and an appeal for loy­

alty. First he spoke of titles and honors he had already given to Altuntash’s son at the

Ghaznavid court, saying, " . . . S ittI. . . is the best person for . . . [hajabl], for his [lin­

eage, being] the son of a father [like the Khvarazmshah], [his] nobility, and excellence

. . . ” ' 14 But this SittI would later die under mysterious circumstances in the Ghaz­

navid court. And the other son of Altuntash, Harun, would be killed, after the failure of

his rebellion against the court.115 So, being the son of Altuntash as well as being the

Khvarazmshah himself, met with reprisals, and not rewards.

The amir also promised Altuntash future rewards, stating, “ . . . from now on

[they] will be unending [payvastah], so that all the hatred and suspicion that this gos-

sipmonger [Bu Sahl] has caused will be eliminated.” 116 It is unclear who held these

feelings, which allows that they may be attributed to Mas'ud himself. This establishes

a motive for him as a suspect, in an intrigue which he had thus far denied.

M as'ud closed the letter with the appeal for Altuntash’s loyalty. He mentioned that

Ahmad Hasan would, also, write the Khvarazmshah, and explain matters more openly.

Finally, the amir said, “ . . . [the Khvarazmshah should tru s t. . . [what the Vizier says],

and be [even] more sincere than before . . . ” *17 Given that this plot had much worse

consequences than the first one, there was need for more effort by Altuntash to put mat­

ters to rest.

Closures

There are four closures to the story, the first one by the narrator Bu Nasr. He said,

“This letter was written, and the confidant of the vizierate went [to Khvarazm] and came

back. [There] was an apparent [zahir] calm, and no serious trouble occurred at the time

[dar vaqt].” 118 The word zahir, apparent, implies that there was trouble, but it was un­

der the surface at the time. One can thus conclude that Bu Nasr related this story to Bay-

haql after the rebellion of Harun. Considered against this shared knowledge between Bu

Nasr and BayhaqI, and subsequently his readers, the closure resonates with irony.

105

The closure by Bu Nasr ends another three-part set in the narrative, comprising an

intrigue, a lie, and the truth. One can call this commentary by Bu Nasr the truth about

the effects of the letter. It was true that it brought calm and prevented an uprising. But

the calm was on the surface, and trouble lay just ahead. One can also characterize the

advice by the vizier as the intrigue that preceded this statement of truth. And the letter

itself was a lie, a fabrication about M as'ud’s role in the intrigue.

The next three closures are by BayhaqT himself. In the first one, the author points

to the irony of the intrigue against Altuntash, by mentioning that he later died fight­

ing ‘Alltigln on behalf of Mas'ud. Intrigue played a role in the KhvarazmI victory over

‘Alltigln. For, the advisor of the Khvarazmshah Ahmad ‘Abd al-Samad kept the news of

his death a secret, until he had “used intrigue [lata’if al-hlyal] to return [the troops] back

to Khvarazm.”119 This connection made between intrigue and ‘Abd al-Samad is impor­

tant, given that the next closure contains mention of other intrigues by Altuntash and his

advisor.

After the death of Ahmad Hasan and Altuntash, ‘Abd al-Samad became M as'ud’s

second vizier, and told BayhaqT about his own role in the murder of Malanjuq.120 ‘Abd

al-Samad began his narrative with the mention of a routine by Altuntash, saying, “In the

beginning when I became the advisor of the Khvarazmshah, he decided on a routine, so

that every day, I would go to see him alone, sit, and be there for a few hours . . . Whether

[there] was something of importance or not, [Altuntash] would meet with me privately,

and ask ‘What did [you] do last night? What did you eat? How did you sleep?’ . . . ” 121

‘Abd al-Samad had found this routine strange. But one day something important and

requiring secrecy had come up. And they had taken care of it in their private meeting,

without anyone’s knowledge. So he concluded, “[I] told myself, ‘How wrong I have

been!” ’122

It was in one of these daily private meetings that Altuntash and ‘Abd al-Samad

had, first, discussed the intrigue, discovered through the code letter of Mas‘adT. Altuntash

had cried, saying, “Damn these bad teachers! [They] arrested someone like ‘All Qarlb

who had no equals and [men] like GhazI and Aryaruq . . . Now [they] have intrigued like

this [dast dar chinln hllat-ha zadand]. . . . [But] even if [they] do this a thousand times, I

will not ruin my good name [nam-i nlk] . . . ” 123

106

Altuntash had suggested that they arrest Malanjuq, but ‘Abd al-Samad had said, “

. . . [one] should cut the head [of someone] who assumes the airs of Khvarazmshah, for a

king like M as'ud . . . ” 124 The advisor, then, had asked Altuntash to leave matters up to

him, and arranged the murder o f Malanjuq at his own house. Once he had found out, the

Khvarazmshah had asked what ‘Abd al-Samad would tell the court. And he had replied,

“[I] have [already] taken care of that [tadblr-i an kardam],” referring to the official letter

of ‘Abd Allah HatamT.125

There are two intrigues in this story, one by Altuntash, and the other by ‘Abd al-

Samad. The first intrigue by Altuntash, the daily private meetings, had allowed the two

to discuss matters secretly. And it was partly due to this routine that the Khvarazmshah

was able to escape the plot by Mas'ud. ‘Abd al-Samad had also intrigued, first against

Malanjuq, and then, in explaining matters to the Ghaznavid court. The reply that he

gave Altuntash, when asked how he would explain matters to the court intimates the

use of intrigue. ‘Abd al-Samad had said, “[I have [already] taken care of that [problem]

[tadblr-i an kardam].” 126 So he had found a solution (tadblr), the solution being a lie.

This new piece of information about how Malanjuq was really killed, by contrast,

reveals that the story of the intrigue had not been completely true. So, it is by knowing

the truth about the intrigue, the story by ‘Abd al-Samad, that the earlier story becomes

less than true, in other words, false. And this, again, allows that one epitomize three

parts in the narrative as an intrigue, a lie, and the truth. The intrigue was the very plot

against Altuntash, the lie, the narrative by Bu Nasr. And the truth was the story by ‘Abd

al-Samad.

The last closure is a story about the Sassanian vizier Buzurgmihr.127 BayhaqT

narrates that Buzurgmihr converted from Zoroastrianism to Christianity, for which the

Sassanian king Nushlrva Kasra had him first imprisoned, and then killed. This nar­

rative is the story of Buzurgmihr’s imprisonment, and is ironic in light of its ending.

BayhaqT closes the story by saying, “ . . . [Buzurgmihr] went to Paradise and Kasra to

Hell.” 128 Throughout the imprisonment, their conditions had been the opposite. It was

Buzurgmihr who had been the victim, and his victimizer, the intriguer, the ironist, had

been Kasra. But he had, then, become the victim of his own deeds, suffering even worse

consequences than Buzurgmihr. So, what happened to them in the end, one having been

107

damned and the other saved, was the truth about who they were. And this belied Kasra’s

high status as king, in contrast to the fate of imprisonment and execution by Buzurgmihr.

There are other “lies” and “truths” in this story, whose contrast lead to irony.

Thus, religions become false, in light of other more true faiths. Kings seem like liars in

comparison with God, the true King. The body is thus false in contrast to the soul, as

women are to men, darkness to light, and ignorance to knowledge.

The author begins the story by saying, “[I] read that when the wise Buzurgmihr

turned away from the religion of Zoroastrians, which had been a faulty religion, and

accepted the religion of the prophet Jesus . . . , he advised his [religious] brothers, say­

ing, ‘[I] have read in books that at the end of time, a prophet will come whose name is

Muhammad . . . You should advise your children . . . [to believe in him], so that [you

will go to] Paradise.’ ” 129 Therefore, Buzurgmihr had realized the truth of Christianity

as opposed to the falsehood of Zoroastrianism, but also anticipated Islam as the most true

religion of all. And it was BayhaqT who bore witness to this, given his Islamic perspec­

tive.

The author then relates that they took this news about Buzurgmihr to Kasra, who

ordered his arrest. But the day before this arrest, the wisemen and philosophers of Pars

went to see Buzurgmihr. And they asked for advice. They stated, “ . . . [you] gave us

fruits of your knowledge, so [we] became wise. [You] were our bright star, who showed

us the right path. [You] were our joyous spring, from which we drank. [You] were our

prairie, full of harvest, from which [we] obtained.” 130 They followed these statements

of what Buzurgmihr had done for them, by saying, “The King holds you in anger and

[they] are taking you away . . . ” 131 Irony arises as a result of an implied contradiction

between these good deeds by Buzurgmihr and the anger of Kasra. A direct statement

of the passage would be, “This is what you have done, whereas this is what the King is

doing to you.” So, it is as though Kasra had Buzurgmihr arrested because of his good

deeds.

Buzurgmihr then advised these men. One can epitomize this advice, also, in terms

of the contrast between lies and truths. Lies or misdeeds are things which Buzurgmihr

warned against, and truths are associated with such things as goodness, honesty, and

a good disposition. He began, “Know God, may He be exalted and glorified,. . . and

108

be assured that [He] sees your good and evil deeds . . . ” 132 He warned against saying

and doing evil, and counseled the men to “ . . . say [what is] good and do that [which is]

righteous . . . ” 133

He pointed to the “lie” of Life in contrast to the “truth” of Death, saying, “Know

that death is the house of life. Though [you] might live a long time, that is where [you]

will go.” 134 So, the advice is that one should live with awareness of his coming death,

as though it is death that will give meaning to the life that one has lived.

Another advice is that one should tell the truth, rast, and not lie. Buzurgmihr

stated, “Tell the truth for [it] illuminates the face ,. . . and refrain from lying, since even

if a liar gives truthful testimony, [people] will not accept [it].” 135 He warned the men

against women, who, “ . . . take possession of all favors and ruin homes.” 136

Buzurgmihr spoke of a good disposition as “the greatest of God’s favors.” In

contrast, an ill-natured person is always in pain, as others are because of him. He said,

“A good-tempered person has both this world and . . . [the next], and he is admired in

both.” 137 He ended this advice by drawing a contrast between the virtues of work and

its futility in the face of death. He asked that the men not put their trust solely in hope,

so that, “ . . . [you] would stop working.” 138 But right after this he said, “And those

who built cities, villages, houses, and wells, and bemoaned the sorrows of this world left

all this behind, and these things were ruined.” 139

On the day after this advice, they took the vizier to the king. In the scene between

Kasra and Buzurgmihr, the former is associated with political power, whereas the power

of Buzurgmihr is symbolic, at once both intellectual and spiritual. Throughout his mono­

logue, Kasra asked that Buzurgmihr return to Zoroastrianism and the court. First was a

reminder of all the favors and ranks that he had received. Kasra said, “[You] reached the

rank of vizier, and the decisions [tadblr] of our kingdom were by you.” 140 Buzurgmihr

had given up many things, like the vizierate, for becoming a Christian in a Zoroastrian

land. So, this part of Kasra’s appeal was to arouse temptation for worldly things like the

vizierate.

But the king, next, threatened Buzurgmihr, saying, “Was your goal to make the

country revolt against me? . . . [I] will have you killed in such a way that no sinner has

[ever] been killed . . . ” 141 Kasra then completely changed his tone, this time entreat-

109

ing his vizier to repent. Kasra stated, “ . . . [it] would be a shame to kill a wiseman like

you. And [there] is no one such as you.” 142 So, the shame was not that it was Kasra

who would have Buzurgmihr killed, but that Buzurgmihr would be killed. Therefore, the

cause for shame was not the murder itself, but the murder of a man who could not be re­

placed.

Buzurgmihr refused to repent. He remained defiant, despite reminders of his past

rewards and the threat of future punishment. He said, “Since I came from darkness to

light, I will not go back to darkness . . . ” 143 The moral coup by the vizier against the

king is in his last statement. Buzurgmihr stated, “ . . . the Judge to whom [I] am going

is just, and will not require testimony . . . [He] will take back His mercy from you.” 144

This moral threat is an answer to the threat of murder that Kasra had made.

But unlike the vizier who remained calm in the face of threats, the king was en­

raged. BayhaqT says, “Kasra was angered to such an extent that he had never been be­

fore.” 145 The king was the one with power over the life of Buzurgmihr. But it was the

vizier who created a rage in Kasra, when he himself remained visibly calm and tranquil.

So, the king was ultimately weak and ineffective, as opposed to Buzurgmihr who was

strong-minded and resolved.

BayhaqT, then, demonstrates the power Buzurgmihr held over Kasra by saying, “

. . . [in imprisonment] one day [they] did not hear . . . [the voice of Buzurgmihr]. When

[they] told K asra,. . . [he] became dejected.” 146 The king ordered that they bring the

family and relatives of Buzurgmihr, so that he might talk. BayhaqT says, “[They] brought

him into the light. [They] found his body strong and his cheeks ruddy.” 147

His good health surprised everyone. He explained, “[I] have made a daily repast

of six things, [from] which [I] eat a little every day, so [I] have remained like this.” 148

He spoke of a daily repast of faith, acceptance, forbearance, shunning of evil, offering of

thanks, and hope.

BayhaqT, again, points to the power Buzurgmihr held over Kasra. When told about

this advice by the vizier, the king said to himself, “How could [one] kill a wise man like

this?” 149 But right after this, the author mentions that Kasra finally had Buzurgmihr

killed and cut into pieces. BayhaqT ends the story by saying, “ . . . [Buzurgmihr] went

to Paradise and Kasra to Hell.” 150

110

One can characterize the whole narrative as comprising an intrigue, a lie, and the

truth. The story of Buzurgmihr tells of truths that follow the lies M as'ud wrote in letters,

and the intrigue that he had planned with Bu Sahl.

Both Marilyn Waldman and Julie Scott Meisami discuss this story in their respec­

tive works, arriving at different conclusions. Waldman believes that Nushlrva Kasra is

compared to Mas'ud. She says, “ . . . the shared question is obvious: how does an ab­

solute ruler deal with other powerful individuals around him so as to maintain his abso­

lutism without denying himself their usefulness?”151 Meisami, on the other hand, con­

siders the two sets of rulers and men of affairs, Mas'ud and Nushlrvan, and Bu Sahl Za-

wzanl and Buzurgmihr, to have been juxtaposed against each other. She thinks that Bay­

haqT intended to validate the Islamic present, in contrast to the Iranian past. She states,

“The point of this story (which is not found in the Shahnamah) is clear: it contrasts

the pious Buzurgmihr with the devious Bu Sahl, the tyrannical Kisra with the clement

Mas'ud (who later released Bu Sahl). The implication is that it is Islam which makes the

difference . . . ” 152

Both scholars note the significance of analogy. In the reading by Waldman, the

implied parallelism between Nushlrva Kasra and Mas'ud focuses one’s attention on the

latter. Meisami, however, draws attention to Nushlrvan, by treating the story in an ex­

clusively Islamic framework. The implication is that BayhaqT has told the story of this

Iranian past, so as to uphold its king for contempt and its righteously converted vizier

for approval. The question that both Waldman and Meisami have implicitly posed, given

their explanations of the story, is this: Why has BayhaqT related this story after the nar­

rative of intrigue by Bu Sahl? They have answered this question by pointing to character

analogies, which they have interpreted antithetically.153

I agree with an analogical approach to The History, but I do not believe this al­

ways dictates analogies of character, or other narrative elements between stories. It is

the act of remembrance itself which interests me, the chain of thought that successively

links the present of telling the intrigue story to the story of yet another imprisonment, in

an even more distant past, far removed from the one more fully portrayed.

In both stories, kings hold power over the lives of others. But it is the viziers who

symbolize a more important kind of power. Ahmad Hasan corrected the mistake that

I l l

M as'ud had made. And Buzurgmihr symbolized wisdom for Kasra. The power associ­

ated with the viziers is the power of knowledge (khirad), and for this the kings turned to

the viziers.

112

Notes to Chapter IV

BayhaqT The History, pp. 430-451.

2ibid., p. 402.

3ibid.

4ibid.

5ibid.

6ibid. ZawzanT considered Malanjuq the right choice also because his troops outnum­bered those of the Khvarazmshah.

7ibid., p. 403.

8 ibid.

9ibid.

10ibid.

1 ’ibid.

12ibid., p. 404.

13ibid.

14ibid.

15ibid.

16ibid.

17ibid.

18ibid.

’9ibid.

20ibid., pp. 404—405.

21 ibid., p. 405.

22ibid.

113

23ibid.

24ibid.

25ibid.

26ibid.

27ibid„ p. 97.

28ibid., p. 405.

29ibid., p. 406.

30ibid.

3’ibid.

32ibid.

33ibid.

34ibid.

35ibid.

36ibid.

37ibid., p. 408.

38ibid.

39ibid.

40ibid.

41 ibid.

42ibid.

43ibid.

44ibid.

45ibid.

46ibid.

47ibid.

48ibid., p. 409.

49 ibid.

50ibid.

51 ibid.

52ibid.

53ibid.

54ibid.

55ibid.

56ibid.

57ibid.

58ibid.

59ibid.

60ibid., p. 410.

61 ibid.

62ibid.

63ibid. The use of the past perfect tense in both accounts indicates that Bu Nasr did not witness the scoldings himself, but heard about them from another source.

64ibid.

65ibid.

66ibid., p. 411.

67ibid.

68ibid.

115

69 ibid.

70ibid.

71ibid., p. 412.

72ibid.

73ibid., p. 413.

74M as‘ud later pardoned Bu Sahl. The account of this pardon is not in The History, per­haps because it fell in the early part of the year 424/1032-1033, which has been lost.In the year 425/1033-1034, Bu Sahl had a hand in a plot against the tax collector of Pushang, who was killed as a result, pp. 560-563.

75ibid., p. 413.

76ibid.

77ibid.

78ibid.

79ibid., p. 414.

80ibid.

81 ibid.

82ibid.

83ibid., p. 415.

84ibid.

85ibid.

86ibid., p. 416.

87ibid.

88ibid.

89ibid.

90ibid., p. 417.

116

91 ibid.

92ibid.

93ibid., p. 418.

" ib id .

95ibid.

96ibid.

" ib id ., p. 419.

98ibid., p. 6.

" ib id ., p. 419.

,00ibid.

101ibid.

I02ibid.

103 ibid.

104ibid.

105ibid., p. 420.

106ibid.

107ibid.

108‘AqTlT, 152-186; Vasaya, 627-629; Khvandmlr [Dastur] 168; Ghaffari, 104-105.

109BayhaqI, op.cit., p. 420.

110ibid.

111 ibid., pp. 420-421.

112ibid., p. 419.

113ibid., p. 421.

117

14ibid.

I5ibid., p. 607.

I6ibid., p. 421.

17ibid.

,8ibid.

19ibid„ p. 422.

20ibid., pp. 469-480.

21 ibid., p. 423.

22ibid.

23ibid.

24ibid., p. 424.

25ibid.

26ibid.

27Buzurgmihr is said to have written the advice book, Plruzl-namah, which was trans- ated from Pahlavi into Persian by Avicenna. See bibliography for the full citation.

28BayhaqT, op.cit., p. 428.

29ibid., p. 425.

30ibid.

31 ibid.

32ibid., p. 426.

33ibid.

34ibid.

35ibid.

36ibid.

137ibid.

,38ibid.

139ibid.,pp. 426-427.

140ibid., p. 427.

,4 Iibid.

I42ibid.

l43ibid.

I44ibid.

I45ibid.

I46ibid.

147ibid„ p. 428.

148ibid.

149ibid.

150ibid.

151 Waldman, M.R., Towards a Theory . . . , p. 192.

152Meisami, J.S., “The past in service of the present. . . . ” Poetics Today (14:2) p. 152.

l53Waldman has also noted that the Buzurgmihr story, “coming as it does in the middle of Tarikh-i BayhaqI,” centers The History as a whole, op.cit., p. 191.

CHAPTER V

ARYARUQ, YUSUF, SUBASHl,‘ALf DA YAH, BIGTUGHDl

The intriguers against these military leaders had different motives. In the case of

Aryaruq, a man of the new order and one who had gained in power under M as‘ud, the

men who inititated the intrigue were motivated by envy. These were three members of

the old guard, which had lost power under Mas'ud. But the intriguer in the other two

plots was the amir himself. Against his uncle Yusuf, first supportive of Muhammad and

then one of the courtiers responsible for his arrest, Mas‘ud plotted after the succession

conflict. And against the other military leaders, who had unsuccessfully fought against

the Saljuqs, the sultan intrigued after the Dandanqan defeat in 431/1040.

Food and wine appear in all three stories. In the first story, the victim of intrigue

indulges in these pleasures. In the second story, the suspicious victim refuses them. And

finally, in the last story, the unsuspecting victims partake of them. Only in the first story

is the hunt an overt metaphor for the action of intrigue. In the other two, one can speak

of the entrapment of these men, coming as they did to their own arrest, as the capture af­

ter the hunt.1

The scenes of the intrigues were respectively, the court, the desert close to Ghazna,

and finally, the fortress of Ghazna. The three narratives end with statements and stories

which imply ironies of fate.

Aryaruq

Aryaruq was a man of the new order and a close companion of GhazT. Under

Mahmud, Aryaruq had become rebellious in India. And during the rule of Muhammad,

he had refused to come to the court, because of loyalty to Mas‘ud. As BayhaqI narrates,

it was the vizier Ahmad Hasan who brought Aryaruq to the court from India, by means

of intrigue (hllah).2

119

120

His capture and imprisonment are ironic considering his loyalty and trust. It was

out of loyalty to M as‘ud that Aryaruq had refused to return from India earlier. But it was

M as‘ud who then had him arrested. Aryaruq’s trust led him to believe the amir, when he

offered gifts of wine, saying that Aryaruq should drink for whole days and nights. But

in the end, this allowed M as‘ud to capture him easily, which he could not have done if

Aryaruq had been sober and alert.

BayhaqI epitomizes the action of intrigue in metaphorical terms, first as a real

hunt, then as entrapment through food and wine, and finally, as the very capture of

Aryaruq. The three commanders of the old guard planned the intrigue while away at

a hunt. The sultan entrapped Aryaruq and GhazT, by sending them platters of food and

wine. Aryaruq entrapped himself, by drinking excessively. And finally, Mas‘ud captured

Aryaruq, who, in his drunken state, was unable to resist.

The metaphors of food and wine (nan va sharab) are associated with intrigue,

when one views the amir untruthfully deny the coming arrest, and then, secretly approve

it. But BayhaqI depicts the vizier advising against the plot and later Mas'ud justifying it

in scenes where these pleasures are absent.

In the story of Aryaruq, the ironic conflict is the discrepancy between the “lies,”

the deceptions, that surrounded the intrigue, and the truths told in commentaries. Bay­

haqI dramatizes the lies in court scenes, and he tells of past and future truths relating to

the intrigue in commentaries. It was Mas‘ud who ultimately decided in favor of the in­

trigue. And one views him lie in court scenes. In commentaries, the ironist BayhaqI con­

fides in his readers against the victim of intrigue, but at times also against other charac­

ters in the narrative.

The three narrative elements that stand out as a result of this metaphorical and

ironic viewing are: the action of intrigue, epitomized in the metaphors of food, wine, and

hunt, the commentary, where BayhaqI tells of truths relating to the intrigue, and the court

scene, where one witnesses M as‘ud lie. Therefore, the narrative divides into four parts,

with each part containing an intrigue, a lie, and the truth.

BayhaqI begins the first three parts with commentaries, and he ends the story with

his last commentary. Thus, one learns of truths about the arrest, before viewing M as‘ud

deny it and then later approve it. In the last part, the author achieves irony by reversing

121

the order of truths and lies. After telling of lies by Mas‘ud following the arrest, BayhaqI

closes the story with an omen, a truth about future outcomes of the intrigue.

In the first commentary, the truths relate to the intriguers and their victims. It was

because of jealousy that Bigtughdl, ‘All Dayah, and Bilgatigln plotted against Aryaruq.

BayhaqI says, “The coming of Aryaruq and GhazI to the court with a few foot soldiers

and shield bearers . . . [was] difficult for the Pidarlyan and Mahmudlyan . . . ”3 The im­

age that this description evokes is that of Aryaruq looking self-important and arrogant,

and the intriguers hiding their resentment towards him.

BayhaqI then gives the reasons for the success of the plot, having to do with the

victims’ advisors and wine. In speaking about the advisors/adjudants, the author says,

“ . . . these two courtiers Aryaruq and GhazI did not have anyone who would give them

advice [tadblr]. . . . ”4 The word tadblr here implies intrigue. Aryaruq and GhazI had no

one to teach them about ways of behavior that would conceal, rather than reveal. So they

aroused the jealousy of other courtiers.

Instead, the advisors were, “ . . . obsequious, lowly, and witless . . . who had nei­

ther studied [with masters] nor read books.”5 In other words, these advisors could not

advise their masters well, unlike experienced and trained scribes.

This passage further gains in ironic significance, considering that BayhaqI goes on

to explain that these men spied on Aryaruq and GhazI, both for Mas'ud and the three

commanders. The author points to the ironic consequence of the advisors’ disloyalty in

metaphorical terms, saying, “ . . . [these advisors] did not realize that once their mas­

ters fall, [they] would be more lowly than [worn, old] sandals, and more humble than

mud.”6

BayhaqI also explains the success of the intrigue in terms of wine. First he states,

“Wine is a great source of trouble, if drunk in excess.”7 His description of the wine par­

ties of Aryaruq and GhazI demonstrates the truth of this statement. In these parties, he

says, “ . . . when wine would take hold of [everyone], the Turks would praise these two

commanders and [make fun of the members of the old guard], calling Bilgatigln effem­

inate, ‘All Dayah a woman, and . . . Bigtughdl, blind and lame.”8 This passage is hu­

morous in itself. But given that the advisors would later report these name callings to the

three commanders, thus adding more fuel to their cause, it is ironically humorous.

122

BayhaqI next reports the plan of intrigue, the hunt. An actual hunt provided the

pretext for a secret meeting where the three commanders plotted against Aryaruq and

GhazI. The author learned about this meeting from the advisor of Bigtughdl, who was

one of the intriguers. Bigtughdl had sent messages to the other two that, “If [one] sees

fit, [they] should ride away on the pretext of a hunt , . . . so as to find a solution [tadblr]

for this thing.”9 BayhaqI learned about this meeting from Bigtughdl’s advisor/adjudant,

most likely after the plots had succeeded. Yet, in this case also there was a betrayal of

confidence, similiar to that of the victims’ advisors.

BayhaqI portrays the intriguers standing atop a hill. The imagery of high ground

is ironic, considering the lower status of the old guard in the court of Mas'ud. After

the three men complained about Aryaruq and GhazI for a while, Bigtughdl pointed to

the irony of their higher status by saying, “The amazing thing is that in the palaces of

Mahmud, [there] was no one lower than these two, and [they] have kissed the ground in

front of me a thousand times. But [they] are both courageous and brave: GhazI being a

bully among bullies, and Aryaruq a jackass among jackasses.” 10 So, the intriguers were

nostalgically remembering their own lost status, while insulting their soon-to-be victims,

as though words could bring about the demise of their enemies. The irony lies in the fact

that it was through words, lies, that the intriguers succeeded in changing M as'ud’s opin­

ion of Aryaruq and GhazI.

The other two intriguers suggested that they poison Aryaruq and GhazI, or have

someone kill them. But Bigtughdl objected, saying, " . . . our reputation will be ruined

. . . The solution [tadblr] is for us . . . to pretend friendship and put other people up to

lying . . . about what these two commanders say . . . ” *1 In other words, let them get

themselves.

BayhaqI follows this hunt scene with the effects of these lies on M as'ud who, as

a result, began to dislike Aryaruq more and more. So, one day the amir held a private

meeting with his vizier, asking whether he should have Aryaruq arrested. At first Ahmad

Hasan refused to answer, saying, “If I say anything about these matters, [it] might not

agree with the opinion of the Lord, and [he] would disfavor me.” 12 In other words, “I

cannot tell the truth, for fear of the Lord’s anger.”

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In return, Mas'ud said, “The Khvajah is our representative and the most trusted of

all servants. And inevitably, [one] has to consult with him in these matters, so that he

relates what he knows, and . . . then [we] think about it ourselves . . . ”13 This is a lie,

considering the second plot against Altuntash. The consultation came only after the plot

had failed, when the amir needed a way out of a self-created disaster.

The vizier advised against the arrest of Aryaruq, and ended his advice with a state­

ment that rings with irony, considering the future defeat at the hands of the Saljuqs.

Ahmad Hasan warned, “The territories of the Lord have increased, and [one] needs men

of action. The likes of Aryaruq are rare.”14 Mas'ud falsely expressed his agreement

with the vizier, and then said, “[One] should keep this matter a secret until [I] think

about it further.” 15 Or more to the point, “until I capture Aryaruq,” given the later ar­

rest.

BayhaqI continues the narrative with his second commentary, stating, “The Mah-

mudlyan did not stop intriguing [tazrib] . . . ” 16 They lied to M as'ud that Aryaruq and

GhazI planned an uprising. Within the historical perspective of the loss of Khurasan,

this charge of disloyalty is ironic. In the long run, the three commanders proved disloyal

themselves. For they helped the Ghaznavid defeat by having a hand in the loss of its mil­

itary leaders like Aryaruq and GhazI.

Having told of the intriguers’ lies, BayhaqI then turns to those of Mas'ud, and

thus the court. One day the amir held court with everyone present. Aryaruq and GhazT

had heard rumors about M as'ud disfavoring them. So they came, looking scared and

uncertain. The vizier reassured them, saying, " . . . [these rumors] are untrue and . . .

unfounded . . . ” 17 Ahmad Hasan spoke to M as'ud about this privately. And the amir

then had everyone called back to the court.

Once everyone returned, the musicians played and everyone talked, until M as'ud

motioned for the music to stop and addressed his vizier. The amir said, “[We] hear that a

few people envy . . . [the commanders Aryaruq and GhazI] . . . and worry them [unnec­

essarily]. [One] should not concern [himself] with that, [but] trust what we say. Since

we will not listen to anyone’s [malicious] talk about them.”18 The vizier followed this

by saying, " . . . what favor could be more than this that came from the royal tongue?” 19

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Aryaruq and GhazI kissed the ground and the throne, then came back to their seats

and sat, looking cheerful and reassured. And Mas'ud ordered that they bring ceremo­

nial robes and swords for the two commanders. He then fastened the robes which the

two wore, and hung the swords around their necks himself. Afterwards everyone left the

court, including Aryaruq and GhazT who mounted their horses and rode away. BayhaqI

ends the scene in this way, “And I, Bui Fazl, was on duty on that day, [I] saw all this and

included it in the journal for this year.”20

What Mas'ud said were lies and what he did was false. He did listen to malicious

talk about Aryaruq and GhazI, and he had no intention of honoring them by giving them

ceremonial robes and swords. Once the two were arrested, M as'ud took everything that

they owned, including these gifts.

BayhaqI continues the narrative by telling of the intrigue against the victims

through wine. The intrigue, or the hunt, from here on was by M as'ud himself. He would

offer or send food and wine to Aryaruq and GhazI, in a seeming gesture of trust and

companionship. And they were much too happy to drink with the amir, or accept his

presents of food and wine.

After the court on this day, Mas'ud sent Aryaruq and GhazI companions, musi­

cians, food, and wine, with the message, “[You] returned unfinished from our court.

Drink wine with companions to the music of musicians.”21 The author ends this part

by saying, " . . . the Mahmudlyan became very discouraged with this turn of events.”22

This is the mid-point of the story, where BayhaqI pauses and reflects on the suc­

cess of the intrigue, characterized in terms of fate (zamanah). Whereas just in the previ­

ous passage, he has mentioned the intriguers’ fear that it would not succeed. He states,

“Neither . . . [the Mahmudlyan], nor others knew that which was hidden. And fate

[zamanah] was voicing [its] song loudly [and clearly]. But no one would listen.”23

The author then relates that Aryaruq and GhazI received the gifts of M as'ud with

gratitude and joy. And once they decided to become drunk, they sent away the com­

panions and musicians. BayhaqI narrates, “GhazT went to sleep. But Aryaruq had the

habit that once [he] sat to wine, [he] would drink for three or four days and nights . . . on

this night, [he] drank til morning, given all the gifts and favors that [he] had received

[daryaftah bud].”24

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The use of the verb daryaftan creates irony. In the second attempt against Altun-

tash, this verb is used in two instances where it implies intrigue. One is in the false nar­

rative about wine having overtaken the amir, which was a lie. And later it was in relation

to Bu Nasr writing to Altuntash in order to “win over” his heart, which was only possible

by falsely minimizing M as'ud’s role in the intrigue.25 In this instance daryaftan implies

intrigue as well. The gifts and favors that Aryaruq had received were traps so he would

not suspect a plot against himself. Also, with continued gifts of wine, Aryaruq would be

much too drunk to resist arrest, when it came time to capture him.

Mas'ud again held court on the day after. In loyal service to the amir, GhazI came

to the court, looking even more pompous than before and putting on even more airs.

When Mas'ud asked why Aryaruq had not come, GhazI explained, “He is in the habit

of drinking wine for three or four nights and days, especially with yesterday’s favors and

gifts.”26 The amir laughed and replied, “We should drink wine today as well, and [we]

will also send some to Aryaruq.”27

Irony arises in viewing the foolishly trusting attitude of GhazI, as opposed to the

amir’s concealed suspicion and anger. GhazI told the truth and Mas'ud responded falsely

by laughing. It is with the hindsight of the following arrest that one can interpret this

laugh as insincere.

The entrapment of Aryaruq continued, with M as'ud sending him fifty containers

of wine along with the commander’s favorite drinking partner. The amir’s message to

Aryaruq was, “We order you not to come to court, and drink wine [as] is your habit.”28

In other words, the order was for Aryaruq to drink so much that he would help his own

arrest, by becoming practically unconscious.

When he received the gift and the message, Aryaruq kissed the ground and cried.

BayhaqI writes, " . . . Aryaruq . . . had become like a ball, wandering in the garden. [He]

would drink and the musicians would play . . . and [he] would sleep, get up, eat rishtah,

and then drink wine, so [he] had no idea what [he] was doing . . . ”29 Aryaruq continued

like this for two more days. His unthoughtful behavior is pathetically humorous, and his

earnest belief in the sincerity of M as'ud’s actions ironic.

BayhaqI then narrates the capture of Aryaruq. One views the hunt for Aryaruq,

first in the palace garden, then in the victim’s home, and again, in the halls of the court.

126

In the palace garden and the court, M as'ud and his people planned the capture and later

arrested Aryaruq. And at home, Aryaruq received the messenger of the sultan with an

invitation to a wine party. Irony arises in considering the sequence of these events. As

M as'ud and his people prepared for the capture, Aryaruq, drunk and unattentive, was get­

ting ready to come to the court, where, he thought, he would be offered wine and food.

BayhaqI begins by saying, “The Amir did not hold court the next day . . . [he] had

planned to have Aryaruq captured.’’30 Mas'ud had given orders to the chief secretary

to send his scribes home, since they were evacuating the garden. Bu Nasr did as he was

told, but he left one of his scribes behind in the chancery. BayhaqI narrates, “Everyone

rose and left, except me [emphasis mine].”31 Bu Nasr told his protege Bui Fazl, “Be

alert to observe everything that happens . . . ”32 In the narrative of the arrest, one sees

BayhaqI as the student of irony, looking at the victim with knowledge of his coming ar­

rest, when the latter himself was completely unaware.

The messenger who went to Aryaruq with the false invitation stated, “The Sul­

tan wishes to drink wine. And people went after the commander-in-chief GhazI so [he]

would come . . . [The Amir] is calling you [as well].”33 Aryaruq first asked to be ex­

cused, given that he was completely drunk. But the messenger reasoned, “ . . . not com­

ing will be unseemly [zisht] and [people] will misinterpret [it].”34 In persuading the at­

tendant of Aryaruq, the messenger was offering a reason which had to do with appear­

ances. But going to the court would mean the reality of arrest, which Aryaruq ended up

suffering.

While he was getting ready to go, the messenger convinced the victim’s attendant

that, “[Aryaruq] is going to a wine [party.] Ten shield-bearers and a hundred foot sol­

diers would be enough.”35 The success of the plot depended on Aryaruq going to the

court without a large group of soldiers, which was accomplished in this way.

Aryaruq came to the court and two officials seated him in the palisade across from

the chancery. He sat for a second, then rose, saying, “[I] am drunk. [I] cannot stay, [I]

will leave,” to which the Chamberlain said, “[It] would be unseemly to return without or­

ders. [We] will inform [the Amir].”36 At this point Aryaruq sat in the hall of the court.

BayhaqI narrates, “I, Bui Fazl, was staring at him.”37 The image of this scene conveys

127

the anxiety Bayhaqi must have felt, in viewing the unaware victim who would soon be

arrested.

Aryaruq tried to sober up at this point. Bayhaqi writes, “[He] called Hajjl the wa­

ter carrier . . . who put the jar [full of water and ice] in front of him. [Aryaruq] would

dip his hand in [the jar] and take out [pieces] of ice and eat [them].”38 Once the cham­

berlain Bigtigln saw this, he said, “Oh brother! This is unseemly. You are a commander!

[You] eat ice in the hall [of the court]? Go to the palisade and do what [you] want!”39

He did as he was told and it was in the palisade that Aryaruq was captured.

Fifty palace colonels, coming from both right and left, took such hold of Aryaruq

that he could hardly move. He cried out to Bigtigln, “Oh [you] unchivalrous [na-javan-

mard] brother! You did this to me?”40 Aryaruq calling Bigtigln “brother” echoes the

latter doing the same. Bigtigln had just done so in the course of his attempt to have

Aryaruq captured. And Aryaruq was then expressing his disbelief and surprise at dis­

covering this, captured as he was by the lie of a “brother,” who in reality, was an enemy,

a deceiver.

In reading the narrative of the arrest, one views Aryaruq being stripped of his be­

longings, his boots, horse, weapon, ghulams, all having been symbols of his high rank,

which was lost. But the ones who arrested Aryaruq also took away his means of despair

and hope, objects which he could have used to destroy himself, or kept close for the so­

lace they offered in his time of need. They took away two knives, hidden in his boots,

and poison in the side of his robe. And they seized a written prayer which he had kept in

the side of his garm ent41

Bayhaqi brings the story of the capture to an end by telling about the ghulams and

the possessions of Aryaruq. The ghulams fought the Ghaznavid troops, both in their

master’s home and in the palace. Mas’ud sent them a message, saying, “Aryaruq was

an ungrateful man and you were in danger with him . . . we are your master. Do not act

childishly and stop fighting, since [it] is obvious how small your number is. [You] will

be killed in an hour, with no benefit to Aryaruq. [But] if [you] act prudently, [we] will

reward [you] and treat [you] well.”42 The ghulams stopped fighting the amir’s troops,

and in a gesture of obedience kissed the ground. The claim by M as’ud that he was their

master seems humorous, since their fighting showed exactly the opposite. Also comical

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is their zealous fight before the surrender, which proved that self-interest was more im­

portant to them than their loyalty to Aryaruq.

Aryaruq’s possessions were seized. Bayhaqi exclaims, “ . . . [they] sealed the

doors of [his hom e]. . . [after which it looked] as though [it] had never been a place

[where] men and women [had lived].”43 The author’s own action at this point conveys

a sense of closure about the arrest. Bayhaqi writes, “And I returned and told my master

everything that [I] had seen.”44

Mas’ud held court on the day after this arrest. Afterwards, he met privately with

the vizier and GhazT. GhazI had come to the court, scared and apprehensive, but the amir

falsely led him to believe that he would be safe. Mas’ud stated, “The situation of this

man [Aryaruq] is one thing and the condition of other servants another. . . [he] had re­

fused to return from India [despite] our father’s request. . . And khvajah [Ahmad Hasan]

used much intrigue [afsun] so [he] could bring him . . . [I] said [all] this so that the

Commander-in-Chief would not worry about this thing that happened.”45 GhazI kissed

the ground after which he submissively said, “I am a servant and if [the Lord] commands

that [I] be a stable boy instead of this, [I] would be proud . . . ”46

Mas’ud and GhazI were both lying. The amir was lying in speaking of Aryaruq’s

rebellious attitude under Mahmud as the reason for his capture at this point. Also, it was

a lie that the situation of other courtiers, including GhazI, was any different than that of

Aryaruq. They all lived in uncertainty and insecurity, though some less so than others.

But GhazI was lying as well. He was no humble servant of the court, and had not acted

so thus far. Yet fear of future arrest and possibly even murder warranted that he beg for­

giveness for his previously self-important and pompous attitude. And that is what he was

doing in this meeting.

After this meeting, Ahmad Hasan called in Bu Nasr and the two consoled GhazT.

In other words, they explained why Aryaruq had to be arrested, as opposed to why GhazT

would not. Bayhaqi writes, “These two nobles said pleasant things until GhazI became

satisfied and returned.”47 The image is that of two shrewd men fooling GhazI into sub­

mission towards M as’Od, as though they were convincing a little child to do what they

wanted.

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Bayhaqi ends the story with worries expressed by the vizier and an omen by the

chief secretary. These expressions were the truth about what this arrest really meant.

It meant suspicions by GhazI and future losses to the state and that is what they pre­

dicted. Ahmad Hasan said to Bu Nasr, “This Turk [GhazI] became suspicious, since [he]

is smart and alert and things like this will not go over his head . . . GhazI will also be lost

. . . take this from me.”48 Referring to his master as an old wolf, an experienced and

discerning man, Bayhaqi closes with the words of Bu Nasr who said, “ . . . ‘ . [these

courtiers] have become [two] . . . groups [of enemies], the Mahmudlyan and Mas'udlyan,

engaged in their individual rivalries. May God, His mention be exalted, bring a good

outcome.’ ”49

Yusuf

Mas'Od was motivated by anger in the intrigue against his uncle Yusuf. Yusuf

had supported Muhammad as the successor to the throne. But like ‘All Qarlb and a few

other courtiers, he had later arrested Muhammad in Taglnabad, and alleged loyalty to

M as'ud.50

The narrative about Yusuf comprises two parts, the intrigue and a closure. In the

intrigue story, Bayhaqi first offers his observations and then relates the plot and the ar­

rest. In the closure, a story about the favorite ghulam of Yusuf who spied on him for

Mas'ud, the author reverses the order. First comes the account of Tughril in the court

of Mahmud, followed by Bayhaql’s commentary about the end Tughril suffered after

Yusuf’s arrest.

This change of order effects irony in both cases. In the Yusuf story, Bayhaqi re­

lates his observations as statements of fact, in other words, the truth. In contrast, in the

account of the plot and the arrest, the author points to both truths and lies by the in­

triguers and their victim. In the Tughril story, Bayhaqi narrates how Yusuf had first

fallen in love with this slave, followed by the account of his fateful end after his master’s

arrest. In light of the betrayal by Tughril, his earlier return of affection for Yusuf seems

false and insincere.

Irony also arises in considering that both Yusuf and the intriguing Tughril suffered

in the end. Yusuf had expected safety for having become loyal to Mas'ud. And Tughril

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had anticipated that he would gain in status for having spied on behalf of the amir. But

neither one realized his expectation.

The story begins with Yusuf in the court of Mahmud. Yusuf would serve at the

court twice a day, and otherwise spend his time drinking wine and playing. Bayhaqi

comments, " . . . under these conditions, and with youth, strength, wealth, and unearned

wishes [coming true], [it] is evident how many experiences [Yusuf] . . . gained.”51 So,

Yusuf learned about the pleasures of court life, but not about how to behave so as not to

endanger himself in the court. Bayhaqi intimates that only Mahmud had guaranteed the

safety of Yusuf, by using a simile (tashblh). The author says, “ . . . amir Mahmud passed

away and [thus] the elephant keeper was [no longer] guarding the elephant. . . ”52

In the court of Muhammad, Yusuf received the position of commander-in-chief,

but he did not acquire much experience there either. Bayhaqi observes, “The duration of

that kingship . . . was very short, so how much experience could . . . [amir Yusuf] have

gained?”53 The implication in both statements about the lack of experience by Yusuf is

that, as a result, he acted imprudently, or foolishly.

Bayhaqi then refers to Yusuf’s role in the arrest of Muhammad, intimating that

M as'ud offered this as reason for the plot against his uncle. The author states,

though [the courtiers who arrested amir Muhammad] did so on behalf of a great king

. . . , kings [usually] accept such devotions at the time, but [they] do not trust people like

this.”54 It seems that courtiers caught in the crossfire of a succession conflict had no

way out, since loyalty to the unsuccessful ruler could mean future arrest by the success­

ful one. But even if the courtiers changed loyalties to the “rightful” king, they still risked

arrest for having betrayed their previous masters. It is almost like these men should have

had divine intuition or wisdom not to arouse the kings’ anger.

Bayhaqi follows his statement about kings and courtiers with a story that demon­

strates its truth. When the Saffarid ruler Ya'qub Layth set out to conquer Khurasan from

the Tahirid Muhammad b. Tahir b. ‘Abd Allah, many nobles from the latter’s court wrote

to Ya'qub, swearing loyalty. But three elder statesmen from the Tahirid court did not.

When the Saffarid ruler succeeded, he had these three men, who had been arrested,

brought to the court. Ya'qub asked them, “Why didn’t [you] swear loyalty to me as did

your friends?”55

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Once they had received a guarantee that Ya'qub would not hold them in anger,

they replied, “We are old and experienced people and [we] have served the Tahirids for

many years, having received many favors and ranks in their government. Would [it] be

right for us to choose . . . ingratitude and swear loyalty to their enemies, even if [they]

behead [us]?”56 Ya'qub freed these men and honored them in his court. Instead, he or­

dered the arrest of those who had earlier written to him, swearing loyalty. Bayhaqi ends

this story by saying, “[I] include anecdotes like this so that slanderers would not criticize

this great king M as'ud . . . since the disposition of kings, their conditions and habits, are

not like those of others and they see what others cannot. . . ”57 But Bayhaqi does not

state what these differences are, which leads to ambiguity and irony regarding his atti­

tude towards kings.

Having told about the succession issue, the author next mentions another rea­

son why M as'ud held Yusuf in anger, this one having to do with women. Yusuf had

made a gift of two of his daughters to his nephews. But Muhammad’s bride had died

on the night of the wedding, after which Mahmud had given the other daughter, already

promised to Mas'ud, to his favorite son Muhammad. Bayhaqi concludes this account

by saying, " . . . amir Mas'ud was hurt for being insulted like this by his uncle, and

[with the hand o f ] . . . Fate . . . Yusuf fell from the height of power to the pit [of misfor­

tune].”58 Thus, Yusuf became the object of M as'ud’s anger the real cause of which had

been the disfavor from Mahmud. It is as though the anger M as'ud could express towards

his uncle released the deeper one that he had towards his father.

Bayhaqi then turns to the plot against Yusuf. Once he ascended the throne, M as'ud

sent his uncle to Qusdar, on the pretext of suppressing an uprising in the nearby Makran.

But in reality, this was because, “ . . . [the Amir] wanted Yusuf to be away from him and

the troops . . . ”59 One could interpret this statement with emphasis on the first part of

the prepositional clause, that Bayhaqi means M as'ud sent Yusuf away so as to allow his

own anger to subside. But the amir most likely sent Yusuf to Qusdar, so that he would be

away from the troops, who might have remained loyal to him as their previous comman­

der under Muhammad.

During this absence, Tughril spied on his master. Bayhaqi characterizes Tughril

both as a victim and an intriguer in the plot against Yusuf, saying, “With orders from

132

the Sultan, [they] deceived [bifarlftand] . . . [the] hajib [of Yusuf] Tughril to spy on him

. . . [they promised Tughril] a high position [in the court].”60 The plan to have someone

from Yusuf’s own circle as a spy with promises of future gain echoes a similar one in the

Aryaruq story. And Bayhaqi displays the same disapproving attitude towards the disloyal

servant, who in this case was a Turk. The author points to the irony of fate in speaking

about this disloyalty. He states, “ . . . this idiot Turk [Tughril] was fooled [like] this, not

knowing that ingratitude brings misfortune.”61 Tughril had become a spy with the hope

that he would gain in status. But, as Bayhaqi intimates here and will later relate, in the

aftermath of Yusuf’s arrest this did not come true.

The narrative of the intrigue contains truths and lies by both the intriguers and

their victim. In the case of the intriguers, the truths and lies helped guarantee that the

plot would succeed. But in the case of Yusuf, the truths he unknowingly revealed further

entrapped him. And the lies that he told in order to deter a possible plot did not protect

him. Bayhaqi associates Yusuf’s true sentiments towards M as’ud with wine, saying, “At

all times, and mostly during wine [parties], [Yusuf] would complain and speak openly

that, ‘What was this that [we] all did to ourselves,. . . [we] will all be arrested one after

another . . . ’ ”62 Irony arises in considering that wine is associated with truth, but with

the truth of sentiments best having remained concealed, given that they ultimately hurt

Yusuf.

Tughril would disclose what Yusuf said, but also overstate his complaints. Bay-

haql narrates, “Tughril. . . [finally] wrote, ‘Yusuf is planning to go to Turkestan and has

started writing to the [Qarajkhanids.’ So, being motivated by ambition and greed,

the spying intriguer was also lying. In his case, this was so as to speed up the arrest,

since this would, supposedly, mean rewards of wealth and a high rank.

These truths and lies by Tughril would enrage M as‘ud even more. The amir would

then secretly write the men in charge of Yusuf, with the order that, “If [he] decides to go

[anywhere but Ghazna], [one] should not allow [it], but capture [him], and bring [him] to

us, bound [and enchained].”64 These statements reveal the truth of how M as'ud viewed

his uncle; that is, with contempt and mistrust. But to Yusuf himself, the amir would

write kind and affectionate letters, falsely addressing him as, “the exalted Amir, uncle

Yusuf, the father of Ya'qub and the son of Nasir al-DIn.”65

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This pretense of affection by the intriguer met with a similar one from the vic­

tim himself. Yusuf would also feign affection towards Mas'ud, writing letters as well

as sending him presents of choice fruits like pomegranates, Persian oranges, and sugar

cane. The mention of these fruits is especially comical, considering that Mas'ud was a

glutton, who could never resist the temptation of food.66 So, it is as though Yusuf, who

must have known about his nephew’s weakness, was fooling Mas'ud like a child by giv­

ing him food.

This lying match between the two finally came to an end, with the amir writing his

uncle from Balkh that, “ . . . [you] should leave Qusdar soon, in order to reach Ghazna

along with us, and your rights will, of course, be recognized.”67 One can only interpret

this statement ironically, considering all the scheming and plotting by Mas'ud. The amir

would not recognize any rights for Yusuf, but take away the ones he already had.

Bayhaqi then gives the account of the capture. Yusuf had arrived earlier in Ghazna.

So, when Mas'ud was getting close to the capital, he went to welcome the amir in the

desert close to Ghazna. And it was there that Yusuf was captured. Both M as'ud and

Yusuf masked their true sentiments in meeting each other, with the former appearing

warm and affectionate, and the latter pretending to be genuinely loyal. Bayhaqi says,

“Amir Yusuf dismounted and kissed the ground.. . . and amir Mas'ud asked after him

very warmly [and] with boundless [enthusiasm] . . . , and [as they] rode together, [the

Sultan] would [only] speak to him.”68

Yusuf had gone to welcome M as'ud at night. And by the time the two reached

the camp, it was daytime. At this point, Mas'ud turned to his confidant ‘Abdus and said,

“My uncle has travelled [very] light. Ask [them] to set up a tent [for him] . . . right here

. . . so [he] will be close to us.”69 Thus, servants raised tents and brought out trays full

of drinks and food. And it was then that Yusuf realized what lay ahead. Bayhaqi says, “I

was looking from my own divan, [Yusuf] was not touching any [of the food or drinks],

having sensed something of the abomination [makruh] that [was about to] occur.”70 It is

as though Bayhaqi, in writing about the intrigue later, was remembering his own realiza­

tion about the one made by the victim.

Once the servants removed the trays and the courtiers dispersed, M as'ud had Yusuf

captured. The author writes, ‘“Abdus would come and go [between their tents], and

134

[they] would l i s t . . . [Yusuf’s] treasons.”71 The intrigue had already succeeded. But

here was M as'ud attempting to prove that he was right to have ordered it. Yusuf was in

M as'ud’s clutches and there was no chance of rebellion, given that only fifty ghulams

had accompanied him on this trip.72 Yet there was a need for justification, this in order

to continue with the appearance, the lie, that the king was fair and just. Therefore, the

amir spoke of treasons by Yusuf.

Bayhaqi ends the arrest scene with ominous words by Yusuf to his betrayer Tugh­

ril, saying, “Be happy [you] ingrate! Did [I] raise you and treat you more lovingly than

[my] children for this? So, [you] would do this to me with the intrigue that [you took

part in]? [You] will get what [you] deserve!”73 After this, they put Yusuf on a mount

and took him to the fortress of Sagavand. Bayhaqi states, “And after that [I] did not see

him.”74

The author then narrates the story of Tughril. First is the account of how Yusuf

fell in love with this ghulam. Tughril had been a gift from one of the Qarakhanid noble­

women to Mahmud. One day amir Mahmud had given a wine party in the Firuzl garden,

where cupbearers would enter in groups of two. Bayhaqi writes, “This Tughril entered,

wearing a ruby-colored robe, with his partner [wearing] a turqoise . . . [one]. . . Wine

had overtaken [daryaftah bud] amir Yusuf. [So when] he glanced a t . . . [Tughril],. . .

[Yusuf] fell in love.”75 The verb daryaftan, to overtake or overpower, intimates intrigue,

with both wine and love as intriguers and Yusuf as their victim. For Yusuf lost his power

against them both. One had overtaken him and the other would soon cost him his life.76

This love was costly for Yusuf even in this wine party, where Mahmud became an­

gry at his brother for staring at his ghulam. But amir Mahmud finally gave Tughril to his

brother, saying, “ . . [I] will give you this ghulam . . . but remember not to make a mis­

take like this next time . . . ”77 Yusuf helped Tughril rise in the court, giving him the po­

sition of hajibl, and even choosing him a wife from a renowned family.

Bayhaqi then points to the irony of Yusuf’s fateful end, saying, " . . . [I] have al­

ready mentioned the punishment [jaza] and suffering [mukafat] of that noble [prince].”78

Irony arises due to the incongruity between the portrayal of Yusuf as a kind patron, and

the use of words like jaza and mukafat, in the mention of what happened to him. One as-

135

sociates these words with wrongdoing, which Yusuf suffered, as though, in consequence

of his kindness and love for Tughril.

Bayhaqi closes the narrative with the fateful end that Tughril suffered. The author

states, “After the arrest of his Lord [Yusuf], [Tughril] received favors and some kind of

a rank from sultan Mas'ud. Yet both by him and most everyone, Tughril was regarded

with contem pt. . . fate [adbar] laid [its hands on] him and [he] died young, his days

[spent] unhappily . . . this is the outcome of ungratefulness.”79 Thus, the gain of wealth

and rank cost Tughril his reputation, his friends, and eventually, his life. By ending the

narrative with a truth about ingratitude, Bayhaqi evokes surprise and fear in his readers.

The surprise is due to the shift of focus from the victim to one of the intriguers, and the

less powerful one at that. It is as though the intrigue story has mostly demonstrated that

an ingrate suffers misfortunes just as much, if not more, than his patron turned victim.

And the fear is that one might become the object of such suffering oneself, if not mindful

of this truth.

SubashI, ‘All Dayah, Bigtughdl

The last intrigue by Mas'ud was against three of his military commanders who had

unsuccessfully fought against the Saljuqs. The three courtiers who participated in this

plot were Bu ‘All Kutval, Suri, and Bu al-Hasan ‘Abd al-Jalll.80 M as'ud left shortly af­

ter the plot against the three commanders for India, fearing an enemy attack on his capi­

tal. And he was soon killed in the fortress of Girl in the year 432/1040-1041.81

The amir was angry at these men, whom he blamed for the Dandanqan defeat.

And with the loss of revenues from Khurasan, he unleashed his greed on the wealth of

his courtiers, men like SubashI, ‘All Dayah, and Bigtughdl.82 As for the other intriguers

who helped M as'ud in this instance, it is understandable that in the past they might have

begrudged these military commanders their wealth and status in the court. But with the

Dandanqan defeat and the perception that these men were partly, if not wholly, respon­

sible for it, there was very little cause for envy. Considering these new realities of the

court, envy on the part of the intriguing courtiers seems absurd and even comical.

M as'ud and his co-conspirators intrigued against SubashI, ‘All Dayah, and Big­

tughdl in the fortress of Ghazna. The fortress keeper Bu ‘All had hosted a wine party

136

on the previous night. So the amir and his courtiers had remained in the fortress. After

holding court the next day, M as'ud told everyone, “Do not disperse because [Bu ‘All]

Kutval has prepared something today as well.”83 Indeed, Bu ‘AIT had prepared some­

thing, given that he was one of the intriguers.

The three unsuspecting victims were then led to different rooms, where they

waited, supposedly, to be called to the feast. Bayhaqi writes, “And when they had seated

[nishandah amad] [these three men], the foot soldiers, [army] leaders, and the hajiban

. . . left at once to plunder these men’s houses . . . , as planned on [the previous] night

”84 jjjg use Qf {fog verb nishandan, meaning to seat or to arrest, creates irony. For

in the case of these three men, both these meanings are appropriate. They were seated

down in these rooms by M as'ud’s people, not knowing at the time that they would soon

be arrested, just as they were waiting for a non-existent feast.

This is the only story of intrigue where one views Bayhaqi as a participating wit­

ness. M as'ud sent Bayhaqi along with Surl to SubashI and ‘All Dayah with messages

of arrest and his reasons for this decision. The messengers to the other victim were the

physician Bu al-‘Ala and ‘Abd al-Jalll. The author says, “The Amir told me, ‘ . . . listen

to [the message] and its reply ,. . . [we] have chosen you as the informant [mushrif]

. . . ’ ”85 So, Surl was conveying the message of arrest, while Bayhaqi was spying on

him.

First the two went to see SubashI. Bayhaqi says, “His belt keeper Hasan was

with him, and when [SubashI] saw Surl, he turned yellow and did not say anything

. . . [but he] spoke kindly to me and I sat down.”86 Here was Surl, the former gover­

nor of Khurasan in the company of a low ranking chancery scribe like Bayhaqi. But

the commander SubashI was showing respect and regard for the latter, while ignoring

Surl. It is as though without anyone mentioning it, SubashI sensed that Surl was partly

to be blamed for his coming arrest. But a low ranking scribe like Bui Fazl could be of no

threat to anyone. Therefore, the commander asked Bayhaqi what the message was, when

it was really Surl who was the messenger.

Bayhaqi then says, “Surl took out a long list from inside his robe, in the hand­

writing of Bu al-Hasan [‘Abd al-Jalll], [who had] written Subashl’s treasons [khlyanat]

one by one, from the day [they] sent him to fight the Turkmens in Khurasan til this time

137

when the Dandanqan misfortune occurred.”87 Even at this late stage, when Khurasan

had already been lost and the Ghaznavid government weakened both politically and eco­

nomically, M as'ud still seems to have had a need for justifying his intrigues, perhaps at

this point more than ever. He could no longer claim to be the powerful ruler of a king­

dom he had mostly lost. Therefore, it was even more important, at least, to appear as fair

and just.

In reply to the accusations against him, SubashI defended himself, saying, " . . . at

that time when [I] came to Ghaznln from Herat, the Lord accepted that all the allega­

tions . . . [made against me] had been false, and the king [himself] said, ‘[I] will disre­

gard [this matter], since it has been a lie [durugh].’ . . . ”88 SubashI further defended

himself against the charge that he had acted disloyalty in Dandanqan, mentioning his

advice against the battle.89 Bayhaqi then reports that Surl spoke to the commander

harshly. And when Surl left the room with Bayhaqi, the former asked, “Did [I] do any­

thing wrong in conveying the message,” to which the scribe replied, “[You] did not.”90

The image of Surl is comical. First he spoke to SubashI harshly, as though to

demonstrate his own power, as opposed to the latter’s weakness. But once Surl had left

the room with Bayhaqi, it seems that he feared the scribe would tell on him, saying that

he had overstepped the bounds of his authority as a messenger. And thus, Surl was ask­

ing for reassurances from Bayhaqi.

After this, the two went to see ‘All Dayah. He also asked Bayhaqi what the mes­

sage was. And again, Surl took out another long list of accusations. Bayhaqi says,

“Surl started reading another long list to him.”91 In reply to these accusations, ‘All

Dayah charged ‘Abd al-Jalll and Surl with treason, saying, “This is [your] doing.”92

‘All Dayah then asked that Bayhaqi carry a message to M as'ud about Surl, that, “ . . .

Khurasan was lost because of this Surl. Indeed, do not let him lay [his] hands on

Ghazna.”93

As Surl and Bayhaqi were returning, the former asked the scribe not to give Mas­

'ud this last message. But Bayhaqi refused, saying, “[I] cannot act disloyalty.”94 Yet

he promised that he would convey the message privately, rather than in front of other

courtiers. Again, it was Surl entreating Bayhaqi, the high official seeming weakened in

front of the lowly scribe. Irony arises as a result of this reversal in their viewed status.

138

Also, Surl had gone to the victims to convey the messages of arrest, which one could

characterize as his political coup against them. But the victims had then said damag­

ing things about him, causing Surl to fear for his own safety. It is as though his political

coup seemed no longer certain. There was even a symbolic victory against Surl, consid­

ering his lowered status in front of Bayhaqi.

When the scribe returned with Surl to where Mas'ud was, the messengers to Big­

tughdl had also come back, his reply having been that, “ . . . [he] has no desire for life,

given that [he can no longer] see or walk, or [use his] hands [much].”95 This is ironic.

Bigtughdl had been one of the intriguers in the plot against Aryaruq. In the story of that

intrigue, Bayhaqi mentions that the Turkish ghulams of Aryaruq and GhazI had made fun

of Bigtughdl, calling him, “blind and lame.”96 Yet at this point, when he had become

the victim of a plot himself, Bigtughdl was using “their” terms in describing himself.

The day after these arrests Mas'ud did not hold court. His people were busy

counting the possessions of the victims, whose houses and treasures had been plundered.

Bayhaqi states, “[They] were not finding anything belonging to SubashI, since [they

had] ransacked [his house] twice [before]. But [they] were finding a lot [of wealth that]

belonged to ‘All [Dayah] and Bigtughdl.”97 The cruel reality of plunder dictated that

M as'ud not hold court on that day. For, the essence of court life was the pretense of ci­

vility, especially by the amir, which ran contrary to the harshness he had sanctioned.

The story ends with one of the only two instances in which one witnesses Bayhaqi

as an intriguer98 On this day, he took the message of ‘All Dayah to Mas'ud. And with

instructions from the latter, Bayhaqi lied to Surl about the meeting. After he had heard

what ‘All Dayah had said about Surl, M as'ud stated, “[I] know. This is the truth.”99 But

when Surl later asked Bayhaqi, he replied, “The Amir said, ‘Those in adversity say a lot

of nonsense.’ ” 100

The outcome of the intrigues against these five military commanders were losses

to the state. Some of their ghulams later joined the Saljuqs, and on the battlefield in

Dandanqan they encouraged yet others to desert M as'ud.101 But in this government,

greed and anger on the part of the amir and envy on the part of his courtiers usually over­

ruled wisdom (khirad). And thus, they all lost in the end, as their victims had done ear­

lier.

139

Notes to Chapter V

I For the importance of the themes of wine and hunt, see articles by Ehsan Yarshater and William L. Hanaway, Jr. Yarshater, “The theme of wine-drinking and the concept of the beloved in early Persian poetry,” Studia Islamica, XIII, 1961, pp. 43-53. Hanaway, “The concept of the hunt in Persian literature,” Bulletin of the Boston Museum of Fine Art, LXIX, nos., 355 and 356, 1971, pp. 21 -34

2BayhaqI The History, p. 282.

3ibid., pp. 282-283.

4ibid., p. 283.

5ibid„ pp. 283-284.

6ibid„ p. 283.

7ibid., p. 284.

8ibid., p. 285.

9ibid.

10ibid., p. 286.

II ibid.

12ibid., p. 287.

13ibid.

14ibid., p. 288.

15ibid.

16ibid.

17ibid.

18ibid„ p. 289.

19ibid.

20ibid„ p. 290.

140

21 ibid.

22ibid.

23ibid.

24ibid., p. 291.

25ibid., p. 416.

26ibid., p. 291.

27ibid.

28ibid„ pp. 291-292.

29ibid., p. 292.

30ibid.

3'ibid.

32ibid.

33ibid., p. 293.

34ibid.

35ibid.

36ibid.

37ibid.

3 8 ibid.

39ibid., p. 294.

40ibid.

4 'ibid.

42ibid., pp. 294-295.

43ibid„ p. 295.

141

44ibid., Bayhaqi foreshadows the future murder of Aryaruq in the statement, “ . . . his story came to an end and [I] will mention the end of his affairs and his murder in its place.”

45ibid., pp. 296-297.

46ibid.

47ibid., p. 297.

48ibid.

49ibid., p. 298.

50FasIh KhvafI and HamadanI name ‘All Qarlb and Yusuf as the courtiers who arrested Muhammad in Taglnabad (KhvafI, 148; HamadanI, 161-163). Husaynl RazI and the au­thor of Tarlkh-i alfl mistakenly report Yusuf and ‘All Qarlb, instead of their sons, to have been the allies of Muhammad’s son Ahmad in killing his uncle Mas‘ud (Husaynl, 496- 498; Alfl, 914-917). Also see footnote 1, chapter II.

51 Bayhaqi, op.cit., p. 322.

52ibid.

53ibid., p. 323.

54ibid.

55ibid.

56ibid.

57ibid., p. 324.

58ibid., p. 325.

59ibid.

60ibid., pp. 325-326.

61 ibid., p. 326.

62ibid.

63ibid.

142

64ibid.

65ibid„ p. 327.

66BayhaqI speaks of the love M as'ud had for food, both in his childhood and later on in life. The author relates that in the later part of his rulership, Mas'ud became so heavy that only elephants could carry him while he hunted, ibid., pp. 134, 151, 334, 530.

67ibid„ p. 327.

68ibid„ pp. 327-328.

69ibid„ p. 328.

70ibid.

7’ibid.

72ibid., p. 327.

73ibid., p. 329.

74ibid.

75ibid., p. 330.

76BayhaqT mentions that Yusuf died one year after this arrest, ibid., p. 329.

77ibid„ p. 330.

78ibid., p. 331.

79ibid.

80For a treatment of the courtier Bu ‘All Kutval, see chapter II, footnote 41. Bayhaqi mentions Bu al-Hasan ‘Abd al-Jalll in many instances in The History. He was one of the officials who travelled to India in order to seize Aryaruq’s wealth in that country, p. 296. At the end of his campaign in Gurgan in the year 426/1034-1035, the amir ap­pointed ‘Abd al-Jalll as the advisor/adjudant of the troops left in that province, pp. 609, 616. But Mas'ud then called back the courtier in the next year, p. 647. Bayhaqi men­tions ‘Abd al-Jalll’s advice after the battle of Talkhab, that Mas'ud should have chased after the Saljuqs, to have been wise. But it met with the anger of the commander-in-chief and the amir’s apathy, p. 763. ‘Abd al-Jalll attempted to persuade Mas'ud to seize the possessions of Bu Nasr Mushkan, just at the time of the latter’s death, which the amir did not, p. 791. And after Bu Nasr had died, Mas‘ud reproached ‘Abd al-Jalll for his ear­lier advice, p. 799. Later in the year 431/1039-1040, he became the ra’is of Nishapur,

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p. 814. ‘Abd al-Jalll was present in the scene of battle in Dandanqan, though earlier he had advised M as‘ud against going to Marv, pp. 819, 835. BayhaqI also intimates that ‘Abd al-Jalll was unskilled in scribal matters. It seems that in one occasion when the courtier had written an official letter, M as‘Gd had chuckled and then asked BayhaqI to rewrite it. Thus, he and the amir had silently made fun of ‘Abd al-Jalll, p. 844. After the Dandanqan defeat, ‘Abd al-Jalll, along with other courtiers, tried to dissuade M as'ud to leave for India. But the amir had become angry and said that they could remain behind and serve in the court, if the Saljuqs did come, p. 899.

Surl was the governor of Khurasan at the time of Mas‘ud, p. 348. BayhaqI mentions him as an oppressive governor who plundered the wealth of Khurasan, sending it to the court of Mas'Od, pp. 359, 530, 531-533. He also took part in an intrigue against the tax col­lector of Pushang, named Tahir. Tahir died as a result of this intrigue, p. 561. BayhaqI also mentions Surl in relation to the Saljuqs. The Turkmen Saljuqs first wrote to Surl, in asking Mas‘ud for grant of territories in Khurasan, pp. 611-612. But later in a pre­tense of humility towards Mas'ud, though they had already won the 426/1034-1035 bat­tle, they blamed SOrl for not having presented their request well, thus causing the battle, p. 638. Another mention of Surl is in relation to the 429/1037-1038 battle of Subashl. M as'ud regarded Subashl with suspicion, accusing him of not obeying orders and not fighting hard against the Saljuqs. But Subashl defended himself to the amir, before fol­lowing his orders and losing to the Saljuqs, by mentioning that Surl and other officials had earlier advised against fighting the Saljuqs in a pitched battle, p. 707. After this unsuccessful battle, Surl had to flee Nishapur and later wrote M as‘ud, reassuring him that that the revenues of Khurasan were safely kept in a fortress, pp. 721-722, 725-727. M as'ud took Surl to the battle of Dandanqan, saying, “ . . . this man should not fall in the hands of enemies, since [he] will make [the whole] world revolt against me,” p. 816.

81 For a discussion about the sources on M as‘ud’s killing, see chapter I, footnote 21.

82SubashI unsuccessfully fought the Saljuqs in the year 429/1037-1038. BayhaqI de­scribes this defeat in detail. The commander also fought in the battle of Talkhab in the year 430/1038-1039, pp. 706-708, 717-719, 758 (other sources that mention this battle, Husaynl, 6-12; Alfl, 891-908; JuzjanI, 249). Ibn Funduq tells a story about Subashl who was a contemporary with his grandfather living in Nishapur. One day they brought news of Turkmen aggressions to the commander. And he ordered the troops to prepare and took along a prayer with him to the battle scene. Before leaving, Ibn Funduq mentions, Subashl asked Ibn Funduq’s grandfather to pray for the troops. But when he left, the reli­gious elder told people, “The sun of this government has set,” p. 274, Tarlkh-i Bayhaq. Ibn Funduq speaks of Subashl as having had 100,000 horsemen and 200 elephants in Khurasan in the year 428/1036-1037, p. 273.

‘All Dayah fought in the Talkhab battle as well, p. 758. Fayyaz records his first name as ‘All ‘Abd Allah in the index, p. 998.

Faslh KhvafI speaks of an allegiance between ‘All Qarlb and Bigtughdl after Mahmud’s death. They alleged to remain allies and protect the court until the resolution of the

144

succession conflict, p. 148. The author of Tarlkh-i STstan speaks of a leader named Bigtughdl as having received the amirate in Sajistan on the fifteenth of Muharram of 422/12th of January of 1030, p. 363. Bigtughdl suffered the first defeat at the hands of the Saljuqs in the year 426/1034-1035, pp. 625-631 (other sources, JuzjanI, 248-249; Firishtah, 392-393, Alfi, 893-895, Muqlm Haravl, 280). BayhaqI only mentions Big­tughdl by name on the battle scene at Dandanqan, also pointing out that he felt slighted by M as‘0d on the night before this decisive battle. Apparently, M as‘ud spoke to his colonels, but not to the commander himself, p. 829.

The arrest of these three leaders is mentioned also by two later Indian historians (Firish­tah, 396-397, Muqlm Haravl, 283-285).

83BayhaqI, op.cit., p. 873.

84ibid.

85ibid., p. 874.

86ibid.

87ibid.

88ibid„ p. 875.

89ibid., p. 818. It seems that most of M as'ud’s courtiers advised him against fighting the Saljuqs in Dandanqan.

90ibid., p. 875.

9’ibid.

92ibid„ p. 876.

93ibid.

94ibid.

95ibid.

96ibid., p. 285.

97ibid„ p. 876.

98The other instance relates to BayhaqI’s flight from the scene of battle in Dandanqan, ibid., p. 839.

145

" ib id ., p. 877.

,00ibid.

101 ibid., pp. 755-756, 834-835.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have studied Tarlkh-i BayhaqI from a rhetorical perspec­

tive, using the trope of irony. I have epitomized The History in terms of intrigue and

characterized BayhaqI as an ironist. This study deals with those stories of intrigue in

The History where BayhaqI disapproves of this mode of behavior. The plots of intrigue

discussed here were against military leaders in the court of Mas‘ud.

The imprisonment and exile of these men played a role in the final Ghaznavid

defeat to the Saljuqs. These plots made other courtiers fearful and demoralized, and

also resulted in the loss of the victims’ ghulams. Some of these ghulams deserted to

the Saljuqs. And they fought in the battle of Dandanqan on the ninth of Ramadan of

431/thirtieth of May of 1040, where they asked their comrades in M as'ud’s army to join

them. The Ghaznavids lost Khurasan on this day, and Mas'ud retreated to India the year

after this. He was soon killed by his ghulams.

The loss of Khurasan was devastating to men like BayhaqI. These men had been

born and raised on its soil and they belonged to its scribal class. It was they who were

preserving many of the traditions of Khurasan. And Tarlkh-i BayhaqI is a remembrance

of their past.

For men like BayhaqI and his master Bu Nasr Mushkan the loss of this land meant

the loss of a home which had given them their identity. They had been trained in Khura­

san. And they would hand down its scribal traditions, which they had inherited from

their masters to those coming after them. In Tarlkh-i BayhaqI these men appear as hav­

ing been most visibly affected over the loss of Khurasan, men like Bu Nasr, who early on

predicted this loss.1 They assessed the realities of M as‘ud’s court with discernment and

sound judgement. The king was much too fond of food and wine to do what had to be

done; that is, protect his kingdom. Instead, he would eat, drink, and hunt. Indeed, later

146

147

on in life, Mas'ud became so heavy due to overeating that he could not ride on horses

while hunting. So he would hunt lions while sitting on the backs of elephants.2

It was the privileges of being a ruler that Mas'ud liked, but not its military duties,

like the protection of Khurasan. In other words, he enjoyed having the appearances that

adorned the life of a Perso-Islamic ruler, but wished to be left alone when it came to the

realities a ruler had to face. Men like Bu Nasr, Ahmad Hasan MaymandT, and Ahmad

Abd al-Samad realized this. They would say what they could so as to motivate Mas'ud

into action. But he would either, first agree and not follow through with decisions to

fight the Saljuqs, or not listen to their advice in the first place.

But there was one kind of advice, tadblr, to which Mas'ud would always listen.

He always listened to advice about plots against his military commanders. And this was

another reality over which men like Bu Nasr despaired. They advised the amir against

these intrigues. And Mas'ud would lie that he agreed with them, while later, he would

follow through with these plots,

One can epitomize the history of M as'ud’s rule in terms of intrigues, lies, in the

court, and the reality of the Saljuqs’ aggressions in Khurasan. These aggressions met

with inaction by the amir in the first part of his rule. And in the second part, when the

Ghaznavid troops did take the field, they were unsuccessful in withstanding the nomadic

Saljuqs.

The lies at court and the truths relating to the loss of Khurasan are enshrined in

the pages of Tarlkh-i BayhaqI. The lies, the intrigues, relate to the events that BayhaqI

witnessed or in which he took part. And the truths are associated with the scribe’s ironic

viewing of what led to the loss of Khurasan. BayhaqI interpreted the events at M as'ud’s

court with the perspective of this loss. And it was this hindsight that threw an ironic light

on these events. It is as though as an old man, he was leaving behind the truth about

what he had experienced, by relating the significance of earlier events.

Being an old man, BayhaqI did not have the anxieties that one suffers in youth.

Thus, it was to the past that he turned, as we all do in old age. And in the past of Mas­

'ud’s time and those of other rulers like Kasra Anushlrvan, he sought the meaning of

events. The ironic meanings that arise in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI are closely associated with

this search for meaning. And they are best epitomized in BayhaqTs stance of eternity.

148

Therefore, it is Time, zamanah or ruzigar, that becomes the supreme ironist.3 And the

most significant conflict or disharmony which leads to an ironic meaning is the one exist­

ing between life and death.

BayhaqI looked at the lives of his contemporaries, most of whom had died, with

a continual reminder of death. The ironic meaning that arises is in viewing the conflict

between the futility of one’s efforts in the face of death. Therefore, Time enjoys the last

laugh while hopes are vanquished, works undone, joys and sorrows brought to an end,

and lies and truths unveiled.

BayhaqI’s eternal stance leads to a close association of irony with truth. It is as

though in viewing matters ironically, one sees how things really are. In contrast, in­

trigues always bespeak of lies. So an ironist like BayhaqI might relate matters that are

false, but then he intimates his ironic attitude towards them, by implying contrasting

truths. It is only through studying Tarlkh-i BayhaqI with attention to his ironic attitude

that one can gain an understanding of his thought.

BayhaqI drew lessons from others’ lives and that of his own, from remembering

the lies they had told and the good deeds they had done. Tarikh-i BayhaqI is a record of

these lessons, it is the scribe’s letter to those who would come after him. There is one

lesson or truth that epitomizes BayhaqT’s worldview. It is his advice (andarz) that one

should be kind and gentle towards others. For all that remains from a person’s life is a

name (nam), and it is only through acts of kindness and gentleness that one leaves be­

hind a good name (nam-i nlk).

Yet this does not mean that BayhaqI advises an earnest and trusting attitude to­

wards others. On the contrary, if intrigue (hllah) might result in a good outcome, like

saving a man’s life, one should resort to it.4 BayhaqI even approves of intrigue when it

might effect a worldly good such as a high position, but only if this will not mean harm

to others. Therefore, not all lies are wrong, considering the good outcomes that some

might have. Yet ultimately, wisdom (khirad) is associated with the knowledge that this

world is a Lie (dunya-yi farlbandah), in contrast to the world of Truth that will come

next.5

149

The life that one has lived, with all its lies and truths, determines the rewards and

punishments that one will receive. The most valuable reward in this world is a good

name, and the one in the next world is salvation.

I have studied the use of intrigue in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI within the framework of the

loss of Khurasan. The use of intrigue in The History as a whole and a deeper under­

standing of BayhaqI as an ironist requires a much more in-depth study. This dissertation

is the stepping stone for this larger project, where I will discuss Tarlkh-i BayhaqI within

the pre-classical tradition of Persian prose (4th—5th/1 Oth— 11th).

Hllah also appears in other works of this period. It also seems to have been a

mode of behavior within the medieval Islamic tradition of thought.6 Thus, a deeper un­

derstanding of hllah requires that one place BayhaqI as a thinker both within the Iranian

and the Islamic traditions to which he belonged. I will continue to study the use of in­

trigue and irony in Tarlkh-i BayhaqI as a whole, within these two traditions.

150

Notes to Chapter VI

’Before the first Ghaznavid defeat, Bu Nasr told his protege, “Bui Fazl! Khurasan is lost!” And before the Ghaznavids unsuccessfully fought the Saljuqs again in 429/1037- 1038, the chief secretary sorrowfully stated, “[I] wish [I] were dead so [I] would not have to see these things,” BayhaqI, pp. 610 and 710.

2ibid., p. 151.

3Stephen Fairbanks refers to the concept of ruzgar in his dissertation on the Saljuq bu- reacracy, The Tarlkh al-vuzara’: a History of the Saljuq Bureacracy (The University of Michigan Dissertation: 1977).

4BayhaqI tells two stories in detail about the use of intrigue when the good outcome is the saving of a man’s life, pp. 197-212 and 213-221. Lazard has discussed the Hasiri story in an article, mainly relating what the story is about, “Un memorialiste persan du XIe si&cles: BeyhaqI,” Etudes de civilization medievale (IXe-XIIe sikcles) melanges offerts h Edmond-Ren6 Labande & l’occassion de son ddpart h la retraite et du XXe anniversaire du C.E.S.C.M. (Poitiers: n.d.).

5See the sermons in The History, pp. 66-68, 308-310, 234-246, 448, 480-497, 795-802.Also see footnote 143 in Chapter II.

6 Among the pre-classical works of Persian prose consulted are, Tarjumah-yi tafslr-i Ta­bari, Hudud al-‘alam min al-mashriq il al-maghrib, Hidayat al-muti'allimln fi al-tibb, Ahval va aqval-i Shaykh Abu al-Hasan KharqanI: aqval-i ahl-i tasavvuf darbarah-yi u bi zamlmah-yi muntakhab-i Nur al-‘ulum, Tarlkh-i Bal‘aml: takallumah va tarjumah-yi Tarlkh-i Tabari, see bibliography for complete citations. Also see the article on hlyal byJ. Schacht, in El, II, (1971), pp. 510-513. J

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151

152

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