Baghdad A300 Incident

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Baghdad A300 Incident Discussion DHL flight hit by missile in BAGHDAD TRIBUTE TO ERIC, STEEVE AND MARIO . Presented by Capt. Jacques ROSAY Airbus Chief Test Pilot 20

Transcript of Baghdad A300 Incident

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Baghdad A300 Incident DiscussionDHL flight hit by missile in BAGHDAD

TRIBUTE TO ERIC, STEEVE AND MARIO

.

Presented by

Capt. Jacques ROSAYAirbus Chief Test Pilot

20

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RIBUTE TO ERIC, STEEVE AND MARIO

• The facts

• How could it fly ?

Flight mechanics with thrust only

 – pitch control

 – roll control

• Bringing the A/C back to the ground

• Conclusion

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HE FACTS

• November 22nd

, 2003. An A300-B4 cargo-transformed, S/N094, operated by DHL, takes off from Baghdad to Bahrain.

• Crew : Capt ERIC, F/O STEEVE, FE MARIO.

• Trip is short, payload is light (Mail) and TOW : 100t (to be

compared to 165.9t MTOW)

• A special Take Off procedure is applied to minimize ground

proximity time and threat exposure duration :Take off with slats only and maximum thrust

Early retraction of slats

Climb at optimum climb speed (215kts)

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HE FACTS (continue)

• Passing 8000ft, a strong impact shakes the structure.

• Immediately, Mario announces the loss of two hydraulic

circuits (green and yellow).

• Twenty seconds later, Eric feels the controls stiffening asthe last hydraulic circuit (blue) is lost.

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HE FACTS (continue)

 A/C configuration is then the following :

• All hydraulics lost

 Ailerons, rudder and elevators are « floating » in the wind (zerohinge moment)

THS is frozen

Spoilers are inoperative and prevented to deflect (sucked by the

airflow) by a non return valve. But one of them is slightly leaking.

Slats and flaps configuration are retracted and frozen

• Left wing in fire and associated fuel tank is emptying

• A significative amount of the left wing surface is missing

• BUT:

BOTH ENGINES ARE STILL RUNNING

C S ( )

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HE FACTS (continue)

HE FACTS ( ti )

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HE FACTS (continue)

• Eric, Steeve and Mario had then to learn how to fly andland an asymmetric aircraft using the only thrust control

• Let’s do the same

H ld it fl ?

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How could it fly ?

• Flight mechanics with thrust only : pitchFrom a trimmed position, an A/C like the A300 (with underwing

engine) will react to a step change of thrust with :

 – An immediate pitch change (increase of thrust induces a nose up motion) – An immediate speed change along with the thrust change (but it will not

last !)

H ld it fl ?

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How could it fly ?

• This is followed by a so called « phugoid » (long period lightly dampedoscillation at constant angle of attack, exchanging altitude and speedaround the stabilised condition)

Pitch , Vc

Pitch , Vc

Pitch , Vc

Pitch , Vc

H ld it fl ?

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How could it fly ?

•When the controls froze, A/C was stabilized at a certain speed, with a

given thrust and a given THS position

•This pitch down motion will continue until :

•The thrust is restored at the adequate level, or 

•The speed has increased sufficiently so that the down lift of thetailplane compensates the pitch down moment created by the

reduction of thrust.

•A thrust variation (decrease) will create a pitch (down) moment

How could it fly ?

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How could it fly ?

•To sum up :

• THE THRUST BECOMES A PITCH CONTRO

• Speed becomes a consequence of the chosen

combination of pitch and thrust.

• Note that against intuition (and initial reaction),

a thrust reduction will finally induce a speedincrease and vice versa.

How could it fly ?

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How could it fly ?

•Flight mechanics with thrust only : roll

•The only way to control the lateral axis is the use of assymetric thrust

•In normal flight with no sideslip, lift is symmetrical.

How could it fly ?

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How could it fly ?

•Increasing the thrust on one engine, will first generate sideslip

How could it fly ?

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How could it fly ?

• The sideslip will induce asymmetric lift; this asymmetric liftwill allow to generate some bank, but with a delayed

response of the A/C

With left sideslip (morethrust on left engine), the

airplane yaws, then rolls to

the right.

How could it fly ?

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How could it fly ?

• On top of it, in their case, the aircraft was in an evolutive

assymetry (Surface missing, airfoil modified, massive fuel leak

on the left wing). It then had a permanent tendancy to roll,

evolving as the fuel leaks and probably wing parts fly away.

• Globally, the roll remained contained during two minutes,without any roll-specific crew action, between 12° right and

22° left, final stabilized state.

• Two minutes after the explosion, the

crew had to cope with the final assymetrywith some permanent sideslip.

How does it fly ?

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How does it fly ?

• Summary:

Symmetrical change of thrust on both engines will allow to controlpitch and then vertical speed. But pitch control will be loose due to

the phugoïd, making slope visualisation very difficult.Thrust being used for pitch control cannot then be used for speed

control. Speed must be accepted as an uncontrolled result of thedesired slope.

When controlling the flight path, the crew will then have to acceptthe resulting speed and to control the slope through an activecontrol of the pitch via the thrust .

 Assymetrical thrust application will allow to control the roll, but witha delayed response of the aircraft.

Therefore, A/C control is achievable, but (at the least) demanding…

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Bring the A/C to the ground

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Bring the A/C to the ground

• Having learned to manage the flight path, the crew

decided to attempt the landing.

• Additionally the left wing was on fire and there was a fuel

leak!… It was time to come back and land.

HE FACTS (continue)

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HE FACTS (continue)

Bring the A/C to the ground

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Bring the A/C to the ground

• They elected runway 33R, the longest of the 2 runways.

• The wind was 290° at 20kt with turbulent conditions !

• After some kind of downwind leg, they came back for long

final in a right turn (although the aircraft was tending to roll

left by itself).

• In addition to the flight path, they closely monitored the left

tank, ready to open the crossfeed, despite the leak and the

fire. It was vital for the engine to stay alive !

Bring the aircraft to the ground

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Bring the aircraft to the ground

 Approximate trajectory

Missile hit

Basic principles

understood

Bring the A/C to the ground

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Bring the A/C to the ground

• Finally the 33L was closer at the end of the approach

• The crew flew the A/C down to the flare, coping with the

phugoïd, the asymmetry in roll and the Xwind• 25 min after missile impact, the A/C was landed (NOT

crashed):

On the runway 33L,with a controlled touch down (Vz below 10ft/s),

a positive pitch

With some divergent heading (8°) and some bank to the

right (10°)

uccessful landing on 33L

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uccess u a d g o 33

Runway exit

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y

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Bring the A/C to the ground

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g g

• A/C exited the runway rapidely; reversers associated to rolling in the sand

provided a good substitute to poor brake efficiency. The A/C stopped after 1000mroll out.

Bring the A/C to the ground

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g g

No injuries for the crew or 

people on ground

• Disregarding some light damage on the landing gear (deflatedtyres), aircraft was intact (but for the wing !)

onclusion

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• Adaptation and tasks prioritization were the key of thesuccess.

• The basic tasks distribution were still applied:

• FLY

•NAVIGATE

• COMMUNICATE

• MONITOR THE SYSTEMS

onclusion

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• Each such situation is unique and cannot be trained for inadvance.

• In this particular case, the following basic principles apply:

• Pitch is controlled by thrust

• Speed MUST be DISREGARDED (provided vertical speed is

controlled)

• Roll is controlled by differential thrust with considerable time

response

• DO NOT RETARD thrust at flare

onclusion

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In terms of airmanship, Eric, Steeve & Mario had done amarkable job

hey managed the priorities

hey worked as a Team

hey shared properly the work :

• FLY

• NAVIGATE

• COMMUNICATE

• MONITOR

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Well doneWell done Mario,Mario, EricEric,,SteeveSteeve!! You really did writ You really did writ

aa nicenice page of aviationpage of aviation

historyhistory!!

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