Batista why history will absolve him

7/28/2019 Batista why history will absolve him

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FulgencioBatista:WhyHistoryWillAbsolveHim

F idel Castros recent illness has focused attention on theCuban dictatorscareer. Castros successes in establishing and maintaininga Communistdictatorship 90 miles off thecoast of theUnited States areremarkableachievements. Unfortunately, thesesuccesses havebeen achieved at theCuban peoples expense. By examining thehistoryof theproceeding Batistaregime, a perspectivewill hopefully emergewhich illustrates how Castrodeceived theCuban peopleand how cruel and unnecessaryhis totalitariandictatorship hasbeen.

Thisbiography, of Castros predecessor, Fulgencio Batista is based on anearlier version written byDavid Bennett which appeared in August 1996 intheMelbournebased publication,TheSentinel.

TheHistoricalSignificanceofFulgencioBatista

One of the myths perpetuated by the extreme

Left since Fidel Castro came to power in

January 1959 is that contemporary Cuba is a

dynamic and politically vibrant nation.

Whatever Castro's past and present successes inpromoting international discord, the current

domestic Cuban political scene is staid and

uneventful, as befits a totalitarian nation where

all politics are controlled by Fidel Castro and/orhis brother Ral. This situation starkly contrasts

with the fluidity, passionate dynamism andcomplexities of pre-Castro Cuba, which were

personified by the major figure of that by-gone

era, Fulgencio Batista.

Because the Castro regime's political repression

is too brazen and apparent to deny, apologistsfor it have asserted that this has been offset by


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the tremendous achievements that have

allegedly occurred in the area of higher living

standards. To help justify this warped logic, theexcesses of Fulgencio Batista's career have been

exaggerated, his positive achievements ignored

and in the process his important role in Cuban

history negated. It is the purpose of this article

to redress this historical vilification.

SpanishColonialRuleand 'Yankee'Intervention:

TheirRespectiveLegacies

Until 1958 Cuba had a potent political tradition

of competing political parties and activism.This tradition can be traced back to 1876 with

the promulgation of a new Spanish constitution.Mid to late nineteenth century Spanish politics

were immersed in dynastic struggles and

ensuing wars of succession. The only

substantive issue that lay outside this paradigm

was that of Cuban autonomy. Cuban

representatives in the Spanish Cortes* were

successful in drawing attention to the cause ofCuban Home Rule.

* Cortes - theSpanishParliament

A notable figure who took exception to thisconstitutionalist approach was the poet Jos

Mart, of whom Castro claims to be a disciple.

Such a claim, while ridiculous and insulting, isnot surprising, because the major ideological

issue in Cuba up until 1958, was not that of free

market economics versus state intervention, but

what Mart stood for and which party and/or

leader could claim his mantle. It was his death

in combat in 1895 which sparked Cuba's War of

Independence.The United States' military intervention, at thepoint at which Cuba was about to break free

from Spain and the ensuing four year

occupation (1898-1902), became a tremendoussource of national frustration which is still to be

fully exorcised from the Cuban psyche. On

terminating its occupation, the United States

retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs


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so as to protect American properties and

investments under the notorious Platt

Amendment. If the aim of this amendment wasto provide stability, then it proved to be

counterproductive.

The new nation was polarized between the

Liberal and the Moderate parties (the lattermetamorphosised into the Conservative and

eventually the Democratic Party).

Consequently, a pattern developed whereby thelosing party in an election, instead of accepting

the result, would stage a revolt in order toprovoke American intervention. Despite the

economic boom that Cuba enjoyed following

the First World War (which spawned a not

inconsiderable middle class), American

dominance, both real and imagined, as well as

racial unrest amongst the Negro minority,

served to retard Cuba's development of apositive national identity.

FrustratedNationalismSpawnstheDictatorshipofGeradoMachado

A milestone in Cuba's struggle for self-assertionwas seemingly reached in 1924, when a

successful businessman, independence hero and

retired general, Gerado Machado of theopposition Liberal Party was elected president.

He pledged that his business acumen would

raise the standard of living and, most

importantly, that he would bring true

independence to the island republic. Machado

launched a vast and unprecedented public

works programme. A less benevolentinnovation of his was the establishment of

Cuba's first secret police and the subsequent

imposition of a dictatorship in 1928 after being

re-elected with a new Constitution that favored

him. The trappings of democracy were

maintained but their hollowness was evident inMachado's purge of the ruling Liberal Party and

of the opposition Conservative Party. Machado

justified these dictatorial acts on the basis that


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they promoted stability and thereby denied the

Americans a pretext for intervention.

Cuba'sNewClass: 'TheGenerationof1933'

Machado (as is the case with Castro) was only

interested in holding power for the sake ofhaving it. His regime's brutal suppression of

student demonstrations in September 1930

spawned the 'Generation of 1933'. This castewould maintain their profile in Cuban politics

for a quarter of a century between Machado's

fall in 1933 and Castro's rise to power in late1958. In the aftermath of the suppression of the

student demonstrations, a clandestine andpredominately middle class organisation called

the ABC was founded. Between 1931 and 1933

both actual and suspected members of the ABC

were hunted down by Machado's secret police.

SergeantBatista'sEmergence

Some of the dissidents that were apprehended

were tried (if they were relatively fortunateenough) by military tribunals. It was as a court

stenographer, that a young Sergeant Batista was

first exposed to and gained an invaluableinsight into the dark side of Cuban politics. In

1921, at the age of twenty, Batista entered the

Cuban army and by 1928 he had risen to therank of sergeant, which was as far as someone

of his humble background could rise.

The ill effects of the Great Depression,

combined with the corrupt Machado's

unpopularity, precipitated massive and violentABC-instigated riots in July 1933. In the face of

this explosion of unrest and the RooseveltAdministration's hostility, Machado resignedand fled first to Bahamas and later to Miami.

Due to the strong intervention of the American

Ambassador Sumner Wells, Carlos Manuel deCspedes (whose father had led an abortive bid

for independence from Spain from 1868 until

his death in 1874 - the bid for independence

continued until 1878) was chosen as the new

* One

Machadistawho escaped

to America

was DesiArnaz, laterofI LoveLucy fame.


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provisional president. His elevation to the

presidency was supported by the ABC, the

National Union (an anti- Machado organisationwhich had emerged from a split from the

Liberal Party) and other smaller parties.

Cspedess assumption of the presidency was

accepted by, (but not actively supported) by the

Conservative Party.

Despite Machados fall there was still a strong

public groundswell for a radical break with thepast and this was manifested by the lynching of

Machadistas*. The students at HavanaUniversity were at the forefront in demanding a

significant shift. Their capacity to affect change

depended on their success in making common

cause with the disgruntled elements within the

army. During the unrest against Machado, a

group of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)

were killed. As the chief orator at the funeral ofSergeant Miguel Angel Hernndez, Batista was

able to project himself as, and gain acceptance

as the champion of NCO concerns. From thisposition Batista helped lead a NCO mutiny

demanding higher wages and better living

conditions as a pretext to take part in the anti-

Machado revolution.

TheRevolutionof 1933

Taking advantage of this discord, a newspaper

editor named Sergio Carb made contact with

the mutineers and helped persuade them to

make common cause with the students and

depose the faltering Cspedes government. Afive member junta (the Pentarqua) succeeded

Cspedes on an interim basis. However due to

internal tension the Pentarqua did not function

properly and the initiative subsequently passed

to the Student Directory (Directorio

Estudiantil), the leading student politicalorganisation, which with Batistas support,

appointed the former Dean of Physiology, Dr.

Grau San Martn as president in September


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1933. In his four-month stint as president, Grau

made a profound impact on the public. His

myopic, if not effeminate persona attractedwidespread popularity because it contrasted

with Machado's brutal machismo. The new

president's declaration of 'Cuba for the Cubans'

and his advocacy of what he termed 'Cubanism',

which was essentially Yankee bashing, revivedmemories of the 1898 Revolution. For many,

Grau had assumed Mart's mantle.

BatistaMovesAgainst theRevolution'sFlawedIdol

For Colonel Batista,* Grau's first presidency

provided a breathing space during which hecould consolidate his hold over the army. This

was accomplished in November 1933, when

Batista crushed an ABC backed revolt by the

army's hostile officer corps. By January 1934,

with middle class opposition to Grau

galvanizing and the continued threat of

American intervention, Batista (with thesupport of some members of the Student

Directory) moved swiftly by deposing Grau.

This coup helped polarize Cuban society. For

many people, Grau became an idol. Carlos Pro

Socarrs, who had been a prominent leader ofthe Student Directory, helped found the Cuban

Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario

Cubano (Autntico), which derived its

popularity from its stated commitment of

restoring Grau. Another avowed adherent of

Grau's, Antonio Guiteras, (who despite being

lionized in contemporary Cuba, was in fact avehement anti-Communist) organized the Joven

Cuba, a militant revolutionary organisation that

was committed to bring drastic changes by

carrying out terrorist actions to promote

political unrest. Needing a shield, Batista

installed Carlos Mendieta, the leader of theNational Union, as the new president.

* A

promotion hereceived for

'services to

the

revolution'

and which he

would holduntil

promoted to

the rank of

General.

TheNew The Mendieta regime was primarily composed


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Strongman of the more moderate elements of the anti-

Machado opposition and they regarded Batista

as a pliant tool who would help underwrite theirrule. As army chief of staff, Batista concerned

himself with bettering the living conditions of

armed forces personnel (most of whom had

received rapid promotion) and their families.

Thus barracks were upgraded, pay hikesgranted, health services and night school

literacy classes provided for armed forces

personnel. Consequently when the Joven Cuba

led by Antonio Guiteras took advantage of a

general strike in 1935 the army was committedand steady enough to crush the revolt.

(Guiteras died in a shoot out with the armyduring this revolt). This abortive revolution

highlighted the depth of the chasm between

Cuban government and the Cuban people.

ReformFromAbove

As a result of this repression, the congressionaland presidential elections held in January 1936

were of little meaning to most Cubans.

Nonetheless the restoration of constitutionalprocesses was a positive development in that it

helped promote a framework for later

democratic progress. Meanwhile Batista was

confronted with the dilemma of commanding alargely inactive army, which faced a hostile

populace. To surmount these interrelated

challenges, Batista had over one thousandEscuelas Cvico Rurales (Rural Public Schools)

built to educate peasant families and these

schools were also built in the most remote partsof the island. Army officers were active in

establishing these schools and in teaching in

them. Despite the much-heralded advancesattributed to the Castro regime in eliminating

illiteracy, Cuba already had a literacy rate of

80% in 1958.

By exerting pressure on the Congress, Batista

ensured that the tax base was broadened so that


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social and public works programs (including the

construction of Tuberculosis sanatoriums in the

remote parts of the country) could be increased.Much of the military's reformist stance was

influenced by the Roosevelt Administration's

New Deal policy. American/Cuban relations

were considerably bolstered in 1934 with the

repeal of the Platt Amendment. In the area ofrace relations, Cuba at this time was more

advanced than the United States. Batista (who

probably had African ancestry) took strong

exception to racial discrimination. Batista also

supported the Association of Cane Growers,and by doing so was able to mollify middle

class reservations about his progressiveorientation, whilst also undercutting American

influence over Cuba's vital sugar industry.

Consequently, in overall terms during the1930s, Batista was able to reposition the role of

the military from being the force that

underwrote an unpopular elite, to anintermediary body, which safeguarded the

public interest.

DemocratizationandReconciliation

Nonetheless, the high rate of voter abstention in

the March 1938 mid-term congressional

elections was a warning to Batista of continuingpublic discontent against the oligarchic political

parties represented in the Congress. Realizing

that new alliances had to be made, Batista

allowed the legalization of the CubanCommunist Party, which eventually constituted

itself in the pre-Castro era as the Popular

Socialist Party (PPS).

Accordingly, the PPS was given a free hand toorganize amongst trade unions and the

Communists entered into a strategic alliance

with the Batista regime. Of greater significancein terms of political re-alignments was Batista's


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reconciliation with the Autntico Party. This

was affected in November 1939 when the

Autnticos took part in elections to aConstituent Assembly, which was charged with

the task of writing a new constitution.

These elections, in contrast to the previous

year's congressional elections, were a positivemilestone. The parties that took part ranged

from staunch Machadistas to Communists. The

party which made the greatest gains was theAutnticos. The Constitution of 1940, which the

Constituent Assembly subsequently drew up,was highly democratic. It contained provision

for a president that was elected for a four-year

term, who was banned from succeeding himself

for eight years. A quasi-parliamentary system

was provided for with the creation of the post of

Prime Minister. Provisions were made

enshrining the right to strike, collectivebargaining and compulsory paid holidays.

Batista retired from the army in December1939 and subsequently presented himself as a

candidate for president under the 1940

Constitution. (Batistas retirement laid thegroundwork for an abortive military revolt in

February 1941 from army officers who were

alienated by their loss of power). The non-

Autntico parties formed an alliance called the

'Democratic Socialist Coalition' which

consequently rallied around Batista because he

was considered to be the only figure that coulddefeat Grau. After fairly winning the June 1940

presidential election (*), Batista formed a

broad-based cabinet, representing the parties

which had backed him.

The most remarkable appointment was that ofDr. Juan Marinello of the PPS as a Minister

Without Portfolio in 1943. Marinellos post was

assumed in 1944, by another PPS stalwart,

(*) The

delayedcompletion ofthe1940

Constitutionforced the

postponementof the

scheduledelections in

Februaryleaving the

country in avoid without

a president.

Batista, in a

patriotic

gesture,

picked-up hisopponents

Grau and Pro

in his car and


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Carlos Rafael Rodrguez as part of a cabinet re-

shuffle that occurred that year. The appointment

of the then 27 year old Rodrquez wassubsequently to become all the more amazing

because he would later hold the position of

vice-president of Cuba under Castro and for a

time he was the third most powerful man in the

country after Castro and his brother Ral. ThePPSs willingness to take part in the Cabinet of

National Unity was due to the Soviet Unions

alliance with the United States during the

Second World War. (The ABC Party also took

the opportunity to join this new cabinet).

all three

together with

Chibs metPresident

Laredo Bru

to express

their

unanimousagreement for

him to remain

as Presidentthrough

October

when theformaltransfer of

powerceremony

took place.

As president, Batista strictly adhered to the new

Constitution. Cuba's relations with the United

States were strengthened by her declaration of

war on the Axis in 1941. The onset of the

Second World War generated a strongeconomic recovery and there were increased

demands for Cuban exports, particularly sugar.

Allowing US warships and aircraft to use Cubaas a base to refuel fostered further goodwill in

terms of Cuban/American relations.

For many Cubans the real test of Batista's

democratic sincerity was whether he would

retire once his term expired in 1944. With thenotable exception of the new Republican Party

(which had split from the Democratic-

Republican Party in 1942 and entered into analliance with the Autnticos) the same parties

that had backed Batista four years earlier, fell in

behind his Prime Minister, Carlos Saladrigas, a

one-time ABC stalwart. Despite this unitedbacking, Saladrigas lost to Grau. This upset


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victory can be attributed to the mystical, if not

saintly mantle that had been attached to Grau's

persona since his previous interlude aspresident. To general disbelief Batista handed

power over to Grau and departed for four years

of self-imposed exile.

FailedExpectations:AutnticoPartyMisrule- 1944to1952

The nearly eight years of Autntico Party rulewere to become the most corrupt that Cuba had

yet experienced. Grau's unassuming personality

conveyed the impression of humility and moralrectitude, but belied the fact that he was a

highly manipulative and cynical character.During his four years in office, Grau and his

sister-in-law extorted money and accepted

bribes. This type of behaviour extended to the

caste of the ruling 'Generation of 1933' and it

became not uncommon for Autntico Party

politicians to acquire palatial residences.

In spite of high taxation rates during the period

of Autntico Party rule, the government was

often unable to service its commitmentsbecause taxation revenue was siphoned off to

illegitimate activities. When Grau's term

expired in 1948 his Education Minister, JosManuel Alemn brazenly absconded with

millions of dollars. Having struggled mightily

to gain power so as to advance the public good,

the 'Generation of 1933' apparently regarded

public money as their own.

Grau's attempt to alter the Constitution to allow

himself a second term caused a split within theruling Autnticos and led to the foundation ofthe Cuban People's Party in 1947, which

became popularly known as the Ortodoxo

Party. Their leader was the charismatic butunstable Senator Eddy Chibs (who had

supported Batistas deposition of Grau in 1934).

Pressure from within the Autntico Party

caused Grau to relent in his attempts to amend


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the Constitution and seek re-election. Grau then

backed Pro's presidential candidacy as the

Autntico Party standard bearer.

Pro's presidential election in June 1948 wasprimarily because of his adroit distribution of

patronage, rather than the electorate's

endorsement of Grau's performance aspresident. A revealing aspect of the election

result was that the runner up was not the

flamboyant Eddy Chibs, but the Liberal Party'sDr. Ricardo Nuez Portuondo, a respected

surgeon. It was also noteworthy that the PPS'scandidate Juan Marinello came a distant fourth

and last. Nuezs strong showing was

attributable to the exiled Batista, who was

elected to the Senate.

The corruption of Pro's regime exceeded that

of his predecessor and the scourge ofgangsterism continued to erode public life. It

should be pointed out at this juncture that

Batista has unfairly been portrayed as a frontman for American and Cuban gangsters,

(particularly with regard to his alleged links to

Meyer Lansky). The caricature of pre-totalitarian Cuban politics as essentially a shell

game for gangster bosses is inaccurate and

insulting to the Cuban people.

The problem of gangsterism was derived from

the deep involvement that crime gangs had in

three revolutionary political groups: AccinRevolucionaria Guiteras (ARG), that descended

from Joven Cuba plus two ostensible student

political groups at Havana University, the

Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR) and

the Insurrectional Revolutionary Union

(UIR)(*). Graus action of bringing both theMSRs and the UIRs chiefs into the National

Police in order to placate these gangs and

subsequently align them to the Autntico Party

Fidel Castroin the

University ofHavana was a

member of

UIR.


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was probably his worst abuse of power because

it promoted an environment of general

lawlessness and extortion.

Batista on his return to power in the 1950s

terminated this private political gangsterism

which subsequently resulted in some membersof the UIR and MSR actually partaking in

political activity by supporting anti-government

insurrectionary groups (which were more often

than not financed by the exiled Pro). In order

to limit the scope of opposition to his regime,Batista was somewhat more permissive to the

gambling and smuggling by former members ofMSR and UIR in return for their foregoing

extortion activities and not opposing his regime.

BatistaRe-Enters theFray

However, Batistas return to power still lay inthe future and in the interim Pro would prove

to be a wily opponent. As president, Pro

attacked Chibs and in the process began to winover the Liberal and Democratic parties from

Batista.

On returning to Cuba in 1948 Senator Batista

decided to run for president in 1952. To solidify

his political base, Batista founded the UnitaryAction Party (PAU) in 1949 as a vehicle with

which to run for president. Rafael Daz Balart,

then Fidel Castro's brother-in-law led the PAU'syouth wing. The PAU in contrast to the Liberal

and Democratic parties identified with the

Revolution of 1933, asserting that thecorruption of the 'Generation of 1933'

contrasted with Batista's positive record.


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Batista's chances of winning the 1952

presidential election were seemingly bolstered

when the temperamental Chibs committedsuicide in August 1951 and Grau split with the

Autnticos and founded the Cubanidad Party.

As Cuba approached what would have been the

historic elections of June 1952, the man whoseemed to hold the balance of power was the

Mayor of Havana, Nicols Castellanos, the

leader of the Cuban National Party (PNC).Batista reached an understanding with

Castellanos that whichever party, out of thePAU and the PNC, had had the most members

in 1951 would support the other partys

candidate for president in the 1952 elections. As

the capital's mayor, Castellanos held the second

most powerful and lucrative position in Cuba

(after the presidency). Having declined Grau's

offer to be the Cubinandad Party's presidentialcandidate, Castellanos fell in behind the

Autnticos. The pay back from Pro was that he

would back candidates of Castellanos' Havanabased PNC in some electoral contests outside

the capital. Once this deal was struck, Grau re-

united his party in February with the

Autnticos. The flow-on effect continued in thesame month with both the Liberal and

Democratic parties pledging their support to the

Autntico Party presidential candidate, CarlosHevia. His glaring point of attraction was that

he was about the only apparently honest senior

Autntico Party figure. Consequently Hevia'scandidacy began to swing the undecided voter

away from the Ortodoxo presidential candidate,

Roberto Agramonte.

These political re-alignments, particularly

Castellanos's new alliance with the Autnticos,seemed to thwart Batista's chances of victory.

Between February and early March 1952 the

PAU was racked by defections to the now


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Autntico-aligned PNC. This state of affairs

was intolerable to Batista. From Batista's

perspective it was bad enough that theAutnticos had been elected in 1944, but even

more infuriating to him was that they would

probably continue to hold office, even after

proving themselves so unfit to rule.

10 thMarch,1952:Batista'sSurpriseReturntoPower

A group of young, professionally trained junior

officers approached Batista in January 1952 and

asked him to lead a coup against Pro. Theseofficers were sick of the corruption of the

Autntico Party and the favoritism shown toofficers linked to the ruling party. They realized

that Batista's support was crucial because he

could persuade their superiors, who were NCOs

in the 1930s, to withhold their support for Pro.

Batista initially scorned their approaches

(although his indignation was not such that he

would report them). But as the rate ofdefections from his party ripped into Batista's

base, his determination to re-assert himself

increased. When informed on the 8th

of Marchof a further swag of defections from the PAU,

the senator (who realized that a coup would be

attempted regardless of his participation)

decided to act. Two days later, withoutconsulting his family or campaign staff, he

detoured from a scheduled election rally and

met up with the army plotters, who escortedhim to the Columbia Barracks. Batista asked the

assembled officers (most of whom were old

comrades) to support his coup. Pro on hearingthat the Columbia Army Barracks had raised the

vertical five colour standard of the blue, white,

red, yellow and green flag of the 1933Revolution, fled to Matanzas Province, but on

discovering that no military units outside

Havana would support him, entered the

Mexican Embassy and then fled the country.

TheRecycled The coup was accomplished in seventy-seven


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Regime's ShakyUnderpinnings

minutes with only three (accidental) fatalities

and this swiftness was due to the decadence of

Autntico Party rule. Other than Pro'sbanishment (and a nominal ban on the PPS, so

as to gain US diplomatic recognition) there

were no bloody purges or mass arrests on

Batista assuming the post of Chief of State,

although Castellanos was dismissed as Mayorof Havana. The new government forged a close

relationship with the Central Organisation of

Cuban Unions (CTC) who, like their leader

Eusebio Mujal, had been aligned to the

Autntico Party. The CTC, beside the armybecame the other pillar underpinning the

regime. Meanwhile, Batista's second wife Martaestablished and headed a quasi-official charity.

Despite the ease of the coup (or perhaps

because of it), the seeds of the second Batista

regime's demise were implanted, particularlywith regard to the army. The officers who

initiated the coup resented Batista's preference

for officers who had been NCOs in the 1930s.To insulate himself from any backlash, Batista

cultivated links with contemporary NCOs - a

policy that would later rebound because it

undermined the lines of authority within thearmy.

Fidel CastroGainsProminence

The man who would later draw out and

capitalize on these internal contradictions was

Fidel Castro. On the 26th of July 1953 Castro

launched his famous attack on the MoncadaBarracks. The attack was more comical than

heroic, but still very tragic due to the number of

people who died as a result of it. Castro, as

Hitler had done following his failed 1923 Beer

Hall Putsch, turned the situation to his

advantage when he was placed on trial.

In contrast to contemporary Cuba, where there

are some political prisoners serving terms of up


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to thirty years for the mildest forms of dissent,

Castro and his cohorts received a fair trial.

From the dock Castro utilized his extraordinaryoratorical talents when he delivered a speech in

his defence, later entitled "History Will Absolve

Me". Castros cause subsequently received

nationwide publicity. Sentenced to fifteen years

imprisonment, Castro was sent to the ModelPrison on the Isle of Pines. There he was treated

in a decent fashion befitting the prison's name

and even allowed to maintain a correspondence

with his political contacts on the outside.

Castro launched his attack in 1953 for the

calculated reason that it was the centenary of

Mart's birth. The Batista Government

organized a year of national celebration. This

policy of glorifying Mart is the only one of

Batista's that the Castro regime has continued.

On another level, after he had returned to powerBatista launched an extensive public works

programme, thus reversing the breakdown in

services that had occurred under the AutnticoParty.

Having ruled Cuba for two years as Chief ofState, Batista scheduled elections for November

1954. Co-opting collaborationist elements

within the Autntico Party, Batista re-launched

the PAU as the Progressive Action Party (PAP)

and used the Crane bird as his mascot. Batista

launched an energetic presidential campaign.

The opportunistic Grau offered himself as theopposition candidate to Batista as a means of

reclaiming the mantle of Autntico Party leader

from the exiled Pro. Realizing that he had no

chance of winning, Grau withdrew his

candidature the day before polling. Although

the government's claim that there was a 70%turnout was exaggerated, the balloting was

generally fair. Shortly after his inauguration for

a four-year term as president in February 1955,


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Batista took the unfortunate and tragic step of

releasing Castro, who shortly thereafter

departed for Mexico. Batista's decision torelease Castro and other political prisoners was

part of a general amnesty which was solicited

by the opposition parties and the public. This

release of political prisoners was made on the

premise that the restoration of constitutionalprocesses constituted a return to normality and

the governments political opponents would

consequently take the opportunity to oppose

him within the constitutional parameters.

Batista's SecondPresidency:PositiveAchievements

As a constitutional president once again, Batista

exercised his prerogatives within institutional

constraints. The government launched a

National Program for Economic Development

which encouraged foreign investment (most of

it American, but also including French and

West German investment) and the promotion oflight industry (so as to boost permanent

employment) and these policies led to a

consumer boom. Using the leverage ofincreased investment opportunities the

government lobbied the United States to

increase its quota of purchases of Cuba's sugar

crop. In the realm of industrial relations, thegovernment took a strong pro-labour stand,

supporting wage increases for unionized

workers.

TheDescent It was at the point at which Batista seemed to be

at the pinnacle of his career that the painfuldescent commenced. The question therefore

emerges of why such a promising government

was to later so ignominiously and dramatically

fall. An important piece in this jigsaw puzzle

was Batistas mishandling of talks with the

opposition between December 1955 and March1956 which became known as the Civic

Dialogue. Batistas intermediaries negotiated

with representatives from opposition parties,


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who had assembled under the banner of the

Society of Friends of the Republic (SAR) which

was led by the elderly and highly respectedindependence war hero, Cosme de la Torriente.

This dialogue was actually a dialogue of the

deaf due to the irreconcilable differences and

expectations between the respective negotiating

parties. Batista conceptualized the talks as anentry point for the mainstream opposition

parties by which they would acknowledge the

legitimacy of his regime and consequently take

the next step of opposing it within a

constitutional framework. From the SARsperspective the talks were a means by which

Batista would negotiate the mechanics offorgoing power in return for immunity for him

and his supporters.

The inevitable collapse of the talks resulted in

the opposition announcing that they would

boycott mid-term 1957 congressional elections.In response to this boycott announcement,

Batista committed one of the worst mistakes ofhis second presidency, that of canceling the1957 congressional elections. Although Batista

committed himself to holding the 1958

presidential election (in which he was

constitutionally barred from standing) the

failure of the Civic Dialogue and cancellation of

the congressional elections served as a rousingconfirmation to the broad mass of the Cuban

people that the Batista regime was self-serving

and could only be removed by force. With the

considerable benefit of hindsight Batista should

have proceeded with the 1957 congressional

elections and instigated a break with the three

junior parties in the ruling ProgressiveCoalition, the Liberal, Democratic and Radical

parties so that there was a safety valve of

electoral activity.


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A violent revolutionary cycle ensued shortly

after the collapse of the Civic Dialogue.Between 1956 and late 1958 a myriad of revolts

were instigated by a range of diverse

revolutionary groups. These revolts and the

groups who undertook them do not warrant

detailing, except to make the general point thatthey created the necessary environment for

Castros phantom guerilla force to triumph in

January 1959.

One of the most important revolts was the one

that was undertaken by a new universityrevolutionary group, the Revolutionary

Directorate (DR). The DR launched an

audacious attack on the presidential palace onMarch the 13th 1957 which almost killed Batista

and his family. This attack (which was funded

and instigated by Pro) failed because Batistakept his nerve. Although a subsequent loyalist

rally drew an estimated quarter of a millionpeople before the presidential palace to showtheir support for Batista, the attack actually

marked the beginning of end for the regime.

This was because the 13th of March attack on

the presidential palace demonstrated the

regimes underlying vulnerability and because it

contributed to a cycle of repression whichwould subsequently benefit Castro.

Castro himself landed in Oriente Province in

December 1956 and then proceeded to the

remote mountainous Sierra Maestra. The yacht

that Castro and his party returned on, theGranma, was purchased by Pro's ill-gottenfunds. (During his exile, the ever scheming Pro

wanted to establish a base of operations in Haitiand he subsequently helped finance the election


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21

campaign of a Dr. Francois Duvalier. Pro

also made a pact with the Dominican

Republics dictator Rafael Trujillo, but this laterfell through). Castro's guerilla campaign has

been mythologized as a military epic. The truth

is somewhat different, as there were no more

than three hundred combat deaths during the

two-year insurgency.

Being the skilled propagandist that he is, Castro

used his opportunities during his interviewswith the NewYork Timesjournalist Herbert

Mathews in the Sierra Maestra to convey theimpression that his insurgency was more potent

than it actually was. Castro's real achievement

was primarily political in that he was able to

make his 26th of J uly Movement into aheterogeneous organisation due to the bonanza

of the Mathews-generated publicity. The 26th ofJ uly Movement was similar to the old ABC as itwas organized on a cell basis and was highly

effective in conducting a campaign of

disruption in urban centres through selectiveassassinations, industrial sabotage, infiltration

of government agencies, violent demonstrations

and the kidnapping of foreigners.

Che Guevara, an influential 26th of J ulyMovement strategist observed that the more theregime resorted to repression, the more people

would turn against it. The nature of the struggle

was a class one, because most of the ranks of

the 26

th

of J uly Movement were drawn from themiddle class, while the personnel of the secretpolice, the SIM (the Military Intelligence

Service) were drawn from humbler

backgrounds and they were consequently

motivated by class resentments.

The excesses that army officers committed in

the 1950s were derived from the anger which

they felt at seeing fellow officers being


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22

indiscriminately killed by terrorist actions

committed by 26th of J uly Movementpartisans.

Castro was very successful in construinggovernment action taken to protect the

population from terrorist actions which killed

innocent civilians. This lack of respect for

human life set the scene for the Castro regimes

brutal repression.

InternalContradictions

As the democratic space narrowed, the Batistaregime became more corrupt as it needed to

maintain the support of the security forces.

The nature of the societal divisions, which

underpinned Castro's rebellion, also existed

within the army. Throughout 1957 Batista

refrained from launching an offensive against

the rebels in the Sierra Maestra because the

Batistiano officers and the NCOs on whom

Batista relied were not trained in guerrilla

warfare and not prepared to undertakesuccessful sustained offensive action. The

professionally trained officers (who had

instigated Batista's return to power) may havebeen competent, but Batista distrusted them too

much to allow them a free hand.

There were also deep divisions on the Castro

side and had Batista exploited them, (the way

that Castro was exploiting the government's) his

regime might have survived. Even as Castro's

reputation as a Robin Hood fighting Batista's

Sheriff of Nottingham grew, it was apparent tosome Cubans that a Castro triumph might not

usher in a democracy. From the Sierra Maestra

there were reports of executions of 26th of J ulyMovementpartisans for minor breaches ofdiscipline and that Castro (later titled the

'Maximum Leader') demanded absolute loyaltyfrom those he led. Castro's authoritarianism


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23

created strains between him and his liberal,

predominately middle class operatives who

were the backbone of the rebellion. While thistension might have proved fatal, even then,

Castro displayed a remarkable knack for turning

adversity to his advantage.

Castro'sDuplicity

The unsuccessful general strike of April 1958 isofficially regarded in contemporary Cuba as the

greatest setback in the struggle against Batista.

The truth however is that the strike's failureenabled Castro to consolidate his power over

the 26

th

of J uly Movement and subsequentlyhasten Batista's demise. The organizers of thestrike were the liberal elements within the 26th

of J uly Movement. Although Castro pledged hissupport to them, he delivered none. The Batista

Government's determined and brutal response,

combined with the crucial support that it

received from the CTC ensured the strike'sfailure. The resulting leadership vacuum in the

26th of J uly Movement was filled by ardent

Fidelistas, while the strident measures that weretaken to crush the strike solidified middle class

opposition to Batista.

Fortified by the crushing of the strike, Batista

ordered the professional officer corps to engage

and wipe out the rebels in their Sierra Maestra

base. That the June 1958 offensive failed was

testament to Castro's success in exploiting the

army's weaknesses. Throughout his guerrilla

campaign, Castro emphasized in his radiobroadcasts his commitment to constitutional

democracy and his distaste at fighting the

honorable elements within the army, whom he

hoped would unburden him by overthrowing

the Batista 'tyranny'. This form of psychological

warfare was highly successful; the officers incombat were often negligent in pressing their

advantage. During the June offensive Castro

maintained cordial contacts with officers such


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as Major Quevedo and this helped sabotage the

offensive. This cultivation of the army

concealed Castro's real intentions, for oncoming to power he would destroy that

institution, even executing those officers that

had maintained their distance from Batista and

in the process helped to deliver Castro victory.

The failure of the June offensive seemed to

herald Batista's demise. The impression that the

historical tide was against Batista hadseemingly been confirmed when the

Eisenhower Administration placed an armsembargo against his regime in March 1958,

which did much to undermine army morale.

Nonetheless, Batista fought on, prophetically

convinced that a Castro victory would mean a

permanent dictatorship for Cuba. Meanwhile

Castro held back, developing his psychological

advantage and waiting for the time to strikewhen the army began to disintegrate from

within. The timing of when matters would reach

their climax, hinged on the success of Castroselection boycott campaign.

Castro DeceivestheCubanPeopleattheCrucialJ uncture

Castro realized that a clean election would

short-circuit his revolutionary route to power

and despite his declared and explicit

commitment to constitutional democracy he

pronounced all-inclusive death sentences

against running candidates in the November1958 general elections. The leading opposition

presidential candidate, Carlos Marquez Sterling

of the electionist wing of the Ortodoxo Party,

the Free Peoples Party, (Grau's candidacy and

his wing of the Autntico Party were too

discredited to be taken seriously), courageouslydefied the strong election boycott movement

because of his fears for the long term prospects

for Cuban democracy should Castro prevail.


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The election victory of the PAP's Andrs

Rivero Agero (who had initially built a

political base in the Cuban Liberal Party buthad followed Batista into the PAU in 1949) was

due to the success of Castros boycott

movement. Rivero Agero had previously

served as prime minister and his humble

background, apparent financial probity andadministrative competence (Cuba maintained a

high economic growth rate despite the political

turbulence during this period) made him the

most credible candidate that the regime could

offer.

For all of Rivero Ageros possible virtues as

president, it was tragic that the overwhelming

majority of the Cuban people forewent the

opportunity to vote for an impeccable democrat

in the person of Carlos Marquez Sterling

because he could have saved them from thetotalitarian future that remained in store.

Marquez Sterling had had an ambivalent

political relationship with Batista, whichreflected the latters ambiguity as a democrat.

(Marquez Sterling had been the president of the

Constituent Assembly which had produced the

1940 Constitution). Although Marquez Sterlinghad commenced his political career as an anti-

Machado Liberal he finished it as an avowed

Ortodoxo due to that partys democratic bonafides. (Marquez Sterlings presidential

candidacy was also supported by minority

factions within the ruling ProgressiveCoalition).

Castros success in seducing theoverwhelming majority of the Cuban electorate

to boycott the November 1958 presidential

election was testament to his charisma (which

still entrances many people around the world

today). For all Castros personal magnetism, it


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is highly improbable that the Cuban people

would have courageously rallied to his cause

had they actually known that he was atotalitarian dictator in waiting. The

overwhelming support that Castro enjoyed at

this point was also due to his masterstroke in

publicly designating Manuel Urrutia as the

future provisional president of Cuba. Urrutiawas a respected former judge who was a

staunch democrat, avowed anti-communist and

someone who was known to be committed to

free and democratic elections. (Unfortunately,

from the very beginning of his tenure aspresident, Urrutia ignored violations of the

Cuban Constitution and thereby providedCastro with sufficient scope to consolidate his

de facto dictatorial power). The cabinet that

Urrutia assembled, which held nominal powerbetween January and July 1959, was the most

honest and talented in Cuban history. However

the Urrutia presidency would be nothing morethan a useful front for Castro which enabled

him to establish a police state. A crucialprerequisite to Castros establishment of apermanent dictatorship was the bloody purge he

undertook in eliminating hundreds of

Batistianos so that his Rebel Army displaced

Cubas regular army. For this reason the

execution of Batistiano war criminals was an

immediate priority for Castro on him taking defacto power.

The final and fatal missed opportunity which

enabled Castro to assume dictatorial power was

American ambivalence about offering Batista

and his family asylum in the United States. In

December 1958, William Pawley acting as anunofficial emissary of the United States

government asked Batista if he would leave the

government to a military junta and depart toDaytona where he had lived in self-imposed


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exile from 1946 to 1948. Batista, point blank,

asked Pawley if he was authorized by the State

Department to make the offer. Pawleyremained silent. Later that month the American

Ambassador, Earl Smith visited President

Batista but did not offer him and his family

asylum in the United States. The American

failure to offer the outgoing Cuban presidentBatista an expeditious exit was a mistake

because it could have forestalled the immediate

catalyst for Castros revolutionary seizure of

power.

Furthermore, from Daytona Batista might haveexercised a degree of political influence

because his outgoing Machadista vice-president

Dr. Gus Incln could have secured a Batistianopolitical base in a post-Batista democratic Cuba.

This was because Gus Incln was due to

assume the post of Mayor of Havana which hehad been elected to in November 1958. By

holding the second most important position inCuba many Batistianos would have takenrefuge in Gus Inclns Liberal Party.

Although the ostensible junior coalition party,

the Liberal Party, due Batistas role in

protecting it following the 1933 Revolution,

had always provided him (with the notable

exception of 1952) with a legitimate block voteapproximating between fifteen and twenty

percent. (This voting base in conjunction with

Castros successful boycott campaign had

secured Rivero Ageros victory over Marquez

Sterling). This scenario would have been

possible only if the whole political structure had

not collapsed.

TheRegimeUnravels

The stunning success that the Rebel Army

enjoyed when it launched its December 1958

offensive was not due to its military prowess,


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but rather the breakdown in their opponent's

morale due to overwhelming hostility toward

the person of President Batista. The maxim thatsuccess in guerrilla war is not achieved by

destroying your enemy militarily, but by

destroying their morale was proven to be

correct. Despite their overwhelming superior

numerical strength, government units whenconfronted mostly surrendered, fled or defected.

On learning that the Army Chief of Staff,General Francisco Tabernilla Dolz had ordered

General Eulogio Cantillo, who commandedoperations in Oriente Province to meet with

Castro behind his back, Batista decided to

abandon power as quickly as he had once seized

it. At the 1959 New Year's party held at his

home at Camp Columbia army barracks, Batista

told his assembled guests of his immediate

resignation. Batista took some of the guestswith him and his wife (and those of his children

that were still in Cuba), departing from Camp

Columbias military airport. The impetuousnature of their escape belied the radical and

tragic transformation that it heralded for Cuba.

Batista'sFinalExile

Batista took initial refuge in the neighboring

Dominican Republic. Realizing that the

unpopularity of Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican

Republics dictator, in Cuba, doomed Trujillos

support for an invasion of that country in

August 1959 to be carried out by Cuban exiles,

(this project is not to be confused with thefailed Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961)

Batista broke with Trujillo and departed for

Portugal and eventually settled in Spain. During

his fourteen-year exile Batista remained in

contact with former cabinet ministers, but not

with Cuba's growing Diaspora. This ostracismdid not particularly disturb Batista, because he

blamed the Cuban middle class for his fall, and

they now constituted the bulk of Cuba's exile


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community. Indeed, Castro's elimination of the

middle class gave Batista a sense of bittersweet

satisfaction. Otherwise, the frustration of exilewas lessened somewhat by financial security,

the time that Batista spent with his family, him

becoming a practicing Roman Catholic and the

solace he found in writing. The two best known

books that Batista published during his secondexile were Cuba Betrayed and TheGrowth andDeclineof theCubanRepublic. The latter bookwas aimed at highlighting the role, and arguing

the case that the 1933 Revolution was in

keeping with Mart's legacy and asserting thatCastro's seizure of power was the antithesis of

that tradition.

Indeed for all his faults, an objective analysis of

Batistas career indicates that he brought Cubacloser in line with Marts vision of an

independent, democratic and prosperous

republic than Castro ever did. It was underBatistas stewardship that the promises of the

1933 Revolution were being fulfilled: in 1934the Platt amendment was abrogated, ademocratic constitution was promulgated in

1940 and from 1955, Cuba due to the

application of the Governments National

Economic Development Program utilized, its

geographical proximity to the United States as a

strategic asset towards Cuba becoming adeveloped nation with a diversified agricultural

and industrial base.

By contrast, Cuba as a totalitarian state under

Castro became overly dependant on the Soviet

bloc with regard to its trading and financial

arrangements. Consequently Cuba wasdangerously exposed following the fall of the

Berlin Wall in 1989 and the implosion of the

Soviet Union in 1991. Utilizing the skills ofbrilliant technocrats such as Carlos Lage, Castro


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was able to stave off economic collapse.

Nonetheless it is disturbing that Castro did not

allow economic reform to be further advanceddue to his concern that a civil society could

emerge which could threaten his power.

Therefore Cuba in a post-Soviet world is now

even more dependant upon sugar as its major

export and on tourism than it ever was underBatista. Indeed contemporary Cuban society is

divided between those who through Communist

Party connections have access to American

dollars by having access to government run

hotels that are patronized by foreign tourists andmost Cubans who are denied such access.

While Batista, from his exile devoted his energy

toward vindicating his legacy by writing books

that extolled the virtues of his regime and

attacked its communist successor, Castro

himself had not forgotten his former nemesis. InAugust 1973 Castro dispatched a special agent,

Tony de la Guardia, on a secret mission to

kidnap Batista and bring him back to Cuba for ashow trial and subsequent execution. On the

night that de la Guardia arrived in Madrid,

Batista died from a sudden and unexpected

heart attack in Marebella, Spain. (Interestingly,and brutally, Castro had Tony de la Guardia

executed in July 1989, along with General

Arnaldo Ochoa, by scapegoating them for drugsmuggling, because the Cuban dictator feared

that they possessed the capacity to stage a

successful military coup).

FulgencioBatista'sTragicEpitaph

That Fulgencio Batista Zaldvar continues to be

reviled by history is testament to the scale of

Castro's triumph over him. Batista might

receive a more balanced and just re-appraisal

should Cubans regain their freedom toobjectively study and analyze their history. It

was Batista's misfortune that his arch-nemesis

Fidel Castro was such a formidable adversary.


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For Batista was not so much an evil man, as a

tragic one, who ultimately destroyed everything

that he tried to build.

More than anything, Batista craved acceptanceand legitimacy. For that reason he initially gave

way to a democracy, only to overturn it when

faced with the prospect of rejection andBatista's failed struggle against Castro thwarted

his attempts to liberalize his regime and

Castro's victory over him has ushered in overtwo generations of totalitarian tyranny, which is

yet to end.While Castro may have been more able than

Batista, his striving for absolute power

illustrated that Castro's motivations are morebasic. Hence Batista is a more complex

historical character and a more detailed study of

him might eventuate in history offering someabsolution for his actions in relative terms and a

critical appreciation that he too, similar to the

Cuban people whom he attempted to serve,ultimately fell victim to Castros chicanery.

David BennettasConvener of Historical and CurrentAffairs Analysis (HCAA) wouldliketo thank Roberto A. Torricella for his comments, corrections and suggestions toaprevious editionof this article. Informationand insight into pre-totalitarianCuba canbegained byvisiting two websites assembled byMr. Torricellahttp://www.cubarepublicana.org and www.cubarepublicana.org.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agote-Freyre, F, Fulgencio Batista FromRevolutionary to Strongman, RutgersUniversity Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, 2006.

Brenner, Leo Grande, Rich and Siegal (editors),TheCuban Reader-TheMaking of aRevolution, Grove Press, New York, 1989.

Edmund A Chester, A SergeantNamed Batista, Henry Holt and Company, New York,1954.

Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1993.
http://www.cubarepublicana.org/http://www.cubarepublicana.org./http://www.cubarepublicana.org./http://www.cubarepublicana.org./http://www.cubarepublicana.org/


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Louis A Perez, Cuba Between Reformand Revolution, Oxford University Press, NewYork, 1988.

Robert E Quirk, Fidel Castro, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1993.

Rhonda P Rabkin, CubanPolitics: TheRevolutionary Experiment, Praeger Publishers,New York, 1993.

SBS World Guide, the-, 5th Edition, Special Broadcasting Service, Reed Reference, PortMelbourne, 1995.

Jean Stubbs, Cuba: TheTest of Time, Latin American Bureau (Research and Action),London, 1989.

James Suchlicki, Historical Dictionaryof Cuba, Latin American Historical Dictionaries;No 22, USA, 1988.

Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York,1986.

Hugh Thomas, Cuba: ThePursuit of Freedom, Eyre & Spohiswoode, London, 1970.

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