TTLE

LEIN

HOWARD WHITEHOUSE

Illustrated by

Peter DennisSeries Editor

Paddy Griffith

FIELDBOOKS

Contents2 Africa before Partition4 The Scramble for Africa6 Strategic Concepts8 Collecting an Army

10 Command12 Collecting Supplies14 Strategic Mobility16 Reconnaissance and Signais18 March Security20 The African Response22 Closing with the Enemy24 Tamai

26 European Battle Plans28 African Battle Plans30 African Leadership32 The New Technology34 The Power of Fire36 Cold Steel38 Horrible Disasters40 Glorious Victories42 Guerrilla Warfare44 Siege Warfare46 After the Battle

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© Copyright 1987 Fieldbooks. Ail rights reserved. ISBN 1 869871 01 4

Africa before PartitionEuropeans in the 1870s were starting to find out about,and became fascinated by, Africa. A mass market wasopening for cheap, popular literature: tales of savagebarbarism and clean-limbed heroism. 'Africans' danced inthe music halls; speculators drearned of fortunes to bemade; clergymen of souls to be saved. Livingstone andStanley became figureheads of a new brand of aggressivephilanthropy, and Africa became an El Dorado where theambitions of a whole generation of Europeans - to do goodor to do well - could be pursued.

Samuel and Florence Baker visitan African village.European traders in Africa were nonovelty. The coastal cities of NorthAfrica had been an integral part ofthe 'Mediterranean Civilisation' forthousands of years. European 'Voyagesof Discovery' from Vasco da Gama(late 15th century) onwards hadbrought meetings,understandings andtrade. A complex network of tradegrew up between European slavers andtheir African middlernen until thesuppression of the slave trade in 1807,when a changeover to other forms ofcommerce took place. Palm oil, rub-ber, ivory, gold dust, cotton andcoffee replaced the traffic in humanchattels - although siaving vesselscontinued to make the 'Middle Pass-age' to Cuba and Brazil until the1880s. All these transactions werestill based on equality betweenAfrican and European - but this wassoon to change.

European missionaries came to Africawith the traders. First the Jesuits inAngola and Mozambique in the 16thcentury, then the other organisedChristian mission groups elsewherefrom the start of the 19th century.Anglican and Methodist missionsemerged in Sierra Leone and theireducated converts - Africans rescuedfrom the slave ships - spread through-out the coastal zone of West Africa.Presbyterians came to the Gold Coastin the 1820s, and by the 1850s everymajor Christian denomination hadmissions on the 'Guinea Coast'. Oftenignorant and intolerant of the tradit-ional values of their self-selectedcharges, these missionaries neverthe-less maintained a firm humanitarianspirit: John Philip of the London Miss-ionary society was outspoken againstthe Cape Boers, while in Madagascarthe society taught 4,000 Hova to readand write their own language between1820 and 1827. Most celebrated wasDavid Livingstone, whose journeys(1853-73) inspired Victorians to corneto the 'Dark Continent' for worldlyreasons as well as to spread the wordof the Lord.

THE MAGHRIB of North West Africawas particularly vulnerable to theEuropean advance. Algiers fell to theFrench in 1830 and years of 'pacificat-ion followed. 100,000 soldiers protect-ed the influx of white colonists whotook the best land, yet Kabylia rem-ained unsubdued and constant militaryoperations were still required.

Morocco was defeated by France in1845 and by Spain in 1895-60. TheSultan found it difficult to control hisnomadic subjects and the Marabouts(religious leaders). Yet Moulai al-Hasan, Sultan frorn 1873, asserted hisauthority by strong military action,and did much to avoid provocativefrontier incidents against theEuropeans.

Tunisia was ruled by a Regencyunder Turkish suzerainty, and itsreforms - including the abolition ofslavery - made a model for theMaghrib. Yet the Bey was unable tocontrol his western hill tribes, andtheir incursions into Algeria were toprovide an excuse for the furtherenceof French ambitions in the area.

WEST AFRICA consisted of the grass-land belt of Western Sudan in thenorth, and a forest zone to the south-west.

In the Western Sudan - long thehome of great empires - the Fulaniempire established by Uthman DanFodio held Hausaland (modern north-ern Nigeria) as far east as Kanem-Bornu and south into the old Oyoempire of the Yorubas. The Tukolorempire of Al-Hajj Umar (died 1864)lay to the west, now under his sonAhmadu Sefu, while in the southwestthe Mandinka soldier Samori Tourécreated a major state in the 1870s.

The Forest Zone was controlled bycentralised nations - Dahomey, Asante(Ashanti), Benin and Yoruba states, aswell as several less formally governedtribal groups. The Asante were amilitary confederation who dominatedthe coastal Fanti, although repeatedclashes with British traders hadbrought Sir Carnet Wolseley's expedit-ion, 1873-4, which captured theircapital.

French Senegal was the most sig-nificant of the European coastaltrading enclaves. Louis Faidherbe, thegovernor from 1854, had extended hispossessions through Futa Toro intoconflict with Al Hajj Umar: the firstof many similar clashes.

In 1821 the Afro-American settle-ment of Liberia had been established,and it has maintained its independ-ence of the Europeans to this day.

European explorera enjoyed theirgolden age in the 19th century. MungoPark, Rèné Caillié and Heinrich Barthvisited the Niger region before 1850;later adventurers included Sir RichardBurton, Samuel Baker, J H Speke anddozens more. Their narratives ofcolourful and exotic lands drew anenormous popular interest until in the1870s their influence - often motiv-ated more by reputation than byscience - weighed heavily with thegovernments of Europe. H M Stanley,

the Welsh-American journalist who'found' Livingstone in 1871, wasemployed by the Belgian King Leopoldto explore the Congo for its commer-cial prospects (1875-85). During thesame period Count Pierre Savorgnande Brazza was surveying equatorialAfrica for the French. Karl Peters ofthe Society for German Colonisationprovided his government with itsticket to a slice of East Africa by his'treaties' of 1884-5.

Sierra

EQiCorestthe19t1negandAfrthewel.in tAraestaking1861LuadomleacenorConhised 1Zan:

AsevETekCan

2

Battle in Africa

NORTH EAST AFRICAIn Egypt ambitious modernisationplans based on the Suez canal broughtbankruptcy, and control by an inter-national debt commission. This in turnproduced discontent and a militaryrebellion. The Khedive Ismail wasdeposed in 1879 but his successor -his son Tawfiq - fell into the powerof the radical army off icer ArabiPasha.

The Sudan had been conquered byEgypt in the 1820s and KhediveIsmail had pushed his military expan-sion still further, extending down theRed Sea and on to Kismayu (1865-75).Corruption and religious grievances,however, provoked a rebellion againstthe Egyptians. Muhammad Ahmad, theself-proclaimed Mandi ('Saviour'), ledthe Sudanese in a series of victories(1881-85).

EQUATORIAL AFRICA The RiverCongo and its great belt of rain for-est had fascinated Europeans sincethe early Portuguese voyages. In the19th century Portugal still held small,neglected coastal enclaves in Angolaand Cabinda. Inland lay centralisedAfrican states. The Luba and Lunda inthe west were being displaced by thewell-armed Chokwe ivory hunters, andin the east by the Nyamwezi and theArabs. In Katanga the trader Msiriestablished a military-mercantilekingdom between 1856 and 1891. By1860 the Arabs had settled on theLualaba, destroying existing king-doms, and by 1870 their paramountleader Tippu Tib, had carved out anenormous kingdom in the EasternCongo. With allegedly 50,000 guns athis command, he nevertheless remain-ed faithful to the distant Sultan ofZanzibar.

Also in the rain forest region wereseveral smaller peoples - Bobangi,Teke and the ferocious - reputedlyCannibal - Fang.

In the isolated Christian empire ofEthiopia, the British had intervened in1868 to defeat the Emperor Theodoros(Tewodoros) and eventually had himreplaced by John (Johannis). Johnovercame domestic anarchy, weath-ered the Egyptian expansion down theRed Sea, and by 1880 he was poisedto expand against the Moslems andpagans to south and east - but hisown throne was threatened by a youngrival, Menelik of Shoa.

In Tripoli the Turks had re-assertedtheir authority in 1835, although inthe interior of Cyrenaica the Bedouinrallied to the Sanusi - a fundamental-ist Moslem brotherhood. Sanusiinfluence spread across the Sahara toBornu and Wadai, and much of thedesert trade fell into their hands.

Suez Canal

EAST AFRICA was dominated by theSwahili-Arab Trading Empire, looselysubject to the Sultan of Zanzibar.Their raids into the interior, in searchof slaves and ivory, shocked bothLivingstone and his Victorian readersbut brought an hegemony extending asfar as the Great Lakes and the East-ern Congo basin. A Nyamwezi trader,Mirambo, built a kingdom east ofLake Tanganyika in the 1870s when hefound himself pushed back by thebetter-organised coastmen.

The East African Plain was inhab-ited by pastoral peoples such as theSomali or the fierce Maasai, or byfarmers such as the Hehe.

Populous centralised states such asBuganda, Bunyoro and Ankhole hadbeen established on the fertile landsof the lake region, isolated until theywere reached by Arab traders in 1844.They fascinated the explorers Burton,Baker and Speke, and in 1874-6 rec-ieved envoys from General Gordon.The Zanzibar Sultanate exercised onlyan informai authority., although itsArab cities were effectively ruled bySeyyid Said (1806-56), and there was asecure credit system and a guaranteedmarket for trade.

SOUTHERN AFRICA was inhabited bymany disparate peoples. The oldestwere the Khoisan 'Hottentots' of theWestern Cape who interbred withEuropeans, and primitive 'Bushmen'groups who were driven remorselesslyinto the Kalahari. Then in the early19th century came a serious populat-ion explosion among the SouthernBantu, as they came into contact withthe Boers. By 1879 the chief Bantupeoples were the Xhosa, Pondo,Gaekas and Gcalekas (who were beat-en by the British 1877-8), the Sotho,Swazis - and the Zulu empire. In thefar west were the Bechuanas andHerero, while driven north of theLimpopo by the Boers were theNdebele (Matabele) and their subjectsthe Shona and Barotse.

On the high veldt were two Afric-aner republics. Descendents of Dutchsettlers, the Boers were independent,individualist and convinced of theirGod-given racial superiority. Follow-ing the British takeover of the Capein 1815, they had trekked north anddefeated the Zulus (1839-40) andNdebele (1837), but in 1877 the Brit-ish proclaimed the annexation of boththe Transvaal and the Orange FreeState.

Madagascar was dominated by thesophisticated Merina state of theHovas, but French influence wasstrong and they controlled most ofthe commerce. J

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A jubilant Zuluwith captured rifleand equipment afterIsandhlwana, 1879.

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ChokweAngola

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Madagascar

Ethiopia /

3

The Scramble for Africa

British

French

Between 1879 and 1914 the Europeans carved up Africa.The reasons for this were many - hope of economic gains,belief in the 'Civilising Mission', strategic advantage, thepressure of excess populations and, most of ail, prestige.The French sought to make up for the humiliation of 1870;the Italians to prove themselves a 'power'; the British andPortuguese to maintain their early lead. The establishmentof King Leopold's 'Congo Free State' after the BrusselsConference of 1876 began the scramble - then the conquestof Tunis and Egypt advanced it, and the Berlin Conference(1884-5) confirmed it. A complex series of treaties dividedAfrica, without reference to the wishes of Africans.Meanwhile the doctrines of 'Spheres of Influence' and'Effective Occupation' dictated that the race on the groundstarted in earnest. Despite some serious quarrels (egFashoda 1898 between France and Britain, or Agadir 1911

between Germany and France ) the Europeans stood togeth-er in observing their drawing-room accords. The result wasa sudden, unanimous spate of conquests throughout Africawhich left only Liberia and Ethiopia free from Europeancontrol by 1914.

Africa in 1914

THE BINorth EgovernnEuropeaafter a1882 a 1Wolseleyiant canAboukirand storTel El Kferociou:whole ofunder Br

In therebellionEgyptianthe mass,and the fonly a feDigna wothe Mandthe BritisTamai. Gcould notrelief expAbu Kleawas too l~another R

Independent was abandMandi's surepeatedlybut disastrEgypt in 1quest of tlFirket in 1man two ykilled in 1lsuppressed

Germany's 'Place in the Sun' waswidely scattered across Africa, as theGermans entered the colonial racerather late and were left to pick upterritories which no one else hadbothered to seize. These includedTogo and the Cameroons (1884) -whence the eastern Fulani cities werelater annexed. Further south theGermans founded a colony in SouthWest Africa (1884), where there wasfighting against Hendrick Witbooi'sHottentots (1892-4). In 1904 theHerrero rose to regain their land andcattle, and inflicted major defeats onthe Europeans before being savagelyput down. Just as the Hereros were

suppressed, the Hottentots rose againunder Hendrick and the brilliantMorenga (1904-7). In East AfricaGermany secured the Sultan of Zanzi-bar's territory in Tanganyika. The'Arab Rebellion' of Abushiri wasdefeated (1888-9) and the long resis-tance of the Wahehe was overcome(1891-8). German rule was harsh andexploitative in the extreme, provokingthe Maji-Maji rising of 1905-7. Thiswas a collective action of the southernpeoples united by religious leaders. Itwas heavily suppressed, after confid-ence that ancestors would return todefeat the invader proved to beunfounded.

4

THE FRENCH EMPIREThe Maghrib By 1879 the French hadconsolidated a position in Algeria andwere making plans for expansion.Incursions by Krumir tribesmen fromTunisia provided an excuse for theannexation of Tunis (May 1881), thena second expedition defeated themountain tribes - capturing Kayruwanbefore the year's end. The advanceinto the Sahara also pushed ahead -to Touggourt 1882, El Golea 1887, InSalah 1900. The Tuareg wiped out theFlatters railway survey mission in1880-1, but the steel rails still foll-owed French columns, confirmingpossession. In South Oranais theSheriff Bou Amana raised a Jihad in1882; inflicted a serious loss on aForeign Legion column at Chott Tigri(1882), and proved such a nuisanceto the French that they eventuallygave him a pension! At El Moungar in1902 a supply column was ambushedand mauled by Shaamba Arabs, and inthe same year the Ahaggar Tuaregwere defeated at Tit. In 1905 theTrarza and Brakna Moors in Mauret-ania attacked the expedition of theFrench agent Coppolani at Tdjikdja,and killed him.

In Morocco the Sultan's efforts tomaintain his independence by exploit-ing European divisions finally brokedown. Under General Lyautey the

Portuguese

French chewed away at the border-lands (1903-7), and then rioting inCasablanca (1907) brought full scaleinvasion. Although Moroccan resist-ance was determined (Mellah River,M'Karto, Menablia - all 1908), theSultan was forced to accept a protec-torate. Risings at Fez (1911) andamong the Tache de Taza tribe (1912-14) were suppressed.West Africa The French expansioneastward along the Senegal-Nigerriver system brought a series of mil-itary conquests. The Damel of Cayorwas defeated and killed in 1886, andthe Soninka peoples led by MamadouLamine were defeated at Touba-Koutain1887. Ahmadu Sefu had aided theFrench against Mamadou but thenhimself feli victim to them, losingactions at Koundian (1889), Segu(1890) and Youri (1891), and finallyfleeing to Sokoto. Samori Touré madea brilliant resistance (1882-98) by dip-lomacy, effective strategy, and evenby moving his entire empire 400 milesto the east. Yet he too was event-ually captured and exiled. Timbuktufellin 1894 when Joffre avenged thedestruction of the 1893 Bonnier col-umn at the hands of the Tuareg. By1900 columns from Algeria, CentralAfrica and the Western Sudan met atLake Chad to conquer Rabih at theBattle of Kousseri.

The French also took Dahomey(1892-4), but found great difficultiesagainst the Baule of the Ivory Coast,who resisted from 1891 to 1911. Mean-while the French expanded theirGabon base - probing north east intoUbangi-Shari as far as Lake Chad by1900. They also engaged in the con-quest of Madagascar following theindecisive war of 1883-5. Fever andrough terrain delayed Duchesne'sinvasion of 1895, but a flying columnbeat the Hovas at Tsynainondry andtook their capital. The rising of the'Red Plaids' in 1896 was suppressed,and Gallieni undertook the militaryunification of the island (1897-1904).The leading French colonial officer ofhis day, he was nevertheless unable toprevent frequent local risings againstEuropean rule.

Italian

Belgian

Spanish

Portugueseive occupatcampaignsCubango re;DI risings, c:1902) is theJntil 1915,troops were~uanhama,ruthority ov)ique the Pr•epeated de:2hikunda innore succesvhere G ungc:aptured Loivas put dow

Battle in Africa

THE BRITISH EMPIRENorth East Africa The revolutionarygovernment of Arabi Pasha threatenedEuropean investments in Egypt, soaf ter a bombardment of Alexandria in1882 a British expedition underWolseley was despatched. In a brill-iant campaign he feinted towardsAboukir then seized the Suez Canaland stormed the entrenchments ofTel El Kebir, covering Cairo. Hisferocious pursuit secured him thewhole of Egypt which was to remainunder British control until 1922.

In the Sudan, however, the Mandistrebellion was rapidly gaining strength.Egyptian authority had collapsed afterthe massacre of Hicks Pasha's armyand the fall of El Obeid (1883) leavingonly a few besieged garrisons. OsmanDigna won those on the Red Sea forthe Mandi, but was defeated twice bythe British in 1884 - at El Teb andTamai. General Gordon, in Khartoumcould not hold out and was killed. Therelief expedition beat the Mandists atAbu Klea and Abu Kru in 1885, butwas too late to save him. Afteranother Red Sea expedition, the Sudanwas abandoned by the British to theMandi's successor, the Khalifa. Herepeatedly overcame internai revolts,but disastrously failed to invadeEgypt in 1889. The Egyptian recon-quest of the Sudan got under way atFirket in 1896 and ended at Omdur-man two years later. The Khalifa waskilled in 1899; a Mandist revival wassuppressed in 1908, and the Dinka and

Nuer peoples were subdued.East Africa By 1890 Zanzibar was aBritish protectorate - a fact confirm-ed by a few minutes of naval gunfirein 1896. In Uganda, British controlcame when Lugard's Maxim gun wonthe battle of Mengo in 1892 on behalfof the Ganda protestants. The victorswent on to overthrow their rulerMwanga, and Kabarega of Bunyoro, in1899. A mutiny of the Sudanesesoldiery was put down in 1897, andthe Uganda railway was completed in1901. Meanwhile Kenya was beingconquered by a series of wars againstthe Mazrui family of Mombassa, theAkamba, Kisii and Kikuyu. The Nandisubmitted only in 1906 - after sixexpeditions against them - when theBritish suppressed the tribe withgreat brutality.West Africa British expansion fromtheir coastal enclaves gave themcontrol over the Nigerian tradingstates (Ijebu in 1892, Oyo in 1895),the empire of Benin (1897), the Tivand the Ibo peoples. The oracle of theAro Ibo was destroyed in 1901. Camp-aigns against Bida and Ilorin (1897),Kano and Sokoto (1903), broke theFulani emirate of northern Nigeria.Asante was conquered in two camp-aigns (1896, 1900), the Temne andMende of Sierra Leone were suppress-ed in the Hut Tax War (1898), and theGambia territory was secured by thedefeat of Marabout leaders Fode Silla(1894) and Fode Kabba (1900).

Southern Africa The British invasionof Zululand (1879) was halted by thedisaster of Isandhlwana, but thedefence of Rorke' Drift and the con-tinued presence of columns at Eshoweand Kambula kept the campaign aliveuntil reinforcements arrived to defeatthe Zulu king Cetshwayo at Ulundi.Later in the year the resistance ofthe Sekukini and the Pedi was crushed.In 1880 the Transvaal Boers roseagainst British rule: in four battlesthe British were beaten, and after thedeath of General Colley in the deb-acle of Majuba Hill (1881), the Boerrepublics gained their independence.In 1890 Cecil Rhodes' British SouthAfrica Company occupied Mashona-land: war with the Ndebele came in1893 and, despite a victory over theShangane Patrol, Lobengula wasbeaten and died in flight. In 1896 theNdebele and Shona rose againstsettler oppression in the Chimurengathey were put down with great blood-shed the following year, althoughresistance continued until 1903.

The Second Boer War (1899-1902)began with a series of British defeats,culminating in the disastrous 'BlackWeek' of three lost battles (Magers-fontein, Stormberg and Colenso) inDecember 1899. The arrivai of LordRoberts secured the Boer capitals in1900, but an effective guerilla warcontinued for another two years.Later, there was an African rising inNatal (1906) and a minor Boer revoitin favour of the Germans in 1914.

Portuguese attempts to take 'effect-ive occupation' of Angola led to thecampaigns of Artur de Piava in theCubango region (1885-8), and a seriesof risings, of which the Bailundo War(1902) is the best remembered. Notuntil 1915, when 7,000 metropolitantroops were sent against theCuanhama, did Portugal have realauthority over ail Angola. In Mozam-bique the Portuguese drive inland metrepeated defeats at the hands of theChikunda in the Zambezi valley, butmore success in the coastal regionwhere Gungunyane's rising (which hadcaptured Lourenco Marques in 1894)was put down by the end of 1896.

The Congo Free State was KingLeopold's private venture - a coastalstation which gradually expanded up-river. An alliance with Tippu Tibbroke down into open war (1891-4)which the Free-Staters won by super-ior organisation and weaponry -capturing Nyangwe in 1893 and Ujijiin 1894. In 1890 the Belgian advancealso reached the Congo-Nile divide,established a foothold at Lado on theNile and defeated the Mandists atRejaf and Bedden (1897-8). In KatangaMsiri was shot dead during 'negotiat-ions' and his kingdom annexed.

Leopold's administration was aston-ishingiy brutal, provoking desperateresistance - a 20 year war with theChokwe; rebellions by Budja and Bowatribesmen forced into rubber plantat-ions, and in 1897 a serious mutiny inthe 'Force Publique' itself. Altogethernome f ive million Congolese diedunder Leopold's rule.The Italians seized Eritrea (1882-90),whence they entered Ethiopia, thenruled by the Emperor John. An Italianforce was massacred at Dogali in1887, but John died fighting theMandists two years later at Gallabat.

He was succeeded by Menelik, whohad gond relations with Italy andpreferred to march against the Gallaand Somali t: ibes to the south. How-ever by 1895 he too was at war withthe Italians, and beat them at AmbaAlagi and then Adowa (1896) - adecisive victory which guaranteedEthiopian independence for fortyyears. In 1897 the Italians also had toface - alongside the British in theHorn of Africa - the Somali Jihad ofAl-Sayyid Muhammed. This war cont-inued until 1920 and the Somalis wonseveral victories, including GamburuHill (1903) and Dul Madoba (1913).

In 1911 the Italians invaded theOttoman provinces of Tripoli andCyrenaica. Despite success in thebattles of Al Hani, Al Hawwari (1911),Al Nadura and Al Mudawwar (1912),the Turks were forced to withdraw bythe European powers. Resistancenevertheless continued, led by theSanusi, and the invaders were badlybeaten at Yawm Al-Djuma (1913).In the following year Italian strengthand organisation prevailed at Ulandubaand Sabha, and at least a measure ofcontrol over the area was achieved.

5

Strategic ConceptsCampaigns were planned either for conquest or for punish-ment. When the intention was occupation, force was alliedto political initiatives and schemes for 'pacification'.When the object was simply to 'discipline' a recalcitrantpeople, a policy of despoilation was often preferred - thetorch was cheaper than the sword. The French 'Razzia'especially raised desolation into a fine art - but the theftor killing of herds, destruction of orchards and use of rap-acious irregulars (and regulars too!) for reprisai pillagingwere methods common to ail the European powers.

Some aims of European campaigns were:A To relieve a besieged outpost - a limited objectivewhich could none the less involve huge forces, eg Buller's

1899 campaign to relieve Ladysmith. Callwell aB To capture the enemy's capital. The three Asant c E Callwcampaigns were ail directed towards Kumasi, the Frenc wrote hisinvasion of Madagascar towards Tananarive. PrinciplesC To defeat the enemy army. Although Chelmsford's 187 recognisedcampaign was aimed at the Zulu capital, Ulundi. th of continelessential object was to destroy the Zulu army threatenin relevanceNatal. he put forD To take the enemy's leaders, or other symbols of so ver insightful 1

eignty - eg the Asante 'Golden Stool'. The French wamessage, bagainst Samori was ended by his capture; and pursuit c broad arra:Ceteshwayo, Lobengula and Behanzin of Dahomey wa was that sideemed necessary for genuine victory in each case. less upon c

sound logisose. The c

The French School Whereas the soid-iers of the Queen were subordinate tocivilian masters within each colony,the French empire in Africa waslargely the consequence of decisionsmade entirely by military men. Thus'The French School' emphasised therole of the soldier as administrator,and of strategy as part of an overallpolicy of 'pacific occupation'. In the1840s Marshal Bugeaud had proposed astrategy of mobile light columns forAlgeria, supported by the settlementof veterans in military villages. Fiftyyears later Gallieni advanced a theoryof colonial warfare, based on hisexperiences in Senegal and WesternSudan, which called for his pupils -among them the future MarshalsJoffre and Lyautey - to throw awaytheir textbooks and rely on experience.In Tonkin (1891-6) and then inMadagascar, Gallieni's 'pacifications'were based on a firm military blowfollowed immediately by the creationof markets, schools and clinics forthe beaten foe - ail under the auth-ority of the 'cercles militaires'(military administrators). This systemwas popularised by Lyautey in hisarticle on the 'Role Coloniale del'Armee' (1900). Lyautey proposedwhat he called the 'oil-stain' approach,whereby French 'zones of influence'

Menelik, Emperor of Ethiopia, giveson audience to an Italien Emissary.

6

Legionnaires with prisoners.

would grow by attracting tribesmen tomarkets and amenities rather than bysimply sending punitive columns orestablishing outposts. As an 'organis-ation on the march', peaceful occup-ation was to accompany, rather thanto follow, the Army of Africa.

Lyautey's warfare therefore usedbroad fronts rather than supportingcolumns, but it retained Bugeaud'sbelief in boldness, planning andmobility - 'In Africa one defendsoneself by moving'. The principles of

Politics. The role of any commanderalways had a political dimension. Hehad to follow, interpret or disregardthe directives of distant ministerswho had little idea of 'events on theground'. Orders from Rome demanding'Any sacrifice to save the honour of

Anatomy ocampaign iland was abut when hcould provoRelief Exp8th Augustwas givenby SeptemtPausing unitroops, stolAssuan byOctober, W'thence to Emobilisatioiwas far sloCamel RegSeptember,NovemberDongola, ar

siegecraft were also applied to moun-December.tain fighting - encircling centres ofopposition by pincer movements,pulling the noose tight, then assault-ing the starving and demoralisedenemy. Lyautey's ideas were notalways as effective as he claimed,however, since in South Oranais and Df the arm)Morocco (1903-25) he said much aboullate to save'native politics' and working with carly by th(local authorities, but actually stillrelied heavily upon the Razzia andstraightforward firepower.

gay. Despitrarrors, theing examplestion. Kitch

the army and the prestige of the a decade lamonarchy' led directly to the Italian - ie almostcatastrophe of Adowa. On a local Wolseley'slevel, equally, commanders had todevise and implement their own pol- 7 Sarras-icies. Alliances with tribal leaders water becould bring warriors, scouts and was the csupplies - and a useful element of telegraph'divide and rule' for the future. here. BeyFrederick Lugard even admitted that k ' into themany of his treaties were fraudulent _- but he made them anyway, and 8A Korti•became a successful exponent of across thImperial policy in both East Africa Jakdul (9and Nigeria. Sometimes, however, make thetreaties could backfire - eg the desert coWitbois Hottentots used guns and Jakdul wrknow-how they had obtained from the support fGermans in their insurrection against ing the jcthe Germans themselves.

was still Si(Sarras to Kthan 9 mileElaborate sthe completOn 28th Jar

Battle in AfricaCallwell and the British School MajorC E Callwell, a British artilleryman,wrote his classic 'Small Wars, TheirPrinciples and Practice' in 1896. Herecognised that the accepted theoriesof continental warfare had but littlerelevance to imperial campaigning, sohe put forward his own clear andinsightful thesis to fill the gap. Hismessage, based on analysis of abroad array of colonial campaigns,was that successful strategy dependedless upon complex maneouvre than onsound logistics and boldness of purp-ose. The conduct of small wars, wrote

Callwell, was 'an art by itself'.He emphasised that resolution was

essential to success, holding 'that theinitiative must be maintained, thatthe regular army must lead while itsadversaries follow, and that theenemy must be made to feel a moralinferiority throughout.' A vigorousoffensive strategy was the key, seek-ing out the enemy and forcing decis-ive battle upon him whenever andwherever he might be found. Delayscould prove disastrous, and wouldcertainly encourage the enemy.Callwell therefore held that it was

better to postpone the start of acampaign until the forces were fullyorganised, equipped and ready.'Organisation' included careful consid-eration of supply and transport, theuse of information, and the study ofthe theatre of operations. In somecircumstances 'flying columns' carry-ing all their own provisions would beemployed - but at other times alengthy line of communication wasbetter. Aggressive strategy foundedon firm logistics and intelligencewould, Callwell claimed, lead tosuccess.

Anatomy of a campaign Organising a The Gordon Relief Expedition 1884-5campaign in a distant and inaccessibleland was always an impressive feat,but when haste was obligatory, itcould prove a nightmare. The GordonRelief Expedition was authorised on8th August 1884; Sir Garnet Wolseleywas given command on the 26th, andby September 9th he was in Cairo.Pausing until the 27th to organisetroops, stores and boats, he reachedAssuan by private yacht on lstOctober, Wadi Halfa on the 5th, andthence to Dongola and Korti. But themobilisation of supplies and soldierswas far slower - eg the GuardsCamel Regiment left London on 26thSeptember, reached Halfa on 12thNovember and, after training atDongola, arrived at Korti on 14thDecember. The boat-borne infantrywas still slower - the best speed fromSarras to Korti was 38 days - lessthan 9 miles per day on average.Elaborate staffwork was needed to tiethe complex transport plans together.On 28th January 1885 the spearheadof the army reached Khartoum - toolate to save Gordon, but remarkablyearly by the normal standards of theday. Despite confusion, squabbling anderrors, the campaign was an astonish-ing example of successful improvis-ation. Kitchener's careful reconquesta decade later was to take two years- ie almost five times as long asWolseley's campaign.

7 Sarras-Korti 330 miles, including 22 miles of whitewater between the Second and Third Cataracts. Kortiwas the advanced base for the Relief Expedition - thetelegraph and lines of communication to Cairo endedhere. Beyond this point only flying columns, advancing' into the blue ' , could operate.

8A Korti-Mettemma The 1 76 miles of caravan routeacross the Bayuda desert was broken at the wells ofJakdul (90 miles) and Abu Klea (153 miles). Rather thonmake the eight-day journey in one stage, Stewart ' sdesert column established a forward supply depot atJakdul wells. This meant much stronger logisticalsupport for the column, but involved more than doubl-ing the journey time to 22 days in ail. e

(2 Cairo-Assiut TheEgyptian rail systemcovered the distanceof around 200 milesto Assiut, and later

`Balliana.

4 Assuan-Shellal The 7miles of rocks and rapidsmaking up the FirstCataract were by-passedby a narrow-gaugerailway.

ALEXANDRIA

Wadi Halfa-Sarras A narrow-gauge railwaycircumvented the Second Cataract and ran on33 miles to Sarras. For the 1896 invasion ofDongola the line was extended another 75miles to Kosheh.

CAIRO

ASSUANSHELLAL _~5 Shellal-Wadi Halfa A second flotilla

of steamers and Nile boots ('Nuggurs'and '

Gyasas') sailed this 215 mile leg.

3 Assiut-Assuan Tourist steamersbelonging to Thomas Cook & Co.,together with a variety of tugs,barges and local river craft,transported troops on this 300 milereach of the Nile. The GordonRelief Expedition was delayed forthree weeks when Cooks ran outof coal.

9 Mettemma-Khartoum The finalleg was 76 miles, with a party ofsoldiers, dressed in red coats toimpress the locals, transported intwo of the remaining steamers.Delayed on starting they took fourtortuous days to ascend the fallingriver - and found the Mandists had

.captured the city two days before.

8B Korti-Berber The bulk of theforce continued by whale boat the270 miles to Berber, averaging only4 miles per day. While it took 31days to reach the Nile column ' sfurthest point, 30 miles short ofAbu Hamed, it came bock in 9!

1 London-Cairo The Voyage bysteamer took 10-15 days toAlexandria, followed by a railjourney of 120 miles to BritishHQ in Cairo. From here therewas a telegraph link to Londonand - until it was cut -Khartoum.

7

Collecting an ArmyTo engage in colonial warfare, a European power neededan army. Since African campaigns were expensive, andfrequently unpopular, there was a strong preference forkeeping this army small - making for the cheapest possible'effective use of force.'

MOBILISATION SEQUENCE: Howcolonial authorities might providetroops -1 Local Garrisons and other troops'onthe spot' might be few in number, ifthe war was a consequence of anAfrican initiative. Europeans wereoften taken by surprise, eg at thestart of Abushiri's revoit the German' Defence Force' in East Africa com-prised 600 Sudanese, 50 Somalis and350 Zulus - a diverse collection ofmen, vastly outnumbered by theSwahili rebels. Even when local forceswere large - such as the 14,750 regul-ar British troops in South Africa in1899 - they rnight be inadequate todeal with the threat.2 New recruits and alliances wouldrapidly be sought. Hastily-formedunits would be drilled and organised,while the 'enemies of the enemy'would be approached and offered loot,privileges and a chance to settle oldscores. The British force that defeat-ed the Sekukuni was mainly made upof their traditional foes the Swazis.3 Nearby possessions of the sameEuropean nation might be asked tohelp, if local resources were inadeq-uate, eg the French in Morocco couldcall on Algeria; the British in the1896 Asante campaign employedHausa infantry from Nigeria. In thewake of the disaster at Isandhlwana,the garrison of peaceful St Helenawas rushed to Natal. 'Naval Brigades'from warships might also be formed.4 An expedition from Europe would bedespatched if the war was considereda really serious motter - often thismeant a 'black mark' against the menon the spot who had apparently failedto cape with the crisis. The Britishgovernment frequently sent units fromIndia to help in its African wars -they were geographically close,experienced in small wars, and freefrom the unwelcome scrutiny of theopposition in parliament.5 Reinforcements were sent onlywhen the war was going very badly -when a home government was forcedto ward off a potential blow to itsprestige. Buller failed to beat theBoers with 47,000 men, so thousandsmore were sent - bringing numbers upto 180,000 in February 1900. TheGermons eventually deployed 20,000regulars to defeat 8,000 Hererowarriors (many unarmed), and then1,500 Hottentots, taking four years todo it.

Appointing a commander. Between1871 and 1914 the European officercaste was eager to see action where-ever it could be found. There wasgreat competition to get an appoint-ment, preferably a good one, in anyexpeditionary force bound for Africa.In general the command would begiven to the man on the spot, as longas he had the proper rank and senior-ity. But if he did not resolve mattersquickly, he was likely to be replaced.Thus the experienced Von Leutweinwas succeeded first by Von Trothaand then by Von Deimling, as theGermons sought to reverse their hum-iliating series of disasters in SouthWest Africa. Equally Lord Chelmsfordwas anxious to beat the Zulus onceand for ail before his replacement,Wolseley, arrived. The latter recipro-cated by making strenuous efforts toreach the field army in time to winthe glory for himself. Wolseley was

Training and acclimatisation wasessential for newly-arrived troops,who had to respond to unfamiliarconditions. Old hands would try todisabuse officers of the notion thatAfrican campaigning was a kind ofglorified big game hunt. Soldiers were'trained' to ride camels or ponies inwhat Kipling called 'Three days tolearn equitation an' six months o'bloomin' well trot'. Men needed time

ambitious, and would pressure politic-al leaders to appoints hirn to thecommand of each and every largeBritish expedition - then he wouldselect his own staff from a favouredgroup of experienced officers knownas the 'Ashanti Ring' (from theirservice in the 1873-4 campaign).Naturally this procedure caused frict-ion with those outside the clique - egsupporters of the arch-conservativeDuke of Cambridge, and later the'Indians' who looked to Lord Robertsfor leadership. In France the officersof the metropolitan army looked downon the 'Troupes de Marine' and'Armee d'Afrique' who were not'smart' and whose leaders - Bazaine,Canrobert and MacMahon - had beenresponsible for the 1870 defeats. Suchconfiicts frequently meant that plumjobs went not to those who most des-erved them, but to those who werebest placed to pull strings.

to adjust to the climate; the crackRifle Brigade and Grenadier Guards -fresh from the Mediterranean in 1898- compared badly with units that hadbeen longer in the Sudan, and sufferedterribly from sunstroke. Animais alsoneeded to regain 'condition'. Whenforced to march for endless miles onstrange fodder immediately after along sea voyage, mules and horsesdied off quickly.

Euraigiocwellofterthanor Hiand sfar lecraftwhicl

Locall)poor -gent -HausaSénégaarmy. !some ntroopsoften cmen ofbelieveibrutal <they evdedicatiusuallyamply Éthe api),armiessuccess(

The conForce'indeed.ition ofoff icersAngola ,and BoeKrupp gsmall foof numbthe Ganpack gurMaxim 8

Sir Carnet Wolseleyspeaks to theColonel of a newly-arrived regiment.Alexandria, 1882

8

European regulars were usually prest-igious soldiers: expert in drill andwell equipped. However, they wereoften inexperienced in anything morethan 'square-bashing'. Smart Guardsor Heavy Cavalry units were imposingand supremely confident - but werefar less flexible or skilled in field-craft than lowly County regimentswhich had seen more active service.

Regulars recruited for colonial servicecould be highly efficient if they werewell trained. The French 'Arméed'Afrique ' featured Spahis, Turcos,Chasseurs d'Afrique, Zouaves and thelegendary Foreign Legion. BritishIndia provided Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabregiments and Bengal Lancers.The field companies of German SouthWest Africa were effective and mob-ile - the Hereos called them 'men'whereas they termed green troopsfrom Germany 'boys'.

Local tribes were often more thanwilling to help the Europeans againsttheir traditional enemies. The Britishused Maasai to fight the Nandi, andthe Ganda to invade Bunyoro. TheBeni Amir supported Italy againstAbyssinia, while Ahmadu Sefu alliedwith the French (when he was notfighting against them). Karl Petersmade a classic appeal to a Nyanwezicaravan: 'Corne and help us. If wecapture the herds of the Wagogo youshah have a share in the booty.'

Locally-raised troops varied frompoor - eg the Natal Native Contin-gent - to very good - eg Goldie'sHausa constabulary; the TirailleursSénégalais, or the reformed Egyptianarmy. Some were keen volunteers,some not. French methods of raisingtroops in the Western Sudan wereoften close to slave-raiding, whilemen of the Congo 'Force Publique'believed that only by obeying thebrutal orders of their officers wouldthey ever be allowed home. It was thededication of officers and ncos whichusually determined quality - a pointamply demonstrated by contrastingthe appallingly demoralised Egyptianarmies of 1883-4 with their reformedsuccessors.

European volunteers were raised fromsettlers in Southern Africa to fightthe Zulus, Ndebele and Boers. Enthus-iastic and skilled in scoutcraft, thevolunteers' knowledge of the terrainand the enemy made them invaluable.They were not, however, amenable tomilitary discipline, and their bigotrytowards 'the natives' often involvedatrocities. For the 'white man's war'against the Boers the British usedmetropolitan volunteers such as theyeomanry or the upper-class CityI mperial Volunteers, as well as some25,000 Australians, Canadians and NewZealanders - 'All independent, queerand odd, but most amazin' new'.

Auxiliaries were required in largenumbers by the imperial field forces,to serve as scouts, interpreters, driv-ers, porters and servants. Most ofthese were local Africans - Bantu oxdrovers, Somali camel boys, etc - butspecialised services demanded suchexotic types as Canadian 'voyageur'boatmen (Nile campaign, 1884-5),Chinese labourers or Indian crews forplate-laying. The Germans evenbrought New Guinea head-hunters toEast Africa! As for porters, even asmall expedition like the Ilorin Col-umn (1897) had 488 carriers to 340combattants. In the First World Warthe Belgians employed no less than260,000 Congolese as porters for theirEast Africa campaign.

The composition of armies. A 'FieldForce' was a very variable quantityindeed. De Paiva's Portuguese exped-ition of 1890 in Angola comprised 20officers and 550 soldiers - a mix ofAngola Askaris, Damara tribesmenand Boer volunteers - plus 50 carts, 2Krupp guns and 2 machine guns. Suchsmall forces at least made up for lackof numbers by heavy firepower: egthe Gambia expedition of 1894 had 2pack guns, 2 rocket devices and aMaxim gun supporting 400 men of the

West India Regiment and a similarnumber of porters. In the JamesonRaid of 1896 there were 3 field gunsand 8 Maxims to support 494 riders;

while at Waterberg in 1904 VonTrotha's 4,000 men had 14 machineguns and no less than 36 field guns.For each 1000 men in these smallforces a proportion of 2.5 to 16machine guns and 3.5 to 9 pieces ofartillery was maintained.

In larger forces the firepower wasproportionally rather less. At Adowa

the 17,700 Italians had 56 guns (or3.16 per thousand), and in SouthAfrica in January 1900 the 86,730British had 270 guns (3.1 perthousand). The proportion of cavalryvaried more widely according to timeand place - eg horsemen were vital inSouth Africa, but useless in SierraLeone. But, in general, forces werebetter balanced and more homogenouswhen the mission was more important.

9

CommandCommand in Africa demanded a mixture of military skill,political acumen, imaginative improvisation and robusthealth. Successful leadership depended less on the applic-ation of set procedures than on the ability to devise andi mplement a plan which worked. The effective rule wasthat there were no rules. Command could devolve ontovery junior officers - in the farthest reaches of the Congoor Tchad it was possible for a young subaltern or captainto become the sole authority for the colonial power,wielding immense local influence. This responsibility couldbecome the springboard to promotion and a great reput-ation; for example the rise of Marshal Joffre dated from1894 when, as an obscure engineer officer, he found him -

self in command of a small French column which went onto capture Timbuktu. (He did not see action again until1914, when he was responsible for more than thirty ArmyCorps in Northern France!)

An African command could also break a man's nerve orhealth. Wolseley took quinine for years af ter a bout ofMalaria in Asante, and one Portuguese officer, deliriouswith fever, shot three inoffensive tribespeople, and thenhimself, in 1887. Another Portuguese officer committedsuicide by wrapping himself in a flag, sitting down amid14 kegs of powder, and then blowing himself through theroof of his house. Obviously command in Africa was noeasy matter.

The commander in battle had two adopt an 'administrative' role andmain options. He would normally place himself at a more rearwardinvolve himself in the thick of the command post where news could befighting, inspiring his troops by person- evaluated and plans revised. This was

the precursor of the 'chateau general-ship' of WW1, although never taken tothe same extreme. Most commanderssensibly co m bined aspects of bothstyles - eg Wolseley would scout theground with his staff, then retire towhere he could 'read' the progress ofthe battle. Kitchener - a cool 'admin-istrator' who covered spells of indecis-ion with his icy exterior - successfully'led from the front' at Omdurman butcreated chaos; panic and defeat whenhe tried to do the same at Paardebergin 1900.

al example and being present at pointsof crisis. Stirring deeds were thestaple of Victorian myth, and theessence of a regim entai officer's duty,but problems arose when more seniorofficers went too close to the front.At Modder River the British General,Lord Methuen , left his HQ for sever-al hours to lead a platoon attack,thereby abandoning his control overthe battle. At Colenso General Bullertook command of a battery. This wasleadership - but not generalship.

Alternatively a commander might

Mof

Troop movements are directedwith the heip of a heliograph.

10

The commander and his armyA commander's relationship with thoseunder his orders was of the utmostimportance. If the men had confidencein their leader, they would devotethemselves to carrying out the mostrisky of operations. On the other handa commander who lost that sense ofbelief among his army would encount-er lethargy and demoralisation.Letters from the Zulu war show bouy-ant faith in Lord Chelmsford collaps-ing into dejected apathy after hisdefeat at Isandhlwana.

An officer could use severalapproaches to motivate his forces.Lord Roberts was loved by his armyfor his cheerful interest in, and gen-uine concern for the soldiers. Bycontrast Kitchener - who is reportedto have never spoken to a privatesoldier except to issue an order -relied on cool efficiency to win histroops' respect. Negrier was a mart-inet who won little affection, but hisreforms revitalised the Foreign Legionin Algeria in the 1880s. Wolseley'smen expected ail to go well under hisleadership, and 'Ail Sir Garnet' becamea catch phrase for anything that wentwithout a hitch.

British troops in particular wantedtheir officers to 'muck in' - eg SirCharles Warren sought popularity bytaking very public baths in the middleof his camp! French off icers, however,preferred a more grandiose manner.

Lyautey held himself more aloof,although he encouraged an innercircle of staff officers, and engagedhis men with colourful reminiscences.There were different ways to estab-lish one's 'style of leadership', butwithout one the troops would lack animage to believe in - a faith thatcould carry the m through in adversity.

The commander and his officersThe development of staff systems inEurope during the late nineteenthcentury barely touched the armies inAfrica. Commanders needed skilledadministrators for intelligence, supplytransport etc., but often found therewas only a mixed collection of enthus-iastic yet inexperienced young officersavailable to perform these tasks. Inthe Zulu war this brought confusionas innocent subalterns and over-agecolonels failed to cope with a landwhich generally lacked roads, transportand sources of supply. Seasoned cam-paigners understandably sought tocreate more reliable staffs for theirown use - Gallieni's circle remainedin contact with him long after he hadretired, and included Lyautey, whoseown staff was a huge, adoring groupof disciples known as the 'Zaouia' (atype of Moslem religious brotherhood).Wolseley's 'Ring' was an effort bothto encourage the ablest young off icersand to build an effective team whichcould be used again and again. This

group was notable for its keen interestin 'scientific soldiering', at a timewhen British officers tended to bebrave rather than bright. Its membersincluded Generals Butler, Brackenbury,Sir Evelyn Wood and the ill-fatedGeorge Pomeroy-Colley. Perhaps itsmost interesting product of ail wasSir Redvers Buller...

RedChining 1He 1Wolsserieto plcomiularwasinfarWolsNileteenhe wSouttand tdisas

Battle in Africa

The commander and his ordersThe first duty of a soldier is to obeyhis orders, and this was never moretrue than in the Victorian era. AtAmba Alagi in 1895 Major Toselliknew his detachment of 2,150 ltalianaskaris was outnumbered ten or fifteento one by Ras Makonnen - yet hisorders did not permit retreat. Hechose to make a stand and died, withmost of his command, because obed-ience was more important than init-iative. During the Boer War theenergetic Lord Dundonald was repeat-edly put 'on the carpet' for exceedinghis orders, while a brilliant flankingaction by the King's Royal RifleCorps - which could have preventedthe disaster at Spion Kop - was recall-ed when it was on the verge ofsuccess because Buller had notordered it.

However, some officers chose to

disregard orders entirely. Lyauteyconducted an elaborate disinformationcampaign against his superiors whilehe was 'digesting' Morocco. He knewthere were no accurate maps in Paris,so he would annex a Moroccan town,give it a new narre, and say it was inAlgeria. However, he brooked nodeceit f rom his own subordinates, andsent home the impulsive CharlesMangin for showing unwanted initiat-ive. The most astonishing disobedienceduring this period was that of Vouletand Chanoine, two junior Frenchofficers whose expedition to Zinderin 1899 became a blood-stained ramp-age of pillage and slave-raiding. Whenan officer was sent to relieve Voulet,he was murdered on the orders of hisnew subordinate. Eventually the Tir-ailleurs Senegalais mutinied, killedVoulet and Chanoine, and still wenton to capture Zinder.

Toselli ' s last stand.

The commander and the enemyA commander's attitude towards hisadversary affecfed his whole approachto the campaign. Few Europeans ofthe period felt much respect or regardfor Africans - including Boers - andmost considered them debased heath-en savages, or worse. This could leadto a casual disregard for basic milit-ary precautions, resulting in disasterssuch as Isandhlwana and Majuba Hill.It could also mean that African lives,rights and property were consideredvalueless - eg wounded Mandists couldexpect no medical attention from theBritish, and were lucky if they escapeda bayonetting. Kitchener receiveddeserved criticism for this alter thewholesale slaughter at Omdurman.Even officers who had some sympathywith Africans, such as Theodor vonLeutwein, were carried by whitesettler opinion to harsh measuresagainst those who dared oppose theEuropeans. His successor - the exceed-ingly ruthless, but not very capable,von Trotha - was so enraged byHerero victorien that he put intoeffect a policy of total exterminationwhich caused the death of some 60,000people (75% of the tribe).

Mandist wounded are despatchedafter Omdurman.

Redvers Henry Buller saw service inChina, India and Canada before enter-ing the Army Staff College in 1871.He left his course to serve underWolseley in Asante - the first of aseries of African campaigns that wereto place Buller in a wide variety ofcommand positions. He led an irreg-ular cavalry force in the Zulu war,was Chief of Intelligence in Egypt, aninfantry brigadier at Suakin, andWolseley's Chief of Staff during theNile expedition. ln 1899, after four-teen years in staff positions at home,he was given overall command inSouth Africa. His record was excellentand his reputation high - yet he faileddisastrously. Why?

In his person, Buller embodiedmany of the contradictions of Victorianwarfare. He was extremely brave, andwon the Victoria Cross for saving hismen at Hlobane; but he also provedirresolute and unable to abide by hisown decisions. Outwardly bluff andcalm, Buller panicked inwardly atColenso. Devoted to the welfare ofhis men, he felt unable to risk theirlives on a high-stakes gamble - thoughhe knew the troops would do anythinghe asked. A resourceful staff officerand a heroic fighting soldier, he wasultimately terrified of overall comm-and. He felt secure as an able, activesubordinate to Wolseley - but on hisown he was out of his depth.

Il

Collecting SuppliesArmies cannot even begin to wage war unless they haveprovisions and transport. In Africa neither was easilyavailable locally, so they had to be brought. An Italiandescribing the quays of Massowa evoked the same scenesthat were familiar in French Algiers, British Cape Townand a dozen other ports. He spoke of the disembarkationof battalions, the issue of baggage, the shortage of bargesand labourers... 'they had to disembark the men, extract

Transport had to be effective if adeq-uate logistical support was to beguaranteed to the troops. A Britishbattalion had vine tons of basic imped-imenta, whixh meant about 17 wagonsand carts. In Zululand Lord Chelmsfordcalculated he would need 1,800 tonsof stores to supply 16,000 fightingmen for a 6-8 week campaign. Hisagents scoured South Africa andbought 977 wagons, 56 carts, 10,023oxen, 803 horses and 398 mules,collecting 90% of the transport beastsand vehicles in Natal. One officerwas also sent to Texas to buy 400mules; others came from Cyprus,Spain and Italy.

Following Bugeaud, Lyautey pref-erred to load equipment on mulesrather than men - but this created aboom in mule prices. British transportofficers in upper Egypt in 1885 paidL16 for camels - up to twice theusual price for beasts that were oftenold or sick - but when they could notprocure enough, they searched as faras Aden and Somalia. ln the hunt forMorenga, the Germans requested1,000 camels for pack transport, while'i n Ethiopia in 1868 the British used noless than 41,723 transport animais -from donkeys to elephants - to support14,600 soldiers. For the Adowa carn-paign (1896) the Italians bought 8,200camels and 3,000 mules in the spaceof two months.

Ammunition and weapons were, ofcourse, vital. An infantryman couldcarry 50-70 rounds, or perhaps twicethis if he laid aside most of hisequipment. The Somaliland CamelConstabulary bore 140 rounds per man,camels being stronger than men, withan extra 160 in reserve on packanimais.

Regirnental reserves would norm-ally carry 50-200 rounds per man,with more in an army 'field reserve'(Some 480 rounds per man in the Zuluwar). The prodigious rate of fire ofmodern weapons meant that thesefigures were really not high. Thestandard allowance of 3,000 roundsfor a Maxim, for instance allowedonly five minutes' continuous fire. In1899 the British in South Africa hadstocks of only 200 rounds per fieldgun, but 151,000,000 rifle cartridges(of which 44% were of the recentlybanned 'Oum Durn' type) - ie a totalof almost 2,000 per man.

12

the cases of rifles with a crane, embark them on theboats, land them on the beach or quay, open them, takeout the rifles, rub off the grease and distribute them,taking away the cases to the warehouse.' Eventually, orderemerged out of chaos. Barracks and hospitais were built,and within two or three days each newly-arrived battalionwas ready to march.

Loads carried (in lbs)A Porter 40-50An Infantryman 60A . Foreign Legionnaire* 100A Mule 200A Camel 300Heavy Ox Wagon (gond terrain) 8,000Heavy Ox Wagon (bad terrain) 2,000A Railway Freight Car 40,000+* The Legion suffered an enormousloss of mobility as the price for this ,until 'compagnies montées' wereintroduced.

Battle in Africa

Tents- etcetera A Victori.an armyrequired a vast assortment of tackleto operate in Africa. Tents - fromtwo-man triangular models, throughthe 18-man British bell-tent, to hugemarquees - were needed in largenumbers. Spare uniforms and bootswere required, although troops expec-ted to serve in tatters. Soap, candies,tobacco and firewood were necessities.Luxuries which were usually apprec-iated sometimes proved a nuisance. In1885 Brackenbury spent days sortingout coffee-grinders and beer taps f rommore vital equipment for his RiverColumn.

Drink Water was a basic need.A gallon per man per day was usual,but often much less was available,and animais needed much more. The6,000 gallons brought for the EastSurrey Regiment at Hashin wasexpected to serve 600 men for fourdays.

In desert lands the presence ofwater determined movements and keystrategic points. In Algeria andMorocco the French, unable to bringtheir mobile foes to battle, garrisonedwells and held the 250-mile line ofthe Zousfana river. In SW Africa theGermans defeated the Herrero only bycordoning them off in the waterlessOmakehe waste. Where there was nofresh water, deep wells might be dug,or seawater pumped by condenserapparatus, transferred to iron tanksand then to barrels for transport. Inthe march to Tofrek (1885) Major deCossen, staff officer in charge ofwater supplies, ernployed 580 camelscarrying 11,500 gallons.

Bad water would cripple an army.Enteric fever from contaminatedwater immobilised Roberts' armyafter the siege of Paardeberg andcapture of Bloemfontein. Soldiers inany case preferred tea, coffee orcocoa to plain water - and alcoholbest of ail. French troops in Algeriadrank Pinard - local red wine - andthe white rum known as Tafia. BothWolseley and Queen Victoria deploredthe issue of rum to British soldiers,seeking to substitute jacos, pickles andother edibles. Officers still broughttheir own chosen tipples - eg SirEvelyn Wood carried 40 cases of wineon the Gordon expedition, while theGerman staff at Swakopmund in 1904brought large supplies of champagneand cigars. Whenever possible ice andsoda water were also brought toensure a proper standard of living.

Food. Army rations were oftenplentiful but seldom good. Here aretwo examples of daily rations:British Army, Sudan, 18851 i'Ïlb fresh, or llb preserved, meat1 =,1b bread or 1 lb biscuitllb fresh, or loz compressed, veg.Sr-malt quantities coffee, tea, sugar,sait, lime-juice and jam or marmalade- Wolseley's 'teetotal' replacementfor the half-gill (21oz) spirit ration ofrurn usually issued.Italian Army, Ethiopia, 1896400 grams meat (451 gr. = [lb)200 grams pista or rice15 grams oil and cheese24 et wine3 cl rumAlso vegetables, coffee, sait, sugarand bread as available.

Allowances for native troops wereusually lower than for Europeans -egEgyptian soldiers received half themeat allowance of their British com-rades, while Aden camel-drivers livedlargely on biscuit, dates and onions.As much food as possible would beprocured locally to save transport -eg Zulu war letters mention the goodquality of the milk, while the columnambushed by the Boers at Bronkhorst-spruit (1880) was eating stolen peaches- but most still had to be broughtfrom home. Chicago 'Bully' beef wasthe Tommy's staple, while the Frenchsoldier lived largely on canned sar-dines. Barrels of pork, boxes of tea orcrates of biscuit were bulky and heavyrequiring vast baggage trains.Slaughter beeves and sheep had to beushered along in the army's wake.Officers improved their own lot bybringing delicacies from home - ahamper from Fortnum & Mason's waswidely considered essential equipment.The soldiers made do with tinnedgoods, stringy beef and bread fromthe field bakeries, 'half of it sand', asPrivate Davies of the 90th reported.

Forage allowances in the Sudan were:For English horses: 101b corn, 121bhay or chopped straw, loz sait.For Native horses and mules: 8 lbbarley, 8 lb chopped straw, 1oz sait.For Camels: 101b beans, 151b choppedstraw.In certain areas the grass was suitablefor fodder, but cavalry horses werenot trained to graze, and unfamiliarfoodstuffs would often upset the deli-cate constitution of the animais. Theloss of horses was massive.

Strategic MobilityMoving an army in Africa involved massive effort, effec-tive organisation and resourceful improvisation. Some ofthe available Transport Officers were placed in charge ofconvoys, others handled the complex detail of servicingthe Lines of Communication. A route of march had to bedevised that was practical on the ground as well as on themap. Basic survival needs - food, water and healthy campgrounds - had to be made available, and the rugged terrainhad to be carefully considered. In desert conditions the'Night March' might be used to allow rest through theheat of the day - although this entailed risks resulting

from confusion and slow progress in the darkness. Intropical rain forests movement was slower still; yet everyday that could be saved reduced the level of sicknessamong the soldiery. Mistakes were common: officersgrazed horses on infected pasture, or drowned ox teams inswollen river crossings. Some leaders relied only on adesperate hope that everything would fall into place.Others, such as Sir Charles Warren at the Tugela drifts(1899) missed the 'big picture' through excessive immer-sion in the details. Trial and error were the watchwords!

Flyirforc(Som(ous (Infarevenownthe ring i(irrel

An army's movement was based on the Transport problems in South Africa 1879speed of its slowest component.Lightly equipped forces could covergreat distances when the need arose -Capt Franke's feldkompanie rodealmost 200 miles in 100 hours to rel-ieve Okahandja (1904) while the CapeMounted Police marched 80 miles in 24hours to catch Morenga in 1907. Footunits could also achieve notable featsof marching - a quality especiallyprized in the Armée d'Afrique. AForeign Legion company covered 38miles in a night march to relieveTaghit (1903), while Lyautey's Algerianirregulars marched 125 miles in 49hours during the Razzia in 1906. Suchrapid marches were, however, except-ional. In heavy country a column withbaggage and wheeled artillery mightcrawl along: the 9 pdr and 12 pdr gunsin the Bida-Ilorin campaign of 1897were hand-hauled at 1 mph. At SuakinGraham's force averaged 1 i mph overthe thorny plain to Tofrek in 1885. Inmountain or jungle terrain, movementwas barely possible: Dodd's column inDahomey (1892) hacked its waythrough scrub jungle at only f ive milesper day.

Cavalry

Wagons

3f

2-2Z

Miles per day Miles per daywith forced march

16-3012 - 16

20 - 25

12 - 20

25-50

BoatstravemighlGyasstropicsuppl(greatNigerboatscarneexpedsectic

Railsreliaiand elinesthe nthe 1.wereexterAlger300 rtransNiger1880:whileopended 1

'Average' movement rates (From a Miles per hour1914 manual, assuming good weather (including halts)and a much better terrain than anyone Infantry / Mixed Troops 21could reasonably expect. Field artilleryis assumed to equal or exceed infantryrates.)

CommentsCorporal H Brown of the 2/24th Foot Day(South Wales Borderers) showed howtheory compared with reality in his 1account of the 74 mile march between 2Greytown and Helpmakaar in NatalDecember 1878.

Time Distance(in miles)

llam - 6pm 16 Leave Greytown, climb a hill 8 miles long.5am - l0am 11 Cross river Mooi then 'ail down hill', followed

by Christmas dinner of foundered bullocks'not fit for a dog'.

8pm 12 To the Tugela river.4pm - Cross the Tugela, camp on far bank.

- Sam 8 Hait for breakfast and dinner, then-- 7.30pm 10 To Sandspruit.

- Rest day at Sandspruit.- 5pm 17 Up a steep hill to Helpmakaar.

Total: 74 or 12.3 miles per day average.

5

3pm3 5am4 4am

3pm

6 - 5am

During the same campaign an off icer about 10 for dinner, when the oxen areof the Naval Brigade wrote that "Our outspanned for two hours; start againusual routine is as follows: 4 am strike at the pm, and camp by some river intents, breakfast 5.30, leave camp; hait the evening".

Battle in Africa

Flying columns were fast-movingforces carrying their own supplies.Some of them really did enjoy enorm-ous mobility - eg British MountedInfantry units of the second Boer Wareventually met the Commando on itsown terms. French Sahariens harnessedthe mobility of the desert Arab: work-ing in tandem with bodies of Goumiers(irregular horse and foot) and Turcos,

these troops were the leading expon-ents of the Razzia.

Many flying columns, however,became weighed down by their ownsupplies - eg the Germans in Tangan-yika and SW Africa found it difficultto move away f rom the railway. With-out magazines to fall back on, a flyingcolumn which got into difficulties andlost its supplies would be entirely

deprived of resources. In 1881 theFlatters expedition ran out of food andwater, and had to make a nightmareretreat harassed by the Tuareg. In1883 Hicks Pasha combined both prob-lems when his force had too muchbaggage for rapid movement, but toolittle food or water to survive theensuing delays.

' Melik ' in action on the Nile in 1898.

Boats were by far the easist way totravel in much of Africa. Local vesselsmight be used - the Nuggurs andGyassas of the Nile, or the canoes oftropical Africa - but these were soonsupplemented by steamers on thegreat lakes, on the Nile and on theNiger. There were also collapsibleboats such as the 'Faidherbe'carried to Fashoda by the Marchandexpedition, which broke down intosections for porterage. For the Gordon

expedition 800 whaleboats werecommissioned, each built to carry 12men with rations for 100 days. With adraught of 2 feet and a pair of maststhey could negotiate the dangerouscateracts when guided by their crewof bluejackets, West African 'Kroomen'or even Canadian 'Voyageurs' (the bestof whom were Iroquois).

Civilian steamers might be amour-ed with sandbags, timber and boiler-plating. At Khartoum, Gordon's

defence depended largely on his smallflotilla of improvised gunboats, butpurpose-built vessels were often usedelsewhere. These varied f rom tinysteam launches, through the 'Tamai'class sternwheelers of 1885 (carrying a9 pdr and two machine guns, with aspeed over 11 knots), to the powerfulscrew-driven 'Melik' class cruisers,which carried searchlights, two 12 pdrquick-firing guns, a 4 inch howitzerand four Maxims.

Railways were the quickest and most Armies often tied their operationsreliable means of transport for men closely to the railways - eg Methuen'sand equipment. In 1879 there were few 1899 campaign to relieve Kimberley,lines in Africa, most of them close to or the Germans' precarious advancethe northern and southern coasts; but across the Namib desert. (They onlythe later conquests of imperialism had one narrow-gauge train per day,were more widely supported by an with 6 cars each carrying only 5 tons;extension of the rails. By 1890 the but without this tiny lifeline theyAlgerian system had grown from only would have been unable to conduct the300 miles to reach into Tunisia, and a campaign at all.) Where there was notrans-Sahara line was planned. The line, the military might seek to buildNiger-Senegal line was begun in the one - eg the abortive Suakin-Berber1880s and completed in 1904; mean- railway attempted in 1885, orwhite the Capetown-Kimberly fine was Kitchener's 'artery of iron' (the Sudanopened, and the Natal railway exten- Military Railway) in 1896. The latterded to Ladysmith. ran 230 miles between Wadi Haifa and

Abu Hamed. It was laid at the unus-ually rapid rate of 2-21 miles per day,thanks to the excellent planning of theCanadian engineer Lt Girouard and theskilled work of his highly-motivated'Railway battalion'. The Uganda rail-way, by contrast, took five years tocover 580 miles - delayed in part bythe regularity with which platelayerswere eaten by lions. Once a line wasin service, the trains could movebetween 200 and 400 miles in a dayprovided progress was not slowed bybreakdowns, trackwork oradministrative delays.

Reconnaissance and SignaisReconnaissance duties were the workof light, mobile forces operating as ascreen ahead, and on either side ofthe main force. The scouts could be:1 Regular troops, mounted on horseor camel - or on foot in close terrain.Regulars had the advantage of discip-line and standard procedures, butoften failed to recognise importantsigns of the enemy, and generally hadrelatively poor moblilty and fieldcraftskills.2 Locally-raised irregulars, such asthe excellent Basuto horsemen of theNatal Native Horse, or the NorthAfrican Goumiers. Accustomed tolocal conditions and fleet of foot,irregulars could bring in useful infor-mation. But their overall efficiencywas often impaired by indiscipline anda predilection for private raiding.3 Scouts, spies and guides hiredspecially for the job - not as soldiers.Selected by intelligence officers fortheir keen fieldcraft and knowledgeof the region, these scouts werepotentially the most effective of ailthe three categories of reconnaissancetroops. They were attuned to theBush Telegraph' - that network of

news and rumour which connectedAfrican communities - and could beastonishingly perceptive and useful toan intelligence officer who handledthem properly. However, regularofficers frequently failed to make useof these resourceful but 'unmilitary'agents.4 Balloons had first been used forobservation at Fleurus in 1793, andlater in the American Civil War; butthey encountered much resistance inEuropean armies. Major Templerpioneered a balloon made of goldbeat-ers' skin, and commanded a detach-ment at Suakin in 1885. Sadly for him,however, his efforts were neutralisedby high winds and thorny vegetation.Methuen's and Buller's armies tookcaptive balloons with them in 1899,following Warren's failure to use thismethod to study the topography ofthe Spion Kop arec, and at LadysmithCol. Rawlinson ascended to 1,600 feet,noting "I found it difficult to spot theguns as the balloon rocks about andkeeps revolving so much that onecannot keep one's glasses steady."

Inflating the bag was a slow pro-cess, so filled balloons would betowed along above a moving column.French soldiers serving in Moroccoreferred to it as 'the betrayer', sinceits appearance on the horizon wouldalert the enemy in plenty of time. By1911 the balloon had a rival in aerialreconnaisance duties: the Italians usedpowered aircraft in support of theirforces in Libya, as did Lyautey inMorocco from 1912.

Navigation in Africa demanded greatcare. During the night march to TelEl Kebir a naval officer with a com-pass led the advance. During a similarmoonlit operation at Magersfontein in1899 a misjudgment of distance tookthe Highland Brigade to within 400yards of Boer lines while still in closecolumn. At Colenso local guides ledHart's brigade into the loop of an un-fordable river - then ran away!Treachery on the part of guides wasalways a possibility, and hostageswere often taken to ensure honestdealing. Where possible a path ofadvance was carefully planned before-

Intelligence. In European armies, per-manent intelligence departments werea recent development, and the British,for example, scarcely possessed oneat ail: their mapping department had30 members compared to 230 in theFrench, and in 1899 its budget was6.6% that of the German. In Africaail the colonial powers relied onimprovised intelligence structures -some remarkably efficient, but ailignored and disdained by the 'fightingsoldiers'. The French and Italiansemphasised the administrative andpolitical roles of the IntelligenceOfficer. The men of the 'BureauxArabes' became minor kingmakers, bywheeling and dealing with local Caidsfor information and military assist-ance. In Morocco Major Simon becamea master of intrigue between compet-ing Berber chieftains; in Eritrea

hand, with staff officers drawingmaps and views of the terrain to becovered. One such officer was Lt.Jahleel Carey, who accompanied theFrench Prince Imperial's reconnaiss-ance of possible camping grounds inZululand in June 1879. Carey waslucky to escape unscathed from theambush which claimed the Prince'slife and caused a European politicalscandai.

By 1899 some photographic unitswere available to help terrain analysis,although they were used mainly toreproduce existing maps.

General Arimondi had established a spynetwork of informant villagers andselected Askari accompanying eachcolumn. This was a double-edgedgame, and on one occasion his escortdiscovered two informers hiding inreadiness to tell the Ethiopians of theGeneral's presence.

In the Mandist state there was acomplex and effective network ofinformers and travelling agents run bySir Reginald Wingate. He used a teamof Lebanese interpreters to processreams of information, which he com-pressed into his book 'Mandism in theEgyptian Sudan' (1891) - a brilliantwork and a propaganda coup. Wingatewas encouraged by his superior,Kitchener, who in turn had onceserved in a convincing Arab disguiseas a liason off icer between the bes-ieged Gordon and the authorities in

CairoAubrEof Afcolurrillas.riskecSamp:exactat amweredos urBenso

Sucwerein kradinnerunder:an abinot thetique

16

The heliograph, shown here being usedin 1879, replaced the heliostat - witha fixed mirror - which was adopted bythe British Army in 1875. It wascarried by all major, and many minorforces throughout our period. Use ofthe instrument reached its Peak ofefficiency during the Boer War, whenspeeds of up to 16 words per minutewere attained.

Battle in Africa

Signais had improved greatly duringthe nineteenth century:1 The electric telegraph linked Europewith its settlements in Africa. In 1862St Louis de Senegal was joined toDakar. In Gordon's time a fine ranLondon-Cairo-Khartoum to Rejjaf onthe upper Nile, and by 1914 it exten-ded to Mombasa. By 1870 the RoyalEngineers had a field telegraphsection, of which a detachment linkedSuakin to Tofrek for the 1885 camp-aign. The telegraph was slow to layand easy to cut.It could not be reliedupon when guerillas threatened rearsecurity - eg in the Boer and Herero)/Hottentot campaigns.2 The telephone was as yet barelyused in warfare. Johannesburg had anexchange in 1895, but the militaryvalue of the telephone (eg a link to aballoon observer) was hardly recog-nised. The same was true of radio,although the French had establishedwireless links with some of their out-lying forts in Morocco by 1914.3 The heliograph was essentially ahinged mirror on a tripod, which couldflash a coded message on a cloudlessday when there was intervisibility.The British 14.137" model had a rangeof 90 miles, the 7.087" model 48miles.4 Semaphore flags were easily carried,but could be seen over only a shortdistance, even in the best visibility.5 Oil burning lamps with focussinglenses could transmit signais a longway - up to 150 miles with oneFrench model - but suffered frommany of the same limitations as theheliograph. At Spion Kop the beleag-ured troops had a lamp... but no oilcould be found!

Runners and riders often carried des-patches, although they were slow bycomparison with heliograph or wire. A1914 manual gave despatch riders'speeds as 'Ordinary - 5mph; Rapid -7 to 8 mph; Urgent - 10 to 12 mph',and unmounted messengers may havebeen able to sustain only half of that.However, human messengers did haveadvantages of adaptability over theirfarter mechanical counterparts.Gordon used volunteers to carry des-patches out of besieged Khartoum(although nobody wanted to comeback with a reply!). One resourcefulArab irregular brought news to aFrench force by joining a charge ofMoroccan cavalry, then dropping hisrifle and leaping over the amazedFrench fine.

It was usual to send at least two

Cairo. In the Transvaal the work ofAubrey Woolls-Sampson and his ringof African agents made Benson'solumn the scourge of the Boer guer-llas. Fiercely loyal to his men, whoisked execution if captured, Woolls-mpson seemed able to predict

xactly where a commando would bet any time. Eventually the Boersere forced to unite several comman-s under Louis Botha to wipe outnson in October 1901.Successful intelligence officers

ere often renegades, more at homekraal or casbah than at regimental

nners. Their stock-in-trade was anderstanding of African culture andability to work with alien peoples,

t the finer points of Europeaniquette.

At Spion Kop Col. Thorneycroft didnot know that he was in commanduntil several hours after his appoint-ment: one runner was killed at hisfeet, while the other became involvedin leading a rush of reinforcements.Fie recieved the news only when asubaltern who had seen the heliograph

men separately to carry each message. yelled "You are a general".

March Security

Once deployed for battle, the Europeans could usuallydefeat their African opponents by superior organisationand firepower. On the march or in camp, however, thestory was different: African fieldcraft and local knowledgecould be used to achieve surprise, while darkness or natur -

al cover could be exploited to negate the technicaladvantages of the Imperial troops. Security on the marchand in camp was therefore a key issue for the Europeans.if the procedures failed, the vulnerability of a column oran encampment might easily lead to disaster.

Rear point Rear guardNCO and 3 scouts I 1 platoon from company H

All-round defence was a necessity forany marching force in Africa, in con-trast to normal practice in Europe.Four-sided formations (squares ofanything from company to brigadesize) were adopted, with scouts on ailsides. The French divided their col-umns into a 'fighting square' in front

and a 'convoy square' in support,rather than place ail the troops andtransport in a single large quadrangle.For open terrain Callwell advocated. asystem of double vedettes at 500-1,500 yards to combat the swiftmoving warriors of desert or grasslandareas. For close country he preferreda variant of the square, using parallelcolumns linked by front and rearscreens of skirmishers. Wolseley usedthis method against an Asante ambushat Amoaful in 1874.

1 squad, compony HNCO and 2 scouts

20 yards2nd wagon section50 wagons, 6 abreast

lst wagon section50 wagons, 6 abreast

Main bodyCompanies B-H(less detachments)and Maxim gun

50 yards

Convoy arrangements, South Africa C.1900A convoy of 100 wagons with an escortof 1 battalion of infantry with 1 troopof cavolry or mounted infantry and aMaxim gun - a fait-1y typical allowance.According to contemporary doctrine,more thon two squadrons of cavalrywould be needed to screen a columnof 4,000 yards length, but in practicethis was rarely possible.

An army on the march occupied agreat deal of space, whether it wasextended in column or arranged incamp. The following 1914 figuresoptimistically assume a column offours at the start of a march, and onenight camps on healthy, level ground.

Unit

Jungle or mountain tracks, demandingsingle file, would stretch the columnto four tirnes this length for infantryand make wheeled vehicles unusable.(Ail distances in yards, ail vehicleshorse drawn.):

Length of Column Camping Space

Infantry Brigade: 2,000 men + regimental c. 1,300 160 x 200trains (24 vehicles)

Cavalry Brigade: 1250 men + regimental c. 1,800 200 x 200trains (26 vehicles)

Horse-drawn Battery: 6 guns & limber c. 600 150 x 150teams, 10 other vehicles

Mountain Battery: 6 guns on pack mules c.440 75 x 100

Army Transport (per 10 vehicles) c. 375 110 x 110

Camdefecuiren

These measures were complex andtime-consuming. One officer who hadserved in the 1898 'Hut Tax War' inSierra Leone stated that if he had towrite an exam paper on forest camp-aigning he would discuss the use offlankers and advance guards but, sincethey would reduce progress to about amile a day in thick bush, he wouldnot use them. Instead, knowing thatthe only real danger would lie instumbling upon a concealed stockade,he would send ahead a group of'friendlies'. These would not fight, oreven report back, but would be found'squatting beside the track wearing anexpression of deep melancholy'. Thiswould indicate that a stockade layahead. Otherwise useless, their sensi-tivity to the 'bush telegraph' madethem invaluable.

did wounds,al officer -was difficuli

African conditions usually called forquinine

couicmany more animais and vehicles than

innovations 1

were needed in Europe - eg a British the carcel orbattalion needed four carts and Pive m

ight alsohe

wagons at home, but seventeen oxln avoiding n

wagons for Natal service in 1879. ~lean waterWhen a spanned ox-wagon took up 60

)Perations. Iryards of column, only thirty of them 4\agrat

(1896in single file would cover a mile. In 2001 , d rY atmany march, also, a column would vas 1=%, In'stretch' up to 25% - or much more

1.-874 expeditic

it fell into disorder. Likewise a permiin1Y six out oanent camp needed more acreage tha

tles amongsta one-day hait,if the force was to rounds - des !'stay healthy, gh speed. Th

ampaign (189;

Reserve

DA squatcan covA bottacan cov■

Support.remainder of A company

Pairs of vedettes

Infantry point, 4 men

Mounted point1 NCO, 4 scouts

El Mouing colsFrenchMoroccconvoylies forwas divattemptwere at .

the seccescortedthe 2ndMorra alhait of ELegionnawere attisome 5,01Arabs. Tipany's mccolumn inmen. VautLt Selcha ied square,his soldiercharge towith half (w

ounded, fsergeant roff anotheithe remnarat 5.30 theand the Mctheir bootywere killedofficers die

jefi 4fite Sickness cla

18

Battle in Africa

Camp security demanded a compact As a general rule latrines and cookingdefensive perimeter; but sanitary req- areas would be on opposite sides, withuirements demanded a more open plan. easy access to water and fuel. MenO Sentry squads OOReserve or 'Cossack ports ' 00

00Patrols g

000 0

DSupports

c.1,000 yards ElA squadron of cavalrycan cover 3,500 yardsA battalion of infantrycon cover 2,500 yards

c.aoo yards

0 40 yards pPickets c.400 \ rdscSentries or Vedettes

o

Oo

El Moungar.The Dangers to a march-ing column are illustrated by theFrench defeat at El Moungar, inMorocco, on 2nd September 1903. Aconvoy of 3,000 camels carrying supp-lies for the. fortified post at Taghitwas divided into three echelons, in anattempt to minimise the risk if theywere attacked. Captain Vauchez ledthe second echelon of 600 camelsescorted by his mounted company ofthe 2nd Legion Etrangère. It left E1Morra at 2am and reached the convoyhait of El Moungar at 9.30. As theLegionnaires began breakfast theywere attacked from a fine of dunes bysome 5,000 Berbers and ShaambaArabs. The camels and mounted com-pany's mules stampeded, splitting thecolumn into three isolated groups ofmen. Vauchez was mortally wounded;Lt Selchauhansen formed an improvis-ed square. Rifle fire was picking offhis soldiers, so he led them in acharge to clear the dunes, but fellwith half of his twenty men. Badlywounded, he directed the fire as asergeant rallied the square to beatoff another attack. For eight hoursthe remnant of the company held out;at 5.30 the third echelon was sightedand the Moroccans withdrew withtheir booty. Of 113 legionnaires, 34were killed and 47 wounded: both theofficers died the following day.

Sickness claimed more victims thandid wounds, and the job of the medic-al officer - the 'Linseed Lancer' -was difficult. New medicines likequinine could control malaria, andinnovations like the hospital ship orthe camel or donkey-borne littermight also help; but the key elementsin avoiding massive epidemics wereclean water and rapid completion ofoperations. In the Italian march toAdigrat (1896), with good water and acool, dry atmosphere, the sick ratewas 12%. In Asante, by contrast, the1874 expedition had a rate of 71% -only six out of more than forty fatal-ities amongst officers dying of theirwounds - despite careful planning andhigh speed. The French Madagascarcampaign(1895) had the most daunting

Tosses from sickness: out of 20,000men, 20 died in action and 5,735 of'other causes'.

Animais were even more at riskthan men. The British used 500,000horses in the Great Boer War, ofwhich two-thirds died, mostly fromsickness. A third of the 150,000 mulesalso succumbed. Lt Courtenay of the20th Hussars in Zululand wrote of thehorse sickness, " It is an extraordinarycomplaint; they begin to flag, andthere is a running at the nostrils, andwithin three hours of these sy m pto msa strong healthy horse is dead." Deadanimais were almost impossible todispose of adequately, and might inturn bring epidemics to an encampedforce.

would draw water upstream of theanimais. The perimeter fines might beguarded by trenches, thorn zarebas orwagon laagers. Beyond the camp fineswere outposts - as much as 5,000yards distant for a large camp threat-ened by artillery; or as littee as 1-200yards for a small force facing astealthy infantry opponent.

Outposts took up 10-30% of thetotal force in theory, although undercampaign conditions and with dif fer-ing terrain there were wide variations.

Night attacks were particularly fearedby the Europeans. During the ZuluWar a piquet of the 91st Foot firedon 'Zulus' in the morning mist andfound themselves in a fire-fight witha trench party of the 60th Rifles. InJune 1879 a similar panic, escalatingto battalion volleys and artillery fireagainst an imaginary foe, woundedfive men. The Tirailleurs Algérienswere notorious for shooting at anysound or movement. Such nervousnesswas well-founded, for a night or dawnattack could bring disaster. At Dogbain Dahomey (1892) a French campwas stormed at daybreak by 4,000 Fonwarriors - lion and elephant huntersassisted by Behanzin's famousAmazons. Snipers had taken positionin trees, and began a plunging fireinto the bivouac while the warriorsmounted charge after charge. TheLegionnaires regained the camp bybayonet assault, then held out forfour hours until a gunboat arrived todisperse the attackers. Less fortunatewas the British laager at IntombiDrift(1879), which was attacked andwiped out as the garrison awoke, soswift was the Zulu attack.

19

n:

The African ResponseAfrican choices, in face of a European invasion, includedthe following:1 To oppose the newcomers by military means.2 To ally with the Europeans against other African peoples.3 To submit to conquest now, making the best possible

terms, to avoid a worse fate later.4 To avoid the threat by flight.An African state might select one or more of theseoptions at different times or it might try to 'feel theopposition', by diplomatic means, while delaying thecrucial decision. If opinion was divided in council, or ifthe nature and strength of the new European arrivais was

unclear, prevarication appeared to be the best policy. TheTuareg regarded their treaties with the French purely aspauses in a continuing skirmish. Indeed, since theEuropeans had Little regard for African claims of sover-eignty, honest negotiation was of small value. The Ndebelemission to London in 1889, and Prempeh of Asante'sdelegation of 1896, received scant results for their efforts.The Italians brought Ras Makonnen to Rome less to talkabout treaty rights than to impress their might upon him.All this won time - but eventually the Africans would beforced to make a decision. Very often it was to fight.

Straal a:compoorinvoeachingTheymobient iZuludaysmov(locusandrecal

A Zu

Mobilising an army might demandlengthy negotiations. Samuel Mahererowrote letters to the chiefs of otherSW African peoples - the Ovambosand Hottentots - in order to unite oldenemies against the Germans. Samoriworked for an alliance with theTukolor against the French, whileMushidi of the Lunda joined with theChokwe, an old foe, to combat theCongo Free State (1905-12). If aneffective force could be put together,it then had to be held together - noeasy task.

The methods of bringing warriorsto a gathering point were various. InEthiopia the Negus ordered a procla-mation to be read in the marketplaces, giving time and place of

assembly, while the rolls were beatenon the Negarit (great war drums) toremind every man of his duty to serve.The Zulu system of military kraalsmeant that mobilisation involvedsimply a calling together of the regi-ments: in 1879 Cetshwayo summonedthe Impis to Ulundi for orders, thensent them to oppose Chelmsford'sadvance. Boer mobilisation wasuncomplicated: the men took theirstate-issue Mauser rifles with eightday's supplies, and rode to a localrendezvous chosen by their Field-Cornet. Ad hoc arrangements mightprovide trains to take them to thefront, or alternatively they mightdrive to war with their wives andchildren in great ox-wagons.

African military systems were asvaried as African peoples, but theymay be grouped into three maincategories:1 'Traditional - Formai': Rigid andestablished systems such as the feud-al kitet of Ethiopia, the permanentmilitia of Ijebu and other Yorubastates, or the age-group-set hierarch-ies of the southern Bantu. The bestknown of these is the Zulu regimentalstructure welded together into amilitary state by Shaka (d.1828), butother Nguni peoples spread the systeminto Central and East Africa.2 'Traditional - Informai': The milit-ary organisation of less centralisedpeoples relied on local or customaryprocedures. A Moroccan Harka wouldbe formed of a number of groupsowing loyalty to regional Caids; theBoer Commandos were independent,local forces. Commanding thesearmies made great demands on theirleaders.3 'Adapted Modern': Egypt and Mada-gascar had armies trained, drilled anddressed in the European manner.Samori and Ahmadu had trained, uni-formed infantry of good quality, whileMutesa of Buganda had added 1,000musket-armed nobles to his army by1872. The Amazons of Dahomey werecreated as a standing elite force; theBoers added drilled artillerymen totheir traditional Commandos.

Reiigiing AEuropviewewitchthe stpowerto unimassiBeninexerc.Europeffortconquas a1ions:gascamoveithe Mces o:focusSeverpromi

The size of armies varied greatly. In1902 the Ahaggar Tuareg lost 93 outof 300 warriors when they were def-eated by the French - a crushing blowto the tiny manpower of their north-ern confederation. By contrast theEthiopian army at Adowa numberedat least 100,000 men - the resuit ofeffective mobilisation of a denselypopulated region. The following surveygives an idea of army size:Nupe 1897 : 25-30,000Ijebu 1892 : 7-10,000Dahomey 1889 : 12,000 (including 4,000 regulars)Gungunhama's army at Coolela 1896 : 6-10,000Samori's army 1887 : 30-35,000 'Sofas' (infantry), 3,000 cavalryBoers at Magersfontein 1899 : 8,000Boers at Ladysmith 1899 : 12,000Hereros 1904 : 6-8,000Hottentots 1904 : 1,500

20

Battle in Africa

Strategy and supply. The organisation-al aspects of ça m paigning - supply,communication etc. - tended to bepoor in African armies. Zulu logisticsinvolved Udibi boys travelling witheach lmpi - 12 - 15 year olds carry-ing grain, water and sleeping mats.They helped the army to be light andmobile, but they did not always prev-ent it from starving: at Kambula theZulu force had not eaten for threedays. Equally the Ethiopian armymoved from valley to valley likelocusts, eating up local stores of foodand then moving on. Babikr Bedrirecalled serving with Nejumi's starv -

ing army in 1889, chewing on datestones and buying the meat of deadcamels at extortionate prices. Evenwhen times were good he lived onbeans, dates and unground millet.Other supplies than food also ranshort - eg some Boer Commandoswore captured British uniforms, des-pite the risk of being shot, whileothers wore animal skins.

Mobility and intelligence were thestrong points of African armies.Callwell said that they would usuallyknow in advance what the regularswere planning (the 'bush telegraph'was a remarkable instrument indeed!),

while strategic mobility was also high.Zulus could move fifty miles a day,crossing rivers by linking arms andrushing into the water.

Strategy was generally simple,relying on local knowledge and effec-tive information-gathering rather thanon complex manoeuvres. Some comm-andera - Menelik, Samori, Jan Smuts,Samuel Maherero - did use elaborateplans, but normally it was the testedpolicies of guerilla warfare, doggeddefence and rapid approach whichworked best. Finesse was hard to pulloff - but speed and surprise weresecond nature to African peoples.

A Zulu Impi assembles in open, rolling terrain.

Religion played a key role in prepar-ing African societies to face theEuropean threat. Traditional religionsviewed the invasions as a form ofwitchcraft, an unnatural imbalance inthe structure of the universe, and thepowers of religious leaders were usedto unite and support the warriors. Themassive human sacrifices made atBenin in 1897 was therefore less anexercise in wanton bloodshed - as theEuropeans saw it - than a desperateeffort to invoke divine help againstconquest. More often, religion servedas a force to overcome tribal divis-ions: the 'War Charm' cuits of Mada-gascar and the Congo, the Mwarimovement of the Shona prophets andthe Maji-Maji revoit were ail instan-ces of traditional beliefs serving as afocus for resistance to colonial rule.Several cuits - including Maji-Maji -promised that enemy bullets would

turn to water and that ancestorswould return. That this did not corneto pass should not blind us to thetremendous vitality and moralstrength which religious ideas contrib-uted to the Africans' resistance.Without the support of prophets theTanganyika peoples could not have setaside their differences, nor could theNdebele and Shona have co metogether.

Islam provided a focus for themilitary efforts of Moslem peoples.Without the charismatic appeal andreligious prestige of Bou Amana therewould have been no Algerian rising in1881 to unite the tribes. The conceptof the Jihad (Holy War) brought unitywhen employed effectively by, eg theSudanese Mandi (1881-5) and by Al-Sayyid, the 'Mad Mullah' of Somalia(1897-1920).

The Mandi

21

Closing with the EnemyClosing for battle was a time of high excitement andtension for both sides. Europeans would write letters homeand make arrangements with comrades in case of death incombat. Africans would undertake prescribed ritualsaccording to their religion, cleansing themselves beforefacing death. Scouts would bring reports; commanderswould analyse information and finalise plans; rumourswould run through the ranks. A good firet-hand account ofthe time immediately before battle was written by LtGraf von Arnim, commander of a patrol probing deep intoHereroland in the summer of 1904: "It gradually grew

lighter and we again sent out flank patrols. A magnificentvista opened before us... There was some evidence of theenemy in the midst of this peace of God in nature. Therewas smoke in the air... from the fires of the Hererosencamped along the base of the little Waterberg... ourposition was not very secure. If we had been discoveredand Samuel decided to cut off our retreat, we would havebeen in the soup... Everyone congratulated us on ourpatrol. We had been in the very midst of the Hererocamp."

Drawing a blank: Sometimes theinvading Europeans were unable tobring their enemy to battle. Theywould slowly work their way acrossthe landscape 'feeling' for the oppos-ition, and eating up their own stores,while the Africans made themselvesscarce. The expedition would returnto base tired and despondent. In harshenvironments the troops would suffer:thorn bushes and thirst could defeat acolumn as completely as an ambush,and at far less cost. In SW Africa,Morocco and the Sudan the Tosses fromheat exhaustion on the march wereserious. A contemporary history tellsus of a march, made by Graham'scommand several days after the bat-tle of Tamai, that accomplished noth-ing but proved more expensive (in theshort term) than the battle itself:"...between 300 and 400 men fell outof the ranks. There were numerouscases of sunstroke... the number ofmen who fell out was equal to one-fourth of the whole force, the rear ofwhich, it is said, resembled a routedarmy. Many of the sick found room inthe ambulances, and others trudgedalong as best they could on foot. Themen were becoming tired and disgust-ed... there was a good deal of grumb-ling and dissatisfaction in the ranks."This disgust at 'drawing a blank' coulddemoralise an army and raise seriousquestions at home. Von Trotha wasrecalled in 1905 after his attempts tobring the Hottentots to battle failedin a series of converging attacks thatmet no resistance, but wore out hisforces.

War correspondents, artists and, later,photographers were sent out by thenew popular press to bring the newsof Imperial campaigns home to Europ-ean firesides. Writers such asArchibald Forbes, G A Henty andBennet Burleigh gave readers the'purpie prose' they wanted, talesof clean-limbed heroes and savagefoes - often turning their despatchesinto entertaining books (of varyingfactual accuracy). The young WinstonChurchill supplemented his subaltern'spay with commissions from the press,and raised some eyebrows by hiscomments on Kitchener in 'The RiverWar' (1899). The doyen of the warcorrespondents was G W Steevens,'The High Priest of Imperialism', whodied of enteric fever during the siegeof Ladysmith.

The soldiers regarded correspond-ents with mixed feelings. Wolseleysaid they contributed nothing and atevaluable rations; yet he made surethat pressmen had every opportunityto see him in his element. When SirGarnet fell off his mount before TelEl Kebir, the artist Melton Priorhastened to assure him that he hadnot even seen the incident!

Prior accompanied Graham's forceat Tamai. In his book 'Campaigns ofa War Correspondent' he relates howin the late afternoon of 12th Marchhe asked Graham if it was wise tohave left so late as to be coming upto the enemy in the dark. Grahamreplied, "Oh dear, yes; that is allright; we are British troops."

22

Battle in Africa

GRAHAM'S FORCE AT TAMAIBuller's First BrigadeGordon Highlanders (712) Royal Irish Fusiliers (343) King'sRoyal Rifle Corps (565) Royal Engineers (62) 8 guns(camel-mounted 7 pounders)Davis' Second BrigadeBlack Watch (623) York & Lancasters (435) Royal Marines(478) Naval Brigade (6 machine guns) 4 guns (9 pounders)Stewart's Cavalry Brigade10th Hussars (251) 19th Hussars (362) Mounted Infantry (124)

Total: 3,955 excluding gunners, staff, train etc.

Mardi 9thMorning. Force disembarks at Suakin. Black Watchsent on to ' Baker ' s Zareba ' , 8 miles towards Tamai.Arrive 1300 after a difficult march with many casesof heatstroke.

March 10th & llthSupplies pushed on to Baker's Zareba from Suakin.At 18.00 March llth 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigadesleave Suakin for the Zareba, arrive 2400.

March 12th06.00 Sir Herbert Stewart arrives with the Cavalry Brigade.10.00 Scouts report enemy in strength 6 miles distant.

Graham orders a general advance after dinner.13.00 The force advances in two brigade squares in echelon

with scouts ahead and the main body of cavalry inreserve.

14.00 Scouts report the low hills some 6 miles ahead areclear of enemy. Graham decides to press on with allhaste.

15.30 Scouts reach the highest point of the hills and reportthat the Tamai valley is immediately ahead.

16.00 Infantry reach the base of the ridge, hait while scoutsadvance further, then continue.

17.00 Scouts report about 4,000 enemy advancing to attack.The force halts in the Tamai valley and starts buildinga Zareba from thorn bushes. Enemy fire a few rifleshots and appear in numbers 1,200 yards away. Theyretire when fired on by two 9 pounders and a Gardnergun.

18.00 Nightfall. The cavalry return to Baker's Zareba towater the horses. The rest of the force remains.

21.00 All lights extinguished.

March 13th00.45 Enemy starts a sporadic dropping fire, with ' excursions

and alarums to keep the regulars from sleeping. Thiscontinues all night: 1 man killed, 5 wounded.

06.00 At daybreak a 9 pounder and a Gardner are run outto disperse enemy concentrations at about 1,300 yards.Breakfast.

07.00 Stewart arrives with the cavalry.07.30 Stewart sends Mounted Infantry ahead to reconnoitre

enemy position.08.00 The entire force advances, with Graham accompanying

Davis' 2nd Brigade. General Buller follows 800 yardsto the right rear with his 1st Brigade, the cavalrydeployed behind Davis' square. Ahead a series of lowridges can be seen within a mile; a broken plateauslopes upwards to the high ground. Graham has beentold that the bulk of Osman Digna's forces will beconcealed in a deep khor - a dry watercourse - acrossthe front of the ridgeline. The morning is bright andclear, and very stili.

R E D S E A

The Battle of Tamai

08.20 The 2nd Brigade halts to dress its ranks because therocky terrain has disordered the square. This givesthe 1 st Brigade, which has started late, a chance toclose up to 700 yards distance. The Mounted Infantryare reinforced by two squadrons of cavalry and someEthiopian irregulars. The Scouts become hotly engag-ed, Captain Humphreys reports a ravine filled with'Dervishes ' .

08.30 The squares advance: the ravine is 900 yards ahead.Some 5-600 Sudanese can be seen clustered beyondthe riverbed. They open an irregular, inaccurate fire.

09.00 As the 2nd Brigade cornes within 200 yards of theKhor, the Mandists make a series of minor assaults.These are beaten off by rifle fire.

09.30 The thrust of the Mandist assault throws the York-09.40 and Lancasters bock onto the Royal Marines behind

them. Small knots of soldiers fight back-to back,with officers attempting to form a firing line. "Atthis dire crisis the dark and demon-like figures of thfoe could be seen rushing on, unchecked even for amoment by the hall of bullets " , wrote Burleigh of tu'Telegraph'. The broken square is pushed bock 6-800yards, but morale holds... barely.

Meanwhile a second wave of charging Africansthreatens to sweep over Buller ' s 1 st Brigade as itadvances towards the ravine. The Brigade halts, s,and cuts down the Mandists with deliberate volleys.As the attack falters, Buller calmly advances tosupport his comrades of the 2nd Brigade in theirmoment of crisis.

09.15 As the attacks die down, Graham orders the BlackWatch - comprising the left front half-face of thesquare - to charge. To their right the York andLancasters join in the rush forward. The sides of thesquare receive no order - it is like 'taking the lid offa box ' , as the front face pulls away from its supports.Reaching a point 30 yards from the ravine, the sold-iers open an excited, uncontrolled fire as Hadend-owah tribesmen appear from folds in the ground.

09.2.5 Several thousand Hadendowah converge in an all-outattack on the square, now wreathed in smoke and itsranks in disorder. The Gatling and Gardner guns arerushed to the front, but are unable to hait the charge.A Gardner jams and the crews are overwhelmed.

24

Battle in Africa

09.40 The remnants of the 2nd Brigade begin to rally, as-10.00 Buller's firepower decimates the Mandists thronging

around the stricken square. Stewart's troopers circleto the left, dismount, and bring carbine fire to bearagainst the right flank of the Hadendowah. Caughtbetween two fires, the enemy begins a slow fall-bock.

10.15 The 1 st Brigade continues to advance, pouring fireinto the massed Hadendowah and preventing a freshassault on Davis ' men, who reform and rest.

10.30 The 2nd Brigade replenishes its ammunition andadvances in line, recapturing the Gatlings and Gard-ners abandoned earlier.

11.00 The 2nd Brigade halts close to the ravine, facing theenemy on the far side. Graham orders the first Brig-ade to advance and drive the Hadendowah from theridgeline, some 800 yards ahead. Clumps of Mandistwarriors are dispersed by artillery fire.

11.20 Buller's attack pushes into the Khor and then up the-11.40 slopes. Disheartened, the enemy retires before him.

From the crest Osman Digna's camp is revealed inthe volley below: it is captured and burnt.

12.00 Squads of men seek out the British wounded. Others'deal with' injured Arabs. The 2nd Brigade drawsback to the Zareba while the cavalry pushes on toensure Chat the enemy is in full retreat. OsmanDigna, who had watched the action from the hilltop,has long disappeared. British losses are 91 killed, 110wounded and 19 missing - 70 of the dead fell duringthe breaking of Davis' square. Mandist losses areover 2,000 killed, from a force of 8-12,000 men. Ofthese 600 are counted on the site of the broken Brit-ish square. No prisoners are taken.

Having looked at the battle of Tamai through British eyes,it is interesting to look at Osman Digna's own despatch:"... an English army of, it is said, 20,000 men including6,000 horsemen arrived in the neighbourhood... the Ansarattacked them, and fought them the whole day until bothforces retreated; the English returned to Suakin with aloss of 8,000 men."

European Battle PlansSuccessful European battle plans, according to Callwell,were offensive - designed to 'impose battle' on the enemy.Plans would be simple, relying less on complex manoeuvresthan upon maximising firepower while avoiding Africanambushes or encirclements. Elaborate movements ortimings usually went wrong, allowed the enemy todisappear or - worse - attack the Europeans in detail. Itwas found to be preferable to rely on a few basicwell-tried tactics again and again:

1 Night March and Dawn Assault Irregular forces seldomkept proper camp security, and could be surprised byenemies whom - in daytime - had been perceived as slowand near-sighted.

2 Flank Attack Distracting the enemy's attention by a

feint in front, then bringing a force onto his wings orrear.

3 Provoking Attack against a prepared firing line, usingartillery harassment or small skirmish groups to irritatethe foe until he makes a frontal charge into a f ire trap.

Most European forces were fairly 'ad hoc' collections ofunits, lacking a habit of close co-operation with eachother. Great flexibility and initiative were demanded ofplatoon or company commanders who found themselves inpositions of local responsibility. Battlefield communic-ations were basic and improvised, often with limited staffsupport. As the period progressed, infantry lines becamethinner and more open - less prone to high casualties, butharder to control once the firing had started.

A Sudanese Battalion of 1898in a four-deep square.

Defensive Positions were favouredif the Europeans felt they were at adisadvantage, or if the enemy wasexpected to launch an impetuousattack.

Defences could be linear or all-around: a natural line of suitableterrain could be used, as at AmbaAlagi. Alternatively a site in openground might be chosen in order totake full advantage of European fire-power. The simplest defensive posture

The Square was an archaic formationin European warfare, but found a newlease of life in the colonial arena.Against an enemy who sought toenvelop flank and rear, and to chargewith cold steel, the tightly-packedsquare was ideal. Its chief disadvant-age was vulnerability to effectivegunf ire - but this was conspicuouslylacking to Zulus, Moroccans andMandists.

Formed 2-4 ranks deep, with gunsat the corners and baggage in thecentre, the square was almost invul-nerable for as long as morale anddiscipline held steady. It was alsomobile, after a fashion. By advancingslowly ( perhaps 25 yards per minuteover good terrain), the square couldforce the foe to attack or fall back.Problems arose when gaps appeared in

was to form up infantry and guns inline or square and await attack but,if time allowed, additional strengthmight be added by such things astrenches, breastworks and rifle pits,barricades of stores, sand- or mealie-bags, abatis, chevaux-de-frises, athorn bush Zariba... or even kneelingcamels. In Southern Africa the Boersformed their laagers from wagonsarranged in square - and often duginto the earth.

the ranks - especially at the corners -and tare had to be taken to ensurethat all parts of the square moved atthesame speed. Often two mutually-supporting squares were employed:smaller squares were easier tocontrol and if - as at Tamai - thingswent wrong, all was not totally lost.

Once the Africans attacked, asquare would appear to be engulfed inassailants. At Bida (1897) 507 Hausaconstables with six Maxims and sevenguns fought two actions against theEmir of Nupe's 30,000 men, losing oneoff icer and seven men for perhaps athousand Fulani. In contrast, at ElTéb, (1884) an Egyptian force of 3,500men fell into complete confusion, andwas almost annihilated when attack dby a Mandist force only a quarter ofits strength.

Such works protected the troopsfrom lire but also, more importantly,helped break the impetus of anAfrican charge. At Rorke's Drift acompany of the 24th Foot was able tohold off some 3-4,000 Zulus, thanks totheir improvised fortification of themission buildings and compound. Inthe final recourse, a mealie-bagredoubt served as an effective'citadel' to repel the assault.

26

Battle in Africa

Mounted Patrols to scout the ground,and to trigger enemy attacks onto themain body of the force by 'goading'them into action - eg Ulundi 1879.

Frontal Assault is easy to co-ordinateand exerts impressive 'moral force' ifsuccessful; but likely to involve heavyfosses, and can involve forces beingrepulsed or pinned clown in front ofthe enemy - eg Modder River,Magersfontein 1899.

Skirmishers to screen flanks and front- often a problem if the enemy forcesthem back, because they thenobstruct the main body's field of fire-eg Abu Klea 1885.

Main Body of the force in fine,column or square formation.Movement rates per minute approx.-Square: 25 yardsLine: 50 yardsColumn: 75 yards(All slower in broken ground)

The Frontage of Infantry Units By 1914 the men formed insingle rank, with one yard per man. Before about 1900Gloser formations had been employed - two to four rankswith 24 - 30 inches per man. These figures are for 1914:

Posture Brigade(3 regiments)

Attacking alone 2,000 ydsPart of general attack 1,200Defending alone 1,600-4,500Part of general defence 1,600-4,500According to this deployment a company offrontage of - 100 yards

Flank and Rear Attacks requirediscipline and organisation to getright - but they can bring victory withlittle cost. Often tied in with frontaldemonstrations to engage the enemy'sattention: when he begins to retreat,he can be caught with his back to themain attack, or facing two attacks atonce.

Regiment(3 battalions)1,000 yds

500600800

100 men has

In 2 ranks at 30" per man - 42 yardsIn 4 ranks at 30" per man - 21 yards

Mounted Men kept available forpatrols and pursuits more often thanfor the charge. Increasingly reliant ondismounted firepower.

Reserves are held 100-1,000 yards inrear, to cover threats, bolster flagg-ing units or fight rearguard actions.

African Battle PlansAfrican warfare had for centuries been based on limitedprinciples - either raiding (for slaves or livestock), orformalised, consciously 'ceremonial' battles. ln 1883, forexample, a British traveller, Joseph Thompson, observedtwo Maasai armies, each some 3,000 strong, confrontingeach other to decide which of them should carry off theirenemy's cattle. The outcome was determined not by ageneral clash of the two forces, but by a duel between

selected detach m ents. There was thus an avoidance of'real' warfare - for conquest and intimidation - since thatwould have been a far rougher game, which societies withlimited manpower would not lightly have wished to play.Instead, African armies preferred to gain victory at thesmallest cost, using the heroism of the 'mock battle'joined with the stealth and speed of the successful raid.

Tiinl18wrchfeiselmecri

Real Battles, as opposed to 'mockbattles', were sornetimes undertaken.In this case envelopment was a usualobject, the army advancing in a Swifthalf-moon to assail the enemy'sflanks and rear. Sudden attacks fromnatural cover might surprise and con-fuse an enemy, or the imposing spec-tacle of ceremonial warfare might beharnessed to give psychological super-iority. In 1890 Cari Weise observed ofMpezeni's Ngoni army "... they try tointimidate the enemy by striking theirshields, by the noises of bells attach-ed to their skin clothing, and bystrident shouts." This 'moral imperat-ive' was usually linked to aggressiveoffensives - the rnassed charge ofFulani or Mandist host was intendedto break the will of its larget beforecrashing into the demoralised foe. Bycombining impetuous resolution andsudden appearances, these tacticswere ideally suitcd to brave butlargely undisciplined warrior bands.They utilised the natural skills of theAfrican fighting man - stealth, cour-age and mobility - to overcome thefoe and crush him before he had timeto react. Then the re m nants could be

pursued and cut down, and their live-stock and wives plundered.

Control by chiefs was largelyunnecessary, which was fortunatesince it was almost impossible toapply once action had been joined.Their role lay more in deciding theinitial direction and timing of theoffensive. They rarely used defensivemethods in open battle: if they didchoose to stand their ground they,undwould usually employ fortifications toincrease their chances - bush Zarebasor Bomas, timber stockades or earth-works. In open battle, defensivetactics depended rather on fiercecounter-attacks, as the enemy'assault lost cohesion - eg Shaka'sdefence at Gqokli Hill, 1818 - or onthe use of chosen ground for conceal-ment, as we have seen at Tamai.

Effective firearms modified thesetraditional tactics sornewhat, bymaking assaults more difficult andmore costly. Some African leaders,such as the Fulani Emirs, provedhidebound when confronted by thisdevelopment. Others adapted success-fully to new conditions and gave theEuropean invader serious problems.

Lt.wrop(forsibtheraifleTuablo

Zulu warfare, based on the regiment-al system, represented the highestpoint of traditional African methodsof fighting. Under Shaka the virtuesof drill and organisation had beenadded to those of courage and speed.The envelopment tactics used byother Bantu peoples were refined byplacing agile young regiments in the'horns' of an impi, veteran warriorsin the 'chest', and by adding a reservein the rear - the 'loins'. The reservewould hold back from the action,sometimes even sitting with its backto the enemy, until called in for a

Loins

decisive stroke. Every man knew hisplace precisely, and the resultingdisciplined assault proved unstoppableby traditional enemies.

Zulu weapons were the fearsomebroad-bladed stabbing spear, the"Ikiwa" and the Knobkerrie. By the1870s thousands of Zulus had aquiredfirearrns, often as payment for work-ing for Europeans or - after the vic-tory at Isandhlwana - as battle booty.Command was in the hands of Indunas- experienced warriors who scoutedthe ground carefully before combatand directed the course of the action

EChest cc

from a chosen vantage point. In 1879Cetshwayo's army had some 55,000men in 33 regiments, of which some40,000 were available to fight. Otherpeoples also adopted Zulu methods -eg the Ndebele had perhaps 20,000warriors in 1893, composed of theZansi (descendents of Mzilikazi's Zuluemigrants), the Enhla ('those fromalong the way') and the Holi (absorbedShona tribesmen). The Ngoni incurs-ions also brought Zulu methods intoEast and central Africa, where theHehe and others adopted them.

Boerthe ifirepIn thdos 1Zulwstingmen,The ithe cposit.ren rmoreish tlemphegictendeconcehiddeBoersMagela Rebasebomb

28

Battle in Africa

Tuareg warfare epitomised the fight-ing style of all the desert nomads. In1860 a Frenchman, Henri Duveyrierwrote that "To see a Tuareg warcharge is to feel complete and utterfear creep through one's body. Greatserried squadrons of tall, blue-veiledmen, mounted on fast white camelscrashing forward like a vast roller."

In 1896 a French military explorer,Lt. Hourst, visited the Tuareg andwrote of their raiding. In these secretoperations less than 100 men, chosenfor their skills, might go "glidingsilently between the encampments ofthe enemy..." If the subjects of theraid were alerted, their men wouldflee but the women remain: "NoTuareg would stain his hands with theblood of a defenceless woman."

Hourst echoed Duveyrier in hisaccount, of a battle. Tradition was thekey, with strict forms of ritual. Itwas "like a set of quadrilles... a med-ieval tournament". So traditional wasTuareg battle that at Izewan (1898)the Kel Dennik warriors demandedthat the Kel Ahaggar - NorthernTuareg from Algeria - lay down theirguns and fight with sword and spear(sensibly the Ahaggar refused). Battlebegan with hurled insults, and thethrowing of spears, and a rush "stabb-ing at each other with their daggers,or trying to crack each other's skullswith their stone amulets..." Personalcombat between chiefs was common.Hourst felt that fighting on foot wasmore usual than mounted, but thismay have been because the 'lower

orders' - the negro Bouzous and theBlacksmith class - had no horses.Tuareg nobles preferred to ride, usinghorses on the southern savannahs,camels in the desert.

Ambushes and night attacks. Theelement of surprise was a vital ingr-edient in African warfare. It wasdoubly valuable in resisting the Euro-peans, since fieldcraft, mobility andlocal knowledge were their weakestsuit. And if the white men could becaught unawares, his frightening tech-nical strength and organisationalresilience might be overcome. Nightapproaches were one way to attackthe Europeans. At Intombi Drift in1879 a Zulu impi took advantage ofearly morning mist to come within 50yards of Captain Moriarty's laager.They fired a volley, threw down theirguns and rushed. "So quickly did theycome", wrote an officer,"there wasreally no defence on the part of ourmen... in a very few minutes all wasover, our men simply slaughtered". AtMenhaba (April 1908) 5,000 Moroccansattacked two Foreign Legion compan-ies in camp under cover of darkness.A series of bayonet charges finallycleared the bivouac, but only after120 legionnaires had fallen. TheMoroccans made off with rifles,mules and stores.

In daylight hours the Africansturned to the use of natural cover. AtDul Madoba in 1913 Yusuf's Somaliswere able to use thorn brush -which cut visibility to 100-400 yards- to approach and defeat CaptainCorfield's Gamet Constabulary. AtShaykan (1883) Wad-el-Nejumi hidJehadia riflemen in the treetops tofire against Hicks Pasha's squares. InMarck 1905 an impetuous Germanofficer, Major Glasenapp, led 56officers and men straight into aHerero ambush at Owikokorero: ent-ering a clearing, the Germans werecaught in column by heavy fire. In 30minutes 26 men were killed beforeGlasenapp was able to retreat.

29

Boer Shelter-trench.The Boers made extensive useof fieldworks which voriedin type from the elaboratestyle shown here, to shallowscrapes in the ground.

Boer tactics traditionally relied uponthe mobility of their ponies and thefirepower of their expert marksmen.In the 1830s and '40s Boer cornman-dos had defeated the Ndebele andZulus by provoking their warriors, bystinging attacks with mounted rifle-men, into assaulting a wagon-laager.The Afrikaners could then shoot downthe charging enemy from a secureposition, while their wives and child-ren reloaded the weapons. Against themore sophisticated and cautious Brit-ish the advantage of mobility wasemphasised still further, at a strat-egic level. Battle plans, however,tended to be defensive, relying onconcealed single guns and carefullyhidden trenches. At Modder River theBoers lined the river bank, while atMagersfontein the innovative Koos dela Rey chose to dig trenches at thebase of a line of hills. Lord Methuenbombarded the hilltops, and hit

nobody.Defensive methods suited the ind-

ependent Afrikaner citizen-soldiersvery well. Without the organisationneeded to handle complex manoeuvresand with an inordinate fear of flankor rear attacks, the major Boerarmies of 1899 were at their best instatic sharpshooting. More cohesivesmall units, however, had a greaterrange of choices. Select bands likethe volunteers who stormed MajubaHill, the "Zarps" of the Johannesburgpolice, or the fierce 'Bitter Ender'Commandos of 1900-2, could assaultBritish positions in rushes covered bytheir comrades. The guerillas alsorevised the cavalry charge, by gallop-ing at the enemy in an open orderline, firing rapidly from the saddleand enveloping the flanks. Highmorale and tight unit control werethe essence of this late-war raiding.

African LeadershipLeadership was an essential factor in African resistance tothe European invader. In societies where there were fewestablished structures of power, or where authority wasi mbued with religious significance, a dynamic leader wasnecessary to focus the éfforts of the people. Whereleadership was aggressive and charismatic, the colonialadvance could be slowed and even beaten back. Whereweak or unpopular leaders were in charge, resistance waslikely to be disorganised or disputed. The military powerof the Zulus and Ndebele was hardly reflected in theirindecisive leadership, and the Fulani states proved verybrittle in face of the British approach. By contrast a

determined leader could oppose the colonial advance to adegree far beyond his apparent military strength. LatDior, the Damel of Cayor in Senegal, was able to resistthe French for no less than five years before he was killedin 1886.

Successful African leaders tended to be flexible in theirstrategies, modernisers of their weaponry and methods,and - most important of ail - survivors. A dogged andsubtle leader could often prolong his campaign for years,whereas the sudden demise of a leader was usually asignal to his army to disperse as a routed rabble.

Dynamism was the crucial element inAfrican leadership - the key ingredi-ent that made ail the differencebetween a sustained resistance andearly collapse. In Senegal Lat Diorexpressed this in no uncertain terms:'as long as I live, be well assured, Ishall oppose with ail my might theconstruction of this railway... evenwere I to go to rest, my horse'Malay' would give you the sameanswer'.

Personal energy could express itselfin overtly 'heroic' leadership. such asthe chivalrous Wad El Nejumi leadinghis men to victory at Shaykan (1883)and Khartoum (1885), and then todestruction at Toski (1889). Others,like Samori and Rabeh of Sennar,built empires by the force of arms.Most characteristic of Africa at thisperiod were those who simply surviv-ed, against great odds, to fight again.Hendrik Witbooi (1838-1905) led asmall Hottentot band into theKalahari in 1904-5 to renew a guerr-illa war against the Germans that hadended ten years earlier. Mkwawa,victor of Lugalo in 1891, held out

until 1898, living as a fugitive forfour years until he shot himselfrather than be taken. It was the res-olution of the professional survivorsBou Amana in Algeria, Osman Dignain the Sudan, De Wet and Smuts inSouth Africa - which did most toensure the European conquest wassuch a long drawn-out affair.

Lou

Mandist Emirs in discussionbefore Omdurman.

Case Study 1 - Decision MakingThe Khalifa Before Omdurman, September 1898

In theory the Khalifa Abdullahi was a divinely inspiredautocrat, appointed by the Mandi of God. In practice hisdecisions were reached by consultation with groups ofwarrior emirs and other leading men. Councils were held

OPTION1 Abandon Omdurman, ret-ire to the Kordofan desertsto wage guerilla warfare.

2 Use the city of Omdurmanas a defensive position.

3 Make a night attack onKitchener's position.

4 Make a daylight attack onKitchener's position.

Ibrahim Al Khalil, a leading warrior, had argued for anight attack, but had been opposed by the Khalifa's sonand heir, Sheik Al Din. Finally the Khalifa followed hisson's proposai of a daylight battle for the political reason

on August 31st and in the afternoon and evening of Sept-ember lst, to determine a policy in the face of Kitchen-er's army. The Khalifa's lieutenants argued the pros andcons of each option in turn:

DISADVANTAGES RESULTMeans abandoning the tapit- Not chosen - the proposeral - and the Mandi's sacred thrown into jail!tomb.

Negate's army's offensive Not chosen, partly becausespirit; endangers civilians. of recent enemy shelling.

Loss of control, and of Not chosen.firepower.

Allows enemy firepower its Chosen - with disastrousfull effect. consequences.

that it offered the best confirmation of the Mandi'svision, and hence of himself and his heir as true success-ors of the Mandi.

ADVANTAGESUses techniques successfulin 1881-5; stretches enemysupply lines.

Uses protection of fortific-ations.

Negates Kitchener's massivef irepower.

Maximises Mandist rifle fireand evokes the Mandi'svision of a victory outsideOmdurman.

CaseBoerJanuaThe Bpositi■of 23rBotha,the 241 To lTugelE2 To v3Toc4 To a5 Wire

In thattackbe pie(initiatithe hilsignific

30

Battle in Africa

The Origins of successful Africanleaders were frequently similar. Mostbegan life as sons of moderate-to-important local families; receivedbetter than usual educations, andshowed 'promise' during their youth.El Raisuni (c 1870-1925) was aKoranic scholar and lawyer whobecame a major bandit Caid in theRif mountains of Morocco. Usingeducation, cunning and the prestige ofdescent f rom an important Moroccansaint, Raisuni's career encompassed

jails and palaces in a chequered paththat for one brief moment even madehim Caid of Tangiers. Menelik of Shoawas a significant regional ruler in the1870s, before accepting Italian cashand arms to act as a counterweight tothe Emperor Yohannis. He was thusable to extend his personal power tothe lowlands south of Shoa, and forceYohannis to recognise him as success-or. On his succession in 1889 heturned on the Italians, lured theirallies into his camp and massively

defeated them (1895-6), unitingEthiopia under his rule.

African leaders born to positions ofgreat authority often had to fight fortheir inheritance. Cetshwayo defeateda rival to the Zulu throne in 1856,while Lobengula had to crush dissentbefore he could succeed Mzilikazi atthe head of the Ndebele. Thus Africanleaders were often the best qualifiedof their peer groups to attain posit-ions of power.

Louis Botha encourages his men under fire at Spion Kop The Death of a Leader was likely tomean the dissolution of his army.Yohannis of Ethiopia was killed at themoment of victory at Gallabat (1889),and his forces collapsed into a rabble.Mamadou Lamine survived a shellthat blew up his HQ as his warriorsstormed the city of Bakel (1886) - buthe was unable to hait the resultingrout. The personal charisma that heldmany African armies together was apoor substitute for the more lastingregular discipline and organisationthat they lacked.

Case Study 2 - Command in ActionBoer Leadership at Spion Kop,January 1899The British seizure of the key Tugelaposition of Spion Kop during the nightof 23rd January was reported to LouisBotha, the Boer leader, at 5 am onthe 24th. His options were:1 To hold what remained of theTugela fine position.2 To withdraw from the Tugela.3 To counter-attack immediately.4 To organise a counter-attack later.5 Wire to Pretoria for new orders.

In the event he chose to counter-attack immediately, even if it wouldbe piecemeal, gambling that a boldinitiative could repulse the British onthe hill before they could dig in or besignificantly reinforced.

The Sequence of Events:5 am to Noon -- Botha calls commandants DanielOpperman (Pretoria Commando) andHendrik Prinsloo (Carolina Comm-ando) to tell them to lead an assaulton the kop.- Botha sends messages to artillerycommanders to fire on the summit ofthe kop.- He rides from laager to laager,re-assuring the men and selecting some1,000 (out of 4,000) to attack theinvader.- He informs co-commander SchalkBurger that ail is under control.- He informs Pretoria of events, bytelegram.Noon to Midnight -- Botha monitors the progress of the

battle - a protracted bloodbath withheavy losses.- He encourages the men to continue,when morale threatens to breakdown, but Burger retires at 5 pm andOpperman at 10 pm. Battle dies out.- Botha watches for other Britishmoues against the now dangerously-spread Boer fine.Midnight to dawn- Botha rallies his men by riding fromlaager to laager ail night. Partialsuccess.- 3 am Receives report that Britishare retreating from the summit.- Boers advance to the summit andfind it abandoned.- Daylight c 4.30 am: British retreatis confirmed. Victory seized from thejaws of defeat!

31

The New TechnologyFrom the middle of the nineteenth century, the ratetechnological progress accelerated sharply. In the fieldweaponry these advances meant that to be a few yearsbehind the times was to be at a considerable disadvantage

- but it also meant that conservative military establish-ments often failed to exploit fully the most recentdevelopments.

ofof

` The Breech-loading rifle was standardequipment for European troops by1879. These were advanced 'secondgeneration' weapons developed fromthe converted muzzle-loaders of theprevious decade. They were capableof rapid f ire at ranges far beyondthose previously known - eg the Brit-ish Martini-Henry M1871 was sightedto 1,450 yards and could fire a heavybullet every five seconds, whileeven its carbine variant was sightedto 1,180 yards. Comparable weaponswere used by the continental armies -the German M1871 Mauser, theFrench Le Gras of 1874 and theItalian M1870 Vetterli. Older weaponswere sold or passed on; Egypt equipp-ed its infantry with American Remin-gton rolling block rifles, while theIndian army received British Snidersas the Redcoats took up the Martini.

In tests the new rifles proved enor-mously accurate - and in the righthands they could be in combat, too. In

1895 a Scots trader, Andrew Dick,and two French companions shot andkilled 100 Maasai warriors before theywere overwhelmed. In general terms,however, the new weapons were farless effective in the field than theirmakers had hoped. There were sometechnical problems - eg the Martinikicked like a mule, fouled easily, andsuffered from spent cartridges jamm-ing in the breech when, in the heat ofbattle their brass Boxer casingsexpanded too much. More importantly,the troops were woefully ill-trained todeal with sophisticated weaponry. AtGingindhlovu the scout John Dunnobserved that when the Zulus camewithin 300 yards the British regulars"still had the long-range sights up",and that they were "firing wildly inany direction". Moreover the smokeof the black powder weapons meantthat a thick fog quickly enveloped thefiring line. Officers preferred volleyfire to the - theoretically more

accurate - 'Independent Fire' simplybecause volleys gave the smoke achance to lift. Volleys also allowed amuch greater degree of fire discipline.In the excitement of battle soldierswould begin to fire uncontrollably,which with the rapid fire of modernweapons meant that a unit could quiteeasily expend all its ammunitionbefore order could be restored. AtOmdurman, in Macdonald's Sudanesebrigade, the officers resorted to issu-ing cartridges three at a time, topreserve ammunition, but still couldnot control their soldiers. Thus it wasfar more sensible to hold fire untilthe enemy was 7-900 yards away,then maintain steady, slow volleys,than to explore the long range limitsof the weapon. Although CountGleichen records cases when pickedmarksmen hit their man at 1,800yards, most regulars could not expectto hit a target beyond 450 yards.

Gatling gun manned bysailors at Alexandria 1882.

The magazine rifle. In 1884 theGermans converted their Mauserbreech-loader to an eight-cartridgemagazine. Other nations followed: theFrench Lebel was introduced in 1886,the Italian Vetterli was converted toa four-round repeater in 1887 and theBritish Lee-Metford, with an eight-round magazine was authorised in1888 (Increased to 10 rounds in 1892.)These new rifles were small-boreweapons, .315" for the Lebel, .303"for the Lee Metford, which meantlighter, easier-to-carry ammunition.They could f ire up to 3,000 yards (the1898 Mauser was sighted to 2,200yards), and could maintain even fasterrates of fire. However the realadvance, for military purposes, wasthe appearance of the smokelesspropellant Cordite in 1892. Firinglines were no longer wreathed in thickwhite smoke and, while no officerwould ever consider allowing his mento fire 20-30 rounds per minute (10-12was the fastest at which disciplinecould be maintained), the Magazinecertainly allowed greater flexibility,especially in the attack. The surprisefor many was the discovery thatsmokeless ammunition kept a conceal-ed adversary hidden - a fact that wasperceived by the Boers and otherirregulars before it was by theirregular foes.

The machine gun in 1879 was nolonger either an amusing novelty or,as it had been in the Franco-PrussianWar, a 'secret weapon'. The Gatlingcompany made a variety of hand-operated guns available on field carri-ages, naval mountings and even - as apromotional stunt - mounted on acamel saddle. British naval Gatlingshad ten barrels and could fire, intheory, 600 rounds per minute, butwere so seriously prone to jammingthat the actual rate was nearer 280.In 1874 a Gardner model was introd-used which fired 120 rounds perminute per barrel (guns were madewith one, two or five barrels). Later aNordenfeldt gun appeared whichexceeded the Gatling's rate of fireand was free from its technical prob-lems. But the real advance came withthe Maxim - a water-cooled gunoperated by its own recoil. Vastly

more reliable than previous models,the Maxim had comparable range(1,000 yards) but twice the rate offire: 1,100-1,200 rounds per minute. Itwas adopted by the British army in1891 and soon became the key enforc-er of British rule in many parts ofAfrica. Weighing only 6o pounds, itwas therefore sufficiently portable tooverawe even the most inaccessibleand intransigent headmen. In 1887 anexhibition of its fire left the Yonni ofSierra Leone 'deeply impressed'.

32

Battle in Africa

A British artillery battery at regulationintervals. 20 yards was allowed betweenguns. Where incoming artillery fire wasexpected on the battery position, theammunition wagons would be further inthe rear, or in cover.

Ammunition Crew Horseswagons Limbers

Guns

$01 1 Ji h

Artillery used in Africa ranged fromlight, portable mountain guns to enor-mous naval pieces capable of sending501b shells several miles. During theperiod 1879-1914 the development ofordnance saw major improvements,such as reliable breech loading,smokeless powder, new and powerfulexplosives - the French Melinite andthe British Lyddite. There were alsoquick-firing (QF) guns like the FrenchM1897 75mm cannon, which could lire20-30 rounds per minute. The 37mmPom Pom - a tiny QF gun - fired alib shell every two seconds. A surveyof the 1899 British Rifled BreechLoading (RBL) equipment which re-placed the Rifled Muzzle Loaders(RML) of the 1880s gives us someranges:12pdr RBL - 3,800 yards with shrapnel15pdr RBL - 4,100 yards with shrapnel(Both the above ranges were increasedby 1,800 yards when better fuses wereintroduced around 1900.)4.7" QF naval gun - 10,000 yards with HE or shrapnel5" howitzer (501b Lyddite shell) - 4,800 yards

It was the small 'mountain' gun thatproved most useful in Africa. The1877 2.5" RML weighed 400lbs, brokedown into five loads for mules, cam-els or a train of porters - and couldfire shrapnel 3,300 yards, or commonshell 4,000 (with case shot as a close-range standby). Incredibly versatile,this 7 pdr piece proved invaluable inbush warfare until the Boer Wardemonstrated that short range, blackpowder weapons were outmoded. In1903 a 10 pdr RBL model with arange of 6,000 yards was introduced.At the same period the recoil mechan-isms pioneered by Creusot and Kruppsbecame standardised, and protectiveshields were added to field guns.

The British made some use ofWilliam Hale's rockets - steel tubesof explosive fired from a 'trough'.They had a range of more than a milebut were erratic in flight. Some weresuccessful in frightening Fode Silla'smen in the Gambia (1894), but theiruse was not widespread.

The Africans get firearms. Before thearrivai of Europeans, African weaponshad consisted of spears - from lightjavelins to huge, leaf-blades - bows,axes, clubs, knives and swords. Fire-arms, traded for slaves, made somepeople very powerful. Yet althoughcertain chiefs could field thousands ofgunmen - one Nyamwezi headman had20,000 in 1883 - most were archaic.Inlaid Berber muskets and WestAfrican 'Dane guns' were joined by avast influx of old European muskets,especially the Tower 'Brown Bess'.Realising that these weapons couldnot compare with modern rifles, sev-eral African leaders sought out cont-acts who could give them somethingbetter. Menelik acquired 25,000 riflesbetween 1882 and 1887, and manymore from Russian and French agentsin the 1890s: before Adowa he hadover 80,000 modern rifles - Martini,Gras, Lebel and Remington models -some of them supplied by the Italiansthemselves. In West Africa SamoriToure developed his armed strengthby careful study of new weapons.From 1876 to 1885 he used FrenchChassepots, then replaced them withGras rifles and the Kropatschek rep-eater - his blacksmiths could makeexcellent replicas of these. From 1888he began to acquire magazine rifles,and had 6,000 by 1893. He even man-aged to infiltrate spies into Frenchmunitions factories in Senegal, tolearn new methods of manufacture.

In 1890 the European powersagreed to stop selling modern arms toAfricans. This was only partiallysuccessful, but did at least ensure

The Remington Rolling-block rifle, shownabove, and in detail with the breech open,fell into the hands of the Mandists inlarge numbers after the defeat of Hicks '

column in 1883.

that heavy weapons stayed out ofAfrican hands. Samori could neveracquire artillery, while the Mandists,who had a good deal of capturedEgyptian equipment, lacked ammunit-ion and skilled gunners. Only theBoers - who were as much Europeanas they were African - were able tobuy whatever they chose. The Trans-vaal government purchased some 70artillery pieces: 75mm and 155mmCreusots from France, 120mm KruppHowitzers from Germany, and 37mmVickers-Maxim QF guns - the famousPom Poms - from their soon-to-beadversaries in England.

33

The Power of FireThe cutting edge of European attacks, and the salvation ofEuropean defensive lines, could often be found in Europeanfirepower. Using 'the new technology', a small body oftroops now at last had an excellent chance of defeatingvery greatly superior numbers of enemy at ranges up to

1,000 yards. If the Europeans could mass their firesufficiently at the key point - and maintain adequatesupplies of ammunition - they could usually manage tohold their ground while inflicting very heavy casualties.

In an attempt to avoid the unpleasant recoil oftheir newly-won Martini-Henrys, many Zuluriflemen are said to have held them at ormslength.

The African Use of Firearms varied.Moroccan horsemen had been usingmatchlock and flintlock muskets -often beautifully crafted weapons -for three centuries in an impressivebut largely ineffective style. Riderswould approach the enemy, hait, firea shot, then retire to reload in best16th century manner - a tactic muchappreciated by their opponents armedwith breechloaders. For rnost Africansfirearms were a recent innovation,useful in slave-raiding or elephanthunting, but causing few changes intraditional tactics. The Zulus usedrifles largely to cover the attack oftheir impis, but were completelyunable to contest the British firesuperiority (eg at Kambula, when theyhad captured modern weapons butfound them strange and mysteriousitems). Ndebele warriors believed thatby pushing the sights as far forwardas possible they would make thebullet strike home harder. Mandistsoften shortened the barrels of theirRernington rifles to make them easierto carry. There was no real appreci-ation of the Europeans' overwhelrning

superiority in training, and at Omdur-man the Mandists were confident thattheir riflemen would be a match forKitchener's.

The Ethiopians used modern riflesas assault weapons, firing as theirmassed formations closed for combat.In contrast to this, there were somepeoples who made an effectivecombination of traditional fieldcraft

skills with modern firepower. TheGerman Official History maintainedthat the Hottentots and Herero weremore dangerous foes than the Boers,because of their sniping from cover.Equally in Somalia the Mullah's forcesemployed an efficient 'fire and rnove-ment' system of short rushes inextended order, making careful use ofbrush cover.

Artillery Doctrine was forged from acombination of theory and exper-ience. There was general agreementon the main points:-1 Guns should be pushed forward toinflict maximum casualties andachieve maximum 'morale effect'.2 Bombardments should not be used ifthey will cause the enemy to with-draw, since the object is to defeat him

British artillery engaging the enemy under riflefire at Colenso. Note the distance between guns.

rather than to drive him away.3 If a bombardment is used, enemyguns should be silenced before firingon the section of line to be attacked.Guns were placed at intervals of 12 -20 yards, usually in the open withteams and vehicles under cover in therear. The Boer War showed theproblems with this directive: atColenso Col Long pushed his guns to

within 700 yards of the Boer line, andwatched his crews mown down. Longranges and smokeless powder alsomeant that targets could not alwaysbe seen or identified. At Talana andStormberg the British gunners bomb-arded their own infantry: at Colensoand Spion Kop they refrained fromshelling Boers whom they look to befellow Britons.

Royal Artillery Equipment, Egypt 1882Per Battery6 guns & limbers6 ammunition wagons1 store wagon1 store limber wagon1 forage wagon1 water cart1 cavalry spring cart

Am munitioni) With the battery

per battery Per gun13 pdr 16 13 pdr 16

Common shell 180 144 30 24Shrapnel 648 432 108 72Case shot 24 24 4 4Star shells 800 800 133 133ii) In Ordnance Department stores

Commonshell 2000 288 333 48

Shrapnel 720 864 120 144Case shot 28 48 46 8

34

Battle in Africa

At extreme range the Martini-Henry is slghtedusing the very top of the extended rear sight.If there was time, range markers were placedin front of the unit.Visibility distances ' with good eye-sight':-1,700 yards - masses of troops can be

recognised- infantry can be disting-

uished from cavalry1,000 yards - individuals may be seen

700 yards - head,crossbelts &c canbe distinguished

500 yards - uniforms recognised,weapons visible 'if bright'

250 yards - officers recognisablefrom men, uniform clear

- from 'The Artillerist's Manual', amid-Victorian work. Recent develop-ments in optical equipment gaveofficers 6 - 8 times magnificationwith binoculars, or much more withportable naval telescopes.

Beyond visibility ranges, dust couldbe seen: a thick cloud indicates inf-antry, a high thin cloud indicatesmounted men, a broken cloud artilleryor wagons.

CLOSE RANGE: 100 - 300 yards2 minutes' fire at 6 shots per minute,at 10% effectiveness = 120 casualties.

Infantry Firepower: an 'ideal'situation, where a massed attack inthe open is met by fresh, steadyEuropean troops:Company of 100 men

African warrlors moving 100 yardsper minute

LONG RANGE: 700 - 1,400 yards7 minutes' fire at 6 shots per minute,2% effectiveness = 84 casualties.

Warriors begin to run: 150 yards perminute.

The rear sight is adjusted to 600 yards. As thetarget closes and passes the range markers anofficer calls out the range.MEDIUM RANGE: 300 - 700 yards4 minutes' fire at 6 shots per minute,5% effectiveness = 120 casualties.

Warriors charge: 200 yards per minute.

At close range the rear sight is lowered. It wasalmost impossible to maintain disciplined volleyfire at close quarters and the men would f ire as

[quickly as they could. In the circumstancesshown here, it is extremely unlikely that thecharge would have got this closel

POINT BLANK: 0 - 100 yards30 seconds at 10 shots per minute,15% effectiveness = 75 casualties.

Overall casualties = 399 in 121minutes' firing, 83 rounds per man, or13 more than normally carried on theperson. This shows the need forcareful conservation of fire.

Note that although casualties pershot are low, the overall effect isenough to disable four times thenumber of those firing. At Omdurman

200,000 bullets and 1,000 shells hit12,000 Mandists at long and mediumrange. This total would have beenreduced if visibility had been lessgood or the target concealed/in openorder, or the troops fatigued: eg. at7idbali in Somalia (1904) it needed600 rounds per hit.

The Volume of Fire was as importantas the casualties inflicted, indeterring the enemy assault. Acompany in traditional close ordertwo deep would have a frontage of 40yards: at 600 shots per minute avolume of 15 shots per yard perminute could be maintained - enoughto subdue the fiercest attack.

35

Cold Steel-the climax of battle'Cold Steel' - the cherished myth of the bayonet thrustand the sabre slash - gained a new lease of life in theAfrican wars. Infantry assaults with naked bayonets -increasingly difficult against modern opponents - wereinvaluable against a foe who was unable to inflict seriouscasualties by f ire. The bayonet charge combined two ofthe Europeans' greatest assets: discipline and aggressivespirit. It was easy to prepare and control - far easier than

lengthy firefights which often tailed off into wasteful,ineffective skirmishing. It confirmed a moral superiorityover the recipients and - most of ail - it was decisive.The victims might not Jose as many men as they would by,say, making a charge against a square's musketry; but theywould know they had been roundly beaten - and would beunlikely to venture into combat again!

Many African peoples relied heavilyon shock tactics, and relished hand-to-hand combat. The Tuareg held ornateweaponry - iron lances and swords -in great esteem. The new Zulu war-fare of Shaka had focussed upon thebroad-headed stabbing assegai, andprovided a moral impetus that broketraditional Bantu foes. In contrast,fighters without mêlée weapons wereloth to engage closely. Fode Sila'smen refused to face the charge of theWest Indian Regiment in 1894, whitethe Boers considered shock weapons'brutal and unchristian': after thepursuit at Elandslaagte they threaten-ed to shoot any lancers they capt-ured. Few Boers would face a bayonetcharge, preferring to run orsurrender; and fewer still would useassault tactics. Only the very bestcommandos - the "Zarps", the foreignvolunteers and the Bitter-Enders -were able to launch effective stormassaults, which included their ownmagazine rifle fire.

The Crisis of Battle was rarelypreceded by long preparatory artilleryduels or skirmishing. There might be along period of quiet, followed by ashort and bloody clash at close range.African attacks often brewed upquickly, emerging as a charge fromcover, rather than the slowmanoeuvres of regular armies. Thusat Abu Kru in 1885 the British took32 - 4 hours to prepare their attack,under constant harassing fire, then

In Africa, as in Europe, the climax of mostsuccessful bayonet assaults was the arrivaiof the attacking force in the hastily desertedposition of the enemy.

there was a ten-minute sequence ofadvance, fierce Mandist charge, andvictory won by the massive firepowerof the regulars. Other battles inwhich 'shock-oriented' Africanpeoples attacked the Europeansshowed a similar profile of long-but-crucial quiet spells punctuated bybrief, frenetic crises. Examples areUlundi, Omdurman, Bou Othmann. Bycontrast the Boer battles displayeda more 'European' and 'technical'

Cavalry Charges were relatively rarein Africa, and the results werescarcely encouraging. At El Teb in1884 Stewart's hussar brigade foundthe Hadendowah distressingly happy tocross swords with galloping troopers.At Omdurman the 21st Lancers failedto reconnoitre adequately and werelured into charging a hidden ravinefilled with several hundred Mandists.At R'Fakha in 1908 Col. Luignécharged a hill held by Moroccan rifle-men. Passing through the line, theChasseurs d'Afrique rallied beyond thecrest, turned round and collided withtheir own supports thundering overthe brow of the hill. They wererescued by infantry, but only afterthe enemy had despatched thewounded and dismounted troopers. Farmore successful were the chargeslaunched against a wavering orretreating foe - eg the 'moonlightcharge' at Kassassin and the pursuitafter Tel El Kebir; the slaughter ofZulus after Ginginhlovu and Ulundi, orthe lancer charge against retiringBoers at Elandslaagte. The exhilar-ation of a successful charge wasreflected in the comments of part-icipants. "We were cutting them downlike grass" wrote Sergeant Powis ofthe Mounted Infantry after Gingin-hlovu; "It is nice to put a lancethrough a man" noted PrivateRawding of the 21st Lancers in 1898,"they are just like old hens, they justsay 'quar".

sequence: artillery bombardmentslasting for hours or even days, thencumbrous infantry assaults eithercleared Boer positions at heavy costor, more often, bogged down at 1,000- 1,200 yards from the line. Thestalled attackers would lie on theirstomachs in the sun, awaiting the fallof night or an initiative from HQ thatwould enable them to regroup, refillbellies and 'canteens, and regain theiroffensive spirit.

36

Battle in Africa

PREPARATION: leave fodder bags,and split force into -Assault force (33-100% of available

troops)Supports (0-66%, 60-500 yards in rear)

Reserves (0-33%, 60 yards to severalmiles in rear)

Cavalry Late Victorian theory emph-asised that cavalry was for scouting,pursuit and dismounted firepower; butthe cavairymen themselves preferredto think in terms of the 'armeblanche' and the traditional knee-to-knee mounted charge. The basicprecepts of the charge had changedlittle in a century, as follows: -

Cavalry Speeds were kept slow, tohelp maintain control and order.The Walk: 60-80 yards per minuteThe Trot: 120-160 "The Gallop: 180-240

Assault force

Pursuit could mean the differencebetween bruising an enemy and annih-ilating him. It was the relentlesschase of the British and Indiancavalry which finished the Tel ElKebir campaign: one dragoon guardreported that his unit did "76 miles in36 hours, not so bad, for I had nothingto eat for three days but twobiscuits..." Foot pursuit could beequally effective. The fleet-footedZulus destroyed the remains of theIsandhlwana garrison as they fled backover the Buffalo River, while themarching prowess of the ItalianAskaris converted the drawn battle ofCoatit into a triumph. On the otherhand, many victories were neveradequately exploited. The end ofcombat was usually a time ofexhaustion for a commander and histroops, and Europeans could not inany case hope to catch a departingAfrican. The Boers especially wastedmany opportunities for pursuit -partly from fatigue, but partly fromtheir own distinctive character. WhenPiet Joubert was implored to pursueafter the battle of Ladysmith (1899)he replied 'When God holds out afinger, don't take the whole hand'.

PURSUIT: Reserves moue up topursue the enemy as the assault forceand supports rally (the latter mustovercome the tempation tocontinue charging in confusion).

Retreat from a lost battle was one ofthe most difficult tanks that mightcônfront a commander. Few Africanarmies had effective plans for such acontingency, and the Zulus placedsuch a total emphasis on the need forvictory that their morale brokecompletely if they were defeated, sothey would offer little resistance topursuers. In contrast to this, theMandists beaten at Abu Klea (1885)remained unbowed, and simply walkedaway from the field.

Most defeated armies tried to getaway as fast as possible. DeneysReitz said of the Boer retreat fromNatal, "No march order was given; wewere simply told to go and it was leftto each man to carry out his ownretirement". European regulars were -

IMPACT! The force hits the target -if it is still there - and hopes tobreak it.MELEE! Both sides Jose formation.Supports enter the fray - possibly f roma flank.Their good order is likely toprove decisive.

at least in theory - trained to with-draw systematically from difficultsituations. A rearguard would beformed of steady troops. In irregularwarfare they would stay close to themain body to avoid encirclement.Under the guidance of officers, thetroops would fall back and rally at achosen position. Accounts of theItalian rearguard af ter Adowa point tothe heroic efforts of Baratieri and hisofficers to create knots of formedmen to stave off pursuit. If moralefailed, however, there was little thecommander could do to stop the rout:in the actions around Dundee andLadysmith (1899) the British retreatsseemed to collapse into anarçhy forno apparent reason.

Horrible DisastersThe possibility of disaster dogged every action taken byany European commander. One error, one failure toperceive what was going on, could mean the destruction ofhis command, blazing headlines in the papers and angryquestions in the government - things to be feared farmore than death itself. Disasters demanded explanations,scapegoats, revenge. In 1904 the Portuguese sent 2,000men to avenge the loss of 300 at Cuamoto in Angola. The

El Eilafun (September 1884) was anEgyptian defeat caused by overconfi-dence. General Gordon's best subor-dinate, Mohammed Pasha, had made aseries of successful sorties to dispersethe Mandist forces surroundingKhartoum. After a victory at Halfaya'the Fighting Pasha' decided on aforay up the Blue Nile to smash anenemy concentration by the Sheikh-EI- Obeid. He won a sharp action,resupplied, and then - leaving a forceentrenched on the right bank - chasedthe Mandists into heavy thorn bush.Separated from the firepower of hisgunboat support, Mohammed wassurrounded, overwhelmed and diedwith sword in hand. El Eilaf un was adebacle for Gordon's defence ofKhartoum: he lost 800 of his besttroops, 980 Remington rifles and hismost capable commander.

Isandhlwana (January 1879) is probablythe best-known European disaster inAfrica. Lord Chelmsford, in search ofthe Zulus' main Impi, had split hisforces into several columns. The Van-guard of one column had found agroup of enemy, so he went to join it.This left the forward supply base atIsandhlwana garrisoned by six comp-anies - 597 men - of the 24th Foot,two guns, 115 mounted troops and 431of the Natal Native Contingent. Thecamp was not fortified, despite advice,and there was a confusion of comm-and responsibility between Lt ColPulleine of the 24th and the newly-arrived Col Durnford. Zulu forceswere spotted on the plateau above thecamp and on the plain ahead. Pulleinedeployed his companies in an extendedline a mile from his tents, whileDurnford took his Basuto horsemen onahead. This thin defence was assailedby 20,000 Zulus, who at first wereheld in check by the British fire. Butthen Durnford's men ran short ofammunition and were forced to retire.The Zulus rushed forward as Pulleinemoved up a company to cover them.The Natal Natives broke and theregulars were overwhelmed. Durnfordfell in a last stand and the drifts ofthe Buffalo river became clogged with

British and Germans sent many more to recover theirprestige after embarrassments in Southern Africa (greatcaution was needed to prevent the Queen receiving badnews at the breakfast table!). Yet catastrophe did some-times strike: forces were surprised, or blundered intotrouble, or got lost. Supplies ran out, camps were overrun,units broke and fled. In this section we look at a fewexamples of what 'Horrible disaster' might mean.

Lugalo (August 1891), in the Tangan-yika region, was a German defeatattributable to poor march security.Commander Emil von Zelewski, knownas 'the hammer', was advancing tow-ards a rocky hill amidst thick grass.He had three companies of the' Defence Force' - some 260 men -with three artillery pieces and abaggage train. At about 7am on the17th the main body was assaulted by3,000 Hehe warriors who had creptunseen to within 30 yards. Zelewskiwas killed and his column overwhelm-ed. The rearguard commander,Tettenborn, managed to rally theremuants on a knoll and held off theenemy through the day and into thenight. The Hehe had a few firearmsand relied on Zulu-style tactics learn-ed from Ngoni groups from the south.At dawn on the 18th they set fire tothe grass to cover their withdrawal,taking with them three guns, 300rifles and most of the stores. Germancasualties were 10 officers and ncos,200 Askaris and 96 porters. Only fourEuropeans and 60 Askaris survived.

fugitives. Of 950 Europeans only 55survived, while most of the NatalContingent was also killed. 2,000Zulus fell - a grievous loss; "Anassegai has been thrust into the bellyof the nation", said Cetshwayo.

The heavy black arrows show thedevelopment of the classic Zuluconcentric attack. The enemy wasengaged frontally while the ' Horns '

rapidly enveloped the flanks of hisposition.

38

Battle in Africa

Adowa (March lst 1896) was anoverwhelming Italian disaster whicharose out of the combination of sev-eral lesser mistakes, none of whichwas necessarily catastrophic in itself.Baratieri, governor of Eritrea, had anarmy of 56 guns and 17,700 men,including 10,596 Italians. Provisionswere short and many of the newarrivais from Italy were green - butmorale was high. The Ethiopian armywas known to be on the verge of ret-reat through hunger and Baratieri hadbeen honour bound, by Prime MinisterCrispi, to press forward. After acouncil with his brigadiers, he decidedon a night march to a mountainposition overlooking Menelik's camp.The Ethiopians would then be forcedeither to attack or withdraw ignomin-iously.

Things went wrong from the start.Baratieri and his senior Brigadier,Arimondi, mistrusted each other.1,200 native troops were absent dueto a telegraphic error. Worst of ail,the maps confused the hill designatedas the left of the chosen fine withanother four miles out of position.Thus when General Albertone reachedthe correct place after a moonlitmarch of six hours, his guides assuredhim he still had further to go. Sincehe had arrived before Arimondi'scentre brigade was in sight, Albertonebelieved he was wrong and continuedthe march. At 5.45 his vanguard raninto a huge body of Ethiopians andbattle was joined. The Italians heldtheir ground for several hours, butthen the left flank battalion wasoverrun by some 15,000 enemy. The

rest of the brigade began to retireand was then completely destroyed.

On the extreme right GeneralDabormida tried to link up withAlbertone, but his line of march viathe mountain passes led him furtheraway, and into a hornets' nest ofShoan warriors. This left Baratieri'sselected flank positions unoccupied,and they were seized by Abyssinianspursuing fugitives f rom Albertone'sforce. From here Arimondi was taken

in flank, then Baratieri's reservebrigade was overrun during an attem-pted deployment. Each one of thethree remaining commands was isolat-ed and overwhelmed. Arimondi andDabormida both died fighting, andtheir men finally lost their disciplinein a general 'sauve-qui-peut' aboutnoon. The Shoans pursued for aboutnine miles, capturing some 4,000 men.Altogether 43% of the Italians werekilled, wounded or missing.

Baratieri should never have foughtat Adowa. He knew the enemy wouldhave to retire, but he underestimatedtheir numbers at 65,000 when in factthey were 100,000 with 45 guns. Hewas also goaded on by orders f romRome. Even so he would have beenable to control the battle had hisforce not split into four separateparts, each of which was destroyed indetail by a brave and mobile opponent.

Abyssinian movements Italian movements

Stormberg Junction (December 1899)was an astonishing example of how adifficult operation - a night attack -could turn into a complete fiasco. LtCol Gatacre planned to attack Boerpositions on the heights above Storm-berg and seize the railway junction.He intended to move 2,700 men toMolteno by rail on 9th December,then cover the ten miles to Stormbergon foot overnight and make a frontalassault at dawn. This was changed toa flank attack - adding several milesto the march - af ter erroneous infor-mation was received that the Boerposition was strengthened by wire.The execution proved disastrous; afterlengthy delays Gatacre left Moltenowith only part of his force, and gotlost. After hours of marching throughrocky terrain arguing with his guides,he eventually reached the enemy out-posts. Unfortunately he believed themto be six miles distant, so he blund-ered into them unexpectedly. Theinfantry charged up a steep crag,were shelled by their own guns andfell back. An irate farmer started fir -

ing at soldiers who were stealing hissheep. Gatacre lost ail control andordered a retreat which turned into ascramble for home. Losses appearedlight - 29 killed and 57 wounded - butwhen the troops assembled, severalhundred were missing. They had notheard the recall and remained on thekopje above Stormberg, to be capt-ured when morning came. The Boers,only 800 strong, rounded up 633bemused officers and men forgottenin Gatacre's retreat.

The Flatters Expedition set out f romOuargla in Algeria (December 1880)to survey a projected stretch of theTrans-Sahara Railway. There were 11Frenchmen and 77 Tirailleurs Algér-iens and Goumiers. Despite carefulplanning and a train of 300 camels,water became short almost 500 milesinto the desert - eight days beyondthe last well. Lt Col Flatters accept-ed an invitation from a Tuareg bandto accompany them to the nearestwells and return with water. Takingthe camels and 37 officers and men,

he marched into a trap. His force wasdestroyed, apart f rom a few survivorswho brought word to Lieut Dianous,commander of the remnant of theexpedition. He ordered a retreat - onfoot - to cover a distance that hadtaken 2+ months by camel. Dianouskept câreful precautions againstambush, since a large group of Tuaregwas reported shadowing the column.He had plenty of ammunition, if Littieelse, and he may have hoped to prov-oke a fight. The Tuareg - apparentlyout of pity - gave the troops somedates, but they were poisoned. Somedied and others were driven mad. Asthe column staggered to the firstlarge well the Tuareg charged andwere beaten off by volleys. Af ter thisthey kept their distance, but Dianouswas killed by a sniper. The men atelizards, leather belts, camel bones,and then their own dead. The lastFrenchman, a sergeant, was killed andeaten. Finally the thirsty, ravingsurvivors reached a French post totell their story, some eight weeksaf ter Flatters had been killed.

39

Glorious Victories'Glorious Victory!' What better to read about on the downtrain f rom Epsom or in a cale by the Seine? It was thesevictories that kept taxpayers from grumbling andgovernments from crumbling. Victorian myth thrived onheroism - and in victory heroism was combined with glory,honour, and the chance of rapid promotion for theoff icers. In this section we look at some of the occasions

on which the Europeans managed to use tactics almost'according to the book'. Despite the difficulties, dangersand uncertainties, military forces could sometimes manageto achieve everything they were supposed to, and toco-ordinate a flank attack, or pre-plan a frontal assault,exactly according to the needs of the moment.

Bedden and Rejjaf The use of flank-ing movements is well illustrated bythe victories of Congo Free Stateforces at Bedden and Rejjaf on 17thFebruary 1897, on the upper Nile.Commandant Chaltin was encampedat Bedden with 700 irfantry of theForce Publique, 580 Azande irregularsand a small Krupp gun. About 1,600yards to the north, some 1,200Mandists were holding a 'strongposition... a natural fort'. Advancingin column with the river to the rightand the irregulars to the left, Chaltinhalted at 400 yards and deployed fiveof his eight platoons in line, holdingthe remainder in reserve with theAzande. The Mandists opened fire: theCongolese artillery replied, but theinfantry did not. After 30 minutes, at7.30 am Chaltin advanced another 200yards. The Mandists began an attackagainst his left flank, so he threw intwo reserve platoons against them,and sent the Azande on a wide sweep

around the enemy in a double envel-opment. This broke the attackersaway from their main body and forcedthem to flee. At the same time -8 am - the three platoons on theCongolese right charged the ridge andcleared it with the bayonet in 20minutes. The Mandists fell back,having lost their Emir, MuhammadAli Badi. Chaltin rested his men until10.30, then followed the foc. At 1.30the advance guard observed that theMandists had taken up another ridgeposition betWeen Mount Rejjaf andthe Nile. In a repeat of the morningaction, Chaltin's men smashed theMandist line by a frontal assault whilethe Azande circled to the left andattacked the enemy rear. By 5.30 theMandist base on the upper Nile was inFree State hands, and they had lostperhaps 200 killed, as againstChaltin's loss of 100 killed and 160wounded.

Coatit (13th January 1895) shows avariant of the night march/dawnattack theme. General Baratieri hadfound Ras Mangasha's Tigrean armyencamped in a valley, unaware of hispresence. An early morning marchplaced the Italian force - three goodbattalions of Askaris (c 3,300 men),four mountain guns and 400 irregulars- into a position overlooking the Ethi-opian camp. Baratieri's plan was not

to storrn the bivouac, but to hold thehigh ground and provoke an enemyattack. Sure enough, the Tigreanscharged frontally at the same time asthey attempted to turn the Italianleft. Mangasha himself led the flank-ing movement, forcing Baratieri tochange his front and start a with-drawal. This was done skilfully: anItalian firing line was established anda prolonged fusillade began which

continued all day, and on into thenext. At 10 pm on the 14th RasMangasha and his 22,000 warriorswithdrew. Baratieri did not pursueuntil the following day, when hisadvance guard caught up with theTigreans. they were easily scattered,and a great haul of booty collected.Thus a drawn battle became a victoryas a result of the regulars' betterdiscipline and organisation.

40

Battle in Africa

Sidi Bou Othmann The offensive useof the square is well exemplified bythe French victory at Sidi Bou Oth-mann on 6th September 1912. Col.Charles Mangin (later known as 'thebutcher' at Verdun) had been orderedto mat-th on Marrakesh when apretender to the Moroccan throne, ElHiba, had taken over the city. Form-ing his 5,000 men into two squares - a'fighting square' and a 'convoysquare' for the 3,500 animais -Mangin came against El Hiba's 10-15,000 men, the core of them Saharannomads. Both sides advanced. TheMoroccans opened f ire at 1,600 yards,wasting ammunition wildly, and beganto envelop the square. At 8 - 900yards the French opened up with LeGras rifles, eight machine guns andtwelves 75 mm QF cannon. TheMoroccan crescent came on, maskingthe French from the fire of E1 Hiba'sfew ancient guns. The attack quicklycollapsed and the Harka fled, leaving2,000 dead on the plain. Mangin's losswas two dead and 23 wounded.

Tsynainondry was a French victory inSeptember 1895, which showed how acampaign could be won less byfighting than by survival in extremetropical conditions. Faced with morethan 340 miles of Madagascar'sswamp and jungle, and virulentdiseases that killed 10% of his forcein two months, General Duchesnedecided to abandon his lines ofcommunication, his 5,000 'Lefebvrechariots' (metal carts), and the bulkof his command. He chose 4,000 men,gave them 3,000 mules, twelve gunsand food for three weeks, then ledthem towards Tananarive. Hackingthrough the rain forest, men dying bythe side of the track, the force fellfoui of the traditional Malagasyweapons of forest and fever. When itreached Tsynainondry, however,though weak from hunger, it was stil!able to fight. The Hova royal army,the Foloalindahy, was entrenched on amountainside, but the Foreign Legionsimply marched over it. The greatestopposition proved to be a herd ofstampeding pigs which 'ran out of avillage and attacked the legionnaires'.

Buller ' s light horsemen pursue thefleeing Zulus after Kambula.

Kambula was a British victory on 29thMarch 1879, which shows how adefensive battle could be used as partof an offensive strategy. In order tobring on a general action on his ownterms, Col. Sir Evelyn Wood had senta strong force to attack the Zulus'herds on Hlobane, a mountain sonie 15miles distant. The operation itselfwas disastrous, but its effect was tobring 24,000 Zulus to assault Wood'sown chosen position. 1-lis commandwas small - 2,000 men and six 7 pdrs.- but his site was well selected andfortified. Three works - a laager, acattle kraal and a redoubt - had beenplaced to give mutual support on ahilltop. As the Impi approached,

Buller led a mounted force out totrigger a premature attack by itsright 'horn'. This brought an immed-iate assault, which was broken up bymassed fire. More threatening was theattack by the Zulu left and centre,which used the 'dead ground' of aravine to get within 200 yards of thesouth face. A company holding thecattle kraal was forced to retire: Zuluriflemen took their position andcovered the advance of theircomrades. Wood ordered a bayonetcharge, which threw back the enemy.Even using captured British Martinirifles, the Zulus were unable to makeeffective use of tire, and after fourhours their attack slackened. A

second sortie trom the laager recapt-ured the kraal and lined the rim ofthe dead ground below. As the Zulusbegan to retreat, Buller led a relent-Iess pursuit with his mountedvolunteers, harrying the beaten Impifor several miles.

41

Guerrilla WarfareFor some African peoples guerrilla warfare was a naturalrecourse once full-scale war had failed. For others,however, it was the standard first response to any invasionby a strong intruder. The essential requirements werethreefold:-1 Mobility: the guerrilla needs greater effective mobilitythan his adversary, be it by horse, camel or fleetness offoot.2 Intelligence: Information from civilians or scouts onenemy actions is essential, as is disinformation to the foeabout one's own.3 Logistic support: Guerrillas cannot live without accessto food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, horses &c.

If these needs could be filled, quite small numbers ofmen, operating without firm bases, could wage effectivecampaigns of harassment against an occupying power. AtEl Moungar we have seen a Moroccan raid directed not atthe enemy's outposts, but at his convoys. Similarapproaches were used by the 'Mad Mullah' of Somalia -whose camels kept him beyond British reach until theadvent of aircraft - by Samori, and by the Rhodesianpeoples. At a lower level, 'social bandits' such asMapondera - who fought both the British and thePortuguese (1892-1903) - committed crimes againstsuch symbols of oppression as taxmen, labour recruiters orgovernment warehouses.

The Hottentots of Namibia provedsteadfast and successful adversariesto the Germans. More sophisticated intheir understanding of the Europeansthan most African peoples, they usedtraditional fieldcraft skills to outman-oeuvre and outwit their foes. Withcaptured rifles, ammunition andhorses, the bands of Hendrik,Cornelius and Morenga waged aneffective guerrilla war between 1904and 1907. Cornelius began in April1905 with a series of lightning raidsagainst German outposts, then outranpursuing columns and joined Morengain the Karras hilis. In March 1906,however, he surrendered,leaving 'therobber chieftain' Joseph Morengaalone in the field. Morenga was askilled strategist who used scouts toinforrn him of German plans, so thathe could avoid their convergingcolumns. When he fought, it was fromambush: in one of a series of success-ful traps, he pinned four companies ofthe Field Force against the OrangeRiver at Hartebeestmund (October1905). Stationing his men on islands inthe river and in the dunes beyond thenorth bank, Morenga laid down acrossfire that inflicted 43 Germancasualties at no cost to his own band.

Morenga ' s band of Hottentots, while theyadopted European dress and weapons, lostnone of their African fieldcraft skills.

Elsewhere he captured convoys, over-ran posts and stole horses untileventually forced to retire to Bechu-analand, where he was killed by CapePolice in 1908. With less than 400riders he had tied up 13 mountedcompanies - at least 2,000 men withten field- and eight machine guns -for a period of two years. At timeshe had been outnumbered by twentyto one.

Forest Peoples relied on guerrillatechniques far more than on largescale actions. Skirmishing from thebush, ambushing columns strung outalong jungle trails, attacking files ofporters or stragglers - these could bevery effective methods. In 1891 theBaule of the Ivory Coast, led by EtienKomenan, defeated one Frenchcolumn and two years later forced asecond to retreat. It was led by J BMarchand (of Fashoda fame), and hewas able to prevail only when hereturned with a third column in

greater strength. In the Congo some5,000 rubber workers rebelled againstLeopold's exactions and maintained afight from forest hideouts from 1899to 1908. In Gambia in 1894 a RoyalNavy landing party was ambushed onthe beach by Fode Sila's war boys,losing 54 casualties out of 200 beforethe ships were regained. Suchsuccesses were usually followed byeventual defeat, but at least theyrepresented the most effective use ofterrain by forces with limitedmanpower.

42

Battle in Africa

The Boer Commandos channelled theirefforts into guerrilla warfare fromthe middle of 1900 onwards. Indepen-dent commandos, loosely co-ordinatedby such senior leaders as Botha, DeLa Rey, De Wet and Smuts, operatedthroughout the Free State and Trans-vaal, and even into the Cape. Raillines were torn up, telegraphs cut,convoys seized, small ports overrun.Sustained by the charity of the Dutchpopulation, and by what they couldforage or capture, the Bitter-Endersfought on in the hope that 'somethingwould turn up'. Between October 1900and September 1901 they cut the rail -

way on average 16 times a month,and in three months it was 30 timesor more. Nevertheless by the winterof 1901 the commandos were in direstraits. Many horses died and the menwere in rags, reduced to scouringBritish campsites for dropped cart-ridges. Yet morale remained high, andBoer victories at Bakenlaagte,

Groenkop and Vlakfontein (1901) andTweebosch (1902) kept the war alive.At war's end on 31st May 1902 thereremained 18,000 tattered but unbowedburghers in the field. Indeed, JanSmuts' commandos had even takencontrol of much of the isolatedWestern Cape region.

The European Response to guerrillawarfare could take several forms. InMadagascar Gallieni used a 'heartsand minds' policy, as did Lyautey inMorocco (although it was backed up,and often superseded, by repressionand Razzia). In South Africa LordRoberts began a policy of concil-iation, but under Kitchener emphasiswas placed on efforts to underminethe Boers' logistic base. Farms wereburnt, livestock slaughtered, womenand children rounded up into concent-ration camps: these harsh measuresfailed to break the Boer will to resist- rather the contrary - but they didslowly shut down their means ofsupply. To protect the vital railways asystem of blockhouses was developed,which also sereved to prevent easycrossing of the tracks - therebyreducing the mobility of the comm-andos. At first independent columnswere used - often several hundredhorsemen with a few guns - butincreasingly dependence was placed onlarge scale 'drives' to sweep largeareas clear of enemy men, horses andcattle. These were expensive andseemed to produce small results - butwere more effective thon any othertechnique.

In SW Africa the Germans followeda policy of 'Schrecklichkeit' againstthe Hereros, killing thousands ofwomen and children by forcing theminto the Omaheke desert. Rewardswere offered for rebel leaders;prisoners were shot; proclamations ofdire intent were issued. Thesemeasures proved to be entirelycounter-productive, however, untileventually a new system was devel-oped under von Deimling. He instit-uted 'flying squads' to cover specificareas. Each Hottentot band wouldthen be pursued by successivecolumns of fresh troops, forcing theexhausted raiders to fight or abandontheir booty. This approach, combinedwith the removal of livestock out ofthe war zone, finally made theconflict too costly for the guerrillas.

'New Model Drive 1902'The first of these involved 300 block-houses, 7 armoured trains & 17,000troops. It failed to catch De Wet butcost the Boers 286 killed, wounded andcaptured.

The 'driving columns ' form up on a 60mile frontage, narrowing as they driveinto the angle created by the block-house and railway lines.

Railway line, protected by block-houses and patrolled by armouredtrains with searchlights.

By the end of the Boer war, over8,000 blockhouses were garrisoned.This is an early production version ofthe prefabricated type, the later'pepperpot' model had a circular roof.The Iron walls were double skinned,sandwiching a bullet-proof layer ofshingle. Each fort slept six or seven.Originally placed some 2,500 yardsapart, later lines of blockhouses weredenser. AIl were connected by barbedwire entanglements.

The Boers are forced into a trop byconverging forces - unless they canbreak through the strong walls of the'net'.

43

Siege WartareSiege warfare as a distinct form of action was relativelyrare in African conflicts. Fortresses were regarded asrefuges rather than as strategic strongpoints, and assaultsupon them traditionally followed the usual rules of thebattlefield, rather than more specialised engineering

methods. Prolonged sieges were very much the product ofthe Europeans' arrivai and the longest (Mafeking, 217days) occurred during the 'White Man's' war in SouthAfrica.

African Fortresses fell into threebroad categories:-1 Temporary Defence Works: somewere rudimentary, others very elabor-ate. At their most basic, a simpleenclosure to keep livestock in andpredators out could be erected frombranches and bushes in a short time.It could then be strengthened withmore wood and thorn-bush; with aditch, a firing step or a rifle trench.Mahmud's zariba on the bank of theAtbara River (1898) involved a seriesof ditches, stockades and rifle pitsdug behind the outer ring of thornscrub - but, alas, the position was byno means as strong as it was comp-lex: it was carried in 40 minutes by adetermined assault. In South Africathe Boers added wire entangle-ments - sometimes arranged to makenoise if touched - to their entrench-ments: at Paardeburg a langer ofwagons was used to beat off Kitch-ener's assault and became the sceneof a ten-day siege that eventuallyended in the surrender of the starvinggarrison.

2 Permanent Fortifications: Islam icAfrica was the home of stone andmud fortresses varying from smallMoorish 'castles' to the walled citiesof the Western Sudan. These pres-ented an imposing appearance, andwere effective against an enemy whopossessed no artillery. Few were verystrong against modern weaponry,however.

Also 'permanent', although requiringconstant rebuilding, were the fortifiedtowns of the Bantu peoples. Mirambohad a capital a half mile square witha population of 15,000 and a strongzareba of poisonous Euphorbia. It hadsupporting embankments and ditches,and a citadel built around the chief'squarters and armoury. When the kraalwas stormed by Lt von Prince'sGerman column in 1893, Mirambo'ssuccessor Siki blew himself up withthe magazine after two days' fight-ing.

3 Natural Positions: These could beused as a defensive recourse. Duringthe 1896 Ndebele and Shona rising,the rock formations of Taba Zi KaMambo and the Matopos providedvaluable strongholds against Rhodes'columns. Throughout Southern Africa,too, settlements were often built onmountain sites - eg Sekukuni's'Fighting Kop', 'Moorosi's Mountain'in Sotho territory and Makoni's kraalin Mashonaland. The more convention-al fortifications of Northern Africaalso gained from the strength ofrugged terrain. The Ethiopian fortressat Magdala, which fell to Napier's1868 expedition, was built on aninaccessible crag. Moroccan forts,such as Taghit in 1903 or the Rifvillages, relied on commanding ailapproaches.

The Boer State-Artillery load the 6 " Creusot gun ' Creechy'during the bombardment of Mafeking. Inset is a typical shelteror ' bombproof ' occupied by the inhabitants of towns under fireduring the Boer War.

European Siegecraf t Most of thescientific theories of siege warfare,developed over centuries in Europe,were set aside in Africa. Few fort-resses needed complex methods toattack: Oyo was captured in one dayafter a 12 pdr was brought up (1895),while Kitchener's gunboats and 60 lbLyddite shells caused serions dest-ruction to Omdurman the day beforethe great battle (1898). It wasgenerally considered best to attack aposition as soon as possible, over -

whelming the defence and 'providing ademonstration' of European strengthand moral fortitude. The attack onSekukuni's stronghold (December1879) shows something of a storrning:"At 11.30 a rocket went up and thetroops rushed forward on our Bide.The sappers were in the thick of it,and strange to say as we doubled overthe open, though the bullets camevery close, no one fell, and the menwere soon swarming up the rocks likebees. It is impossible to describe

things as they were then, shotscoming out of holes all around whichkilled two or three poor fellows...themen fired clown the holes and usedtheir bayonets freely". The bayonetand clubbed rifle were the usualweapons in an assault, but in thisincident our writer - an Engineerofficer - used gun-cotton to blow upthe Pedi caves ("sot very gloriouswork"), and two decades laterdynamite was used to defeat theShona rebels in their rock retreats.

44

Battle in Africa

African Siegecraft was rudimentary,and more often than not a well-supplied defender could expect simplyto sit out his investment until thebesieging army dispersed with its Followers of the Mandi storm

plunder. The options open to theGordon s defences at Khartoum.

besieging commander were limited:-1 Simple Blockade: The attempt tostarve out the defender was a low-risk choice, but it .required anencircling force that was content tosit in enforced idleness for days,weeks or months. Most of the Boersieges lapsed into a loose and lazyblockade. Deneys Reitz recalled thepicnic-like atmosphere of the Trans-vaal lines around Ladysmith, withmuch hunting, visiting friends andswapping pleasantries with theenemy. This was probably the bestthat could be expected, since illfortune, lack of provisions or thedesire to go home could easily causethe dissolution of an army if itsleaders were unable to keep motiv-ation at a peak.2 Bombardment: This would be aimedless at deliberate breaching of wallsthan at the discomfiture of the garr-ison and civilian population. AtKimberley the Boers used 6" Creusot'Long Toms', causing much alarmalbeit few casualties - 8,500 shellskilled only 21 citizens. At MafekingBaden-Powell sent the message "Ailwell. Four hours' bombardment. Onedog killed". Artillery was a rarity inAfrican armies, however - eg the giftof a 75 mm cannon made the Morocc-an Caid Madani El Glaoui a master ofsiegecraft and a Most Important Man(1893). Sporadic rifle fire was thebest that most besieging armies couldoppose to the defence. Althoughplunging fire inflicted heavy casual-ties on the Turcos holding a sectionof the ramparts at Fez in 1912, Littlemore than desultory sniping was far

The Europeans Besieged As a siegeapproached, the commander of agarrison had a number of issues toaddress. If he resolved them effect-ively he would prolong resistance, andprobably ensure success:-1 Preparation of the Position: Earth-works would be dug, thorn or wireentanglements laid, buildings conver-ted to hospitals, HQs & strongpoints.Gordon made improvised landmines atKhartoum, while at Kimberley a civil-ian engineer designed and built a 4.1"gun - 'Long Cecil' - in 24 days.2 Organisation of the Defence: Arran-gements for reserves and dividing theworks into sectors of responsibility;civilians placed under military ordersand told off as guards and workmen.Dealing with civilians posed specialheadaches: at Kimberley the garrison

commander was effectively subordin-ated to Cecil Rhodes: at KhartoumGordon was faced with a populacethat showed strong signs of favouringthe enemy.3 Provision of Food and Water: Thiswas a vital priority. At Macalle theItalians lost control of the watersupply, and for 11 days the garrisonlived on half a litre per day. AtKhartoum the problem was food: inthe final days the bread had to bemade of palm fibre, and it made themen sick. A garrison commanderwould usually seek to take control offood supply to ensure fair distribution- although at Kimberley the Africaninhabitants starved while the prosp-erous whites had champagne andcaviar in stock.

4 Provision for the Health of Garrisonand Civilians: Disease was the inevit-able consequence of siege. WithinLadysmith (1899-1900) there were10,673 hospital admissions out of the13,497 - man garrison in a siege of118 days: deaths from enteric feverwere six times the losses from enemyaction.5 Maintenance of Morale and MilitaryEffectiveness: A vigorous defencesorties against the enemy, 'highprofile' leadership and continuingactivity could all help a great deal.During the Boer War sieges the Brit-ish commandera even resorted toconcerts, sports and emergency news-papers in order to stave off idleness -making Robert Baden-Powell anational hero in the process.

more often the order of the day.3 Assault: Always expensive, butpotentially decisive. At El Obeid(1883) the Mandi's attack failed dis-astrously with thousands killed: as aresult of this experience he wasunwilling to risk a storm of theKhartoum defences until in January1885 it was a question of 'assault orretire'. At Macalle (1896) the Ethi-opian assault was repulsed, so theblockade was resumed; while at Fez(1912) the failure of the assault

brought demoralisation and dissolutionfor the Moroccan Harka. Success,however, would bring results botteimmediately - loot, slaves &c - and inthe longer term, as waverers threw intheir lot with the victors.

45

After the BattleIn the aftermath of battle the sequence of events was asfollows:1 Rally and reform the victorious soldiery. If this was notdone quickly, disaster could result. Outside Khenifra in1914 a successful French dawn attack on a Moroccancamp degenerated into a Razzia of individual plundering.The enemy rallied, counter-attacked and wiped out 700men, capturing ten machine guns and eight cannon.2 Feed and - especially - water the men and animais.3 Scour the battlefield - by moonlight if necessary - torecover the dead and wounded. In the Boer War a trucemight be arranged for this purpose. Get the wounded to adressing station, give the dead as much of a 'ceremonial'

burial as the situation permits, and attend to enemycasualties in whatever manner seems appropriate. Hunt foritems worth scavenging - souvenirs for the Europeans ( egCount Gleichen found a 'Birmingham billhook' on the fieldof Abu Klea); weapons and clothing for the Africans.4 Write home to your family to confirm your survival, andto the families of fallen friends to inform them of theirloss. The commander writes despatches for his superiors,while correspondents race to get their reports home first.5 Collect the prisoners - if any - and make provision forthem.6 Handle any disciplinary duties, appoint officers to takethe positions of those fallen, and carry on.

Victorious African Armies behaveddifferently from regular armies inseveral important respects. Restoringdiscipline alter success was moredifficult, as warriors sought plunder,slaves and livestock; and keeping thearmy together was a serious problemas men demanded to go home - part-icularly if they had not eaten inrecent days. The Zulus and otherBantu peoples had certain prescribedrituals after combat: a warrior whohad killed was obliged to rip open hisvictim's belly to release the spiritand to don the apparel of the slain. Itwas for this reason that after Isand-

What Were the Consequences of these'Striai! Wars', these campaigns of imp-erial conquest? For Africans theyspelt subjection to an alien authoritywhich was sometimes distant, some-tirnes very clearly in evidence. Somepeoples fared better than others, butthe loss of independence applied toail. Whatever benefits the Europeansbrought, it was clear that they hadacquired African land and labour fortheir own purposes, and had deprivedAfricans of any say in matters ofsignificance. These wars, in short,brought decades of subjection.

For the Europeans, and especiallythe soldiers, these wars broughtadventure, sport and glory. For sornethey brought promotion and experi-

hlwana Commandant Lonsdale failedto notice that the men in red coatswere not Welshmen at ail! A Zulu whohad killed also had to follow cleansingceremonies separated from hiscompanions, which meant that thearmy melted away after ;sandhlwana,and in defeat it might be too ashamedto return to the king at ail! Otherpeoples had their own rituals aftercombat: in 1892 a young Belgianofficer observed a cannibal allycooking the leg ot a slain enemy; "Iknew it was horrible, but still, for themoment, we had to pretend not to seeit..."

ence that was to bear fruit in theFirst World War: Kitchener, French,Haig, Gallieni and Joffre had aillearned their trade in Africa. Sorne ofthe specific African lessons were alsouseful - eg the improvement in Britishfieldcraft in the years before1914 was a result of the Boer War.Other lessons were less useful - eg in1914 many believed the 'African'finding that cavalry had an excellentfuture in Europe. They missed thetrue lesson, that was adopted best bythe German Lettow-Vorbeck between1914 and 1918, which was that therewere no strict rules; that 'the book'could be thrown away; that everysituation had to be dealt with on itsown terms.

Prisoners Surrender was sometimes anoption for men facing defeat. Duringthe Boer Wars both sides were willingto give up when things got toue and- despite some alleged abuses of thewhite flag, and of misconduct towardsprisoners during the last stages of thewar- both sides treated most captivesgenerously. At Bronkhorstspruit (1880)Boer civilians were highly attentive toBritish wounded who had been theirenemies a few minutes earlier. Bycontrast, we have seen how injuredMandists were killed by British andEgyptian troops, partly from fear theywould turn on their would-be benef-actors. In the disastrous 1889 Mandistcampaign Babikr Bedri recounts howhe and his comrades chose to be'captured' (they really 'deserted')once it was known that the Egyptianswould accept their surrender.

The Zulus took no prisoners inbattle, and were given no quarter inreturn. Even if a man succeeded ingiving himself up, he was not necess-arily safe. Herero prisoners handedover to the Germans by Hottentotscouts were summarily killed. Italianscaptured by the Ethiopians were oftenmutilated later, while torture -especially by women - was widelyfeared by soldiers. 'The last bullet'seemed a preferable choice. Evenwhen treatment was good, the loss offreedom and exile f rom the homeland

(eg Boer POWs sent to Bermuda orCeylon, Samori Toure to Gabon), wasnot a prospect to relish. Good fortunecould occur, however: Britons capt-ured by Boers were sometimesdisarmed - and even undressed! - thenset free. Black soldiers of the Egypt-ian army were pressed into Mandistservice as 'Jehadia'.

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Zulu warrior in the tunic of a slainmember of the 24th Regiment at Isandhlwana.

Battle in Africa

The Wounded faced a serious ordeal,despite radical improvements in thestandards of treatment since theCrimean and American Civil Wars.General anaesthesia now made oper-ations less grim, but the care ofcasualties remained a difficult, pain-ful business. The wounded were sortedout by 'triage' for attention immed-iately, later or - for some - never.Abdominal wounds, for instance,almost inevitably proved fatal andcondemned the recipient to the thirdcategory.

A central principle of surgery wasthe massive 'debridement' of deadtissue around a wound - a brutalprocess aimed at the prevention ofgas gangrene. Likewise limb wounds

were likely to need amputation toavoid infection, and the treatment ofshock was primitive. Until the majorblood groups were identified in 1902there were no transfusions, so salinesolutions and strychnine were ail thata physician could offer. The vastdistances involved in African camp-aigns meant that particular attentionwas given to immediate treatmentand safe transportation of casualties,rather than to the processing of largenumbers of them. From 1884 Germantroops carried basic dressing kits, andby the Boer War the British weredoing the same. Prompt treatment atField Dressing Stations saved manylives, and provision for movingpatients coula be inventive - camel

borne litters, hammocks carried byporters (but seldom comfortable), andso forth. Hospitals were often muchworse - disease-ridden places wherepoor food, lack of basic supplies andneglect by third rate orderlies anddoctors permitted infection to reachepidemic levels. Even the mixedblessings of modern medicine weredenied to the Europeans' opponents:The Boers had a number of foreignvolunteer ambulances (rejected bysome in favour of herbal remedies) -but most Africans relied on tradit-ional cures and religious or magicalhealing... often surprisingly success-fui, although the Zulus killed those oftheir wounded who obviously couldnot be helped.

A portable X-ray machine used at Ladysmithin the Boer War. Bullets and shell fragmentslodged in the body could be detected withoutthe excruciating business of probing the wound.

Casualties in the unequal 'Maximgun versus Spear' actions so commonin Africa i the losses were oftengrossly unbalanced. At Coolela inMozambique (1896) Galhardo's columndefeated Gungunhama's 6-10,000 menwithin 40 minutes. 1,000 Portuguesetroops inflicted heavy loss on theirenemies but themselves lost only five

dead. However when the Africansclosed hand-to-hand, and especially ifthey won, the Europeans could takevery heavy losses, as is shown by asurvey of the Zulu War battles. Notethat the Zulus averaged about 10%loss irrespective of whether they werevictorious or defeated:-

Battle British Present British Loss Zulus Present Zulu LossIntombi Drift 106 78(75%) 800 80(10%)Isandhlwana 1,774 1,329(73.5%) c20,000 2,200(11%)Hlobane 1,200* 202(25%) 2,000Rorke's Drift 139 25(18%) 4,000 500(12.5%)Kambula 1,998 83(4%) 24,000 2,200(9%)Ulundi 5,124 113(2.2%) 18,000 1,200(6.5%)Gingindhlovu 5,670 71(1.2%) 11,000 1,200(11%)Inyezane 2,782 26(1%) 5,000 350(7%)

*includes 800 Swazi irregulars deserted during the action

In contrast the different style ofwarfare of the Boer War yields ratherdifferent figures. Casualties werealmost ail from shells or bullets and -except at Elandslaagte - the winnersdid not pursue. Aside f rom bloodbathssuch as Spion Kop, where more than50% of the British troops becamecasualties, losses were relativelylight. Surprisingly, British casualtiesin the victories of Talana (11%) and

Elandslaagte (8.7%) were higher thanin the defeats of Colenso (6.2%) andMagersfontein (7%) - though individ-ual battalions could suffer dispropor-tionately heavily. On the Boer side,losses at Colenso were tiny (0.42%)but huge at Elandslaagte (27.7%).Other actions show a 3-7% loss, lowerboth in numbers and in proportion totheir adversaries.

Sending the News Home was a fever-ish activity, as newsmen raced to geta 'scoop' and beat their rivais to thepresses. After Ulundi ArchibaldForbes rode alone across still-hostilecountry 300 miles in 50 hours to sendhis despatch. The telegraph couldtransmit the message rapidly, bringingjoy or sorrow to the European public.The news of the relief of Mafekingwas known in London on 18th May1900, leading to exuberant 'Mafekingnight' celebrations that wereremembered by a whole generation.

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Further ReadingThe literature covering these African campaigns isextremely patchy. The larger British 'Small Wars' are verywell covered, with a wide variety of Victorian accountsand more recent books. The French colonial wars havealso produced a large body of work, although little of it isavailable in English translation. Likewise, there is muchmaterial in Italian on the wars of Menelik, but no recentEnglish volume. The German, Belgian and Portuguesecampaigns are very sparsely covered indeed. What followsis a list of useful 'starting points' for the reader.

GENERALA Adu Boahen "Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880 -1935" (UNESCO 'General History of Africa', London 1985,Vol VII) Thorough work, very strong on the African view-point; Basil Davidson "Africa in Modern History" (London1978); W L Langer "The Diplomacy of Imperialism" (NewYork, 1956); R Oliver & A Atmore "Africa since 1800"(Cambridge, 1972); R Robinson & J Gallagher "Africa andthe Victorians" (London 1961).

MILITARYLawrence James "The Savage Wars - British campaigns inAfrica 1870-1920" (London, 1985) Excellent recent study,strong on soldiers' experience and daily life; Frank Emery"Marching Over Africa" (London, 1986) Soldiers' lettersfrom the Abyssinian war to the outbreak of the 2nd BoerWar; Byron Farwell "Queen Victoria's little Wars" (NewYork, 1972) Concise, entertaining survey of British cam-paigns; C E Callwell "Small Wars, Their Principles andPractice" (London, 1896) The classic work on 'how to con-duct a colonial war'; Hugh McLeave "The Damned DieHard" (New York,l973) Colourful anecdotes of the FrenchForeign Legion - perhaps the best of a very mixed bunchon this subject.

THE ZULU WARDonald Morris "The Washing of the Spears" (New York,1962) A classic account, but look also at the work ofJ J Guy and Sonia Clarke for recent revissons; Frank Emery"The Red Soldier" (London, 1977) A Marvellous collectionof letters home from Zululand.

THE BOER WARSq Ransford "The Battle of Majuba Hill" (London,1967);Thomas Pakenham "The Boer War" (London,1979); ByronFarwell "The Great Anglo-Boer War"(New York 1976);Deneys Reitz "Commando" (Johannesburg, 1929) A superbBoer Memoir.

THE HERERO/HOTTENTOT WARSJon Bridgeman "The revoit of the Hereros" (Berkeley 1981)H Bley "South West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914(London, 1971).

WEST AFRICAMichael Crowder "West African Resistance" (London 1971)An excellent source; and his "West Africa under ColonialRule" (London, 1968); Frederick Myatt "The Golden Stool"(London 1966) On Asante 1900; A S Kanya-Forster "TheConquest of the Western Sudan" (London, 1970).

MOROCCO

Douglas Porch "The Conquest of Morocco" (London, 1982).

ETHIOPIA

G F Berkeley "The Carnpaign of Adowa and the rise ofMenelik" (London, 1902).

RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

T O Ranger "Revoit in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7" (London,1967); F C Selous "Sunshine and storm in Rhodesia" (London1896).

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

James Duffy "Portuguese Africa" (Harvard, 1961); EricAxelson "Portugal and the Scramble for Africa 1875-91"(New York, 19--).

BELGIAN AFRICARuth Slade "King Leopold's Congo" (London, 1962); R OCollins "The Southern Sudan" (Yale, 1962).

EAST AFRICAD A Low, R Oliver et al "The Oxford History of EastAfrica" (2 vols, Oxford, 1962); Richard Meinertzhagen"Kenya Diary 1902-6" (London, 1959); John Iliffe "Tangan-yika under German Rule" (Cambridge, 1969); Charles Miller"The Lunatic Express" (New York, 1972).

EGYPT/SUDANC Royle "The Egyptian Campaigns 1882-99" (London, 1900);W S Churchill "The River War" (London, 1899); Henry Kuen-Boyd "A Good Dusting" (London 1986); 1 H Zulfo "Karari, aSudanese Account of Omdurman" (London, 1980); BabikrBedri "Memoirs of a Mandist" (Oxford, 1969).

PERIODICALS"The Journal of African History" is the most importantacademic journal for the topic. "Soldiers of the Queen" isthe excellent publication of the Victorian Military Society."Savage and Soldier" is a wargames-oriented magazinedevoted to the colonial wars of the 19th century.

WARGAME RULESLarry Brom "The Sword and the Flame" is a fast-pacedgame of 'small wars' with a tongue-in-cheek feel; M Blakeand I Colwill "The Colonial Skirmish Rules" gives a fairlydetailed approach to man-to-man combat; HowardWhitehouse "Science versus Pluck, or too much for theMandi" provides historical roleplay and large scale actionsin the Sudan campaigns.

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Battle in Africa is a uniquely vivid analysis of colonial campaigning in the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras. Author Howard Whitehouse guides the readersystematically through each stage of an African campaign,from the formulationof strategy to the fate of the wounded, and from the collection of supplies to thetactics of guerrilla warfare. He also offers a long-overdue comparativeapproach, which describes the Belgian, German and Italian experiences as wellas the better-known French and British ... and he gives a rare emphasis to theperceptions of the indigenous African `enemy'. lllustrated throughout byQeter Dennis - who is himself a keen student of these campaigns - in anappropriately ` period' style.Also available in this series: Battle in the Civil War, Generalship and Tactics inAmerica 1861-65.

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