Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
-
Upload
lada-laika -
Category
Documents
-
view
223 -
download
0
Transcript of Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
-
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
1/7
Simmel's Philosophy of History and Its Relation to Phenomenology: IntroductionAuthor(s): Gary BackhausSource: Human Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2003), pp. 203-208Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010328.
Accessed: 22/10/2014 19:45
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Springeris collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toHuman Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springerhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20010328?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20010328?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer -
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
2/7
k.J
Human Studies 26:
203-208,
2003.
203
f
?
2003 Kluwer Academic
Publishers. Printed
in
the
Netherlands.
Simmel's
Philosophy
of
History
and
Its
Relation
to
Phenomenology:
Introduction
GARY
BACKHAUS
Department
of
Philosophy
and
Religious
Studies,
Morgan
State
University,
Baltimore,
MD
21251,
USA
This
set
of three
papers
presents
an
inaugural
study
of the
relationship
of
Georg
Simmel's
philosophy
of
history
to
phenomenology.
These
studies function
as
provisional,
yet
trailblazing
explorations
in
the
sense
that
they
lack
corrobo
ration with
an
established
body
of
research.
They
are
meant
to
motivate fur?
ther
historical
research
concerning,
and
creative
use
of,
Simmel's
philosophy
of
history
towards the
goal
of
developing
a
phenomenological
approach
to
history.
One
task of this
brief
introduction
is
to
demonstrate that this
subject
matter
should
be
viewed
as
transcending
the
narrow
interests
of
a
circum?
scribed
group
of Simmelian
specialists.
This new direction in Simmelian stud?
ies
should be
recognized
as
potentially
effecting
important
consequences
in
the
fields of
both the human
sciences
and
philosophy.
Any
historical
period
of
theoretical
thought
needs
to
be
a
living
history,
continually
engaged
so
that it
dynamically
and
continually
unfolds
through
perspectival
modifications.
Otherwise,
the
historical
relation
(and
history
only
exists
as
a
relation)
becomes
reified:
we
forget
that
it
is
a
human
achievement
and
allow it
to
be
packaged
as
positivistic
facticities
( no
assembly
neces?
sary ),
rather
than
as
a
lived
relation.
Just
as
inauthenticity
is
a
fundamental
characteristic of
Dasein,
the
reification of
history
is
also
a
fundamental
mo?
dality
of
historical
inauthenticity.
Once
the
historicality
of
the
lifeworld is
objectivated
as
history,
the
hypostatization
of
the
temporal
process
can
be
accepted
without renewed
and
continued
reflection. Another
fundamental
aspect
of
history
is
anachronistic
thinking,
which
follows from
its
present-at
hand
objectivation.
Anachronistic
thinking
reads
an
outcome
back
into
its
genesis.
For
example,
we
think
of
Husserl
as
the
father of
the
phenomen?
ological
movement
and from
our
temporally
situated
reflective
glance
may
unthinkingly
place
the
present
meaning-context
back
into the
horizons of his
milieu.
This
anachronistic
thinking
is
quite
common
without
disciplined
train?
ing
in
historical
thinking
and
method,
but
only
a
lived-historical
reflection
can
counter
this
tendency
of
the
natural
attitude
to
de-historicize the
genesis
of
its outcomes.
This
set
of
papers
reopens
to
historical
reflection
a
fertile
moment
in
the
history
of
theoretical
thought
that
exhibited
great
intellectual
transformation.
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
3/7
204
GARY BACKHAUS
Through relating
ourselves
to
it
we
bear
witness
to
the
waning
of neo-Kantianism
and
to
the
genesis
of the
phenomenological
movement.
It
is
a
contemporary
we,
a
succeeding generation
that
bears historical
witness,
for those within
the historical milieu
did
not
say
to
themselves:
We
are
bearing
historical
witness
to
the
waning
of neo-Kantianism
. .
.
They
could
not,
unless
they
fantasized
what their
successors
might
say
of them. We
successors
also bear
historical
witness
to
the
arisings
and
developments
of the human and social
sciences that occurred
during
Simmers
intellectual
times.
By raising
the
ques?
tion of Simmel's
philosophy
of
history
in
light
of its
possible
relation
to
phe?
nomenology,
our
three
studies
regenerate
the
lived-dynamics
of historical
perspective and open the potential for perspectival transformation. The pos?
sible
consequence
will not
merely
concern a
specific
sub-text
in
this
history,
but rather there
is the
potential
to
set
inmotion reverberations
throughout
the
historical
period
in
question,
which
engenders
consequences
for
our
living
relation
to
it.
Studies
concerning
the relation of Simmel's
work
to
phenomenology
are
virtually
non-existent.
Even
including
the studies
already accomplished by
the
authors
of this
set
there
simply
exist
scanty
serious
research
exploring
this
relation.
Some
thinkers
(Levine,
1997;
Psathas, 1973; Wolff,
1991)
have
com?
mented on Simmel's affinity to phenomenology's studies of essences and of
the
ontology
of
the
lifeworld,
so
we
must
ask
why
such studies have been
slow
in
materializing.
One
reason
is
that
Simmel
is
read
primarily
by
theoretical
sociologists
who have been
trained
in
the
history
of
German
social
theory,
but
not
in
phenomenology.
The
resulting
reified
historical
perspective
is
that
Simmel
is
an
original,
but
neo-Kantian
thinker.
However,
some
recent
histori?
cal reflections
(e.g.,
Jaworski,
1997)
have
linked Simmel with the
postmodern
perspective.
Simmel
has
proven
to
be
an
enigmatic,
ambiguous
figure
-
a
stat?
ure
that
probably
would have
pleased
him. Not
only
was
he
marginalized
during his lifetime, his influence, although recognized, generally has been
something
woven
inconspicuously
into
the
social
science
tradition,
which is
quite
ironic
given
his
notable,
intellectual
flamboyance.
New
insights
into
Simmel
are
welcome,
for
they
engender
a
living-exploration
of
his
work.
If
Simmel's
development
as a
thinker
can
be linked
to
a
phenomenological
ori?
entation,
his
works
appear
within
a
whole
new
light,
which
effects
a
transfor?
mation
in
our
living
history.
Non-phenomenological
sociologists
may
then be
drawn
into
an
exploration
of
phenomenology,
for
only
then
can
they
under?
stand and
critically
remark
on
the
Simmel-phenomenology
thesis.
The converse is also true:
phenomenologists
who have failed to
recognize
the
phenomenological
potential
in
Simmel
will
gain by viewing
him
as amem?
ber of the
fold
who
accomplished
valuable
applied/practitioner
studies.
It
is
ironic that the
philosopher
whose
battlecry
was
back
to
the
things
themselves
gave
us
no
applied
studies
to
speak
of,
unless
one
counts
the
things
that
were
on
Husserl's
desk
or
things
that
he
saw
outside
his
window,
which
served
as
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
4/7
-
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
5/7
206
GARY
BACKHAUS
Another
aspect
of
this
set
of
papers
concerns
the
specific
theoretical
area
addressed,
the
philosophy
of
history.
We
hope
that
our
studies
stimulate
sys?
tematic
comparative
research of various
philosophies
of
history by
compar?
ing
Simmel's work with that of others who also
sought
to
establish
the scientific
limits
for the field of historical research.
Moreover,
our
research
promotes
the
viability
of
Simmel's
work for continued theoretical
development
of
phen?
omenological
approaches
to
history.
If
Simmel's
approach
to
the
philosophy
of
history
can
be
shown
to
be
phenomenologically
oriented,
then his
work
in
this
area can serve
to
promote
further
theoretical and
applied study
as
well
as
to
train the
phenomenologically
oriented historian.
Some
general points
concerning
the fundamental
nature
of
phenomen?
ological
orientation
in
light
of Husserl's
goals
and
a
few
remarks
concerning
the
sense
of each of
our
three
papers
complete
this
introduction.
These studies
are
based
on
the
recognition
that various
strata
of Simmel's
thought developed gradually
from
a
consciously
oriented
neo-Kantianism,
through
various revisions that weakened
this
affiliation,
and
finally
to
exhibit?
ing
amore
phenomenological
basis.
Too much
hair-splitting
would
be
involved
to
decide whether Simmel's
later work should be labeled
quasi-phenomenol
ogy,
proto-phenomenology,
a
propaedeutic
for
phenomenology,
or
properly
phenomenological.
The first
point
is that the
early major phenomenologists
agree
with
Husserl's
fundamental
insight
that
non-constructive material
a
priori
knowledge
can
be uncovered
as
the field
of
phenomenological
inquiry.
For
example, Heidegger
states:
But
to
disclose
the
a
priori
is
not
to
make
an
''a-prioristic
construction.
Edmund
Husserl
has
not
only
enabled
us
to
understand
once more
the
mean?
ing
of
any
genuine philosophical
empiricism;
he
has also
given
us
the
nec?
essary
tools.
'A-priorism'
is the
method
of
every
scientific
philosophy
which
understands itself.
There
is
nothing
constructivist about
it.
(1962,
p.
490)
It
is
this
specific
character
of
non-constructivity
that
essentially
separates
the
sense
of
phenomenology
from neo-Kantian
perspectives.
Husserl's
methodo?
logical
strategies
for and
theoretical constraint
in
apprehending phenomen?
ological
evidence
become
more
understandable
by
keeping
this
single
point
in
mind.
Husserl
clung
to
his
Cartesianism,
not
because
he did
not
recognize
its
limits and inherent
problems,
but because
phenomenological
evidence
se?
cured
against
neo-Kantian
constructivism
was
his
goal
at
all
costs.
Recent
evidence shows that Husserl had already begun in the very early twenties to
replace
the
egological
standpoint
of
Cartesianism
with
intersubjectivity,
to
see
the
worldly
horizon
as
co-constituting
along
with
intersubjectivity,
and
to
ground
genetic
phenomenology
as a
concrete
deepening
beyond
the
abstrac?
tive
nature
of static
phenomenology
(Welton, 2000).
Husserl
already
had
begun
phenomenological
investigations
that
Heidegger
was
to
take
up
and
develop
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
6/7
introduction:
simmel's
philosophy of history
207
in
his
own
way.
But he
was
concerned
to
avoid
constructivisms
that would
corrupt phenomenological
evidence
in
those
non-egological investigations.
It
is
not
incompatible
to
have
papers
in
this
set
that exhibit
Simmel's
relation
to
both
Husserlian
and
Heideggerian
phenomenology.
In
light
of
a
broader
understanding
of
Husserl's entire
corpus,
we
believe
that
Husserl
would
not
have
been
opposed
to
Simmel's
starting
points
for
study,
but
that he
was
at?
tempting
to
find
a
way
to
rigorously
ground
such
starting points.
Simmel's
intellectual
flamboyance
allows him
to
leap
straightaway
into
areas
in
which
Husserl
was
too
cautious
to
venture.
We
claim
that
Simmel's
development
pushes
him
closer
to
a
phenomenological
viewpoint
because he
began to recognize structures present in the things themselves prior to any
cognitive
construction
on
the
theoretical
observer's
part.
It
was
this
honest
apprehension
that led
Simmel
to
modify
his
neo-Kantianism
and
then to
aban?
don
much of
it.
He
does
this
by starting
from
a
standpoint
of
immersion ;
from
the
empirical
subject
embedded
in
the
socio-historical
intersubjective
world,
which
allows him
to
advance
phenomenology
without
a
conscious
pre?
figuring
of
its
scope.
In
his
philosophical
anthropology
Simmel
strives
to
ground
a
fundamental
a
priori
basis
for human
feelings,
images,
and
narratives.
He
rejects
both
strictly
empirical approaches and sheerly speculative accounts in favor of piecemeal
advancements
into
a
wide
variety
of
human
activities,
attitudes,
and
world
views.
His
panoramic
compilation
of
human
studies
range
through
the
descrip?
tive
study
of
adventure
to
the
nature
of
the
bridge, through
ancient
ruins
to
modern
coquetry,
and
through
the
development
of
money
to
the
need for
tact.
His
work,
in
contrast
to
Husserl's,
arrives
at
the
parameters
of
phenomenol?
ogy
through
discovery;
that
is,
by
concrete
applications,
rather
than
through
a
highly
self-reflective
stance
of the
principles
of
phenomenology
prior
to
its
practice.
For Simmel, showing the legitimacy of history as a science
appeared
to be
an
important strategy.
Human
life
unfolds in
its
history;
thus
without
history
having
legitimacy,
the other
sciences,
which deal
with contents
of
an
histori?
cal
nature,
are
inherently problematic
sciences.
History
had
to
be
wrested
from
metaphysical
speculation
as
well
as
mere
storytelling.
Its
interpretative
meth?
odologies
had
to
be
justified
as an
epistemologically
sound
component
of
historical
science,
otherwise
the
legitimizing
course
would be
caught
in
the
errors
of
realism.
And
finally,
history
had
to
contain
a
logical
or
existential
component
such
that
it could
be
wrested
from
historicism.
The
philosophy
of
history that followed this course for
grounding
the
legitimacy
of historical
science
would
at
least
show
itself
to
be
not
incompatible
with
phenomenol?
ogy.
The
first of
the
papers
that
follows,
by
Gary
Backhaus
and
Richard
Owsley,
presents
a
discussion of
four
components
constitutive of
Simmel's
philoso?
phy
of
history
and shows
the
compatibility
ofthat
philosophy
of
history
with
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf
7/7
208
GARY
BACKHAUS
phenomenology.
Comparisons
could
be made with
Droysen,
Dilthey,
Humboldt,
and others (Mueller-Vollmer, 1994). Such a task is modest in its claim, but if
one were
to
carry
this
out
systematically,
certain
thinkers,
such
as
Rickert,
put
forth
a
philosophy
of
history quite
incompatible
with
phenomenology.
The
paper
discusses
methodological
and
epistemological
affinities that
are
absent
from
many
thinkers who
expounded
a
philosophy
of
history,
and exhibits
Simmel's
phenomenological
affinities.
The
second
paper,
by
Backhaus,
takes
up
the
problem
of evidence and in?
terlaces Husserlian
texts
with Simmel's 1918
essay
on
the
philosophy
of his?
tory.
My
goal
is
to
show that
Simmel
recognizes
the intuitive
apprehension
of
evidence,
instead
of
cognitive
constructions of the
observer,
as the basis
for
a
science of
history.
I
propose
that Simmel
explicates
historical intuition
in
a
way
that
is
coherent
with Husserl's
categorial
intuition,
which
is consid?
ered
the
epistemological
breakthrough
that
opens up
the material
apriori
-
the
field of
phenomenology.
The third
paper,
by
John
Jalbert,
addresses Simmel's
philosophy
of
life
and
thus is oriented
to
ontological
issues
in which Simmel shares
Heidegger's
concerns.
He
assesses
Simmel's
struggles
to
account
for the relation
between
the
historicity
of
human
existence
as
the
uninterrupted
flow
of life and the
problem
of
history
as
the
product
of
historical
reflection.
In
other
words,
the
focus
here is
on
the relation
between
the
ontological
and the
ontic.
References
Backhaus,
G.
(1992).
The Foundations
of
Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty
and
the Phenomen?
ological
Critique
of
Science.
Ph.D.
diss.
The American
University.
Heidegger,
M.
(1962).
Being
and
Time,
trans.
John
Macquarrie
and
Edward
Robinson.
New
York:
Harper
and Row.
Jaworski,
G.D.
(1997).
Georg
Simmel
and
the
American
Prospect.
Albany:
State
University
of
New
York Press.
Levine,
D.N.
(1997).
Simmel
Reappraised:
Old
Images,
New
Scholarship.
In C.
Camic
(Ed.),
Reclaiming
the
Sociological
Classics.
Oxford:
Blackwell
Publishers
Ltd.
Mueller-Vollmer,
K.
(Ed.)
(1994).
The Hermeneutic
Reader.
New York: Continuum.
Psathas,
G.
(Ed.)
(1973).
Phenomenological
Sociology:
Issues
and
Applications.
New
York:
John
Wiley
&
Sons.
Welton,
D.
(2000).
The
Other
Husserl:
The
Horizons
of
Transcendental
Phenomenology.
Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Press.
Wolff,
K.H.
(1991).
Survival
and
Sociology:
Vindicating
the
Human
Subject.
New
Brunswick
NJ: Transaction Publishers.
This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 19:45:40 PM
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp