Background

1985 TCSEC USA

1991 ITSEC Europe(France, Germany,Netherlands, UK)

1993 CTCPEC Canada

1993 FC(draft) USA

History

June 1993 All collaborate onCommon Criteria

January 1996 Version 1.0

October 1997 Version 2.0 Beta

June 1999 ISO 15408/version 2.1

TCSEC Issues

• non-standard

• inflexible

• not scalable

The Global Information Grid (GIG) and the Common Criteria (CC)

Global Information Grid•Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (reference (d)) and Title 10, U.S.C., Section 2223 (reference (a))•All DoD and Intelligence Community Computers

Information Assurance G&PM:5.2.20. Consult the IA Technical Framework (IATF) and published Common Criteria (CC) Protection Profiles for guidance regarding common classes of network and system attacks, interoperability and compatibility with the defense-in-depth strategy, and IA solutions that should be considered tocounter attacks.

5.2.21. Acquire IA solutions that have been evaluated using the CommonCriteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme based on the National InformationAssurance Program (NIAP) process.

NIAP - Collaboration between NIST and NSA for security evaluation

Common Criteria Sections

I. Introduction and General Model

II. Security Functional Requirements

III. Security Assurance Requirements

I. Introduction and General Model

• Defines general concepts and principals of IT security evaluation.

• Provides constructs for defining and selecting security objectives

• Provides guidelines for writing high-level specifications

II. Security Functional Requirements

• Provides functional components

III. Security Assurance Requirements

• Provides assurance requirements

• Evaluation Criteria of PP and ST

• Provides evaluation levels with a predefined scale (EAL’s)

Common Criteria

I. Introduction and General Model

I. Introduction and General Model

Definitions-

Target of Evaluation (TOE) — An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance

documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

Protection Profile (PP) — An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that

meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target (ST) — A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

I. Introduction and General Model

Protection Profiles

• Operating System

• Firewall

• Database

• Smart Card

• etc.

I. Introduction and General Model

Security Targets

• NT 4.0

• Oracle 8

• Checkpoint-1

• Visa SmartCard

• etc.

Requirements Structure

•Class

•Family

•leveling-specifies if components are hierarchic

•Component

•dependencies-other components that are relied upon

Requirements Structure

CLASS_FAMILY.Component

Class FIA-Identification and authentication

Family FIA_UID-User Identification

Component FIA_UID.1-Timing of Identification

Common Criteria

II. Security Functional Requirements

II. Security Functional Requirements

Level Example

Class Cryptographic Support

Family Cryptographic Key Management

Component Cryptographic Key Generation

Hierarchy of Security Functional Requirements

II. Security Functional RequirementsSecurity Functional Component•Dependencies

-Components rely on other components for satisfaction•Operations

-Iteration-Assignment:

FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of the least disruptive actions]

upon detection of a potential security violation.

-Selection: FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following

auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit;

-Refinement

ClassFAUFCOFCSFDPFIAFMTFPRFPTFRUFTAFTP

NameAuditCommunicationsCryptographic SupportUser Data ProtectionIdentification & AuthenticationSecurity ManagementPrivacyProtection of TOE Security FunctionsResource UtilizationTOE AccessTrusted Path / Channels

Security Functional Classes

II. Security Functional Requirements

Common Criteria

III. Security Assurance Requirements

III. Security Assurance Requirements

Definitions-

Package — A reusable set of either functional or assurance components (e.g. an EAL), combined together to satisfy a

set of identified security objectives.

Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) — A package consisting of assurance components from Part 3 that represents a point on the CC predefined assurancescale.

III. Security Assurance Requirements

Level Example

Class Delivery and Operation

Family Delivery

Component Detection of modification

Hierarchy of Security Assurance Requirements

ClassACMADOADVAGDALCATEAVAAPEASEAMA

NameConfiguration ManagementDelivery & OperationDevelopmentGuidance DocumentsLife Cycle SupportTestsVulnerability AssessmentProtection Profile EvaluationSecurity Target EvaluationMaintenance of Assurance

III. Security Assurance RequirementsSecurity Assurance Classes

III. Security Assurance Requirements

EAL Level Rough TCSECequivalent

Features

EAL1 N/A Functionally tested

EAL2 C1 Structurally testedGood commercial practice

EAL3 C2 Methodically testedProactive security design

EAL4 B1 Methodically designed, tested, and checkedMaximum assurance without specialized knowledgeLikely maximum for security retrofit

EAL5 B2 Semiformally designed and testedIncludes covert channel analysisDevelopment environment controls

EAL6 B3 Semiformally verified design and testedStructured development processModular and layered design

EAL7 A1 Formally verified design

Evaluation Assurance Levels

Current Certified Protection Profiles

• C2 =Controlled Access Protection Profile (Version 1.d)

• B1=Labeled Security Protection Profile (Version 1.b)

• Traffic Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low Risk Environments (Version 1.d)

Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP)

• Version 1.d

• Written by NSA

• Designed to replace C2

C2 vs CAPPC2 Sections CAPP Sections2.2.1 Security Policy 5.2 User Data Policy2.2.2 Accountability 2.2.2.1 Identification and

Authorization5.3 Identification and

Authorization 2.2.2.2 Audit 5.1 Security Audit

2.2.3 Assurance

2.2.3.1 Operational Assurance 5.5.15.5.3

Abstract Machine TestingDomain Seperation

2.2.3.2 Life-Cycle Assurance 6.6.3 Functional Testing2.2.4 Documentation 2.2.4.1 Security Feature User's

Guide6.4.2 User Guidance

2.2.4.2 Trusted Facility Manual 6.4.1 Administrator Guidance 2.2.4.3 Test Documentation 6.6 Security Testing 2.2.4.4 Design Documentation 6.3 Development

New Items in CAPP

5.1 Security Audit-lists 19 auditable events•All modifications to the values of security attributes•Actions taken due to audit storage failure

5.3.2 Strength of Authentication Data•Single guess has less than 1/1,000,000 chance•Multiple attempts in one minute have less than 1/100,000 chance

5.4 Security Management-specifies requirements and roles.

6.2 Delivery and Operation

Labeled Security Protection Profile(LSPP)

• Version 1.b

• Developed by NSA

• Designed to replace B1

B1 vs LSPPB1 Section LSPP Section2.1.1 Security Policy 5.2 User Data Policy3.1.2 Accountability 3.1.2.1 Identification and

Authorization5.3 Identification and

Authorization 3.1.2.2 Audit 5.1 Security Audit

3.1.3 Assurance

3.1.3.1 Operational Assurance 5.5.15.5.3

Abstract Machine TestingDomain Seperation

3.1.3.2 Life-Cycle Assurance 6.6.3 Functional Testing3.1.4 Documentation 3.1.4.1 Security Feature User's

Guide6.4.2 User Guidance

3.1.4.2 Trusted Facility Manual 6.4.1 Administrator Guidance 3.1.4.3 Test Documentation 6.6 Security Testing 3.1.4.4 Design Documentation 6.3 Development

New Items in LSPP

5.1 Security Audit-lists 19 auditable events•All attempts to import user data, including any security attributes•Actions taken due to audit storage failure

5.3.2 Strength of Authentication Data•Single guess has less than 1/1,000,000 chance•Multiple attempts in one minute have less than 1/100,000 chance

5.4 Security Management-specifies requirements and roles.

6.2 Delivery and Operation

ISO/IEC PDTR 15446• Expands on PPs and STs

• PPs and STs for composite TOEs

• Functional and Assurance Packages

• Generic and Worked Examples

Websites of InterestCommon Criteria

NIST- csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/cc

CC Toolbox- niap.nist.gov/tools/cctool.html

Others

GIG- cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/files.htm

NIAP- niap.nist.gov