1 Introduction

Lund University STV003

Department of Political Science Spring 2005

Supervisor: Martin Hall

US Foreign Policy and the Iraq War

An empirical study of realism?

Camilla Hansen

Abstract

This BA-thesis examines whether realism can be empirically tested on the Iraq war in 2003. I am inspired by Mearsheimers offensive realism, which holds that all states are aggressive because of the structure of international politics. Realism has a lot of theories about power, which I examine extensively and then apply empirically. Realism states that there are two strategies for a states survival. One for gaining power, and one for checking aggressors. The Iraq war can be analysed as a way for the US to gain power, or as a way of checking Saddam Hussein as an aggressor. I analyse the American foreign policy using offensive realism, which holds that all states want to become hegemons. I analyse how realist theory predicts that the US should behave as a state, and compare this with the empirical evidence. I also analyse the behaviour of Saddam Hussein using realist theory, which holds that all state leaders are rational.

Keywords: Realism, the 2003 Iraq War, Hegemony, Power, Geopolitics.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction... 4

1.1 Purpose and Research Question. 4

1.2 Methodological Considerations. 5

1.2.1 Methodological Discussion. 5

1.2.2 Material 5

1.2.3 Operational Discussion 6

1.3 Disposition.. 6

2 Realism.. 7 2.1 The Common Elements of Realism 7

2.2 Power and Realism. 8

2.2.1 The Balance of Power 10

2.2.2 Why States Struggle for Power. 10

2.3 Strategies for Survival 10

2.3.1 Strategies for Gaining Power. 11

2.3.2 Strategies for Checking Aggressors... 11

3 Realist Theory and the Iraq War.. 12

3.1 Balancing 12

3.2 US Foreign Policy.. 12

3.3 Continuing American Hegemony.. 13

3.3.1 Strategies for Gaining Power and Checking Aggressors 14

3.4 The Rationality of Saddam Hussein.. 15

4 Theories about the Iraq War 18

4.1 The Clash of Civilizations... 18

4.2 Securing the Continuation of Israel. 19

4.3 Gaining Control over the Oil Production. 19

4.4 Continuing American Hegemony 20

4.4.1 Buffer States.. 24

5 Conclusion... 25

5.1 Supports Realism. 25

5.2 Complicates Realism... 26

5.3 Summary. 27

6 References... 28

6.1 Literature. 28

6.2 Internet Sources... 29

1 IntroductionWhen the US government decided to invade Iraq in 2003 a lot of state leaders were appalled, which made a lot of people wonder why the US decided to make such a seemingly unpopular decision. The US is by far the most powerful nation today, which made the invasion of Iraq seem unnecessary, when the US does not seem to be threatened by any state. Considering the fact that the US decided to ignore the UN it seemed even more irrational for the US government to invade Iraq.

1.1 Purpose and Research Question

In this thesis I want to take a closer look at the foreign policy of the US government today. I am especially intrigued by what made the US government decide to invade Iraq in 2003, when they did not have the support of the UN or the world opinion in this decision. I believe that there must have been other reasons that made it seem necessary for the US government to invade Iraq in spite of the enormous opposition and reactions it caused. Therefore, in this thesis, I am examining what these reasons were.

I am using realist theory, especially inspired by Mearsheimers theories of offensive realism in this thesis in order to examine whether it can explain empirical evidence as the Iraq war. So, the purpose of this thesis is to examine if realist theory can explain the Iraq war in 2003. The thesis has two aims. To examine whether realist theory can be used in reality, and to examine why the US invaded Iraq. I am using realist theory to try to get a deeper understanding of why states act the way they do, and if this can be explained in a rational way. Can the behaviour of state leaders like Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush be interpreted as rational using realist theory? Can realist theory explain why the US decided to go against the world opinion and the UN by invading Iraq in 2003? In order to get a deeper understanding of why the US acts in ways that sometimes seem irrational, I am using offensive realism to analyse the US government, and how their role as a unipolar hegemon affects its actions. So, this thesis is a testing of realist theory and an examination of the Iraq war.

I have decided to use realist theory because it is the dominant theory in international relations, and therefore it seems appropriate to test this theory empirically on the Iraq war. Also, realist theory focuses on power and survival, and has extensive theories about hegemons, which makes this theory useful for an analysis of US hegemony. I have focused on Mearsheimers theories of offensive realism, because he focuses on the role of states and hegemons like the US, which he has analysed a lot. Therefore, I have chosen offensive realism as the basis of my thesis.

The research questions, which I have formulated and intend to answer in this thesis, are:Does realist theory explain the 2003 Iraq war?

Why did the US invade Iraq in 2003?

1.2 Methodological Considerations

1.2.1 Methodological Discussion

This thesis has a theoretical approach, meaning that I want to examine whether the empirical evidence from the 2003 Iraq war corresponds to what realist theory predicts. This type of method is suitable for a study that seeks to test the usefulness of a theory. I will be testing realist theory first by explaining realist theory, and especially offensive realism. After going through a thorough study of realist theory I will apply it to the empirical evidence of the Iraq war. I will then go on to examine the literature in the field of the 2003 Iraq war, which are mainly case studies and theories about US hegemony and the Iraq war.

Writing a BA-thesis has its limitations when it comes to time and money. Therefore I have had limited ways of obtaining knowledge about the 2003 Iraq war. I have chosen to deal with this by gathering as much literature about the Iraq war as possible during the writing process. By examining and comparing this literature I believe that I have been able to have as diverse views on the 2003 Iraq war as possible.

1.2.2 Material

This study is based on the empirical evidence gathered by writers and theorists, who have gathered information about the Iraq war and analysed it according to their point of view. I have used this material to gain knowledge about the Iraq war, which I have used as empirical evidence to test realism. I have also used this literature in chapter four to get an overview of the theories that exist about the Iraq war. I have gathered as many books as possible about this, because I believe that gathering as much literature from credible writers is the best way to gather as many views as possible.

Because of the fact that I am empirically testing realism, the foundation of my thesis is the literature about realism. In order to get diversity I have used textbooks about theories, international relations, and literature by realists. By incorporating textbooks I believe that I am able to get a more critical examination of realism, and I have used the literature by realists when I have wanted to get a closer look at certain aspects of realism. This was necessary when I needed to get more knowledge about offensive realism, and its theories about power and hegemony.

The literature I am using can be divided into three different categories: Literature about realist theory, literature about the 2003 Iraq war, and literature about the theories of clashes between civilizations.1.2.3 Operational Discussion

When writing a thesis, validity is of the essence, but it is also one of the hardest things to accomplish. Esaiasson et al. defines validity as the absence of systematic faults, which means the agreement between the theoretical definition and the operational indicator (Esaiasson et al. 2003: 61). The problem with validity occurs, because theories are formulated on a theoretical level whereas they are tested on an operational level. Therefore, the question of validity is: Am I studying what I am claiming to study?

Since my thesis is actually a testing of realist theory, I am testing the validity of realism when it is tested on empirical evidence. I do this by taking a close look at realist theory, and its explanations of international politics, and then compare them with the empirical evidence, which I have gathered about the Iraq war. I believe that I have overcome the problem with validity, because I have taken the explicit theories about power, hegemons etc. and compared this with the information gathered about the Iraq war.

1.3 Disposition

My intention for this thesis is to test realist theory empirically. Therefore, chapter two is an extensive overview of realism and offensive realism. I focus on the common elements of realism, but also on realist theories about power and the offensive realist theories about strategies for survival. In Chapter three I test realism empirically by applying the theories I have explained in chapter two to empirical evidence on balancing, US foreign policy and the rationality of state leaders. Chapter four is an overview of the theories that exist about the Iraq war, which I have selected from the literature I am using. These include theories about the clash of civilizations, theories about geopolitics, theories about the continuation of the state of Israel and theories about continuing American hegemony. In chapter five I will sum up my thesis by stating what evidence that supports realism and what evidence that does not support realism, and present some concluding remarks.

2 Realism

I am examining whether realist theory can explain the 2003 Iraq war, and in order to fully understand this, I will explain the characteristics of realist theory. I am focusing on the common elements of realism, but I am also influenced by offensive realism and John Mearsheimers theories.

2.1 The Common Elements of Realism

Realists believe that states do what they can to survive, and that the survival of the state is above all other things i.e. ethics. Realists believe that some moral principles do not exist (Baylis & Smith 2001: 142), and do not believe that states should act according to moral or ethics.

Dual moral standard is one of the core elements of realism. It states that there exists one moral standard for citizens living inside the state, and another for the state in its external relations with other states. These two moral standards exist, because the condition of international politics often make it necessary for state leaders to lie, cheat, kill etc. even though this is completely unacceptable to do for an individual (Ibid: 143).

All realists agree that outside the boundaries of the state anarchy exists (Ibid.). This is rooted in the fact that realists believe that international politics has no central authority that controls the behaviour of states. The use of the word anarchy is used to emphasise the lack of a central authority in this realm. Realists believe that the state is the key actor in international politics (Ibid.: 142).

Statism is the centrepiece of realism. Realists believe that states are the main actors in world politics, and that sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. Within the state sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws. Realists believe that there is an unwritten contract between the state and the individual in which the individual trade liberty for security. For realists power is the absolute basis of the state; the community simply cannot exist in the absence of power. Realists believe that within the state, the problem of order and security is solved. However, among independent sovereign states there is insecurity, danger, and threats to the existence of the state. This is because the existence of a sovereign which is the condition for order and security is missing in international politics. Because realists believe that anarchy exists outside the boundaries of the state, they compete for security, markets, influence etc. Realists believe that this competition is viewed in zero-sum terms, meaning that if one state gets more security, markets etc. another will get less, which evens out each other out. Because of this it is hard for states to agree on certain principles (Ibid.: 150).

Most realists agree that survival is the primary goal for every state in international politics. This is because survival is a precondition for attaining anything else; no other goals can be attained without survival of the state, which makes it essential. Besides survival, the goals of states can vary immensely.

I am supportive of Mearsheimers theory that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. According to Mearsheimer, states are always in pursuit of more power, and are willing to alter the existing distribution of power even if it jeopardises their own security. This means that there is always competition, because revisionist states and aspiring hegemons will always be willing to take risks with the aim of improving their position in the international system (Ibid.: 151-152).

Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states intentions. (Ibid.: 3).

Since there is no higher authority in the international system, there is no one to prevent or counter the use of force in international politics. Therefore security can only be obtained through self-help, but this will inevitably make other countries more insecure. The paradox of this is that military preparations of one state make the other countries uncertain, and insecure, which will turn the other countries to match the military preparations. The spiral of insecurity is called the security dilemma. States do not trust each other and tend to think that other states have bad intentions, which causes states to react very strongly to the actions of other states, because they always assume the worst. Ironically, the attempt to enhance security always worsens it in international politics (Ibid.: 153).

Realists do not believe that international organisations have any significance in international politics (Baylis & Smith 2003: 1), and they do not believe that the state should entrust its safety and survival to anyone else, because tomorrow they might be enemies. Therefore it is not wise for a state to trust in the UN, EU etc., because everything is uncertain.

2.2 Power and Realism

In realism power is defined as the ability to control outcomes (Baylis & Smith 2001: 158). According to realism, international politics is a constant balance of power, where some will gain more power, while other states will lose power. Because power is in equilibrium, the loss of power will always equal the gain of power. Power is mostly defined in military capabilities, because war is such an important factor in realist theory. Realists believe in the ubiquity of power (Ibid.: 142). Realism has its roots in the US, and it taught that leaders should focus on interests rather than ideology, to seek peace through strength, and to recognise that great powers can coexist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs. Because of this, realism can actually be seen as a manual for maximising the interests of the state in a hostile environment (Ibid.).

Power is essential to realists, because they believe that politics is a struggle for power, and that power is and its pursuit by individuals and states is ubiquitous and inescapable (Rengger 2000: 41). However, there is a clear distinction between domestic and international politics. For example, realists believe that domestic politics is able to channel the power-seeking ambitions of individuals in a less violent direction, but international politics is not (Baylis & Smith 2001: 143). This is due to the difference in structure of domestic and international politics. Power is also essential, because realists believe that states with more power stand a better chance of surviving than state with less power. Realists generally define power in military strategic terms as the ability to get what you want either through the threat or use of force (Ibid.: 144).

Great powers aim to be wealthy, and preferably wealthier than their rivals, because military power demands an economic foundation. Great powers also seek nuclear superiority and to have the mightiest land forces (Mearsheimer 2001: 138).

Realism holds that every state is fundamentally a power state i.e. the community can only function when power had been organised. According to realist theory the first move of the state is to organise power domestically, and then afterwards to accumulate power internationally (Baylis & Smith 2001: 150).

I am supportive of Mearsheimers theory that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system. Therefore states always desire more power and are willing to gain more power even if it jeopardises the states own security. Because of this, competition is always keen, because revisionist states and aspiring hegemons are always willing to take risks with the aim of improving their position in the international system (Ibid.: 152).

Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism states that The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001: 2). Because of the fact that all state leaders pursue this, international politics is always dominated by every state trying to gain more power. However, there are several ways to gain power.

Mearsheimers theory states that the unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favour. Simply put, great powers are primed for offence.. Mearsheimer argues that the structure of the international system forces states who seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other, and therefore international politics will always be aggressive (Ibid.: 3).

Blackmail and war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire power, and balancing and buck-passing are the principal strategies that great powers use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dangerous rival (Ibid.: 13).

I support the view of Mearsheimers offensive realism, which states that the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security. In other words, survival mandates aggressive behaviour. (Ibid: 21).

The US is an offshore balancer, because of the fact that it is protected by water, and geographically is more isolated than other countries (Ibid.: 234). However, the US has still acted as offensive realism predicts by maximizing its share of world power. The US is the only state in modern times to have gained regional hegemony (Ibid.: 236), which is exceptional in international politics. This makes the US by far the strongest power in the world. The US is the only regional hegemonic power in the multipolar world, which is the West, according to offensive realism.

Ikenberry uses a theory of international relations that is in-between realism and liberalism. He argues that the hegemon has three choices. It can dominate other countries by using the power it has. It can abandon by retreating to domestic isolation or it can transform the system into a durable institutionalised order. The choice of domination creates a hegemonic or imperial order in a hierarchical system. There are no checks on concentrated power in this system, and the stability of the system relies on the coercive use of the hegemons superior power. Abandonment causes a balance of power, and transformation causes a constitutional order (Schweller 2001: 1292). There is no doubt that the US has chosen domination as a strategy.

2.2.1 The Balance of Power

Realism argues that the balance of power is the primary guarantor of order in international politics (Rengger 2000: 43). Realists believe that the balance of power is essential for preserving the liberty of states. This theory states that if the survival of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side. (Baylis & Smith 2001: 144). The balance of power ensures an equilibrium of power, because it does not allow a state or several states to dominate other states. Realist theory also holds that this balance of power is not stable, because it will inevitably be broken by war or peaceful change (Ibid.: 154). Therefore the balance of power is part of a cycle that goes on in international politics. According to Baylis and Smith this shows that states are at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of the security dilemma, but they are not able to escape it. They believe that this is because of the absence of trust in international politics (Ibid.). A balance of power existed during the Cold War where both the US and the Soviet Union had allies to create a balance in power. However, because the Soviet Union no longer exists there currently is no balance of power.

2.2.2 Why States Struggle for PowerMearsheimer argues that the structure of the international system causes states to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. The emphasis is on structure instead of actors in offensive realism. Unlike human nature realism, which holds that states behave aggressively because they have a will to power, offensive realism argue that the structure forces them to act this way in order to survive. The explanation for why states strive for power is derived from five assumptions, which mandates states to behave competitively. The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic. The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the means to hurt and destroy other states. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states intentions. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001: 29-54).

2.3 Strategies for Survival

Realists argue that great powers strive for hegemony in their region of the world, aim to be wealthy, and seek nuclear superiority. States can use various strategies to shift the balance of power, and war is the main strategy in this case. Also, blackmail is a very useful tool, because it relies on the threat of the use of force, rather than the actual use of force, and therefore it is cheap (Mearsheimer 2001: 138). Balancing and buck-passing are the main tools used by great powers to prevent aggressors from upsetting the balance of power (Ibid.: 139).

2.3.1 Strategies for Gaining Power

War is the most common strategy that great powers use to increase their power. By conquering another state the great power can exploit a vanquished states economy for the benefit of the now even greater power. Also, the state can expand by defeating and help rebuilding the vanquished state. It is also possible for conquerors to gain power by confiscating natural resources such as oil and foodstuffs. The conqueror might also employ a part of the vanquished states population in its army or as forced labour in its homeland. Also, the conquestor can gain strategic important territory, in which the conquered state can act as a buffer zone used against attacks or to launch an attack. The balance of power can also be shifted in the victors favour by eliminating the vanquished state from the ranks of the great powers (Mearsheimer 2001: 147-151).

2.3.2 Strategies for Checking Aggressors

Great powers seek to gain power at the expense of others, but they also see to prevent other states from gaining power at their expense. Great powers invest in military power, which makes most states deterrable, but sometimes highly aggressive rivals do occur. There are two ways to deal with these aggressors: By balancing or buck-passing, where the latter is preferred, because it means that the state gets another state to bear the burden of balancing (Mearsheimer 2001: 155).

By balancing, the great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power. This is done by preferably deterring the aggressor or, if this does not work, by going to war. By balancing, the state has three options to make it work. It can use diplomatic channels to signal to the aggressor that the current balance of power will be maintained, and that they are willing to go to war in order to keep it that way. However, the emphasis is on confrontation, not conciliation, because they are stating a warning. The second option is for the threatened state to work to create a defensive alliance to help each other contain the aggressor. However, this approach is often inefficient, because it takes time to coordinate the efforts of all allies, and agreeing on the distribution of the burdens. The third option is for the threatened states to balance against the aggressor by mobilizing additional resources of their own e.g. by increasing the defence spending or implementing conscription (Mearsheimer 2001: 156-157). This is also called internal balancing.

3 Realist Theory and the Iraq War

States operate in a self-help world almost always according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. (Mearsheimer 2001: 33).

The decision made by the Bush administration to invade Iraq in 2003 can both be fit into realist theory, while some things also complicate realist theory. I will start by showing the things that are supported by realist theory, and then move on to the things in the 2003 Iraq war that does not seem to be supported by realist theory.

3.1 Balancing

When states are threatened in a multipolar system they can buck-pass, but if a great power is threatened in a bipolar system the hegemon must balance, because there is no other great power so that they can cooperate and buck-pass, which is always preferable because it is less risky. When there is only two hegemons balancing is the only option for the great power, and it will have to rely on its own resources, but can also seek alliances with smaller states.

In the case of the Iraq war in 2003; when the US felt that Iraq was a threat to the US, they had no other choice than to balance against Iraq, because the US is the only hegemon in a multipolar system, and therefore there is no other state that the US can share the risk with. Also, the US government felt that they had to balance against Iraq because Iraq was threatening the current balance of power, and the US had to defend this. The US had to be prepared to rely mainly on their own resources because it is the only hegemonic power, but could also seek alliances with smaller states. In reality, the US did go its own way when attacking Iraq, but also sought alliances with smaller states, so realist theory does explain this scenario well, assuming that the US did feel threatened by Iraq.

3.2 US Foreign Policy

The central aim of American foreign policy is, according to Mearsheimer, to dominate the Western Hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia. A pentagon planning document that was leaked to the press states: our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rivalthat poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet UnionOur strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. (Mearsheimer 2001: 386). The US has acted as a balancer mainly in Europe, but also in Northeast Asia to obtain this goal e.g. with the presence of the US army in former Yugoslavia. But the forces only acted like this when there was a potential hegemon in the neighbourhood that the local great powers could not contain by themselves (Ibid.).

Mearsheimer argues that the US does not have interests in keeping their troops in Europe and Northeast Asia. The argument for keeping US troops in these regions is that if the US sends its troops home it would probably lead to instability, and maybe even a great power war. Peace in these regions is vital for the US because of two things: 1) The prosperity of the American economy would be undermined by a major war in one of these regions, because of the level of economic interdependence among the worlds wealthiest powers, 2) the US would inevitably get dragged into a distant great power war, which is also why it makes sense for the US to maintain forces in these areas, and preserve peace in the regions. However, Mearsheimer argues that the US would not be harmed economically by a war in one of these regions, because the US actually prospered from World War 1. Also, he does not believe that the US would be willing to secure economic prosperity by going to war. He argues that they were not willing to use military forces during the oil crisis, and if they were not willing to engage in a war to secure economic prosperity, they are not willing to engage in a great power war for the same purpose. Mearsheimer does not believe that the US will get dragged into a great power war because the US is an offshore balancer, who will only get pulled into a great power war if there is a potential hegemon in the region that the local great powers cannot contain. This was also what happened in World War I and World War II when the European great powers were not able to contain Germany. Mearsheimer argues that there is no evidence so far that the US is willing to play the role of the peacemaker in Europe and Northeast Asia. The US has only sent forces to these regions in the past to prevent the rise of a peer competitor, not to maintain peace (Ibid.: 387-389).

The way the George W. Bush administration behaves seems to fit very well with realist theory. Martin Shaw writes: The US has a leadership with little interest in international institutions and worldwide democracy as such. Although the US needs international legitimacy, the USs interests in the UN will be purely tactical and it is likely to rely more on bilateral deals with Russia and China, whose semi- or openly authoritarian regimes will be happy if the US deals a blow to Islamic militancy. (Shaw 2001: 7).

3.3 Continuing American Hegemony

When the hegemonic power decides to go to war there is little that other nations and world opinion can do to stop it. (Baylis & Smith 2003: 1). This realist argument does seem to be supported by the behaviour of the US government in reality. In 2003 the US decided to invade Iraq in spite of the fact that the vast majority of nations tried to persuade them not to, or at least to wait. Also, the US decided to invade Iraq even though the UN advised them to wait. However, the US decided to invade Iraq without the consent of the world opinion or most nations, but neither world opinion nor any nations could do anything to stop it, and they turned out to be powerless when trying to stop the US from invading Iraq. Realists do not believe that international organisations in themselves have power over nations, which is supported by the fact that the UN could not affect the US in its decision about invading Iraq. Therefore the US chose to ignore the belief shared by many that the accusations towards Iraq stated by the US simply did not fit with reality, and instead the US chose to invade Iraq based on reasons that was mainly accusations.

In George W. Bush State of the Union address he stated that Our cause is just, and it continuesWe have found diagrams of American nuclear power plantsdetailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American citiesour war against terror is only beginning. (Sifry & Cerf 2003: 250). In this speech Bush is clearly trying to explain that Iraq is a danger to the rest of the world, and especially the US. He vividly explains how they have found evidence of WMD along with maps of American cities by trying to prove that Saddam Hussein is a threat to the US. Basically Bush is trying to prove that an invasion of Iraq would be self-defence, just as he is trying to explain that the war on terror is self-defence, and a just war. This is supported by realist theory, which holds that if a state is threatened by another state and there is only one great power, the great power has no other choice than to balance against the state. Balancing would mean that the state threatens to use force if the aggressor does not change his behaviour, and ultimately war if threats do not work.

In his State of the Union address George W. Bush said that the US invasion of Iraq had two objectives: First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. (Ibid.: 250). In this speech Bush is trying to prove that the Iraq war is prevention, securing not only the US but also the rest of the world from terrorists.

Kenneth Waltz cites a French cleric in saying that: I have never known a country disposing of overwhelming power to behave with forbearance and moderation for more than a very short period of time. (Kreisler 2003: 5). He says this because he believes that states do not learn from history, and abuse their power. He also says that The key characteristic of a unipolar world is that there are no checks and balances against that power...everything depends on the internal politics of the country in question. (Ibid.). Therefore, even though he is against the Iraq war, Kenneth Waltz believes that it is absolutely predictable that the US would invade Iraq, because hegemons will inevitably destroy themselves.

Offensive realist theory holds that the number one goal of states is survival, but states can also pursue non-security goals: For example, great powers invariably seek greater economic prosperity to enhance the welfare of their citizenrygreat powers also occasionally try to foster human rights around the globe. (Mearsheimer 2001: 46). The pursuit of non-security goals sometimes complements the hunt for power. For example the pursuit of oil provides the US with money, which makes the US even more powerful as a hegemon because money enables it to increase its military strength.

3.3.1 Strategies for Gaining Power and Checking Aggressors

Realists theory can explain why the US invaded Iraq in two ways. If the US sees Saddam as an aggressor the US would have to balance against Iraq by threatening with war. When these threats did not, according to the US, work on Saddam Hussein the US had to invade Iraq, because that is the only way to get rid of an aggressor according to realist theory. This is a strategy for containing an aggressor, and offensive realism states that the US has to behave in an aggressive way, because of the structure of international politics. The other way that realist theory can explain the Iraq war is that the US used Iraq to increase its power. This can be done by conquering another state, in this case Iraq, and exploiting its economy for the benefit of the conqueror that will acquire even more power by showing that it is able to beat another state, and because power can only thrive with a good economy (Mearsheimer 2001: 67-75). The US can also expand by defeating Iraq and then help rebuilding the country, which have been the case in reality. The conqueror can also gain power by confiscating natural resources such as oil and foodstuffs. The oil has played a significant role in Iraq. During the 2003 Iraq war oil pumps were sabotaged by Iraqis, which proves that oil was believed to be an important strategic resource. Also, during the rebuilding of Iraq, the US hired American firms to do the job. The conquered state can also act as a buffer zone used against attacks or to launch an attack. This is particularly interesting in the case of the Iraq war, because the US has lost all of its allies in the Middle East except for Israel, and is in desperate need of allies in the region in order to have any influence in the region. This is mostly due to the fact that the US and Israel are allies, and Israel is not popular in the Middle East. Gaining control over Iraq and gaining an ally in the Middle East could help the US with gaining significance in the Middle East.

3.4 The Rationality of Saddam Hussein

Some of the most prominent realists actually argued that the US should not invade Iraq. Some of them paid for an announcement in the New York Times on September 26, 2002, where they advised the US government not to invade Iraq (Baylis & Smith 2003: 1). The main argument made by realists was that invading Iraq was simply not in the interests of the US. This was because they, among other things, believed that Iraq was deterrable because the economic sanctions and threats of massive retaliation had worked so far (Ibid.: 3). So, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 also complicates realist theory.

Even though Kenneth Waltz believes that it was predictable that the US invaded Iraq, he does not think it was the best thing to do. He argues that Saddam Hussein is a dictator who has survived for a long time, and because he is a survivor he would not do anything that would jeopardise his survival. First of all he argues that Iraq is so weak, with a gross domestic product of $15 billion compared to $400 billion in the US, that Saddam Hussein would not send Iraq to war, when he knows that Iraq is too weak to survive a war. Second, Kenneth Waltz argues that containment and deterrence works, and that it deters Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction. He argues that Saddam Hussein is wise enough to know, that if he sold weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, the world would know that and punish him (Kreisler 2003: 6). Therefore it is not in Saddam Husseins interest to use or sell weapons of mass destruction. These guys are pressed from all sides...internally and externally as well, and they survive. Theyre crafty...They have proved themselves able to calculate where that line is. Crossing that line means youre going to be put out of business. (Ibid.: 6). Realists believe in the rationality of state leaders, and therefore Waltz believes that Iraq would not use weapons of mass destruction, because it would mean that Saddam Hussein is irrational. If Iraq used weapons of mass destruction, it would most certainly be the end of Iraq, as we know it, because Iraqs military capabilities are too weak to win a war against the US. This also turned out to be true, when the US invaded Iraq. The actual war was over very fast, and Iraq did not prove to be very resistant.

Mearsheimer and Walt elaborate further on the rationalism of Saddam Hussein. They argue that it was actually rational for Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in 1980, and Kuwait in 1990. They believe that the invasion of Iran was rational, because Iran had been very provocative towards Iraq combined with the diplomatic isolation of Iran, and the reduction of Irans military power. They believe that the invasion of Kuwait was rational, because it arose from a dispute over oil prices and war debts, and because of the fact that Iraq waited to invade Kuwait after the US government had stated that it would not oppose the decision of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. By showing these examples Mearsheimer and Walt believe to have shown, that Saddam Hussein only goes to war, when he is vulnerable or when he has a good reason to believe that his targets are weak or isolated (Mearsheimer & Walt 2002: 2). Because realists believe in the rationality of state leaders, realists argue that Saddam Hussein is not a madman like the US government has tried to picture him, but instead he is rational, like any other state leader.

Because realists believe that Saddam Hussein behaves in a rational way, they do not believe that the threat of Saddam using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is real. Like I argued earlier it would not benefit Iraq on the contrary and besides they see that fact that Saddam Hussein did not use WMD during the Gulf War or fire warheads at Israel as a proof that he did not intend to use WMD, and that the US was not under any real threat from being attacked by Iraq. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. (Mearsheimer 2001: 33).

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the fact that Saddam Hussein started two wars does not demonstrate that he is undeterrable, because he is not worse than states like Israel or Egypt in this respect. The Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 started when Iran was the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf due to its large population and support from the US. Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Shah was determined to extend his revolution across the Islamic world, starting with Iraq, which caused Iraq to go to war against Iran. Mearsheimer and Walt do not see this war as a sign of aggression coming from Saddam Hussein, but as an opportunistic response to a significant threat which thwarted Khomeinis attempt to topple Saddam and dominate the region (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003: 53).

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Gulf war of 1990 to 1991 was also rational. They see the war as an attempt to deal with Iraqs continued vulnerability, when the Iraqi economy was still damaged from the war with Iran, and argue that Saddam Hussein tried to solve Iraqs problems by using diplomacy, but that Kuwait did not budge to this. After meeting with the US, Saddam was told that the US had no special defence or security commitments to Kuwait, which was seen as giving the green light. Mearsheimer and Walt do believe that Saddam Hussein misjudged the situation when he attacked Kuwait, but they argue that history is full of cases like this. This does not make him any different than any other state leader, because he had weighted his options carefully before attacking. Therefore Mearsheimer and Walt believe that the invasion of Kuwait was Saddam Husseins way of finding a solution to Iraqs serious problems, and he did not believe that the war would cause such serious opposition (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003: 54).

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that invading Iraq in 2003 was not a wise decision made by the US government, because it is more important to eliminate the terrorist threat, and the Iraq war would divert attention and resources away from this task (Mearsheimer & Walt 2002: 2). Also, invading Iraq would most certainly fuel anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, which actually helps the terrorists that the US are fighting. Mearsheimer and Walt argue, Although the United States would almost certainly win such a war, armed conflict with Iraq would divert resources and attention from the more important task of eliminating the terrorist threat. There is no serious evidence of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda today, but war with Iraq would fuel anti-American sentiments in the Arab and Muslim world, making it easier for bin Laden and his ilk to recruit new martyrs to their cause. War with Iraq could also destabilize the region, and ousting Saddam would force the United States to occupy and police Iraq for many years. (Mearsheimer & Walt 2002: 2). So far, this point seems to have proven itself to be true, because the number of terrorist actions in Iraq has risen dramatically as an expression of anti-American sentiments, and the US has not been able to retreat from Iraq yet, because Iraq seems to be destabilised.

Realists believe that Saddam Hussein like any other state leader wants to survive, and therefore he is not a threat to the US. This is because he would never use WMD against a country that also has WMD, because it would be able to respond (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003: 55). Saddam Husseins past record also shows that he has never used WMD against the US or Israel although he has had the opportunity to do so, which seems to support realist theory about using WMD.

Mearsheimer and Walt do agree that containment may not be enough to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, and only the conquest and permanent occupation of Iraq could guarantee that, but they argue that the US can contain a nuclear Iraq just as they contained the Soviet Union, and therefore none of the nightmare scenarios invoked by the American government are realistic (Ibid.: 56).

George W. Bush has stated that Saddam Hussein intends to blackmail the world, and Condoleezza Rica has said that Saddam Hussein would use nuclear weapons to blackmail the entire international community (Ibid.: 56), which have been stated as a reason for invading Iraq, believing that only an invasion and occupation of Iraq would prevent Iraq from getting nuclear weapons. However, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that Saddam Hussein would not blackmail other countries, because this strategy only works if only the blackmailer has nuclear weapons, and not the target state or its allies: If the blackmailer and the target state both have nuclear weaponsthe blackmailers threat is an empty one because the blackmailer cannot carry out the threat without triggering his own destruction. (Ibid.). In fact Condoleezza Rice once said The first line of defence should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence if they [Iraq] do acquire weapons of mass destruction, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. (Ibid.: 57). This theory has also shown to be true so far, because the Soviet Union never blackmailed the US or its allies during the Cold War, because they both had nuclear weapons.

The argument that Iraq might hand nuclear weapons over to terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda is highly unlikely. First of all, the US government have tried to prove that there is a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda, but they have not been able to prove any connection, and therefore this scenario cannot be taken as a serious threat. However, if Al Qaeda did get their hands on nuclear weapons they most probably would use them, because they operate between borders and are not as easily found as regular states.

4 Theories about the Iraq War

In this chapter I will summarise the theories about why the US invaded Iraq in 2003. There are many theories about this, but the theories generally circle around three things: That the US wanted to gain control over the oil production in Iraq, the US wanted to secure the continuation of the state of Israel, and that the US wanted to continue American hegemony.

4.1 The Clash of Civilizations

Even though Samuel Huntingtons book The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order was written in 1996 it is useful for my analysis of the Iraq war in 2003 because Huntington describes the evolution of global politics after the Cold War. This is due to his theories about the clash of civilizations, and particularly the relationship between the West and Islam. First of all, Huntington argues that clashes between the West and Islam have happened before (Huntington 2002: 259). This is because violence between Muslims and the West has existed before and this violence is still in peoples memories. However, this does not explain the US invasion of Iraq fully. Huntington elaborates by arguing that changes in the demographic balance is one reason, because the expansion of one group creates political, economic and social pressures on other groups and induces countervailing responses (ibid.).

The US have been very dominating in the Middle East in the past century and Huntingtons theory would explain the rising anger in the Middle East directed towards the US, and the disrespect that leaders like Saddam Hussein have shown towards the US. It should be kept in mind that Iraq have behaved moderately towards other countries, because Saddam Husseins attention have been directed towards the US, which is surely not a coincidence.

Huntington makes a division between the West and the rest, which he believes will always be in conflict. In Clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order he predicts that future clashes between the West and the rest will arise because of interaction between Western arrogance and Islamic intolerance (ibid.: 183). This is a good description of the Iraq war in 2003, in which the US did seem arrogant because of its efforts to democratise the Middle East, which can be seen as a way of imposing Western values, and where also Saddam Hussein seemed as an arrogant leader who mocked the weapon inspectors and the UN. Huntington argues that the central problem in the relations between the West and the rest is, consequently, the discordance between the Wests particularly Americas efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so. (Ibid.). In other words Huntington argues that, in a way, the US have unknowingly helped to create all the anger towards the US that have been and still is - increasing in the Middle East. He argues that the US has always been a missionary nation and that the collapse of communism has reinforced the West in its view that democratic liberalism has triumphed globally (Ibid.). Because the US is in such a strong position in international politics it will continue to attempt to defend its interests and direct the rest of the world to do what it wants them to do. However, because non-Western states like Iraq have achieved independence they want to free themselves from the US economic, military and cultural domination. It is certainly obvious that this is what Saddam Hussein wants to accomplish. However, the US has not able to accept that.

4.2 Securing the Continuation of Israel

In Geoff Simons book Targeting Iraq Sanctions & bombing in US policy he is very critical towards the US. He argues that the US has been contemplating an economic embargo against Iraq before Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and that this was largely due to the pressure put upon the US government by the Jewish opinion (Simons 2002: 233). This was because Iraq had expressed its solidarity with the Palestinians which the US and Israel felt threatened by. Simons claims that the rest of the Arab world was under the control of the US-Israeli axis, but Saddam Hussein could not be bought of easily in this case, which is the real reason why the US invaded Iraq, according to Simons. Iraq was in the way of securing the continuation of Israel, which is why the US felt that they needed to destroy his (Saddam Husseins) capacity to endanger the Zionist entity (ibid.). Simons argues that the US also had a mercenary motive for invading Iraq. He believes this because he sees the US as a country that is driven by money more than any other country, and he argues that the immense amount of money that is put into the presidential campaigns is an example of this (ibid.: 134-235).

Gabriel Kolko argues that the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused a geopolitical earthquake that permitted American unilateralism on a scale never seen before. He argues that the American government can be split into three parts; Nationalists, like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who believe that America has overwhelming military power and should apply it, and neo-conservatives, such as Paul Wolfowitz, who are mainly Jewish academics and lawyers capable of articulating justifications for the use of power and war, and many of them are personally close to the Likud party. Kolko argues that their focus is mainly on altering fundamentally Middle Eastern politics to provide Israel a friendly geopolitical environment. The third part of the American government is Christians, who believe that the US has a divine mission to reorder the world (Kolko 2003: 12). Therefore the central aim of the Bush government is to gain control over the oil, military dominance and power in a geo-political sense. And the invasion of Iraq was seen by the US as a good way of gaining geo-political power in order to strengthen Israel and the US.4.3 Gaining Control over the Oil Production

The US uses 25% of all the oil that is produced today, which is far bigger than that of China by 8% that is the second biggest spender of oil. Calculations made by the American government estimates that the US will have to get 70% of its oil from other countries by 2025, and the Middle East, on the other hand, is the area that contains most oil. Saudi Arabia contains 20% of the oil in the world, which is the most, Iran contains 10% and Iraq contains 9%, which makes it the third biggest. So, if the US wants to secure that it will continue getting oil (which inevitably means abroad) there is no other way than to pursue an active foreign policy against these countries. Michael Klare believes that this involves war. In his book Blood and Oil he argues that the access of oil has played a major part in American foreign policy since 1979, where President Jimmy Carter guaranteed American that he would ensure the oil supply by all means necessary, including military forces. Klare believes that the oil supplies in the Persian Gulf is and has been an important reason for most wars recently, including the Iraq war. Klare argues that the US government can only get the trust of the American people by securing economic growth, which can only happen if the US gets the oil it needs (rskov 2005: 1). Therefore the US has to be sure that it will continue to get oil from the Persian Gulf, and one of the reasons for the Iraq war in 2003 was that the US wanted to be sure that it could also get oil from the Persian Gulf in the future.

4.4 Continuing American hegemony

Amin Saikal argues that the US involvement in the Middle East is dominated by the fact that the US has locked itself into a position to oppose any form of ideological and political behaviour that it perceives as threatening to US interests, which is the reason for the military interventionism in the Middle East by the US (Saikal 2003: 49). The US government feels that military intervention is needed to maintain American hegemony, and to contain the Middle East. Containing the Middle East is a part of continuing American hegemony, because the US, as the biggest consumer of oil, needs to be sure that it can get oil from the Persian Gulf in order to secure economic growth in the US.

The Danish journalist Jens Nauntofte have written the book Terror-krigen og det nye Mellemsten in which he argues that the Bush government have always wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein ever since the government was elected in 2001 (Nauntofte 2004: 29). Nauntofte believes that the US has a vision of creating a democratic Middle East created by a change of regime. Nauntofte argues that the Bush government is very neo-conservative, and that its primary goal is a world order controlled by the US, because they believe that the most important objective for a US government is to secure US hegemony. This new world order would start with a change of regime in the Middle East by making sure that the Arabian dictators had no more power, because this would provide the US with strategic access to oil deliverances in the Middle East, and secure the continuation of the state of Israel on a long term basis.

When Nauntofte labels Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle as neo-conservatives he defines this as being very conservative with an emphasis on living morally and being a good Christian. In reality this means that they willing to use military forces to achieve the goals they have set for the US without consideration of their allies or the UNs consent (ibid.). This is because the government believes that the US has to act as a hegemon in international politics, and create a new American world order. Nauntofte argues that the US government wants to spread democracy and create stabile governments in the Middle East, because they governments who focus on politics instead of religion (ibid.: 29-30). The US wants non-religious governments in the Middle East. They want this because they believe that the democratisation of states in the Middle East will make it harder for fundamentalist Muslims to support terrorism. The goal for the US government is a democratic Middle East without terrorism, and the US government is prepared to use military force in order to force a change of regime through if a country is not prepared to collaborate. Nauntofte argues that the US government intentionally implied that Saddam Hussein supported Al Qaeda even though they knew that it was not true, because making the public believe that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda made it easier for them to get the consent of the American public. Nauntofte believes that the primary objective of the US government is to continue American hegemony, but it also has other secondary goals such as securing the continuation of Israel and gaining control over the oil production, which according to offensive realism is possible as long as power is always the primary objective.

In Lars Erslev Andersens book Den amerikanske orden. USA og det moderne Mellemsten he focuses on Richard Perle, Richard Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz, who he believes influences the US policy a lot. He labels them hawks, because of their political aggressiveness, and he argues that their strategy for Iraq was to support a coup by the opposition in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein as the dictator of Iraq. They planned to use US military forces to support this mission, which in reality was an invasion, argues Andersen (Andersen 2003: 204). One thing that sets the hawks aside from other politicians is that they believe that Saddam Hussein is a madman beyond any reason, which means that the only thing that could be done about this was to remove him from his position as a dictator. The hawks believed that Saddam Hussein either had or were trying to get WMD, and that he were willing to use them, because he is irrational, which made him a threat to the US. The plan was to install a new government based on American values. The hawks in the US government thought that Saddam Hussein was such a big threat to the US that they were willing to pay whatever it cost to invade Iraq. They believed that Saddam Hussein was threat because it had been proven previously that Iraq had WMD, and because they believed it had been proven that Saddam Hussein was so irrational that regular strategies would not work on him. Andersen argues that oil also played a significant role in the war (Ibid.: 233-234). Not only did the US have its interests, but also Russia, France and China had even bigger investments in Iraq. A change of regime could mean a big loss to these countries, which is why Russia, France and China disagreed with the countries that wanted to pressure Saddam Hussein.In the article The new Bush doctrine by Richard Falk, he argues that the George W. Bush government has a new strategic doctrine that holds that the United States has the right to use military force against any state that is seen as hostile or makes moves to acquire weapons of mass destruction. (Richard Falk in Sifry & Cerf (ed.) 2003: 272). Falk sees this as an expression of the fact that the US government is now willing to use international force to fight terrorism, because of the thriving American nationalism that has blossomed since 9/11. Falk argues that this actually repudiates the core idea of the UN charter, because it prohibits the use of international force that is not undertaken in self-defence after an armed attack, or the result of a decision made by the UN (ibid.). Falk believes that for George W. Bush the emphasis has been on carrying the retaliatory war to the networked enemyand on declaring war against all those nonstable forces around the world. even though it did require some stretching of international law (ibid.: 273). Falk thinks that Bush misreads the challenge of cross-national terrorism when he does this, because Falk believes that containment and deterrence is still effective (ibid.: 274-275).

Falk argues that as a state Iraq behaves rationally by weighing costs and benefits. Iraq is threatened and surrounded by superior force and therefore, he argues, Saddam Hussein is a rational person, who the USA should not deal with differently than it deals with other states (ibid.). Falk believes that the US does not fear aggressive moves by the axis of evil, but instead it fears their acquisition of WMD which would give them a deterrent capability with respect to the US and UN, and the US is used to being undeterred (ibid.: 276). Falk argues that the US claims the right to global dominance and also professes to have the final answers for societal well being which is one of the reasons why the US invaded Iraq (ibid.). The US sees itself as the policeman of the world, and therefore he believes that the aim for the US is global dominance and to spread American values as much as possible, and he sees the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a way of doing that (ibid.: 276-277)

John Mearsheimer argues that the central aim of US foreign policy has been to dominate Europe and Northeast Asia. A pentagon planning document from 1992 states that Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rivalthat poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet UnionOur strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. (Mearsheimer 2001: 1). This document clearly states that the main objective for the US government is to continue US hegemony, and that this is not done by being protective, but also in foreign politics by preventing attacks to the American hegemony by potential hegemons or rogue states.

The hawks in the US government basically believe that Saddam Hussein is a madman, and that he is a serious threat to the US. By looking at what he has done in the past they believe that it is certain that he is a threat to his surroundings, and that deterrence does not work on Saddam. The fact that they also believed that he potentially had WMD was a fact too dangerous to accept for the US government, according to Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer 2003: 52). The hawks in the US government are neoconservatives, which causes them to believe that any threat to the US hegemony should be eliminated, and going to war is a reasonable solution to this for the neoconservatives. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, those who call for a preventive war portray Saddam Hussein as a serial aggressor bent on dominating the Persian Gulf. (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003: 52). These people also argue that Saddam Hussein is irrational and that he is unable to judge situations in a rational way, and therefore he may not be intimidated by serious threats.

People who support the war against Iraq have stated that containment will not prevent Saddam Hussein from obtaining nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer & Walt 2003: 56). These people also believe that once Saddam Hussein gets nuclear weapons, really bad things will happen. George W. Bush has stated that Saddam Hussein intends to blackmail the world, and Condoleezza Rice has stated that Saddam Hussein would use nuclear weapons to blackmail the entire international community (Ibid.). The US government has stated several times that they believe that Sadddam Hussein collaborates with Al Qaeda, and therefore, they also argue, that if Saddam Hussein got nuclear weapons some of them might slip in to the hands of Al Qaeda. According to Mearsheimer and Walt the reason why the US invaded Iraq in 2003 is that they believe that containment is not enough to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, and only the conquest and permanent occupation of Iraq could guarantee that (Ibid.).

Richard Falk believes that the US foreign policy needs to be understood in the light of the foreign policy of the Bush government prior to September 11th, which was notable for its self-conscious unilateralism, and its determination to proceed with missile defence despite the objections of almost everyone of its closest allies: To assert such preventive war prerogatives, without even seeking the backing of coalition partners, much less a willingness to proceed by way of the United Nations is to take on a domineering role that threatens to a degree the sovereign rights of every state on the planet and poses serious war dangers to all peoples in the world (Mearsheimer & Walt 2002: 6). Considering the fact that the US has ignored the world opinion and the UN when invading Iraq, and has stated if you are not with us, you are against us, it is very clear that the US sees itself as a strong hegemonic power, that will do what it wants regardless of the rest of the world.

Kees van der Pijl sees the 2003 Iraq war as a part of a bigger picture. He argues that the Western approach towards the outside world has shifted from a concern to aid indigenous processes of development to imposing Western social model, and if needed by force. He cites Dan Plesch in saying that President Bushs concern over Iraqs weapons of mass destruction is a pretext for a global strategy of pre-emptive attack. He and his advisors intend to establish precedents with Iraq that can be used against other states that stand out against US global control. (van der Pijl :1).

Van der Pijl clearly sees the invasion of Iraq as a way of maintaining US hegemony by suppressing those states that oppose US hegemony. He also believes that this is apparent in other US wars e.g. the Kosovo war. This is because the US suppresses state leaders who are defiant of the US. It does not matter to the US whether the state leader is a crook or a madman. It only matters if he is supportive of US hegemony. Van der Pijl believes that freedom and democracy for the Iraqi people, human rights and deterrence are only labels used to diminish opposition of the world when the US goes to war, and that war on terrorism is the unilateral, militarised version of interventionism (van der Pijl: 2).

Van der Pijl argues that to maintain US hegemony, they strike down on state leaders who oppose, and camouflage it as war on barbarians to satisfy the Western public. He argues that this legitimisation of war is needed for the US (as well as the West) to hold on to their self-image as being good people who are fighting against evil. Van der Pijl says that it is important for understanding contemporary world affairs to see that the English-speaking heartland was founded on ideas of a chosen people who made short shrift with any native populations they encountered (van der Pijl: 5), because he believes that this goes on to this day with the 2003 Iraq war.

Henry Kissinger and George Schultz published an article in the Washington Post in which they wrote that the United States continuing leverage should be focused on four key objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorist; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy Iranian or indigenous (Achcar 2005: 4). This implies that the US wants to gain control over Iraq, by emphasising the rivalries between the Sunnis and Shia Muslims, because it is easier to control Iraq if the population is divided, rather than if people stand together against US occupation. In this way the US will be able to maintain hegemony by invading Iraq and eliminating the country as a threat against American hegemony.

Robert Kagan argues that the immense power the US possesses makes it react differently to things than Europe do. He argues that Europe have enjoyed free security because most threats emanate from regions outside Europe where only the US can project effective force. It is precisely Americas great power and its willingness to assume the responsibility for protecting other nations that make it the primary target (Kagan 2003: 34). Kagan argues that it is true that the US meddles in a lot of issues across the world for example in the Middle East but the division of power today allows them to do this, because it is the only country that is powerful enough to handle such a task. America not only has the power, but also the willingness to exercise this power, which sets it apart from other countries on the planet. The US has been expanding its power and influence and it continues to do so.

4.4.1 Buffer States

Rufin has an interesting point about war in his LEmpire et les nouveaux barbares. According to Rufin the world consists of the civilised core, which is the empire, and outer barbarian area, and buffer states on the boundary lines, the limes. Wars are only conducted to contest or establish the status of buffer states (van der Pijl: 6). In the case of the Iraq war, the US is the empire. The empire is the most important area, and it is perceived as morally and ethically superior to the barbarians, and justice can only be a characteristic of the empire and not of the barbarians (Ibid.). This can be seen in the arguments the US made about preserving human rights in Iraq, democratising the Middle East by invading Iraq, and by portraying Saddam Hussein as a barbarian that could not be deterred and controlled, and had to be stopped by American forces. Although this theory is very interesting, and that I do believe that it does make sense to some extent, there are some flaws too. Rufins theory states that wars only occur to contest or establish the stats of buffer states, which would make Iraq a buffer state, because of the war between the US and Iraq in 2003. However, barbarians are seen as morally and ethically inferior and unjust, because they are the opposite of the empire. Therefore, according to this theory, Iraq would be a barbarian, but because war occurred between the US and Iraq, it would also be a buffer state.

5 Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to gain more knowledge about the Iraq war and to test whether realist theory, and especially offensive realism, can be tested empirically. I believe that realism has proven both that it can be tested empirically, but also that it only applies to certain cases.

5.1 Supports Realism

Realists believe that power is the controlling force in politics, and especially international politics, and power is defined as the ability to control outcomes. This is a hard thing to prove but the US certainly have shown that it is able to control outcomes, when US forces invaded Iraq without the consent of the UN or most other nations. Other countries like France also tried hard to persuade the US not to invade Iraq, which is also a sign of wanting to control outcomes. However, the US turned out to be a lot more powerful in this case. Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism states that the unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favour. This means that the US, which is by far the greatest power in the West, will always be looking for opportunities to gain even more power at the expense of other states. Realist theory can explain the Iraq war in 2003 by saying that the US saw invading Iraq as an opportunity to gain even more power at the expense of foremost Iraq. The invasion of Iraq can also be seen as a way for the US to prove to the world how powerful it is by not letting the US be taunted by Saddam Hussein, and by defying the opinion of the UN and other states.

The invasion of Iraq can be analysed as a strategy for gaining power or as a strategy for checking aggressors. By using war as a way of increasing their power, the US can exploit Iraqs economy for their own benefit and gain power by confiscating natural resources such as oil and foodstuffs. Also, the US can gain strategic important land by gaining an ally in the new Iraq, which the US has helped rebuild. War has been used as a way of checking aggressors, which is basically a way of preventing other states from gaining power at their own expense. In reality this is done by deterring the aggressor, who in this case is Iraq. When the US did not think that Iraq was deterrable they had no other choice than to invade Iraq, according to offensive realism. This is because the structure of international politics forces states to be aggressive in order to survive. Before and during the 2003 Iraq war the US gave the impression that they were threatened by Iraq, which means that they were trying to deter Iraq, which was an aggressor. However, looking at the image as being just and democratic that the US clearly wants the world to think of them, it is hard to imagine that they would say anything different from what they did, no matter what their motives were. The conditions of international politics today for countries in the West demands them to be just and democratic or at least to appear that way and no state leader would say anything that could not be explained as being just and democratic, because it is the rules of survival in international politics today. This does not mean that states today in the West are only just and democratic, because they can do whatever they want to within reason. It just means that whatever they do will have to be camouflaged as just and democratic.

US foreign policy can both be explained by offensive realist theory, but it also complicates offensive realist theory. The US foreign policy is, according to Mearshiemer, to be the hegemon (which is what all states strife for) in the Western Hemisphere and have no rival in either Europe or Northeast Asia. Empirically the US foreign policy is supported by offensive realist theory, because the central aim of American foreign policy is to be the hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and have no rival hegemon in Europe or Northeast Asia, which is supported by a Pentagon planning document that was leaked to the press (see page 8-9).

The US government decided to invade Iraq even though the UN and most of the US allies were against it. This is supported by offensive realism, which states, When the hegemonic power decides to go to war there is little that other nations and world opinion can do to stop it. (Baylis & Smith 2003: 1). It seemed to prove how powerful the US is, when it invaded Iraq in spite of all the objections from the public, because in the end the US were able to do what they wanted. When the US government decided to balance against Iraq it had three options. It can use diplomatic channels to signal to the aggressor that the current balance of power will be maintained, and that they are willing to go to war to keep it that way. The second option is for the threatened state to work to create a defensive alliance to help each other contain the aggressor. The third option is for the threatened states to balance against the aggressor by mobilizing additional resources of their own e.g. by increasing the defence spending or implementing conscription (Mearsheimer 2001: 156-157). During 2003 before the US invaded Iraq, it seems like the US went through all these stages. The US started by signalling to Iraq that they would not accept Saddam Husseins behaviour, and started to threaten with war against Iraq. When the US felt that threats did not work, they tried to create a defensive alliance to help contain Saddam Hussein. However, the US were not able to cooperate fully with the UN, which inevitably caused the US to balance against Iraq on their own.

5.2 Complicates Realism

The invasion of Iraq is hard to explain with offensive realism in some ways. According to offensive realism, the central aim of American foreign policy is to be the Hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and have no rival hegemon in Europe or Northeast Asia. How can offensive realism then explain that the US is invading a country in the Middle East, because this region should not interest the US enough to want to invade a country in other regions than Europe and Northeast Asia? Mearsheimer has trouble seeing why the US have troops in Europe and Northeast Asia, and argues that they should be sent back, and therefore it is even harder to explain why they should have troops in a region in which the US government does not aspire to be a hegemon.

Some of the most prominent realist scholars like Walt, Mearsheimer and Waltz actually argued against invading Iraq, because they believed that it was unnecessary. All state leaders are rational according to realist theory, which means that Saddam Hussein is also rational although the US government kept arguing that he was irrational and therefore you could not reason with him. Because realist theory holds that Saddam Hussein, like all state leaders, are rational, he is also deterrable because economic sanctions and threats of massive retaliation will always work on him, and they have in the past, realists argue. Therefore, realist theory tells us, that Saddam Hussein is not as big a threat to the US as the US government claimed and there was no reason to invade Iraq. If Saddam Hussein is rational he would acknowledge that Iraq is a weak state, and would never be foolish enough to attack such a powerful state as the US, because it is not wise to attack a state that has nuclear weapons regardless of whether you have WMD or not.

5.3 Summary

What realist theory tells us from this empirical testing is that it is certainly useful for empirical testing. However, it does have its limitations. I do believe that realist theory is true in some ways, but I also believe that it is impossible to create a theory about international politics, that is bullet-proof, because there will always be an element of unpredictability, which is unavoidable when humans interact. Realist theory has been able to explain the US foreign policy, why the US invaded Iraq and what the purpose was for invading Iraq. However, realist theory also has trouble explaining the behaviour of Saddam Hussein, and why the US invaded Iraq. It has been possible to explain most elements in the Iraq war using realist theory, but contradictions and complications have occurred. However, considering the fact that one theory cannot explain all events, I believe that realist theory can explain the Iraq war to some extent. Therefore I believe that realist theory have proven itself to be applicable in this case study although moderations must be taken into account.

6 References

6.1 Literature

Andersen, Lars Erslev: Den amerikanske orden. USA og det moderne Mellemsten. Kbenhavn: Aschehoug, 2003. 2nd ed.

Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: The globalization of world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 2nd ed.

Esaiasson, Peter Gilljam, Mikael Oscarsson, Henrik Wngnerud, Lena: Metodpraktikan. Konsten att studera samhlle, individ och marknad. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik, 2003. 2nd ed.

Huntington, Samuel P.: The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Touchstone, 1997.

Kagan, Robert: Of paradise and power. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

Kolko, Gabriel: Iraq, the United States and the End of the European Coalition in Coates, Ken (ed.): Speak truth to power. Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd., 2003.

Mearsheimer, John J.: The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton, 2001.

Mearsheimer, John J.: The future of the American Pacifier. Foreign affairs, September, No 1, 2001. pages 46-62

Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M.: An unnecessary war. Foreign policy. January/February 2003. No 134. pages 50-59

Nauntofte, Jens: Terror-krigen og det nye Mellemsten. Kbenhavn: Alinea, 2004.

Rengger, N. J.: International relations, political theory and the problem of order. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Saikal, Amin: Islam and the West. Conflict or cooperation? New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.

Schweller, Randall L.: After victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. By G. John Ikenberry. Journal of Politics, 2001. Vol. 63, issue 4, page 1291-1293. Blackwell Publishing.

Sifry, Micah L. and Cerf, Christopher (ed.): The Iraq war reader. History, documents, opinions. New York: Touchstone, 2003.

Simons, Geoff: Targeting Iraq. Sanctions & Bombing in US policy. London: Saqi books, 2002.

rskov, Stig: Mismatch. Der er en masse af olie i verden. Men de gale steder. Politiken, May 18th, 2005. 2nd section, page 5.

6.2 Internet Sources

Achcar, Gilbert: Whither Iraq? The US occupation and the antiwar movement after the election. Available at www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cmf?SectionID=15&ItemID=7308 (2-27-05)

Baylis, John and Smith, Steve: The globalization of world politics: 3e case study: The Iraq War, 2003. Available at www.oup.com/uk/best.textbooks/politics/globalization3e (2-27-05)

Falk, Richard: Testing patriotism and citizenship in the global terror war. Available at www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/202falk.htm (2-27-05)

Kreisler, Harry: Conversation with Kenneth N. Waltz. February 10, 2003. Available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Waltz/waltz-con0.html (2-27-05)

Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M.: Realists are not alone in opposing war with Iraq. Chronicle of Higher Education, November, No 15, 2002. Available at

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2002/iraq_che_111502.htm (2-27-05)

van der Pijl, Kees: The aesthetics of empire and the defeat of the left. Available at www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/212vanderpijl.htm (2-27-05)

Shaw, Martin: A regressive crystallization of global state power: Theorising a response to the war against terrorism. 2001. Available at www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/109shaw.htm (2-27-05)

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