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Ethical Engineers? Why Not?Author(s): Archie J. BahmReviewed work(s):Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter, 1983), pp. 33-36Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/688907 .

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applications: it "raises a number ofinteresting theoretical issues"; itprovides "opportunity for easy ex-amination of preconceived deas," or"examination of the scope and ad-equacy of existing moral theories,"andfor"reshaping ormativeviews";or it may "highlight tacit values"and "providea rich taxonomy of de-scriptive values," and increase"awareness of need for conceptualclarification."Caplan's conclusion seems toconfess that he has no more to offerthan his engineering model scape-goat:". . . the pressuresanddemandsof the real world do not provide anoptimal environment for supportingthe kinds of inquirynecessaryto ex-amine these issues with greatdepthor rigor."Should we not ask: "Whyshould Caplan's applied ethicistapply?"Is "Applied Ethics" Possible?Because Caplan is engagedas an ap-plied ethicist, and because the di-rectors of his and at least four otherimportant centers for appliedethicsaccept the view that "ethical theory,or knowledge of the ultimate basesformoralappealsinherent in humannature, s not necessaryforproposingsolutions,"t I take his defense of thisview as most serious.In spite of Caplan'sassertion in aletter to me (dated 9 March 1982)that "I do not think anyone seriouslybelieves that it is possible to do ap-plied ethics sans theory,"his articleclaims that"[d]evoteesof desert,so-

cial worth, utility, merit, and needwill inevitably conflict as a directresult of their eagerness to applyparticularmoral rules." The articleemphasizes his view that "No singlemoral theory can lay claim to themantle of truth." He excuses the ab-sence of agreementabout basic eth-ical theory by sayingthat "Therearemany ways currentlyof constructingtheories in ethics." He seems un-worried about the prevalence ofcompeting alternatives and the fail-ure of professional ethical theoriststo locate andunderstand he ultimatefoundations for moral appeals.He has not offeredus such a theoryandappearsnot to be tryingto obtainone or even to believe that such anattempt might succeed. So I judgehis view as also exemplifying theapplication of ethics without ethicsto apply and as actually supportinga deficiency in American culturewhich needs to be overcome.Enlightened Self-InterestHaving rejected both Caplan's "en-gineering model" and his lack ofconstructivesuggestionsas deficient,I am challenged by the question ofhow to make up the deficiencies.What do I propose?

* Arthur L.Caplan,"EthicalEngineersNeed Not Apply: The State of AppliedEthics Today,' Science, Technology,&Human Values, Volume 6, No. 33 (Fall1980): 24-32.t See my "Teaching Ethics withoutEthics to Teach," Journal of BusinessEthics, Volume 1 (1982): 43-47.

?) 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the President and Fellows of HarvardCollege. Published by JohnWiley &tSons, Inc.Science, Technology, ee)Human Values, Volume 8, Issue 1,pp. 33-38 (Winter 1983) CCC 0162-2439/83/010033-06$02.20

Responses & Reconsiderations

Ethical Engineers?Why Not?ArthurL. Caplan's"EthicalEngineersNeed Not Apply: The State of Ap-plied Ethics Today"* ably describesthe present status of applied ethicsand his ugly picture of "engineers"persuadesus that "ethicalengineers"would domoreharmthangood:"Themain thrust of this essay has beento critique what I have called the'engineering'view of applied ethicsas an inadequateconception of whatis involved in appliednormative in-quiry."He describes"theengineeringmodel" as "value-free,"as "alwaysrecognizing that the nature and de-scription of the problem is not indispute," and as seeing "theories ashierarchicalpyramidsof deductivelylinked generalizations."He criticizesit as having "no single theory," im-plying that he believes it claims tohave one. He complains:"It s simplynaive to think that a well-trainedphilosophercan step boldly into theemergencyroom orneonatal unit andimmediately dissolve moral conun-drums by dint of expertise in moraltheory." Although I doubt that nu-clear engineers, for example, wouldrecognize themselves as fitting hisdescription, I do agree with his re-jection of the model that he depicts.

But when I turn to his own con-structive suggestions, under theheading of "What Should AppliedEthics Be?",I find no proposalabouthow an applied ethicist might helpin dealingwith actual medical prob-lems. Instead, he lists some advan-tagesto ethical theorists engaging n

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34 Science, Technology, & Human Values-Winter 1983My proposal is, first, an ethicaltheory that anyone can draw fromhis own experience by observingat-tentively how he and others makedecisions about what they believethey ought to do. "Ethics,"according

to my dictionary, is "the disciplinedealingwith goodandbad andmoralduty and obligation." An ethicaltheory is an hypothesis about thenature of good and bad, of duty orobligationor,to use the term Iprefer,"oughtness.""Good" and "bad," for presentpurposes,arefeelings of satisfactionandfrustrationof desire.Distinctionneeds to be made between ends andmeans, the ends (or ends-in-them-selves) being feelings of satisfactionand frustration, and the means (ormeans-to-ends) being whatever isinstrumental in producingthe ends.Since the objects, or objectives, ofdesiringappearas thingsoractivities,the feeling of satisfaction in eatingpie, for example, is a good-in-itself,an intrinsic good, and the pie andall that was involved in preparing tfor eating serve as means or instru-mental goods. Since feelings of sat-isfaction may cause desires formoresuch feelings, they may also serveas instrumental goods."Oughtness," or the feeling ofoughtness, which each person canobserve for oneself, consists in thepower hat anapparently reatergoodhas over an apparently lesser goodin compelling our choices. Whenfaced with two alternatives, one ofwhich appearsbetter than the other,which oughta personto choose? Thebetter.Why?Because it appearsbet-ter.This apparent"bettemess" s theultimate basis for choosing, i.e., forchoosing as one ought.This ethical theory has beennamed"the enlightenedself-interesttheory." Understanding it involvesunderstanding he nature of self, itsinterests, and "enlightenment."Each person understands its selfin terms of self-concepts. Each nor-mally identifies itself with its body,mind andideas,desires andinterests,andall that it considers ts own. Eachnormally identifies itself with itsmother, amily, intimate groups,and

social roles, and then with somelarger groups such as recreational,educational,religious, occupational,and political. Each person normallyhas limits to the extents of theseidentifications and the limits oftenare experienced in terms of oppo-sition to other persons or groups.Some persons (e.g., those who areshy) are slow to achieve extensiveidentities and some (e.g., those nat-urally gregarious)are fast. Some de-velop rigid self-conceptions, someadapteasily,andsome delightin role-taking ventures.Eachpersonnaturallydesires whatis best foritself and thus has interestsin self in each of the ways it is con-ceived. It desires what is best for itsbody, mind, family, social roles, andeach of the groups it regardsas itsown. Each of these interests is partof a self that is inherently self-in-terested in that they arepartsof theself and the self naturally seeks tosatisfy these interests as much aspossible.Unfortunately, desires may befrustrated as well as satisfied. Acommon kind of frustration resultsfromhaving conflicting desires suchthat satisfaction of one involvesfrustration of another. Forexample,I like both apple and cherry pie. Onsome occasions I must choose be-tween them, frustrating my desirefor one while satisfying my desirefor the other. On another occasion,my sister and I may both desire theone remaining piece of pie. If I takeit, she will feel frustrated. Becauseshe is my sister and I love her anddesire that she should have her de-sires satisfied, I have a conflict ofdesires-to eat the pie and to havemy sister eat it. I must choose be-tween which of the desired resultsappears etter. Ifmy interest is short-range,I eat the pie and frustratemysister. Such action is called "selfish."If my interest is long-range,I offerher the pie, because she is a goodcook and will preparemore pies inthe future. Such action exemplifieswiserself-interest. Becauseeach selfseeks to maximize satisfactions, itnaturallyseeks enlightenment, i.e.,understanding ow to chooseand act

in ways facilitating such maximi-zation.The "enlightened elf-interesttheory" is intended to state whatpersons do naturally, includingseeking more understandingof waysfor long-range maximization ofsatisfactions.

Self as SocialOur traditional ideals emphasizingindividualismobscure the extents towhich each self is essentially social.Eachperson is bornof a mother, as-sociating biologicallywith her beforebirth, dependingon her for nourish-ment, care and protection, andgrad-ually becoming aware of differencesfrom her. A persongains self-aware-ness partly throughthe attitudes andactions takentoward t andobservingits own responses. It becomes awareof itself as pleased and pleasing, aspraisedandblamed,and as attractingassistance and being ignored.Its de-sires areshapedby toys provided,bybehaviorto emulate, andby rewardsfor approvedbehavior. A child firstcopies its mother model, or siblings,its father model, the milkman andotherswho appear,orfairies, heroes,and deities describedin stories, andthen builds its own ideas from themost desirable traits in each. Ac-ceptedsocial roles, as student, baby-sitter,newsboy, athlete, typist, clerk,nurse,physician, awyer,and so forth,further mold a self's concepts, de-sires, motives, and ideals.Associating with others involvesgive and take, as each person helpsto satisfy orfrustrate others'desires.Aprincipleof reciprocity may be ob-served operating in human associ-ation, such that when a person ishelped by another a tendencyto helpthe other appears. When one isharmed by another intentionally,intention to respondharmfullyoftenoccurs. A person usually admiresthose by whom one is admired, atleast for providingsuch admiration.Theprincipleof reciprocitydoes notwork exactly, but it works wellenough so that most persons learnthat, in the long run, selfishness is

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Responses & Reconsiderations 35counterproductive.A chief tenet ofthe enlightened self-interest theoryis that a wisely self-interestedpersonnot only will not be selfish but alsois more likely to thrive in promotingits interests through generouslyhelping others by cooperating,shar-ing, and caring.Oughtness: Two KindsOughtness occurs actually when aperson faced with two alternatives,one of which appearsbetter than theother,has a feeling of preferenceandcompulsion to choose the one ap-pearingas better. Actual oughtnessis situational. Many ethical princi-ples, often included in codes, arestated as universals: "A physicianought always to save a life wheneverpossible." Such an ought is condi-tional in the sense that no physicianfeels actualcompulsion to save a lifeuntil in the presence of a life thatwill die without his or her help. Inits conditional form, the principlemay be stated: "Ifa physician is inthe presence of a life that will diewithout his or her help, then he orshe always ought to try to preventit from dying." Such conditionaloughtness is stated as universal.But ethical principles may be con-ditional in another way. Instead ofbeing stated as universals withoutexceptions, they may be stated inways intending to make clear thatexceptions are to be expected. Aphysician coming upon a personwhomay die without help may find thatone or more other physicians are al-ready serving the patient fully, orthat the person is about to be exe-cuted by a firing squad, or that con-tinuation of the person'slife will re-sult in deaths to many others, orthat the person has demanded to beallowed to die. Here, other ethicalprinciples nterveneandhavepriorityover the physician'sstatedprinciple.Therefore,the principle is more cor-rectly stated as "If a physician is inthe presence of a life that will diewithout his or her help, then thephysician always ought to try to pre-vent the person from dying, other

things being equal." "Other thingsbeingequal" signifies that the prin-cipleholds under ideal conditions orunder conditions where no otherprinciples have priority.My proposal includes the recom-mendation that all ethical principlesbe stated as universals conditionalupon exceptions-that is, "oneoughtalways to choose the better of twoalternatives (such as helping or nothelping to save a life), other thingsbeing equal."When this is done, thecommon objectionthat ethical prin-ciples are false when and becauseexceptions occur will be avoided.Oughtness is of two kinds: actual(whichis situational)andconditional(which is universal, except, whenproperlystated, for exceptions).Ethics as ScientificEthics may be regardedas scientificin two ways. First, scientific prin-ciples-formulated in terms of thescientific attitude thatrequiresopen-mindedness about any relevant evi-dence thatmay appearn the future-areproperly tatedin terms of "otherthings being equal." Scientists whoregard such an attitude as presup-posedoftenneglect to add the phrase,or its equivalent, in actual state-ments. By intending to state ethicalprinciples in the same way, and bypresupposing an attitude of tenta-tivity and conditionality, one mayhold that ethical principles (gener-alizations based on equally soundevidence) may attain the status ofscientific principles.There is nothingin the natureof the scientific attitudeand method which prevents themfrombeing appliedto understandingthe nature of values and oughtnessand of particularkinds of goods andoughts.This is the firstway in whichethics is scientific.Many scientists do not have valueor ethical issues in mind when pur-suing their investigations. When aphysical scientist concludes, for ex-ample, that "water boils at 212?Fatsea level under normal atmosphericconditions," he or she is not in-tending to state either that it is good

orbad to boil water or that anyoneever ought to do so. The principlestated s not an ethical principle.Butwhen a person acquaintedwith thisprinciple is in a situation whereboiling water is desired, then he orshe can call upon it, not as an ethicalprinciple,but as a basisforan ethicalprincipalthat can be stated: "When-ever a person desires to boil waterat sea level under normal atmos-pheric conditions, he or she oughtto heat the water to 212?F, otherthings being equal."This is anethicalprinciple because it is stated as aconditioned ought. It is as much anethical principle as any other prin-ciple stated as a conditional ought.The purpose of citing this exampleis to illustrate how every principlein every science, assuming that it isreliably ounded, may serveas a basisfor an ethical principle stated as aconditional ought. In this way, allsound scientific principlesmay serveas bases for, and thus as resourcesfor, ethics as a science.My proposalthus includes regard-ing ethics as a field of inquiry bestrepresentedby the enlightened self-interest theory, distinguishing be-tween actual and conditional oughtsand interpretingethical principlesasconditional oughts. Such principlesare,then, regardedas scientific bothbecause they are stated in terms ofotherthings being equalandbecausethey include all other reliable sci-entific principles as resources avail-able as bases.

Applied Ethics:A Multidisciplinary ChallengeI believe that few persons workingin the area of applied ethics todayhave an ethical theory to apply,andthat this lack is evidence of mis-understanding the nature of ethicsand ethical theory. That such mis-understandingis now culturally in-duced, is widespread,and has manycauses does not minimize it as a de-ficiency. It does have implicationsfor whether and how much thoseseeking advice about ethical theory

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36 Science, Technology,& Human Values-Winter 19836 Science, Technology,& Human Values-Winter 1983are warrantedin trusting ethicists,including applied ethicists, who re-fuse to name, explain, verify as re-liable, anddemonstrate the practicalrelevance of a sound theory to theproblems that seekers face.

Iprefernot to use the term"ethicalengineer." But to the extent that adistinctionbetweenpureandappliedscience is useful, and if ethics is thescience of enlightened self-interest,then applied ethics is the practice(technology and engineering)of en-lightened self-interest. If "engineer"meanscompetent,practicalproblem-solver,then we need all of the ethicalengineers we can get. Whv not?Iwill not attempt here a detailedcomparisonof the enlightened self-interest theory with other theories.I propose incorporating desirablepartsof many theories as specializedprinciplesacceptablewhen relevantandsuitably modified. Forexample,theutilitarian "greatestgoodforthegreatestnumber" principle may bestated: "When faced with a choicebetween the greatest good for thegreatest number and the greatestgoodfor less than the greatestnum-ber,one ought always to choose theformer, other things being equal."The Kantian "imperative" may beheld as an enlightened, inductivegeneralization: "Treat humanity,whether in one's self or others, al-waysas an end andnever as a meansmerely, other things being equal."[Evenpersons having theistic pre-conceptionsmay observe that God,beingomniscient, andthus fully en-lightened,practices the enlightenedself-interest theory and that theChurch, claiming to provide en-lightenment or its members,advisesthem to do likewise.]

When enlightened about the in-terdependencef theoryandpractice,i.e.,of the need forcontinuing open-mindednessand tentativity of atti-tudeessential to science, an ethicistwill be on the lookout for new evi-dence emerging in increasinglycomplicated, practical problemshaving mplications for foundationaltheorytself. My enlightenedappliedethicist not only will be aware ofwhichethical principles(conditional

are warrantedin trusting ethicists,including applied ethicists, who re-fuse to name, explain, verify as re-liable, anddemonstrate the practicalrelevance of a sound theory to theproblems that seekers face.Iprefernot to use the term"ethicalengineer." But to the extent that adistinctionbetweenpureandappliedscience is useful, and if ethics is thescience of enlightened self-interest,then applied ethics is the practice

(technology and engineering)of en-lightened self-interest. If "engineer"meanscompetent,practicalproblem-solver,then we need all of the ethicalengineers we can get. Whv not?Iwill not attempt here a detailedcomparisonof the enlightened self-interest theory with other theories.I propose incorporating desirablepartsof many theories as specializedprinciplesacceptablewhen relevantandsuitably modified. Forexample,theutilitarian "greatestgoodforthegreatestnumber" principle may bestated: "When faced with a choicebetween the greatest good for thegreatest number and the greatestgoodfor less than the greatestnum-ber,one ought always to choose theformer, other things being equal."The Kantian "imperative" may beheld as an enlightened, inductivegeneralization: "Treat humanity,whether in one's self or others, al-waysas an end andnever as a meansmerely, other things being equal."[Evenpersons having theistic pre-conceptionsmay observe that God,beingomniscient, andthus fully en-lightened,practices the enlightenedself-interest theory and that theChurch, claiming to provide en-lightenment or its members,advisesthem to do likewise.]

When enlightened about the in-terdependencef theoryandpractice,i.e.,of the need forcontinuing open-mindednessand tentativity of atti-tudeessential to science, an ethicistwill be on the lookout for new evi-dence emerging in increasinglycomplicated, practical problemshaving mplications for foundationaltheorytself. My enlightenedappliedethicist not only will be aware ofwhichethical principles(conditional

oughts) are relevant to a particularcase and be able to help evaluatetheir relative importance in com-parisonwith the principles of otherspecialists believed to be relevant,but also will remain alert to defi-ciencies in information calling forfurtherscientific research.Becomingan applied ethicist should be an ad-venture in multidisciplinary growthandin perpetualre-evaluationofboththe reliability and deficiency ofavailable principles and their con-certed use in particularpractice.Archie J. BahmProfessorof Philosophy EmeritusUniversity of New MexicoAlbuquerque, New Mexico 8 7131

More on CreationismMichaelRuse is distressed hatIhavetaken exception to Judge WilliamOverton'sopinion in McLean v. Ar-kansas.* WhereI saw that ruling asfullof sloppyargumentsandnon se-quiturs,he hails it as "a first-classpiece of reasoning."Since Ruse hasclaimed that my reservations are"hopelesslywide of the mark,"I feelobligedto enter the frayonce again,in the hope that reiteration willachieve what my initial argumenthas evidently failed to pull off,namely, to convince knee-jerk de-marcationistslike Ruse that thingsaremore complicatedthan they haveconceded.Inmy short commentary,I soughttoshow: (1) hat the criteria whichJudgeOverton offered as "essentialconditions" of science are nothingof he sort, since many partsof whatwe all call "science" fail to satisfythoseconditions; (2) hat several ofOverton's criteria constitute ex-tremelyweak demands from an ep-istemic point of view, so weak thatifCreationism does not alreadysat-isfy them (whichI believe it man-ifestlydoes),it would be child's playfor creationiststo modify their po-

oughts) are relevant to a particularcase and be able to help evaluatetheir relative importance in com-parisonwith the principles of otherspecialists believed to be relevant,but also will remain alert to defi-ciencies in information calling forfurtherscientific research.Becomingan applied ethicist should be an ad-venture in multidisciplinary growthandin perpetualre-evaluationofboththe reliability and deficiency ofavailable principles and their con-certed use in particularpractice.Archie J. BahmProfessorof Philosophy EmeritusUniversity of New MexicoAlbuquerque, New Mexico 8 7131

More on CreationismMichaelRuse is distressed hatIhavetaken exception to Judge WilliamOverton'sopinion in McLean v. Ar-kansas.* WhereI saw that ruling asfullof sloppyargumentsandnon se-quiturs,he hails it as "a first-classpiece of reasoning."Since Ruse hasclaimed that my reservations are"hopelesslywide of the mark,"I feelobligedto enter the frayonce again,in the hope that reiteration willachieve what my initial argumenthas evidently failed to pull off,namely, to convince knee-jerk de-marcationistslike Ruse that thingsaremore complicatedthan they haveconceded.Inmy short commentary,I soughttoshow: (1) hat the criteria whichJudgeOverton offered as "essentialconditions" of science are nothingof he sort, since many partsof whatwe all call "science" fail to satisfythoseconditions; (2) hat several ofOverton's criteria constitute ex-tremelyweak demands from an ep-istemic point of view, so weak thatifCreationism does not alreadysat-isfy them (whichI believe it man-ifestlydoes),it would be child's playfor creationiststo modify their po-

sition slightly-thus making theirenterprise(byOverton'slights) "sci-entific"; and (3) that Overton'spreoccupation with the dogmatismand closemindedness of the advo-cates of creation-sciencehas led himinto a chronicconfusionof doctrinesand their advocates.Rusemakes no replyto the secondpoint. Quite why is unclear since,standing entirely alone, it is morethan sufficient to give one pauseaboutthe worryingprecedentsset inMcLeanv. Arkansas. But Ruse doesdeal, after a fashion, with points (1)and (3). Since we do not see eye-to-eye about these matters, I shall tryto redirect his gaze.

The Logic of"Essential Conditions"Considerthe following parable:sup-posethat some city dweller saidthatthe "essential conditions"forsome-thing to be a sheep were that it bea medium-sized mammal and thatit invariably butt into any humanbeings n its vicinty.A country ellowmight try to suggest that his citycousinevidently did not understandwhat a sheep was. He might show,for nstance, that there areplenty ofthings we call sheep which neverbuttinto anything, let alone humanbeings. He might go further to saythat what the city fellow is callinga sheep is what all the rest of usregards a goat. Suppose, inally,thatasecond city fellow, on hearinghistown friend abused by the bucolicbumpkin, entered the discussionsaying "I once knew a sheep thatbutted into human beings withouthesitation,and besides I once saw agoat which never bothered humanbeings.Accordingly, it is correct tosaythat the essential conditions of

*SeeLarryLaudan, "Science t the Bar:Causes or Concern," Science, Technol-ogy,& Human Values, Volume 7, No.41 (Fall 19821:16-18;and Michael Ruse,"Pro ludice," Science, Technology, &HumanValues, Volume 7, No. 41 (Fall1982): 19-23.

sition slightly-thus making theirenterprise(byOverton'slights) "sci-entific"; and (3) that Overton'spreoccupation with the dogmatismand closemindedness of the advo-cates of creation-sciencehas led himinto a chronicconfusionof doctrinesand their advocates.Rusemakes no replyto the secondpoint. Quite why is unclear since,standing entirely alone, it is morethan sufficient to give one pauseaboutthe worryingprecedentsset inMcLeanv. Arkansas. But Ruse doesdeal, after a fashion, with points (1)and (3). Since we do not see eye-to-eye about these matters, I shall tryto redirect his gaze.

The Logic of"Essential Conditions"Considerthe following parable:sup-posethat some city dweller saidthatthe "essential conditions"forsome-thing to be a sheep were that it bea medium-sized mammal and thatit invariably butt into any humanbeings n its vicinty.A country ellowmight try to suggest that his citycousinevidently did not understandwhat a sheep was. He might show,for nstance, that there areplenty ofthings we call sheep which neverbuttinto anything, let alone humanbeings. He might go further to saythat what the city fellow is callinga sheep is what all the rest of usregards a goat. Suppose, inally,thatasecond city fellow, on hearinghistown friend abused by the bucolicbumpkin, entered the discussionsaying "I once knew a sheep thatbutted into human beings withouthesitation,and besides I once saw agoat which never bothered humanbeings.Accordingly, it is correct tosaythat the essential conditions of

*SeeLarryLaudan, "Science t the Bar:Causes or Concern," Science, Technol-ogy,& Human Values, Volume 7, No.41 (Fall 19821:16-18;and Michael Ruse,"Pro ludice," Science, Technology, &HumanValues, Volume 7, No. 41 (Fall1982): 19-23.