b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno

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COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, Division p

Daniel COOPER, an individual; Petitioner/Appellant

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )))

Court of Appeal B241184 Superior Court YC064994 Lead for additional consolidated cases YC065018, YC065019, YC065021, YC065164, and SC113064 SC113135 SC113136 SC113137

v. Elia WEINBACH, an individual;

Defendant/Respondent.

Appeal From a Judgment of The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles

The Honorable Robert O’Brien

APPELLANT’S APPENDIX IN LIEU OF CLERK’S TRANSCRIPT

Volume 1 of 2, Pages 1 – 233 of 445

Kevin M. McCormick Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura, California 93002

Daniel Cooper 1836 10th Street #B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 In Pro Per

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AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS _________________

I, Daniel Cooper, in Pro Per, hereby certify pursuant to the

California Rules of Court, that the exhibits in this Appendix are true

copies of the original documents. They are labeled and consecutively

paginated chronologically with a separate alphabetic index.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of

California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed, at Los

Angeles, California on March 30, 2013.

_______________________________ Daniel Cooper, In Pro Per,


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APPENDICES CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX FOR RULE 8.124

DATE APP DESCRIPTION Vol Page

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5/8/2012 A Notice of Appeal (App-002) 1 7

6/5/2012 B Appellant’s Notice Designating Record

of Appeal (App-003)

1 12

5/25/2012 C Civil Case Information Statement (App-

004)

1 21

8/15/2012 D Certificate of Interested Entities or

Persons, Supplemental (App-008)

1 28

4/18/2012 E Court Order from which Appeal is

taken -- Entry of Judgment

1 31

3/5/2013 F Case Summary (Docket for both

SC113064 and Lead case YC064994)

1 71

6/17/2011 G Civil Complaint against Elia Weinbach

(Including Appendices 1-6);

1 81

6/24/2011 H Recusal of Judge Tarle, Segal and all

West District

1 152

7/7/2011 I Judge Kuhl relates COOPER cases and

assigns to Judge O’Brien

1 157

8/15/2011 J Petitioner Response to Request to

Consolidate

1 167

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8/30/2011 K Defendant Reply to Opposition to

Motion for Consolidation

1 172

8/31/2011 L Supplemental Response to Request to

Consolidate

1 182

8/31/2011 M Ettlin Joinder of Hearing and Opposition

to Consolidation

1 193

9/12/2011 N Court Orders of Consolidation 1 214

8/25/2011 O Request for Recusal under CCP

§170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)

1 224

8/25/2011 P Court Order Striking Statement of

Disqualification

1 230

9/6/2011 Q Writ of Mandate for Recusal of Judge

Robert O’Brien (Excluding duplicated

Appendices 4[part], 5, 7, 8, 9)

2 235

8/1/2011 R Demurrer by Defendant (without 300

pages of case citations)

2 329

8/10/2011 S Motion To Strike Demurrer

(Ruling 9-7-2011)

2 348

8/16/2011 T Plaintiff’s Answer to Demurrer

(Appendix omitted, duplicated above)

2 356

10/6/2011 U Motion For Change Of Venue For

Consolidated Cases (Excluding

duplicated Appendices 4, 6, 7, 9)

2 373

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APPENDICES ALPHABETIC INDEX FOR RULE 8.124

DATE APP DESCRIPTION Vol Page

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6/5/2012 B Appellant’s Notice Designating Record

of Appeal (App-003)

1 12

3/5/2013 F Case Summary (Docket for both

SC113064 and Lead case YC064994)

1 71

8/15/2012 D Certificate of Interested Entities or

Persons, Supplemental (App-008)

1 28

5/25/2012 C Civil Case Information Statement (App-

004)

1 21

6/17/2011 G Civil Complaint against Elia Weinbach

(Including Appendices 1-6);

1 81

4/18/2012 E Court Order from which Appeal is

taken -- Entry of Judgment

1 31

8/25/2011 P Court Order Striking Statement of

Disqualification

1 230

9/12/2011 N Court Orders of Consolidation 1 214

8/30/2011 K Defendant Reply to Opposition to

Motion for Consolidation

1 172

8/1/2011 R Demurrer by Defendant (without 300

pages of case citations)

2 329

8/31/2011 M Ettlin Joinder of Hearing and Opposition

to Consolidation

1 193

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7/7/2011 I Judge Kuhl relates COOPER cases and

assigns to Judge O’Brien

1 157

10/6/2011 U Motion For Change Of Venue For

Consolidated Cases (Excluding

duplicated Appendices 4, 6, 7, 9)

2 373

8/10/2011 S Motion To Strike Demurrer

(Ruling 9-7-2011)

2 348

5/8/2012 A Notice of Appeal (App-002) 1 7

8/15/2011 J Petitioner Response to Request to

Consolidate

1 167

8/16/2011 T Plaintiff’s Answer to Demurrer

(Appendix omitted, duplicated above)

2 356

6/24/2011 H Recusal of Judge Tarle, Segal and all

West District

1 152

8/25/2011 O Request for Recusal under CCP

§170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)

1 224

8/31/2011 L Supplemental Response to Request to

Consolidate

1 182

9/6/2011 Q Writ of Mandate for Recusal of Judge

Robert O’Brien (Excluding duplicated

Appendices 4[part], 5, 7, 8, 9)

2 235

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APPENDIX ! A!

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX ! B!

APPENDIX

B

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APPENDIX ! C!

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX ! D!

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APPENDIX

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!!(6)!MADELEINE FLIER received payments, failed to recuse, at risk !(7) LAURENCE D. RUBIN received payments, failed to recuse, at risk (8) VICTORIA GERRARD CHANEY received payments, failed to recuse, at risk (9) ROBERT M. MALLANO received payments, failed to recuse, at risk

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Dennis M Ettlin

Dennis M Ettlin

ATTACHMENT 2(SECOND PAGE OF APP-008)

APPENDIX ! E!

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Dennis M Ettlin

Dennis M Ettlin

APPENDIX ! F!

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F !!! !

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Case Number: SC113064DANIEL COOPER VS. ELIA WEINBACH

Filing Date: 06/17/2011Case Type: Civil Rights (General Jurisdiction)Status: Cons with Lead Case (see X-Ref) 09/12/2011

Consolidated for all Proceedings: YC064994 on 09/12/2011

Future Hearings

None

Documents Filed | Proceeding Information

Parties

ASHMANN-GERST JUDITH M. - Defendant

COOPER DANIEL - Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

COOPER DANIEL - Plaintiff

LEVANAS MICHAEL I. HON. - Defendant

MCCORMICK KEVIN M. ESQ. - Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

TODD KATHRYN DOI - Defendant

WEINBACH ELIA - Defendant

WEINBACH ELLA HON. - Defendant

Case Information | Party Information | Proceeding Information


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Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)

09/12/2011 Order (RE: MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATING MATTERS FILED BY DEFENDANT LEVANAS (SC 113137) )Filed by Court

09/08/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND VACATE ORDER RELATING CASE BYPLAINTIFF )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

09/02/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT. LEVANAS JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

PRINT

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https://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/onlineservices/LAECourtOnlineIndex.htm

FN-SSD Dennis

SC113064 prior to Consolidation

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI#































http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/index.aspx?ct=CI

https://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/onlineservices/civilImages/externalAppLink.aspx?casenumber=SC113064

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI#DOC

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI#EVT

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI#CAS

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilcasesummarynet/ui/casesummary.aspx?CT=CI#PTY


https://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/onlineservices/civilImages/externalAppLink.aspx?casenumber=SC113064



09/02/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT. LEVANAS JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTOF CAL., COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/31/2011 Response (TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES (SUPPLEMENTAL); )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/31/2011 Joinder in Opposition (TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES; (EMERGENCY) )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/30/2011 Reply to Opposition (TO MTION FOR AN ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/30/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (APPENDIX OF FEDERAL AUTHORITIES; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER BY DENT. JUDITH M. ASHMANN-GERST, JUSTICE OFTHE COURT OF APPEAL OF CAL. SECOND APPELLATE DIST. TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT(NO.SC 113136);)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE DEMURRER OF DENT. MICHAEL I. LEVANAS; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER BY DENT. KATHRYN DOI TODD, JUSTICE OF THECOURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT TO PLNT. IN PRO PER DANIEL COOPER'SCOMPLAINT CASE NO. SC113135 AND AUTHORITIES IN)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE DEMURRER OF DENT. ELIA WEINBACH; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/25/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOT. TO CONSOLIDATE BY DENT., MICHAEL I. LEVANES; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/22/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (MEDIA REQUEST; [FILED BY LESLIC C. DUTTON, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER-FULLDISCLOSURE NETWORK] )Filed by Interested Party

08/22/2011 Order (ON MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT COVERAGE; [DENIED] )Filed by Interested Party

08/16/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (ANSWER TO DEMURRER BY DEFENDANTS WEINBACH AND LEVANAS )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/01/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNTS. IN PRO PER D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

07/29/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; (2 OF 2) (RECEIPT # CCH118782085) )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

07/29/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR ORDER CONSOLIDATING MATTERS; (1 OF 2) RECEIT # CCH118782084) )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

07/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (AND DEMURRER MICHAEL I. LEVANAS, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIORCOURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, D. COOPER'S COMPLAINT (CASE NO.SC113137);)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

06/17/2011 Complaint Filed

06/17/2011 Order-Court Fee Waiver (AS TO PLFF DANIEL COOPER )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

06/17/2011 Request-Waive Court FeesFiled by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

06/17/2011 ComplaintFiled by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

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Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed

Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

09/12/2011 at 01:51 pm in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingCourt Order - Completed

08/25/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingDEMURRER - Case Taken Under Submission

07/07/2011 in Department 1, Carolyn B. Kuhl, PresidingOrder Re: Related Cases - Transferred to Department One

Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed | Proceeding Information

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6/1/12 11:22 AMLos Angeles Superior Court - Civil Case Summary

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Case Summary


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Case Number: YC064994DENNIS ETTLIN VS. GLENDA VEASEY

Filing Date: 06/16/2011Case Type: Civil Rights (General Jurisdiction)Status: Other Judgment 04/18/2012

Future Hearings None


Parties

ASHMANN-GERST JUDITH M. - Defendant

ETTLIN DENNIS - Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

ETTLIN DENNIS - Plaintiff, & Plaintiff in Pro Per

MCCORMICK KEVIN M. ESQ. - Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

SLAWSON JOHN - Defendant

TAYLOR KENNETH - Defendant

TODD KATHRYN DOI - Defendant

VEASEY GLENDA - Defendant

WEINBACH ELIA - Defendant



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https://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/onlineservices/civilImages/externalAppLink.aspx?casenumber=YC064994

FN-SSD Dennis

Consolidated under YC064994

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index#DOC

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index#EVT

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index#CAS

http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index#PTY


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05/09/2012 Notice (NTC TO ATTY RE NTC OF APPEAL )Filed by Clerk

05/08/2012 Notice of Appeal (filed by: Daniel Cooper, appellant in pro per )Filed by Appellant

05/08/2012 Request-Waive Court Fees (filed by: Daniel Cooper, appellant in pro per)Filed by Appellant

05/08/2012 Notice of Appeal (Dennis Ettlin )Filed by Appellant

05/08/2012 Request-Waive Court Fees (Dennis Ettlin )Filed by Appellant

04/18/2012 Judgment (ON ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT GLENDA VEASEY, COMMISSIONER OF THESUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)Filed by Court

04/18/2012 Judgment (ON ORDER SUSTAINING DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ELIA WEINBACH, COMMISSIONER OF THESUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)Filed by Court

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KATHRYN DOI TODD )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE//ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT FILED ON BEHALF OF KATHRYNDOI TODD)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF THE HON.MICHAEL I. LEVANAS)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF JUDITH M.ASHMANN-GERST)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF KENNETHTAYLOR )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF JOHNSLAWSON )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF SANDY R.

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KRIEGLER)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Memorandum of Costs ($395.00 COST ARE ENTERED 4-12-12 MEMOSCAN UNIT NO FILE/ORIGINAL JUDGMENT TO DEPT. FILED ON BEHALF OF THE HON.CAROLYN KUHL)Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SANDY R. KRIEGLER )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT THE HON. CAROLYN KUHL )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT JOHN SLAWSON )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KENNETH TAYLOR )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT JUDITH M. ASHMANN-GERST )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/20/2012 Judgment (IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT THE HON. MICHAEL I. LEVANAS )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

03/12/2012 Notice (OF VOID ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS BY JUDGE O'BRIEN BASEDUPON HIS FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT DISCLOSING ILLEGAL PAYMENTS FROMLOS ANGELES COUNTY )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

03/08/2012 Objection (TO BASIS FOR FEE AND PROPOSED JUDGMENT AFTERORDER )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

11/14/2011 Notice of RulingFiled by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

10/27/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FORCONSOLIDATED CASES; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

10/12/2011 Order (RE: DEMURRERS IN CASES YC064994, YC065018, YC065021,YC065019, YC065164 )Filed by Court

10/12/2011 Order (RE: DEMURRERS IN CASES SC113064, SC113135, SC113136,SC113137 )Filed by Court


10/06/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (ANSWER TO DEMURRER BY DENTS. DOI-TODD(SC113135) AND ASHMANN- GERTS (SC113136) RENEWED DEMAND O FOR JUDGESWHO NEVER RECIEVED COUNTY "JUDICIAL BENEFITS"; )

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Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

10/06/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOT. FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FORCONSOLIDATED CASES: )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per


10/03/2011 Proof of Serv of Ntc by Mail (RE: MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE,YC046994 AND CONSOLIDATED CASES; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

10/03/2011 Proof of Serv of Ntc by Mail (FOR RENEWED MOTION TO STRIKEDEMURRER, YC064994 AND CONSOLIDATED CASES, )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

09/29/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

09/29/2011 Opposition Document (TO MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

09/26/2011 Reply to Opposition (TO DEMURRER BY DENT. THE HON. GLENDAVEASEY, COMMISSIONER TO PLNT. IN PRO PER, DENNIS ETTLIN'S COMPLAINT; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

09/26/2011 Motion to Strike (ON DEMURRER )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

09/26/2011 Notice of Motion (MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FORCONSOLIDATED CASES; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

09/16/2011 Answer (TO DEMURRER BY DEFENDANT VASELY, ET AL; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

09/16/2011 Notice of Ruling (RE MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND VACTE ORDERELATING CASE BY PLNT. IN PRO PER, DENNIS ETTLIN; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNTS. COMPLAINT; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/30/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on Demurrer (TO PLNT. IN PRO PER D. ETTLIN'SCOMPLAINT; )Filed by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/25/2011 1N11's Ntc of Hrng on DemurrerFiled by Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

08/10/2011 Proof-Service/Summons (PARTY SERVED: GLENDA VEASEY; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/08/2011 Request (MEDIA REQUEST FILED BY FULL DISCLOSURE NETWORK )Filed by Interested Party

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08/08/2011 Order (ON MEDIA REQUEST TO PERMIT COVERAGE ** DENIED ** )Filed by Interested Party

Click on any of the below link(s) to see documents filed on or before the dateindicated:TOP 08/05/2011

08/05/2011 Motion to Strike (DEMURRER filed under case number SC11064 BYKEVIN M. McCOMICK AND BENTON, ORR, DUVAL,AND BUCKINGHAM; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/05/2011 Summons FiledFiled by Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner

08/05/2011 Motion (TO VACATE JUDGE KUHL'S ORDER RELATING CASESYC064994, YC065018, YC065019, and YC065021 RENEWED DEMAND; )Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/03/2011 Order (STRIKING STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION )Filed by Court

08/01/2011 Request (FOR RECUSAL UNDER CCP SECTION 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A. COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT BRIBES & OBJECTIONUNDER CCP 170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO RECUSE)Filed by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

08/01/2011 Order-Court Fee Waiver After Hrg (ON COURT FEE WAIVER )Filed by Court

07/22/2011 Request for Judicial NoticeFiled by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

06/16/2011 ComplaintFiled by Plaintiff & Plaintiff In Pro Per

06/16/2011 Complaint Filed

06/16/2011 Notice-Case Management Conference (DATE: 11-23-11 )Filed by Clerk

06/16/2011 Request-Waive Court FeesFiled by Plaintiff/Petitioner

Click on any of the below link(s) to see documents filed on or before the dateindicated:TOP 08/05/2011



04/18/2012 at 10:45 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingNotice of Entry of Judgment mailed - Completed

03/20/2012 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingCourt Order - Completed

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11/23/2011 at 08:30 am in Department SW11, William G. Willett, PresidingConference-Case Management (O/C - CASE TRANSFERRED TO CENTRALDISTRICT,PER 6/20/11 ORDER OFTHE SUPERVISING JUDGE) - Matter Placed Off Calendar

11/15/2011 at 10:40 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingRuling on Submitted Matter - Completed

11/09/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 86, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingMOTION - CHANGE OF VENUE (FOR CONSOLIDATED CASES;) - Submitted

10/12/2011 at 08:47 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingRuling on Submitted Matter - Completed

10/12/2011 at 01:40 pm in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingNunc Pro Tunc Order - Completed

10/06/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingDEMURRER (C/F 10/03/11) - Submitted

10/03/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingDEMURRER (BY DENT. JOHN SLAWSON;DEMURRER BY DENT. KENNETHTAYLOR;DEMURRER BY DENT. GLENDA VEASEY;MOTION TO STRIKE;) - Court makesorder

09/14/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingMotion to Vacate (AND MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER;) - Court makes order

09/12/2011 at 03:50 pm in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingCourt Order - Completed


08/01/2011 at 08:30 am in Department 59, Robert H. O'Brien, PresidingHrng/Appl for Fees and Costs - Granted in Part


07/06/2011 at 09:00 am in Department 1, Carolyn Kuhl, PresidingOrder Re: Related Cases - Case is reassigned

06/20/2011 at 08:30 am in Department G, Mark S. Arnold, PresidingRecusal (RECUSAL OF ALL SOUTHWEST DISTRICTJUDGES) - Case is reassigned

06/17/2011 at 08:30 am in Department SW11, William G. Willett, PresidingRecusal (RECUSAL OF JUDGE WILLETT G.WILLETT) - Case is reassigned


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CIVIL COMPLAINT AGAINST ELIA WEINBACH 2

Dan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4

PARTIES ..................................................................................................................... 4

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................... 4

ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE ...................................................................................... 4

GENERAL ALLEGATION ........................................................................................... 5

TITLE IV-D BIAS ......................................................................................................... 6

SBX2 11 ...................................................................................................................... 9

FRAUD ON THE COURT .......................................................................................... 12

JUDICIAL ETHICS .................................................................................................... 15

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE ................................ 16

VIOLATION OF “INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES” ......................... 16

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 20

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 23

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ..................................................................................... 24

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 25

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 29

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................... 30

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS ..................................................... 31

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................. 32 !

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 Documentation of payments to Elia WEINBACH ................................... A1

APPENDIX 2 Child Support Services Department Budget ......................................... A4

APPENDIX 3 Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties ............................................. A10

APPENDIX 4 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary ............................................ A17

APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 .................................................................................... A22

APPENDIX 6 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Public Summary .............................. A26

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Table of Authorities

Cases Page

Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) ........................................................................................... 14 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) .................................................................................................... 17 Carlson v. Eassa 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 (1997); ............................................................ 14 Carr v. Kamins 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 (2007) ................................................... 14 Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) ................................................................................. 13 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ............................................................................................. 15 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ................................................................................................. 16 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 .......................................................................................... 13 Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125 (1995) ........................................................ 14 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2008) ...................... 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 31 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles ___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) ......................................... 10, 11, 16, 19, 31 U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) ......................................................................................................... 13 Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) ..................................................................................................... 13 Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499 ........................................................................................ 13 Statutes

California Code of Civil Procedure § ____ ............................................ 14, 15, 17, 19, 34 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act ........................................................ 9, 16 U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 654 ................................ 6 U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 ............................ 7, 8 U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 658a .......................... 7, 8 U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 666 ................................ 7

Other Authorities California Senate Bill SBX2-11 ...................................................................... 9-14, 16, 20 California Code of Judicial Ethics ...................................................................... 15, 19, 30 Constitutional Provisions California Constitution, Article I, Sec. 1 ................................................................... 19, 20 California Constitution, Article I, Sec. 15 ....................................................................... 20 California Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 19 ................................................................. 9, 16

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INTRODUCTION

1. This action arises from the divorce proceedings for Daniel Cooper and Maeve

Crommie. The presiding bench officers received bribes from L.A. County, did not

disclose such, committed “fraud upon the court”, and still presided over the case.

Plaintiff is suing for damages and for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Section 1983.

PARTIES

2. Plaintiff, Daniel Cooper (“COOPER”), was at relevant times mentioned a resident

of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.

3. Plaintiff’s now ex-spouse, Maeve Crommie (“CROMMIE”) was formerly known as

Maeve Cooper.

4. Defendant, Elia Weinbach (“WEINBACH)”, is employed by the State of California

as a Superior Court Judge, for the County of Los Angeles. WEINBACH has held

that position since at least November 2007.

JURISDICTION

5. Plaintiff sues for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE

6. The acts and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Los Angeles

County, California and therefore the appropriate venue for this action is Superior

Court of California, Los Angeles County. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial with a judge

who has not received “judicial benefits” and has no experience with Family Law,

Title IV-D or Los Angeles County Domestic Violence programs.

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GENERAL ALLEGATION

7. At the time the family law case, SD026673, was filed in Superior Court in 2008

and throughout the proceedings, Plaintiff was not aware that Judge WEINBACH

was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time from the commencement of

the filing of the case through the present did Judge WEINBACH disclose that he

was receiving payments from L.A. County. At no time did he disclose the

appearance of, or the actual bias due to the L. A. County payments to him and

the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD) receipt of Title IV-D

funds from the federal and state governments based upon a percentage of the

disbursements ordered by the L.A. County judges plus an incentive for collections

above an annual “floor”. At no time did he disclose this “partnership” with the

CSSD. On January 20, 2011 Defendant denied any bias or prejudice. Defendant

obstructed justice by refusing to acknowledge the appearance of bribery and

obstructed justice by refusing to recuse himself.

8. Plaintiff’s January 20, 2011 motion and the January 28, 2011 Writ of Mandate

seeking to void Defendant’s orders identified and clarified the nature of the bias

introduced by the illegal payments. The linkage of federal Title IV-D funding to the

county budgets and the L.A. County Child Support Services Department (CSSD)

partnership with Judges is sufficient evidence of real and probable judicial bias

against Plaintiff, purchased by the county’s illegal payments. This linkage is also

documented here in succeeding paragraphs.

9. Plaintiff seeks damages for the loss of his constitutional rights, for obstruction of

justice, for damage to his livelihood and for emotional distress of not seeing his

children.

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TITLE IV-D BIAS

10. Family Law cases involve a large potential liability for the county. Federal funding

of the Title IV-D programs covers many of the potential county costs but only if the

state and county comply with federal guidelines.

11. L.A. County is an interested party in every divorce case because it receives Title

IV-D money based upon the expenses of its Child Support Services Department

with a “Floor” payment plus an incentive.

12. U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 654 states in

relevant part:

A state plan for child and spousal support must –

(1) Provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions [counties]

of the state;

**********

(4) provide that the state will --

(a) Provide services relative to ....the establishment, modification, or

enforcement of child support obligations...

(b) Enforce any support obligation established with respect to --

(1) A child with respect to whom the state provides services under the

plan; or

(2) the custodial parent of such child.

*******

(7) Provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate

courts and law enforcement officials...

(a) To assist the agency administering the plan, including the

entering into of financial arrangements with such courts and

officials in order to assure optimum results under such program,

and

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(b) with respect to any other matters of common concern to such courts

or officials and the agency administering such plan

*********

(13) Provide that the state will comply with such other requirements and

standards as the secretary determines to be necessary to the

establishment of an effective program for locating noncustodial parents,

establish paternity, obtaining support orders and collecting support.

13. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 sets forth the payments to

the states and shows the amount of payments to the states.

14. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 658a provides for incentive

payments to the states.

15. Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 666 requires the states to

have statutorily prescribed procedures to improve the effectiveness of child

support enforcement.

16. A true and correct copy of the Fiscal Year 2005-2006 L.A. County Budget for

Child Support Services Department pages 59-62 is included in the Appendix 2

and is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Such document shows the Child

Support Services Department “establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and

medical support obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders

... as required under federal and state law” (page 59). The Child Support Services

Department received federal and state Title IV-D funding fiscal years 2003-2006

(pages 61-62).

17. Appendix 3, Guidelines Section 2 makes it clear that support orders must be

issued. (The callous disregard for paternity is an affront to, and blatant disregard

to, the constitutional rights of a man receiving such a support order).

18. The L.A. County budget for the fiscal year 2005-2006 shows that the L.A. County

Child Support Services Department received $103,083,000 Federal Tittle IV-D

and $72,487,000 State Title IV-D for fiscal year 2003-2004; $125,545,000 Federal

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Tittle IV-D and $63,674,000 State Title IV-D budgeted for fiscal year 2004-2005,

and $124,578,000 Federal Tittle IV-D and $62,475,000 State Title IV-D proposed

for fiscal year 2005-2006. The budget shows that the Child Support Services

Department has the Superior Court as a “collaborative partner” and that it “

establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical support obligations for

children, enforces existing spousal support orders and determines parentage for

children as required under Federal and state law.” Among the services it provides

are “establishing parentage and child support orders”, “modify court orders” and

enforce support obligations amongst others.

19. The L.A. County payments to the L.A. Superior Court judges influences the

judges to order higher support awards from noncustodial parents and establish

mechanisms to require/enforce the ordering of higher support awards from

noncustodial parents to enable L.A. County to receive greater monies under Title

IV-D from the Federal and state governments to operate their Child Support

Services Departments and foster care departments. The higher awards by the

judges are made possible because there is no downside for the county. The

higher awards reduce the likelihood that children and supported spouses will seek

indigent aid from the county. The higher awards also increase the need and

likelihood for enforcement. The punitive enforcement mechanisms and excessive

interest rate increase the CSSD operations budget. Title IV-D sections 655 and

658 pay a percentage of the expenses related to support orders as well as

incentives, related to a “floor” payment for a fiscal year.

20. Page 61 of the 2005-2006 L.A. County budget shows that the Title IV-D federal

and state payments to L.A. County literally paid for the entire budget of Child

Support Services Department for the fiscal years 2004-2006.

21. The L.A. County Payments are “bribes” as they “influence” Judges to award

unequal custody and thus by CSSD guidelines establish higher custody payments

from noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support Services Department

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“establishes financial .... support obligations for children... as required under

federal and state law” and works as a “collaborative Partner” with the Superior

Court. The payment of money by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the

amount of child support (which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the

expenses of the L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of

those expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A.

County Child Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D federal and

state funds.

22. The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders against non-

custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support

Services Department, the higher the amount of Title IV-D federal and state

funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in the judge setting the greatest number

and the highest monetary child support orders. L.A. County is a “real party in

interest” in every divorce case as it reaps a financial benefit.

23. The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no purpose

other than to influence the judge’s decision to create a non-custodial parent and

high child support order, thus protecting the county interests.

SBX2 11

24. In mid-2010, COOPER became aware of the decision of Sturgeon v. County of

Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied 12/23/08, which held that

the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated Article VI,

Section 19 of the California Constitution and that the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial

Court Funding Act did not “prescribe” the payments of “judicial benefits” by

counties to Superior Court judges.

25. In December 2010 COOPER sent a letter to Greg Iverson, Countywide Payroll

Division Chief, Los Angeles County Auditor Controller requesting information on

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judicial benefits that might have been paid to the judges in his case. Appendix 1

contains the correspondence with the county and the auditor’s information.

26. Subsequent to the Sturgeon decision, on 2/20/09, SBX2 11 was passed by the

California legislature and acknowledged the unconstitutional and illegal nature of

the L.A. County payments by granting retroactive immunity. The full text of SBX2

11 is included in Appendix 5. Section 5 of SBX2 11 limited the immunity to “any

liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits

provided to a judge” effective 5/21/09.

27. This ex post facto immunity did not and could not restore Plaintiff’s California

Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during the

proceedings of Plaintiff’s family law case SD026673 under Judge WEINBACH.

28. The Fourth Appellate Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,

__Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called “Sturgeon II” concluded

on page 14:

“As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate governmental powers, quite limited.” (emphasis added)

29. The Appellate Court continues and contradicts itself on page 15;

“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to … the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I …[and] that interim remedy [SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.”

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(emphasis added)

30. If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by the court, why

would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels “quite limited” in

ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing to fully address this issue.

31. The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the county judicial benefit

payments. This civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of the citizen challenges

encouraged by Sturgeon II and, more importantly, to address the issue of bias,

the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on the court that

Sturgeon does not address.

32. Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not a

county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2 11) to terminate all

payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce cases;

therefore the furtherance and continued payments must be in the county

interests. Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and

reimbursements. Those county interests are the basis for judicial recusal and void

orders in divorce cases.

33. SBX2 11 stated that the judicial benefits are not state payments. SBX2 11

deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal immunity. The bill

granted immunity for monies received prior to July 2009.

34. The Judicial Council and the Legislature did not consider the injury and damage

to those who appeared before the judges or the injury by those prosecuted due to

void orders, or to the denial of civil rights by the California Attorney General due to

his cancellation of an investigation into this matter. Thus, there is no immunity

from fraud on the court or civil rights violations. (The state also has an incentive

to encourage Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements because whatever

general welfare responsibilities the counties do not pick up, could easily be shifted

to the state. Plus the state is the conduit by which the Title IV-D is implemented

and the judges will be liable to bias based on state compensation payments to

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them as well. If the Federal government wants to pass out money it can. As soon

as that money is administered by the courts, that money must meet all federal,

state and local legal and constitutional tests.)

35. Since the Appellate Court admitted that it did not fully address all the

Constitutional issues, the same payments, which received immunity prior to July

2009, no longer have criminal immunity. Defendant is also now liable for criminal

charges for the bribes taken in 2010 and 2011.

36. Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity and therefore its actual payments to

a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff. Both are

bribes. SBX2 11 granted criminal immunity for the bribes prior to May 2009. The

Appellate court in 2010 affirmed the county payments are optional. Thus they still

constitute a bribe and are illegal.

FRAUD ON THE COURT

37. Los Angeles County is the largest user of the Superior Court of California, County

of Los Angeles services. There are approximately, 2.7 million new cases each

year: about 1.7 million traffic tickets, 500,000 criminal cases, 120,000 family law

cases, and 150,000 civil lawsuits. The Office of the County Counsel provides

quarterly reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the county from on-

going litigation. This report is confidential and thus protects strategic and tactical

planning discussions from being exposed to the public. Appendix 6 contains the

2007 -2008 report signed by the Litigation Cost Manager.

38. Since L.A. County is an interested party in divorce cases and since the judges

receive illegal payments, “bribes”, from the county, the judges must at a minimum

inform parties that they are receiving such payments. Failure to do so is “FRAUD

ON THE COURT”.

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39. Defendant’s acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and his sitting on a case in

which L.A. County was an interested party voided all his orders and judgments.

Senate Bill SBX2 11 gave retroactive immunity because of benefits provided to a

judge under the official action of a governmental entity. Senate bill SBX2 11 did

not give retroactive immunity to judges who had received the county payments,

did not disclose such and then presided over cases in which the county had an

interest.

40. Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. The U.S. Supreme

Court stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):

“There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the solemn

contracts, documents and even judgments”

The Court continued at page 66:

“Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract...”

(citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)

The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co.,

254 U.S. 348 (1920):

“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act] beyond the

power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly

in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as

nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to

reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828):

Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236”

Since “fraud on the court” vitiates the entire case, all orders from that court or any

subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter jurisdiction.

No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; a void order is void at all

times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage

of time, Vallely, supra. The order is void ab initio.

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41. The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343

(1962):

“If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based

upon it is also void.”

42. All of Defendant’s orders are void and were void ab initio. Plaintiff sought to

achieve certainty under the law with a new judicial officer who had not taken the

illegal bribes. Plaintiff filed a Writ of Mandate on January 28, 2011, seeking to

void all Defendant’s orders and judgments as well as seeking his recusal. Appeal

may be taken from an order denying a motion to vacate a void judgment because

denial of the motion constitutes an order giving effect to a void judgment and thus

is itself void and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60

CR3d 196, 199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888;

Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34

CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125]. The Second Appellate Court in Los

Angeles County denied Plaintiff’s Writ of Mandate. Each of the Appellate court

Judges received the L.A. County bribes while serving in the Superior Court. Civil

suits are also being prepared against each of them for not recusing themselves

and committing their own “fraud on the court”.

43. SBX2 11 provided immunity to all those governmental persons associated with

the paying or receiving of judicial payments. SBX2 11 did not address “fraud on

the court” because it did not address or acknowledge any of the biases bought by

the bribes for the counties.

44. Defendant is not alone in committing “fraud on the court” by refusing to disclose

the L.A. County payments and refusing to disqualify himself in cases in which L.A.

County was a party or had an interest and in violating Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1)

and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). It appears to be a tacit agreement amongst

all of the L.A. Superior Court Judges, who have received L.A. County payments,

and L.A. County and L.A. County’s attorneys, to conceal such payments from

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opposing parties and commit “fraud on the court” in any case in which L.A. County

is a party or has an interest.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

45. California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from engaging in

any financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent transactions

or continuing business relations with lawyers or other persons likely to appear

before the judge or before the court in which the judge serves.

46. Canon 3E(2) requires the judge to disclose on the record information that is

reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil

Procedure (CCP) Section 170.1, even if the judge believes there is no actual

basis for disqualification.

47. Canon 3E(1) requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in

which disqualification is required by law.

48. CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states “A judge shall be disqualified if any one or

more of the following is true: .... A person aware of the facts might reasonably

entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial”.

49. Defendant violated Canon 4D(1) by taking payments from L.A. County, violated

Canon 3E(2) by not disclosing such payments on the record, and violated Canon

3E(1) and CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself.

50. Defendant’s actions of taking the bribe, not disclosing such and the resulting

“fraud on the court” have denied COOPER due process by denying him the right

to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

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DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE VIOLATION OF “INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES”

51. The L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges were held to violate

Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon, supra.

SBX2 11 did not change the California Constitution, did not make the judicial

benefits a state obligation, and therefore continuing payments also violate the

Constitution. The Sturgeon II decision acknowledged that SBX2 11 “preserved

the status quo ante Sturgeon I”

52. Appendix 4 incorporates herein as if set forth in full a true and correct copy of the

L.A. County Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Proposed Budget Trial Court Operations

pages 60.1 to 60.4. Such section shows that the “judicial benefits” are required to

be paid under the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. This is a false

statement as the Sturgeon case held that the 1997 Trial Court Funding Act did not

“prescribe the payment of judicial benefits by counties under Article VI, Section 19

of the California Constitution”. All of the L.A. County budgets from 1998 onwards

contain the same false statement.

53. Senate bill SBX2 11 did not give immunity to a judge who did not disclose the

county payments and then presided over a case in which the county had an

interest or was a party. Here the L.A. County Child Support Services Department

is an interested party as it “establishes financial ...support obligations for children,

enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under federal and state

law” and is a “collaborative partner” with the Superior Court (see Appendix 2,

pages 59-60).

54. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348

U.S. 11, 14 (1954): “A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which

he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.” In essence, by making all

L.A. Superior Court judges “eligible” for the L.A. County payments, L.A. County

has “bought the L.A. Superior Court”. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case

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of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion

page 16 in relevant part:

……..just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar

fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other

parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.

55. By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge, no party in

a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to benefit the

L.A. County Child Support Services Department over the interests of the “parties”

to the case.

56. The Sturgeon case showed that L.A. County had been making illegal payments to

L.A. Superior Court judges since the late 1980s. From that time through the

present, L.A. County and the L.A. Superior Court judges who received such illegal

payments committed “fraud on the court”, by not disclosing such. The L.A.

Superior Court judges also committed fraud upon the court by not disqualifying

themselves. They also violated Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1) and CCP Section

170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

57. These type of actions have been held to be a denial of due process in the U.S.

Supreme Court case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___

(2009). The court stated at Slip Opinion page 16:

.....just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man chooses the judge in his own cause.

58. The County-Auditor’s letter in Appendix 1, combined with the 2010-2011 L.A.

County proposed budget Trial Court Operations section in Appendix 4,

demonstrates that L.A. County has “bought” the L.A. Superior Court without the

consent of the “other party” opposing them. The L.A. County interest and

partnership with the court is clearly documented in Appendix 2 for all Family Law

cases.

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59. In addition to fraud on the court and the denial of due process, the non-disclosure

of illegal payments and the Title IV-D “partnership” are also violations of 18 U.S.C

Section 1346 – “the intangible right to honest services” (which U.S. Constitution

Article 6, CL 2 requires state judges to obey), which mandates that payments by a

party in a case to a judge are illegal, particularly in California which has a “unique”

bribery statute. Skilling v. United States, (Decided June 24, 2010) ___U.S.

____(18 U.S.C Section 346) “criminalizes” only the bribe and kick-back core of

the pre-McNally case law, page 45 of opinion. In the case of Adams v.

Commission on Judicial Performance (1994), 8 Cal.4th 630, 661-663 (Adams I)

the court represented “… conduct prejudicial to the administration justice that

brings the judicial office into disrepute.”) and in U.S. v. Frega, U.S. v. Malkus, U.S.

v. Adams (1999) 179 F. 3d 793 (the payment by a party and attorney appearing

before a judge to such judge are bribery and violate 18 U.S.C section 1346 – the

intangible right to honest services) starting at 805-807;

Because no linkage of payment and specific official act is required under California law and because the indictment incorporates the relevant state bribery statutes, which, in turn, state the elements of the bribery offenses, the indictment is valid in this respect.

60. But for the refusal of public officials to perform their sworn duties, these judges

and all other judges who received county payments would be removed from

judicial office and imprisoned for “bribery”, obstruction of justice and violation of

the “intangible right to honest services”.

61. California and Federal statutes and case law show that judges who take money

from persons appearing before them are guilty of accepting “bribes”, will be

disqualified from the case, removed from office for “ .. conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” and

imprisoned for “bribery” and violation of the “intangible right to honest services” 18

U.S.C. Section 1346.

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62. The result of these actions is that all cases before Defendant were vitiated and all

orders and judgments in the cases were void. The parties are left in a “legal

limbo” without any certainty. An entire legal system was corrupted.

63. Plaintiff COOPER brings this civil complaint seeking damages against Defendant

for the denial of Plaintiff’s civil rights. The current court partnership, built over 25

years of county bribes and federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of

California’s due process and equal protection guarantees and even to its

fundamental constitutional guarantee that,

SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

64. The Fourth Appellate Court’s decisions in the Sturgeon, supra , and Sturgeon v.

County of Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called

“Sturgeon I and II” cases, clearly stated that the judicial payments were

unconstitutional. The legislature confirmed the payments were illegal by giving

the judges limited immunity due to the bribes. Plaintiff’s case was heard during

this time in L.A. Superior Court. Plaintiff has established the nature of the bias

“bought” by the county. The orders and judgments in case SD026673 are void.

Judge WEINBACH has refused to recuse himself.

65. Plaintiff seeks damages for the injuries done to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks a divorce

judgment consistent with the California Constitution; especially Article 1 Section 1.

The “fraud on the court” has caused this case to be vitiated and the parties to be

in “legal limbo”. Case SD026673 needs to be completed, finalized and legal

certainty achieved to avoid problems in the future for the parties who are the

victims of Defendant Elia WEINBACH’s “fraud on the court”, violations of the

Canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics and violation of the California Code of Civil

Procedure. COOPER needs due process and his Constitutional rights restored.

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66. Plaintiff is seeking a jury trial on the issues because judges judging judges does

not provide due process when most judges are bribed. Plaintiff is also seeking an

award for consequential damages and for denial of his civil rights.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Denied Constitutional Guarantees)

67. Plaintiff COOPER re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through

66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the Appendices) as if

the same were fully set forth herein.

68. SBX2 11 was passed by the California legislature and acknowledged the

unconstitutional and illegal nature of the L.A. County payments by granting

immunity. Section 5 of SBX2 11 limited the immunity to “any liability or be subject

to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge”.

This unconstitutional ex post facto immunity did not and could not restore

Plaintiff’s California Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection

lost during the proceedings of Plaintiff’s family law case SD026673 under

Defendant, WEINBACH.

69. Defendant denied Plaintiff his 5th and 14th Amendment rights under the United

States Constitution and his similar rights under Article 1, Section 1 and Section 15

from the Constitution of the State of California.

70. Defendant’s payments from L.A. County from 2007 to 2010 are documented in

Exhibit 1. Defendant heard Plaintiff’s case in 2009. No disclosure of the payments

was made as required by CCP. This constituted “fraud on the court”.

71. Defendant filed papers to seek election as judge. The Fair Political Practices

Commission (FPPC) requires filing of a Form 700 Statement of Economic

Interests. The L.A. County payments are not included on that form as required by

the FPPC. Failure to reveal such information constituted electoral fraud.

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72. Defendant is sworn to uphold the laws and Constitutions of the United States and

the State of California. Defendant is assigned to hear Family Law cases in Los

Angeles County. Litigants in his courtroom have a right to expect that any ruling

will uphold all three bodies of law. The bribes from L.A. County call into question

Defendant’s ability and willingness to “hold the balance nice, clear and true”,

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). The bribes denied Plaintiff his right to

due process of law in his courtroom.

73. The taking of money by a judge who does not “throw the case” is still corrupt.

Justice Posner of the 7th Circuit stated in his remarks relating to Sir Francis

Bacon, that the judge who does not fulfill the “bargain” after he has taken the

money is equally as corrupt as the judge who takes the money and fulfills the

“bargain”.

74. Defendant chose those portions of the law that favored L.A. County because of its

bribe. L.A. County maintains a General Relief program and a Family and Social

Services program. In order to reduce the potential number of recipients and thus

the costs, Defendant used child support provisions of family law to shift the

potential burden of CROMMIE and the children from L.A. County onto Plaintiff.

The Title IV-D calculations, used by Defendant, are not based on California and

U.S. constitutional principles but rather on transferring the county’s welfare policy

to a related/convenient single individual earner.

75. Full remediation of Plaintiff’s civil rights likely includes, at a minimum, the

complete separation of the family courts from all the county’s Title IV-D funded

agencies. The current court partnership, built over 25 years of county bribes and

federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of California’s due process and equal

protection guarantees and even to its fundamental constitutional guarantee that, SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

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76. Divorce is the action of separating two parties and returning them to their pre-

marriage status as free and independent individuals. L.A. County’s bribes

guarantee that Plaintiff is not, and will never be, free and independent from his ex-

spouse following his L.A. County divorce. Defendant did not select the law that

upheld Plaintiff’s freedom and liberty.

77. Defendant’s Status order of July 7, 2009 changed the legal marital status of the

parties CROMMIE and COOPER to separate individuals and removed any prior

contractual obligations between CROMMIE and COOPER. Defendant failed to

return each party to their full constitutional status prior to marriage, required in a

“No Fault” divorce. By issuing inflated and unnecessary support orders between

the parties, and allowing CROMMIE to remain in a home she could not afford,

Defendant was solely protecting the interests of L.A. County.

78. California Family Law §4336 (b) states in relevant part “…..Nothing in this

subdivision precludes a court from determining that a marriage of less than 10

years is a marriage of long duration.“ This represents a lifetime penalty on Plaintiff

that is without precedent outside of Family Law. It is patently unconstitutional but

is written into the family law code and enforced because of the bribes by L.A.

County and the Title IV-D funding incentives from the Federal Government,

through the state, to Los Angeles County. Plaintiff has no confidence such a

provision would not be invoked in the future by Defendant or other bribed judge.

79. The supported party in a divorce can enjoy any post-divorce self-betterment by

the supporting party. Every salaried pay raise, every sales bonus raises the fear

of a support modification hearing. Thus, the risk and reward tradeoff for any

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investment in one’s self or a business venture is seriously and negatively

impacted. Any supporting spouse has a fiduciary responsibility to future business

partners to disclose the adverse impacts of a possible CA Family Law §3651

proceeding.

80. CA Family Law §3651 also applies to the success of this complaint. Plaintiff

therefore is requesting that any awards be placed in a charitable trust benefitting

Plaintiff’s children and such non-profits as Plaintiff may designate.

81. Plaintiff seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive

damages for violations of his constitutional rights.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Undeclared bribes from Los Angeles County caused fraud and bias)


66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the Appendices and all

paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the same were fully set

forth herein.

83. L.A. County Auditor records clearly document, in Appendix 1, the payments to

Defendant. The payments are bribes, paid by L.A. County to influence the courts

and reduce L.A. County liability.

84. Defendant also filed to campaign for a judicial office in 2010. The Form 700 did

not list Los Angeles County judicial payments. This constitutes electoral fraud.

85. Petitioner seeks punitive damages equal to all the bribes taken. The county

auditor records show this total of $153,549

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Denial of due process in domestic violence allegations)




forth herein.

87. Defendant’s practices and conduct have violated Plaintiff’s freedom,

independence and inalienable rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the

State of California.

88. On or about October 2008, a false allegation of domestic violence by CROMMIE

led to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) that forced Plaintiff to move out of

the marital home and leave his children.

89. On or about June 2010, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff due process in

resolving competing allegations of domestic violence. Defendant failed to notify

the District Attorney’s Family Violence Division, which handles cases in

Downtown Los Angeles and the surrounding areas. The District Attorney’s Office

will file criminal charges whenever there is legally sufficient evidence of a family

violence crime. No referral was made to the District Attorney, no public defender

was appointed to represent Plaintiff for the domestic violence charges. No

criminal convictions were sought or obtained.

90. Defendant’s refusal to insist on criminal prosecution for domestic violence

allegations reduced the workload of the District Attorney’s Office and thus

reduced L.A. County costs. The L.A. County bribe worked!

91. Based on the administrative review of the COOPER and CROMMIE domestic

violence filings and statements, Defendant abused COOPER’s right to due

process, decided in favor of CROMMIE, ordered Plaintiff to remain away from the

marital home and denied Plaintiff equal access to his children.

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92. Defendant consented to Title IV-D incentives to accept into family court a criminal

allegation because a hearing in Family Court provided justification for a lop-sided

custody award and increased child support order to meet Title IV-D incentives. It

provided the pretext for future CSSD administrative actions that would increase

the county’s Title IV-D reimbursements. CSSD has indeed taken actions to deny

COOPER his driving privilege and seize COOPER’s assets.

93. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages for the emotional distress of being treated

like a violent criminal, when in fact he is innocent, as related to the denial of his

constitutional rights.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Refusal to grant equal 50% custody)




forth herein.

95. Plaintiff has an inalienable right to raise his children. Each parent has an equal

50% right to their children. Defendant’s custody order is capricious and without

merit and designed solely to generate the largest Title IV-D support payment

possible.

96. On or about April 2009, Defendant’s final trial judgment made permanent the

temporary custody arrangement created by the TRO. Plaintiff was permanently

forced out of his house and forced to leave his children. Defendant provided

CROMMIE with de facto primary custody, justifying a lop-sided child support

payment for CSSD.

97. The responsibility to support children is also shared equally by each parent.

Defendant never asserted that responsibility to CROMMIE. Instead, Defendant,

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allowed CROMMIE to go to school rather than work full-time in her profession as

a specialty nurse. Full time earnings would have reduced child support owed by

Plaintiff. Plaintiff was thus left to conclude that Defendant intended to order

Plaintiff to assume an unequal share of the parental financial responsibility; again,

justifying a lop-sided child support payment for CSSD.

98. The support order was generated using the Title IV-D influenced support

calculator promulgated by the Los Angeles County Child Support Services

Department (CSSD). Plaintiff’s current income was clearly shown as zero.

Defendant, however, used the monthly average annual income for support

calculation; again, justifying a lop-sided child support payment for CSSD.

99. Defendant’s bias was further evident when CROMMIE became agitated at

Defendant that support was too low. Defendant prompted CROMMIE for F.C.

§4062 childcare expenses. Plaintiff stated that such payments were fully

reimbursed by the State and demanded evidence of net childcare expenses by

CROMMIE. CROMMIE screamed at Defendant about the low level of child

support and was then forcibly removed from the Court. Defendant ignored the

apparent perjury and then ordered the highest possible child support, in keeping

with Title IV-D biases. The very next day Plaintiff, with no income, was in default

on his child support payments. Again, this justified CSSD administrative actions,

which increased the reimbursements from the State and Federal governments.

100. Defendant’s partnership with the CSSD made him aware that CSSD would

vigorously prosecute the defaulted child support. The first step by CSSD is to

revoke a driver’s license. Defendant could easily foresee the situation that Plaintiff

would have no vehicle insurance and no driver’s license but be attempting to

search for work. The L.A. County bribes clearly influenced Defendant’s decisions.

101. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $500,000 for the alienation and

emotional distress of!being deprived of his inalienable right to raise his children

and enjoy stable and safe parental relations with his children as protected by the

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14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

102. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $750,000 for the emotional distress

and injury of!being placed in a “debtors prison” condition as relates to the denial of

his constitutional rights.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Failure to exercise fiduciary responsibility for family assets)

103. Plaintiff COOPER re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1

through 66, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the

Appendices and all paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the

same were fully set forth herein.

104. Defendant failed his fiduciary responsibility by allowing uncontrolled legal

expenses, not consistent with the marital lifestyle, assets or income and by failing

to provide proper guidance for the parties in settling property claims.

105. Defendant failed his fiduciary responsibility by allowing CROMMIE to remain in

the marital home without the income to support the mortgage payments.

CROMMIE’s gross monthly income was stated as $2,800. The mortgage

payments totaled approximately $3,500 monthly. Defendant failed to monitor the

parties home mortgage situation closely, destroying community property asset

value and destroying COOPER’s credit rating and future employability.

106. Defendant encouraged CROMMIE to attend school while the family was

without sufficient income. As a registered nurse, CROMMIE could easily have

increased her hours to full-time, allowing her to support the mortgage payment

and provide spousal support to unemployed COOPER.

107. Paragraph 14 of Defendant’s Final Judgment in SD026673 gave CROMMIE

120 days from July 8, 2009 to refinance the home. After 18 months CROMMIE

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had not completed the refinancing or a loan assumption. COOPER received no

notification, communication or notices from an escrow company or Bank of

America on the pending refinance. COOPER informed the court that CROMMIE

refused to make the loan payments. Defendant refused to address CROMMIE’s

lack of income and subsequent default on the mortgage payments and the

consequent impact on getting the loan refinanced.

108. On about January 20, 2011 Plaintiff sought to protect his credit rating and

future employability by seeking court authorization to allow him to sell the home.

Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s claim and instead transferred the marital home to a

biased third party without any admonition to protect Plaintiff’s credit rating.

109. Defendant’s irresponsibility caused a destruction of family assets far greater

than any child or spousal support awards. Defendant’s irresponsibility cost the

State and Federal government far more in education and retirement costs than

could possibly have been saved by L.A. County welfare costs.

110. Defendant allowed the transfer of marital assets to one of the lawyers with

whom he had frequent contact, in violation of Canon 4D(1).

111. Plaintiff seeks $800,000 in compensatory damages for lifetime damage to his

credit rating and employability.

112. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to remain in a

home which she could not afford and thus diminishing the value of community

property.

113. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to hire counsel,

which she could not afford and deplete community assets contrary to the marital

lifestyle.

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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Gender Discrimination)





115. In a clear case of gender discrimination, Defendant failed to monitor

CROMMIE’s job search and refused to order CROMMIE to fully support the

family, but insisted on punitive weekly job search reports from Plaintiff. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant has rarely if ever made such an order against women in

other Family Law cases before him.

116. Defendant’s dismissal of COOPER’s motion for spousal support is further

evidence of gender bias against COOPER. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has

rarely if ever ordered and enforced spousal support orders for women to support

men.

117. Defendant’s child support order of $574 per month for an unemployed home

construction worker in Southern California in the depth of the great recession was

clearly prejudicial. COOPER could only assume that Defendant expected

COOPER to disproportionately bear the responsibility of supporting the children

and was sending COOPER the strongest possible message to that effect.

118. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in gender bias damages and $500,000 in punitive

damages for not making equal orders for CROMMIE and COOPER to find and

secure full-time employment to support the family.

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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Legal Fees)





120. Plaintiff broke no laws. Plaintiff had no need for a lawyer prior to divorce.

Plaintiff’s marital lifestyle and income level were not consistent with significant

expenditures on legal fees. Plaintiff only needed the administrative services of the

court, the principles of fairness that are typically associated with the Small Claims

Court, and respect for his Constitutional rights.

121. On or about April 2009, Defendant indicated that he was in a hurry to decide

the dissolution case because the parties had been to court about 20 times.

122. California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from

engaging in continuing business relations with lawyers or other persons likely to

appear before the judge or before the court in which the judge serves. There were

approximately 25 dates on which court proceedings took place. Using a cost of

approximately $12,000 per day per courtroom, Defendant’s refusal to make

decisions conducive to settlement offers and his rush to justice cost the state

(approximately 1/3 day on average per appearance) about $100,000. This does

not include the state costs of the appellate court.

123. Since all orders in Plaintiff’s dissolution case are void, Plaintiff must now re-

litigate his marital dissolution to remove and compensate for Title IV-D biases and

for any influence of L.A. County interests. This new litigation is estimated to easily

exceed $300,000.

124. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 for his injury, $100,000 for the damage to the state,

and $250,000 in punitive damages.

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS BASED ON WIDESPREAD JUDICIAL BIAS





126. The Sturgeon, supra, case is an example of judges judging judges. Under the

best of circumstances this process upholds the rule of law. Introduction of bribes

corrupts the process. Payment of “judicial benefits” to 80% of California judges

over a 20-year period not only corrupts the individuals but also the entire system.

127. Plaintiff’s first choice was to have this matter fully addressed, decided and

remedied by the Appellate Courts. The Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division, in

its December 28, 2010 ruling on “Sturgeon II” refused to order additional actions

to eliminate the unconstitutional county payments. The court did not in any way

rescind or modify its prior determination that the bribes were illegal. Therefore, the

Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division noted that, following its Sturgeon II ruling,

it anticipated additional challenges and remedies by taxpayers. The court, on its

own, would not uphold Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

128. Individual judges and the court system will not stop this corruption and denial

of civil rights. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks a jury trial to achieve declaratory relief,

compensatory relief and also punitive relief.

129. Plaintiff seeks remediation of his impaired civil rights. The county’s welfare

biases introduced by the bribes can be partially ameliorated with an un-bribed

judge. However, finding an un-bribed judge who is also un-biased by over 25

years of county-participation in Title IV-D funding incentives will be difficult.

Plaintiff is seeking his constitutional rights, not easy solutions.

AA-113

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Dan

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oope

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pria

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sona

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows with regard to each of the above causes of

action:

AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. For general compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000,000;

2. For punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000

3. For attorneys’ fees and costs of suit herein according to proof;

4. For interest as allowed by law

AS TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. For general and specific punitive damages of $153,549;



AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages for the emotional distress of being

treated like a violent criminal when in fact he was innocent.



AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. For general compensatory damages Plaintiff seeks an amount of $500,000

for the alienation and emotional distress of!being deprived of his inalienable

right to raise his children.

2. For general compensatory damages Plaintiff seeks an amount of $750,000

AA-114

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Dan

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for the emotional distress and injury of!being placed in a “debtors prison”

condition



AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. Plaintiff seeks $800,000 in compensatory damages for lifetime damage to

his credit rating.

2. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to remain in a

home that she could not afford, diminishing the value of community

property.

3. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages for allowing CROMMIE to hire

counsel, which she could not afford



AS TO THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 for his gender bias injury and $500,000 in

punitive damages.



AS TO THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 for his injury, $100,000 for the damage to the

state, and $250,000 in punitive damages.



AA-115

AA-116

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APPENDIX

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Page A1 AA-117

Page A2 AA-118

Page A3 AA-119

!

APPENDIX

2

Page A4 AA-120

Page A5 AA-121

Page A6 AA-122

Page A7 AA-123

Dennis M Ettlin

Page A8 AA-124

Dennis M Ettlin

Page A9 AA-125

Dennis M Ettlin

!

!!!!!!!!!!!

APPENDIX

3

Page A10 AA-126

3/20/11 11:29 AMChild Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)

Page 1 of 4http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/

Home | Food Stamp Guide | Case Summaries | Google

These are electronic copies of materials distributed with the permission of the various presenters of thistraining. The materials are organized by the corresponding topics presented. Included are otherdocuments useful to advocates working on child support issues, including copies of or links to relevantfederal and state statutory and regulatory resources, select court orders and essential administrativeforms. The documents are either Web (HTML) pages or Adobe Acrobat (PDF) files which should open inyour Web browser when you click on the document links, below. We recommend you install MSInternet Explorer 6.x for optimal viewing. To access the PDF files, you need to have the freeAcrobat Reader installed on your computer.

Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planning within the Department ofChild Support Services (Presenter: Curt Child, Director of California Departmentof Child Support Services)

Child Support 101 | Basic Services | Basic Remedies (Presenters: BrianPaddock, Paddock & Mastin and Stephen Goldberg, Legal Services of NorthernCalifornia)

Child Support Distribution and AB 1449 | Medical Support Remedies andEnforcement (Presenter: Sarah Kurtz, National Center for Youth Law)

California Child Support Services Regulations | CSS LettersCalifornia CSS Administrative FormsCourt DocumentsAdditional Online Child Support Resources

Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planningwithin the Department of Child Support Services

CSS Program Performance and Statistical Report - Annual Report (2001) (103 pages)CSS Program Draft Strategic Plan (October 17, 2002) (14 pages)

Child Support 101Basic Services | Basic Remedies

Page A11 AA-127

http://www.lsnc.net/

http://www.lsnc.net/

http://www.lsnc.net/fsguide/

http://www.lsncweb.net/cases/

http://www.google.com/

http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/

http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#cdcss

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#paddock

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#kurtz

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#state

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#forms

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#court

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/#other

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/curt_child/annual_report_v10.pdf

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/curt_child/draft_strategic_plan_unsigned.pdf

3/20/11 11:29 AMChild Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)

Page 2 of 4http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/

Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties (Brian Paddock: November 2002)Making the Child Support Program Work for Your Clients, or the Best Way to FightPoverty Is Money! - Tennessee CLE Child Support Outline (Brian Paddock: October 16,2001)

Child Support Distribution and Disbursement (Paula Roberts, Center for Law and SocialPolicy (CLASP): October 1, 2000)

Rulings in the Harp distribution, processing fees, recoupment and notices caseFederal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)

National Electronic Child Support Resource System (NECSRS)OCSE regulations, action transmittals and policy documentsACF Action Transmittals - Listed by Year (1975-2002) - for example, AT 97-13deals with State Distribution Units (central collections); AT 97-17 deals with thedistribution of support, etc.

Action Transmittal OCSE-AT-98-24 - re distribution of supportcollected to TANF families

Financial Institutions Data Match (FIDM) - for finding assets.

Index of California Child Support Services (CSS) Letters (2000-2003)CSS Letter 01-09 - retroactive support.CSS Letter 01-16 - case closure.CSS Letter 01-28 - revisions re retroactive support.CSS Letter 02-04 - AB 891 re 5% of Title II limit.CSS Letter 02-14 - clarification re AB 891 (credit toward child support obligationfor Social Security dependent's benefits.

CSS Letter 02-15 - enforcement against SSI benefitsCSS Letter 02-18 - duplicate case transfers.Local Child Support Agency (LCSA) Letter 02-34 - case transfer coordinators.

22 CCR § 119184 - Barnes notice

CSS Regulatory Time Frames - key time frames for case openings, location ofinformation, enforcement, interstate claims, transfers, closures and complaint resolution.

Child Support Distribution and AB 1449Medical Support Remedies and Enforcement

How Child Support is Distributed in California: A Guide for Advocates (Sarah Kurtz,National Center for Youth Law (NCYL): November 2001)

AB 1449New Law Can Help Reunite Families (Youth Law News: September-October2001)

Page A12 AA-128

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/brian_paddock/Title%20IV-D%20Child%20Support%20Program%20Duties.pdf

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/brian_paddock/Tennessee%20CLE%20-%20Child%20Support%20Outline%20(October%2016,%202001).pdf

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/brian_paddock/Child%20Support%20Distribution%20and%20Disbursement%20(Paula%20Roberts%20-%20October%201,%202000).pdf

http://www.Divorcetn.com/

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/

http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/poldoc.htm

http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/federal/at/chrono.cfm

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/at-9824.htm

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/fidm/index.htm

http://www.childsup.ca.gov/css03.asp

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/css_regs/CSS01-09.pdf







http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/css_regs/LCSA02-34.pdf

http://ccr.oal.ca.gov/cgi-bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=86319&advquery=119184&infobase=ccr&record=%7B6877A%7D&softpage=Search_Frame_Pg42&zz=

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/stephen_goldberg/CSS%20Regulatory%20Time%20Frames.pdf

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/sarah_kurtz/How%20Child%20%20Support%20is%20Distributed%20in%20California.pdf

http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_1449&sess=PREV&house=B&site=sen

http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/sarah_kurtz/New%20Law%20Can%20Help%20Reunite%20Families%20(AB%201449).pdf

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Page A13 AA-129

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Page A16 AA-132

http://www.Divorcetn.com

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/

http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/poldoc.htm

http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/federal/at/chrono.cfm

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/at-9824.htm

http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/fidm/index.htm

!

!!!!!!!!!!!

APPENDIX

4

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TRIAL COURT OPERATIONSBudget Summaries

FY 2010-11 Proposed Budget Volume One 60.1 County of Los Angeles

Trial Court Operations

Trial Court Operations Budget Summary

2010-11 Budget MessageThe Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997,Assembly Bill (AB) 233, Chapter 850, Statutes of 1997, requirescounties to make an annual Maintenance of Effort (MOE)payment to the State for support of trial courts and to continueto fund certain court-related expenditures such as indigentdefense, collections enhancement, and local judicial benefits.The Trial Court Facilities Act, Senate Bill 1732, Chapter 1082,Statutes of 2002, authorized the transfer of responsibility forcourt facilities from the counties to the State and requires thatcounties make County Facilities Payment (CFP). Revenue fromcourt fines and fees is used to partially finance the MOEobligation to the State and other court-related expenditures.

The 2010-11 Proposed Budget reflects funding for the County’s$294.7 million MOE payment to the State, which is comprisedof $245.9 million base MOE; $37.6 million CFP; and$11.2 million representing 50 percent of any excess above theAB 233 fines and forfeitures MOE, and $93.0 million forcourt-related expenditures that are the County’s responsibility.The Proposed Budget reflects anticipated increases in costsrelated to court collections enhancement.

Changes From 2009-10 Budget

TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET SUMMARYFY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11 FY 2010-11 CHANGE FROM

CLASSIFICATION ACTUAL ESTIMATED BUDGET REQUESTED PROPOSED BUDGET

FINANCING REQUIREMENTS

SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITS $ 28,216,975.26 $ 28,865,000 $ 30,773,000 $ 31,130,000 $ 30,854,000 $ 81,000

SERVICES & SUPPLIES 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000

OTHER CHARGES 282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)

GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000

REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000

BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0

GrossAppropriation

($)

IntrafundTransfer

($)Revenue

($)

NetCounty Cost

($)Budg

Pos

2009-10 Final Adopted Budget 385,657,000 0 146,302,000 239,355,000 50.0

Other Changes1. Salaries and Employee Benefits: Primarily reflects

Board-approved increases in health insurance subsidies.81,000 -- -- 81,000 --

2. Services and Supplies: Reflects an increase in costs for the Court’s Cost Recovery Program fully offset by fines and forfeitures revenues.

3,276,000 -- 3,276,000 -- --

3. Intergovernmental Revenue: Reflects a reduction in services and supplies due to the elimination of the grant funding for the Drug Court program.

(72,000) -- (72,000) -- --

Page A18 AA-134

Dennis M Ettlin



4. Maintenance of Effort (MOE) Payment: Reflects a decrease in funding for MOE payments offset by reductions in revenues.

(1,288,000) -- (1,288,000) -- --

Total Changes 1,997,000 0 1,916,000 81,000 0.0

2010-11 Proposed Budget 387,654,000 0 148,218,000 239,436,000 50.0

GrossAppropriation

($)

IntrafundTransfer

($)Revenue

($)

NetCounty Cost

($)Budg

Pos

Page A19 AA-135



TOPE

TTRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL

FY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11 FY 2010-11 CHANGE FROMCLASSIFICATION ACTUAL ESTIMATED BUDGET REQUESTED PROPOSED BUDGET

FINANCING REQUIREMENTS

SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITSSALARIES & WAGES

$ 2,274,843.16 $ 2,416,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 2,602,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 0

CAFETERIA PLAN BENEFITS 14,714,097.48 16,669,000 17,643,000 17,698,000 17,662,000 19,000DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS 5,908,251.79 6,055,000 6,776,000 6,786,000 6,759,000 (17,000)EMPLOYEE GROUP INS - E/B 1,793,080.50 195,000 247,000 304,000 293,000 46,000OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 3,180,170.50 3,234,000 3,202,000 3,246,000 3,225,000 23,000RETIREMENT - EMP BENEFITS 346,531.83 296,000 327,000 494,000 337,000 10,000

TOTAL S & E B 28,216,975.26 28,865,000 30,773,000 31,130,000 30,854,000 81,000

SERVICES & SUPPLIESADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 15,088,912.38 14,347,000 11,902,000 15,503,000 15,165,000 3,263,000COMMUNICATIONS 398.00 0 0 0 0 0COMPUTING-PERSONAL 1,021.26 0 0 0 0 0INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 24,288.00 0 0 0 13,000 13,000JURY & WITNESS EXPENSE 1,887,874.56 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 0MAINTENANCE - EQUIPMENT 226.13 0 0 0 0 0MAINTENANCE--BUILDINGS & IMPRV 9,608,247.26 135,000 135,000 184,000 135,000 0MEMBERSHIPS 150.00 0 0 0 0 0MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSE 13,734.32 14,000 80,000 80,000 33,000 (47,000)OFFICE EXPENSE 69,394.99 150,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 0PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 58,303,389.94 57,231,000 43,458,000 59,968,000 43,458,000 0RENTS & LEASES - BLDG & IMPRV 49,218.09 0 0 0 0 0SMALL TOOLS & MINOR EQUIPMENT 70.23 0 0 0 0 0SPECIAL DEPARTMENTAL EXPENSE 14,545.15 0 25,000 25,000 0 (25,000)TECHNICAL SERVICES 1,614,094.51 2,030,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 0TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL 42,004.05 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL S & S 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000

OTHER CHARGESTRIAL COURT-MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT

282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)

GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000

NET TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000

REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000

BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0

REVENUE DETAIL

CHARGES FOR SERVICESLEGAL SERVICES $ 3,743,413.57 $ 3,529,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 3,439,000 $ 489,000COURT FEES & COSTS 7,545,766.23 6,490,000 7,964,000 7,964,000 6,729,000 (1,235,000)RECORDING FEES 116,805.00 104,000 130,000 130,000 130,000 0

TOTAL CHARGES-SVS 11,405,984.80 10,123,000 11,044,000 11,044,000 10,298,000 (746,000)

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TOPE

TTRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL (Continued)

FY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11 FY 2010-11 CHANGE FROMCLASSIFICATION ACTUAL ESTIMATED BUDGET REQUESTED PROPOSED BUDGET

REVENUE DETAIL

FINES FORFEITURES & PENALTIESVEHICLE CODE FINES 7,299,152.51 6,469,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 0OTHER COURT FINES 132,763,353.59 126,724,000 128,071,000 131,056,000 130,805,000 2,734,000

TOTAL FINES FO/PEN 140,062,506.10 133,193,000 134,772,000 137,757,000 137,506,000 2,734,000

INTERGVMTL REVENUE - STATESTATE - OTHER 0.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)STATE-TRIAL COURTS 144.00 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL I R - STATE 144.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)

LICENSES PERMITS & FRANCHISESOTHER LICENSES & PERMITS 173,670.00 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 0BUSINESS LICENSES 400.00 0 10,000 10,000 10,000 0

TOTAL LIC/PER/FRAN 174,070.00 160,000 170,000 170,000 170,000 0

MISCELLANEOUS REVENUEMISCELLANEOUS 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0

TOTAL MISC REV 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0

OTHER FINANCING SOURCESTRANSFERS IN 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0

TOTAL OTH FIN SRCS 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0

TOTAL REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000

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APPENDIX

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Senate Bill No. 11

CHAPTER 9

An act to add Sections 68220, 68221, and 68222 to the Government Code,relating to judges.

[Approved by Governor February 20, 2009. Filed withSecretary of State February 20, 2009.]

legislative counsel’s digest

SB 11, Steinberg. Judges: employment benefits.The California Constitution requires the Legislature to prescribe

compensation for judges of courts of record. Existing law authorizes a countyto deem judges and court employees as county employees for purposes ofproviding employment benefits. These provisions were held unconstitutionalas an impermissible delegation of the obligation of the Legislature toprescribe the compensation of judges of courts of record.

This bill would provide that judges who received supplemental judicialbenefits provided by a county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shallcontinue to receive supplemental benefits from the county or court thenpaying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect onthat date. The bill would authorize a county to terminate its obligation toprovide benefits upon providing 180 days’ written notice to theAdministrative Director of the Courts and the impacted judges, but thattermination would not be effective as to any judge during his or her currentterm while that judge continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at theelection of the county, when that judge leaves office. The bill also wouldauthorize the county to elect to provide benefits for all judges in that county.The bill would require the Judicial Council to report to the Senate Committeeon Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, andboth the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or beforeDecember 31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benefits inconsistencies.

This bill would provide that no governmental entity, or officer or employeeof a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecutionor disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under theofficial action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of the billon the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.

This bill would provide that nothing in its provisions shall require theJudicial Council to increase funding to a court for the purpose of payingjudicial benefits or obligate the state or the Judicial Council to pay forbenefits previously provided by the county, city and county, or the court.

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The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to address the decision of the Court

of Appeal in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th630, regarding county-provided benefits for judges.

(b) These county-provided benefits were considered by the Legislaturein enacting the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, in whichcounties could receive a reduction in the county’s maintenance of effortobligations if counties elected to provide benefits pursuant to paragraph (l)of subdivision (c) of Section 77201 of the Government Code for trial courtjudges of that county.

(c) Numerous counties and courts established local or court supplementalbenefits to retain qualified applicants for judicial office, and trial courtjudges relied upon the existence of these longstanding supplemental benefitsprovided by the counties or the court.

SEC. 2. Section 68220 is added to the Government Code, to read:68220. (a) Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental judicial

benefits provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shallcontinue to receive supplemental benefits from the county or court thenpaying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect onthat date.

(b) A county may terminate its obligation to provide benefits under thissection upon providing the Administrative Director of the Courts and theimpacted judges with 180 days’ written notice. The termination shall notbe effective as to any judge during his or her current term while that judgecontinues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the election of the county,when that judge leaves office. The county is also authorized to elect toprovide benefits for all judges in the county.

SEC. 3. Section 68221 is added to the Government Code, to read:68221. To clarify ambiguities and inconsistencies in terms with regard

to judges and justices and to ensure uniformity statewide, the followingshall apply for purposes of Sections 68220 to 68222, inclusive:

(a) “Benefits” and “benefit” shall include federally regulated benefits,as described in Section 71627, and deferred compensation plan benefits,such as 401(k) and 457 plans, as described in Section 71628, and may alsoinclude professional development allowances.

(b) “Salary” and “compensation” shall have the meaning as set forth inSection 1241.

SEC. 4. Section 68222 is added to the Government Code, to read:68222. Nothing in this act shall require the Judicial Council to increase

funding to a court for the purpose of paying judicial benefits or obligate thestate or the Judicial Council to pay for benefits previously provided by thecounty, city and county, or the court.

SEC. 5. Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, orofficer or employee of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or besubject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided

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Dennis M Ettlin

to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to theeffective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorizedunder law.

SEC. 6. The Judicial Council shall report to the Senate Committee onBudget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and boththe Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before December31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benefits inconsistencies.

SEC. 7. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of thisact or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect otherprovisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalidprovision or application.

O

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Ch. 9— 3 —

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APPENDIX

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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATING CASES 1

Dan

iel C

oope

r, In

Pro

pria

Per

sona

Daniel Cooper 1836 10th st # B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 IN PROPRIA PERSONA SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ))))))) ) )))

Los Angeles County Case No. SC113137 (Appearance by M. Lavanas) SC113064, lead

Daniel COOPER, an individual; Plaintiff,

vs.

RESPONSE TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES YC064994 Lead, YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, lead SC113135 SC113136 SC113137 AND YC065164

Michael I. Levanas, an individual; Defendant.

DATE: August 25, 2011 TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 59

AA-168

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Dan

iel C

oope

r, In

Pro

pria

Per

sona

Defendant’s motion for consolidation is pre-mature. The cases will not be

decided in the same courtroom. Unless an unbiased judge is assigned immediately,

a change of venue for each case will be motioned for differing counties, those which

did not pay bribes. Indeed, since all the judicial officers are located within Los

Angeles County, the likelihood of an unbiased judge within Los Angeles County is

extremely remote.

Defendant did not follow the California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350 (a)(1)(C)

which requires the motion to “Be filed in each case sought to be consolidated.”

Plaintiffs Dennis Ettlin and Anthony Locatelli do not have standing for this hearing.

Plaintiff Locatelli does not agree to the transfer of his case from San Diego, and will

seek recusal of Judge Strauss at the first opportunity. A new motion of consolidation

will be needed if that case is eventually transferred and survives all the appeals to

remain in San Diego County. Furthermore, three new cases will be filed in the next

few weeks with five more likely in four to five weeks. Any consolidation at this point

will be meaningless.

Multiple adjudications are necessary because the judiciary itself has failed to

resolve the issues at hand. The Fourth Appellate Court refused to order an overhaul

of judicial compensation. The Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the

Courts failed to sufficiently address the issues in writing SBX2 11. Individual bench

officers have refused to recuse themselves. The judiciary has totally failed to resolve

the issues itself.

Multiple adjudications by citizen juries is exactly what the Fourth Appellate

District had in mind with its Sturgeon II decision. The cases YC064994,

YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, SC113135, SC113136, SC113137

and YC065164 are all different. Inconsistent adjudications are needed to provide the

necessary guidelines for tribunal reviews of similar cases voided by the bribes.

The Plaintiffs are each separate, In Pro Per individuals. Who could speak for

all three. No single Plaintiff could speak for any of the others. Two Plaintiffs have

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domestic violence issues while one does not. One Plaintiff has a move-away and

international kidnapping issues while two do not. Two Plaintiffs have direct contact

with Child Support Services Department while all three are subject to the guidelines,

polices and threatened sanctions. One lives in San Diego, while two reside currently

in Los Angeles County.

The Defendants are likewise different and separate. Carolyn Kuhl had

supervisory duties and thus had greater responsibility for alerting bench officers to

the inappropriateness of the bribes and also the failure of bench officers to recuse

themselves; thus a greater responsibility for the denial of due process and fraud on

the court. The three appellate judges have a disproportionate responsibility for the

denial of constitutional rights based on the unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 and the

conflicts between Title IV-D laws and the California Constitutional protections. All four

are guilty of “Misprision of felony”.

The duplication of discovery and evidence is a specious argument. Properly

documented evidence can easily be shared without duplication. The testimony of

experts and officials can again be shared and supplemented if necessary. The

judiciary and its litigators will determine the amount of duplication of effort.

Defendants have made no efforts at negotiation, so the extent of litigation is

also unknown at this time. Defendants mistakenly believe state resources will defend

them. Defendants mistakenly listen to Court Counsel. Defendants are not immune.

After the first couple of jury decisions, the path of negotiations going forward will be

much clearer.

The Memorandum of Points and Authorities fails to support a claim of

consolidation. Section I describes the similarities and makes no references to the

differences between Plaintiffs or Defendants. Section II cites CCP 1048.(a) but

makes no connection or attempted argument linking “unnecessary costs” with

“avoid(ing) inconsistent and/or conflicting rulings”. Section III envisions a single

judge of the same Los Angeles County judiciary ruling on the constitutionality of the

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bribes, superseding the Fourth Appellate Court’s Sturgeon I and II decisions and

rescuing the judges. The simple statement that the rights of all parties will be

protected by the consolidation is unsubstantiated and simply preposterous!

The Memorandum of Points and Authorities is an opportunity lost in defending

the constitutionality of SBX2 11; in defending the criminality of post May 2009

payments by Los Angeles County; and in defending the actions of individuals taking

monies offered by an interested party. The wishful thinking of the Defendant’s

Demurrer is contradicted by SBX2 11 and the Fourth Appellate Court.

The Declaration of Kevin McCormick is a regurgitation of the minute orders by

Judge Kuhl. The title suggests a reference to dismissal or stay of action but the body

of the declaration does not elaborate, clarify or make such a request.

The motion to consolidate cases is premature. The Writ of Mandate for

Recusal of Judge O’Brien was only submitted August 12, 2011. The motion to vacate

Judge Kuhl’s void order relating the cases has not been heard. The motion to strike

the demurrer has not been responded to nor been heard. Most importantly, the other

two Plaintiffs are not represented at this hearing and there is no discussion of how

their rights and claims would be protected during any consolidation.

Dated: ___ August, 2011

By: __________________________

DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

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SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATING CASES 1

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Daniel Cooper 1836 10th Street # B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 IN PROPRIA PERSONA SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ))))))) ) )))



vs.

--------SUPPLEMENTAL-------- RESPONSE TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES YC064994 Lead, YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, lead SC113135 SC113136 SC113137 AND YC065164


DATE: September 1, 2011 TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 59

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Defendant’s motion for consolidation is pre-mature. If an unbribed judge is not

appointed soon, a change of venue will be sought to counties which did not pay the

bribes.

Defendant’s legal counsel will also change. The civil suits are correctly

filed against individuals outside of their official capacities. The taking of bribes is an

individual act, is outside the scope of all official actions and thus renders the

Government Claims Act inappropriate. Until evidence is presented showing explicit

management direction from the Superior Court, ordering its employees to take the

L.A. County monies, Plaintiff claims these are individual private actions to take the

bribes. Furthermore, as elected judicial officers, the judges’ status as employees is

highly questionable. An elected official is not normally considered an

"employee". Depending on how this key issue is decided, Court Counsel will likely

not be representing the defendants. New counsel will, most likely, be retained by

each defendant, further denying defendants their own due process rights if the

cases are consolidated now.

Court counsel states that individual Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s rights will be

protected. The current consolidation motions show that Court Counsel cannot even

keep the case numbers and Plaintiffs separate. Plaintiff Ettlin has received copies of

filings in Plaintiff Cooper’s cases but ETTLIN has not been officially noticed of any

motions on his pending cases. The Notice of Demurrer states an October 3, 2011

hearing date for only two of ETTLIN’s five cases; but the court calendar as of August

29, 2011 contains no such hearing and thus no opportunities for Plaintiff Ettlin to

address the court on the Demurrer or the Consolidation. Clearly, Court Counsel has

no clue how to protect anyone’s rights of due process.

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Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied

12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated

Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-

Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT

set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization

under Lockyer-Isenberg of “judicial benefits” payments by counties to Superior Court

judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.

As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments became bribes paid by Los

Angeles County. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such

payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6

were not applicable.

The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The

relevant portions state: “Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the

Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180 days' notice.

On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for summary judgment.

The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, we affirm.”

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But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph which

contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a permanent

response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional?

It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court, acknowledges

the contradiction and encourages these particular civil suits by stating:

“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.”

The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the “same terms and

conditions as were in effect on that date.” Since the Fourth Appellate Court is

deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on

whether the county’s terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are

arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus

terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No

authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners.

The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now

paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be

determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to

Commissioners are called “warrants” by the L.A. County Auditor because they are

issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments

by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a

continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that these payments are

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unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney General’s opinion in this matter

because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is


whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments are legal

and constitutional.

The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been challenged

in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I. The attempted

immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION

9 that states “A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of

contracts may not be passed.” Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation conflicts

with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance

(CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments shows the legislature’s attempt to

usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney

General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court

is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions

on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiff

is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A. County bribes

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The constitutionality of the severable portions of SBX2 11 is only one issue in

the civil suits. These civil suits are, first and foremost, about the biases experienced

by the Plaintiffs as a result of the county payments.

The United States Census Bureau data and analysis published in 2009 clearly

identifies the bias, at the national level, shown against Plaintiff by both Defendants

Weinbach and Levanas. These civil cases will establish that defendant’s county

bribes encouraged denial of Plaintiff’s rights to raise his sons and gross exaggeration

of the child support due from zero income Plaintiff. A jury, with evidence, will decide if

the defendant judges are biased.

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8/23/11 7:16 PMThe bias against fathers in U.S. custody and child support

Page 1 of 39http://www.the-spearhead.com/2011/08/22/the-bias-against-u-s-fathers-in-custody-and-child-support/

The Spearhead

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The bias against fathers in U.S. custody and childsupportby Dalrock on August 22, 2011

We all know the system is biased against fathers, but the actual data is important when discussing this with those whoare skeptical. It can’t be that bad, can it? Here is the data I pulled together from Table 1 in the latest US CensusBureau report on the topic, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007

All of the steps of the process are biased against men except the percentage of support due which is collected (the twoare roughly equal).

It starts with who is granted custody:



Looking at the figures for 2007, it appears to me that there may be a sampling anomaly. The percentage of custodialmothers awarded support dropped by 4% between 2005 and 2007. This is 3% lower than any other year in the series. I’m not aware of any sweeping changes which occurred in this time frame, and since parents receive child support forbetween 18 and 21 years it seems highly unlikely that the makeup of the population would change this much in just 2years. I’m also not sure why they don’t have data beyond 2007. Since they publish this every other year they shouldhave data out for at least 2009. Once they publish the 2009 and 2011 data we will have a better understanding of ifthe 2007 data shows a trend towards slightly less bias against fathers or if it was in fact a sampling error.

*Clarence’s experience makes sense, as Table 2 shows that 47.6% of all custodial parents with support agreements in2007 were on public assistance. In these cases the state is generally the recipient of the child support payment,although some states do pass $50 a month or a similar token amount on to the parent. This also shows up in thenumbers, as only 27% of custodial parents who stated they were due support payments in 2007 were on publicassistance. Those parents who didn’t receive anything aren’t included in the average figures reported by the Census,but those who received $50 are.

{ 78 comments… read them below or add one }

Firepower August 22, 2011 at 08:56

A fine report such as this, (replete with concrete, irrefutable evidence in chart form) is normally expected to beenough to get men finally motivated to fight.

If they do not, nor even emerge victorious, then not much can be said for the feebleness of their state.

Nor should any more tears be shed or energies expended on their behalf.

Liberty or slaveryLiberty, or death

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The $7,000 annual professional development bribe encouraged attendance at

anti-father conferences by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges

and yielded biased rulings against Plaintiff on domestic violence and financial

settlements. Similarly, as lawyers, the judges would also have been included in the

anti-father advocacy campaigns of the American Bar Association in its distribution of

materials to discredit allegations of Parental Alienation Syndrome, encourage the

family court to take up domestic violence issues and otherwise prejudice the court in

the presentation of evidence. (A portion of one such document is shown below.)

Domestic violence is the purview of the District Attorney. A jury, based on the

evidence, will decide if the defendant judges were biased based on the payment of

L. A. County bribes.

Four judges who have taken the bribes have sworn on a stack of holy

documents that they are not biased. Plaintiff does not believe them and defendant’s

actions also speak otherwise. Plaintiff demands to have multiple jury decisions to

resolve these matters.

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The motion to consolidate cases is premature. A Writ of Mandate for Recusal

of Judge O’Brien will be submitted at about the time of the next hearing. The motion

to vacate Judge Kuhl’s void order relating the cases has not even been heard. The

motion to strike the Demurrer based on Court Counsel’s erroneous and unilateral

misrepresentations has not been responded to nor been heard. The motions for

change of venue have not yet been completed. Most importantly, the other two

Plaintiffs are not represented at this hearing and there is no discussion of how their

rights and claims would be protected during any consolidation.

Dated: 29 August 2011

By: __________________________ DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

"I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing images inserted herein are true and correct representations of the documents and information delineated."

Dated: 29 August 2011

By: __________________________ DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

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ETTLIN JOINDER OF SEPT 1, 2011 HEARING AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION 1

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Dennis Ettlin 4520 Toucan Street Torrance, CA 90503 310-795-9507 IN PROPRIA PERSONA SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ))))))) ) )))))) ))

Los Angeles County Case No. YC064994, lead for YC065018, YC065019, YC065021 and YC065164

Dennis ETTLIN, an individual; Plaintiff,

vs.

--------EMERGENCY --------JOINDER OF HEARING AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION REQUESTING CONSOLIDATION OF CASES YC064994, lead for YC065018, YC065019, YC065021, and YC065164 AND SC113064, lead for SC113135 SC113136 SC113137

Glenda VEASEY, an individual; Defendant.

DATE: September 1, 2011 TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 59

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Plaintiff Dennis Ettlin (hereafter referenced as ETTLIN) requests a Joinder with

Plaintiff Daniel Cooper of the responses in opposition to the motion for consolidation

of civil cases. The sole purpose of the joinder is a request to appear at the hearing

on consolidation and submit his response in opposition. Plaintiff ETTLIN strongly

opposes consolidation.

ETTLIN is surprised that Court Counsel doesn’t propose consolidating all

handgun murders in the county. They all involve a similar small metal gun. Why not

also consolidate all traffic tickets where a radar gun is involved. Each of those would

share many of the same points of law and the same legal theories and would save

Los Angeles County large sums of money. Court Counsel knows the public and even

the judges would not stand for such a travesty of justice.

ETTLIN’s cases are against Glenda Veasey, John Slawson, Kenneth Taylor,

Carolyn Kuhl and Sandy Kriegler. COOPER has no direct experience with any of the

facts in those cases. The similarity of any foundational facts and foundational

evidence is no different than that of handguns or radar measurement devices.

Court Counsel did not follow the California Rules of Court, Rule 3.350

(a)(1)(C) that requires the motion to “Be filed in each case sought to be

consolidated.” (emphasis added) Plaintiffs Dennis Ettlin and Anthony Locatelli did

not have standing for the August 25, 2011 hearing. Only with the Court’s acceptance

of this joinder of the response in opposition to consolidation is ETTLIN asserting his

rights to be heard, with the Court’s permission.

Court Counsel states that individual Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s rights will be

protected. The current consolidation motions show that Court Counsel cannot even

keep the filings and Plaintiffs separate. Plaintiff Ettlin has received copies of filings in

Plaintiff Cooper’s cases but none of defendant’s motions have been filed on

ETTLIN’s pending cases. Did service alone entitle ETTLIN to speak at the August 25,

2011 hearing?

The Notice of Demurrer for YC065019 and YC065164 (mailed on August 25,

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2011) shows an October 3, 2011 hearing date for only these two of ETTLIN’s five

cases; but the court calendar as of August 29 and August 30, 2011 contains no such

hearing. Since ETTLIN was served with the COOPER filings in July, 2011, does that

now mean that the Demurrer which the Court has taken under submission applies to

both ETTLIN and COOPER? Is the October 3, 2011 hearing now expected to be a

sham for ETTLIN? A mere rubber stamp by the Court of its decision in the COOPER

cases? Is this how Court Counsel plans to protect the due process rights of multiple

litigants with multiple suits?

The Motion for Consolidation was mailed to Plaintiff ETTLIN on July 29, 2011.

Glenda Veasey (case number YC064994) was not served a summons until August 2,

2011. The consolidation motion was not filed in any of the ETTLIN cases as indicated

by the Court’s own website. Was Glenda Veasey represented at the hearing on

August 25, 2011? Court records make no mention of Plaintiff ETTLIN or Defendant

Veasey. Did service AND mere inclusion of ETTLIN’s cases in the caption of the

motion in COOPER’s case provide the proper standing for ETTLIN or Veasey?

The August 30, 2011 Reply to Opposition for consolidation includes ETTLIN

on the service list and the proof of service states that ETTLIN was served by email.

However, ETTLIN received no email from Kevin McCormick and is not aware of any

telephone messages requesting an email address. This is an unfortunate mistake

and error by the process server, Jacqueline Mora. Perhaps the service by Federal

Express shipment will include ETTLIN, although not in a timely fashion for the

September 1, 2011 hearing.

Is this the kind of due process that Court Counsel has in mind for Plaintiffs and

Defendants? Clearly, Court Counsel has no interest in and no clue how to protect

anyone’s rights of due process. Plaintiff ETTLIN strongly objects to any contention by

Court Counsel that due process rights will be protected following consolidation!

Court Counsel claims in the last minute reply to the opposition that a copy of

the Motion to Consolidate was filed in all five ETTLIN cases. The screen captures

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below show this is not true for three of the cases. The other two also were not filed.

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Court Counsel’s reply to COOPER’s opposition asserts that ETTLIN chose not

to oppose the motion. Nothing could be further from the truth. Did the Court ascertain

ETTLIN’s presence or request ETTLIN to come forward to the Plaintiff’s table. NO.

Did the Court solicit any information on the whereabouts of ETTLIN or otherwise

indicate that ETTLIN was a party to the matters before the Court? NO. Did the

Court’s own minutes in any way reference, include or mention ETTLIN or any of his

case numbers or Defendant’s. NO. Did Kevin McCormick’s version of the minutes in

any way reference, include or mention ETTLIN or any of his case numbers or

Defendant’s? NO.

THE CASES ARE PROPERLY SUED AND SERVED

AGAINST INDIVIDUALS.

Court Counsel fails to appreciate the larger point made by COOPER that

the taking of the bribes is an individual action, not approved for employees and

not approved for elected officials. Court Counsel fails to provide any evidence as

to supervisors directly ordering the “employees” to accept the L.A. County

monies. Court Counsel fails to identify Election Code that absolves the

Defendants from declaring the bribes on their Form 700 financial disclosure

forms. Then the judges would not need SBX2 11 immunity and may be entitled

to Court Counsel’s services. Until each piece of that evidence is forthcoming,

Plaintiffs ETTLIN and COOPER assert the taking of the bribes was an individual

action not required by the employer as part of the judges’ official duties. Such

individual actions do beg for immunity. Plaintiff COOPER filed case SC113137

against Michael I. Levanas as an individual. The case was not erroneously sued

and served as stated by Kevin M. McCormick and the firm of Benton, Orr, Duval

and Buckingham (BODB). The case very properly is sued against the individual

person of Michael I. Levanas.

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Plaintiffs' argument that the judges are being sued as individuals must be

respected as true until such time as there is a ruling to the contrary.

These cases are against individuals, tailored to the actions taken and

specific biases shown by each defendant. They are not a class action, they are not

against public officials as used in Government Code section 6103; they are against

the actions, biases and misdeeds of individuals because of the bribes they took.

Plaintiff demands to know who authorized the services of BODB for the Demurrer

in case SC113137 or SC113064,lead. Any work by or documents presented by

Kevin McCormick and BODB are, at this time, a misuse of public funds.

The civil suits are being filed against the judges for actions and omissions

they took as individuals. The individuals accepted the monies made available to

them by or through the County of Los Angeles. The damages are associated with

the “favors” to Los Angeles County shown by the defendant’s subsequent actions

as bribed individuals unqualified to be bench officers who failed to disqualify

themselves. Those biases/ favors were perpetrated as individuals who attempted

to not disclose such payments to litigants and cover up their “fraud on the court”.

Plaintiff demands to see written evidence that Superior Court of California

supervisors of bench officers, acting in their official supervisorial capacity are

promulgating Superior Court of California command media or specifically directing

the bench officers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County as part of their

employment contract with the State of California. In the absence of such

management direction, Plaintiff must again assume that it was individual actions to

accept and cash the checks offered by L.A. County. Those individual actions are

the basis of the civil suits against individuals. Consequently, Plaintiff demands to

see a signed private agreement between the individual Defendants for

representation by BODB. Plaintiff also demands that filing fees be paid, as they are

not exempt under Government Code section 6103.

The discussion of whether the individuals are acting in their official judicial

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capacities or as individuals can be settled by identifying the precedents for judicial

officers to take money from parties that are frequently before the court. If

defendant can produce such case law, Plaintiff will gladly review it.

The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11 decided that the affected individuals needed

and were to be given retroactive criminal immunity for making or taking judicial

payments. While judicial officers already had broad immunity for the conduct of

their normal judicial duties, the briberous, unconstitutional and illegal nature of the

county payments necessitated the attempted special immunity described in SBX2

11. That immunity is itself unconstitutional as are the current payments illegal and

that is exactly why the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has asked the

Attorney General for a determination.

Court Counsel‘s actions as a state employee to usurp the Courts authority

to determine if these complaints are properly sued against an individual, as stated

on the summons and on the complaint, and to volunteer state legal services to

these individuals may itself be illegal and possibly obstructions of justice.

Information from the County Auditor’s office for Brett Bianco indicates he himself

gets a bonus, a 23% bonus for 2010, from these same “judicial benefits”. Thus, he

has a personal individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status

quo for “judicial benefits”. Furthermore, by asserting an error on Plaintiff’s part, he

is using State legal resources to protect his own illegal payments and the illegal

payments to individuals who just happen to be judges.

The Court Counsel, with his personal and individual interest in protecting the

practice of county-paid judicial benefits, works in concert with the Los Angeles

County Office of the County Counsel to obscure the simple truth that bribes were

paid to individuals who protect the interests of Los Angeles County and illegally

hide behind the veneer of organizational authority. The Litigation manager provides

quarterly risk management reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the

county from on-going litigation and is responsible for working with the Superior

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Court and the District Attorney to reduce risk and protect the county’s interests.

This report is confidential, protecting planning discussions from being exposed to

the public. The Appendix of the complaint contains the 2007-2008 public report

signed by the Litigation Cost Manager. The Commission on Judicial Performance

is now finally investigating the Superior Court payments with the linkage to county

payments.

Court Counsel has intimidated process servers and apparently instructed

court personnel to prevent the service of court documents to the individuals at their

place of work by directing process servers to his office. After the process server

sought a restraining order against Court Counsel, the court personnel now accept

service for the individuals at their place of work.

Plaintiffs continues to believe and must assume the POS-010 form for

individual service is the proper form and process for serving these individuals and

is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section 415.10 or 415.20.

For a court bench officer, the court executive officer should be served (per page 32

of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government Entities, November

2010). Plaintiff is not aware that Court Counsel is simultaneously the court

executive officer and therefore his intercepting the court documents intended for

individuals at their place of work has denied proper service to those individuals.

Defendants cashed the L.A. County bribe as individuals. No supervisor,

acting in an official role, directed them to accept the monies in an official capacity.

It was not part of their state employee compensation package. They acted as

private citizens not in a judicial capacity when they used those monies for personal

gain. Plaintiff’s complaints are properly sued against the defendants as individuals.

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THE COMPLAINT IS NOT DEFECTIVE

The demurrer is based on Defendant’s changes to Plaintiff’s complaint and

raises a straw man that does not represent Plaintiff’s position and then provides

totally irrelevant citations and arguments that the judges were acting in an official

capacity when they accepted Los

Angeles County payments. Just as

the Pennsylvanian judge denied

any wrongdoing even after his

conviction by a jury for bribery,

Court Counsel and the Los Angeles judges deny their own law-breaking.

Plaintiff demands a jury trial because judges judging judges has not put this

subject to rest. The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to the civil cases like this and the

juries of taxpayers to bring about the constitutional changes needed to restore due

process and remove bias from the courts.

Court Counsel claims Sturgeon and SBX2 11 make the cases suitable for

consolidation. Just the opposite is true. In front of a jury, the Sturgeon and SBX2 11

issues will take 20 minutes each. The Title IV-D issues will take 2-4 hours. The

damages due to ETTLIN will take 8-15 hours in front of a jury. The damages due to

COOPER may take 15-20 hours because of the loss of lifetime earnings. The

damages to LOCATELLI may take 20-40 hours because of the complexity of

international law in child kidnapping cases. Concatenating these sessions will only

lengthen the jury service, confuse the jurors, trivialize arguments and complicate

appeals.

The Plaintiffs are each separate, In Pro Per individuals. None are lawyers,

none can legally represent anyone else. No single Plaintiff could speak for any of the

others. Each case is different in key respects. Two Plaintiffs have domestic violence

issues while one does not. One Plaintiff has a move-away and international

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kidnapping issues while two do not. Two Plaintiffs have direct contact with Child

Support Services Department while all three are subject to the guidelines, polices

and threatened sanctions. One lives in San Diego, while two reside currently in Los

Angeles County.

The Defendants are likewise different and separate. Carolyn Kuhl had

supervisory duties and thus had greater responsibility for alerting bench officers to

the inappropriateness of the bribes and also the failure of bench officers to recuse

themselves; thus a greater responsibility for the denial of due process and fraud on

the court. The three appellate judges have a disproportionate responsibility for the

denial of constitutional rights based on the unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 and the

conflicts between California’s “Title IV-D” laws and the California Constitutional

protections. All four are guilty of “Misprision of felony”.

Defendant’s legal counsel will also change. The civil suits are correctly

filed against individuals outside of their official capacities. The taking of bribes is an

individual act, is outside the scope of all official actions and thus renders the

Government Claims Act inappropriate. Until evidence is presented showing explicit

management direction from the Superior Court, ordering its employees to take the

L.A. County monies, Plaintiff claims these are individual private actions to take the

bribes. Depending on how this key issue is decided, Court Counsel will likely not

be representing the defendants. New counsel will, most likely, be retained by each

defendant, further denying defendants their own due process rights if the cases are

consolidated now.

The judges are also different. COOPER has zero current income yet has

three different fee waiver determinations; immediate, show the court tax returns,

and 30 days only with review. ETTLIN is unemployed and likewise received three

different fee waiver determinations; waived, initial filing fee only waived, denied.

The duplication of discovery and evidence is a specious argument. Properly

documented evidence can easily be shared without duplication. The testimony of

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experts and officials can again be shared and supplemented if necessary. The

judiciary and its litigators will determine the amount of duplication of effort.

Defendants have made no efforts at negotiation, so the extent of litigation is

also unknown at this time. Defendants mistakenly believe state resources will defend

them. Defendants mistakenly listen to Court Counsel. Defendants are not immune.

After the first couple of jury decisions, the path of negotiations going forward will be

much clearer.

The Memorandum of Points and Authorities fails to support a claim of

consolidation. Section I describes the similarities and makes no references to the

differences between Plaintiffs or Defendants. Section II cites CCP 1048(a) but makes

no connection or attempted argument linking “unnecessary costs” with “avoid(ing)

inconsistent and/or conflicting rulings”. The unnecessary costs are the bribes

themselves. Further, if the defense arguments are as compelling as Court Counsel

claims, there would be no chance of conflicting rulings. Thus a tacit admission that

the cases are not the slam-dunk for consolidation and justice as alleged. Section III

envisions a single judge of the same Los Angeles County bribed judiciary ruling on

the constitutionality of the bribes, superseding the Fourth Appellate Court’s Sturgeon

I and II decisions and rescuing the judges. The simple statement that the rights of all

parties will be protected by the consolidation is unsubstantiated and simply

preposterous!

The Memorandum of Points and Authorities is an opportunity lost in defending

the constitutionality of SBX2 11; in arguing the criminality of post May 2009 payments

by Los Angeles County; and in defending the actions of individuals taking monies

offered by an interested party. The wishful thinking of “absolute judicial immunity”

asserted in the Defendant’s Demurrer is contradicted by SBX2 11 and by the Fourth

Appellate Court.

L.A. County is not a sovereign entity. Its payments to judges are no different

than (hypothetically) Plaintiff’s gifts to the judges. Both are bribes. The jury gets it.

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The Los Angeles County supervisors and the California legislature are unable to

justify wage increases for the judiciary and thus resort to briberous payments.

Defendant’s motion for consolidation is pre-mature. The cases will not be

decided in the same courtroom. Unless an unbiased judge is assigned immediately,

a change of venue for each case will be filed in differing counties, those which did not

pay bribes. Indeed, since all the judicial officers are located within Los Angeles

County, the likelihood of an unbiased judge within Los Angeles County is extremely

remote.

Plaintiff Locatelli does not agree to the transfer of his case from San Diego,

and will seek recusal of Judge Strauss at the first opportunity. A new motion of

consolidation will be needed if that case is eventually transferred and survives all the

appeals to remain in San Diego County. Furthermore, three new cases will be filed in

the next few weeks with five more likely in four to five weeks. Any consolidation at

this point will be meaningless.

Multiple adjudications are necessary because the judiciary itself has failed to

resolve the issues at hand. The Fourth Appellate Court refused to order an overhaul

of judicial compensation. The Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the

Courts failed to sufficiently address the issues in writing SBX2 11. Individual bench

officers have refused to recuse themselves. The judiciary has totally failed to resolve

the issues itself.

Multiple adjudications by citizen juries is exactly what the Fourth Appellate

District had in mind with its Sturgeon II decision. The cases YC064994,

YC065018, YC065019, YC065021. SC113064, SC113135, SC113136, SC113137

and YC065164 are all different. Inconsistent adjudications are needed to provide the

necessary guidelines for tribunal reviews of similar cases voided by the bribes.

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SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied

12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated

Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-

Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT

set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization

under Lockyer-Isenberg of “judicial benefits” payments by counties to Superior Court

judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.

As of December 23, 2008 the judicial payments became bribes paid by Los

Angeles County. As of December 23, 2008 Judges lost all immunity for taking such

payments. As of December 23, 2008 Government Code Sections 810 and 821.6

were not applicable.

The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds. The

relevant portions state: “Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the

Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180 days' notice.

On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for summary judgment.

The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to

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judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, we affirm.”

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph which

contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is not a permanent

response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional?

It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court, acknowledges

the contradiction and encourages these particular civil suits by stating:

“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.”

The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the “same terms and

conditions as were in effect on that date.” Since the Fourth Appellate Court is


whether the county’s terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus are

arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and thus

terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No

authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners.

The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now

paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will be

determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to

Commissioners are called “warrants” by the L.A. County Auditor because they are

issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued payments

by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a

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continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions of the

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that these payments are

unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the Attorney General’s opinion in this matter

because the judges are clearly biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is


whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments are legal

and constitutional.

The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been challenged

in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I. The attempted

immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION

9 that states “A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of

contracts may not be passed.” Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation conflicts

with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on Judicial Performance

(CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments shows the legislature’s attempt to

usurp constitutional powers and requests an opinion from the California Attorney

General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court

is deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions

on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiff

is due damages for the biases bought by the L.A. County bribes.

BIAS, INJURY AND DAMAGES !

The constitutionality of the severable portions of SBX2 11 is only one issue in

the civil suits. These civil suits are, first and foremost, about the biases experienced

by the Plaintiffs as a result of the county payments.

The United States Census Bureau data and analysis published in 2009 clearly

identifies the bias, at the national level, shown against the Plaintiffs by the family law

Defendants. These civil cases will establish that defendant’s county bribes

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encouraged denial of Plaintiff’s rights to raise their children and exaggerated the child

support due from Plaintiffs. A jury, with evidence, will decide if the defendant judges

were biased.



Looking at the figures for 2007, it appears to me that there may be a sampling anomaly. The percentage of custodialmothers awarded support dropped by 4% between 2005 and 2007. This is 3% lower than any other year in the series. I’m not aware of any sweeping changes which occurred in this time frame, and since parents receive child support forbetween 18 and 21 years it seems highly unlikely that the makeup of the population would change this much in just 2years. I’m also not sure why they don’t have data beyond 2007. Since they publish this every other year they shouldhave data out for at least 2009. Once they publish the 2009 and 2011 data we will have a better understanding of ifthe 2007 data shows a trend towards slightly less bias against fathers or if it was in fact a sampling error.

*Clarence’s experience makes sense, as Table 2 shows that 47.6% of all custodial parents with support agreements in2007 were on public assistance. In these cases the state is generally the recipient of the child support payment,although some states do pass $50 a month or a similar token amount on to the parent. This also shows up in thenumbers, as only 27% of custodial parents who stated they were due support payments in 2007 were on publicassistance. Those parents who didn’t receive anything aren’t included in the average figures reported by the Census,but those who received $50 are.

{ 78 comments… read them below or add one }

Firepower August 22, 2011 at 08:56

A fine report such as this, (replete with concrete, irrefutable evidence in chart form) is normally expected to beenough to get men finally motivated to fight.

If they do not, nor even emerge victorious, then not much can be said for the feebleness of their state.

Nor should any more tears be shed or energies expended on their behalf.

Liberty or slaveryLiberty, or death



The Spearhead

HomeAboutContactCommenting PolicyForumSubmissionsMarriage ReformSubscribe

The bias against fathers in U.S. custody and childsupportby Dalrock on August 22, 2011

We all know the system is biased against fathers, but the actual data is important when discussing this with those whoare skeptical. It can’t be that bad, can it? Here is the data I pulled together from Table 1 in the latest US CensusBureau report on the topic, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007

All of the steps of the process are biased against men except the percentage of support due which is collected (the twoare roughly equal).

It starts with who is granted custody:

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The $7,000 annual professional development bribe encouraged attendance at

anti-father conferences like the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges

and yielded biased rulings against Plaintiffs on domestic violence and financial

settlements. Similarly, as lawyers, the judges would also have been included in the

anti-father advocacy campaigns of the American Bar Association in its distribution of

materials to discredit allegations of Parental Alienation Syndrome, encourage the

family court to take up domestic violence issues and otherwise prejudice the court in

the presentation of evidence. (A portion of one such document is shown below.)

Domestic violence is the purview of the District Attorney. A jury, based on the

evidence, will decide if the defendant judges were biased based on the payment of

Los Angeles County bribes.

Four judges who have taken the bribes have sworn on a stack of holy

documents that they are not biased. Plaintiff does not believe them and defendant’s

actions also speak otherwise. Plaintiff demands to have multiple jury decisions to

resolve these matters.

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If Court Counsel wants to achieve cost savings, BODB can start by

systematically addressing the questions and issues identified and then convincing

both the Court and the Plaintiffs of the robustness of those answers. Plaintiffs have

no interest in duplicating 50-page Appendices and generating pleadings with the

same information and questions repeated. Plaintiffs would be very interested in a

process for building a foundation of evidence and admissions of fact.

The motion to consolidate cases is premature. Another Writ of Mandate for

Recusal of Judge O’Brien will be submitted on September 5, 2011. The motion to

vacate Judge Kuhl’s void order relating the cases has not even been heard or

responded to by Court Counsel. The motion to strike the Demurrer based on Court

Counsel’s erroneous and unilateral misrepresentations has not been responded to

nor been heard. The motions for change of venue have not yet been completed.

Most importantly, prior to any consolidation, a stipulation must be in place for proper

representation of Plaintiffs and Defendants at these hearings and discussion of how

their rights and claims would be protected following any consolidation.

Dated: 31 August 2011 By: _______________________________ DENNIS ETTLIN

In Pro Per

"I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing images inserted herein are true and correct representations of the documents and information delineated."

Dated: 31 August 2011 By: _______________________________ DENNIS ETTLIN

In Pro Per

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REQUEST FOR RECUSAL AND OBJECTION TO REFUSAL 1

Dan

iel C

oope

r, In

Pro

pria

Per

sona



) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ))))))) ) ) ) ))))))) )



vs.

REQUEST FOR RECUSAL UNDER CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A. COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT BRIBES AND FAILURE TO DISCLOSE L.A. COUNTY INTERESTS IN THE CASE OBJECTION UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO RECUSE REQUEST UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(5) FOR A JUDGE SELECTED BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Michael I. LEVANAS, an individual; Defendant


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The Judicial Council report of December 2009 states that all L.A. County judges

have been receiving “L.A. County Judicial Benefits”. Under California Code of Civil

Procedure (CCP), Section 170.1(a)(3), Judge O’Brien must disclose all such monies

he receives now or in the past from L.A. County or similar benefits from the Los

Angeles Superior Court. He has not done so. An Internet search for Judge Robert

O’Brien shows that he has indeed received such monies. An email from Gregg

Iverson of the L.A. County Auditor’s office clearly confirms that Judge O’Brien

took $277,925 of L.A. County judicial payments from 1989 to 1999 before

he retired.

California Code of Civil Procedure, §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states “A judge shall

be disqualified if any one or more the following is true: ....(iii) A person aware of the

facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be

impartial”. Plaintiff doubts that Judge O’Brien, like Michael Lavanas and others,

can be impartial in Plaintiff’s family law and alleged domestic violence matters.

Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1) states, “A judge shall disqualify himself

or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law”. Code of

Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) states, “In all Trial Court proceedings, a judge shall

disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of

disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for

disqualification.” That L.A. County is an interested party and paid bribes to the

judges, is extremely relevant to Plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff has seen no such disclosures. Since this case is totally about L.A.

County payments to judges and the bias arising therefrom, Judge O’Brien must

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recuse himself and transfer the case to a judge who has not received benefits as

demanded in the civil complaint.

This objection is also a formal CCP section 170.3(c)(1) objection to Judge

O’Brien’s refusal to disqualify himself for cause under CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

Based upon Judge O’Brien’s taking of L.A. County payments and the presumed

bias against Plaintiff, Judge O’Brien must disqualify himself under the standard set

forth in the cases of Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88

Cal.App.4th 925 , as modified at 89 Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker

Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723 (1998); Ceriale v. AMCO Ins.

Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).

The CCP §170.3(c)(1) required facts constituting the grounds are

voluminously detailed in the Writ of Mandate filed August 12, 2011 in the Second

Appellate Court, Division 8, case number B235113 against Robert O’Brien, are

again partially described in the underlying complaint to this very case SC113137

and are not included here for the sake of brevity.

RENEWED DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE

Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received “judicial benefits” from any

county, has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los Angeles

County, has no familiarity with Title IV-D agencies, and no familiarity with domestic

violence agencies or advocates. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a

change of venue to a county where the judges are not receiving supplemental judicial

payments.

Dated: ____ August, 2011

By: __________________________

DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

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VERIFICATION

Verification of Pleading and Declaration under Penalty of Perjury Form

By Party

DANIEL COOPER

CASE TITLE: DANIEL COOPER

v. Michael I. LEVANAS,

I, Daniel Cooper, declare:

1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2. I have read the foregoing Request for Recusal and know the contents

thereof.

3. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which

are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I

believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This

verification was executed on August 21, 2011, at Los Angeles County,

California.

____________________________

Daniel Cooper In Pro Per

Daniel Cooper 1836 10th st # B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 IN PROPRIA PERSONA

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POS-030ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY

CASE NUMBER:

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place.

My residence or business address is:

On (date): I mailed from (city and state): the following documents (specify):

I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):a. depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid. b.

The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:Name of person served:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date:

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council of California POS-030 [New January 1, 2005]

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1013, 1013a

1.

2.

3.

placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

4.

Address of person served:b.a.

www.courtinfo.ca.gov

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:

TELEPHONE NO.:

ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OFSTREET ADDRESS:

MAILING ADDRESS:

CITY AND ZIP CODE:

BRANCH NAME:

FAX NO. (Optional):

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)

The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).

The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail—Civil (Documents Served) (form POS-030(D)).

5.

E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):

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APPENDIX ! P!

APPENDIX

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B241184!

! COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, Division p

Daniel COOPER, an individual; Petitioner/Appellant

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )))

Court of Appeal B241184 Superior Court YC064994 Lead for additional consolidated cases YC065018, YC065019, YC065021, YC065164, and SC113064 SC113135 SC113136 SC113137

v. Elia WEINBACH, an individual;

Defendant/Respondent.

Appeal From a Judgment of The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles

The Honorable Robert O’Brien


Volume 2 of 2, Pages _______________

Kevin M. McCormick Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura, California 93002


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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

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Statement of Decision Requested on Constitutional Issues

!WRIT OF MANDATE FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE O’BRIEN 1

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SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Los Angeles County Case No. SC113137

DANIEL COOPER APPELLANT v. SUPERIOR COURT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY RESPONDENT from the Judgment of the Superior Court Hon. Robert O’Brien, Judge

SC113064, lead SC113135 SC113136

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE FOR

IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE ROBERT O’BRIEN

from the Judgment of the Superior Court

Honorable Robert O’Brien, Judge

Daniel Cooper 1836 10th Street # B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 IN PROPRIA PERSONA

Statement of Decision Requested on Constitutional Issues. Sturgeon II left constitutional issues unresolved. Plaintiff seeks Second Appellate decision to avoid change of Venue and hardship on all parties to the cases. !

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX&TO&APPENDICES&SUPPORTING&PETITION&FOR&WRIT&.....................&3&

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES&...............................................................&4&

CASE SUMMARY STATUS&...............................................................&6&

PLAINTIFFS APPELLATE SUMMARY&...........................................&7&

REQUEST&FOR&STATEMENT&OF&DECISION&...............................................&8&

APPELLANT&SEEKS&THE&RECUSAL&OF&JUDGE&O’BRIEN&.............................&10&

JUDGE&O’BRIEN&COMMITED&“FRAUD&ON&THE&COURT”&..........................&12&

JUDGE&O’BRIEN&COMMITED&A&DENIAL&OF&DUE&PROCESS&......................&14&

SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL&.................................................&16&

LOS&ANGELES&COUNTY&IS&AN&INTERESTED&PARTY,&.................................&23&

JUDGE&O’BRIEN&VIOLATED&CODE&OF&JUDICIAL&ETHICS&...........................&26&

DEMAND FOR UNBIASED JUDGE&.................................................&27&

CONCLUSION&...................................................................................&27&

PRAYER&.............................................................................................&28&

VERIFICATION&................................................................................&29&

INDEX TO APPENDICES SUPPORTING PETITION FOR WRIT APPENDIX 1 Request for Recusal .............................................................. A1

APPENDIX 2 Order Striking Disqualification ........................................... A7

APPENDIX 3 County Auditor Data on O’Brien Payments ..................... A14

APPENDIX 4 COOPER Correspondence with County Auditor. ............ A19

APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 ................................................................. A27

APPENDIX 6 Commission on Judicial Performance Opinions ............... A31

APPENDIX 7 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary .......................... A55

APPENDIX 8 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Summary ....................... A60

APPENDIX 9 Child Support Services Dept. Budget ................................. A66

APPENDIX 10 Zolin 1988 Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court ........... A72

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Table of Authorities Cases

Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) .................................................................................. 16 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) ....................................................................... 8, 12, 14, 25 Carlson v. Eassa 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 (1997); ........................................ 24 Carr v. Kamins 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 (2007) ............................. 24 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ................................................................................... 26 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ......................................................................................... 25 Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) .................................................................... 16 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 .............................................................. 12 Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125 (1995) .................................................... 24 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2008) ............................................ 9-11, 14-16, 18, 20-21 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles ___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) ......................... 9-11, 20-21, 27 U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) .................................................................................................. 13-15, 23 Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) .............................................................................................. 13-15, 23 Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499 ....................................................................................... 15 Statutes

California Code of Civil Procedure § ____ ....................................... 12-14, 22, 26-27 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act ............................................. 14-16, 18

Other Authorities California Senate Bill SBX2 11 .................................................................... 9-11, 18-22 California Code of Judicial Ethics .................................................................... 12-13, 26

Constitutional Provisions California Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 19 ............................................................. 14-17

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SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

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DANIEL COOPER APPELLANT

SC113064, lead SC113135 SC113136

v.

SUPERIOR COURT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY RESPONDENT from the Judgment of the Superior Court Hon. Robert O’Brien, Judge

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE FOR IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE ROBERT O’BRIEN

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CASE SUMMARY STATUS

Appellant (hereinafter “COOPER”) requested recusal “with

cause” of Judge Robert H. O’Brien. The order striking the statement of

disqualification provided only this Writ of Mandate process for review.

COOPER has been in civil case proceedings since June 17, 2011 in Los

Angeles County. On August 25, 2011, Appellant filed with the court,

prior to the proceeding, a written request for recusal, a section

170.3(c)(1) objection and a section 170.3(c)(5) request for independent

review. During the proceeding, Appellant verbally requested Judge

O’Brien’s recusal due to receipt of Judicial Benefits. The Judge replied

he would take the matter under consideration. Later on August 25, 2011,

Judge O’Brien issued an order striking the statement of disqualification.

That statement denied current receipt of Los Angeles County judicial

benefits and never admitted to receipts in the past. Judge O’Brien then

declared his complete lack of bias on Appellant’s judicial benefit

matters before the court.

Appendix 1 contains a true and correct copy of the August 25,

2011 Request for Recusal and 170.3(c)(1) Objection. Appendix 2

contains a true and correct copy of the Court Order

Striking Statement of Disqualification. Appendix 3 contains the

evidence Judge O’Brien tried to conceal from Appellant. Appellant

believes this to be true and correct copy, similar in key respects to actual

data received directly by the Appellant from Gregg Iverson of the

County Auditor’s office, which is shown in Appendix 4. The L.A.

County Auditor data in Appendix 3 clearly indicates that Judge

O’Brien took $277,925 in judicial payments from 1989 to 1999.

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PLAINTIFFS APPELLATE SUMMARY

COOPER requested recusal of Elia Weinbach on January 20,

2011from case SD026673. Weinbach refused. COOPER requested a

Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District on January 26,

2011. On February 8, 2011. The Writ was summarily denied by Justices

Boren, Doi Todd and Ashmann-Gerst. Civil complaints were

subsequently filed against Kathryn Doi Todd (SC113135) and Judith

Ashmann-Gerst (SC113136) for civil rights violations.

Another Plaintiff and Appellant, Dennis Ettlin, filed a civil suit

against Sandy Kriegler (YC065019) for failure to recuse himself in

family law appeal case, B187741, filed in the Appellate Court in 2006.

Subsequently, Ettlin requested recusal of Robert O’Brien on

August 1, 2011. O’Brien refused. Ettlin requested a Writ of Mandate

from the Second Appellate District on August 10, 2011. The petition

was denied by justices Bigelow, Rubin and Flier. Civil suits are in

preparation for all three and will be filed in counties where the judges

did not take bribes.

A third Appellant, Anthony Locatelli, requested Thomas Trent

Lewis to recuse himself from case BD516629. Lewis refused. Locatelli

requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District on

August 19, 2011. The petition was denied on August 25, 2011 by

justices Mallano, Chaney and Johnson. Civil suits are in preparation for

all three and will be filed in counties where the judges did not take

bribes.

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Nine of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District are being

sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. The three

current cases will seek a change of venue and the six new cases will be

filed outside Los Angeles County. This will create great hardship on the

Plaintiffs and Defendants because a fair trial cannot be had in Los

Angeles County. All nine justices were silent and failed to recuse

themselves because of the bribes they received from Los Angeles

County and the interest that Los Angeles County had in the cases

involved. Additionally, eight have participated in the denial of Writs of

Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a

judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal

reasoning on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test

for bias, Plaintiff sees an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’” that is

widespread and persistent.

REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION

COOPER requests a detailed Statement of Decision to include an

opinion on each of the constitutional questions identified in this

Petition.

1. Affirm that Los Angeles County is not sovereign, is a private

entity no different than Appellant in the eyes of the law.

2. Affirm that judicial compensation by sovereign entities is an

accepted compromise by the sovereign when the sovereign entity

is involved in a matter before the judiciary. The same principle

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does not apply to non-sovereign entities, such as county

government.

3. Affirm that Los Angeles County judicial payments are made to

individuals who are making personal and individual choices to

live and work in Los Angeles County. Affirm that acceptance of

the payments is an individual act, not required for employment.

4. Affirm that the immunity of SBX2 11, Section 5 is

unconstitutional due to Article 1, Section 9 of the California

Constitution.

5. Affirm that SBX2 11, Section 2 does not authorize Los Angeles

County Superior Court (not a county) to make “judicial benefits”

payments to Commissioners, Court Counsel and other non-

“Judges”.

6. Affirm SBX2 11, Section 2 allows a reduction in judicial benefits

for all judges equally within a county or court. The state salaries

are annual salaries, the judicial benefits are annual benefits and

therefore taxpayers facing judicial layoffs would expect the terms

and conditions might allow for a reduction in the amount (not

termination) of annual judicial benefits following May 20, 2010.

7. Affirm that judicial benefit bribes from a county, received in the

past, but not recently, will continue to influence the judicial

officer.

Failure of this Court to provide detailed opinions that apply and

extend the legal reasoning of the Fourth Appellate District’s Sturgeon II

decision will be used as prima facie evidence of the Second Appellate

Court’s bias and protection of Los Angeles County interests. Ideally, a

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permanent solution for the Sturgeon cases by the judiciary would

originate at the source of the largest bribes. Only if the judiciary has the

courage to uphold and protect the California Constitution in all matters

pertaining to the judiciary itself, can it have any authority to rule upon

or impose a solution on the voters and their legislators.

APPELLANT SEEKS THE IMMEDIATE RECUSAL OF

JUDGE O’BRIEN

Judge O’Brien lost all judicial immunity when he accepted

monies from a party (Los Angeles County) frequently before the court.

To fill this void, California Senate Bill SBX2 11 offered judge Robert

O’Brien, as an individual, retroactive immunity from civil liability,

criminal prosecution and disciplinary action effective 5/21/09 for

accepting the L.A. County payments. He did NOT receive any

retroactive immunity for presiding over cases such as the present one in

which L.A. County had an interest, in which neither he nor L.A. County

disclosed the L.A. County payments, and for which he did not

disqualify himself.

It is important to be clear that there are three disqualifying events

here. The first is the mere acceptance of any judicial payments. The

second is Defendant’s failure to identify the Los Angeles County

interest in the family law case to Plaintiff, and the third event is the

failure of either Judge O’Brien or the County Counsel to disclose such

and notify Plaintiff at the outset of proceedings. SBX2 11 only

attempted to provide immunity for the first disqualifying event.

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Appellant’s civil case is about damages due to the failure to

disqualify in any case where L.A. County has an interest in the case.

Clearly Judge O’Brien does not comprehend the enormity of the

Sturgeon rulings and SBX2 11. The immunity intended by SBX2 11

acknowledged the criminality of the judicial payments. The bias that

arises from a bribe does not cease at the end of a fiscal year. Ten years

of a bias in favor of L.A. County by Judge O’Brien easily persists to

today’s review of the issues surrounding those payments.

This case, and others like it, originates in the judicial bribes paid

by L.A. County. It is the individual responsibility of Judge O’Brien to

voluntarily identify anything in his past, which might indicate a bias. It

is the height of arrogance for Judge O’Brien to proclaim his lack of bias

without even acknowledging his past judicial benefit payments or the

retroactive immunity for him under the unconstitutional SBX2 11.

Appellant seeks an IMMEDIATE ORDER FOR THE

RECUSAL OF ROBERT O’BRIEN and a stay on any further

proceedings, orders or judgments that impact this case, especially the

motions seeking a consolidation order. Such order will immediately

deny Appellant his 5th and 14th amendment rights.

Court Counsel seeks to portray the three plaintiffs seeking

damages for the loss of those constitutional rights as disgruntled

litigants. Court Counsel would also have characterized all African-

Americans seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1960’s as

disgruntled domestic help; and all women seeking their full

constitutional rights in the 1970’s as disgruntled housewives; and all

those in the 1990’s seeking full constitutional rights for marriage as

disgruntled lovers.

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Three In Pro Per litigants today have the courage to stand up to

the entire judicial establishment and argue for “NO MORE BRIBES,

NO MORE BIAS”; to fight for the rights of our children and for other

fathers. It would be professional suicide for any lawyer to advance the

same truths or represent us. We seek judges who have not taken bribes

and are not biased toward the interests of Los Angeles County.

Court Counsel has spewed the same “absolute immunity”

hogwash to each of the judges striking statements of disqualification

and to the Orange County Superior Court judge appointed for an

independent CCP 170.3(c)(5) review. The U.S. Supreme Court would

not have wasted its precious time on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal

Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) if judges had the “absolute

immunity” envisioned by Court Counsel.

JUDGE O’BRIEN COMMITED “FRAUD ON THE COURT”

Judge O’Brien refused to volunteer information about his judicial

benefits. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) requires the judge

(including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) to disclose on

the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of

disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 170.1,

even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for disqualification.

CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states “A judge (including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true: .... A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial”.

Judge O’Brien was evasive about, and never admitted to the

payments he did receive from L.A. County from 1989 to 1999.

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California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge

(including a commissioner acting as a temporary judge) from engaging

in any financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent

transactions or continuing business relations with lawyers or other

persons (such as Los Angeles County) likely to appear before the judge

or before the court in which the judge serves.

L.A. County officials and employees are involved or have an

interest in all divorce, domestic violence, traffic and many civil matters

before the Superior Court.

Canon 3E(1) requires a judge (including a commissioner acting

as a temporary judge) to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding

in which disqualification is required by law.

Judge Robert O’Brien violated Canon 4D(1) by taking payments

from L.A. County, violated Canon 3E(2) by not disclosing such

payments on the record, and violated Canon 3E(1) and CCP Section

170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself.

Judge Robert O’Brien committed “fraud on the court” by not

disclosing the L.A. County payments to COOPER at the outset of the

case and not disqualifying himself. His having committed “fraud on the

court” renders any orders and judgments made by him void. See U.S. v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine

Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)

Since the “fraud on the court” vitiates the entire case, all orders

from that court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts

has subject matter jurisdiction, no court has the lawful authority to

validate a void order. A void order is void at all times, cannot be made

valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage of time. The

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order is void ab initio. (See U.S. v. Throckmorton, supra; Vallely v.

Northern Fire and Marine Co., supra).

JUDGE O’BRIEN COMMITED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

Judge Robert O’Brien is not alone in “committing fraud on the

court” by refusing to disclose the L.A. County payments and refusing to

disqualify himself in cases in which L.A. County was a party or had an

interest and in violating Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1) and CCP Section

170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). It appears to be a tacit agreement amongst all of the

L.A. Superior Court Judges and Court commissioners, who have

received L.A. County payments and L.A. County and L.A. County’s

attorneys, to conceal such payments from opposing parties and commit

“fraud on the court” in any case in which L.A. County is a party or has

an interest.

This type of action has been held to be a denial of due process in

the U.S. Supreme Court case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,

556 U.S. ___ (2009). The court stated at Slip Opinion page 16: .....just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man chooses the judge in his own cause.

The L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court judges were

held to violate Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution in

the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630

(2008) rev. denied 12/23/08. Such case also held that in the 1997

Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, the State Legislators did not

“prescribe” county payments to Superior Court judges under Article VI,

Section 19 of the California Constitution. (See last four paragraphs of

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opinion.) The 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act was an

unconstitutional delegation of power because it did not also set the

standards for that authority.

Appendix 7 incorporates herein as if set forth in full, a true and

correct copy of the L.A. County Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Proposed

Budget Trial Court Operations pages 60.1 to 60.4. Such section shows

that the “judicial benefits” are required to be paid under the 1997

Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. This is a false statement as

the Sturgeon case held that the 1997 Trial Court Funding Act did not

“prescribe the payment of judicial benefits by counties under Article VI,

Section 19 of the California Constitution. All of the L.A. County

budgets from 1998 onwards contain the same false statement.

Judge O’Brien committed “fraud on the court” by not disclosing

the L.A. County payments to him and not disqualifying himself at the

outset of the case.

The fraud on the court vitiates the entire case and voided all of

the orders and judgments entered in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court

stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):

“There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the

solemn contracts, documents and even judgments”

The Court continued at page 66:

“Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a

contract...” (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)

///

The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire and

Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920):

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“Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act] beyond

the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority,

and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are

regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and

this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1

Pet.) 328, 340 (1828): Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough,

204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236”

The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312

F2nd. 337,343 (1962):

“If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment

based upon it is also void.”

SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008)

Rev. denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A.

Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California

Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding

Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT set any

standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS the

authorization of “judicial benefits” payments by counties to Superior

Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.

The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact it is

a long simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles

County, into the “labor-management” relationship between the State and

the Judges. In 1976 the Attorney General issued an opinion that health

insurance benefits were unconstitutional;

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“The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue states:

The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added).

The Attorney General argues that, “Because of the use of ‘prescribe’ the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid.” 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of a judge’s compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County

Counsel, advised Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the

Superior Court that it would be permissible for the county to pay

“additional benefits for judges”, although he acknowledged the Attorney

General had opinions otherwise (see Appendix 10).

Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a

memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and

updated the Attorney General’s opinion on the unconstitutionality of

such county benefits. The Commission staff memorandum then

expressed a fear of the voters and went on to conclude that the

legislature should take action and gamble on the validity of the

delegation of authority. Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will

be held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority …., a case can be made that this will not occur. The problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. (emphasis added)

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(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995; pages 1, 4, 5, 9,and 10 included in App. 10)

The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislature’s bluff in the 1997

Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial

problems of unconstitutionality and bias accrued over the last 15 years

must be made whole. Sturgeon I was no surprise or rogue ruling.

After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed

and the Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11, which became effective

5/21/09. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what

they failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also

unconstitutional.

Senate Bill SBX2 11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such

that no “governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to

prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a

judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the

effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not

authorized under law.” Senate bill SBX2 11, Section 5, did not give

retroactive immunity to judges or “temporary judges” who had received

the county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases

in which the county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being

disqualified as a judge in the past, present or future.

Senate bill SBX2 11, a true and correct copy of the full text of

which is included in Appendix 5, acknowledged both the criminality of

the payment of judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also

the loss of immunity protections under current state and federal laws by

attempting to give all parties to the bribes limited retroactive immunity.

The immunity in SBX2 11, Section 5, effective 5/21/09, is not part of

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California government codes. The attempted immunity is also

unconstitutional under the California Constitution, ARTICLE 1,

SECTION 9 that states “A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law

impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” Furthermore,

the legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). Appendix 6 contains the

extensive CJP analysis and arguments obtained under the Freedom of

Information Act. The CJP has not publicized its analyses showing the

legislature’s attempt to usurp constitutional powers from the CJP and

their requests for an opinion from the California Attorney General on

the constitutionality of SBX2 11.

The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial

Council is now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court

Counsel and others. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A.

County to Commissioners are called “warrants” by the L.A. County

Auditor because they are issued by L.A. County but funded by the

Judicial Council.) The continued payments by the counties under

Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council payments a continued

obligation, especially since any increase is prohibited by Section 4. The

opinions of the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) are that

these payments are also unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the

Attorney General’s opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly

biased. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the

taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on

whether the Superior Court payments obligated by the county payments

are legal and constitutional.

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The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not

been challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo

ante Sturgeon I. The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the

California Constitution, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states “A bill of

attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts

may not be passed.” Furthermore, SBX2 11 Section 5 legislation

conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the Commission on

Judicial Performance (CJP). The extensive CJP analysis and arguments

shows the legislature’s attempt to usurp constitutional powers and

requests an opinion from the California Attorney General on the

constitutionality of SBX2 11. Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is

deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury

decisions on whether the judges have immunity from civil liability and

if so whether the Plaintiff is due damages for the biases bought by the

L.A. County bribes.

The Fourth Appellate Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. County of

Los Angeles, __Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called

“Sturgeon II” concluded on page 14:

“As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate governmental powers, quite limited.” (emphasis added)

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The Appellate Court continues and contradicts itself on page 15;

“However, on its face SBX2 11 is not a permanent response to … the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I …[and] that interim remedy [SBX2 11], if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.” (emphasis added)

If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by

the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court

feels “quite limited” in ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing

to fully address this issue.

The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county

judicial benefits. Appellant’s civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of

the citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II, but more importantly,

to address the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the

resulting fraud on the court that Sturgeon does not address.

Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments

are not a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2

11) to terminate all payments and since the county is clearly an

interested party in all divorce and traffic cases; therefore the continued

payments must be in the county’s interests. Those county interests are

the Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements as well as the penalty

assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis for

judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases.

SBX2 11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal

immunity. The bill granted immunity for monies paid and received prior

to May 2009. This attempted ex post facto immunity is unconstitutional

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and furthermore did not and could not restore Appellant’s California

Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection lost during

the proceedings of Appellant’s family law case SD026673 under Judge

Weinbach or Appellant’s civil case SC113137 now under Judge O’Brien.

Senate bill SBX2 11 did not even attempt to give immunity for

the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe. Judge O’Brien did not

disclose the county payments, refuses review by another judge under

CCP 170.3(c)(2), makes his own ruling on the sufficiency of the law,

contrary to CCP 170.3(c)(5), and then attempts to continue presiding

over a case in which the county has a major interest. Judge Weinbach,

likewise, did not disclose the county payments and then presided over a

case in which the L.A. County Child Support Services Department is a

very interested party as it “establishes financial ...support obligations for

children, enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under

federal and state law” and is a “collaborative partner” with the Superior

Court. (See Exhibit 9)

Appendix 9 contains a true and correct copy of the Fiscal Year

2005-2006 L.A. County Budget for Child Support Services Department

pages 59-62 and is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Such

document shows the Child Support Services Department “establishes,

modifies, and enforces financial and medical support obligations for

children, enforces existing spousal support orders ... as required under

federal and state law” (page 59). The Child Support Services

Department received federal and state Title IV-D funding fiscal years

2003-2006 (pages 61-62).

///

///

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LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY, NOT A SOVEREIGN ENTITY

Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity; only the Federal

Government and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the United

States of America. Therefore Los Angeles County’s actual payments to

a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Appellant.

Both are bribes. The stated purpose of Los Angeles County payments is

to “retain” judges in Los Angeles County. The favorable disposition

related to job assignment reasonably and easily carries over to a pre-

disposition toward Los Angeles County in matters where the county has

an interest. Judge O’Brien’s acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and

his sitting on a case in which L.A. County is an interested party voids all

his orders and judgments. Judge O’Brien’s failure to disclose the county

payments to Appellant, constituted an extrinsic “fraud on the court”. All

of Judge O’Brien’s orders in case SC113137 are and will be void.

Furthermore, Judge Kuhl’s order relating Plaintiff’s cases is void and

Judge O’Brien’s actions to sustain and implement that order are also

void ab initio.

Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment.

See U.S. v. Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878) – since “fraud on the

court” vitiates the entire case, all orders from that court or any

subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter

jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order.

See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) – a

void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor

does it gain validity by the passage of time.

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Contrary to Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge O’Brien’s

Order Striking Statement Of Disqualification, the order is indeed

appealable as a void order. An appeal may be taken from an order

denying a motion to vacate a void judgment because denial of the

motion constitutes an order giving effect to a void judgment and thus is

itself void and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-

934, 60 CR3d 196, 199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62

CR2d 884, 888; Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley

County Water Dist. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125].

The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly

documented for all Family Law cases (Appendix 9). The L.A. County

Payments are “bribes” as they “influence” Judges, in family law cases,

to award unequal custody and thus by L.A. County Child Support

Services Department (CSSD) guidelines establish higher custody

payments from noncustodial parents. The L.A. County Child Support

Services Department “establishes financial .... support obligations for

children... as required under federal and state law” and works as a

“collaborative Partner” with the Superior Court. The payment of money

by L.A. County, to the judge who rules on the amount of child support

(which taken in the aggregate) directly determines the expenses of the

L.A. County Child Support Services Department. The amount of those

expenses then directly determines the amount of money that the L.A.

County Child Support Services Department receives in Title IV-D

federal and state funds. (Page 61 of the report in Appendix 9 shows the

$176 million received from Title IV-D compared to the small $3 million

cost to L.A. County.) The annual $30 million cost of judicial benefits

was cost effective for L.A. County at a ratio of 6:1 for just one program.

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The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders

against non-custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A.

County Child Support Services Department, the higher the amount of

Title IV-D federal and state funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in

the judge setting the greatest number and the highest monetary child

support orders. L.A. County is a “real party in interest” in every divorce

case as it reaps a huge financial benefit.

The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no

purpose other than to influence the judge’s decision to create a non-

custodial parent and high child support order which must frequently also

use federally-funded enforcement resources.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United

States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): “A judge receiving a bribe from an

interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of

justice.”

In essence, by making all L.A. Superior Court judges “eligible” for

the L.A. County payments, L.A. County has “bought the L.A. Superior

Court”. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in

relevant part:

“...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.”

By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court

judge, no party in a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was

biased to rule to benefit the L.A. County Child Support Services

Department over the interests of the “parties” to the case.

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By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court

judge as individuals, no party in a civil case involving the Judges of the

Superior Court can receive a fair trial, as the judge is biased to rule for

any benefit to L.A. County over the interests of the other “parties” to the

case.

The County-Auditor’s data (in Appendix 3) combined with the

Judicial Council’s report (in Appendix 4) and the 2010-2011 L.A.

County proposed budget Trial Court Operations section (in Appendix 7)

demonstrate that L.A. County has “bought” the L.A. County Superior

Court without the consent of the “other party” opposing them in any

case. The L.A. County interest and partnership with the court is clearly

documented for all Family Law cases (Appendix 9). Based on the

payment information in Appendix 3, Appellant has serious doubts that

Judge O’Brien can be impartial during a jury trial on damages due to the

biases inherent in the L.A. County bribes. Judge O’Brien’s actions

constitute “fraud on the court” and have denied COOPER due process

by denying him the right to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349

U.S. 133, 136 (1955)

JUDGE O’BRIEN VIOLATED THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS AND THE CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Judge O’Brien also violated California Code of Judicial Ethics

Canon 4D(1), which prohibits a judge from engaging in any financial or

business dealings with a person (Los Angeles County) who is likely to

appear before the court upon which the judge serves; Canon 3E(2)

which requires the judge to disclose on the record information that is

reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under CCP

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1 Request for Recusal .............................................................. A1

APPENDIX 2 Order Striking Disqualification ........................................... A7

APPENDIX 3 County Auditor Data on O’Brien Payments ..................... A14

APPENDIX 4 COOPER Correspondence with County Auditor. ............ A19

APPENDIX 5 Text of SBX2 11 ................................................................. A27

APPENDIX 6 Commission on Judicial Performance Opinions ............... A31

APPENDIX 7 Trial Court Operations Budget Summary .......................... A55

APPENDIX 8 Litigation Cost Manager Report, Summary ....................... A60

APPENDIX 9 Child Support Services Dept. Budget ................................. A66

APPENDIX 10 Zolin 1988 Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court ........... A72

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APPENDIX

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vs.

REQUEST FOR RECUSAL UNDER CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) BASED ON BIAS DUE TO L.A. COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT BRIBES AND FAILURE TO DISCLOSE L.A. COUNTY INTERESTS IN THE CASE OBJECTION UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(1) TO REFUSAL TO RECUSE REQUEST UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(5) FOR A JUDGE SELECTED BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Michael I. LEVANAS, an individual; Defendant


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The Judicial Council report of December 2009 states that all L.A. County judges

have been receiving “L.A. County Judicial Benefits”. Under California Code of Civil

Procedure (CCP), Section 170.1(a)(3), Judge O’Brien must disclose all such monies

he receives now or in the past from L.A. County or similar benefits from the Los

Angeles Superior Court. He has not done so. An Internet search for Judge Robert

O’Brien shows that he has indeed received such monies. An email from Gregg

Iverson of the L.A. County Auditor’s office clearly confirms that Judge O’Brien

took $277,925 of L.A. County judicial payments from 1989 to 1999 before

he retired.

California Code of Civil Procedure, §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states “A judge shall

be disqualified if any one or more the following is true: ....(iii) A person aware of the

facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be

impartial”. Plaintiff doubts that Judge O’Brien, like Michael Lavanas and others,

can be impartial in Plaintiff’s family law and alleged domestic violence matters.

Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1) states, “A judge shall disqualify himself

or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law”. Code of

Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) states, “In all Trial Court proceedings, a judge shall

disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of

disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for

disqualification.” That L.A. County is an interested party and paid bribes to the

judges, is extremely relevant to Plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff has seen no such disclosures. Since this case is totally about L.A.

County payments to judges and the bias arising therefrom, Judge O’Brien must

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recuse himself and transfer the case to a judge who has not received benefits as

demanded in the civil complaint.

This objection is also a formal CCP section 170.3(c)(1) objection to Judge

O’Brien’s refusal to disqualify himself for cause under CCP §170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

Based upon Judge O’Brien’s taking of L.A. County payments and the presumed

bias against Plaintiff, Judge O’Brien must disqualify himself under the standard set

forth in the cases of Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88

Cal.App.4th 925 , as modified at 89 Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker

Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723 (1998); Ceriale v. AMCO Ins.

Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).

The CCP §170.3(c)(1) required facts constituting the grounds are

voluminously detailed in the Writ of Mandate filed August 12, 2011 in the Second

Appellate Court, Division 8, case number B235113 against Robert O’Brien, are

again partially described in the underlying complaint to this very case SC113137

and are not included here for the sake of brevity.


Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received “judicial benefits” from any

county, has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los Angeles

County, has no familiarity with Title IV-D agencies, and no familiarity with domestic

violence agencies or advocates. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a


payments.

Dated: ____ August, 2011

By: __________________________

DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

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VERIFICATION

Verification of Pleading and Declaration under Penalty of Perjury Form

By Party

DANIEL COOPER

CASE TITLE: DANIEL COOPER

v. Michael I. LEVANAS,

I, Daniel Cooper, declare:

1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2. I have read the foregoing Request for Recusal and know the contents

thereof.

3. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which

are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I

believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This

verification was executed on August 21, 2011, at Los Angeles County,

California.

____________________________

Daniel Cooper In Pro Per


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POS-030ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY

CASE NUMBER:

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place.

My residence or business address is:

On (date): I mailed from (city and state): the following documents (specify):

I served the documents by enclosing them in an envelope and (check one):a. depositing the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid. b.

The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows:Name of person served:


Date:

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM) (SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS FORM)

Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council of California POS-030 [New January 1, 2005]

PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL—CIVIL Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 1013, 1013a

1.

2.

3.

placing the envelope for collection and mailing following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business’s practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

4.

Address of person served:b.a.

www.courtinfo.ca.gov

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:

RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:

TELEPHONE NO.:

ATTORNEY FOR (Name):

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OFSTREET ADDRESS:

MAILING ADDRESS:

CITY AND ZIP CODE:

BRANCH NAME:

FAX NO. (Optional):

(Do not use this Proof of Service to show service of a Summons and Complaint.)

The name and address of each person to whom I mailed the documents is listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail—Civil (Persons Served) (POS-030(P)).

The documents are listed in the Attachment to Proof of Service by First-Class Mail—Civil (Documents Served) (form POS-030(D)).

5.

E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):

(Proof of Service)A-6 AA-276

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3 2011 9:29PM Richard I. Fine ~ Assoc. 310 277 1543

> ••':~.•..

Real Party in Interest

RICHARD 1. FINE,

3 Telephone:Filcsitnile:

4 .Permer Attorney for P~t.iHoJlerMarina Strand Colony U Homeowners Associailon

S Respondent in Contempt Proceeding, alee6, In Pro Pel' in the Contempt Preceedlng

ORIGiNALFILED '

J,.OS ANOJLSS SUPWOJ. C()tOO"

MAR 02 2ml

J~~"KIV~IMV

StJPERIOR COURT OF THE S'fA; B OF CALIFORNIA

f."ORTHE COUNTY OF L S ANOELE~

CENTRAL orsr CT

7

8

9

10

T 1

12

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14v.

MARINA STRAND COLONY TTlHOMEOWNERS ASSOClA nON,

Petitioner,

15 COUNTY OF LOS AN(TBtES,

16 Respondent.

17 DEI,My SHORES JOJNf VDNTIJRE,18 DtJ ...REY SHORES JOTNT VBNTIlRE

NORTH19

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22621 wl'd1t7a

)))) Rep y in SUpP()rt of Notice of Mot101l3nd) MQ on for Renewal of the Motion to V,~id) and AnQul AU Orders and Judgmenb) Inti djng Thoso In tbe Contempt) Pro eedings in the Cage Made by Judge) VII e; Request for ."-Idictal Notice aud) D~ nrafifm of Rlchard J. Fine)))))))

Dal' : March 10. 201 JTim: 9:00 amNe Place: Dept. 1

, filed: 11/3/2008Date: 1212212{)O~

CC Section I008(b)(e)

Reply In Support of Motion

p. 1

A-18 AA-288

Dennis M Ettlin

source file: LASCRedactedReply3-2-11.pdf

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lb:92 E>2&2372ee3 JUDICIAl WATCH P4(j[ 17/43

. . •

COUNTY OF L05 ANCELES o FFICf Of TH£ COU Nl1' CO U N .s.! l

• • •• 0' AO ,,,,, •• '.A'f'IO ...

• 00 ".CC" ,-os •• C.A"'''OAN'A .00'.

__.,., ..."",T••. cov-yy November 10. 1988

Mr. Frank S. %011n countf Orfic.,

Court 11 North B111 Stre.t tos Ang_l•• , 90012

Attention, Eric D. Webber, Chi,t Deputy

Rea 3udic1al Compens.tlon

Dear Hr. ZOlin:

You hive .sked out opinion concerning the le9ality of judgea with County employee benetits such •• the Flexibl. and S«vin98 Plans.

It 18 oue opinion th.t judges' salaries mu.c b. set by the Le91slature, but oth.r benefits may (and in ,ome case. must) b. by the county.

ANALYSIS

Article VI, Section 19 ot tne California Constitution provides#

Lev181ature shall prescribe compenaat1on for judV•• ot court. ot recor4. A judge of • court of record ftal not rece!v. the .alary tor the ofticial of tic. he d by the j udge while Iny cause before the j ud9- remAin. pen41n9 .nd tor '0 daysafter it ha. been 8ubmitte4 ear deci.lon. u .

/ I I:< A-73 AA-317

02/2&/2eee 1&: 132 &2&231'28eJ JUDICIAl. 18/43

Mr. Frank S. &olln Nov.abel" 10, 1988 Pa9. 'rW0

Aa • generAl proposition, the word o r1 91nally ...nt •• • or ·salary,- but •• otber b.net1t. ha•• it h•• to hev. a •••ni n9, and 1. now use4 to include both ••1Aryand frLn9. benefit.. qu •• or whlch me.nln9 wa. intended 1ft section 19 i. celtical, since the courts h.ve th.t where th. Constitution requlr•• tbe Le9i.1ature to ••cribe· .ameth1 n9, the Leg1alature.Y8t do .0 It•• lf, .nd may not leave or deleqate the tunctlon to another body or person. County of Kadera v. Superior CoutS (1974) 39 C.A.Jd 665.

For re••on. which vill belov, we belleve that ·compen•• t1on- .s Ysed 1n Section 19 reCers only to the •• l.ry which 1. the of the judiclal ottlce. The Attorney Gener.l does not agree.S•• , •• 9., S, Ope. Cal. Atty. Cent 496; 6l Ope. Cal. Atty. a.n. 31S. w. note initially th.t jud9•• , like other elected .re p.id under the law rule that the 11 an incident of the oflic•• Consequently, they do not technically hay. such benefits a. vacltlon, sick leave or overtime, which otherwise alvht be considered a p.rt of compensation.

R••din9 18 ae a whole, it appear. that the word. "coapen•• tion- and ere inte(chan9••b1y; that is, "salary'l in the second sentence 'PP4ars to refer to the "compensation-prescrib4d purau.nt to the first sentence.

Th1. r ••dln9 of Section 19 i. supported by the t.ct that Article VI, Section 20 provldes:

"The Legislature sh.l1 provid. for retir.ment, with r •••onable .llowanc., of judgea of courts of record tor a;e or dlsAb111t,."

If aa used in Section 19 was intended to include triD98 ben.tit. such •• benerits, there would b. no need for Section 20.

A-74 AA-318

Dennis M Ettlin

82/26/2eBe 1&:82 6262372883 JUDICIAL WAT(>4 INC Pc.GE 19/43

.'

Hr. Frenk S. Solin Nov..be C' 10, 1 , as '.9- Thr..

Prior to Art1cle VI, Section 19 (vhieh was 196'). jydlcial ..tlon w•• provided under 91, S.ctlon 11, which r ••d in p.rtl

added 1n

"The •• of the ju.t-Ices ot" j ud9 •• ot .u court. 0 .h&ll be fixe4 f .n4 th. payMentther80f pr••cr1bed by the Le9ial.tuce.-

Thi. langU4V. a;a1n sU99••tl ratber than other benefita.

the payment ol a salary,

The pre4ece••or to Article VI, Section Article VI, Section 17, which pcov1deda

11 ••

"The juetic•• of the Supreme Court and of the Distr1ct of Appeal, and the judge. or the .uperlot court., .hall leverallf' at times during their continuance in oft ee, recelve for their aervlce such compen•• tion a8 ia or shall provided by lAW, The sal.ri•• of the ju49•• of the

court, in all eounties heviMQ but one judve, an4 1n .11 count i •• in which the term. of the •• of the Bupecior court expire at the same tl•• , .hall not her •• lter be incr ••••d or diminished .rter their election, nor the ter. tor which they 'h.ll h&ve b•• n elected. Uponthe adoption this the s.la:1 •• then e8t.b118hed by law shall be paid unitormly to the juatleea and judges then 1n ottlee. The salaries of the justice. ot the Supreme Court and of the Olatrict of Appeal be paid by the State. One h.lt of the SAlary of each sup.rioe cour' jud9••hall be by the St.t8J .nd

halt thereof .hAll paid by the county tor which he 18 elected, On and after the first day of J&nU8ry, A.D. 1907, the jUItice8 oC the SupremeCourt sh.ll each rlceive an annual salary of $8,000, and the ju.tice. of the several Diatrict Court. of App•• l shall .ach receive en annual salarr of $7,000, the •• 1d salar1ee to be payable IDOnth ,."

rer•• r Section ·compensation-

11 elso to use the and w•• l ary " lntlrchanQeably.

/1, '3 A-75 AA-319

1&: 82 6262312ee3 JUDICIAL WATCH PAGE 2e/43

"

Hr. rcank S. &011n November: 10, 1981' P.g. rour

The laft9ua,. of former Sect10n 17 1. directly trac.able to the COnatltutlon of 1879, an4 thence to the Con.tltutloft of 11.9.

Artlcle VI, S.ctlon 15 at the Conetltutlon of 1849 prOYide4r

-The Juatlce8 of the Couct, and Jud9•• ot the Dlatrict Court, sh.ll severally, at stated tl... durin; their continu.nce In office, reo.iv, toe thelc servic•• a co-pen.atlon, to be paid out of the tr ••• which shAll not be incre•••d or d1.1n18hed duriA9 the ter- tor which they shall have be.n .1ected. The County JUdqes shall 41so ••v.call" at atated ti••• , r.celv. tor their ••fyie-•• co.pen•• tlon to paid out of the county tr ••• of their re.pect1ve counties, whjch 'hAll not be lncr•••• or dimini.hed dur1n9 the term which they eh.ll have been

It 1. 01•• 1' that weompensltion" as used in Section 15 meant M.alary.- POt th.t we doubt that public offlcSal. in eith.r 1849 or 1879 received much in the w.y 01 fr1nge benet1ta any

Thus, hlatorlc.l1y N compens.t1on" for judges has b••n and under.toO<! to m... n "salary," And this hAS carried ovec to the pre ••nt day.

The Legi.lature ha. interpreted the constitutional lan9uage in the •• way. 1.5 at Titl. 8 of the Government Code (Sections 68200, et seq.) entitled

•• tlon of JU8tic••• •• or Court. ot Record." It d••l. with salary and not with fring. benetit. or any other torm of Similarly, Code Seceion 7S00J, which is a part of the Jud9•• - Retirement define. ·selaryM follow.:

me.ns the eompens.tJon received by • judve a8 the eaolument. of the oEfie. of: judge .••• ••

Ie-! tj A-76 AA-320

e2/2&IZeee 1&:62 JUDICIAL WATCH INC PAGE 21/43

.. Kr. Frank S. Zo11 n Nov••ber 10, 1988 P.ge Five

we conclude that while the Le91.1ature the .al.ry ot a auperior court jud9. and ..y not d.leg.te r ••ponalbillty to AnI otber pee.on or Artlcl. VI, Section l' of the Ca do•• not prohibit the board ot

ot a county fra. providlno b.netlta tor jud9•• in eounty. In fact.

the Leqls1.ture h••• or required .uen additional benetit. in .0•• in.t.ncea.

ror ••••pl., GOV8rnN.nt Code Section 53200.3 pcov14•• th.t are dee.ed to be county e.ployees tor the 11-1te4 pucpo.e or th. application ot th.t article (d••11n9 with 9roUP in.urance) and provides that ju4ge8 are entitled to the lame or similar health and weltlre benet its •• ace to of the

1n whioh the court i. loeated. Thua, judgee are ele.rly .ntitled to dental and lite insurance b.nctlte auch •• tho•• provided 1n the Fl •• ible Senefit

Government Code Section 53214.5 •• judge. to in deterred

compensation plan. establ1ahed by counties, S.ct1on 53214.5 w•• probably inepired tn. existence of d.ferred •• tlon plan•••tablished purSuAnt to Section 457 ot the Internal Revenue Cod., 401(k) planaauah •• ouc Savln9a Pl.n are also dererred compensationpl.nlf and health care .nd dependent C4ce reimbursement accounts •• well •• salary reduction

under the Plexlbl, Benefit Plan ace deterred campen•• tion An4 consequently we believe that 'udge_' therein i8 author12ed bySection 53214.5.

It 1. true that participlnt. in the Flexible Benefit may elect to take ot all oe the County'. contcibutlon aa taxable cAah, and that the County provide... tehln9 conttibutlons to the 401(k) plan. Wt b.118ve that thel. ben@flts are similarlyauthorlze4 by Sectione 53200.) and 53214.5, linea they Ir. part of the plana .uthorl1ed by those sections. In addition, Government Code Sect10n 68206.6, whlch prc9id•• for pay.ent of luperlor court jUQ9•• solely

J'r; A A-77 AA-321

&26'2371883 JUDICIAL WATCH PAGE

.: Mr. Fr.nk S. Zolln November 10, 198' Page st.x

tro•• county payroll, w•••dded tOt the speclfic purpo•• ot to in county caeeterla end 401(k) plan,.

low••• even that such benefit. are not apec1t! ca111 by atatute, w. believe that the

•• provide them to •• , so 10n9 •• the ,"Board of SUr_rYl.0rs tlndt that there i •• benefLt the "dol"9 eo. This would a1.o be tcu. ot other benefit. tor judge., such .8 • prote •• ional development allowance or bonu8.

Supecior court judge. are tech"1c.lly St.te conatltutional ottieer., but they .re in re.pecta qu•• i-county officecs. Ther •• rve the populatlon of a particular countr' the1r .a arie. are paid in part bythe county ln wh ch they .it, and as noted above, they are d.emed to be county ••' eor purpose. or partlclpatlon in h •• lth end 1 fe insurance program••5 well aa in 4.rerr.d compensation plans.

The •• lary of a superior court judge is the ••m• • tat.wide. Thus,. jud,e in a rural county m.y be well compen•• ted b•••d upon the cOlt ot living there .nd In eOMperleon to what he could •• rn in privat.pract1ce. On the other han4, judgee 1n Loa Angel •• County Are cONpen•• ted based upon the co.t of l1vlnQ here and in to what th.y could in private practice. The 90.rd of Supec v !8oce h•• evidently found th.t 1n ocder to .ttraet and retain quallfJed 'u4gel to .erve 1n this County, it i. nece••ary and appropriate to provide with benefit. luch .8 the Flexible Benetlt Pl«n contribution an4 the 401(k) matcb, which .re Available to employe•• in the priv.te .ector, ae well as to CQunty ••• and court And employees other thAn jud9•••

lip

A-78 AA-322

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HI. rr.nlc s. %ol.in Noveaber 10, 19•• Page S...n

It .. be nec•••&ry tor the of Supervl.ors to provide additional benet it. foe jud ges in the future in order to .. a hi9h level of judicial competenee and pertor.ance in th18 County.

It we oan be ot turth.r •••1.tence to you in thl • .. ..tter, pl•••• lee u. know. Very truly yours,

De WITT W. CLINTON County Counsel

By " ROGER M. WHITBY (Senior A•• 1stant county Counsel

APPROVED AND RELEASED:

County Coun••l

RMWr jk NovlOW

I] A-79 AA-323

C A L I F O R N I A L A W R E V I S I O N C O M M I S S I O N S T A F F M E M O R A N D U M

Study J-1201 November 27, 1995

Memorandum 95-77

Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority

The trial court unification legislation, Senate Bill 162 (Lockyer), is effectiveJanuary 1, 1996. The measure provides that on occurrence of a vacancy in amunicipal court judgeship, if the Governor makes certain findings concerning theconversion of the judgeship to a superior court judgeship, “the number ofmunicipal court judges for the county shall then be reduced by one and thenumber of superior court judges for the county shall be increased by one.” Is thisa valid delegation of legislative authority?

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

The California Constitution provides:

The Legislature shall prescribe the number of judges and providefor the officers and employees of each superior court.Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 4 (emphasis added).

The Legislature shall provide for the organization and prescribethe jurisdiction of municipal courts. It shall prescribe for eachmunicipal court the number, qualifications, and compensation ofjudges, officers, and employeesCal. Const. Art. VI, § 5(c) (emphasis added).

The statutes reiterate the mandate: “The Legislature shall prescribe the numberand compensation of judges, officers, and attaches of each municipal court.”Gov’t Code § 7200.

Pursuant to these provisions, the Legislature has prescribed the numbers ofsuperior court and municipal court judges in each county. See Gov’t Code §§69580-69615 (superior court); 72600-74987 (municipal court).

Although historically the Legislature has prescribed a fixed number of judgesin each county, beginning a decade or so ago the Legislature began to allow theboards of supervisors of some counties to provide for a greater number. Thestatute governing the superior court in Los Angeles County, for example,provides:

– 1 –A-80 AA-324

It fixes the compensation of the employees, declares a policy thatsuch compensation shall be commensurate with that furnishedcounty employees with equivalent responsibilities and provides forinterim changes, subject to review by the Legislature, in the eventthere are local changes which would otherwise cause discrepanciesin compensation in violation of the legislative policy.8 Cal. App. 3d at 862.

In Board of Supervisors v. Krumm, 62 Cal. App. 3d 935, 133 Cal. Rptr. 475(1976), the municipal court ordered the hiring of two new marshals pursuant to astatute that allows more than the statutorily prescribed number of deputies incase of an increase of business of the municipal court or other emergency. Theboard of supervisors contested this order on grounds that included the primacyof the Legislature to determine municipal court staffing under Article VI, Section5 of the Constitution. The court rejected the argument, stating:

Such argument proceeds from plaintiff’s view of the effect to begiven to section 5, article VI, of the California Constitution, alreadynoted, which specifies that the “Legislature ... shall prescribe foreach municipal court ... the number ... of... officers, and employees.”The short answer to that contention is that the Legislature itselfenacted section 72150 and within the constitutional prescriptionthereby provided a specific mechanism for the staffing of municipalcourts under emergency circumstances.62 Cal. App. 3d at 944.

Attorney General OpinionsOn the other hand, the Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute

permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under countyhealth insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislativeauthority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issuestates:

The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courtsof record.Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added).

The Attorney General argues that, “Because of the use of ‘prescribe’ theLegislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 ofthe Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would beconstitutionally invalid.” 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General

– 4 –A-81 AA-325

reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that theeffect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of ajudge’s compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative authority.

The Attorney General distinguishes the Martin case, pointing out that thestatute involved in that case was a detailed treatment of compensation ofemployees in a particular county, and was subject to continuing legislativereview of the county’s actions. The health care statute involved in the AttorneyGeneral Opinion, on the other hand, is of statewide applicability, and is notsubject to continuing legislative control over subsequent changes by counties.

The Legislature responded to the Attorney General’s opinion by amendingthe statute in 1977 to provide that judges would participate in the health plansubject to “the same or similar employee benefits as are now required or grantedto employees of the county.” This was evidently an effort to make the statutesimilar to the parity statute held constitutional in Martin. The Attorney Generaldid not buy it, again issuing an opinion that the statute is unconstitutional. 61Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 388 (1978). The opinion elaborates:

Thus, the Constitution explicitly mandates the Legislature toitself determine the compensation of judges. Therefore if theLegislature seeks to involve other agencies in this compensationdetermining process, it would, at the very least, have to formulatereasonably precise standards as a constraining statutory guide forsuch agencies. (59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra. See Blumenthal v.Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235. See also thediscussion in 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra, at pp. 498-500, ofthe statutory standards approved in Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371 and in Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d856.)61 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 390.

APPLICATION TO SB 162

Does SB 162, by vesting in the Governor the authority to increase the numberof superior court judges and decrease the number of municipal court judges in acounty, run afoul of the constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall“prescribe” the numbers of superior court and municipal court judges? Cal.Const. Art. VI , §§ 4, 5.

– 5 –A-82 AA-326

before the election. There are interests opposed to unification, and the argumentthat unification will increase judicial salaries has been effective with the voters inat least one previous unification effort, despite the fact that unification shouldyield overall savings to the judicial system. The fact that the Governor mustconsider the fiscal impact of the conversion and find there are sufficient funds todo it may help in this respect.

Add Statutory Savings ClauseOne way to proceed is to assume the validity of SB 162, but to add curative or

savings language to the statute to deal with potential problems in the event it isultimately held invalid. This should be do-able, since before converting ajudgeship the Governor must consider the existence of a coordination plan in thecounty that permits blanket cross-assignment of judges. The staff envisions astatute along the following lines:

If conversion by the Governor of a municipal court judgeship toa superior court judgeship under Section 68083 is determined by afinal judgment of a court to be invalid for any reason:

(a) All judgments, orders, decrees, and other acts of anyincumbent of that judgeship within the jurisdiction of the superiorcourt shall be deemed to be acts of the incumbent made as a judgeof the municipal court acting under cross-assignment pursuant tothe trial court coordination plan of the county.

(b) The Judicial Council shall reallocate to the municipal courtthe funding in support of the municipal court salary and thechamber staff positions and other previously allocated funding forthe judgeship, but all salary, benefits, and other payments made insupport of the converted judgeship before the effective date of thefinal judgment shall be deemed to have been made as part of thetrial court coordination plan of the county.

We would need to consult with the Judicial Council to make sure that all basesare covered in such a statute. The existence of such a statute could make it easierfor a court to determine the underlying invalidity of SB 162, however, bylowering the stakes.

CONCLUSION

Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be held to be aninvalid delegation of legislative authority to determine the number of superiorcourt and municipal court judges, a case can be made that this will not occur. The

– 9 –A-83 AA-327

Dennis M Ettlin

problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. The staffbelieves something should be done in anticipation of this possibility. All of thealternatives discussed in this memorandum have drawbacks. However, of thealternatives, the staff prefers a savings clause that would validate actions takenunder the converted judgeship if the conversion is held invalid. This approachappears to be low-key and workable; it could substantially minimize risks ofimplementation without causing substantial delay of implementation.

Respectfully submitted,

Nathaniel SterlingExecutive Secretary

– 10 –A-84 AA-328

Dennis M Ettlin

R

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MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER AND RENEWED DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE 1

Dan

iel C

oope

r, In

Pro

pria

Per

sona


SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ))))))) ) )



vs.

MOTION TO STRIKE DEMURRER filed under case number SC113064 BY KEVIN M. MCCORMICK AND BENTON, ORR, DUVAL AND BUCKINGHAM RENEWED DEMAND FOR JUDGE WHO NEVER RECEIVED COUNTY “JUDICIAL BENEFITS”


DATE: TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 59

AA-349

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Dan

iel C

oope

r, In

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pria

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sona

Plaintiff filed case SC113137 against Michael I. Levanas as an individual.

The case was not erroneously sued and served as stated by Kevin M. McCormick

and the firm of Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham (BODB). The case very

properly is sued against the individual person of Michael I. Levanas.

Court Counsel is desperate is to protect judges from the bribes they

took as individuals. Court Counsel has intimidated process servers and apparently

instructed court personnel to prevent the service of court documents to the

individuals at their place of work. One of the first motions to the court will now be a

request for determination on the adequacy of service. Additionally, the flow of

information to Plaintiff from the L.A. County Auditor’s office has recently slowed

dramatically and become more evasive.

These cases are against individuals, tailored to the actions and specific

biases taken by each defendant. They are not a class action, they are not against

public officials as used in Government Code section 6103; they are against the

actions, biases and misdeeds of individuals. Plaintiff demands to know who

authorized the services of BODB for the Demurrer in case SC113137. Any work by

or documents presented by Kevin McCormick and BODB are, at this time, a

misuse of public funds.

The civil suits are being filed against the judges for actions and omissions

they took as individuals. The individuals accepted the monies made available to

them by or through the County of Los Angeles. The damages are associated with

the “favors” to Los Angeles County shown by the defendant’s subsequent actions

as bribed bench officers who failed to disqualify themselves. Those biases/ favors

were perpetrated by and as individuals who attempted to not disclose such

payments to litigants and cover up their “fraud on the court”.

The matter of whether the individuals are acting in their official judicial

capacities or as individuals is not an issue here. The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11

decided that the affected individuals needed and were to be given retroactive

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criminal immunity for taking judicial payment. The individuals already had broad

immunity for the conduct of their normal judicial duties. The briberous,

unconstitutional and illegal nature of the county payments necessitated the

immunity described in SBX2 11. That immunity is itself unconstitutional but will not

be argued here by Plaintiff. The bureaucratic resistance to moving forward on the

issue of judicial payments since June 2009 and the illegality of the current

payments is exactly why the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has

asked the Attorney General for a determination. The CJP would prefer to not be

the body sanctioning judges statewide.

The Commission on Judicial Performance submitted two questions to Harris in late May 2011, inquiring whether lawmakers would have the authority to pass a measure which “purports to preclude the [CJP] from disciplining California superior court judges for authorizing supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds, and/or receiving that supplemental compensation, on the ground that such benefits were or are not authorized by law.”

Court Counsel‘s actions as a state employee to usurp the Courts authority

to determine if these complaints are properly sued against an individual, as stated

on the summons and on the complaint, and to volunteer state legal services to

these individuals may itself be illegal and possibly obstructions of justice.

Information from the County Auditor’s office for Brett Bianco and Fred Bennett

indicates they are both eligible for these same “judicial benefits”. Thus, they have

an individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status quo for

“judicial benefits”.

Plaintiff further demands to see written evidence that Superior Court of

California supervisors of bench officers, acting in their official supervisorial capacity

are promulgating Superior Court of California command media or specifically

directing the bench officers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County. In

the absence of such management direction, Plaintiff must assume that it was

individual actions to accept and cash the checks offered by L.A. County. Those

individual actions are the basis of the civil suits against individuals. Therefore,

AA-351

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Plaintiff demands to see a signed private agreement between the individual

persons for representation by BODB. Plaintiff also demands that filing fees be paid,

as they are not exempt under Government Code section 6103.

Court Counsel’s actions necessitate a motion for a determination on the

adequacy of service. Plaintiff continues to believe and must assume the POS-010

form for individual service is the proper form and process for serving these

individuals and is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section

415.10 or 415.20. For a court bench officer, the court executive officer should be

served (page 32 of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government

Entities, November 2010). Plaintiff is not aware that Court Counsel is

simultaneously the court executive officer and therefore his intercepting the court

documents intended for individuals at their place of work has denied proper service

to those individuals.

For these many reasons, the Demurrer document by Kevin McCormick

must be struck from the record.


Plaintiff continues to insist upon a judge who has not received “judicial

benefits” from any county, and has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or

judges in Los Angeles County. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a


payments.

Dated: ________, 2011

By: __________________________

DANIEL COOPER

In Pro Per

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

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FN-SSD Dennis

FN-SSD Dennis

FN-SSD Dennis

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Dennis M Ettlin

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

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! !PLAINTIFF’S RESUBMITTED NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 1!

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Dennis Ettlin 4520 Toucan Street Torrance, CA 90503 310-795-9507 IN PROPRIA PERSONA

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

) )) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )) ) )

Los Angeles County Case No. YC064994 Lead for Consolidated cases

Dennis ETTLIN, an individual; Plaintiff,

vs.

NOTICE OF MOTION; AND MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE FOR CONSOLIDATED CASES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATIONS OF DENNIS ETTLIN AND DANIEL COOPER

Glenda VEASEY, an individual; Defendant.

AND CONSOLIDATED MATTERS ) )

Ettlin v. Slawson, Case No. YC065018, Ettlin v. Kriegler, Case No. YC065019, Ettlin v. Taylor, Case No. YC065021, Ettlin v. Kuhl, Case No. YC065164, Cooper v. Weinbach, Case No. SC113064, Cooper v. Levanas, Case No. SC113137, Cooper v. Todd, Case No. SC113135 Cooper v. Ashmann, Case No. SC113136,

DATE: November 9, 2011 TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: 59

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Section 4 allows state employees to give compensation raises to the judges,

bypassing the legislature’s Article IV section 19 responsibility to set judicial

compensation.

The California Attorney General (AG) ruled in 1976 that county judicial

benefits were unconstitutional. In 1995, the California Law Revision Commission4,

reviewing a precursor to the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act,

acknowledged judicial benefits were probably illegal but suggested it was unlikely

that anyone would object. Now in 2011, the CJP has requested an updated

opinion from the AG on the constitutionality of SBX2 11 and the payment of

judicial benefits.

The widespread, pervasive and negative nature of the bribes paid by

Counties and by the Superior Courts have made it impossible in Los Angeles

County to accomplish pretrial and jury-trial actions to resolve Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiffs have seen the recusal of all judges from both the Southwest-

Torrance and the West-Santa Monica courthouses but have been denied an

unbribed judge at the Los Angeles Central District Courthouse. For the Sturgeon I

case, all Los Angeles County Superior Court judges recused themselves.

For these civil suits under Sturgeon II, the “downtown” judges have decided

to hold the line, not recuse themselves, to fight back against any attack on

SBX2 11 or the Sturgeon II decision, to preserve their immunity and the continued

payments under the unconstitutional legislation SBX2 11, and continue the

biases bought by the county and court bribes.

On September 14, 2011, the Second Appellate Court denied a fourth Writ

of Mandate for judicial recusal of Robert O’Brien, refused to issue a Statement of

Decision and confirmed that a prima facie case exists for denial of due process for

Plaintiffs at the trial court and also at the Appellate Court levels (See Appendix 1).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!Trial!Court!Unification:!Delegation!of!Legislative!Authority;!California!Law!Revision!Commission!Staff!Memorandum;!Memorandum!95R77,!Study!JR1201;!November!27,!1995!

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Therefore, aware of a greatly increased hardship for all parties involved, Plaintiffs

regretfully seek a change of venue in accordance with California Civil Code of

Procedure (CCP) Sections (§) 397 (b) and (d).

1.2 Trial Court Under Judges Kuhl and O’Brien

Plaintiffs’ rights of due process for the civil suits have already been denied

in Los Angeles County. Judges Kuhl and O’Brien refused to recuse themselves in

the face of direct evidence that they took the bribes. Judge O’Brien has further

denied due process by allowing the civil complaints to be arbitrarily and without

stipulation modified by Court Counsel for The Superior Court of Los Angeles

County. The change in defendant status from “Individual” to Judge, allows Court

Counsel to use state resources to defend the bribes and to assert totally

inappropriate legal protections for defendants. Judge O’Brien has refused to insist

that the Defendants appear as individuals. An untainted “general public” jury will

have no trouble seeing the prejudice shown in Los Angeles County against

Plaintiffs and that the civil cases were properly sued against individuals.

Judge O’Brien’s consolidation of the nine cases under a single bribed

judge as sought by Court Counsel further demonstrates a judicial bias in focusing

only on the common issues of bribery. Court Counsel seeks to declare judicial

immunity and throw out all the civil suits.

The civil suits take the bribes as a “disqualifying event”, as a starting point,

and address the subsequent and explosive issue of personal damages inflicted by

the “fraud on the court” of each of the disqualified “judges” who failed to

voluntarily recuse themselves and remained on the bench in cases where Los

Angeles County was an interested party.

A judge’s acceptance of money from Los Angeles County is an individual

action. Defendants offer no evidence that such monies are part of the

employment contract between the State and the judges or part of any

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management direction to the judges. The San Diego Superior Court, in a similar

matter of judicial bribes, determined that Defendant Thomas Trent Lewis was an

individual and needed to pay his own court fees. The San Diego Superior Court

rejected Court Counsel’s argument and did not recognize Defendant’s status as a

judge, which would exempt defendant Lewis from fees under Government Code

section 6103.

1.3 Los Angeles Superior Court

Court Counsel for The Superior Court of Los Angeles County seeks to

portray the three plaintiffs seeking damages for the loss of their constitutional

rights as disgruntled litigants. Court Counsel would also have characterized all

African-Americans seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1950’s as

disgruntled domestic help; all Chicano’s in the 1960’s as disgruntled field workers,

all women seeking their full constitutional rights in the 1970’s as disgruntled

housewives; and all those in the 1990’s seeking full constitutional rights for

marriage as disgruntled lovers.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Change of Venue is necessary because Los Angeles

County refuses to appoint unbribed judges, refuses to follow California Code of

Civil Procedures for judicial recusal, and has arbitrarily redefined the defendants

as Judges from the original filings against individuals. Court Counsel of Los

Angeles Superior Court interfered with the service process to such a degree that

Plaintiff Ettlin sought a restraining order (see Appendix 3). Court Counsel is also

misappropriating state funds to represent the individuals without any

determination by a court that such representation is appropriate.

Court Counsel deceives at the very first opportunity. Information from the

County Auditor’s Office in Appendix 2 for Brett Bianco indicates he himself gets a

bonus, a 23% bonus for 2010, from these same “judicial benefits”. Thus, he has a

personal and individual interest and bias in preserving and protecting the status quo for

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“judicial benefits”. By asserting the bribes were accepted by an official judicial officer,

Counsel is able to unilaterally enter the case, defend the judicial payments for himself

and for the defendants by mis-appropriating state funds, and attempting his own

interpretation of SBX2 11.

Court Counsel’s opposition to the first motion for a change of venue continues

the deception. By claiming the Court of Appeal in Sturgeon I found that Lockyer-

Isenberg statutorily authorized the payments, Court Counsel suggests the payments

are legal and he completely ignores the Appellate Court finding that Lockyer-

Isenberg did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and THUS

the authorization of “judicial benefits” payments by counties to Superior Court judges

was an unconstitutional delegation of power. The payments became petty bribes.

Court Counsel also deceives about the benefits not being a waste of public

funds and thus a bribe. Sturgeon I held that if the public funds were used for a public

purpose, they were not a gift5. While the court’s logic certainly made sense for state

or sovereign monies, the application to funds from a private entity with an interest

before the court such as Plaintiffs, herein, or the County of Los Angeles, the largest

user of court services, was not considered by the court. The Court made no finding

with respect to interested individuals making payments and claiming a “public

purpose”. Without equal protection for Plaintiffs, such judicial benefit payments by the

counties are unconstitutional.

In addition to the deceptive interpretations of the law, Los Angeles Court

Counsel attempted to interfere with the proof of service process. The complaints

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds are to be used for public or private purpose. If they are to be used for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of this constitutional prohibition. [Citation]’ [Citation]” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450.) Importantly, “(t)he determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.]” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730,746.)!

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were sued against individuals. When attempts were made to serve the complaints

on the individuals at their place of work, Court Counsel insisted they be served on

his office. The bullying was so extreme that Dennis Ettlin, serving documents for

Daniel Cooper, was confronted by Court Counsel, two Sherriff deputies and a

supervisor from the risk management department and threatened with a restraining

order. Ettlin himself then sought a restraining order against Court Counsel, it was

denied, but subsequently, court staff quietly accepted the packages from the

process servers. (See Appendix 3)

The Court Counsel, with his personal and individual interest in protecting the

practice of court-paid and county-paid judicial benefits, works in concert with the

Los Angeles County Office of the County Counsel to obscure the simple truth that

bribes were paid to individuals who protect the interests of Los Angeles County

and illegally hide behind the veneer of organizational authority.

The Los Angeles County Litigation manager provides quarterly risk

management reports to the supervisors on the projected costs to the county from

on-going litigation and is responsible for working with the Superior Court and the

District Attorney to reduce risk and protect the county’s interests. This report is

confidential, protecting planning discussions from being exposed to the public.

Appendix 4 contains the 2007-2008 public report signed by the Litigation Cost

Manager. The Commission on Judicial Performance is now finally investigating the

Superior Court payments with the linkage to county payments.

1.4 Appellate and Supreme Courts

These civil suits are specifically called for by the San Diego-based Fourth

Appellate Court’s Sturgeon II decision, which explicitly called for “further challenges

by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves.” Unfortunately, Plaintiffs have no

effective Appellate recourse in Los Angeles County.

Plaintiff and Appellant, Dennis Ettlin, filed a civil suit against Sandy Kriegler

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(YC065019) for failure to voluntarily recuse himself and concealment of his bribes in a

Los Angeles family law appeal case (B187741) filed in the Second Appellate Court in

2006. Subsequently, Ettlin requested recusal of Robert O’Brien on August 1, 2011.

O’Brien refused. Ettlin requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second Appellate District

on August 10, 2011. The petition was denied by Justices Bigelow, Rubin and Flier

without any explanation and without the requested Statement of Decision. Civil suits are

in preparation for all three and will immediately request a change of venue in those

cases to counties where the judges did not take bribes.

Another Plaintiff and Appellant Daniel COOPER requested recusal of Judge

Elia Weinbach on January 20, 2011 from his family law case (SD026673).

Weinbach refused. COOPER requested a Writ of Mandate from the Second

Appellate District for the recusal of Judge Weinbach on January 26, 2011. On

February 8, 2011, the Writ was summarily denied by Justices Boren, Doi-Todd and

Ashmann-Gerst without any explanation and no Statement of Decision. Civil

complaints were subsequently filed against Kathryn Doi-Todd (SC113135) and

Judith Ashmann-Gerst (SC113136) for civil rights violations for failure to recuse

themselves because of the same bribes they had taken.

Another Plaintiff and also Appellant, Anthony Locatelli, requested recusal of

Los Angeles County Judge Thomas Trent Lewis from a family law case

(BD516629). Lewis refused. LOCATELLI requested a Writ of Mandate from the

Second Appellate District on August 19, 2011. Justices Mallano, Chaney and

Johnson denied the petition on August 25, 2011, again, without any explanation

and no Statement of Decision. Civil suits are in preparation for all three and will

immediately request a change of venue to a county where the judges did not take

bribes.

The judiciary has failed to resolve the bribery issue and Plaintiff simply seeks

to let a jury of his peers make that incidental determination as part of the trial on bias

and damages. Los Angeles County, as a private party, pays all judges in the county

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$57,000 for 2011 to “look favorably” on the county. This creates an especially strong

bias in the family courts toward the county where large sums of revenue are at stake.

Twelve of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District will be or are

already being sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. All 12

justices were silent and failed to recuse themselves because of the bribes they

received from Los Angeles County and the interest that Los Angeles County had

in the cases involved. Additionally, eight of the 12 have participated in the denial of

Writs of Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a

judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal reasoning

on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test for bias, Plaintiffs see, and

believe a citizen jury will also see the “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’” that is

widespread and persistent. A change of venue is mandated. No justice can be

had in Los Angeles County.

1.5 Legislative History on Judicial Compensation

Appendix 5 (with additional supporting material in Appendices 6-8)

contains a more substantial but still brief legislative history of the

unconstitutionality of county and court judicial payments. The key item to bring

forward is that the Fourth Appellate Court acknowledged during oral arguments

on October 13, 2010 the great turmoil among the judges over Sturgeon I. Chief

Justice Ron George, a strong and long-time proponent of increased judicial

salaries, then reasserts his interests, one week before a decision on Sturgeon II,

by assigning Presiding Judge Tricia Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting

Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, on another high-profile case. This

collegial “plum” of an appointment had no purpose other than to influence the

Sturgeon II decision-making process. On December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II

decision claims the Justices have limited authority to enforce the California

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Constitution, refuses to declare SBX2 11 unconstitutional, and dares the people

of California to stand up for their due process rights. It would be professional

suicide for any lawyer to challenge the courts or represent us, so three In Pro Per

litigants, today, fighting for themselves and their sons and daughters, have the

courage to stand up to the entire judicial establishment and argue for “NO MORE

BRIBES, NO MORE BIAS”.

1.6 Jurisdiction and Venue

The need for a change of venue is self-evident to Plaintiffs in these civil

rights lawsuits against the judiciary. Early judges in the cases recused

themselves. Plaintiffs had some initial hope for an unbiased judge. Now the

Central judges are judging themselves, refusing to recuse themselves, swear they

are unbiased even though they took the very bribes at the heart of the complaints.

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs “voluntarily selected to bring these consolidated

actions” in Los Angeles County. Quite the contrary is true! For a civil suit against

an individual for bribery, the jurisdictional guidelines provided in the CCP provide

very little discretion in selecting a venue. CCP Section 395(a) states “Except as

otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions

or proceedings as provided in this title, the Superior Court in the county where the

defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the

proper court for the trial of the action.” The suits are filed in the correct court. The

basis for changing the venue is provided in Section 397, which states in relevant

part: The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: (a) When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. (b) When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had

therein. (c) When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be

promoted by the change. (d) When from any cause there is no judge of the court qualified to act.!

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Sections 397(b) and (d) capture Plaintiff’s major concerns. The key

reasons for a change of venue. Plaintiff will not get an impartial trial with Los

Angeles County bribed judges and furthermore, no judge from any county which

paid “judicial benefits” is qualified to act. Even the Appellate Court judges in Los

Angeles are not qualified to provide due process for Plaintiffs there. CCP Sections

397(b) and (d) supercede CCP Section 395(a).

These are civil suits not criminal suits. However, since the cases are

subsequent to a criminal action, it might be instructive to consider the California

Supreme Court’s five part test for Change of Venue in criminal cases; Martinez v.

Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574; Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d

584. Those factors are: 1. The nature and gravity of the offense; 2. The size of the community; 3. The status of the victim and accused 4. The nature and extent of the publicity, and 5. The existence of political overtones in the case

While, a first analysis of these factors would further confirm that a change

of venue out of Los Angeles County is required, a second analysis is critically

needed to identify the factors governing selection of any new venue for the trial of

these civil suits. Since 90% of all state judges received the judicial benefits and

since a high percentage of the Appellate Court justices are drawn from former

Superior Court judges, the selection of a new venue can be equally challenging.

Appendix 9 shows the data tables of Appendix D of the Judicial Council of

California report titled, Historical Analysis of Disparities in Judicial Benefits, dated

December 15, 2009, and mandated by SBX2 11. The scope of the problem in

identifying a new venue is identified in Appendix 10 showing the geographic

dispersion and pattern of the judicial benefit payments using the raw data

contained in Appendix D of the Judicial Council report. Most likely, Plaintiffs must

go to the far corners of the state to get a fair trial.

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The recourse to an unbribed and independent Appellate Court is of equal

concern to Plaintiff. The map of county payments in Appendix 10 also shows

California appellate districts. No district presents itself as an obvious choice.

Given the pervasiveness of the judicial benefits and the near certain uproar and

lobbying from the California Judges Association, appeals and mandates are likely.

Plaintiffs must have an unbiased trial court and also an unbiased channel for

appellate review.

The normal process of venue selection would fall to the Judicial Council.

However, since the Judicial Council along with the California Judges Association

sponsored SBX2 11, the Judicial Council is hardly unbiased and its ability to

choose an appropriate venue will give every appearance of gaming the system.

This bias was already evident in the proceedings during the request for recusal of

Los Angeles Judge Trent Lewis. The Judicial Council just appointed another

bribed judge from neighboring Orange County (which also pays bribes) who was

then subjected to the legal hogwash of the same self-serving bribed Los Angeles

Court Counsel and then decided the matter without a hearing from all parties

using Los Angeles Court Counsel’s favorite phrase of “absolute judicial immunity”.

Plaintiff’s analysis of the data in Appendix 9 is shown in table form in

Appendix 10. The conclusion of that analysis is that Humboldt County is the

Plaintiffs’ preferred choice for a new venue. There are 12 counties which do not

pay bribes and which have more than five judges in the county Superior Court.

Humboldt is geographically isolated and small enough to likely be removed from

the intense lobbying influence of the CJA. In the interest of achieving a fair trial

and due process, all costs associated with travel, video conferencing and media

distribution should be paid by the Superior Court of the county in which the civil

suit originates. Appellate reviews in San Francisco’s First District will serve to

keep this issue in the forefront of the California Supreme Court and the Attorney

General.

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Instead of crying “forum shopping”, Defendants could be more productive

suggesting their own forum selections that meet Plaintiffs’ concerns. Plaintiffs are

mindful of the LOCATELLI civil suit in San Diego County where LOCATELLI

voluntarily selected his home county. The Los Angeles Court Counsel then

requested transfer of the San Diego civil suit to Los Angeles under the very same

CCP §395. Since the San Diego Superior Court is also bribed, it is not surprising

that it also failed to uphold LOCATELLI’s due process rights. The Fourth

Appellate District Court continues to wash their hands of this issue and chooses

to “Let L.A. handle it”. LOCATELLI is seeking an Extraordinary Writ to block the

transfer until an unbiased court is identified. Part of LOCATELLI’s evidence is this

very Change of Venue motion. LOCATELLI also plans a civil suit action against

Richard E. L. Strauss, employed as a judge in San Diego Superior Court for

concealing his own judicial benefits, the resulting “fraud on the court” and failing to

recuse himself for the approximately $15,000 he received annually in judicial

benefits.

CONCLUSION

Failure to grant a Change of Venue would be a travesty of justice and a

waste of jury trial resources. Court Counsel has spewed the same “absolute

immunity” hogwash to each of the judges striking statements of disqualification

and to the Orange County Superior Court. Immunity disappeared on December

23, 2008. Citizen juries will emphatically and quickly repudiate Court Counsel’s

wishful thinking. The U.S. Supreme Court would not have wasted its precious time

on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) if judges

had the “absolute immunity” envisioned by Los Angeles Court Counsel.

This case bears striking similarity to a northeastern Pennsylvania judge

ordered to spend nearly three decades in prison for his role in a massive juvenile

justice bribery scandal that prompted the state's high court to toss thousands of

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 Mandate for Recusal – Prima Facie Evidence ........... A1

APPENDIX 2 Court Counsel Payments and Conflict of Interest ..... A7

APPENDIX 3 Civil Harassment Case against Court Counsel ....... A11

APPENDIX 4 Litigation Cost Manager Summary Report. .............. A27

APPENDIX 5 Limited History of Judicial Compensation ................. A33

APPENDIX 6 1988 Zolin Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court .... A42

APPENDIX 7 1995 Calif. Law Comm.!Memo on Court Unification A50

APPENDIX 8 Appointment of Patricia Benke ................................. A61

APPENDIX 9 Judicial Council Report on Benefits .......................... A66

APPENDIX 10 Analysis Recommending Humboldt County ........... A75

AA-392

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PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

APPENDIX

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Dan

iel C

oope

r. In

Pro

pria

Per

sona

B________________

Nine of the 32 justices in the Second Appellate District are being

sued for civil rights violations due to the county paid bribes. The three

current cases will seek a change of venue and the six new cases will be

filed outside Los Angeles County. This will create great hardship on the

Plaintiffs and Defendants because a fair trial cannot be had in Los

Angeles County. All nine justices were silent and failed to recuse

themselves because of the bribes they received from Los Angeles

County and the interest that Los Angeles County had in the cases

involved. Additionally, eight have participated in the denial of Writs of

Mandate where they refused to recuse themselves, participated in a

judgment upholding the bribes and then remained silent about any legal

reasoning on the constitutionality of the county payments. Under the

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) test

for bias, Plaintiff sees an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’” that is

widespread and persistent.

REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION

COOPER requests a detailed Statement of Decision to include an

opinion on each of the constitutional questions identified in this

Petition.

1. Affirm that Los Angeles County is not sovereign, is a private

entity no different than Appellant in the eyes of the law.

2. Affirm that judicial compensation by sovereign entities is an

accepted compromise by the sovereign when the sovereign entity

is involved in a matter before the judiciary. The same principle

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Dan

iel C

oope

r. In

Pro

pria

Per

sona

B________________

does not apply to non-sovereign entities, such as county

government.

3. Affirm that Los Angeles County judicial payments are made to

individuals who are making personal and individual choices to

live and work in Los Angeles County. Affirm that acceptance of

the payments is an individual act, not required for employment.

4. Affirm that the immunity of SBX2 11, Section 5 is

unconstitutional due to Article 1, Section 9 of the California

Constitution.

5. Affirm that SBX2 11, Section 2 does not authorize Los Angeles

County Superior Court (not a county) to make “judicial benefits”

payments to Commissioners, Court Counsel and other non-

“Judges”.

6. Affirm SBX2 11, Section 2 allows a reduction in judicial benefits

for all judges equally within a county or court. The state salaries

are annual salaries, the judicial benefits are annual benefits and

therefore taxpayers facing judicial layoffs would expect the terms

and conditions might allow for a reduction in the amount (not

termination) of annual judicial benefits following May 20, 2010.

7. Affirm that judicial benefit bribes from a county, received in the

past, but not recently, will continue to influence the judicial

officer.

Failure of this Court to provide detailed opinions that apply and

extend the legal reasoning of the Fourth Appellate District’s Sturgeon II

decision will be used as prima facie evidence of the Second Appellate

Court’s bias and protection of Los Angeles County interests. Ideally, a

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Dennis M Ettlin

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APPENDIX

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Dennis Ettlin4520 Toucan StreetTorrance, CA 90503

T 310-356-6947C 310-795-9507

[email protected]

July 15, 2011

Administrative Records Request c/o Central Civil Operations AdministrationRoom 109, Stanley Mosk Courthouse111 N. Hill StreetLos Angeles, CA 90012

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am seeking information on payments made by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles to the following persons from 1990 to the present while these persons were California state employees.

D. Brett Bianco

Frederick R. Bennett

Glenda Veasey (Commissioner)

John Slawson (Commissioner)

Carolyn Kuhl (Judge)

Sandy Kriegler (Judge)

In addition to their compensation by the state, the Los Angeles County Auditor says they were eligible to receive additional “judicial benefits” payments (matching those paid by Los Angeles County). For each of the persons above, I would like to know the amount and type of any payments for each benefit below for each year from 1990 through 2011:

1. Matching payments into the County’s 401K/457 Retirement Savings Plans

2. Cafeteria fringe benefit plan (approximately $34,000)

3. Professional development allowance (approximately $7,000)

I would also like to know the name, financial “object” or other identifier name for the account from which these payments (accounting transactions) were made.

I appreciate your help in this matter and I look forward to your response.

Sincerely yours,

Dennis Ettlin

A-8 AA-400

mailto:[email protected]


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APPENDIX

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9/19/11 12:17 PMLos Angeles Superior Court - Civil Case Summary


Case Summary

Case Number: BS132755DENNIS ETTLIN VS. BRETT BIANCO

Filing Date: 07/12/2011Case Type: Civil Harassment (General Jurisdiction)Status: Dismissed - Other 07/12/2011

Future Hearings None


Parties

BIANCO BRETT - Defendant/Respondent

ETTLIN DENNIS - Petitioner



07/12/2011 Application for TROFiled by Petitioner



07/12/2011 at 02:00 pm in Department 75, Carol Boas Goodson, PresidingExparte proceeding - Denied


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T 310-356-6947C 310-795-9507

[email protected]

June 29, 2011

Brett BiancoCourt CounselStanley Mosk Courthouse111 N. Hill Street, Room 546Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear Mr. Bianco;

This letter is in response to your comments and actions while I was serving San Diego Superior Court documents on Thomas Trent Lewis. Without disrupting the courtroom, I handed the documents to a clerk’s assistant about 1:30pm Tuesday, June 28. I was told by said clerk the papers were unusual and to come back later at 3:30pm to speak to the supervisor. At 3:30pm I returned and was told that the matter was being referred to the regional clerk and I should return the next day after 1:30pm.

I then went to your office and informed you that the process seemed to be out of control and that I was supposed to return the next day and that you might want to intervene and accept the document. You indicated at the time that I had set the process in motion, there was nothing you could do and you refused to sign a proof of service form at that time as you had done before. Furthermore, you indicated there would be repercussions if I continued to try to serve Judges.

I returned June 29 at about 3:00pm as requested by the clerk to retrieve my proof of service form. The clerk told me “case management” was coming, asked me to have a seat. Shortly thereafter, the bailiff said there was chatter on her communications device and asked me to step into the corridor. Outside the courtroom, we were immediately met by yourself demanding to know why I was there. I repeated that I was told to return and that I wanted to retrieve my original stamped proof of service form for the county of San Diego. At that time a sergeant showed up, brandished a restraining order, indicated to me that you, the court counsel were shown at the top of the form and assured me that you were indeed Bret Bianco. You refused to indicate at that time what the restraining order restrictions were and told me not to play games with you.

At about that time a risk management representative showed up with my packet from the day before. I was asked what I wanted. I requested my original proof of service

CH-100, Item 12, Temporary Order Letters not mailed

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form that I needed to file in San Diego and a signature by someone to indicate it had been sufficiently delivered. I received the form and the signature. At that point I was threatened to never come back to the judges courtroom and I would be receiving paperwork soon.

You have stated that the Proof of Service process is different for judges. You refused to offer to me what that process was so that I could follow it. I inquired of all the following offices;

• the clerk in the Torrance courthouse,

• the clerk at 111 North Hill Street,

• the sheriff’s office at the Santa Monica Courthouse

• the sheriff’s office at the 111 Hill Street Courthouse

if there were separate procedures for serving a judge or serving a judge as an individual and all indicated there was no special process for a judge.

The reference librarian at the Los Angeles Law Library did identify for my review, Chapter 17.23 of the highly specialized California Civil Procedure Before Trial, Volume 1 as applicable to public entities. She also identified a section for service on a judicial branch entity, page 32 of the Action Guide, Handling Claims Against Government Entities, November 2010 which would cover a judge as part of a judicial entity. Page 32 (attached) indicates the court executive officer should be served. Again, this references a judge as a member of a judicial branch entity. Since the paperwork identified the defendant as an individual, this reference is not applicable and furthermore, I am not aware that you are the court executive officer.

I will certainly abide by the restraining order after it is served on me and in the meantime I will honor your request to not serve the judges directly.

Sincerely yours,

Dennis Ettlin


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file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt

CALIFORNIA CODESCODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURESECTION 415.10-415.95

415.10. A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy ofthe summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Serviceof a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of suchdelivery. The date upon which personal delivery is made shall be entered onor affixed to the face of the copy of the summons at the time of itsdelivery. However, service of a summons without such date shall bevalid and effective.

415.20. (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summonsand complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served byleaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual officehours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, athis or her usual mailing address, other than a United States PostalService post office box, with the person who is apparently in chargethereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons andcomplaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to beserved at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint wereleft. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons andcomplaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person atleast 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof.Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10thday after the mailing. (b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonablediligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, asspecified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons maybe served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at theperson's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place ofbusiness, or usual mailing address other than a United States PostalService post office box, in the presence of a competent member of thehousehold or a person apparently in charge of his or her office,place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United

file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt (1 of 8) [3/11/11 1:20:05 PM]


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FN-SSD Dennis


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T 310-356-6947C 310-795-9507

[email protected]

June 29, 2011

Brett BiancoCourt CounselStanley Mosk Courthouse111 N. Hill Street, Room 546Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear Mr. Bianco;

This letter is in response to your actions complicating and interfering with the service of court documents. As a Plaintiff waiting for a fee waiver determination and looking forward to having a summons and complaint served on four different judges, I find your actions very confusing.

The civil suits are being filed against the judges for actions they took as individuals. The individuals accepted monies made available to them by or through the County of Los Angeles. The damages are associated with the “favors” to Los Angeles County shown by the defendant’s subsequent actions as bribed bench officers. Those biases/favors were perpetrated by and as individuals who attempted to cover up their “fraud on the court” by not disclosing such payments to litigants.

The matter of whether the individuals are acting in their official judicial capacities or as individuals is not an issue here. The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11 decided that the affected individuals were to be given retroactive criminal immunity. The bureaucratic resistance to moving forward on the issue of judicial payments since June 2009 and the illegality of the current payments is exactly why the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has asked the Attorney General for a determination. The CJP would prefer to not be the sanctioning body.

The Commission on Judicial Performance submitted two questions to Harris in late May, in-quiring whether lawmakers would have the authority to pass a measure which “purports to pre-clude the [CJP] from disciplining California superior court judges for authorizing supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds, and/or receiving that supplemental compensation, on the ground that such benefits were or are not authorized by law.”

While I applaud your pro-active response and thoughtfulness, your actions as a state employee to volunteer state legal services to these individuals, as stated on the summons and on the complaint, may itself be illegal and possibly an obstruction of


A-23 AA-415



justice. I have requested county payment information from the County Auditor’s office for you and Fred Bennett to help clarify your interest in these “judicial benefits” cases. One of the first motions to the court will now request a determination on the adequacy of service.

While I have no objection to providing you courtesy copies of the complaints, until I see written evidence that supervisors of bench officers, acting in their official supervisorial capacity are promulgating Superior Court command media or specifically directing the bench officers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County, and, in the absence of such, until I see a signed private agreement between the individual persons and yourself as private counsel, I will continue to believe and must assume the POS-010 form for individual service is the proper form and process for serving these individuals and is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section 415.10 or 415.20.

On a related matter from Mr. Bennett’s letters to me, the county auditor’s office has provided a small clarification that I will be pursuing in the weeks ahead. While Commissioners and Judges both receive payments from the County of Los Angeles, the payments to Commissioners are from an account funded by the Superior Court. The payments to the judges are funded by a county judicial operations account. Thus, it appears that there is no separate “reimbursement” transaction by the Superior Court to the county.

This accounting arrangement does, however, bear directly on the Attorney General’s inquiry of “the question of whether judges may be disciplined for authorizing supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds”.

Sincerely yours,

Dennis Ettlin

Plaintiff, In Pro Percase # YC064994


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APPENDIX

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! 17!PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

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Selective History of Legislative on Judicial Compensation

The only way to understand the actions of the Los Angeles Courts and the

Los Angeles Court Counsel is to understand the legislative history and the

powerful dynamics of judicial salaries.

The Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the California

Supreme Court have spent years trying to simply increase the salaries of their

respective bench officers. They have had no direct success. The frustration in

California led to the passage of the unconstitutional 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial

Court Funding Act under the “just do it” Chief Justice Ron George.

Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev.

denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court

judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the

1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial

benefits, it did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and

THUS the authorization of “judicial benefits” payments by counties to Superior

Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.

The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact it is a long

simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles County, into

the “labor-management” relationship between the State and the Judges. In 1976

the Attorney General issued an opinion that county payments for health insurance

benefits were unconstitutional; “The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute

permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue states:

“The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 19 (as amended in 1974; emphasis added).

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“The Attorney General argues that, “Because of the use of ‘prescribe’ the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid.” 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of a judge’s compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”

(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)

In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised

Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be

permissible for the county to pay “additional benefits for judges”, although he

acknowledged the Attorney General had opinions otherwise (see Appendix 6).

Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a

memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and updated the

Attorney General’s opinion on the unconstitutionality of such county benefits (see

Appendix 7). The Commission staff memorandum then expressed a fear of the

voters and went on to conclude that the legislature should take action and

gamble on the validity of the delegation of authority.

Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be

held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority …., a case can be made that this will not occur. The problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. (emphasis added)

(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)

The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislature’s bluff in the 1997 Lockyer-

Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial problems of bias and

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unconstitutionality accrued over the last 15 years must be made whole. Sturgeon I

was no surprise or rogue ruling.

In a last ditch effort to overturn the Sturgeon I decision, the California

Judges Association (CJA) filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court

to grant review in Sturgeon. The review was denied December 28, 2008. Michael

Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association said, "I always thought it

was likely there would have to be legislative action, but this certainly steps up the

urgency." (See Appendix 10)

After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed and the

Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11 on February 20, 2009 amidst all the frantic

activity on the state budget. There was no public debate and no legislative

analysis. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what they

failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional.

Sturgeon II appealed the constitutionality of SBX2 11. The response was

swift and stiff from the County of Los Angeles, from the Superior Court of the

State of California, County of Los Angeles, and from all the current and former

judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court who were or had received judicial

benefits.

The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.

The relevant description states: “Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon!I and while the

Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we identified in Sturgeon!I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180 days' notice.

On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection

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principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for summary judgment.

The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon II. As we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, we affirm.”

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph of the

decision, which contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is

not a permanent response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be

temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth

Appellate Court, acknowledges the contradiction and encourages these particular

civil suits by stating:

“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon!I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon!I !defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.”

The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the “same terms

and conditions as were in effect on that date.” Since the Fourth Appellate Court is

deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions

on whether the county’s terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus

are arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and

thus terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients.

No authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners. The

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Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) is also very interested in the

constitutionality of this section and has requested an opinion from the Attorney

General.

The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is

now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will

be determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County

to Commissioners are called “warrants” by the L.A. County Auditor because they

are issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued

payments by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council

payments a continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions

(see Appendix 6 of the Writ of Mandate identified in this Appendix 1) of the CJP

are that these payments are unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the

Attorney General’s opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly biased.

Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,

these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the Superior Court

payments obligated by the county payments are legal and constitutional.

The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been

challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I.

The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution,

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states “A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law

impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” Furthermore, SBX2 11

Section 5 legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the

Commission on Judicial Performance. The extensive CJP analysis and arguments

show the legislature’s attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an

opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11.

Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,

these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the judges have immunity

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from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiffs are due damages for the biases

bought by the L.A. County bribes

Behind the Scenes Judicial Turmoil and Stress

The California Court of Appeal 4th District in San Diego heard oral

arguments for Sturgeon II on October 13, 2010. Jones-Day Attorney Elwood Lui

(former Appellate Court Justice representing Los Angeles County) stated that the

Sturgeon I decision “…was quite alarming to many judges throughout the state of

California”; prompting Presiding Judge Tricia Benke to interrupt and concur, “it

was very disruptive” (emphasis from oral argument). Apparently the Appellate

Court justices have taken a lot of heat since Sturgeon I. Judge Gilbert Nares

suggested the court might just delay and see what happens; then he predicted a

Sturgeon III after the legislature acts1.

Sturgeon II Fizzled

The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.

The Fourth Appellate Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,

__Cal App.4th_(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called “Sturgeon II” concluded on

page 14:

“As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Media!coverage!by!Full!Disclosure!®!“the!news!behind!the!news”,!Are)Judicial)Double)Benefits)Constitutional?)Judges)To)Rule)on)Judges)Benefits)Round)II,)!Internet!Exclusive!Video!News!Blog:!10:00!min;!http://fulldisclosure.net/Blogs/92.php;!!Release!Date:!November!21,!2010;!

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By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of separate governmental powers, quite limited.” (emphasis added)

The Appellate Court continues with the!disturbing!portion!of!the!decision!is!the!

final!paragraph!of!the!decision and contradicts itself on page 15,

“However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.” (emphasis added)

How can a law be temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not

constitutional. If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by

the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels

“quite limited” in ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing to fully address

this issue. The bold Sturgeon I decision by the Fourth Appellate Court fizzled

when they decided Sturgeon II.

The key to understanding the Court’s unwillingness to fully address their

responsibility is found in the Fourth Appellate Court’s acknowledgment during oral

arguments on October 13, 2010 of the great turmoil among the judges over

Sturgeon I. Chief Justice Ron George then. Following oral arguments, and only

one week before a decision on Sturgeon II, Ron George, a strong and long-time

proponent of increased judicial salaries, reasserts his interest and assigns the

Sturgeon II Presiding Judge Tricia Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting Chief

Justice of the California Supreme Court, on another high-profile case. (See

Appendix 8 Media Advisories.) This collegial “plum” of an appointment had no

A-40 AA-426


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purpose other than to influence the Sturgeon II decision-making process. On

December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II decision claims the Justices have limited

authority to enforce the California Constitution, refuses to declare SBX2 11

unconstitutional, and dares the people of California to stand up for their due

process rights. Now both the legislature (in 1997) and the judiciary (in 2010) have

dared the people to fight for their due process rights!

The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county

judicial benefits. Plaintiffs’ civil actions are undertaken, in part, as one of the

citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II, but more importantly, to address

the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on

the court that Sturgeon does not address.

Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not

a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2 11) to terminate

all payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce and

traffic cases; therefore the continued payments must be in the county’s interests.

Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements as well

as the penalty assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis

for judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases. SBX2 11 did

not even attempt to give immunity for the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe.

A-41 AA-427

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APPENDIX

8

A-61 AA-428

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

Public Information Office 455 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 www.courtinfo.ca.gov

415-865-7740

Lynn Holton

Public Information Officer

MEDIA ADVISORYRelease Number: 32 Release Date: December 21, 2010

Supreme Court Justices Disqualify Themselves in State Building Sale Case;

Will Assign Temporary Justices San Francisco – The California Supreme Court today issued an order in which all justices disqualified themselves from hearing an emergency writ involving the state’s sale of California state buildings. (Schwarzenegger v. Court of Appeal, S189114). In addition to announcing the recusal of all members of the court from hearing this matter, the Supreme Court order also directs that seven pro tem justices from the state Courts of Appeal be assigned to hear the case in accordance with applicable provisions of the California Constitution and pursuant to the court's Internal Operating Policies and Procedures. The order was signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter. Previously, all members of the Supreme Court recused themselves, and Court of Appeal justices were assigned in their place, in the case of Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474. The Supreme Court issued its order today in response to a petition for writ of mandate and request for emergency relief filed by the Governor's Office this morning.

-#-

A-62 AA-429

A-63 AA-430

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

Public Information Office 455 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 www.courtinfo.ca.gov

415-865-7740

Lynn Holton

Public Information Officer

MEDIA ADVISORYRelease Number: 33 Release Date: December 22, 2010

Supreme Court Assigns Temporary Justices in State Building Sale Case

San Francisco—Yesterday, the justices of the California Supreme Court unanimously recused themselves in a matter involving the sale of California state buildings, Schwarzenegger v. California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, S189114. This morning, the California Supreme Court issued an order assigning seven Court of Appeal justices to serve as “pro tempore” (temporary) justices to the Supreme Court in that same case. The assigned Court of Appeal justices are: Justice Richard Aronson (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana); Justice William Bedsworth (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana); Justice Patricia Benke (Fourth Appellate District, Division One, San Diego); Justice M. Kathleen Butz (Third Appellate District, Sacramento); Justice Dennis Cornell (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); Justice Betty Dawson (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); and Justice Richard Fybel (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana.) Justice Patricia Benke was assigned as Acting Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court in this matter. The justices were assigned according to procedures set out in the Supreme Court’s published “Internal Operating Practices and Procedures.” The order, signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter, assigns the Court of Appeal justices to the case starting today, December 22, 2010, until they have completed and disposed of all related causes and matters submitted to them, and all petitions for rehearing arising out of such causes and matters. The immediate matter before the court is a writ of mandate and request for an emergency stay filed by the Governor’s Office on Tuesday, December 21, 2010.

A-64 AA-431

A-65 AA-432

!

!!!!!!!

APPENDIX

10

A-75 AA-433

ANALYSIS OF SUPERIOR COURTS BY COUNTY SELECTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

Draft !!

The conclusion of this analysis is that Humboldt County is the Plaintiffs’

preferred choice for a new venue. There are 12 counties which do not pay

bribes and which have more than five judges in the county Superior Court.

Humboldt is geographically isolated, large enough to accommodate the jury

trials and small enough to likely be removed from the intense lobbying

influence of the California Judicial Association. Since travel costs are a major

concern, Superior Court of each county where the civil suit cases originate

should pay all costs associated with travel, video conferencing and media in

the interest of achieving a fair trial and due process for residents of that

county. !

!Unbribed Counties With Fewer Than 5 Judges

!County #

Judges 2007

Population Lake 4 63,821 Tehama 4 62,093 Del Norte 3 29,207 Alpine 2 1,261 Amador 2 38,320 Colusa 2 21,945 Inyo 2 18,253 Lassen 2 36,223 Modoc 2 9,747 Plumas 2 20,891 Sierra 2 3,400 !

A-76 AA-434

!!

County Appellate District

# and City

Unbribed Counties

# Judges

Population 2007

Comments

Santa Cruz 6 San Jose 1 of 4 10 265,183 Small number of Appellate justices Stanislaus 5 Fresno 3 of 9 22 523,095 Small number of Appellate justices Madera 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 149,916 Small number of Appellate justices Merced 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 252,554 Small number of Appellate justices Imperial 4 San Diego 2 of 6 9 174,322 Appellate already bowed to pressure Shasta 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 11 181,380 Legislature and lobbyist Influence El Dorado 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 6 178,689 Legislature and lobbyist Influence Sutter 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 95,516 Legislature and lobbyist Influence Yuba 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 71,612 Legislature and lobbyist Influence Santa Barbara 2 Los Angeles 1of 4 19 425,710 Prima Facie evidence of bias Marin 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 10 256,310 Proximity to San Francisco Judges Humboldt 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 7 132,364 Isolated

!!

!Appellate District

Size !

1st Appellate District has 20 justices

2nd Appellate District has 32 Justices

3rd Appellate District has 11 Justices

4th Appellate District has 25 Justices

5th Appellate District has 10 Justices

6th Appellate District has only 7 Justices !

A-77 AA-435

!All Appellate reviews should be held in San Francisco’s First District to

keep this issue in the forefront of the California Supreme Court. The First

District is the largest of the remaining districts, when the Los Angeles and

San Diego Districts are excluded. The Second Appellate is dominated by Los

Angeles with the highest bribe amounts and has provided the prima facie

evidence they are biased. The Fourth Appellate has bowed under judicial

pressure during its Sturgeon II decision, backing away from the uprightness of

its landmark Sturgeon I decision. Additionally, the Third Appellate District in

Sacramento is too susceptible to California Judicial Association lobbying. !!!!

A-78 AA-436

A-79 AA-437

Dennis M Ettlin

MAP SHOWS PAYMENTS BY TYPEred=Countyorange=Courtgreen =NONEblue = appellate districts

California State Association of Counties Ù May 2009

Provision of Supplemental Judicial Benefits Summary of SBX2 11 (Steinberg, 2009)

��BACKGROUND

Prior�to�and�following�the�passage�of�AB�233,�the�Trial�Court�Funding�Act�of�1997,�some�counties�have�opted�to�pay�supplemental�benefits�to�local�judges.�Although�the�record�is�not�entirely�clear�on�which�counties�currently�are�providing�judicial�benefits,�we�believe�that�as�of�February�2009�those�counties�included,�at�a�minimum,�all�of�the�following:��

Alameda� Kings� Riverside� Santa�Clara�Calaveras� Los�Angeles� Sacramento� Sonoma�Contra�Costa� Mendocino� San�Bernardino� Trinity�Fresno� Monterey� San�Francisco� Ventura�Kern� Orange� San�Mateo� Yolo�

�In�2006,�a�taxpayer�filed�suit�against�Los�Angeles�County�over�this�issue�(Sturgeon�v.�County�of�Los�Angeles),�challenging�the�validity�of�the�benefits.�In�October�2008,�a�state�appellate�court�overturned�the�trial�court�decision�—�which�had�initially�found�in�favor�of�the�county�—�and�ruled�that�the�provision�of�benefits�by�the�county�was�unconstitutional�on�the�grounds�that�Section�19,�article�VI�of�the�California�Constitution�requires�the�Legislature�to�“prescribe�compensation”�for�judges.�(Because�the�Legislature�had�not�approved�local�judicial�benefits,�the�provision�of�such�benefits�was�incompatible�with�the�constitutional�limitation.)�The�California�Supreme�Court�opted�not�to�review�the�appellate�court�decision,�so�the�ruling�in�Sturgeon�stands.��2009 LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE STURGEON DECISION

To�address�the�Sturgeon�decision,�the�Judicial�Council�and�the�California�Judges’�Association�jointly�sponsored�SBX2�11,�by�Senate�President�pro�Tempore�Darrell�Steinberg.��The�Legislature�approved�this�measure�in�the�2009–10�Second�Extraordinary�Session�as�part�of�the�17Ǧmonth�budget�resolution�adopted�in�February�2009;�SBX2�11�was�signed�into�law�by�the�Governor�on�February�20.�Given�the�enactment�of�this�measure�as�a�nonǦurgency�bill�in�the�second�extraordinary�session,�the�measure�goes�into�effect�—�pursuant�to�constitutional�provisions�—�on�the�91st�day�following�the�adjournment�of�the�special�session.�The�second�extraordinary�session�adjourned�sine�die�on�February�19,�meaning�that�the�provisions�of�SBX2�11�become�effective�on�May�21,�2009.��The�key�provisions�in�the�supplemental�judicial�benefits�measure�do�all�of�the�following:��1. Obligates�any�county�that�was�providing�supplemental�judicial�benefits�as�of�July�1,�2008,�to�sustain�the�

same�level�of�benefits�that�were�effective�on�that�date�for�the�term�of�the�judge,�which�limits�counties’�liability�to�a�maximum�of�six�years�per�judicial�officer;�

2. Allows�counties�to�terminate�future�obligations�by�giving�the�Administrative�Office�of�the�Courts�a�180Ǧday�written�termination�notice;�

3. Defines�benefits�to�include�federally�regulated�benefits,�deferred�compensation�plans,�and�professional�development�allowances,�as�specified;�

4. Gives�immunity�to�entities�that�provided�supplemental�judicial�benefits�prior�to�the�effective�date�of�the�measure;�and�

5. Requires�the�Judicial�Council�to�report�to�the�legislative�budget�and�judiciary�committees�by�December�31,�2009,�regarding�the�provision�of�local�judicial�benefits.�

�

A-80 AA-438

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_6

Dennis M Ettlin

http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/D050832.PDF

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sbx2_11_bill_20090220_chaptered.pdf

California State Association of Counties Ù May 2009

CSAC�remained�neutral�on�SBX2�11�for�a�number�of�reasons.�First,�the�measure�provided�a�necessary�safeguard�for�those�entities�that�had�provided�and�were�continuing�to�provide�judicial�benefits�prior�to�and�following�the�Sturgeon�decision.�Further,�several�counties�expressed�an�intent�to�sustain�judicial�benefits�for�the�foreseeable�future.��TECHNICAL NOTE ON LEGISLATIVE FINDING

Although�legislative�findings�and�declarations�are�not�codified�and,�therefore,�have�no�force�of�law,�courts�routinely�take�note�of�these�for�purposes�of�determining�legislative�intent.�For�that�reason,�we�feel�it�is�important�to�state�for�the�record�that�we�object�to�the�characterization�of�a�historic�element�described�in�Section�1�(b)�of�SBX2�11,�which�states:��

These�countyǦprovided�benefits�were�considered�by�the�Legislature�in�enacting�the�LockyerǦIsenberg�Trial�Court�Funding�Act�of�1997,�in�which�counties�could�receive�a�reduction�in�the�county's�maintenance�of�effort�obligations�if�counties�elected�to�provide�benefits�pursuant�to�paragraph�(l)�of�subdivision�(c)�of�Section�77201�of�the�Government�Code�for�trial�court�judges�of�that�county.�

�This�summary�is�a�misstatement�of�facts.�The�Trial�Court�Funding�Act�of�1997�(AB�233)�capped�county�responsibility�for�court�operations�at�the�1994Ǧ95�level.�Responsibility�for�future�court�costs�and�growth�transferred�to�the�state.�Counties�were�required�to�identify�for�their�individual�jurisdictions�the�historical�costs�of�supporting�the�trial�courts,�based�on�statutorily�defined�cost�elements�(“allowable�costs”)�that�were�necessary�and�required�to�sustain�court�operations.�These�elements�were�bundled�into�an�operations�Maintenance�of�Effort�(MOE).��There�were�other�elements�outside�of�the�necessary�and�required�elements�of�court�operations�(“unallowable�costs”);�among�those�were�locally�negotiated�judicial�benefits.�(An�important�distinction:�There�are�two�types�of�“local�judicial�benefits.”�The�first�type�was�provided�to�judges�across�the�board,�regardless�of�jurisdiction;�responsibility�for�those�statewide�judicial�benefits�transferred�to�the�state�under�AB�233.�This�second�type�was�a�class�of�supplemental�benefits�that�clearly�fell�outside�the�standard�benefits�judges�received�statewide.�These�benefits�were�agreed�upon�locally�between�the�court�and�the�county�and�might�have�included�perquisites�such�as�a�car�allowance�or�sabbatical�pay.)��The�state�took�the�position�that�this�second�type�of�benefits�was�unallowable,�for�the�following�reasons:�they�were�discretionary,�were�not�“necessary�and�required”�elements�of�court�operations,�and,�therefore,�were�not�appropriate�for�transfer�to�the�state.�Therefore,�counties�underwent�a�process�to�identify�costs�associated�with�these�extra�judicial�benefits;�this�cost�element�was�excised�from�certain�counties’�ongoing�obligation�to�the�state.�The�action�to�amend�a�county’s�MOE�to�exclude�any�component�associated�with�locally�provided�judicial�benefits�should�not�be�construed�as�a�benefit�to�counties;�it�was�at�the�direction�of�the�Legislature,�in�recognition�of�the�fact�that�(1)�the�state�would�not�assume�responsibility�for�these�discretionary�benefits�and�(2)�provision�of�those�benefits�remained�elective,�pursuant�to�local�decisions.�Stated�differently,�there�was�no�offset�or�reduction�to�the�MOE�–�just�an�exclusion�of�unallowable�costs�that�were�not�going�to�be�assumed�by�the�State.�The�legislative�finding�in�SBX2�11�characterizes�the�MOE�reduction�was�a�“benefit”�to�counties,�when�it�in�fact�was,�as�stated�previously,�simply�the�necessary�response�to�the�Legislature’s�rejection�of�what�it�deemed�to�be�unallowable�court�operation�costs.��QUESTIONS

If�we�can�provide�any�further�information�about�this�issue�or�the�specific�legislative�measure�to�address�local�judicial�benefits,�please�do�not�hesitate�to�contact�Elizabeth�Howard�at�[email protected]�or�916Ǧ650Ǧ8131.�

A-81 AA-439


3/15/09 10:35 AMLaw.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks

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Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge PerksState high court's unanimous vote means that judges will lose the perks

unless lawmakers decide to help

Mike McKeeThe RecorderDecember 29, 2008

Printer-friendly Email this Article Reprints & Permissions

Any hope the California Supreme Court might resolve a politically sensitive

imbroglio over extra judicial benefits dissipated Tuesday when the high

court refused to review the case that stirred things up.

The Supreme Court's unanimous vote -- minus participation by Justice

Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, who was absent -- means the judges will lose

the perks unless lawmakers decide to help.

The Supreme Court's decision to not take up Sturgeon v. County of Los

Angeles , S168408, lets stand a lower court ruling that could void L.A.

County's 20-year practice of supplementing judges' $178,000 salaries and

state-provided benefits with perks that amounted to almost $50,000 a

year.

The Oct. 10 ruling by San Diego's 4th District Court of Appeal held that

the practice violated the state Constitution's requirement that the

Legislature "prescribe compensation for judges." County-funded judicial

perks occur in many of the state's 58 counties, but Los Angeles' appear to

be the most lucrative.

The decision was a blow to judicial advocates who say the state already

has trouble attracting judges to the bench with salaries that often pale in

comparison to those of major law firms.

"I always thought it was likely there would have to be legislative action,"

Michael Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association, said

Tuesday. "But this certainly steps up the urgency."

The benefits package provided by the county includes travel and

professional development allowances that judges could take in cash, as

well as additional contributions to retirement accounts.

The CJA had filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court to

grant review in Sturgeon. "We have heard from judges who have indicated

it would be their intent to leave the bench," Belote said. "Just as we all

have financial obligations and need to plan, there are judges who believe

this completely disrupts their career plan."

CJA President Mary Wiss said Tuesday that Los Angeles County Superior

Court Judge Joseph Hilberman indicated in a recent news report that he

will leave the bench next month after only seven years partly because of

Sturgeon. Wiss, a judge with the San Francisco Superior Court, said it

"would be a shame to lose talent and experience from the bench because

of the loss of benefits and [because of] the difficulty in attracting quality

members of the bar to the bench."

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3/15/09 10:35 AMLaw.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks

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members of the bar to the bench."

California Chief Justice Ronald George has criticized some counties'

provisions for extra benefits, but has never tried to block it. Instead, he

has tried to raise judges' salaries and benefits statewide. George's recent

decision, along with Justice Marvin Baxter, to not participate in what was

very likely Judicial Council discussion of the Sturgeon case, had left

observers wondering whether he and Baxter were preparing to hear the

case in the high court.

Attorneys for the San Marino-based Judicial Watch Inc., which filed the

case on behalf of L.A. County resident and taxpayer Harold Sturgeon,

didn't respond to calls on Tuesday.

But in their brief arguing against review, they said the 4th District's ruling would still ensure that California judges would "remain

the highest paid" in the nation.

"Far from deviating from long-standing constitutional doctrines," attorney Sterling Norris wrote, "the ruling restores the Legislature's

proper constitutional role in setting the compensation received by the state trial court judges, a role that had been usurped by the

county."

Neither Elwood Lui, the L.A.-based Jones Day partner who represented Los Angeles County, nor J. Stephen Czuleger, presiding

judge of L.A. County Superior Court, returned calls seeking comment Tuesday.

But in his petition for review, Lui, a former justice on L.A.'s 2nd District, accused the Sturgeon court of cutting "a swath through the

law," imperiling "the livelihood of judges" and leaving "the law and bench in confusion."

"The ultimate victims," Lui wrote, "will be the people, who depend on quality in the courts."

Lui also predicted that the ruling could lead to "copycat suits by disgruntled lawyers and litigants" in other counties that offer extra

benefits.

Belote said the CJA now needs to step up its efforts to come up with a legislative solution.

"We've been talking to people ... about how you might craft a bill or a legislative solution," he said, "and actually we were kind of

getting down to a draft that might be workable and we'd hoped to have that in early January. But we are going to have to move

this thing as quick as possible."

Belote acknowledged that pushing for perks during a recession and budget crisis is a daunting task, but was still optimistic.

"I would say you could not have picked a more challenging time to discuss any issue that relates to money," he said. "But I would

say the legislators we have talked to, in general, have expressed a willingness to consider" the issue.

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL --CIVIL

Den

nis

Ettl

in, I

n P

ropr

ia P

erso

na

SERVICE LIST

Defendant: Kevin M. McCormick Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura, California 93002

Plaintiff, In Pro Per Daniel Cooper 1836 10th Street #B Santa Monica, CA 90404 310-562-7668 Interested Parties: Commission On Judicial Performance 500 W. Temple Street, Suite 505 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Kamala Harris, California Attorney General California Department Of Justice Attn: Public Inquiry Unit PO Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

Commission On Judicial Performance 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 14400 San Francisco, CA 94102 Kamala Harris, California Attorney General California Department Of Justice Ronald Reagan Building 300 So. Spring Street, 3rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90013

Thomas O'Brien, U.S. Attorney 1200 U.S. Courthouse 312 North Spring Street Los Angeles CA 90012 Supreme Court of California 350 Mc Alister St. San Francisco, CA 94102-4797 Judicial Watch, Inc. 501 School St, SW Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20024

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!PROOF OF SERVICE

8!

PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

B241184 / SC113064 PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: DANIEL COOPER, an Individual RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Elia Weinbach, an Individual

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of he county where the service took place. My residence or business address is

2601 E. Victoria St. #108 Rancho Dominguez, CA 90220

On MARCH 31, 2013, I served on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST with type and address) the following documents



Executed on MARCH 31, 2013 at Los Angeles, California,

________________________________

FRED SOTTILE

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!PROOF OF SERVICE

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SERVICE LIST Mail Service -- Defendant: Kevin M. McCormick Benton, Orr, Duval and Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura, California 93002

!

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b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno

Documents

Transcript of b241184 Appendix Cooper Rev6 Wtoc Wpgno